Establishment of Brahman 3.71

3.71

atha pramāṇāntarasaṃbhave 'pi yadi codanāprāmāṇyaṃ na vyāhanyate, ko 'rthaḥ pramāṇāntaranirākaraṇena? dharmatattvajñānam /
pramāṇāntarasaṃbhave hi sarvajñābhimatabuddhādyupadiṣṭo 'pi dharmaḥ pratīyeta tatra na dharmatattvamavadhāritaṃ syāt /
tadavadhāraṇārthaścāyaṃ yatnaḥ /
codanāprāmāṇyamapi tadarthaṃ mṛgyate, nādṛṣṭāya /
athavā tadvirodhāccodanāyā bādhaḥ syāt, saṃśayo vā tulyabalatve, tena tasyāsaṃbhavaḥ pratipādyate /
na tu tatsaṃbhavātsāpekṣateti /
nanu tadabhāvo 'pekṣaṇīyaḥ syāt /
kāmam /
na tu śabdaḥ pramāṇāntarāpekṣamarthaṃ pratipādayati /
yataḥ yadarthasya pratipādakam, na tu tadapekṣyate /
yadapekṣyate na tadarthaṃ pratipādayati /
na hi virodhipramāṇābhāvaḥ pratipattihetuḥ /
virodhasaṃbhavamātreṇa cāprāmāṇye pratyakṣādīnāmapi tatsyāt /
api ca virodhisaṃbhavādaprāmāṇyaṃ kāryaniṣṭhatve 'pyaparihāryam, kartavyatādvāreṇa bhūtārthapratipatteriṣṭatvāt /
tatra tu pramāṇāntaravirodhisaṃbhāvanāt /
bhūtārthasya pramāṇāntaraviṣayatvāttena kāryaniṣṭhatā varṇyate /
pramāṇāntaraviṣayatve kilānuvādatvātpramāṇāntarāpekṣamarthaṃ pratipādayati ---
pramāṇāntareṇāyamadhigataḥ ---
iti na svātantryeṇa /
kāryaniṣṭhatve tu svātantryeṇa, tasya pramāṇāntarāgocaratvāt /
uktena prakāreṇa na sāpekṣatvamiti ‘bhūtārthamapi sāpekṣaṃ nāto 'puruṣabuddhijam'iti suṣṭhūktam /

Now, even if another means of valid cognition were possible, if the validity of an injunctive statement were not contradicted, what would be the purpose of refuting other means of valid cognition? The purpose is knowledge of the reality of dharma.
For if another means of valid cognition were possible, dharma taught even by the Buddha and others regarded as omniscient would be accepted; in that case, the reality of dharma would not be ascertained.
And this effort is for the sake of ascertaining that.
The validity of an injunctive statement is also sought for that purpose, not for an unseen result.
Or, because of conflict with that [other means], the injunctive statement would be sublated, or there would be doubt if they are of equal strength; therefore its impossibility is demonstrated,
not, however, that dependence arises from the possibility of that [other means].
Objection: Its absence would have to be depended upon.
Granted;
nevertheless, verbal testimony does not make known an object dependent on another means of valid cognition.
For that which makes known an object is not depended upon,
and that which is depended upon does not make known the object;
for the absence of an opposing means of valid cognition is not the cause of apprehension.
And if there were invalidity merely by the possibility of opposition, that would be the case even for perception and the rest.
Moreover, invalidity due to the possibility of an opposing [means] would be unavoidable even on the view that [scripture] culminates in that which is to be done, because apprehension of an accomplished entity is accepted through the medium of what is to be done,
and in that case, the possibility of an opposing means of valid cognition is present.
Because an accomplished entity is an object of another means of valid cognition, culmination in that which is to be done is maintained [by you].
If it were an object of another means of valid cognition, it would indeed, being reiterative, make known an object dependent on another means of valid cognition—
'This has been understood by another means of valid cognition'—
and not independently.
On the view that it culminates in that which is to be done, however, it makes it known independently, because that is not in the scope of another means of valid cognition.
[Yet,] according to the manner explained, there is no dependence; hence it is well said: 'therefore, even [if speaking of] an accomplished entity, that which does not arise from human intellect is not dependent.'