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War in Ancient India c11: Chapter VIII: Diplomacy and War

War in Ancient India c11

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Contents

Chapter VIII: Diplomacy and War

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HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY

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Notwithstanding the elaborate rules of war laid down in the epics and the law-books, insisting in the main that to wage war was the duty and privilege of every true Kṣatriya, in several cases the horrors of war made the belligerents think of the consequences and avoid outbreak of hostilities by a well calculated policy which we now term diplomacy. A recent writer says: ‘ Diplomacy is the name for a method of negotiation, persuasion and conciliation for promoting the common interests of different nations, and adjusting those interests which are opposed...... Without the diplomatic system war would be more frequent than it is. Behind the diplomatic system, however, lie the preparations for war: and in certain forms of policy, the threat of war is used as an instrument of diplomacy.’¹ It will be shown, in the sequel, how exactly this concept was enunciated and realised in ancient India. It may be noticed at the outset that the words negotiation, persuasion and conciliation are mere translations of the terms sāma, dāna and bheda, and the expression ‘ threat of war ’ may be equated with daṇḍa. These four were the cardinal points of the ancient Indian diplomatic system, and were effective instruments in averting many a war, which would otherwise have resulted in much bloodshed and economic distress.²

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¹ C. D. Burns, *War*, pp. 81-3.

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² Attention may be drawn to Kalidas Nag's book in French *Les Theories Diplomatiques de l' Inde Ancienne et l' Arthaśāstra* (Paris, 1923) of which I have published a translation in the *Journal of Indian History*, Madras, 1926-27.

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The political term for diplomacy is *naya*, and in the opinion of Kauṭalya, the eminent politician of the 4th century B.C., a king who understands the true implications of diplomacy conquers the whole earth.³

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³ नयज्ञः पृथिवीं जयति ।

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The history of diplomacy in ancient India commences with the *Ṛg Veda Saṃhitā*, and the date of its composition may be taken as far back as the Chalcolithic period.⁴ In the battles the help of Agni is invoked to overcome enemies. He is to be the deceiver of foes.⁵ For it is said in another hymn that his foes are full of deceit.⁶ In pursuing his mission to a successful end, the use of spies is mentioned.⁷ This bears eloquent testimony to the system of espionage prevalent so early as the time of the *Ṛg Veda Saṃhitā*. In the battle of the Ten Kings described in the seventh maṇḍala,⁸ we find the diplomacy of rulers getting supplemented by its association with priestly diplomacy,⁹ which exercised a healthy influence on the constitutional evolution.

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⁴ See my note on the *Culture of the Indus Valley* (Madras University Journal, 1934, January).

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⁵ *RV.*, iv, 15.4.

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⁶ *Ibid.*, iii, 18.1.

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⁷ *Ibid.*, iv, 4.3.

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⁸ *Ibid.*, vii, 18.33.

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⁹ See Nag., *op. cit.*, p. 10.

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The diplomatic system gained more and more importance with the march of time. By the epoch of the *Atharva Veda Samhitā*¹⁰ we find the monarch as the centre of Hindu diplomacy occupying a seemingly absolute position, but subjected to discipline by his Purohita and public opinion. In this respect the ancient king differed from the Archon Basileus of Athens and the *Rex sacrorum* of early Rome.

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¹⁰ *A.V.*, iii, iv, 1-6.

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According to a hymn in the *Atharva Veda Samhitā*,¹¹ Varuṇa had a number of spies who were thousand-eyed and who went forth hither and thither. This hymn, read along with other hymns in that Veda praying that the King may be invested with victory in battle, shows the diplomatic practices then in vogue. The *Atharva Veda* recommends the conquest of enemies more by artifice and stratagem and by spells and incantations.

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¹¹ *Ibid.*, iv, 16.4.

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By the time when the *Atharva Veda* was composed, the kernel of the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa* had come into existence. In these books we find the king gaining more power and influence. War and diplomacy have come to stay. They are no more in their primitive stage, but have become developed institutions. The tribal system has given place to organised communities, a good number of which took a leading part in the great battle between the Pāṇḍavas and the Kauravas.¹² Even in the first parvan of the great epic, the Ādi Parvan, we find a chapter (143) which discloses a stifling atmosphere of court intrigue and currents and cross-currents of negotiation. There is then a discourse on diplomacy by a distinguished diplomat, Kaṇika, perhaps the Kaṇika-Bhāradvāja of the *Arthaśāstra*, to the blind and aged Dhṛtarāṣṭra, jealous of the Pāṇḍavas:

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¹² See for details *JRAS.*, 1908—Pargiter's paper.

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“Kings should ever be ready with upraised sceptre and they should ever extend their prowess carefully avoiding all faults of theirs; they should ceaselessly watch for the faults of other.

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“He (a king) should so act as others (his enemies) may not find any fault in him. But he should see the fault of others. He should keep his resources concealed as does a tortoise his members of the body.

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“Having begun a particular act, he should always accomplish it. A thorn, if not wholly extracted, produces a festering sore.

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“The killing of a harmful foe is always praiseworthy. If he be powerful, if he be escaping, if he be a great warrior, one should watch for the hour of his disaster, and then kill him without any scruple. O, son, if the enemy be weak, still he should not be scorned. A spark of fire can consume a forest if it can spread from object to object.

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“They (kings) should sometimes feign deafness and blindness; for, if they are incapable of chastising they should pretend not to notice the faults. They should then consider their bows as made of straw, but they be as watchful as a herd of deer sleeping (in the woods).

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“When your enemy will be in your hands, destroy him by any means, open or secret. Do not show him any mercy, though he seeks your protection.

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“An old enemy should be killed even by winning him over by wealth. Thus you must be free of anxiety, for there is no fear from a dead man.

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“Destroy all the three, five and seven sources of the enemy; you must destroy them by uprooting them.

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“Then you should destroy their allies and partisans. If the root is destroyed, they (allies) can never exist.

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“If the root of the lord of the forest (tree) is uprooted its branches and twigs can never exist as before. Carefully conceal your own weaknesses and watch those of your enemies.

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“O, king, you should rule over your kingdom, ever being very watchful. By maintaining the perpetual fire, by sacrifices, by brown cloths, by matted locks and skin cloth, you should first gain the confidence of men (your enemies) and then you must spring upon them like a wolf. It is said that in earning wealth, hypocrisy is a cheap means. As a hooked staff is used to bend down the bough of a tree to pluck the ripe fruits, so this method should be adopted in destroying one’s own enemies.

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“Carry your enemy on your shoulder till the time comes when you can throw him down and break him into pieces as an earthen vessel is broken being thrown on stones.

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“An enemy should never be allowed to escape, even if he piteously addresses you. You ought not to show him any mercy; he must be slain at once.

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“Enemies should be destroyed by the arts of conciliation, or the expenditure of money, or by producing disunion amongst his allies, or by the employment of every means in your power.”

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Being further asked by Dhṛtarāṣṭra to give him in detail the arts of conciliation, Kaṇika proceeds to narrate them. Its substance is as follows: The king should destroy by incantations, by gifts of wealth, by poison or by deception the enemy even if he be his own son, friend, father, or preceptor. In so doing, he should utter soft words, and after hitting should pity the victim and even shed tears over him. Securing confidence by conciliation and gift of wealth, or by any means, the enemy must be destroyed so effectually that he may not raise his head afterwards. Spies should act as diplomatic agents. Just like a fisherman catching and killing a fish, the king should tear the vitals of the enemy under a pretext. In getting rid of the enemy the king should be razor-like, sharp, and shining when opportunity occurs.

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If this discourse, which smacks of Machiavellianism in a sense, is read together with what Bharadvāja is said to have narrated on the same subject to Śatrujit, the king of the Sauvīras, in the Śānti Parvan, we can perceive that there are certain differences, though in fundamentals there is agreement between them. Despite these diplomatic intrigues, the Pāṇḍavas came out successful and were treated to an excellent discourse by the sage Nārada, versed especially in the six-fold policy (ṣaḍ-guṇa-vidhi).

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It would be a refreshing contrast to know the views of Nārada on diplomacy.¹³

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¹³ *Sabhāparva*, V, 20 ff. (Trans. P. C. Ray).

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"With the six attributes of kings (viz., cleverness of speech, readiness in providing means, intelligence in dealing with the foe, memory, and acquaintance with morals and politics), doest thou attend to the seven means (viz., sowing dissensions, chastisement, conciliation, gifts, incantation, medicine and magic)? Examinest thou also, after a survey of thy own strength and weakness, the fourteen possessions of thy foes? These are the territory, forts, cars, elephants, cavalry, foot-soldiers, the principal officials of state, the zenana, food supply, computation of the army and income, the religious treatises in force, the accounts of state, the revenue, wine-shops and other secret enemies. Attendest thou to the eight occupations (agriculture, trade, etc.) after having examined, and made peace with thy enemies? O bull of the Bhārata race, thy seven principal officers of state (viz. the governor of the citadel, the commander of the forces, the chief judge, the general in interior command, the chief priest, the chief physician, and the chief astrologer), have not, I hope, succumbed to the influence of thy foes, nor have they, I hope, become idle in consequence of the wealth they have earned? They are, I hope, all obedient to thee. Thy counsels, I hope, are never divulged by the trusted spies in disguise, by thyself or by thy ministers? Thou ascertainest, I hope, what thy friends, foes and strangers are about? Makest thou peace and makest thou war at proper times? Observest thou neutrality towards strangers and persons that are neutral themselves towards thee.

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"Seekest thou to know everything about the eighteen tīrthas of the foe, and fifteen of thine own, by means of three spies all acquainted with one another? O Slayer of all foes, watchest thou all thy enemies with care and attention, and unknown to them? ¹⁴ “Marchest thou, without loss of time, and reflecting well upon three kinds of forces, against thy foe when thou hearest that he is in distress? O, subjugator of all foes, beginnest thou thy march when the time cometh, having taken into consideration all the omens you might see, and convinced that the resolutions thou hast formed, and defeat in their execution, depend upon the twelve maṇḍalas (such as reserves, and ambuscades, etc.), and having paid the troops their pay in advance? And, O persecutor of all foes, givest thou gems and jewels, as they deserve, unto the principal officers of thy enemy, without thy enemy’s knowledge? O son of Pārtha, seekest thou to conquer thy incensed foes that are slaves to their passions, having first conquered thy own soul and obtained the mastery of thy own senses? Before thou marchest out against thy foes, dost thou properly employ the four arts, conciliation, gift (of wealth), producing disunion, and application of strength? O monarch, goest thou out against thy enemies, having first strengthened thy own kingdom? And having gone out against them, exertest thou to the utmost to obtain victory over them? And having conquered them, seekest thou to protect them with care?”¹⁵

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¹⁴ *Ibid.*

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¹⁵ *Ibid.*

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In the foregoing texts there is a very important term, *upadhā*. The term *upadhā* anticipates the diplomatic code of Kauṭalya. The theory has been propounded that Kauṭalya is a close follower of the school of Kaṇika and that his principles are Machiavellian.¹⁶

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¹⁶ See Beni Prasad: *The Theory of Government in Ancient India*, pp. 60-61. K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar in *Some Aspects of Ancient Indian Polity*, pp. 114-15 shows similarities but insists that Machiavelli has been unfairly traduced.

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I have pointed out elsewhere¹⁷ that this is not quite the correct view and cannot stand critical examination. Comparing impartially the principles formulated by Kaṇika with those of Kauṭalya, we note that the Kauṭalīyan code is not vitiated by intrigues and cruelty in utter disregard of all morality. Kauṭalya’s political philosophy is of a high order and can fitly be compared with the theoretical principles furnished by the sage Nārada, to which we have already referred. The fundamental idea common to both is that ‘conquest is not an end in itself; victory is counter-balanced by responsibilities, and acquisitions by the necessity of having to provide for safeguarding them.’¹⁸

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¹⁷ See *I.H.Q.*, March, 1927. 18 See Dikshitar: *Hindu Administrative Institutions*, p. 274. 19 Nag: *op. cit.*, ch. iv. 20 *Ibid.*, Bk. VI, ch. ii. 21 Cp. *Agni Purāṇa*, ch. 238; *Manu*, IX, 294; *Yājñ*. I. 352; *Śukra*, I. 61. 22 See Burns: *op. cit.*, pp. 97-98.

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Let me now proceed to trace in general outline the diplomacy of the Kauṭalīya.¹⁹ The basis of diplomacy is distinguished by seven elements (prakṛti).²⁰ These are the svāmin (king), amātya (ministers), janapada (kingdom), durga (fortress), kośa (treasure), daṇḍa (army), and mitra (allies),²¹ and are regarded as veritable elements of sovereignty. But sovereignty, according to Machiavelli, Hobbes and Hegel, seems to involve no moral responsibility. In other words, the State acts ‘without regard to a moral standard.’²² An examination of the conditions which existed in ancient India in diplomatic practice does not warrant the conception of ‘unmoral’ or ‘irresponsible’ sovereignty.

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Among the seven elements, the svāmin or king was the pivot of the whole system, and his office carried with it grave and great responsibilities (svāmi sampat). There is a catalogue of virtues expected of a good king.²³ According to Kauṭalya, sovereignty depends on the co-operation of the svāmin with the other elements like ministers, army, etc. Great care was to be taken in choosing the right type of men as councillors.²⁴ We are given an ideal description of a kingdom and a fortress, the third and fourth elements of sovereignty.²⁵ A rich treasury, a hereditary army, mainly composed of Kṣatriyas, and loyal allies are the last three elements,²⁶ which are rightly emphasised.

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²³ Cp. Kāma, IV. 6-23.

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²⁴ Bk. I, ch. ix.

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²⁵ Bk. II, ch. 21.

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²⁶ Bk. VII, ch. 116.

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We pass on to the sphere of action,²⁷ which goes by the name of Maṇḍala, its conception being essentially dynamic. Except the madhyama and udāsīna, the other ten of the Rājaprakṛti form the ten diplomatic zones. The ‘circle of states’ is known as the maṇḍala group. The credit for the invention of this new policy is attributed to Śukrācārya.²⁸ We must not confound this new political theorist with the author of the treatise now extant and edited by Dr. Oppert. Undoubtedly the reference is to a work lost now. It is certainly not unreasonable to conjecture that Śukrācārya, the Purohit of the Asuras and a finished master of Vedic literature, took this idea from the Vedic rituals.²⁹ “Prajāpati, the God of Creation, once thought to himself, ‘May I become greater?’ For this he practised fervour. On this he was struck with what is known as the twelve-day rite. He grasped it at once and went through the sacrifice with it. He encircled the twelve-day rite with the fortification of Gāyatrī and won glory and prosperity. He who understands this is sure to prosper. Further, Prajāpati addressed the seasons and the months to sacrifice with him in the twelve-day rite. Those of the first half joined as allies in it, by which evil was effectively removed. The other half did not join in the sacrifice, and hence were regarded as enemies. He who realises this could do away with evil.” It may be said that the circle of twelve states with allies and enemies could have been evolved from this conception of the twelve-day rite. For it is said to consist of 12 kings, who, according to Kauṭalya, are Vijigīṣu (the invader), Ari (immediate enemy), Mitra (invader’s ally), Arimitra (enemy’s ally), Mitrāmitra (invader’s ally’s ally), Amitrāmitra (enemy’s ally’s ally), Pārṣṇigrāha (rear enemy), Ākranda (rear friend), Pārṣṇigrāhasāra (ally of rear enemy), and Ākrandasāra (ally of a rear ally).³⁰ Behind are the madhyama and the udāsīna, wrongly interpreted by Shama Sastri³¹ as ‘mediatory’ and ‘neutral’ kings. Dr. N. N. Law is right when he explains the term as ‘medium’ and ‘super’ and assigns them a right position in the circle.

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²⁷ Ar. Śās., VI. 2; Cp. Kāma. VIII, 43-90; Śukra, IV, 1.1-40; Agnipurāṇa, 232; Matsya, I, 344; Manu, VII. 154-58.

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²⁸ Kāma., VIII, 22.

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²⁹ Ait. Brā., IV. 23; XIX. 1; IV. 25. (19-3).

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³⁰ Bk. VI, ch. 2.

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³¹ Trans. p. 290 (Third Ed.).

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The Madhyama is thus a stronger power intermediate between the Vijigīṣu or the Ari on the one hand and the Udāsīna on the other. Both these are states of higher grades of strength perhaps ‘to meet emergencies of references to such powers.’³²

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³² Inter-State relations in Ancient India, pp. 12 and 13.

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The Vijigīṣu seems to have been invariably an emperor lording it over the states of the circle. That it was so is seen from the *Raghuvamśa* where Kālidāsa, the immortal poet, characterised Daśaratha as the central monarch of a maṇḍala of twelve kings. The term Vijigīṣu occurs in the Purāṇas and means the conquering king.

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The *Mitākṣara* on the verse I. 345 of the *Yājñavalkya smṛti* has some interesting points on the maṇḍala question. There are different versions as to the constitution of a circle of states. Some fix the number at four, six or eight, and others at twelve. Immediate neighbours are hostile to each other, and those succeeding the first circle or the immediate neighbours are allies to the king at the centre. The centre of the circle is composed of the conquering king (Vijigīṣu) and his immediate enemy (Ari); and on the circumference are the different maṇḍalas of other States. Then follow orbits described in accordance with the laws of attraction and repulsion, primordial and fatal. This probably reflects the ancient astronomical theories of the movement of the stars. Thus the conception of Maṇḍala is dynamic. The kings residing in the surrounding circles are not neutrals, as some scholars seem to opine. The Kauṭalīya speaks of the four kinds of foreign rulers—Ari, Mitra, Madhyama, Udāsīna.

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Each of these States, just like the central state, possesses respectively śakti or power which is power of deliberation (mantra) with its adjunct of intellect, and power of lordship (prabhu) with its adjunct of treasury, and activity (utsāha) with its adjunct of heroic valour.³³ He who possesses more of everything is superior to the other. Besides, each of them possesses the five veritable elements of sovereignty: the minister, the country, the fort, the treasury, and the army. These sixty elements with the twelve kings form the seventy-two elements of a State.34

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³³ S.T.R., V. 7. 14-39. 34 Ar. Śās., VI, 1. 35 Ch. VI, 1-6. See also Māgha's Śiśupālavadha, canto. II.

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We notice this maṇḍala idea in the Āśramavāsa Parvan of the Mahābhārata.35 This portion of the Mahābhārata follows the Kauṭalyan principles and must be taken to be only later additions. It mentions the twelve maṇḍalas and distinguishes four kinds of enemies. It is said that these twelve, as also the sixty, having ministers for their foremost, should be looked after by the king. On these are said to depend the Ṣāḍguṇya. Or rather the attributes of these sixfold incidents rest on the seventy-two elements (12 and 60). and if this is carefully understood, a king might feel desirous of conquering the whole earth. We shall examine in the sequel the sixfold incidents. The foregoing survey makes one thing clear, viz. the increasing power of the ministers in the Arthaśāstra polity as contrasted with the king as the most important figure in the polity of the epic age. As we have it in modern times, the policy expressed through diplomacy was primarily in the hands of ministers of State in the fourth century B.C., as it is definitely laid down that the king can do nothing of his own will without consultation with his councillors. Hence the ministers are prominently mentioned among the seven elements and the seventy-two elements as well. It would be surely wrong to bring this kind of sovereignty into line with the idea of an unmoral and irresponsible sovereignty propounded by European writers of the Machiavellian type.

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THE SIX-FOLD POLICY

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Ṣāḍguṇyam³⁶ has been translated in different ways, such as sixfold incidents, sixfold policy, and sixfold action or method.³⁷ These six methods are Sandhi or peace, Vigraha or war, Āsana or maintaining a post against an enemy, Yāna or preparedness for attack, Samśraya or friendship, and lastly Dvaidībhāva or double-dealing or duplicity. There are differences of opinion among political theorists with regard to their number and classification. For instance, Vātavyādhi says that Sandhi and Vigraha—peace and war—form the basis of the sixfold policy. But Kauṭalya’s theory comprehended all the six methods. The conditions that determine the course of action are Daiva (providential) and Mānuṣa (human). The former is either naya or anaya (favourable or otherwise), whilst the latter is either naya or apanaya (equitable or otherwise).³⁸ These circumstances must be weighed in the balance of Kṣaya (low ebb), Sthāna (inactivity), and Vṛddhi (high tide), before a course of action is determined upon.³⁹ It is laid down that the invading monarch should set out for conquest when the enemy is slack and when his own State is in a condition of prosperity, with soldiers and animals in good condition.⁴⁰ He must influence the movements of the madhyama and udāsīna kings also, by any of the four expedients of statecraft such as Sāma (conciliation), Dāna (gift), Bheda (dissension), and Daṇḍa (coercion), or by using all of them simultaneously. It must be his endeavour to bring other kings under his dominion by such diplomatic methods.⁴¹ For it is realised that war is an evil and full of horrors and that it should be avoided as far as possible. Kauṭalya, who is actuated by honest motives, does not see anything dishonest or immoral in the employment of diplomacy and he naturally assigns to it a large place in the scheme of his work. This he seeks to achieve, statesman as he is, by any kind of entente. The nature of the entente rests upon the strength and resources of the parties concerned. Alliance (āśraya) should be sought with good kings and must be kept up to the end. Rāma allied himself with Sugrīva against the unrighteous Vāli and with Vibhīṣaṇa against the immoral Rāvaṇa. Of the six expedients to be pursued in foreign policy by a conqueror, the first is that peace may be concluded with equals and superiors.

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³⁶ *Ar. Śās.* II, p. 23 (Trivandrum Series); *Rāma*, VI, 14.22 Govindarāja’s Gloss.

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³⁷ *Ar. Śās.* VI, 98-99; *Agnipurāṇa*, Chs. 233, 239; *Manu*, VII, 159-180; *Śukra*, IV, 7. 232; *Kāma*. ch. 11.

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³⁸ Br. Niti. VI. 1. 39 Ar. Śās. Bk. VI, ch. 2; Cp. Mhb., Āśramavāsa, ch. 6. 6. 40 Śānti. 113; Sārasāram balam; Ar. Śās. VII. 1; Manu, 7.157; Yāj. I, 347-9. 41 Manu. VII. 159; Viṣṇu. ch. iii.

Sandhi or the Treaty System

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This is a frank and open procedure in diplomacy. To seek war would be ruinous to both the contending parties. To undertake an operation against a superior is like a foot-soldier opposing an elephant, and to make war against an equal is but the collision of unbaked mud vessels against each other causing mutual destruction.⁴² But the inferior must be attacked and made to submit if the differences cannot be amicably settled. There are also cases where an inferior king may sue for alliance with a superior by offering himself to help the latter with army, wealth, or land. This is called the Hīna-sandhi.⁴³

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⁴² *Ar. Śās.* VIII. 3; Cp. Mallinātha on *Raghu.* 17-56.

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⁴³ Bk. VII. 3, p. 253. Vol. II. (Triv. Sans. Series).

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The following is a list of *entente* methods under the category of *daṇḍa*.⁴⁴ When the inferior king delivers himself to a superior that *entente* is called *ātmamiṣa*, and when he offers as a hostage his general or commander-in-chief or Crown Prince, it is *puruṣāntara*. If he is allowed to withdraw with his army, it is *adṛṣṭa-puruṣa*. In case the treasury is offered, the *entente* is *pārikraya* (dependent on money), *upagraha* (dependent on heavy charges), *ātyaya* (harmful in space and time), *suvarṇa* (dependent on indemnity), with their opposite *kapāla* (involving heavy indemnities). In case land is surrendered, the *entente* is *adiṣṭa* (by cession), *ucchinna* (all land except the capital), *apakraya* (liberation of the territory by imposts), and *paribhūṣaṇa* (by homage). These are the different kinds of alliances entered into by inferior powers.

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⁴⁴ Cp. *S.T.R.* 5. 11. 40-45.

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Alliances may be temporary (calasandhi) or permanent (sthāvarasandhi).⁴⁵ In other words, the latter is stable and the former is only a time marking device. The following is the list of alliances which may be made. (1) Mitrasandhi (agreement with an ally on definite terms), (2) Hiraṇyasandhi (for gold), (3) Bhūmisandhi (by acquisition of territory), (4) Karmasandhi (use of army and treasury for common enterprises), (5) Anavasitasandhi (help in colonising an unsettled tract). These are elaborately explained by Kauṭalya.⁴⁶

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⁴⁵ Ar. Śās. VII. ch. 17.

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⁴⁶ Ibid., VII, chh. 9 to 12.

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Dr. Nag takes mitra and hiraṇyasandhis as one and hence he considers paripaṇitāparipaṇitāpasṛṣṭisandhi as the fourth. But we take mitra and hiraṇyasandhi as two different agreements. The term paripaṇitāparipaṇitāpasṛṣṭisandhi is thus explained. An agreement entered into in mutual faith is definite (paripaṇita), and the others are indefinite (aparipaṇita). We need not enter into the details of each of these. It is enough to say that they were deemed mutually advantageous and profitable in the long run. But it is a deceitful alliance (atisandhi) when one has the opportunity to overreach the other, whether equal (sama) or unequal (viṣama).

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The Kauṭalīya proceeds to trace the four different stages in the evolution of a sandhi.⁴⁷ The first is termed akṛtacikīrṣa or peace with no specific end. Here the arts of conciliation and other modes of diplomacy are employed, and the rights of respective powers, equal, inferior and superior, are clearly defined. The second is kṛtāśleṣaṇam or peace with specific terms. In this case the agreement made continues intact, and its provisions are strictly observed, through the medium of common friends. The third is kṛtāvidūṣaṇam or violating the peace terms. If it is seen that one party is treacherous and violates the terms of agreement through the agency of traitors and spies, that agreement is broken. The last is avaśīrṇa kriyā or the restoration of peace when broken. On a promise to observe the provisions of the treaty strictly, a reconciliation is effected. The restoration of the original compact depends on the peculiar circumstances of the case. For there can be no true reconciliation with those who break the entente and then express a wish to join, offering no satisfactory explanation of their previous action. The same holds good with persons of outrageous conduct and those who are unsteady. In formulating these principles, a critical study of the relevant portions of the Arthaśāstra shows that its author is lenient to a fault. For he lays down the rule that “ whoever annoys the enemy should be accepted and he who does equal harm to both should be politically examined ”.

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⁴⁷ Ar. Śās. VII, ch. 6.

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Particular care is to be taken in making political compacts. Kauṭalya condemns in unequivocal terms indiscriminate alliances. It is said that a king should not make peace with a minor, an old man, an invalid, one deserted by his kith and kin, a coward, a greedy man, an unbeliever in God, and other fourteen kinds of disqualified men. But these must be fought and conquered.

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Vigraha: Though seemingly utilitarian in his attitude, Kauṭalya attaches more value to a diplomatic struggle than to an armed contest which goes by the name of saṅgrāmika.⁴⁸ Vigraha is a diplomatic contest, and is but a means to the end, viz., to avoid regular warfare.⁴⁹ There can be no clearer indication of the fact that laws of war and peace had already reached a sufficiently high level in our land in those times. This second line of action or the method of hostilities is, according to the Śivatattvaratnākara, of eight kinds.⁵⁰ This indicates the progress of military science in the diplomatic sphere. Kāma Vigraha (a war where love of woman is the cause), Lopaja (a strife born of greed), Bhū-vigraha (a struggle about some piece of territory), Mānasambhava (one due to the wounded sense of honour), Abhaya (fighting for friends and relatives), Icchāja (born of ambition), Madotthita (due to sheer haughtiness and folly), and Ekadravyabhilāṣa (aiming at a particular object). Though various causes contributed to the outbreak of hostilities and though thirst for military renown fired the zeal of the parties, yet proof is not lacking to demonstrate that wars of aggression were few and far between. It is further laid down that a king must avoid sixteen different kinds of war⁵¹ such as those where the result is uncertain, where it is a violation of the existing treaty rights, where it affects the law of international relations, where the strength of the enemy cannot be calculated, where it would result in a tedious and protracted war, and where adverse consequences are certain.

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⁴⁸ Ibid. Bk. X.

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⁴⁹ Cp. Manu. VII, 107-8, 198-9.

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⁵⁰ Though a late work it is valuable as it transmits the Indian tradition faithfully (5.11.46 f.)

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⁵¹ S.T.R. 5.12.7 ff; Śukra IV, 7.250.

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In this connexion it is interesting to read a section in the Kauṭalīya entitled ‘Yātavyavṛtti.’⁵² Here the discussion centres around the conduct of an assailable power. Here Kauṭalya gives a description of diplomatic struggles carried on between attacking and attackable powers, every one of them trying to get an advantage over the other.⁵³ In the concept of Vigrahaka, there is postponement of actual fighting even after war is declared.⁵⁴ A bargain is effected with little or even no profit, with an eye always to the future permanent gain. This diplomatic war generally came to an end by ceding soldiers, money, or an ally. It was realised that this method was more profitable than that obtained by regular wars.

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⁵² VII. 8.

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⁵³ See Nag: *op. cit.* ch. iv.

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⁵⁴ Cp. *Manu*, VII, 161.

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Āsana: The third method of āsana is loosely interpreted by some scholars as ‘neutrality’; but it may mean ‘holding a post against an enemy’. It is of ten kinds. These are Svasthāna (to hold one’s own place), Upekṣā (indifference), Mārgarodha (blocking canals and channels), Durgasādhya (possession of a fort), Rāṣṭravikaraṇa (bringing the enemy under control), Ramaṇīya (to maintain a post pleasantly), Nikaṭāsana (defeating the enemy at a place near his own), Dūramārga (selecting choice sites and owning them), Pralopāsana (stabilising his power in the conquered country) and Parādhīna (by taking refuge with a superior king).

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Some aspects of neutrality are implied by this term āsana. This opens the discussion on neutrality in general. Wheaton has remarked: “According to the laws of war, observed even by the most civilised nations of antiquity, the right of one nation to remain at peace, while other neighbouring nations were engaged in war, was not admitted to exist.”⁵⁵ Surely, the political theorist had not in mind the principles of ancient Indian polity, however it may be true of ancient Greece and Rome.⁵⁶ According to Henry Wheaton, a State was either an ally or an enemy. There was no intermediate relation. But a careful study of the working of the Hindu circle of States reveals a number of intermediary relationships. Both the terms, Madhyama and Udāsīna, of which mention has been made, corresponded to what we to-day understand by the neutral king. The Udāsīna’s territory was the neutral zone, and here prevailed the laws of peace in actual practice.

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⁵⁵ *Elements of International Law*, p. 564 (London, 1904).

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⁵⁶ See in this connexion S. V. Viswanatha: *International Law in Ancient India*, ch. X.

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Kautalya defines the Madhyama thus: ‘He is the king who occupied a territory close to both the conqueror and his immediate enemy in front and who is capable of helping both the kings, whether united or disunited, or of resisting either of them individually.’ The Udāsīna is that king ‘who is situated beyond the territory of any of the above kings and who is very powerful and capable of helping the enemy, the conqueror, and the Madhyama king together or individually.’⁵⁷ Thus both the Madhyama and the Udāsīna occupied interior zones, apart from diplomatic zones. It is not quite possible to draw a clear line of distinction between them. But still it has been said by some scholars that the Madhyama is more a mediator than a pronounced neutral. In certain cases it is true that the conqueror entered the Madhyama territory, but there is no precedent for the invasion of the Udāsīna kingdom.⁵⁸ The Udāsīna pursued the policy of non-intervention accepted by the diplomatic code of the maṇḍala.⁵⁹

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⁵⁷ Bk. VI, ch. ii, Shama Sastri’s translation.

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⁵⁸ Ar. Śās. Bk. VII, ch. 18.

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⁵⁹ Op. Śukra IV, 7.237.

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To return to the term āsana with which we are at present concerned, it occurs in the Tālgunda pillar inscription.⁶⁰ According to this epigraph the Kadamba king Kākusthavarman observed the state of āsana, and was yet a terror to sāmantas and other chieftains. For he possessed the three śaktis (prabhu, utsāha and mantra), and hence he had gained a spirit of mastery. In the case of Kākusthavarman, it was a question of armed neutrality. It is reasonable to conjecture that Kauṭalya also envisages a condition of armed neutrality, though these kings strictly remained neutral.⁶¹

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⁶⁰ Ep. Ind. VII, No. 5, l. 13.

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⁶¹ See Viswanatha: op. cit., p. 196.

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Yāna: The next method is yāna. Kauṭalya explains abhyuncayo yānam and Ganapati Sastri comments śaktideśakāla.⁶² It means preparedness to march, having due regard to army, place and time. Different kinds of this yāna are distinguished. The chief are Sandhānaja (marching with ally), Pārṣṇirodha (attacking from the rear), Mitravigrahini (causing dissension between his ally and the enemy), Dvandvaja (taking the offensive without the crumbling of the defences), Nirvyāja (marching with an invincible army), Kulya (helped by his enemy's vassals) and Śigragāmini (to pretend to march against one enemy, but suddenly turn towards another).⁶³ An invading king could embark on a march after properly safeguarding his own State, if he felt confident that he would be able to destroy the enemy's works.⁶⁴ In a later section of the Kauṭalīya the diplomatic utility of the yāna is furnished.⁶⁵ If the conqueror finds his enemy beset by troubles, and his subjects disaffected and disunited, and his kingdom ravaged by pestilence and other ills, then he may attack (vigraha yānam). He could again resort to yāna if he found his allies in front and in the rear of his enemy; also he must get heavily backed by his own subjects. There was the Sandhaya yānam which was to lead an expedition against the enemy in front after making a peace with the rear enemy. The third was the sambhūya-prayānam or preparedness for march by a confederation of States of different resources, fixing the ratio of the spoils to be taken by them.

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⁶² Vol. II, p. 238 (T. S. S. Series).

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⁶³ S.T.R., 5.11.57 ff. 64 Ar. Śās. VII, 1. 65 Ibid., VII, 4. 66 Cp. S.T.R., 5.12. 24-29.

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Samśraya:⁶⁶ Samśraya was the fifth policy under the category of ṣāḍgunyam. It literally means ‘support’ and in its broader sense means the seeking of the support of allies. This state of affairs emerges when a king feels that he has not the wherewithal to defend his kingdom against a possible attack of the enemy and also feels his inability to weaken otherwise the resources of his enemy. It is the firmness of the prospect and of deterioration moving on to well conceived strategy through vigorous efforts.⁶⁷ This was provided for by an alliance with a ruler of superior power. There is in the succeeding section an interesting discussion which centres round the nature of alliance. Any alliance with a great power may be tolerated as a stopgap. Permanent arrangements stand condemned; perhaps there was the fear and consequent gravity of strategic setbacks. A weak king should wait for some opportunity by watching the movements of his enemy, and if any such occasion should occur, he must seize it promptly and remove him from his path completely. If he, again, finds himself situated between two strong powers, he must enter into a compact with both of them and slowly set one of them against the other, causing a dissension or division in their ranks. At that time he may put each down separately by secret or covert means. Since no risk can be taken, an alliance must be entered into with him in whom the king has complete confidence and whose friendship is sincere and genuine.

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⁶⁷ *Ar. Śās.* VII, 1.

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*Dvaidībhāva*: The sixth method of state policy in respect of foreign relations is Dvaidībhāva, which means practising duplicity against one's enemies invariably through fear of them. Dr. Shama Sastri’s interpretation, ‘making peace with one and waging war with another’, is thus subject to correction. Underneath this policy lies an attitude of duplicity.⁶⁸ The *Śrīmūlam* commentary⁶⁹ explains the term as meaning the ‘policy of inducing in two enemies confidence by mere speech but behaving inimically in secret.” This policy is to be adopted only when help is not possible from any other source. Kāmandaka compares the behaviour of such a conquering monarch to the eyes of a cow.⁷⁰

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⁶⁸ *Ar. Śās.* VII, 1; *Kāma.* Ch. 11, 23 ff.

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⁶⁹ Vol. II, p. 238.

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⁷⁰ Kāma. XI, 23-6; Cf. Manu, VII, 160, Comm. Bār. Sūtra, V, 5-7; Pañcatantra Reconstructed, p. 360.

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This policy is set forth thus: "The conquering king invokes the aid of his potential enemy. Having combined with a neighbouring king, the conqueror may march against another neighbouring king. Or, if he thinks that 'my enemy will neither capture my rear nor make an alliance with my assailable enemy against whom I am going to march: I shall have double the strength possessed by him, i.e., the enemy suing peace; (my ally) will not only facilitate the collection of my revenue and supplies and put down the internal enemies who are causing me immense trouble, but also punish wild tribes and their followers entrenched in their strongholds, reduce my assailable enemy to a precarious condition or compel him to accept the proffered peace, and having received as much profit as he desires, he will endeavour to reconcile other enemies to me'"; then the conqueror may proclaim war against one and make peace with another, and endeavour to get an army for money or money for the supply of an army from among his neighbouring kings.⁷¹ It is rather difficult to make out the exact recommendation in pursuance of the policy of *dvaidhībhāva*.

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⁷¹ Bk. VII. ch. vii.

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Five kinds of this policy are distinguished in later literature.⁷² These are Mithyacitta (to dislike one in his heart of hearts but pretend to be friendly towards him), Mithya-vacanasaṃjña (to speak out one thing while having in mind just the opposite), Mithyakaraṇa (doing things as if for his good, but to subvert him in the end), Ubhayavetana (to secretly accept illicit emoluments from the enemy while continuing in his master’s service), and Yugmaprābhṛtaka (to pretend to collect men and money for another’s expedition, but on the other hand to serve his own purposes).⁷³

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⁷² S.T.R., 5.12.30-41.

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⁷³ S.T.R., 5.12. 31 f.

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INSTRUMENTS OF DIPLOMACY OR THE SEVEN EXPEDIENTS

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The application of the six methods of foreign policy was through the four means of sāma, dāna, bheda, and daṇḍa, either severally or jointly. According to the Arthaśāstra and the epics these are the recognized traditional expedients, which are found only in germ in Vedic literature. The Purāṇa literature and later nīti works like the Kāmandakīya add three more to this fourfold classification.⁷⁴ These are upekṣa, māyā, and indrajāla. This shows unmistakably the slow but sure advance in the art of war and peace, for the influence of diplomacy is felt in both.

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⁷⁴ See Matsya P. ch. 222.2-3. Kāma. ch. 18.

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Let us now proceed to examine each of these several modes of diplomacy, with regard to their nature and application. The Matsya Purāṇa rules that one and the same policy cannot be pursued at all times and towards all persons. In fact, the Purāṇa sets forth the theory that in the world the people are either righteous or unrighteous, and therefore the application of the policy should differ from person to person. For instance, it speaks of a twofold classification of the first diplomatic mode or sāma. Sāma literally means conciliation, and according to the Purāṇa there is the division into satya sāma and asatya sāma. While the first or satya sāma was applied to righteous beings, the asatya sāma was used towards the unrighteous. The righteous king was easily reconciled when an earnest appeal was made to his ancient family traditions, and when his action in other spheres was approved. If the same policy was pursued towards the unrighteous, surely it would endanger the conqueror's position. For the wicked king would be led to think of the conqueror's weakness and indulge in more mischief. Towards him is therefore recommended asatya sāma which was seemingly a reconciliation but in reality insincere. For in the case of an unrighteous monarch no amount of appeal to family traditions or appreciation of his actions would move him even an inch from his policy.⁷⁵

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⁷⁵ See also Kāma. ch. 18, 19 f.

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The implications of this diplomatic means of sāma are found buried in the texts of the Dharmaśāstra and Arthaśāstra. The conquering king is asked to observe this policy of conciliation by the promise of protection of villages and forests, of sheep and cattle, of roads and traffic, of the restoration of the banished and of the runaway.⁷⁶ Kauṭalya recommends the application of this policy towards the conquered king so that the latter may remain loyal.⁷⁷ The sāma was again a method to bring weaker kings under one's control. If the weak king could not be brought down by a policy of conciliation alone, the other means of dāna or gift might be employed. With the passage of time, five kinds of sāma were distinguished, as is seen in the Śivatattva-ratnākara.⁷⁸ Surely in diplomacy it was not a question of stagnation but of progress of ideas.

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⁷⁶ Bk. VII, ch. 16.

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⁷⁷ Ibid.

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⁷⁸ S.T.R., 5, 12, 50 ff.

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Dāna: The next policy of diplomatic utility was dāna or gift. As we have already seen, Kauṭalya recommends the policy of conciliation and of gifts to inferior kings. The policy of gifts was put into operation if the straight method of conciliation did not produce the intended effect. It is said in the Matsya Purāṇa that even the gods are brought round through gifts of wealth and other presents.⁷⁹ Gifts were often the temptation—this is true largely to-day also—to win over the recalcitrant and the rebellious.

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⁷⁹ Cp. Kāma. ch. 18, 21 f.

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This policy also met another situation. It may be that sometimes the local chiefs or leaders joined hands with foreigners and rose against the king. In such cases Kauṭalya recommends the policy of sāma and dāna towards the discontented subjects, so that they might give up their unholy alliance with the aliens. After ensuring peace at home, the conqueror is asked to apply the policy of bheda and daṇḍa towards the foreigner. In this recommendation and the equally statesmanlike principle that the internal danger must be suppressed first before the external danger should be met, Kauṭalya shows himself a keen politician, and anticipates many of our modern statesmen. This recommendation of a practical statesman is supported by the views of law-givers like Manu.⁸⁰ But Manu does not attach much value either to the policy of gifts or the other diplomatic means like bheda. For does he not say that Paṇḍits or those who are versed in such technical literature, hold the opinion that from the point of view of progress of the kingdom only sāma and daṇḍa are the best?⁸¹ Thus the policy of gifts, though effective in several cases, is assigned a secondary place in the Mānavadharmaśāstra. The Śivatattvaratnākara mentions as many as sixteen kinds of dāna or gift,⁸² thus improving on the few kinds of gifts mentioned by the Arthaśāstra. Under the category come political marriage alliances. To cite an instance, Vaugandharāyaṇa, the minister of Udayana, arranged a matrimonial alliance between his king and the sister of the Magadha king Darśaka, which prevented Darśaka’s support to the Vatsa country and strengthened Udayana’s hands.⁸³ Instances of such marriages can be multiplied.⁸⁴ To mention only a few, we have the marriage alliance of Vākāṭakas and Guptas, of the Cholas and Cheras, the Cholas and Chālukyas, of the Licchavis and the Guptas. In his discussion on gifts, Kauṭalya uses the term abhava which is explained in the Śrīmūlam commentary as अर्थाद् दानं शत्रुभ्यो भयप्रसङ्ग meaning the gift awarded in the shape of wealth to avert the fear caused by the enemy. Otherthe Roman world, and the most important events of the reign of Constantine are thus represented as the immediate consequences of his conversion. But the historian, who must be content with the evidence of the times, will not be easily persuaded that the zeal of Constantine was not stimulated by the hope of political advantage, or that the conversion of the empire was not the result of a long and gradual process of change.

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⁸⁰ VII. 107.

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⁸¹ Ibid. 109.

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⁸² S.T.R., 5.12.59 ff.

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⁸³ Note Rājarāja’s and Rājendra’s marriage alliances with the Eastern Chālukya princes, so as to secure their alliance and turn the flank against their hereditary enemies, the Western Chālukyas of Kalyāni. See also Bhāsa—a study by A. D. Pusalkar, pp. 278-86.

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⁸⁴ See Kāma. ch. 18, 24-41.

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The conversion of Constantine is a subject which has been discussed with great warmth by the historians of the church, and it is not surprising that their opinions should be divided. The panegyrists of the emperor, who were eager to celebrate his piety and his zeal, have represented his conversion as a miraculous event, which was confirmed by the appearance of a cross in the sky, and by the victory which he obtained over his rival Maxentius. The critics, on the other hand, who are less disposed to believe in the supernatural, have sought to explain the conversion of Constantine by the influence of his mother Helena, or by the political necessity of securing the support of the Christians, who were already a powerful and influential body in the empire.

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It is probable that the truth lies between these two extremes, and that the conversion of Constantine was the result of a combination of motives, in which the influence of his mother, the political advantages of the Christian religion, and the genuine conviction of his own mind, all played a part. The character of Constantine was complex and contradictory, and it is not easy to determine the precise nature of his religious beliefs. He was a man of great ambition and of great ability, and he was always ready to adapt his conduct to the circumstances of the time.

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The conversion of Constantine was a turning point in the history of the Roman empire, and it had a profound influence on the development of the Christian church. The emperor, who had once been the persecutor of the Christians, became their protector and their patron, and he used his power to promote the interests of the church and to suppress the pagan religion. The conversion of Constantine was the beginning of a new era in the history of the world, and it is a subject which will continue to be discussed by historians for many years to come.

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ratnākara refers to six kinds of bheda, and shows, as in others, a distinct advance over the Kauṭalyan tradition. These are Prāṇahāni (involving life and death), Mānabhanga (where honour is at stake), Dhanahāni (appealing to a rich enemy's avariciousness), Bandhaka (creating fear of imprisonment in the enemy's ally), Dārābhilāṣa (the enemy coveting his ally's wife), and Arigabhanga (the enemy's covetousness of his ally's kingdom).⁸⁷

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⁸⁷ S.T.R., 5.12.60 ff.

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Daṇḍa: We now pass on to Daṇḍa, the last mode of policy according to the epic tradition. Daṇḍa is not actual punishment or opening of hostilities. It is a diplomatic war, not an armed contest. It is a threat of war, generally applied as a last resort before the actual commencement of fighting. Recourse was had to this policy if the three, sāma, dāna and bheda, had been applied separately or conjointly, and had been found ineffective to achieve the purpose. According to Kauṭalya this policy of daṇḍa should be followed in the case of stronger powers. Sometimes a threat of war might lead to open battle.⁸⁸ This is the use of diplomacy in war. Different modes of daṇḍa are mentioned.⁸⁹ One was to capture the enemy in open fight. The second was to subdue him by resorting to treacherous warfare. The third was to strike him by planning a secret conspiracy. The last was to besiege his fortress to create panic and to capture him during the tumult and confusion caused by the fall of the fortress. If the conquered king behaves better, he should be reinstated.

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⁸⁸ See Kāma. ch. 18, 41 f.

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⁸⁹ Ar. Śās. Bk. VII. 16.

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*Upekṣā*: It has been well realised that the application of *daṇḍa* cannot be resorted to by all monarchs. How could an inferior power meet a stronger power in open warfare? Even the use of treachery or duplicity on his part would not give him success. In that case what should be the policy to be adopted by the weaker State? The *Matsya Purāṇa* envisages a similar situation and recommends the diplomatic policy of *upekṣā*. In the midst of superior powers a lesser power should pursue *upekṣā* or indifference. Already in the Kauṭalīya, this *upekṣā* is mentioned, not as a separate policy but as an aspect of the Udāsīna attitude. In other words, Kauṭalya asks a neutral power to cultivate the virtue of indifference towards his neighbours, whether they be his allies or foes. The ethics of international law, as the ancient Hindus conceived it, respected this neutral power, and no belligerent was prepared to take notice of this ruler of indifferent attitude.⁹⁰ From the Kauṭalyan sense of *upekṣā*, it is a distinct advance in the science of diplomacy to regard *upekṣā* as one of the expedients, which was the privilege of the weaker power to adopt. Either this power should ever remain in that neutral or indifferent attitude, or it should pursue that until the time when it would feel strong enough to meet the adversary in the open field. There seems to be the further implication that even in case the more powerful State should give trouble unprovoked, it was for the small power to endure it for the time being, and not to retaliate. In such cases patience has its own reward.⁹¹ In another section Kāmandaka speaks of a threefold *upekṣā* and cites the classical examples of the Virāṭa king leaving alone the wicked Kicaka, and Bhīmasēna leaving uninjured Hiḍimba’s brother.⁹²

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