History of the Khaljis, A.D. 1290–1320 c17: Chapter XVII. Economic Measures

History of the Khaljis, A.D. 1290–1320 c17

Language: English

c17.s1 The Market Officials — 19 parts
c17.s2 Horse Market — 23 parts

Chapter XVII. Economic Measures

c17.2

'Alāüddīn's passion for incessant conquest and constant invasions of the Mughal free-booters from the north-west had rendered maintenance of a large army unavoidable. Besides the army, the expenses on a large staff of state officials, civil and military administration, and on slaves¹ involved heavy liabilities on the royal exchequer. The wealth accumulated in the time of Sultan Jalāluddīn,² the treasures secured from the raid on Devagiri in 1296 and the yearly tributes collected from the various provinces and dependencies of the empire were insufficient to meet the financial burden. Even the raising of the revenue to fifty per cent. of the produce, the levying of different kinds of cesses, and the conversion of the drinking vessels of gold and silver into coins³ failed to meet the requirements of the state. It was calculated that if the king recruited a large number of troops on a moderate salary, the entire state treasure would be exhausted within five or six years.⁴ Moreover, from 1303 onwards a large number of buildings were constructed. 'Alāüddīn, therefore, decided to cut down the salary of soldiers; but to prevent their falling a victim to economic distress⁵ he decided to reduce the prices of commodities of daily use.⁶ With this end in view, he instituted various regulations and promulgated orders which brought down the cost of living. These regulations, which may be termed as Economic Reforms of ‘Alāūddīn Khaljī, form a conspicuous feature of his administration.

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¹ According to Ferishtah 'Alāüddīn had 50,000 slaves.

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² Jalāluddīn was not an extravagant monarch. He did not waste money to maintain a magnificent court nor did he undertake any grand conquests which might have entailed a large expense. According to *Tarīkh-i-Haqqī* (Bankipore Ms. Fol. 200) he was not liberal. "سلطان نیز بادشاهانه نبود بخشش" Also Barani p. 188.

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³ *Ferishtah* p. 109.

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⁴ *Barani* p. 303.

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⁵ *Ibid.* p. 304.

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⁶ See the chapter on Administration.

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Shaikh Nasiruddīn, the author of *Khairulmajālis* (written in 1352-53 A.D.), has given a very interesting annecdote in connection with these regulations. He writes that once Qazi Hamīduddīn held a grand feast and invited him (the saint) to dinner. When all the other guests had left and the Shaikh was the only person left with Hamīd, the latter related an incident of the days of ‘Alāūddīn. He said that once he found sultan ‘Alāūddīn sitting close and pensive, his head bare, his mind perturbed. Malik Qīra Bēg asked the sultan to unfold the reason of his quiet contemplation and oppressing silence. The sultan replied: "Listen! It has often crossed my mind......that in this world of God, where so many men reside, I have been chosen to rule (over them). It behoves me, therefore, that I should do something the benefit of which may be enjoyed by everybody (بهبۀ خلق). I know that whether I distribute all the treasures that I possess or give away all the lands and villages to the people, I would not be able to benefit the whole section of them. Just now, however, an idea has struck my mind and I shall talk it over to you. I have planned to cheapen the foodstuffs and the benefit (of this step) will reach everybody. Grain would be made cheap in this way. I will send for all the *naigān* (roving merchants?) who bring grain into the City. I shall give them money from the treasury to buy and bring grain (into the City). (In lieu thereof) I shall give the traders apparel and money to support their families." Orders were accordingly given and grain began to arrive from all sides..

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...... The saint then comments: "such was sultan 'Alāuddīn that people used to pay homage to his tomb, put sacred thread on his grave, beg for boons and their wishes were fulfilled."⁷

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⁷ *Khairulmajālis* Prof. Habib's Ms. fols. 290-92.
* This list does not exhaust the names of all food-grains. Obviously the prices of other cereals like pulses and peas would also have been controlled in the same way.

c17.12

This may be called Sūfic interpretation of 'Alāuddīn's Market Control. The incident has not been mentioned by any historian contemporary or later. It is recorded in a book on saints written about fifty years after the enforcement of market regulations. Even if it be accepted as true, since the Qazi's conversation with Sultan took place at a private interview, the philanthropic motive of the Sultan as depicted by the author of *Khairulmajālis*, may have been only a passing whim of his mind. Barani, the contemporary historian, definitely states that 'Alāuddīn introduced market regulations for the benefit of the imperial troops. The army was only a portion of the humanity (Khalq-i-Khuda) whom the king was trying to make happy. Moreover, the prices were controlled in Delhi alone, and nothing was done for the benefit of the people elsewhere. Again, the peasants and the traders were also as good Khalq-i-Khuda as the soldiers, but the regulations of 'Alāuddīn, as would appear from the following pages, proved to be highly injurious to their interests. Even to the soldiery the benefit of the cheapness of the prices did not amount to much. If the prices for the necessaries of life were lowered the salaries of the soldiers were also curtailed, and it is difficult to conclude that the troops really gained from the new arrangement. Ziyāuddīn's humorous expression that a rumour got afloat in Delhi that "a camel could be had for a *dang*, but wherefrom the *dang*" clearly explains the position. The revenue regulations of the sultan impoverished the agriculturists. His reduction of salaries of soldiers did not improve the lot of government servants. In these circumstances the control of price was the outcome of an imperative necessity rather than of a philanthropic motive. Moreover, the harshness and violence with which the market regulations were enforced, tell a story very different from that related by Shaikh Nasiruddin.

c17.13

In fact high prices mean a high standard of living. 'Alāūddīn did not want to pay high salaries. He did not want people to be rich lest they should be refractory and turbulent. Naturally, if he wanted to pay lower salaries he had to lower the prices of commodities. 'Alāūddīn may not have known such principles of Political Economy, but one thing is certain that his reduction of salaries and his revenue regulations directly, and his market control indirectly, impoverished his subjects. Ziyāuddin Barani is quite correct when he says that the sultan lowered the prices of commodities, firstly, because he wanted to reduce the salaries of the soldiers to relieve pressure on the imperial exchequer, and secondly, because he wanted to keep them contented with their meagre pay.

c17.14

The reign of 'Alāóddin was full of bloody warfare, a state which tended to increase the prices of commodities. Moreover, war involves dislocation of traffic, and the almost primitive means of transport of the 13th and 14th centuries must have been surely affected by the then conditions. A glaring instance of it is to be found during the invasion of Targhī (1303 A.D.) when the Mughal invader stopped all caravans from entering Delhi by capturing the roads around it as well as the fords of Jumna. Such a situation would have created intense scarcity of food grain in the capital and would have raised the prices of things exorbitantly. 'Alāūddin tried to overcome the difficulties of transport and of high prices by accumulating food stuffs in the capital on the one hand, and by fixing their prices on the other. For this, the sultan undertook certain measures which are interesting to study as they show that as far back as the 14th century the principles of enhancement of taxes, of price control, and of rationing during a state of war, were as much comprehensible as they are to-day.

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*Food Control.*

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The prime necessity of man is food to which the sultan gave his first and fullest attention. To begin with, he regulated the prices of food-grains and fixed them at very low rates. The prices fixed were as follows :— Wheat . . . . . 7½ jītal per man. Barley . . . . . 4 jītal ,, ,, Gram . . . . . 5 jītal ,, ,, Rice . . . . . 5 jītal ,, ,, Māsh (Urad) . . . . . 5 jītal ,, ,, Moth . . . . . 3 jītal ,, ,,*

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It is extremely difficult to calculate these prices in terms of modern currency and weights since the data necessary to determine the proportion of the coins and weights of those times with the modern ones are not available. The purchasing power of money since the 14th century has considerably changed. Consequently, it is not easy to determine exactly as to what extent man in the 14th century was better or worse off than he is to-day.

c17.18

Ferishtah, however, states that in ‘Alāuddīn’s times a *tankah*, whether of gold or silver, was equal to one tola in weight, and that a *tankah* of silver was equal to fifty jītals. The weight of jītal, a small copper coin which continued to be current in Ferishtah’s time also, weighed according to some one tola and according to some others 1¾ tolas. The *tankah* of ‘Alāuddīn, adds Ferishtah, was equal to one tola consisting of 96 *rattis*, and so also it was later found by Babur.# Therefore, the *tankah* of ‘Alāuddīn was exactly equal in weight to the present day rupee. So far as the *jītal* is concerned, Mr. Nelson Wright thinks that “an equation of 48

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# Nelson Wright p. 72.

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*jitals* to the *tankah* would be more in keeping with probablity than one of 50 *jitals*" which ratio is given by Ferishtah. Mr. Wright further adds "the fractional silver issues of 7th century point emphatically to a *tankah* of 48 jitals. To that extent Ferishtah's statement which after all was made some centuries later must be regarded as indirectly corroborative rather than implicity correct. The *jital* then may be taken as equivalent to two ratties of silver."¹⁰ Thus if we take a *tankah* equal to a rupee, a *jital* could be equal to 1⅓ of our modern pice.

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¹⁰ Ibid.

c17.22

7½ *jitals*, says Baranī, bought one *man* of wheat. The *man* of Fīrōz Tughlaq's time was of 40 *sers* and a *ser* is stated to have been of 70 *misqāls*. Taking the weight of *misqāl* at the even average of 72 grains, the *ser* would range at 5040 grains and a *man* would amount to 201, 600 grains, 35 lbs. troy and 28.8 lbs. avoirdupois. Ferishtah, however, says that the *man* of 'Alāuddīn's time consisted of 40 *sers*, the weight of a *ser* being 24 tolas. Thus according to Ferishtah, a *man* of 'Alāuddīn's times was equal to 12 *sers* and according to Thomas' calculations it was equal to 14 *sers* of today. Thus if 7½ *jitals* bought one *man* of wheat, one *jital* would buy 5⅓ *sers* (of 24 tolas each). Calculated in modern money one pice (¾ jital) would buy 1⅓ *ser* of 80 tolas each. Thus a present day rupee would buy about two present day maunds of wheat in 'Alāuddīn's time. All other prices may be calculated on this basis.

c17.23

Now, though the prices fixed by 'Alāuddīn were quite low yet it is difficult to agree with Baranī that they were the lowest compared with those that were prevalent in the reigns of his predecessors and successors. In the time of Balban, baked bread used to sell at two *sers* a *jital*;¹² and, therefore, wheat would have been cheaper still. Price level on the whole went up in the time of Muḥammad bin Tughlaq, but it again dropped to the previous level of ‘Alāuddīn under Fīrōz Tughlaq. The following table would illustrate this point:—

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¹¹ Thomas: *Chronicles*, pp. 162-63. Thomas calculates on the authority of Yule: *Cathay and the Way Thither*.

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¹² Habib: *Hazrat Amir Khusrau* p. 30.

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c17.27

It is possible that ‘Afīf exaggerated when giving the prices of the time of Fīrōz, because Shaikh Naṣīruddīn Chirāgh says in *Khairulmajālis*, which he wrote in Fīrōz’s reign, that ‘Alāuddīn's days were cheaper. Yet we find that prices were still cheaper in the time of the Lōdīs. The author of *Tarīkh-i-Dāūdī* mentions that in the reign of sultan Ibrāhīm Lōdī the prices of commodities were cheaper than those obtained in the reign of any other sultan except in ‘Alāuddīn's last days. He further adds that whereas in ‘Alāuddīn’s time the cheapness of price was maintained by resorting to coercion and force, in Ibrāhīm's reign prices remained low without anything like that.¹² Thus what is really of importance in ‘Alāuddīn’s reign is not so much the cheapness of the prices, as "the establishment of a fixed price in the market, which was considered one of the wonders of the age."

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¹² یکی ازنوا درعہد سلطان ابراهيم آن بوده که غله و جامه و سائراجناس چنان ارزان شد که در هیچ عصر نبوده مگر درآ خر عهد سلطان علاالدين خلجی شده باشد - و ارزاني عهد علاالدين بصد هراز تکلیف و سیاست و اکراه بود ارزانی عهد ابراهیم آسمانی بود - *Tarīkh-i-Dāūdī*, Bankipore Ms. fols. 223-24.

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*The Grain Market.*

c17.30

Having fixed the prices of food grain, the sultan established grain market and government grain stores wherefrom the people and the merchants could obtain foodstuffs. The grain market was run by two types of merchants. Firstly, those who had their permanent shops in Delhi and may be called retailers or distributors, and secondly, the *caravanians* or travelling-merchants who brought grain into the city and sold it to the shopkeepers as well as to the people. Before the enforcement of market regulations the shopkeepers as well as the *caravanians* made as much profit as they liked. But with the promulgation of the new orders fixing the prices of food grains at a lower level and for all time—irrespective of the vagaries of weather—the merchants were left with very little marginal profit. The result was that while the shopkeepers in Delhi looked with disgust at the new regulations, the *caravanians* stopped coming into the City. But 'Alāuddīn was determined to see his scheme carried out to a successful end. He ordered that the travelling-merchants should get themselves registered with the *Shahnah* of the market. Malik Qabūl, the superintendent of the Grain Market, apprehended the leaders of the travelling-merchants and kept them under surveillance until they agreed to bring grain regularly to the market from places outside Delhi and sell it at scheduled rates. They were asked to take up residence with their women and children in villages on the Jumna within the direct jurisdiction of the superintendent. They had no other alternative but to obey. They signed agreements, collectively and individually, to maintain a regular supply of grain to the market. Thus the danger of supplies falling short in the grain market was eliminated.

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To obviate the difficulties of *caravanians* in obtaining grain at prices which would ensure them a margin of profit 'Alāuddīn issued a royal rescript to all the magistrates and collectors (*shahnagān* and *mutaṣarrifān*) of the country lying in the doāb and other regions near the capital city, requiring them to give written undertakings to the crown to the effect that they would try to obtain as much grain from the cultivators as possible. They were ordered to realise 50% of the produce as land tax from the agriculturists with the utmost rigour. They were also asked to compel the latter to sell their surplus stocks to the travelling merchants on the fields, at a rate fixed by the king. It was the duty of the revenue officials to prevent regrating of corn by husbandmen and to see that they were left only with bare sustenance.¹⁴ For breach of this regulation the officers were held responsible and were called to account. Thus all the available grain flowed into the market which remained well stocked. Black-marketing did not and could not exist, and profits were wiped off.

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¹⁴ Barani says that a peasant could not even lay aside ten *man* of grain (p. 305). The following two statements of Barani testify to the severe orders of the sultan:—

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*The Grain Stores.*

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Besides the husbandman and the roving merchant there was yet another factor from which interruption in supply could be apprehended. This was weather on which depended crops.¹⁵ As a counterblast against its vagaries, the sultan

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¹⁵ Cf. the famine in Jalāluddīn's time when price of grain rose very high.

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(۱) خراج میان دوآب و ولایت صد كروهی برنهجی
كنند كه رعایا نتوانند كه ده من غله ذخيره كنند—
چنان بشدت طلبند (نطلبند Text wrongly has) كه ريت
غله برسر كشت بدست کاروانیان بفروشند (p. 305)—
(۲) سلطان فرمان داده بود تا از دیوان اعلی از شحنگان
و متصرفان و ولایت میان دو آب كه به شهر نزديك است خط
ستانند تا ایشان از رعایا خراج چنان بشدت طلب نمایند
كه ایشان را غله از كشت درخانها آوردن و احتکار كردن
ممكن نبود و هم بر سر كشت بنرخ ارزان غله بدست كاروانیان
بفروشند (p. 307)—

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established government grain stores. These granaries were kept well stocked. There was scarcely a *mohalla*, says Barani, where two or three royal stores filled with foodstuffs did not exist. These were different from grain shops. They were godowns where grain was stored in reserve to be released in times of emergency. If the crops were spoilt due to scarcity or irregularity of rainfall, or if the primitive agencies of transport were not able to bring sufficient grain into the capital the accumulated grain was taken out, handed over to the travelling merchants, who carried it to the grain market, where it was sold to the public at the regulated prices and in quantities fixed for individual purchasers.

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*Rationing.*

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In favourable seasons the people could buy as much grain as they liked. But conditions were not the same in seasons of drought and famine. In seasons of drought, grain could not be sold to the people of Delhi in indefinite quantities, the more so because the people of the vicinity also flocked into the capital city. Consequently it was rationed. In seasons of scarcity each household was given half a *man* of grain per day. Ferishtah's statement is a little different. He says that in times of drought every purchaser was required to buy just the quantity he needed, and if somebody bought even half a *man* more than his needs, he was severely punished.¹⁶ Barani's statement is more acceptable on the ground that half a *man*¹⁷ (approximately 6 or 7 *sers*) per day was a reasonable quantity in those days for a normal family with one or two servants. Rich persons of the town who had no villages or fields to fall back upon in unfavourable seasons were also given a fixed quantity of grain for their requirements.

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¹⁶ Ferishtah p. 112.

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¹⁷ Barani clearly says (p. 309)
– نیمگاں من عام خریداران منده را دادندی

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But in those days there were no ration cards nor were people numbered or counted for obtaining grain in fixed quantities. It seems that whosoever went to the *bazār* was given a reasonable quantity of grain. Barani says that during the seasons of drought poor and helpless people crowded in the *bazārs* and sometimes got crushed to death. In such cases, where the officers were found derelict in discharging their duty, they, as well as the superintendent of the market, were taken to task by the king.¹⁸ The chronicler does not say much about the poor people or if there was any provision for the free distribution of grain in times of scarcity. It appears, however, that no such concessions were given to anybody as the prices of food grains were already sufficiently cheap. The system of rationing was a novel idea of 'Alāuddīn¹⁹, and Barani asserts that on account of the various regulations of 'Alāuddīn no famine occurred in Delhi even when there was drought and people thought famine to be unavoidable. At least in Delhi the people lived a life of contentment, undisturbed by any fear of scarcity.

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¹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 309.

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¹⁹ According to Dr. Moti Chand rationing was resorted to ameliorate conditions of famine in ancient India. (Journal of the U.P. Historical Society, vol. XIX December, 1945). That may be so, but 'Alāuddīn's scheme was quite novel so far as Muslim rule in India is concerned.

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Ferishtah's statement that the prices fixed for Delhi were obtained in other parts of the country as well,²⁰ is very doubtful. Firstly, it was very difficult in those days to fix a uniform price of food grains and other articles all over the empire. Even in the 20th century, with all the elaborate system of transport and communications, a uniform system of price control has not been possible in India. In the 14th century conditions were still more unfavourable. Secondly, Barani always talks only of the capital city while describing rationing and price control, and his statements are more trustworthy than Ferishtah's. Barani was living in 'Alāūddīns days, Ferishtah was not.

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²⁰ Ferishtah p. 112.

The Market Officials

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Such an elaborate system of market control under which prices of articles were fixed, the merchants registered, and profiteering and speculation strictly forbidden, could not be worked without a large and efficient staff of officials. 'Alā-ūddīn appointed Malik Qabūl, who was a trustworthy servant of Ulugh Khān and whom Barani credits with wisdom, discretion, and trustworthiness, as *shahnah* or superintendent of the market. He was granted a large estate and was given a large body of cavalry and infantry to help him in the discharge of his duties. His powers were extensive and he was put in charge of all the travelling-marchants of the city. He saw to it that they regularly brought grain to the grain market, sold it at rates fixed by the crown and that nothing was hoarded or sold in the black-market. He used to report to the Sultan about prices prevailing in the market and also about the general condition of the *bazār*. His reports were verified through other sources which would be mentioned below; and if there was even a little difference between the reports of the superintendent and other officials of the *bazār*, a thorough enquiry was conducted to find out the cause of discrepancy and the defaulters were severly punished. The *shahnah*, who held a high position and big estates, was in constant dread of the sultan, and was liable to be taken to task for any delinquency. He tried his utmost to see that nothing happened in the market against the orders or wishes of the sultan lest the wrath of the king should fall on him. In spite of his high authority in the market, Malik Qabūl could not suggest a single amendment or change in the king's orders. When once or twice in seasons of drought he requested the sultan to raise a little the price of grain, he was awarded twenty cuts. Consequently the superintendent could not afford to be anything but an extremely harsh and strict officer. He moved about in the grain market whipping the fraudulent merchants publicly. The strictness of the *shahnah* compelled the market people to be honest in their dealings.

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Other officials of the grain market were the *barīd-i-mandi*, who reported the quality of the wares, and the *munhiyāns* who may be compared to the secret service police of to-day. These officials were inferior to the *shahnah-i-mandi* in status, but they submitted their reports separately and directly to the sultan and not through the *shahnah*. Thus the shrewd monarch received reports of the market from three different sources and scrutinized them carefully. This compelled the market officials to be correct in their accounts and honest in their dealings. The traders also could not deviate from the market regulations, since they would not receive any favour from a single officer.

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*The Cloth Market.*

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Next to food, the other important item of price control was cloth. In fact the sultan established separate markets for all the commodities needed by the soldier. There was a horse market, a slave market, markets for cattle and for sweets, spices, fruits, weapons, shoes etc. Ziyāuddīn Baranī describes in detail the condition of the Cloth Market, the administration of which was regulated on the lines of the Grain Market. Just as Malik Qabūl was appointed *shahnah* of the Grain Market one Yāqūb was appointed as Dīvān-i-Riyāsat to control the Cloth Market, but his jurisdiction extended to other markets also. The Sultan had given him the post of Dīvān-i-Riyāsat in addition to his duties as *Nāzir* (Superintendent *Dārogha*) and *Muhtasib* (Censor of Public Morals) of the empire.²¹

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²¹ Baranī p. 317.

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Thus his powers were very extensive indeed, and although Malik Qabūl was all in all in the Grain Market, he was in reality subordinate to Yāqūb in rank, since Barani at one place says that Yāqūb appointed *shahnahs* for each of the various market in the town.²² The Divān-i-Riyāsat was "not only trustworthy and upright but also ill-tempered, hard, close, cruel and coarse." The respect and obedience he commanded on account of his position as well as temper, and the severe punishments he freely inflicted upon the bazār people, improved the tone of transactions in the markets.

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²² Ibid. p. 318.

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The Cloth Market was located in the building known as the Sarai 'Adl. It was established "inside the Badaon gate, in the direction of Kaushak-i-Sabz, which for years had not been used." The Sarai 'Adl was open from early morning till late in the night, the hour of the last prayer. The public, therefore, could buy wares any time during the day. It was the only market in the town which dealt in cloth, since no trader was permitted to sell his goods secretly or at prices higher than those fixed by the sultan. Those who dared to contravene this regulation were severely punished and their goods lapsed to the crown. Ziyāuddīn gives a long list of silk and cotton cloths, the prices of which were fixed by the crown. It is difficult to ascertain the prices of cloths now because the measure and currency of those days cannot be calculated in modern money, and also because in many cases the contemporary chronicler does not give measure of the cloth whose price he mentions. He simply mentions the name of the stuff and its price without mentioning any specific measure. But it is well-nigh certain that cloth was not cheap in those days. While wheat was sold at 7½ *jitals* per *man*; a *chādar*, obviously of ordinary size, was sold at 10 *jītals*. Long-cloth of good quality, twenty yards in length, was sold for one *tankah*. It is the only thing for which Barani gives a measure. Shaikh Nasiruddin Chirāgh, writing in *Khairulmajālis* says that in the time of 'Alāuddīn a quilt (*lihāf*) could be made in one or two *tankahs*. He gives the details of various stuffs needed in its preparation. The upper piece (*fard*) could be had for 20 *jītals*, border of ordinary quality for 30 *jītals*, cotton and lower piece (*astar*) for 12 *jītals*. Carding and sewing meant a further cost of 4 to 6 *jītals*. Compared with to-day cotton cloth was fairly cheap. But at another place the Shaikh writes that in those days a whole feast could be arranged in one *tankah*. Compared with food, therefore, cloth of even ordinary quality was not cheap in those times.

c17.s1.9

The prices of silk cloths were very high indeed. Delhi *Khazz* was sold for 16 *tankahs*, almost a whole month's pay of a soldier; *Silāhti*, an ordinary cotton cloth, which is known to this day and which was cheap in the time of Akbar,²³ was sold at 6 *tankahs*. The fact that 'Alāuddīn controlled the price of cloth and gave advance to merchants to import goods into Delhi, shows that cloth was still dearer before the Sultan issued the regulations. Barani relates that a regulation was introduced whereby people were stopped from buying silk stuffs at cheap rates in Delhi and selling them at prices four or five times higher outside Delhi. This clearly means that outside the metropolis the price of cloth was still higher. The following cloths and their controlled prices have been given by Barani:—

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²³ Blochmann: *Aīn-i-Akbarī*, p. 95.

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Delhi *Khazz* silk . . . . . 16 tankahs. Orange colour raw silk . . . . . 6 " " Half Silks, mixed with hair........... 3 " " *Shīrīn Bāft* fine . . . . . 5 " " " " " middling . . . . . 3 " " " " " coarse . . . . . 2 " "

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The control of prices of cloth brought to the forefront the same problems which had cropped up in the case of food grains. The merchants were reluctant to sell their goods in Delhi, since they were not allowed as much profit as they were accustomed to. Moreover, they bought their goods in far off places at prices which surely were not controlled, they incurred expenses in transporting them to Delhi, and then they were expected to sell their articles in the capital at prices fixed by the Sultan. In the case of agricultural produce 'Alāuddīn could compel the cultivators in the *doāb* and other regions to sell grain to the travelling-merchants at regulated rates, but he could not compel manufacturers of far off places like Devagiri and Multan, and places beyond Multan in the north west,²⁴ to sell to merchants goods at fixed rates. Consequently the Sultan provided more facilities to cloth merchants than to those who imported grain into Delhi. So far as the registration was concerned every merchant whether Hindu or Musalman who traded in Delhi²⁵ was ordered to get his name registered with the Dīvān-i-Riyāsat. He was also required to sign an agreement stipulating that he would bring a fixed quantity of goods in the city and sell them at controlled rates. The Sultan advanced money from the state treasury to the Multānī merchants to enable them to purchase commadites elsewhere and to sell them in the Sarai 'Adl at the controlled rates. The money advanced by the sultan amounted to about 2,000,000 *tankahs*. Ziyāuddin does not say if the merchants were expected to return the same to the public exchequer. It would appear that as the money was advanced for buying commodities at higher rates outside, and selling them at cheaper and controlled rates in Delhi, the merchants could not be expected to return it. But the observation of Barani that the king determined the prices of various goods leaving a fair margin of profit to the merchant²⁶ leads one to infer that the government money was returned by the merchant after his goods had been sold out. Ibn Battūtah's statement makes the point clear. He says that the sultan abolished all taxes on merchandise, advanced money to merchants and told them: "with this money buy bullock and sheep, and sell them; the price that they will fetch must be paid to the treasury, and you shall receive allowance for selling them."²⁷ Thus it would appear that the Multānī merchants and other traders who were induced to trade in Delhi were not traders in the true sense of the term, selling goods at profitable rates; but they were virtually agents of the government. They were advanced money to buy goods abroad and sell them in Delhi, and they received remuneration for this service. It may be surmised that such transactions must have caused an immense loss to the state.

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²⁴ E.g. Devagiri silks, horses, swords and other sundry articles were brought from far off places.

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²⁵ Baranī says "merchants of the empire" but this seems to be an exaggeration. 'Alāuddīn was only concerned with Delhi where the prices were controlled.

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²⁶ Barani p. 316.

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²⁷ Elliot, vol. III, p. 599.

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To put a stop to black-marketeering, restriction were imposed on the sale and purchase of high class fabrics. Silks were sold at high prices outside Delhi and there was danger of people's buying costly stuffs in the capital at controlled rates and selling them at prices four or five times higher outside. Thus the evil of profiteering at the cost of the state loomed large. Some cases of profiteering on the part of public men were brought to the notice of the sultan, who was not slow to issue orders to counteract it. (Accordingly nobody was allowed to buy costly stuffs as *tazbīb* and *Tabrezi*, Delhi foiselle silks (*khazz*), *kamkhob*, *shashtari*, *harīrī*, Chinese, *Bhīram* and Devagiri silks, cloths embroidered with gold threads²⁸ and other similar articles without first obtaining a permit from the Dīvān-i-Riyāsat. The Dīvān issued permits to Maliks and Amirs and other well-known persons with whose credentials he was satisfied. The purchaser had to give a written receipt in acknowledgement of the article bought by him and in this way any possibility of profiteering in the black market was eliminated.)

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²⁸ Barani p. 311. اسامى (? اسپهاتى) که بنام حشم در دیوان بگذرند —

Horse Market

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(Rules were also framed to regulate the sale of horses, cattle and slaves. In medieval times cavalry was the most important branch of the army and horses were much valued. In Central Asia, among the Mughals, horse stealing was punished with death. In South India large amount of money was spent by Hindu Rajas to procure horses from countries like Arabia and Qipchāq. (In North India horses of good breed were mostly imported from Arabia, Persia and Afghanistan, but the Mughal activities interrupted the course of trade and the price of horses rose high. But 'Alāuddīn could not allow a high price for any commodity needed by a soldier, and the price of horses was also regulated.) Horses considered fit for military service²⁹ were divided into three grades according to their quality and breed. The price of the best quality horse ranged from 100 to 120 *tankahs*, that of the second from 80 to 90 *tankahs*, and of the third from 65 to 70 *tankahs*. The horses which were not passed as fit for military service by the Divān, and which were known as *tattūs* (ponies) were priced from 10 to 25 *tankahs*. To maintain these low prices 'Alāuddīn had to treat the horse brokers and middlemen very severly. He ordered that no dealer or his agent should be permitted to frequent the market with the intention of buying a horse for reselling it at a higher price. But it was not very easy to bring them under control. *Dallāls* or middlemen are even to-day one of the most cunning and unmanageable section of the *mandi* people. In those days, declares Ziyāuddīn, "brokers and middlemen were a most arrogant, rebellious and audacious class of people." They were wont to take commission both from the purchaser and the seller in every transaction, and had so complicated the business that no transaction could be effected without their mediation. Virtually, they were the "Kings of the market." Consequently it was with some difficulty that the sultan could bring the brokers to book. He instituted very harsh measures to put an end to the nefarious *dallāls*, who for years had earned their livelihood on high bidding and speculation. Those who still persisted in their old ways were incarcerated with life long imprisonment. It was no longer possible for the merchants and brokers to prevaricate or speak lies, and the price of horses fixed by the sultan began to obtain in the city.

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²⁹ Barani p. 313, has insert Persian quotation from note 28. By Dīvān here is meant Dīvān-i-'Arz اسامى is meaningless. It is in all probability اسپهاتی

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'Alāuddīn used to send for inspection after every six weeks or two months horses of every variety to ascertain that each variety was sold at the price specified for it. If any variation was detected the brokers had to suffer penalties and punishments. Fear kept the brokers vigilant and prevented them from trading upon the simplicity of customers. In this way the king was successful in establishing fixed prices for horses of every variety.

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(On lines similar to these were fixed the prices of slaves and cattle.) In medieval times slaves of both sexes, like any other commodity, were sold in the market and the sultan fixed prices for them also. The standard price of a working girl was fixed at from 5 to 12 *tankahs*, and that of a good-looking girl from 20 to 30 and even to 40 *tankahs*. If a very beautiful slave girl of a very high price, say of 100 or 200 *tankahs*, was offered for sale in the market, nobody dared to buy her for fear of the *munhiyāns* (secret police), lest the king should be informed that a particular person was rich enough to pay so high a price for a slave girl. The prices of boys were fixed from 20 to 30 *tankahs*. The slave-boys were classified according to their looks and working capacity. As was the case with the horse market, in the slave market also it was not possible for the dealers and monied men to go about showing or seeing slave boys or girls or tampering with their prices. The punishments inflicted on brokers for contravening the orders of the king were very severe and Barani exaggeratingly, though not untruthfully, says that such penalties were inflicted on the brokers that even life became distasteful to them, and they longed for death.

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Similar regulations were introduced in the cattle market also. A good beast of burden which was sold for 40 *tankahs* in the reign of Muhammad Tughlaq or of Fīrōz, used to be sold for 4 or at the most 5 *tankahs* in the time of 'Alāuddīn. A cow for slaughtering was sold at a *tankah* and a half while a milk cow was sold at 3 to 4 *tankahs*. The price of a cow or buffalo in milk averaged from 10 to 12 *tankahs*.

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So much about the large markets. It has been pointed out before that 'Alāuddīn fixed the price of each and every commodity however trifling.) It was a matter of policy also. It was useless to control the price of foodstuffs if sweets or things prepared from them were not controlled. The prices of different commodities are interconnected. For example, if the prices of wheat, *ghī* and sugar are controlled, and the price of sweets is left uncontrolled, the control is not complete. Thus the prices for *harīsah*, *reorī*, sugar-candy, puddings, vegetables, bread, combs, slippers, shoes, cups, pitchers, goblets, needle, betelnuts and even betel were fixed.

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*Means of enforcing orders.*

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It was not easy to force all these regulations down the throats of tradesman—wholesale dealers as well as retailers, who for long had been enjoying liberal profits. But the state exigency forced the king to see that his orders were faithfully carried out. Upon effective enforcement of his orders depended the efficiency and happiness of his armed forces, the safety of the state against foreign aggressors and the glory of the crown through conquests.

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A schedule of the prices of different commodities was prepared and a reasonable profit was allowed to the seller.³⁸ Since this margin was determined according to the wishes of the king without any consultation with the merchants, it may safely be surmised that it was not very high. The schedule was forwarded to the Divān-i-Riyāsat, whose duty it was to enforce it in the market. Malik Yāqūb; the Divān-i-Riyāsat, or the Inspector General of all the markets in Delhi, appointed *shahnahs* or magistrates for various markets dealing with various commodities. The *shahnahs* had full jurisdiction over their markets and were directly responsible to the king. The status of a *shahnah* was high as can well be imagined from the instance of Malik Qabūl. Each *shahnah* received a copy of the schedule of rates for his market. The superintendents were instructed to enquire from the purchasers what they had paid for a particular ware, and were to note down their statements to verify if the prices charged were not in contravention of the scheduled ones. If the market people were found to be selling things at higher prices they were at once taken to task. The appointment of a *shahnah* for each market was extremely conducive to keeping prices low.

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³⁸ Barani p. 316.

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The powers vested in the market officials were very extensive. They coerced, whipped and tyrannized over the traders in every way. But in short weights were their common habits, and they did all this in spite of the barbarous punishments inflicted upon them for the slightest offence.

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'Alāuddīn ordered most severe punishments for contravention of his orders regarding price-control. Even in these days a fine of a few thousand rupees is levied or rigorous imprisonment for some months is awarded to a shopkeeper who is found to have sold an article for even a few annas above the controlled rate. Six centuries back the traders were perhaps as persistent in their cunning, while the punishments more severe. It was ordered that the Nāzir Yāqūb should ill-treat and administer lashes to guilty traders. In cases of short-weight he used to cut off flesh from the haunches of traders, equal to the deficiency in weight. The harshness of Yāqūb was talked about everywhere among the young and the old. Every day the Nāzir used to inquire about the transactions of the *bazārs* several times, and on the discovery of the slightest discrepancy he whipped the traders mercilessly.³² Notwithstanding his harshness the merchants continued to cheat the customers, and it was found that short-weight trick was commonly practised when little boys came to purchase things in the market. To detect the mischief the sultan used to call young slave-boys from his pigeon houses, give them some *jitals*³³ and send them to the market place, asking one to bring bread, another to bring *halvā*, a third *yakhnī*, a fourth *reorī* a fifth melon, a sixth cucumber and so on, and when these boys returned after their purchases the sultan sent for the Dīvān-i-Riyāsat and had the articles brought by the boys weighed in his presence. If any thing was found to be deficient in weight it was given to the Dīvān-i-Riyāsat, who at once proceeded to the shop from where the articles had been brought. A quantity of flesh equal to the deficiency in weight was cut from the haunches of the fraudulent seller, and he was kicked out of his shop. Such drastic punishments seem to have been meted out only to habitual offenders. The horrible punishments introduced by 'Alāúddīn continued to be awarded for some time, says the historian, till at last the tradesmen became quite submissive and discontinued giving short weights. Not only that, they were so much terrified with these drastic measures that sometimes they gave much more than the actual weight.

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³² Barani p. 318.

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³³ *Ibid.* p. 318 wrongly has *diram* which coin probably then did not exist.

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Now, this was the other extreme. If profiteering and selling short weight and cheating the purchasers in various ways deserved discouragement, the extremely severe punishments which led the shopkeepers to weigh more than the actual quantity indicates a lack of far-sightedness on the part of the king. How long could trade flourish under conditions in which the shopkeepers worked without getting sufficient profits. The market regulations of 'Alāúddīn did not permit enough profit to the tradespeople and consequently lent no encouragement to trade and commerce. The king did not permit even the least flexibility in prices and if hope of gain is lacking there can be no incentive to trade. Moreover, the regulations which hardly benefitted the traders were forced down their throats. Even after giving due consideration to the exaggeration in which Barani is prone to indulge, the facts that such severe penalties were inflicted on brokers in horse, cattle and slave markets, that even life became so distasteful to them and they longed for death, and deficiency in weights was made up by slicing off an equivalent quantity of flesh from the person of shopkeepers, clearly show that the market people must have been disgusted. That there was no encouragement to trade is clearly borne out by the fact that the merchants carrying on trade in food stuffs as well as other commodities were *compelled* to take up their abodes in Delhi. They had to sign agreements making them individually and collectively responsible for one another's good conduct, and the authority of state officials extended even over their wives and children.³⁴ It can well be surmised how the merchants would have chafed under the rigorous regulations of the monarch and how they would have rejoiced to see such a state of affairs come to an end.

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³⁴ Barani pp. 306-7, 310-11.

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Not only trade and commerce but agriculture was also affected. It has been pointed out at length in the preceding chapter how the revenue regulations of the king as well as his economic measures were harmful to agriculturists. Here it may be pointed out once again that these regulations rendered the condition of peasantry almost hopeless. Mr. Moreland thinks that the revenue regulations of the sultan were meant to crush the rich middlemen and not the poor peasants or the "herds" as such. But one fails to understand how the poor peasantry could be happy under the market regulations. It is conceivable that the realization of 50 per cent. of the land produce in kind was not meant to oppress the peasants but to store grain in the capital city. Yet when a husbandman paid half of his hard earned produce in land tax, some portion of the remaining in other sundry duties, and then was compelled to sell his grain at cheap rates to travelling merchants, who on their part were helped by government officials in obtaining their stocks, it does not speak well of the general condition of the peasantry of those days. There is no doubt that the cultivators were relieved of the drudgery of taking their grain into grain markets of big cities lying in the vicinity of their fields, and were saved from falling a victim to the seductions of the profiteering middlemen and speculators, still they could never be happy in selling their grain at a cheap price fixed by the government without having the choice of selecting a market for themselves and trying for a profit. The temptation of making profit, which is the greatest incentive to production, was completely checked by ‘Alāūddīn’s market regulations and the peasants seem to have lived a life of monotony and low standard, if not of squalor. The motive of the sultan may not have been to crush the poor peasants against whom he could possibly have no grudge, but the exigencies of the state required him to take such steps under which the interests of commerce and cultivation were sacrificed to those of the army. A peasant is not always a hoarder; he will not hoard if he is given a fair price for his produce. Just for the sake of safety he stores up some grain as security against bad seasons, but even that was denied to him, and every *man* of available grain was transferred to the Grain Market of Delhi. The stores of the sultan continued to increase so that Ibn Battūṭah ate the rice which had been stored by sultan ‘Alāūddīn. The rice had become dark in colour but had preserved its taste. This fact alone shows that the government had hoarded a large quantity of grain, much above the needs of the state, so much so that it was available even three decades after the death of the king.

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It is obvious that neither agriculture nor trade and commerce could flourish under the regulations of ‘Alāūddīn. But the fostering of agriculture and trade were not his motives either. To him the prime necessity of the state was the maintenance of a huge army, sufficient to repel Mongol invasions as well as to subdue independent chiefs of India. There is no doubt that the benefits of market regulations were enjoyed by the civil as well as the military population of Delhi,—a fact about which Baranī does not forget to make a special mention,³⁸ still the agriculturists of the doāb and of tracts in the vicinity of Delhi, of Jhain and of Bayana, suffered privations for the benefit of the people at the capital. The tradesmen also did not gain much and worked under compulsion. But 'Alāuddīn was not learned enough to philosophise on the benefits of a far distant future and to foster trade, commerce and agriculture. He thought he was called upon to act and he acted vigorously. He invariably sacrificed civil interests to those of military. In the reign of no other king were the Mughal invasions so persistent as in the time of 'Alāuddīn. In the reign of no other king of the sultanate period were conquests made on such a large scale. Under these circumstances if all his reforms and regulations were directed towards the benefit of the army, it is not at all surprising. And how many renowned Turkish kings of India could afford to keep the happiness and prosperity of the peasants and traders above those of the army? Necessity, religious zeal and personal ambition, rendered the glory of conquest much more appealing to them than the glory of making such laws as would make the peasants rich and traders richer. 'Alāuddīn was no exception. It is, therefore, not surprising that he put military necessities above civil ones and raised such a strong and contented army, that, whether at home or in foreign kingdoms, it always defeated its adversaries.

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³⁸ Baranī p. 304.

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The most remarkable feature of the economic regulations is the success with which they were carried out. Appointment of *shahnahs* for the various markets, appointment of *barīds*, and the secret and efficient service of the *munhiyans*, all independent of one another and all responsible to the king, improved the tone of administration. No officer, however highly placed, could neglect his duties or play false, because the sultan was constantly informed about everything through his secret service agents. The Dīvān-i-Riyāsat, inflicted drastic punishments on the *bāzār* people and did not permit any breach of the orders of the government. Coercion, compulsion and terrorization were the methods adopted by the officers with regard to market administration. But the character and conduct of the market people, as described by Baranī, justified to a considerable extent the harsh means the sultan resorted to. If the chronicler is to be believed, 'Alāuddīn had undertaken the economic measures after consulting his trusty and experienced councillors and ministers. He had asked their opinion as to what he should do in order that the means of livelihood might be made exceedingly cheap "without introducing capital punishment, torture and severe coercion." But he had to banish brokers and torture tradespeople to see that his orders were carried out once they had been issued. Had the traders been more honest and the king less severe, perhaps the totures inflicted on the *bāzār* people would have been avoided.

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Cites (3)

Devagiri (Daulatabad)
Multân
Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī — Shams-i Sirāj ʿAfīf, Persian

History of the Khaljis, A.D. 1290–1320 c17: Chapter XVII. Economic Measures

Contents

Chapter XVII. Economic Measures

The Market Officials

Horse Market

Cites (3)