Manava Dharmashastra 3.45.4

3.45.4

utpannaputrasya ca na dvitīyaputrotpādanaṃ vaidham | apatyamutpādayedityekatvavivakṣāyāṃ vidhyarthanivṛtteḥ | na ca gamanamevādṛṣṭārthatayā śakyaṃ vidhātum | saṃskāravidhitvādadhikāraśravaṇātkalpanāyāścāśakyatvāt, apatyotpattividhyākṣepādṛtau gamanasya | yadyātrartāvupeyāditi tadanṛtupratiṣedhārtham | tatrānuvādaḥ, paraṃ parisaṃkhyā | tatra hyarthāntaralakṣaṇāyā'pyarthavattā bhavati | evaṃ ca kṛtvā gautamīyenāvipratipattiḥ | evaṃ tatroktam | ‘ṛtāvupeyātsarvatra vā pratiṣiddhavarjam’ ( a0 5 sū0 1-2) iti | ‘sarvatra ve’tyeṣa vikalpaḥ kāmacārātnujñānārthaḥ | na punaḥ sarvadartāvanṛtau ca niyamopapattiḥ | yadi ca pūrvatrartāvupeyāditi niyamaḥ, ‘sarvatra ve’tyatrāpi sa evopeyādityanuprayujyamānaśabdo niyamārthaḥ prāpnoti ekaprakramatvāt, nahi sa eva śabdaḥ punaranuccāryamāṇo bhinnārtho bhavituṃ yuktaḥ | na cartauranyatra niyamārthatopapadyate ityuktam | tasmādṛttau gamanavacanamanṛtau pratiṣedhārtham | tatrānutpannaputrasya vidhyantarānniyama eva | utpannaputrastu yathākāmī | anṛtau pratiṣiddhe gamane bhāryecchayā punaḥ pratiprasūyate parvavarjaṃ vrajeccaināṃ tadvrat iti | taditi bhāryāyāḥ pratyavamarśaḥ | taccittagrahaṇaṃ vratamasyeti tadvrataḥ | ratikāmyayā | vinā'pyapatyārthenotpannaputra ṛtāvanutpannaputro vā'nṛtau suratasambhogecchayā tadvrata enāṃ vrajentāmecchayetyarthaḥ | athavā tacchabdo ratikāmyayetyatra vyapekṣyate, smṛtiśāstratvādyasya | tadratikāmyayā parvavarjamanyatrāpi vrajet | tatraivākāraśleṣo draṣṭavyaḥ, ‘aratikāmyayā’, ātmana iti śeṣaḥ |

When it is thus, taken, then this text does not conflict with what has been said in Gautama’s work. In the latter, it is asserted—‘one should approach one’s wife during season, or at all times, with the exception of the sacred days’ (5. 1-2); and here the phrase, ‘or at all times,’ mentions an option, which permits freedom of action; and there would be no point in laying down any such rule as ‘one may do the act at all times, during season as well as out of season;’ and (as the words stand) when the preceding clause is taken as laying down the rule that ‘one should approach one’s wife during season,’ the same verb, ‘should approach,’ being construed with the subsequent phrase, ‘at all times,’ this also would have to be regarded as a rule, occurring as it does in the same context as the preceding rule; specially because, so long as the word is not actually repeated in the text (and is construed with the latter clause only as it stands in the preceding clause), no different meaning can be attributed to it. And it has already been explained that there would be no point in any restriction being imposed, apart from the ‘season.’

From all this it follows that the assertion regarding ‘approaching during season’ is meant to prohibit the act ‘out of season.’ For one who has not yet got a son, the restriction (regarding approaching during season only) is got at from a different injunction (that of begetting a child); but for one who has already got a son might do what he likes (hence the prohibition becomes useful).

The act of approaching the wife out of season having been prohibited, the text proceeds to make an exception in the case of the wife evincing a desire for intercourse—‘In consideration of her, he may approach her, except on the sacred days.’ ‘Her’ refers to the wife. ‘In consideration of her,’—i.e., intent upon pleasing her mind.

‘With the desire for sexual intercourse,’ ‘ratikāmyayā,’ i.e., in consideration of her wishes,—not by one’s own wish—one may approach her with a view to the pleasures of sexual intercourse,—one who has already got a son may do this during ‘season,’ and one who has not got a son may do it out of season.

Or, the pronoun ‘tat’ (in ‘tadvrataḥ’) may be construed with ‘ratikāmyayā;’ such irregular construction being permissible, in view of the work being a text-book of Smṛti. The meaning in this case would be—‘with a view to giving her pleasure, he may approach her at other times also, except on the sacred days.’ And in this case, we might assume the presence of an ‘a,’ the term being ‘aratikāmyayā’—i.e., ‘not with a view to giving pleasure to himself.’ But in the explanation that has been given before, there would be no use for assuming this ‘a,’ nor for construing the pronoun ‘tat’ apart from its context.

Since the present case fulfills the condition of Preclusion that ‘what is laid down is possible, as well as something else,’ it should be taken as a Preclusion. It is possible for the man to approach his wife ‘during the season’ as well as ‘out of season;’ but if the approaching is done ‘daring season,’ then it cannot be done ‘out of season’ at the same time (i.e., both alternatives are not possible at the same time). Just as when the man is hungry, it is open to him to eat at śrāddhas as well as not at śrāddhas; and when the rule says, ‘he should eat not at śrādḍha,’ he simply avoids eating at śrāddhas; and he does not give up all food, seeking thereby to obey the injunction of not eating at śrāddhas;—similarly, when the man has a longing for intercourse, it is open to him to have recourse to it at all times, and we understand the present rale to mean that ‘one should not approach one’s wife out of season.’ The act of approaching itself being already possible by reason of the man himself desiring it, it is only right that the sentence should be taken as laying down the proper time for that act. Otherwise, it would be prescribing something not referred to before at all. Farther, the obeying of the injunction of begetting children is possible only for one who has married; and this begetting is possible only by approaching one’s wife daring ‘season;’ so that the act of approaching daring ‘Beason’ is already rendered possible by all this. Then, again, for one who has already got a child, the act of approaching oue’s wife again for the purpose of begetting a second child cannot be regarded as being done in accordance with the injunction of begetting children, for the injunction being in the form ‘one should beget a child,’ and the singular number in ‘child’ being meant to be significant, the injunction will have been duly fulfilled by the- begetting of the first child. [Thus, then, there would be no point in the present text enjoining the act of approaching one’s wife during ‘season’]. Nor could the approaching be taken as laid down for the purpose of accomplishing a transcendental result; because it is not possible to impose upon it either the character of a sacramental rite, or that of an act for a definite result; specially, as the act of approaching during ‘season’ is already implied by the injunction of ‘begetting a child.’ From all this it follows that the statement that ‘one should approach one’s wife during season’ is meant to prohibit the act ‘out of season;’ so that, in its own(?) form, it is merely re-iterative (of what has been enjoined in regard to the begetting of a child), but in its indirect sense it is a Preclusion. And when thus taken in this indirect sense, the passage comes to serve a distinctly useful purpose.