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The Rashtrakutas and their Times c19.s1: Section A: The Military and Police

The Rāṣṭrakūṭas and their Times c19.s1

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Section A: The Military and Police

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There was hardly a monarch of our dynasty who had not to undertake extensive military operations either to quell internal rebellions or to carry out ambitious foreign expeditions. The military machine of the Empire must, therefore, have been a very strong and efficient one. It used to inspire terror literally from the Himalayas to the Cape Kamorin and and Kathiawar to Bengal when handled by efficient emperors and generals, and it was through its instrumentality that the Rāṣṭrakūṭas compelled ‘every prince,’ to quote the words of Sulaiman, ‘though master in his own state, to pay homage to themselves¹. The ascendancy of the military was so great that it was reflected even in civil administration; we have seen already how many of the provincial governors, district officers, and city prefects were generals or captains. The incessant wars with foreign powers and the protected feudatories had infused the military spirit in the whole population; there were local militias even in villages² and skirmishes among them were not infrequent.

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¹ Elliot, History, p. 7.

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² Ante pp. 190-192

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The reputation for bravery which the Marathas and Karṇāṭas possessed in the days of Yuan Chwang was maintained if not enhanced in our period. Bengal rulers used to recruit soldiers from Karnatak and Lāṭa, ³ a procedure which will clearly show that the Rāṣṭrakūṭa dominions were inhabited by races, famous all over the country for their martial qualities. In his *Viddhaśālabhañjikā* Rājaśekhara, a contemporary writer, pays a handsome compliment to the bravery of the Karṇāṭas when he observes that they were naturally brave.⁴

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³ Bhagalpur plates, I. A., XV, p. 305.

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⁴ Cf. समरकर्मणि निसर्गोद्धता एव कर्णाटाः; Act IV.

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The army headquarters were at the Imperial capital, Malkhed. The Salotgi inscription of Kṛṣṇa III⁵ describes Malkhed as 'sthiribhūta-kaṭake' i. e. a place where the military forces were located. There must have been provincial headquarters as well. Al Masudi has observed about the Gurjara-Pratīhāras that they used to maintain large army garrisons in the south and north, east and west in order to deal promptly with the prospective attacks on all the fronts.⁶ The army arrangements of the Rāṣṭrakūṭas were also similar. The army of the south was under the Banavasi viceroy and that of the north under the rulers of the Gujarat branch. The first had to carry operations against the Gangas, Noḷambas, Pallavas and the Cholas, and the latter had to guard the frontiers against the Gurjara Pratihāras and their allies and feudatories. Though not specifically mentioned in epigraphical records, there must have been an army of the east as well to deal with the Vengi and Vanga rulers. Any corps could be summoned in any direction in times of difficulty. Thus the southern army under the Banavasi viceroy was summoned by Amoghavarsha 1 to quell the rebellions in the central and northern portions of the empire.⁷ All these armies must have been mobilised for the memorable campaigns in the south and north of Dhruva, Govinda III, Indra III, and Kṛṣṇa III.

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⁵ E. I., IV, p. 66.

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⁶ Elliot, History of India 1.

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⁷ E. I., VI, p. 29.

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The Indian armies in the time of the Rāṣṭrakūṭas had ceased to be *chaturanga*, for chariot as a fighting force was not used in our time. We nowhere find any mention of battalions of chariots either in epigraphical records or in the accounts of the contemporary Muslim writers. The epigraphical documents, while describing the military victories resulting in the surrender of war materials, refer to elephants, infantary and cavalry; chariots are mentioned only in connection with the insignia of honour of distinguished generals and military officers.⁸

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⁸ See the Kalas inscription of Govinda IV, E. I., XIII, p. 334.

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From contemporary Muslim writers we learn that the Rāṣṭrakūṭa, Pāla, and Gurjara Pratihāra armies were famous for their infantry, elephant battalions and cavalry respectively. Al Masudi says about the Balhara i. e. the Rāṣṭrakūṭas king:-

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'His horses and elephants are innumerable but his troops are mostly infantry because the seat of his government is mostly among mountains.'

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The latter part of this statement is incorrect, but it may have been probably intended to mean that the infantry was mostly recruited from the mountainous tribes inhabiting the Vindhya and Sahya ranges, as was later the case in the Maratha Empire. The cavalry battalions in the army could not have been insignificant, for the Rāṣṭrakūṭas had very often to face the Gurjara Pratihāra armies, which were particularly strong in that arm. Govinda II was a great horseman (9) and the lightning all-India movements of Dhruva, Govinda III and Indra III presuppose a strong cavalry. The Deccan had no good breed of horse, and the Rāṣṭrakūṭas were probably importing their army horses from Arabia, as was later the practice of a number of states. It may be interesting to note that most of the places mentioned in the Nītivākyāmṛta as famous for their breed of horse are trans-Indian and that the first variety mentioned in that work is that of the Tājika i. e. the Arabian horse. At the time of Marco Polo the kingdom of Thana used to import its army horses from Arabia; the traffic in horses was so great in the 13th and 14th centuries that no ship came to India without horses in addition to other cargo.(11) The Vijayanagara rulers also had to rely on Arabia for their army horses. The same, therefore, was almost certainly the case in our period as well. This dependence on Arabia for the supply of the needs of the cavalry may have been one of the main reasons that induced the Rāṣṭrakūṭas to maintain friendly relations with the Muslim traders residing in their dominions.

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The recruitment to the army was extended to all the classes; even the Brahmanas are to be seen in the fighting force. Bettegiri inscription of Kṛṣṇa III(12) immortalises the memory of a Brahmana named Ganaramma who laid down his life while defending his village in a valliant manner. The Kalas inscription of Govinda IV(13) describes the glorious career and achievements of two Brahmana generals Revādāsa Dikshita and Visottara Dikshita who are expressly described as Somayājins and ornaments of the Brahmana race. Kudarkota inscription records the erection of a building for vedic studies by a Brahmana in memory of his son Takshadatta, who had died in war. Both the father and the son are described in the record as familiar with the three Vedas.(14) The Smriti rules do not seem to have been much respected with reference to the selection of professions in our as also in the earlier periods. It will be shown in chap. XIV how even the Jains used to enlist themselves in the army and distinguish themselves on the battlefield.

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⁹ Cf. निजतुरंगमैकविजयनीतलक्ष्मीसनाथः। Kadba plates, E. I., IV, p. 340.

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¹⁰ XXII.

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¹⁰ The reading Tārjika is obviously a mistake for Tājika.

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¹¹ Marco Polo, II, p. 391.

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¹² E. I., XIII, p. 334.

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A part of the army consisted of the hereditary forces and the forces of the feudatories. The Muslim writers seem to be referring to the hereditary forces when they mention the troops of the Indian kings, who came out to fight for their king though they received no pay from him.(15) The principle of heredity, which was allowed to operate to some extent in the appointments to civil offices seems to have governed to a great extent the recruitment of the army as well. Maula bala or the hereditary force is very often referred to in our epigraphical records as the most efficient and trustworthy arm. Amoghavarsha I particularly extols the capture of the fort of Kedal by Bankeya, because it was garrisoned by hereditary (maula) forces. Both Sukra(16) and Kāmandaka(17) hold the maula bala in the highest esteem. It would seem that fighting was followed as a hereditary profession in several families or localities from where the hereditary forces were recruited. Bankeya, the viceroy of Banavasi, has been described as the leader of a hereditary force. It would thus appear that the military captains who were often hereditary, used to recruit their forces from the families of hereditary fighters. The Arthaśāstra (18) refers to villages enjoying exemption from land tax (āyudhīyaparihāra) on condition of supplying a certain number of soldiers to the army. These villages were obviously tenanted by families from among whom the maula bala was recruited. There may have been similar villages in our period also, which were assigned to the members of the maula bala. We can now well understand the apparently incredible statement of the contemporary Muslim writers that the troops in India are not paid by Indian kings but maintain themselves without receiving anything from them.

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¹⁴ E. I., I, p. 180.

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¹⁵ Elliot, I, p. 7.

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¹⁶ IV, 7, 8-10.

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¹⁷ XVIII, 4, ff.

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The Muslim writers, who make this statement, also add that the members of the fighting forces of the Rāṣṭrakūṭas were paid regularly by their employers. It would, therefore, seem that even the maula bala was paid a part of its salary in cash by the Malkhed government. We have seen already how the Rāṣṭrakūṭas used to exercise rigorous administrative control over their viceroys and feudatories, who had to send all their collections to the imperial exchequer. This must have enabled them, unlike many of their contemporaries, to pay their troops directly in cash or kind at the army headquarters. Direct payment must have naturally increased the efficiency of the fighting force. The Rāṣṭrakūṭa administration is thus seen sharing the views of Kāmandaka, a contemporary writer, who points out that a force, which is given its wages without delay, will fight with greater enthusiasm than a force which is not promptly paid. (19)

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In contemporary Kashmir the soldiers, when out on duty, were paid an additional allowance (20) as was the practice of the East India Company for some time at the beginning of its career. We do not know whether the practice in Kashmir prevailed in the Deccan of our period as well. It is, however, not unlikely that the soldiers may have been paid, when out on a campaign, an additional allowance by the Rāṣṭrakūṭas as well, since such an allowance was calculated to infuse greater enthusiasm in the army.

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¹⁸ II, 34.

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¹⁹ Chapter, XV.

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²⁰ Rājatarangiṇī, VII, 1457, VIII, 757, 808-810 etc.,

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Government used to pay pensions to the dependents of the soldiers killed in war; a concrete case of such a provision is contained in one of the Bāṇa records.²¹ Another record of the same dynasty chronicles the death of an officer, who was successful in driving away the enemy, but who fell while pursuing him, as he was too much in advance of his column. ‘His army put off their arms with which they had come, raised a lamentation, and made a gift to yield an annual income for him.’ It would seem that the soldiers of this regiment felt that the death of their gallant officer was due to their negligence in not having followed him with agility in his pursuit. It is not, however, unlikely that even in such cases the central government may have paid its own pension in addition to the provision made by the members of the regiment.

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²¹ I. A., XII, p. 39.

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The Rāṣṭrakūṭa forces did not consist of untrained or half trained soldiers. Regular officers were appointed to train different units. A cavalry instructor is referred to in an inscription from Ron in Dharwar district.²² This record, which probably belongs to the time of Amoghavarsha I, records a gift of land by the illustrious Turagaveṇḍega (Marvel in training horses), when he was going out to battle. The training of the recruits, however, was not as arduous a task during our period as it is now. We have seen already how most of our villages had their own militias, recruited from their own inhabitants. These militias must have been the principal recruitment fields for the regular armies. The recruits thus possessed a certain amount of military efficiency at the time of their enrolment. The Rāṣṭrakūṭas could very well have afforded to set a high test for admission to the army, e. g. requiring the recruit to show his skill in archery or riding as was done by some of the Muslim states in the 14th century. (23)

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²² E. I., XIII, p. 187

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Most of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa emperors were themselves distinguished soldiers and must have been, at least in theory, their own commanders-in-chief. Under them were a number of generals, who may have been in charge of the different corps. The status of the general was as high as that of a Māhāsāmanta entitled to the five great musical instruments. They were allowed to use elephants and chariots, invested with the robes of their office and assigned distinctive parasols. (24) Here again we find epigraphical evidence corroborating the statement in the Nitivākyāmṛta, a contemporary work on politics, that the generals were to be respected not only by the feudatories but also by the emperor, who was to invest them with insignia of honour and dignity similar to his own. (25) Balādhikṛta, daṇḍanāyaka, and mahāprachaṇḍadaṇḍanāyaka are the main military designations that we come across in our documents. The precise relative status of these is difficult to determine. Several other designations also must have existed. The fierce lord of the elephant force is mentioned in the Kalas inscription (26) and cavalry and infantry also must have had their own separate officers of the different grades. These latter are not referred to in our records but are mentioned in the copper plates of the Gahadwal dynasty and in the Nitisāra of Kāmandaka. (27)

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The army had its own commissariat office. A number of merchants were engaged by this office for the purpose of meeting the needs of the army when on march. One such merchant contractor figures in inscription No. 177 of the Madras Epigraphical Report for the year 1912. This document records a charitable gift of Narasingayan, a merchant from Mānyakheta who had accompanied the camp of Kṛṣṇa III during the southern campaigns of that emperor.

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²³ Gibbs, Ibn Batuta, p. 189.

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²⁴ E. I., XIII, p. 334.

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²⁵ XII, 1.

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²⁶ E. I., XIII, p. 334.

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²⁷ XIX, 32.

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The Rājatarangiṇī refers to ambulance corps arrangements made for the soldiers in the Kashmir armies. (28) It is very likely that similar arrangements must have been made by the Rāṣṭrakūṭas, though so far no evidence is forthcoming to prove their actual existence. The same observation will probably be true about the Sappers and Miners corps.

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The army must have been accompanied by numerous camp followers. Quite a large battalion of cooks, washermen, sweepers, watermen, cartmen, etc., must have been necessary to meet its various needs. It seems that in Northern India slaves were employed for these menial duties; Al Utbi informs us that the victory, which the Hindus had almost secured against Mahmud of Ghazni in the battle of Ohind was lost by them owing to the revolt of the slaves in the household, who attacked them in the rear while the battle was at the critical stage. (29) We do not know whether this unsound practice was followed by the Rāṣṭrakūṭas in their military administration. The reputation for great efficiency, which the army possessed, and the numerous victories that stand to its credit would suggest that it was all composed of free men; slaves could hardly have found a place in it even for menial duties.

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Wives and other female relatives of the emperors used to accompany them even in distant expeditions. Amoghavarsha I was born, while his father's camp was pitched at the feet of the Vindyas, during his campaign in the Central India. (30) An inscription from Tiruvurru records a gift from the mother of Kṛṣṇa III made to a local temple. (31) It is interesting to note that Kāmandaka has no objection against this unsound practice (32) and it is, therefore, not unlikely that it may have been fairly common in our period. Our records do not enlighten us as to whether officers and soldiers were allowed to be accompanied by their families when the armies were out on campaigns. In the case of ordinary soldiers this must have been an impossibility, and it would seem that only high officers and generals may have been shown this indulgence. Among the causes that contribute to the weakness of the fighting force, Kāmandaka mentions the presence of women in the camp. (33) It would thus appear that strict and efficient military administrations of our period were not permitting any officers to be accompanied by their families when out on campaigns. The only exception made seems to have been in favour of the emperors and perhaps the generals.

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²⁸ VIII, 741.

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²⁹ Elliot, History, II pp. 33-4. 30 E. I. XVIII, p. 244.

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³¹ Inscriptions from Madras Presidency, Chingleput, No. 1048

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No evidence is available to determine the exact strength of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa army. Muslim writers simply attest to its high prestige, but they are silent about its numerical strength. Al Masudi informs us that each of the four armies that were maintained in the four directions by the Gurjara-Pratīhāras was seven to nine lakhs in strength. (34) The reports of the strength of the armies of the various states in India that had reached the Muslim traders and travellers were often exaggerated; Sulaiman says (35) that the elephant force of the Pālas was 50,000 strong, but Ibn Khurdadba, a contemporary of his, observes that it was only 5000 strong. (36) Al Masudi no doubt states that the Bengal elephant force was reputed to be 50,000 strong, but adds that the reports in these matters were exaggerated. He refers to the report that there were 15,000 washermen in the camp of the Bengal ruler, in proof of his contention that no strict reliance could be placed on what one heard about these matters. The statement of Al Masudi that each of the four armies of the Gurjara-Pratīhāras was about eight lakhs in strength may be similarly exaggerated. It is, however, quite likely that Al Masudi may have based his statement about the strength of each of the Gurjara-Pratīhāra armies on the report of the strength of only one of them, which may have been strengthened in numbers by the temporary mobilisation of large forces from other fronts or armies. The total fighting force of the Gurjara-Pratīhāras may have been a million or a million and a quarter. The Rāṣṭrakūṭas had more than once crossed swords with them successfully and their forces too could not have been much less in numbers. Their civil administration was largely manned by military officers, and, therefore, it is not in the least unlikely, that they might have so arranged the matters as to raise easily an efficient fighting force of about a million, when critical battles had to be fought at several fronts. The Vijayanagar Empire of later period, with approximately equal resources, had an army of about a million.(37)

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³² XIV, 69.

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³³ XVIII, 45.

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³⁴ Elliot, I, p. 23.

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³⁵ Ibid, p. 5.

Forts

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Writers on the Nītiśāstra devote a large space to the description of the various types of forts (durga) and declare that the strength of the army becomes immensely increased if it can take their shelter. The Deccan, over which the Rāṣṭrakūṭas were ruling, affords ideal opportunities for the construction of mountain forts. It is, therefore, strange that neither Muslim chroniclers nor epigraphical documents should give any information about or description of the forts of the period. This silence will have to be interpreted as accidental. The Konur inscription of Amoghavarsha I(38) refers in glowing terms to the great feat of Bankeya in capturing the fort of Kedala from the enemy; it is, therefore, clear that the value of the forts was well understood by the

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37. Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, pp 16-17.

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Rāṣṭrakūṭas. We may presume that they must have built several forts on the hills, which were plentiful in their dominions. The fort of Morkhind in Nasik district is one of the forts in Maharashtra, the antiquity of which goes back to our period; when the Wani-Dindori(39) and Radhanpur(40) plates were issued by Govinda III, he was encamped in that fort. Many other forts in the Deccan, which were repaired by Shivaji in his war of independence, may have been as old as our period. It is almost certain that the Rāṣṭrakūṭas must have built several forts in their Empire, though unfortunately we know nothing about them at present.

Navy

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Neither Muslim accounts nor epigraphical records give us any information about the navy of the Empire. Even the grants of the S'ilāhāras, the Konkan feudatories of the Rāṣṭrakūṭas, give no clue to the condition or the strength of the navy. There was no necessity of the naval force to carry on the warfare with the Gangas, Pallavas, Chālukyas, Pālas, and the Gurjara Pratīhāras, who were the principal foes of the Empire. The Arabs, with whom the Rāṣṭrakūṭas used to come into contact, were a maritime power, but they were always on terms of friendship with them, and this may have rendered the maintenance of a strong navy unnecessary. From Abu Zaid, a contemporary writer, we learn that some of the kings on the western coast, e. g. the king of Cape Kamorin, used to have their navies; it is, therefore, not unlikely that our Empire too may have had a naval force. But it is not in the least likely that its strength could have been anything like the strength of the army.

Weapons of War

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It is to be regretted that the weapons of war should have been nowhere mentioned in our records in the manner of the Allahabad Pillar Inscription of Samudragupta.⁴¹ Historians of Mahmud of Ghazni mention swords, spears, bows, arrows and maces as the weapons used by the opposing Hindu forces.⁴² These were also the principal weapons of fighting in contemporary Kashmir. It is, therefore, clear that these must have been the weapons mainly used by the Deccan armies of our period. Stone-throwing-machines are mentioned in the Mahābhārata; they were used by Alexander the Great and the Muslim invaders of Sindh. But neither epigraphical records, nor Mahomedan writers refer to the use of such machines by the Hindu forces of the time. They were, however, used by the Kashmir armies, and were known as ‘yantrotpala’ i.e. machines (to throw) stones.⁴³ It is, therefore, not unlikely that the use of these machines may have been known in the south as well. The rules of fighting as laid down by Manu prohibit the use of poisoned arrows; it will be soon shown that not all these rules were observed in our period and we know that in contemporary Kashmir, arrows used to be besmeared with a certain ointment in order to set ablaze the camp of the enemy.⁴⁴ It is, therefore, not likely that the arrows used were always pure and unbesmeared. It was customary in Kashmir to supply the soldiers with heavy armours⁴⁵ to protect them while fighting; we may well presume that similar protection was available to the soldiers in the Deccan of our period.

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⁴¹ C. I. I., III, p. 1.

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⁴² Elliot, History, II, p. 30.

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⁴³ Rājatarangiṇī, VIII, 2530.

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⁴⁴ Ibid, VII, 983.

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⁴⁵ Ibid, VIII, 3294.

Rules of Fighting

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The rules of righteous fighting laid down by some of the earlier writers had become dead letter during our period. The war had ceased to be a concern merely of the fighters. Whole villages were often destroyed⁴⁶ and the loot of property could not be avoided. Express reference to the depredations of war is made in a Yādava Grant of the 11th contury.⁴⁷ One of the articles of treaty concluded between Nayapāla and Karṇa, at the instance of the Budhist monk Atīśa, was to restore or compensate for the property seized by either side with the exception of the articles of food.⁴⁸ When Chacha captured the fort of Sikka, he killed 5000 soldiers and made the inhabitants slaves and prisoners of war.⁴⁹ This procedure was in direct contradiction of the rule in Manusmriti, VII, 92. Kiraṇapura and Chakrakottya were burn. when they were captured by the hostile forces,⁵⁰ and Mānyakheṭa was plundered when it capitulated to the Parmāra ruler S'rī Harsha.⁵¹ Numerous examples of a similar nature are recorded by Kalhana.⁵² It is, therefore, clear that the rules of humane and equitable warfare laid down by earlier writers were more often violated than observed during our period throughout the length and breadth of India. It is interesting to note that the practice of the age is in conformity with the theories to be seen in contemporary works. Kāmandaka boldly declares that one need not refrain from the destruction of the enemy even by unfair and immoral means,⁵³ and even the Jain ascetic writer Somadeva, is compelled to countenance crooked (kūṭayuddha) and treacherous (tūṣṇīm yuddha)⁵⁴ warfare.

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⁴⁶ E. I., VI, p. 162.

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⁴⁷ I. A., XII, p. 123.

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⁴⁸ J. P. T. S., I., p. 9.

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⁴⁹ Elliot, I, p. 142.

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⁵⁰ E. I., IX, p. 51.

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⁵¹ E I., XIII, p. 180.

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⁵² Rājatarangiṇī, IV, 294, VI, 351, VII, 149 } etc.

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⁵³ XVIII, 54.

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⁵⁴ XXX, 90-91.

Police Department

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The policing arrangements of villages were under the supervision of the headmen. The village watchman was in the immediate charge of the work, and it was his business to detect all the crimes, especially the thefts, that may be committed in the village. If a theft or robbery was committed, he had either to find out the culprit or to trace his footsteps to a neighbouring village; otherwise he was compelled to compensate for the loss. His liability was, of course, limited by his means and it was based on a shrewd suspicion that he himself might be the thief or in league with him. If the watchman refused to pay, his grain-share at the time of the harvest was cut off, his service-land was transferred to his nearest relative, or he was fined, imprisoned and given corporal punishment.⁵⁵ If the stolen goods could not be either recovered or full compensation for them could not be exacted from the watchman, the whole community or the government had to compensate the victim.

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⁵⁵ Altekar, *Village Communities*, p. 59,

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This communal and government liability has been recognised by several writers. Viṣṇu says that if the king is unable to recover stolen goods, he must pay their value out of his treasury.⁵⁶ The rules in the Arthaśāstra are more detailed. Kauṭalya says, ‘When any part of merchandise has been lost or stolen, the headman of the village shall make up the loss. Whatever merchandise is lost or stolen in the intervening places between two villages, shall be made good by the superintendent of the pasture. If there is no pasture-land, then the officer called Chorarajjuka would be responsible. Failing him, the boundary and neighbouring villages shall make up the loss, and if the property cannot be ultimately traced, the king shall ultimately make good the loss out of his own treasury.⁵⁷ That this communal and government liability, which has been admitted even by Kauṭalya, was actually enforced in practice is shown by a 12th century inscription from Rajaputana, which embodies an agreement on the part of the townsmen of Dhalopa, that they would be responsible for any thefts that might occur in their town. The king of the place had made the arrangements about the watch and ward of the place.⁵⁸ The principle of the communal responsibility was thus recognised by early writers like Viṣṇu and Kauṭalya, and was actually enforced in Rajputana of the 12th and in the Deccan of the 17th and the 18th centuries. It is, therefore, very likely that it was enforced in our period as well.

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⁵⁶ III, 67.

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⁵⁷ IV, 13.

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⁵⁸ E. I., XI, p. 40.

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Manu lays down that there should be established police stations in the kingdom, one being intended for 2, 4, or 5 villages.⁵⁹ Similar arrangements probably existed in our period. The police officers were known in our period as Choroddharaṇikas or Daṇḍapāśikas. The former are actually mentioned in the Antroli-Charoli copper plates of Karkkarāja of Gujarat,⁶⁰ and the latter in several Valabhi records.⁶¹ That only one Rāṣṭrakūṭa record just mentioned should make reference to the police officers is probably to be explained on the assumption that it was not deemed necessary to mention these officers in the copper-plate grants creating alienated villages, as these officers had no powers to interfere with the fiscal matters. There cannot be any doubt that the Choroddharaṇikas were fairly common in our period. Chola records of our period mention watchmen, whose duty it was to keep a watch over the paths;⁶² it is not unlikely that similar officers may have been employed in the Rāṣṭrakūṭa dominions as well.

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⁵⁹ VII, 114.

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⁶⁰ J. B. B. R. A. S., XVI, p. 106.

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⁶¹ E. g. Valabhi plates of Dhruvasena. dated 526 A. D. V. p. 204

c19.s1.t5.11

⁶² S. I. I., II, Nos. 23 and 24.

c19.s1.t5.12

Crimes, that could not be locally detected, must have been investigated by these Choroddharaṇika and Daṇḍapāśika officers. It is very likely that these officers worked under the directions of the Rāṣṭrapatis and Viṣayapatis, who being also at the head of the local troops, could have afforded military assistance to the police department, in case it was necessary for the apprehension of desperate robbers or dacoits.

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