華嚴一乘教義分齊章 4

English (machine translation) 4

Language: English

4.1

Composed by the Śramaṇa Fazang of the Great Jianfu Monastery of the Tang.

Tenth, the divisions of doctrine and principle has four gates: (1) the meaning of identity and difference among the three natures; (2) the six-meaning dharma of the causal approach of dependent origination; (3) the unobstructed dharma of the ten profundities of dependent origination; (4) the meaning of the perfect fusion of the six characteristics.

4.3

First, the explanation of the identity and difference among the three natures has two gates: first explaining separately, and second explaining generally.

4.4

Within the separate [explanation] there are also two parts: first stating directly, and second resolving [questions].

4.5

In the former, each of the three natures has two meanings. The two meanings in the real [nature] are: first, the meaning of unchanging; second, the meaning of according with conditions. The two meanings in the other-dependent [nature] are: first, the meaning of appearing to exist; second, the meaning of being without self-nature. The two meanings in the imagined [nature] are: first, the meaning of existing in sentiment; second, the meaning of nonexistence in principle. Because the real is unchanging, the other-dependent is without self-nature, and the imagined is nonexistent in principle—due to these three meanings, the three natures are of one single limit, identical and without difference; this is not destroying the branches while being eternally the root. A sūtra states: "Sentient beings are themselves nirvāṇa, and do not extinguish again." Furthermore, in terms of suchness according with conditions, the other-dependent appearing to exist, and the imagined existing in sentiment—due to these three meanings they are also without difference; this is not moving the root while being eternally the branches. A sūtra states: "The dharma body transmigrates through the five paths, and is named sentient beings." That is, due to these three meanings and the previous three meanings, this is the gate of non-oneness; therefore, the real embraces the false branches, and the false penetrates to the real source; nature and characteristics thoroughly fuse, without hindrance or obstruction. Question: "How could the other-dependent's appearing to exist and so forth be identical to the imagined's existing in sentiment?" Answer: "Due to two meanings, there is no difference: (1) Because that imagined [nature] grasps what appears as real, there is no different dharma. (2) If separated from what is imagined, the appearance does not arise. One should know that according with conditions in the real is also thus, because without what is imagined, there is no according with conditions." Question: "How can each of the three natures have two meanings without mutually contradicting?" Answer: "Because these two meanings do not have different natures. What is this non-difference? Take, for example, the consummate [nature]: although it accords with conditions to form the defiled and pure, it never loses its own pure nature; precisely because it does not lose its own pure nature, it can accord with conditions to form the defiled and pure. It is like a bright mirror reflecting the defiled and pure: although it reflects the defiled and pure, it never loses the brightness and purity of the mirror; precisely because it does not lose the brightness and purity of the mirror, it is able to reflect the forms of defiled and pure. From the reflection of defiled and pure one knows the brightness and purity of the mirror; from the brightness and purity of the mirror one knows the reflection of defiled and pure. Therefore, the two meanings are only one single nature: although it reflects pure dharmas, it does not increase the brightness of the mirror; although it reflects defiled dharmas, it does not stain the purity of the mirror. Not only does it not stain it, but precisely because of this, it conversely reveals the brightness and purity of the mirror. One should know that the principle of suchness is also thus: not only does it form the defiled and pure without moving its pure nature, but also precisely by forming the defiled and pure does it reveal its pure nature; not only does it clarify the pure nature without destroying the defiled and pure, but also precisely because of its pure nature does it form the defiled and pure. Therefore, the two meanings completely embrace each other, one nature without duality; how could they contradict each other? In the other-dependent, although it is manifested as appearing to exist through causes and conditions, yet this apparent existence necessarily lacks self-nature, because all things born from conditions lack self-nature. If it were not without self-nature, it would not rely on conditions. Because it would not rely on conditions, it would not be an apparent existence. If apparent existence is established, it must proceed from multiple conditions; because it proceeds from multiple conditions, it necessarily lacks self-nature. Therefore, due to lacking self-nature, apparent existence is accomplished; because apparent existence is accomplished, it lacks self-nature. Thus the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa states: 'Contemplate all dharmas as arising from causes and conditions; arising from causes and conditions, they are without self-nature; because they are without self-nature, they are ultimately empty. That which is ultimately empty is named the prajñāpāramitā.' This shows that due to condition-arising, lack of self-nature is revealed. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: 'Because there is the meaning of emptiness, all dharmas are able to be accomplished'; this shows that due to lack of self-nature, condition-arising is clarified. The Nirvāṇa-sūtra states: 'Because of causes and conditions there is existence; because of lack of self-nature there is emptiness.' This means that lack of self-nature is causes and conditions, and causes and conditions are lack of self-nature; it is the non-dual Dharma gate. Not only do the two meanings not contradict each other in nature, but they also completely embrace each other, being ultimately non-dual. In the imagined nature, although it is presented as existing in sentiment in accordance with grasping, yet in principle it is ultimately nonexistent, because it falsely calculates existence where there is none. Just like falsely calculating a ghost on a tree stump, yet the ghost is ultimately nonexistent on the wood; if the ghost were not nonexistent on that wood, it could not be named falsely calculating a ghost, because existing on the wood would not be due to calculation. Now since it is falsely calculated, we clearly know it is nonexistent in principle; because it is nonexistent in principle, false calculation is accomplished; because false calculation is accomplished, only then do we know it is nonexistent in principle. Therefore there is no duality, but only one single nature; one should know that the principle of the imagined is also thus." The above direct clarification is concluded.

4.6

Second, the resolution through questions and answers contains three gates: first, warding off differentiated attachments; second, demonstrating the fault of attachment; third, revealing the meaning.

4.7

Regarding the first gate, warding off attachments: Question: "Is suchness existent?" Answer: "No, because it accords with conditions." Question: "Is suchness nonexistent?" Answer: "No, because it is unchanging." Question: "Is it both existent and nonexistent?" Answer: "No, because it lacks dual natures." Question: "Is it neither existent nor nonexistent?" Answer: "No, because it is endowed with virtues." Further question: "Is it existent?" Answer: "No, because it is unchanging. Why? Because being unchanging, it is revealed in accordance with conditions." Question: "Is it nonexistent?" Answer: "No, because it accords with conditions. Why? Because in according with conditions, it is unchanging and permanently abiding." The remaining two propositions can be understood by extension. Further question: "Is it existent?" Answer: "No, because it is free from what is predicated." The lower three propositions follow this pattern. Further question: "Is it existent?" Answer: "No, because it is empty suchness." Question: "Is it nonexistent?" Answer: "No, because it is non-empty suchness." Question: "Is it both existent and nonexistent?" Answer: "No, because it is free from contradiction." Question: "Is it neither existent nor nonexistent?" Answer: "No, because it is free from conceptual proliferation." Further question: "Is it existent?" Answer: "No, because it is free from false thoughts." Question: "Is it nonexistent?" Answer: "No, because it is the sphere of activity of noble gnosis." The remaining propositions are modeled on this.

4.8

Regarding the other-dependent nature: Question: "Is the other-dependent existent?" Answer: "No, because it is dependently originated and without nature." Question: "Is the other-dependent nonexistent?" Answer: "No, because it is dependent origination that lacks a nature." Question: "Is it both existent and nonexistent?" Answer: "No, because it lacks a dual nature." Question: "Is it neither existent nor nonexistent?" Answer: "No, because it possesses multiple approaches of meaning." Again, question: "Is it existent?" Answer: "No, because of dependent origination. Why is that? Because all dependent originations are without nature." Question: "Is it nonexistent?" Answer: "No, because it is without nature. Why is that? Because being without nature, it constitutes dependent origination." The remaining two phrases can be understood [accordingly]. Furthermore, because dependent origination [transcends] the four phrases, and also because being without nature it is also free from the four phrases, all of this can be understood. Again, question: "Is the other-dependent existent?" Answer: "No, because it is eliminated according to contemplation." Question: "Is it nonexistent?" Answer: "No, because it can manifest non-arising." The lower two phrases can be understood because they are free from contradiction and free from conceptual proliferation. Again, question: "Is it existent?" Answer: "No, because it is different from the fully perfected, and also in terms of the parikalpita fraction, and also because it is free from what is referred to [by words]." Question: "Is it nonexistent?" Answer: "No, because it is different from the imagined, because of the fully perfected fraction, and also because it is an object of gnosis." The remaining phrases correspond to this.

4.9

Regarding the imagined [nature]: Question: "Is the imagined existent?" Answer: "No, because it does not exist in principle." Question: "Is it nonexistent?" Answer: "No, because it exists in subjective sentiment." Question: "Is it both existent and nonexistent?" Answer: "No, because it lacks a dual nature." Question: "Is it neither existent nor nonexistent?" Answer: "No, because it is the nature of what is grasped." Again, question: "Is it existent?" Answer: "No, because it lacks reason." Question: "Is it nonexistent?" Answer: "No, because it lacks reason." The remaining phrases are to be understood by analogy. Again, question: "Is it existent?" "No, because it is clung to as existent." Again, question: "Is it nonexistent?" "No, because it is clung to as existent." Again: "Is it both existent and nonexistent?" "No, because it is clung to as existent." Again: "Is it neither existent nor nonexistent?" "No, because it is constituted by clinging." Again: "Is it existent?" "No, because it is markless." Again: "Is it nonexistent?" "No, because it is the cognitive object of markless contemplation." The remaining phrases correspond to this. Again: "Is it existent?" "No, because it has no substance." Again: "Is it nonexistent?" "No, because it can obscure the true." The remaining phrases correspond to this.

4.10

Second, demonstrating the faults of clinging: if one grasps that true suchness is exclusively existent, there are two faults:

4.11

First, the fault of permanence: that is, because it would not accord with conditions, would not be hidden when in defilement, and would not depend on a revealing cause, one falls into the fault of permanence. Question: "The sacred teachings universally state that true suchness is quiescently permanent. Since it does not accord with conditions, how could this be a fault?" Answer: "When the noble ones speak of true suchness as quiescent, this means that when it accords with conditions to form the defiled and pure, it constantly acts as the defiled and pure without losing its own substance; this is precisely the permanence that is not distinct from impermanence, called inconceivable permanence. It does not mean that it does not produce phenomena as quiescent according to what subjective sentiment asserts. If one says that it is quiescent by not producing phenomena, this is grasped by subjective sentiment, and thus loses true permanence. Because that true permanence is the permanence that is not distinct from impermanence, and the permanence that is not distinct from impermanence transcends subjective sentiment, it is therefore called true permanence. Therefore the sūtra says: 'Being undefiled yet defiled explains that the permanent acts as the impermanent; being defiled yet undefiled explains that when acting as the impermanent it does not lose permanence.'" Question: "Since the teaching speaks of true suchness as quiescently permanent with respect to the permanence that is not distinct from impermanence, why does it not speak of true suchness as impermanent with respect to the impermanence that is not distinct from permanence?" Answer: "The teaching also states this meaning. Thus the sūtra says: 'The tathāgatagarbha undergoes suffering and pleasure, together with causes, whether arising or ceasing.' The treatise says: 'The mind pure by nature, stirred by the wind of ignorance, becomes a defiled mind,' and so forth. By these teachings and reasonings, one knows that true suchness is the impermanence that is not distinct from permanence, and therefore accords with conditions to conceal its substance, which is nonexistence." Question: "True suchness is an unproduced and unceasing phenomenon; since it is called permanent because it is not distinct from the permanence of impermanence, and can be called impermanent because it is not distinct from the impermanence of permanence, could it also be that the other-dependent, as an arising and ceasing phenomenon, should also possess the meaning of impermanence not distinct from permanence and permanence not distinct from impermanence?" Answer: "It also possesses them. How so? Because all dependently originated impermanent phenomena are precisely without self-nature, only then does dependent origination occur; therefore they attain impermanence without being distinct from the nature of permanence. Thus the sūtra says: 'Neither arising nor ceasing is the meaning of impermanence'—this is achieving impermanence without being distinct from permanence. Furthermore, because all dependent originations are precisely without self-nature, and it is not by extinguishing dependent origination that one speaks of lack of nature, this is then the permanence that is not distinct from impermanence. Therefore the sūtra says: 'Form is emptiness; it is not that the extinction of form is emptiness.' It also says: 'Sentient beings are nirvāṇa; they do not undergo further extinction,' and so forth. The two meanings here correspond to the two meanings in the true, as can be understood. This is the dual fusion of the ultimate and conventional, being two yet non-dual. Hence the Dazhidulun says: 'The cognitive obstacle is extremely blind and dark, meaning the separate grasping of the ultimate and conventional.' This is what it refers to. Therefore, if one clings to true suchness as quiescently permanent according to what subjective sentiment asserts, then it would not accord with conditions to conceal its own substance, and would not rely on a revealing cause, thus falling into the fault of permanence. Furthermore, if it does not accord with conditions to form the defiled and pure, then the phenomena of defilement and purity would have nothing to rely upon; and for phenomena to exist without reliance also falls into permanence, because defiled and pure phenomena are all without self-nature and depend on the true to be established."

4.12

Second, the fault of annihilation: existence according to subjective sentiment is precisely not true existence; because it is not true existence, it is annihilationist existence. Furthermore, if it were [substantially] existent, it would not accord with defilement and purity; since defiled and pure phenomena are already without self-nature, and the true also does not accord with them, phenomena cannot exist, which is also annihilation.

4.13

Second, clinging to nonexistence also has two faults: First, the fault of permanence: if there were no true suchness, saṃsāra would have nothing to rely upon; for phenomena to exist without reliance is precisely permanence. Furthermore, without true suchness, noble gnosis would have no cause, which is also permanence. Furthermore, having nothing to rely upon, phenomena cannot exist, which is precisely annihilation. In addition, clinging to true suchness as nonexistent is also annihilation.

4.14

Third, clinging to both existence and nonexistence possesses all the above faults: true suchness is non-dual, yet one doubly grasps at existence and nonexistence; the existence and nonexistence grasped by the mind do not correspond to the true, and losing that true principle is therefore annihilation. If one says that what is grasped by that [mind] is taken to be the true, since the true would exist without principle, this is permanence.

4.15

Fourth, regarding neither existence nor nonexistence: conceptual proliferation regarding the true is deluded sentiment, and therefore losing the true principle is annihilation. Proliferating the existence of the true and asserting it to be the true, since in principle there is no such true, is permanence.

4.16

Second, within the other-dependent nature, if one clings to existence, there are also two faults: First, the fault of permanence: it would mean that it already has a substance and does not depend on conditions; for a phenomenon to exist without conditions is precisely permanence. Furthermore, due to clinging to existence it would not depend on conditions; because it does not depend on conditions, phenomena cannot exist, which is precisely annihilation. Question: "If stating that the other-dependent nature has the meaning of existence entails faults, why do the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and other texts speak of the other-dependent nature as existent?" Answer: "When the noble ones speak of the other-dependent as existent, this is precisely the existence that is not distinct from emptiness. Why is that? Because it lacks substantial nature from the assembly of conditions, and within each individual condition there is no agent; precisely because conditions are without an agent, dependent origination is attained. Therefore, existence that is non-existence is called other-dependent existence. This is how the noble ones establish all phenomena without moving from the true limit. If one asserts that the other-dependent exists according to words, then dependent origination would have a nature. If conditions had a nature, they would not depend on one another; because they would not depend on one another, the other-dependent would be destroyed. The destruction of the other-dependent is truly caused by clinging to existence. Therefore, your mind feared falling into empty annihilation and made strenuous efforts to establish existence, not realizing that through failing to comprehend that phenomena arising from conditions are without self-nature, one thereby destroys dependent origination, falls into empty nonexistence, and annihilates the other-dependent."

4.17

Second, if one clings to nonexistence, there are also two faults: if one asserts that the other-dependent is a nonexistent phenomenon, then conditions have nothing to originate; because there is nothing to originate, phenomena cannot exist, which is precisely annihilation. Question: "If stating that conditioned arising is empty and nonexistent thereby falls into annihilation, why do the Madhyamakaśāstra and other texts broadly explain conditioned arising as ultimate emptiness?" Answer: "When the noble ones speak of conditioned arising as empty, this is precisely the emptiness that is not distinct from existence. Why is that? Because only when phenomena arise from conditions does one speak of the lack of nature; therefore, only when there is conditioned arising can it be empty. If it were not so, there would be no cause for conditioned arising; on what basis could one speak of emptiness? Therefore, the emptiness that is not distinct from existence is called the emptiness of conditioned arising. This is the noble ones speaking of the phenomenon of true reality without moving from conditioned arising. If one asserts that conditioned arising is empty according to words, then there would be no conditioned arising; because there is no conditioned arising, there would be no principle of emptiness. The absence of the principle of emptiness is truly caused by clinging to emptiness. Therefore, your mind feared falling into the view of existence and vigorously established emptiness, not realizing that through failing to comprehend the conditioned arising of non-nature, one thereby loses nature-emptiness. Because one loses nature-emptiness, one falls back into sentiment, into pernicious emptiness." Question: "If the other-dependent possesses these two meanings, and former treatise masters each set forth one meaning, harmoniously integrating the other-dependent without mutual contradiction, why did later treatise masters, such as Bhāviveka and others, each cling to one meaning and refute each other?" Answer: "This is actually mutual completion, not mutual refutation. How so? Because the capacities of sentient beings in the final age gradually grew dull, upon hearing it said that the other-dependent has the meaning of existence, they did not comprehend that it is the existence not distinct from emptiness, and so clung to it as existence according to what is asserted. Therefore, Bhāviveka and others refuted the existence of the other-dependent to bring it to nonexistence; only when reaching ultimate nonexistence does one attain that other-dependent existence. If one does not reach this thorough nature-emptiness, then other-dependent existence cannot be established; therefore, in order to establish existence, they refuted existence. Furthermore, those sentient beings, hearing that the other-dependent is ultimately nature-empty, did not comprehend that it is the emptiness not distinct from existence, and so clung to it as emptiness according to what is asserted. Therefore, Dharmapāla and others refuted that asserted emptiness in order to preserve illusory existence; only when illusory existence is established does one attain that emptiness not distinct from existence. Because if existence is extinguished, it is not true emptiness; therefore, in order to establish emptiness, they refuted emptiness. Because form is emptiness, Bhāviveka's meaning is established; because emptiness is form, Dharmapāla's meaning is preserved. The two meanings fuse and dissolve, completely subsuming the entire substance. If later treatise masters had not had the two principles mutually penetrate and fully displace one another, there would be no way to reveal the profound phenomenon of the other-dependent nature of dependent origination; therefore, mutual refutation conversely brings about mutual completion. Hence, clinging to nonexistence according to subjective sentiment is the fault of annihilation. Furthermore, if one states that a nonexistent phenomenon is the other-dependent, a nonexistent phenomenon is not a condition; and a phenomenon that is not a condition falls into permanence."

4.18

Third, regarding both existence and nonexistence: it possesses all the above faults, which can be understood by analogy. Question: "According to what was said above, grasping biasedly at either existence or nonexistence of the other-dependent nature is inadmissible. Grasping both existence and nonexistence should accord with reason. How is it that [grasping] both existence [and nonexistence] possesses the above faults?" Answer: "Although within the other-dependent nature both principles of existence and nonexistence are present, yet their entire substance mutually penetrates, and emptiness and existence are completely fused. But when both existence and nonexistence are grasped as conceived [by ordinary mind], it becomes a contradiction and possesses all the above faults."

4.19

Fourth, to hold that [dependent origination] is neither existent nor nonexistent is conceptual proliferation regarding dependent origination, and is likewise irrational. Why? Because the grasper's conceptualization between existence and nonexistence has failed to be established, they mentally posit 'neither existent nor nonexistent' as the correct principle. Since this is already irrational, it also incurs the aforementioned faults. This can be understood by analogy.

4.20

Third, regarding the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhāva): if one imagines what is grasped to be existent, there are two faults: if what is grasped were existent, it should not be empty when illuminated by holy wisdom, which would be [the fault of] permanence; and if one deludedly clings to the imagined as existent in principle, that forfeits its emotional existence, which is the fault of annihilation. Second, if one clings to the imagined as mentally nonexistent, then ordinary beings in their delusion and error would not differ from sages, which is [the fault of] permanence; furthermore, there would be no ordinary beings, which is [the fault of] annihilation. Moreover, since there would be no delusion, there would also be no awakening; and because there is no awakening, there would be no sages, which is also [the fault of] annihilation. Third, regarding 'both existent and nonexistent': since the nature is non-dual, to assert both existence and nonexistence is contradictory, and thus incurs the aforementioned faults. Fourth, regarding 'neither existent nor nonexistent': this conceptual proliferation about the imagined nature also incurs the aforementioned faults, which may be understood by analogy. The second section, establishing the faults of attachment, is completed.

4.21

Third, in revealing its meaning: True suchness has the meaning of existence, because it is the support for delusion and awakening; furthermore, because of the meaning of non-emptiness and because it is indestructible, the rest being as stated above. True suchness also has the meaning of emptiness, because it is free of characteristics, accords with conditions, and opposes defilement, the rest likewise being as above. True suchness also has the meaning of both existence and nonexistence, because it possesses virtues, is free in opposing and conforming, and is completely fused. It also has the meaning of neither existence nor nonexistence, because the two are non-dual and cannot be grasped definitively; other converse explanations should be understood by analogy with the above. Second, other-dependence has the meaning of existence, because it is accomplished through conditions and lacks self-nature, the rest being understood by analogy with the preceding; other-dependence has the meaning of nonexistence, because it is accomplished through conditions and lacks self-nature, likewise understood as before; other-dependence has the meaning of both existence and nonexistence, because it is accomplished through conditions and lacks self-nature, as before; other-dependence has the meaning of neither existence nor nonexistence, because the two are non-dual and neither one can be grasped alone, as before. Third, the imagined has existence, from the perspective of sentiment; the imagined has nonexistence, from the perspective of principle; the imagined is both existent and nonexistent, because it is what is grasped; the imagined is neither existent nor nonexistent, because it is what is grasped. The rest can be grasped by reflecting on the above. The detailed explanation of the three natures is completed above.

4.22

Second, in the general explanation: The three natures are of a single limit; raising one completely subsumes them all. The true and the deluded mutually interpenetrate, and the natures are unobstructed. As stated in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, citing the Questions of the Brāhmaṇa Sūtra: 'Based on what meaning did the World-Honoured One make this statement: "The Tathāgata sees neither saṃsāra nor nirvāṇa"? Within the other-dependent, the discriminated nature and the true nature are such that saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are supported without distinction. Why? This other-dependent nature, by virtue of one part which is discriminated, becomes saṃsāra; and by virtue of one part which is true, becomes nirvāṇa.' The commentary explains: 'The other-dependent nature is not saṃsāra, because by virtue of this nature becoming nirvāṇa through the true [part]. This nature is not nirvāṇa. Why? Because this nature, by virtue of one part which is discriminated, is saṃsāra. Therefore, one cannot definitively assert one part alone. If one sees one part, the nature of the other part is not different; therefore, he sees neither saṃsāra nor nirvāṇa.' Based on this intent, the Tathāgata answered the brāhmaṇa in this way. It also says: 'In the Abhidharma-sūtra, the World-Honoured One said that phenomena are of three kinds: first, the defiled portion; second, the pure portion; third, the defiled and pure portion. Based on what meaning did he speak of these three portions? Within the other-dependent nature, the discriminated nature is the defiled portion, the true nature is the pure portion, and the other-dependent nature is the defiled and pure portion; it is based on this meaning that he spoke of three portions.' The commentary explains: 'The Abhidharma-sūtra states that the discriminated nature has affliction as its nature, the true nature has the pure portion as its nature, and the other-dependent nature, having both portions, has the two natures as its nature. Thus it is said that phenomena are of three kinds: one with affliction as its portion, two with purity as its portion, and three with both phenomena as its portion; it is based on this meaning that this is said.' The above treatise passages further clarify that the true encompasses the extremes of delusion, so that nothing fails to match the true; delusion penetrates to the source of the true, so that its essence is completely quiescent. The true and the deluded mutually interpenetrate, the two portions are mutually fused, and unobstructed, totally include [each other]; this can be recognized upon reflection.

4.23

Second, the doctrine of the six meanings in the approach of the cause in dependent origination. In explaining this doctrine, there are six approaches of differentiation: first, explaining the characteristics; second, establishing [them]; third, permutations of propositions; fourth, opening and combining; fifth, fusion and subsumption; sixth, according to the teachings.

4.24

The first approach contains two parts: first, listing the names; next, explaining the characteristics.

4.25

First, listing the names: All causes possess six meanings: 1. empty, potent, and not dependent on conditions; 2. empty, potent, and dependent on conditions; 3. empty, impotent, and dependent on conditions; 4. existent, potent, and not dependent on conditions; 5. existent, potent, and dependent on conditions; 6. existent, impotent, and dependent on conditions.

4.26

Second, explaining the characteristics: The first is the meaning of momentary cessation. Why? Because through momentary cessation, it reveals the absence of self-nature, which is empty; because through this cessation, the effect-phenomenon can arise, which is potent; however, this passing away in cessation is not due to the power of conditions, hence it is said to be not dependent on conditions. The second is the meaning of co-existence. Why? Because it only exists by virtue of co-existing, which reveals that it does not inherently exist, which is the meaning of empty; being co-existent, it can accomplish existence, which is potent; being co-existent, it is not solitary, which is dependent on conditions. The third is the meaning of depending on multiple conditions. Why? Because lacking self-nature, it is empty; because the cause does not produce [on its own] while conditions produce, it is impotent; and precisely because of this meaning, it is dependent on conditions. The fourth is the meaning of determination. Why? Because its own kind does not alter, it has the meaning of existent; because it can produce an effect without itself altering, it has the meaning of potent; however, this non-alteration is not due to the power of conditions, hence it has the meaning of not dependent on conditions. The fifth is the meaning of drawing forth its own effect. Why? Because drawing forth its own present effect has the meaning of potent; although it arises only upon waiting for conditions, it does not produce the effect of the conditions, which has the meaning of potent; and precisely because of this, it has the meaning of dependent on conditions. The sixth is the meaning of continually following and turning. Why? Because following others, it cannot be nonexistent; and being unable to oppose conditions, it has no potent functioning, and precisely because of this, it is dependent on conditions. Therefore, to reveal these six meanings, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha speaks in verse: / 'Momentary cessation, co-existence, / Continually following and turning should be known; / Determination, depending on multiple conditions, / And being capable of drawing forth only its own effect.'

4.27

Second, establishing [them]: Question: 'Why are six meanings definitively posited, neither increasing to seven nor decreasing to five?' Answer: 'Because when the direct cause is contrasted with conditions, there are only three meanings: first, the cause is potent and does not depend on conditions, because it produces the whole entity without being mixed with the power of conditions; second, the cause is potent and depends on conditions, because they mutually assist and initiate [the result]; third, the cause is impotent and depends on conditions, because it does not act at all, the cause reverting to the conditions. Furthermore, due to the above three meanings, within the cause there are each two meanings: namely, the meaning of emptiness and the meaning of existence. Since each of the two approaches has three meanings, there are only six, neither increasing nor decreasing.' Question: 'Why is a fourth proposition, the meaning of being impotent and not dependent on conditions, not established?' Answer: 'Because that is not the meaning of a cause, it is not established, as can be seen upon reflection.' Question: 'Regarding

4.28

Third, the examination of the permutations of propositions: There are two kinds: first, in terms of substance; second, in terms of function. First, in terms of the existence and nonexistence of substance, there are four propositions: 1. existence, namely the meaning of determination; 2. nonexistence, namely the meaning of momentary cessation; 3. both existence and nonexistence, namely the non-dual combination of drawing forth its own effect and co-existence; 4. neither existence nor nonexistence, namely the non-dual combination of continually following and turning and depending on multiple conditions. In terms of function, the four propositions are: because of the non-duality of combining continually following and turning with depending on multiple conditions, it is not self-produced; because of the non-duality of combining momentary cessation with determination, it is not produced from another; because of the non-duality of combining co-existence with drawing forth its own effect, it is not produced from both; because the meaning of cause is accomplished only by possessing the three propositions that combine the six meanings, it is not produced without a cause. Thus, by means of these six meanings, cause and condition totally appropriate each other, revealing the sublime virtue of dependent origination. Therefore, the Daśabhūmika-śāstra states: 'The cause does not produce, because conditions produce; conditions do not produce, because its own cause produces; they do not produce jointly, because there is no knower, and at the time of acting there is no abiding; it is not without cause, because production exists in conformity.' Furthermore, the Abhidharmasamuccaya states: 'Because its own seed exists, it is not produced from another; because it depends on multiple conditions, it is not self-produced; because it is devoid of agency, it is not produced jointly; because it has efficacy, it is not produced without cause.' Question: 'What is the distinction between these six meanings and the eight negations?' Answer: 'The eight negations are based on refutation, while the six meanings are based on affirmation. Furthermore, the eight negations proceed by overturning deluded sentiments so that the principle reveals itself; the six meanings proceed by revealing the principle so that deluded sentiments perish of themselves. There is this complementary relationship.'

4.29

Fourth, opening and combining: It may be taken as solely one in terms of substance, because a cause has no dual substance. Or it may be divided into two in terms of meaning, namely emptiness and existence, because it lacks self-nature and because dependent origination is manifest. Or it may be divided into three in terms of function: 1. potent and not dependent on conditions; 2. potent and dependent on conditions; 3. impotent and dependent on conditions. The first is entirely potent, the last is entirely impotent, and the middle is both potent and impotent. Because the fourth proposition—impotent and not dependent on conditions—is not a cause, it is not discussed, and hence there are only three propositions. Or they may be divided into six, by opening the three propositions into the two approaches [of emptiness and existence], as explained before. Or they may be divided into nine, because any one of the above three meanings possesses all three. Why? Because if there were no potency, there would be no impotency; therefore, each one possesses the three, thus there are nine. Or they may be divided into twelve, because in the above six meanings, the two approaches of emptiness and existence are inseparable: what accords with emptiness is immediately existence, and what accords with existence is immediately emptiness. Existence being empty has six, and emptiness being existent also has six, thus there are twelve. Or they may be divided into eighteen, because within each of the above six meanings there are three meanings: first, existence and nonexistence of substance; second, presence and absence of power; third, in terms of depending on conditions or not depending on conditions; three times six makes eighteen. Or they may be divided into thirty-six, because within the above six meanings, any one possesses all six. Why? Because if one were absent, all the rest would be absent. The other approaches can be understood by analogy through reflection.

4.30

Fifth, fusion and integration: these six meanings are harmoniously integrated through the six characteristics. Integrating the six meanings into a single cause is the universal characteristic. Unfolding the single cause into the six meanings is the particular characteristic. That all six meanings are equally named 'cause' is the identical characteristic. That the six meanings do not know one another is the distinct characteristic. That the cause and so forth are accomplished through these six meanings is the integrating characteristic. That the six meanings each abide in their own status is the disintegrating characteristic. Question: 'What is the division between the six characteristics and the six meanings?' Answer: 'The six meanings are based on the self-nature of dependent origination; the six characteristics are based on the approaches of meaning of dependent origination. Bringing the entity of phenomena into the approaches of meaning creates distinctions. If one enters the four propositions with the six meanings to reveal the right and discard the wrong, it accords with the Three Vehicles; if one enters the six characteristics to reveal inherent virtues, it accords with the One Vehicle. Therefore, both the four propositions and the six characteristics are upāyas for entering the Dharma.'

4.31

Sixth, distinguishing according to teachings: in the Hīnayāna, the causal marks of grasping at dharmas possess neither the name nor the meaning of these six meanings. In the Three Vehicles, regarding the dharmas of the ālayavijñāna and the tathāgatagarbha, the cause of selflessness has the names and meanings of the six meanings, but the master and companion are not yet complete. In the complete cause of Samantabhadra in the One Vehicle, master and companion are fully complete, and boundless dependent origination is finally ultimate. Furthermore, through the meanings of emptiness and existence, there is the approach of mutual identity; through the meanings of having power and lacking power, there is the approach of mutual interpenetration; through the meanings of depending on conditions and not depending on conditions, there is the approach of identical essence and different essence. Through having these approaches of meaning, the matter of a pore containing an ocean of kṣetras is attained; contemplate this and it can be understood.

4.32

Three: The meaning of the unhindered dharma-gate of the ten mysteries of dependent origination. Dependent origination of the dharma-realm is utterly unimpeded and boundless. Now, it is briefly subsumed into two essential approaches: first, explaining the meaning of the ultimate fruition-realization, which is the own-realm of the ten buddhas; second, explaining the doctrine according to the cause in accordance with conditions, which is the realm of Samantabhadra.

4.33

Regarding the first meaning, it is completely interfused and unimpeded, one is all and all is one, and its form and marks cannot be spoken of. Such matters as the ocean of lands in the ultimate fruition aspect and the interfused meaning of the own-bodies of the ten buddhas in the Avataṃsaka-sūtra are precisely this. Without discussing Indra or the subtle and so forth, this corresponds to the ineffable meaning. Why? Because it does not correspond to the verbal teaching. When the Daśabhūmika-śāstra says, 'The causal aspect can be spoken of; the fruition aspect cannot be spoken of,' it refers precisely to this matter. Question: 'If the meaning is like this, why does the sūtra speak of fruitions such as the Chapter on the Inconceivable Qualities of the Buddha?' Answer: 'This meaning of fruition is spoken in contrast to conditions to accomplish the cause; hence this fruition is spoken of, not that ultimate, unimpeded fruition. Why is this so? Because it is spoken in the same assembly as the causal stage, one knows it is spoken merely in contrast.'

4.34

Regarding the second meaning, there are two parts: first, a brief indication by means of a metaphor; second, a detailed exposition in terms of dharmas.

4.35

First, the indication by metaphor: like the method of counting ten coins. The reason ten are spoken of is to correspond to the round number and reveal boundlessness. In this, there are two: first, different essence; second, identical essence. The reason there are these two approaches is that within all approaches to dependent origination there are two meanings: first, the meaning of not depending on one another, which means possessing virtues by oneself, as in not depending on conditions in the cause; second, the meaning of depending on one another, as in depending on conditions. The former is identical essence; the latter is different essence. Within different essence there are two approaches: first, mutual identity; second, mutual interpenetration. The reason there are these two approaches is that all dependently originated dharmas possess two meanings: first, the meaning of emptiness and existence, which regards the self-essence; second, the meaning of power and powerlessness, which regards power and function. Through the first meaning, mutual identity is attained; through the second meaning, mutual interpenetration is attained. In the first, when the self exists, the other is necessarily absent, so the other is identical with the self. Why? Because the other lacks self-nature and is made by the self. Second, when the self is empty, the other necessarily exists by itself, so the self is identical with the other. Why? Because the self lacks self-nature and is made by using the other. Since two existences and two empties do not coexist, there is none that is not mutually identical; because existence and non-existence, and non-existence and existence, are non-dual, therefore they are always mutually identical. If it were not so, dependent origination would not be established, and there would be faults such as having self-nature. Contemplate this and it can be seen. Second, in explaining power and function, because the self has full power, it can subsume the other; because the other is completely powerless, it can enter into the self. When the other has power and the self is powerless (the reverse of above, which can be understood), because it is not based on the self-essence, it is not mutual identity; because power and function thoroughly interpenetrate, it constitutes mutual interpenetration. Moreover, because two having power and two lacking power do not coexist, there is none that does not mutually interpenetrate; because having power and lacking power, and lacking power and having power, are non-dual, therefore they always mutually interpenetrate. Furthermore, taking the essence with function, there is no separate essence, so it is solely mutual interpenetration; taking the function with essence, there is no separate function, so it is solely mutual identity. This should be inferred in accordance with the six meanings of cause. Among them, first explain mutual interpenetration. First, in the approach of counting upward to ten: one is the base number. Why? Because it is accomplished through conditions. Up to ten: ten within one. Why? Because if there were no one, ten would not be accomplished; one has full power, so it subsumes ten, yet ten is not one. The other nine approaches are also like this; each and every one has ten, as can be known by following this model. In counting downward, there are also ten approaches: first, ten subsumes one. Why? Because it is accomplished through conditions; that is, if there were no ten, one would not be accomplished, so one is completely powerless and returns to ten, yet one is not ten. The rest are modeled likewise. In this way, both the base and derivative approaches are fully endowed with ten approaches; one can contemplate and infer this in each of the other coins. This is spoken from the mutual perspective of different approaches. Question: 'Since you say "one", how can there be ten within one?' Answer: 'In the great dhāraṇī-dharma of dependent origination, if there is no one, then all is not accomplished; thus it is definitely known to be like this. What does this mean? What is called "one" is not a one of self-nature; because it is accomplished through conditions, the ten within one is a conditionally accomplished one. If it were not so, self-nature would lack dependent origination and could not be called "one". Up to ten, none is a ten of self-nature, because of conditionally accomplished existence. Therefore, that there is one within ten is a conditionally accomplished ten that lacks nature. If it were not so, self-nature would lack dependent origination and would not be called ten. Therefore, all dependent origination lacks self-nature. Why? Because if any single condition is removed, all is not accomplished; therefore, only when one contains the many can it be called a dependently originated one.' Question: 'If removing a single condition means it is not accomplished, then this lacks nature. If it lacks self-nature, how can the dependent origination of one and many be accomplished?' Answer: 'Precisely because of lacking nature, the dependent origination of one and many can be accomplished. Why? Because this dependent origination is the real virtue of the dharma-realm, and the realm of Samantabhadra possesses virtues with freedom and without obstruction. As the Avataṃsaka says: "Bodhisattvas skillfully contemplate the dharma of dependent origination; within one dharma they understand many dharmas, and within many dharmas they understand one dharma." Therefore, one should know that ten in one and one in ten accommodate each other without obstruction, yet they are not mutually identical. Since one approach is fully endowed with ten meanings, clearly one approach contains boundless meanings, and the other approaches are also like this.' Question: 'Does one approach subsume ten completely or not?' Answer: 'Completely and not completely. Why? Because ten is in one, it is completely; because one is in ten, it is not completely. Guard against the four propositions; it is not revealing virtue, etc. Inferring it, this can be understood. In each of the various distinct approaches, the model is like this; the profound principle of dependent origination should be known in this way.' The first approach is concluded.

4.36

In the initial approach of different essence, regarding the second meaning of identity: here there are two approaches: first, going upward; second, coming downward.

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華嚴一乘教義分齊章 — Classical Chinese