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The Administration of the Sultanate of Dehli c11: Chapter VI: Finance

The Administration of the Sultanate of Dehlī c11

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Contents

Chapter VI: Finance

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(THE importance of sound state finance was widely recognized by Muslim political thinkers as well as administrators; solvency and stability were to go hand in hand.¹) The sources of income and the channels of expenditure were, on the whole, well defined. The sultanate of Dehlī organized the main features of its financial administration on the lines laid down by the *shar'* and the Abbasid tradition. By the time the system reached India, it had been carefully elaborated and its principles were clearly understood. Indigenous finance was not very different and the Hindus did not find it difficult to adjust minor differences of detail.

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¹ A.M., f. 33b; *Nasa'ih Shāh Rukhī*, f. 198a; *Inshā-i-Mahrū*, Letter II; Tāj, p. 145a.

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According to the jurists a Muslim state has two sources of revenue: religious and secular. The former can be demanded only from Muslims, for non-Muslims have no obligation to observe the tenets of Islam. The religious taxes are grouped under the name of *zakāt*, so called because a Muslim purifies himself of greed and avarice by sharing his property with the poor and needy.³ It is an act of piety to pay *zakāt*; this religious obligation must be enforced by the *imām*, for it is based on a clear injunction of the Qur'ān.⁴ The *zakāt* is payable on gold or silver, herds and merchandise, provided such belongings reach or exceed a certain limit called a *Zakāt*.

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³ Aghnides, p. 200.

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⁴ Holy Qur'ān, p. 681, note 1713. [^Idem, v. 55]: This makes *zakāt* a *fard* or compulsory.

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niṣāb.¹ The zakāt when assessed on value or weight is one-fortieth of the property; the doctors have elaborate tables regarding the zakāt on pasture animals, though the general principle underlying these tables is to secure a fortieth for the exchequer. The property on which zakāt is assessed should have been in the possession of the owner for at least one year.² Fīrūz Shāh includes zakāt in the list of regular state demands. Fiqh-i-Fīrūz Shāhī mentions a separate treasury for zakāt.³ The zakāt on land and imports will be discussed later.

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¹ Hidāyah, p. 2. The niṣāb is very low, e.g., 52 tolahs 6 māshahs of silver forms a niṣāb.

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² Aghnides, pp. 206-207, 249-254; Sulūk-u'l-mulūk f. 79.

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³ Futūḥāt-i-Fīrūzshāhī, f. 300b; Fiqh-i-Fīrūz Shāhī, f, 410a.

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The secular taxes are kharāj, jiziyah, the tax on non-Muslim traders, and imposts on spoils of war, on mines and on treasure trove. The government also sequestrated the estates of persons dying intestate and without heirs.⁴ Kharāj will be discussed later.

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⁴ Aghnides, p. 202.

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The jiziyah, or poll-tax, was levied only from non-Muslims as the cash equivalent of the assistance which they would be liable to give if they had not persisted in their unbelief, because living as they do in the Muslim state, they must be ready to defend it.⁵ Military service was, theoretically, compulsory on all Muslims, and the sultan, as the representative of the caliph, could call upon any Muslim to defend the state. This religious duty did not affect non-Muslims because they were not bound by the law of Islam; hence they were required to pay tax in lieu of military service. Naturally the tax was not imposed on those who fought in Muslim armies. The theory advanced by some that the jiziyah is a payment for the privilege of living in a Muslim state is obviously wrong, for if it were true, the tax would have been levied on women and children. The latter are, however, exempt, because they would not be required to fight even if they were Muslims.⁶

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⁵ Idem, p. 399.

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⁶ Aghnides, p. 399.

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The Qur'ān uses the word *jiziyah*, like *kharāj*, to mean a tax and early writers do not attach any technical significance to the term.¹ The *jiziyah*, however, was soon levied as a capitation tax; as such it was borrowed from Persia where it was called *gezīt*. The Romans also had imposed a poll-tax on those who were not Roman citizens. Those liable to pay *jiziyah* were assessed in three classes. Imbecile old men, cripples, the blind and those who had not enough to pay the tax after defraying the cost of their living were excused; monks and priests, if they did not work to earn their living and devoted all their time to worship and devotion, were also exempt. The lowest class paid a *dīnār*, the middle two *dīnārs* and the richest four *dīnārs* per head per annum.² The Hindus were first recognized as *dhimmīs* and *mu'āhids*, or allies and protected people, by Muḥammad bin Qāsim on his conquest of Sind, and he imposed on them the *jiziyah* in accordance with the rates universally recognized in the Muslim world.³ The sultans of Dehlī assessed this tax in their own money, and charged ten, twenty and forty *tankahs* respectively.⁴ The Brahmans as monks and priests were exempt. Fīrūz Shāh, after consulting the 'ulamā, levied the tax from them as well; probably he did not recognize men of the Brahman caste who did not devote themselves exclusively to religious pursuits as monks and priests. This measure, however, caused considerable unrest in the capital. The sultan remained firm and ultimately the rich Hindus of Dehlī undertook to pay for these Brahmans. On a subsequent representation, the sultan reduced the tax on the richer Brahmans to ten *tankahs* of fifty *jitals* each.⁵ This is the only occasion on record in the history of the sultanate when the imposition of *jiziyah* was resented, so the assessment must have been lenient.¹ Besides, a poll-tax was not unfamiliar to the Hindus. For instance, under the Gaharwar dynasty of Kanauj, a tax called Turushkadanda was levied either from the Hindus to defend the kingdom from the Muslims or from Muslims who were resident in the kingdom.² Even in Tod's days a poll-tax of a rupee per head was levied in some Rājpūt states.³ There is nothing in the chronicles to support a modern view that 'Alā-u'd-dīn Khaljī neither exacted jiziyah from Hindus nor recognized them as dhimmīs; a subject who was neither a Muslim nor a dhimmī could not reside in a Muslim state.⁴ Actually 'Alā-u'd-dīn Khaljī, in his conversation with Qāḍī Mughīth, did not contradict him when he used the word dhimmī for the Hindus.⁵

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¹ Even when the term *jiziyah* was given a technical meaning, it continued to be used loosely for 'tax' as well as 'tribute', e.g., *Qirān-u's-sa'dain*, p. 35; D A, p. 66.

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² *Encyclopædia of Islām*, vol. i, p. 1051.

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³ *Chach-nāmah*, pp. 208, 209.

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⁴ *Afīf*, p. 383.

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⁵ *Afīf*, pp. 382-384.

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¹ This view is supported by Tripathi: Some Aspects of Muslim Administration, pp 290-291.

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² Agrarian System in Ancient India, pp. 67, 68.

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³ Rājasthān, p. 1116.

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⁴ Sociology of Islam, ii, p. 263. The author states thar 'Alā-u'd-dīn refused to levy jiziyah from the Hindus because he refused to accord them the status of dhimmīs.

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⁵ Barani, p. 290.

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The zakāt on imports was a fortieth of the value of the merchandise; on horses it was 5 per cent. These charges were doubled in the case of non-Muslim traders.⁶ Ibn Baṭṭūṭah found that the sultanate charged a quarter as duty on all imports, but he affirms that it was reduced later by Muḥammad bin Tughluq to the legal ratio.⁷ Probably the sultan had increased the import duty when his finances worried him; the restoration of the legal proportion must have been the result of a decrease in revenue owing to the adverse effect of his enhanced impost on trade. Sikandar Lodī, owing to a transient shortage of corn, abolished the zakāt on grain and it was not renewed by any subsequent sultan.⁸ Some sultans were not content with this tax and levied a cess called dāngānah, which is mentioned among the taxes abolished by Fīrūz Shāh. When the zakāt had been assessed in the sarāi 'adl, on the commodities brought for sale, they were taken to another warehouse called darībah or khazīnah, where they were weighed again.

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⁶ Aghnides, p. 318; Hidāyah, pp. 7-14, D.A. pp. 68, 69.

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⁷ Ibn Baṭṭūṭah, i, p. 210.

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⁸ Mir'at-i-jahān-numā, f. 294a.

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A fresh tax of a dāng on every tankah of their assessed value was levied, which comes to about ½ per cent., not crippling in amount but vexatious in method.¹

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¹ ‘Afīf, p. 375, 4 dāngs=1 jital. ² A.M., ff. 111-113. ³ Futūḥāt-i-Fīrūzshāhī, p. 6; Inshā-i-Māhrū, Letter XV, Sīrat-i-Fīrūz-shāhī, p. 126 ⁴ A.M., f. 113a; D.A., p. 57. ⁵ Aghnides, pp. 415-419; Futūḥāt-i-Fīrūzshāhī, f. 300b. Such a treasure trove was technically called rikāz; D.A., p. 32.

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The spoils of war are called ghanīmah. Legally all booty should be collected, and a fifth set apart for the state, the rest being equitably distributed among the soldiers. It is lawful for the sultan or the commander-in-chief to select an animal, a sword, or some other article which particularly pleases him for his own use before the division of the spoils. This is called ṣafīyah, and is not taken into consideration at the time of division.² The portion which goes to the public exchequer is legally called khums. Gradually a practice grew up in the sultanate of Dehlī that a fifth was distributed among the soldiers and four-fifths kept in the treasury. Fīrūz Shāh’s ‘ulamā considered it illegal and the sultan re-established the old system.³ When the booty was distributed a cavalryman was given twice and sometimes thrice as much as a foot soldier.⁴

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According to the Ḥanafī school of jurisprudence, whose tenets mostly found favour in India, the state was entitled to a fifth of all minerals, provided they were solid, and capable of being melted and bearing an imprint. The Shāfi‘īs maintain that no tax is due on minerals and the Mālikīs hold that zakāt should be paid, even though a year has not elapsed since their extraction. The same principle applied to treasure trove, of which a fifth had to be paid to the state and the rest belonged to the finder, irrespective of his being a Muslim or a dhimmi. If the land did not belong to the finder, then the land owner was entitled to four-fifths of the treasure and the rest went to the state. The state claimed a share only of unstamped bullion or of money minted before the conquest of the area by Muslims.⁵ The argument was that the treasure would have formed part of the spoils of war if it had not been hidden. Sulṭān Sikandar Lodī twice refused to take any portion of treasure trove discovered in his reign; probably the coins bore Islamic legends.¹ This law had its counterpart in the Hindu nīti-shāstras. Kautilya holds that all treasure trove belongs to the king, but Viṣṇu takes a more lenient view and allows a small share to the finder; according to the latter, the Brahmans may keep the whole.² Viṣṇu lays down that a king is entitled to the entire product of mines.³

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¹ Da'ūdī, f. 26a.

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² Viṣṇu, iii, pp. 55-64. The shares vary according to the caste of the finder.

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³ Evolution of Indian Polity, p. 173.

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⁵ Ā'īn-i-Akbarī, i, pp. 293, 294; D.A., pp. 60, 61.

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Heirless property. The property of Muslims dying intestate and without heirs belonged entirely to the state; the property of a dhimmī dying in similar circumstances was handed over to his community.⁴

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⁴ Mez, p. 112; D.A., p. 68.

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Land revenue. The main source of income, indeed the backbone of Indian finance, has always been the land revenue. In Muslim states all cultivated land was legally classified for the purposes of assessment of land revenue. The main classifications were (i) 'ushrī, (ii) kharājī, and (iii) ṣulḥī; other classifications have not received such universal recognition. 'Ushrī lands were (i) the land of Jazīrat-u'l-'arab; (ii) all lands whose owners accepted Islam of their own accord and were left in possession of their estates; (iii) all lands conquered by force and distributed among Muslim soldiers; (iv) habitations of Muslims converted into gardens, provided they are irrigated with tithe water or alternately with 'ushrī and kharājī water; (v) waste lands developed by Muslims with the imām's permission, provided they are, according to Abū Yūsuf, in an 'ushrī district or, according to Muḥammad ibn-u'l-Ḥasan, if they have been fertilised with tithe water. There is difference of opinion regarding a kharājī estate bought by a Muslim : Abū Ḥanīfah thinks it remains kharājī, whereas Mālik thinks it becomes *ushrī*.¹ If a *dhimmi* buys *ushrī* land, it becomes *kharājī*, and, according to Abū Yūsuf, the *kharāj* is twice the amount of *ushr*, that is, a fifth of the produce.² In instances of nīm *ushrī* land, the new owner would pay a tenth.³ This classification requires a definition of *ushrī* water. Rivers, lakes, springs, and wells sunk in the first three categories of *ushrī* lands, also any water which has not come under the jurisdiction of authority are *ushrī*. *Kharājī* water is that situated in *kharājī* lands; also that of wells, canals or reservoirs constructed by non-Muslim kings or at the expense of the public exchequer, and that of rivers controlled by human agency.⁴ The rate charged on *ushrī* lands is uniform; for produce irrigated by rain or flood water and for wild fruit, the growing of which does not require exceptional labour, it is a tenth; where the crops have to be irrigated with buckets or wheels, thus requiring extra hard work, the rate is one-twentieth of the produce.⁵ There is some difference of opinion whether a *niṣāb* is necessary before *ushr* can be charged. Abū Ḥanīfah thinks that cultivated crops and wild fruit should pay the *ushr* irrespective of their quantity, but the other *imāms* as well as his own disciples say that a minimum forming a *niṣāb* is necessary.⁶ All the jurists agree that *ushr* should be charged on honey.⁷

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¹ *Fiqh-i-Fīrūzshāhī*, f. 414.

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² *Aghnides*, p. 373.

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³ Many jurists however hold that a fifth is the minimum; *vide infra*

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⁴ *Aghnides*, pp 359, 360; *Sulūk-u’l-mulūk*, ff. 93b-97a.

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⁵ *Hidāyah*, p. 17.

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⁶ *Aghnides*, pp. 289-291.

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⁷ *Hidāyah*, p. 18.

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Later writers on the agrarian system under the sultans of Dehlī do not mention the existence of *ushrī* lands. It is true that the extent of these areas was not great, but there can be no doubt about their existence. Muḥammad bin Qāsim recognized the lands of all who accepted Islam as *ushrī*.⁸ Similarly Sulṭān Quṭb-u’d-dīn Aibak commanded that all the lands possessed by Muslims should be treated as *ushrī* and be required to pay only a tenth or a twentieth of the produce as revenue.¹ This order probably applied to the region of Lāhor, though it may have extended to that part of the Panjāb which was formerly under the Ghaznavids. 'Ushrī lands continued to exist under the later sultans. Fīrūz Shāh definitely mentions 'ushr : the jurists of his reign pronounced decisions on questions relating to 'ushrī lands; the Tuhfat-u'l-kirām records that the jurists had defined certain areas as 'ushrī.²

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⁸ *Chach-nāmah*, f. 139a.

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¹ Tārīkh-i-Fakhr-u'd-dīn Mubārakshāh, pp. 33, 34.

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² Futūhāt-i-Fīrūzshāhī, p. 6; Fiqh-i-Fīrūzshāhī, ff. 410-420; Tuhfat-u'l-kirām, f. 258a; D.A., pp. 30, 60, 61.

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Before discussing the kharājī lands, it will be better to dismiss those termed sulhī. This appellation is used in a technical sense for certain areas regarding which the earlier Muslims reached some agreement with their owners. Such lands were outside India, and, therefore, need not detain us.³ Some authors mention yet another variety called ard-i-mumlikat: conquered lands or those obtained by treaty and taken over by the public exchequer.⁴ Such lands could not be owned by private individuals; those who tilled them were merely tenants and could not sell them, give them away or convert them into waqfs.⁵ This class is not mentioned by any Indian authority; it never existed in India. Financially, this ard-i-mumlikat has no importance and much resembles kharājī land.

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³ Ā'īn-i-Akbarī, i, pp. 293-294.

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⁴ Fiqh-i-Fīrūzshāhī, ff. 415-418.

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⁵ Aghnides, p. 376.

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The word kharāj, in its Aramaic form, precedes the birth of the Prophet.⁶ The earlier Muslims used the term Kharāj in the sense of a tax, but later it came to be identified with land revenue. All lands conquered by force and not divided among the Muslim soldiers but left to their non-Muslim owners or given to non-Muslim settlers from elsewhere are kharājī lands.⁷

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⁶ Kharāj, used also by the Persians; Ancient Persia and Ancient Persian Civilization, pp. 157, 158.

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⁷ Aghnides, pp. 366-368; Ā'īn-i-Akbarī, i, p. 294.

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Besides, if a *dhimmi* buys *‘ushri* land, it becomes *kharāji*.¹ If the owner of *kharāji* land turns Muslim, his land remains *kharāji*.² Land developed by Muslims with *kharāji* water is also *kharāji*.³ All the water carried in channels dug or controlled by the state is *kharāji*; so is water contained in reservoirs built with public money.⁴

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¹ *Fiqh-i-Fīrūzshāhī*, f. 416.

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² *Idem*, f. 410b; D.A., p. 64.

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³ *Ā’in-i-Akbarī*, i, p. 294; D.A., p. 64.

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⁴ *Aghnides*, p. 360; D.A., p. 64.

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Muslim writers divide *kharāj* into two kinds: (i) *kharāj-i-wazīfah*, and (ii) *kharāj-i-muqāsimah*.⁵ The first term is applied to a demand in money and kind per unit area fixed according to the species of the crops grown. The rates are those applied by the caliph ‘Umar to the lands of Sawād in ‘Irāq and cannot be increased.⁶ However, if the *kharāj-i-wazīfah* exceeds half the produce, the demand should be reduced, for the *shar‘* does not allow the state to take more than half.⁷ Under the rule of the Abbasid caliphs the method of taking a certain proportion of the produce called *kharāj-i-muqāsimah* became more popular and was widely adopted.⁸ According to the jurists the state’s share ranges from a tenth to a half.⁹ They take into account such considerations as the nature of the soil, the means of irrigation and the distance from the market. However, the *imām’s* authority is final, so long as the outside limit of a half is not exceeded.¹⁰ Much deference was paid to local usage in existence before the Muslim conquest. Even ‘Umar’s demand was based on ancient custom, and Muslim conquerors did not disturb the *status quo* so long as it did not come into conflict with their sacred law and sense of justice.

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⁵ *Sulūk-u’l-mulūk*, f. 93b.

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⁶ *Aghnides*, p. 379.

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⁷ *Idem*, p. 380.

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⁸ Manṣūr had to introduce *muqāsimah* in ‘Irāq as well owing to the change in prices, J. Z., p. 137; *History of the Saracens*, p. 427.

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⁹ *Aghnides*, p. 378. According to Abū Yūsuf, a *dhimmi* buying *nim ‘ushri* land pays a tenth; *Aghnides*, p. 373.

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¹⁰ *Idem*, pp. 379-382; *Fiqh-i-Fīrūzshāhī*, f. 418a.

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In Hindu India the basic principle that the cultivator must pay a proportion of his produce to the state was universally recognized and Hindu notions.

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the *nīti-shāstras* freely acknowledge the right of the king to levy it: the fundamental idea of *kharāj* was firmly rooted in Hindu society.¹ It is natural that the state should devise various methods of settling the claims of the ruler upon the cultivator. The simplest and the most primitive, yet the safest and the most just, method would be to divide the actual produce when it was ready. If the state were small, like an ancient city state, this method would be ideal; but in larger states it would not work satisfactorily. It would mean the employment of a large staff at harvest time when, in an agricultural community, labour would be practically unavailable. If the staff were not inordinately large, there would be delay in dividing the produce; and in unfavourable weather, great loss would result both to the state and to the cultivator. Besides, the system would be almost entirely unworkable in case of perishable articles. But so long as actual sharing is the method adopted it may be done in several ways; weighing, forming equal heaps, or dividing the cultivated area would all be feasible. In all such methods of sharing, the basic difficulty of finding a numerous staff persists, and there is the strong probability of the crops suffering on account of inclement weather while they are waiting for division or collection. To remedy this, and to spread the work over a longer period so that a small whole-time staff may be kept employed, a new method was devised. Experienced men with expert knowledge estimated the probable produce by inspecting the crops before harvest. With practice these estimates would become almost accurate; it would also be possible to appraise the value of the crops at an early stage. This system may be called 'appraisement'. To see that no injustice is done, the peasant would generally have the right to insist on actual sharing if he was dissatisfied. A subsidiary growth of this system would be that, if the peasant so desired, he might buy the share of the state, which in actual practice meant the payment of the state demand in cash at the current price. If there are no violent changes caused either by political revolutions or natural calamities, both the peasant and the state would come to know how much they could expect from certain crops in a particular area, and would find it simpler to fix a demand on the basis of past experience which would resolve itself into the well-known method of a fixed quantity, or even a sum of money, per unit of area for each kind of crop. The state would then have schedules of rates for the different crops grown on various kinds of soil. This system mainly depends on 'measurement' and should be called by that name.¹ When prices change or a political or natural calamity devastates a region, it would be necessary to alter the arrangement, and sharing or appraisement may again come into force. We find all three methods of sharing, appraisement and measurement existing in different parts of India, sometimes side by side.² Even in the days of Akbar these methods had preserved their Hindi names which are recorded in the *Ā'in-i-Akbarī* and point to the existence of the systems in pre-Muslim days.³ Fortunately, however, there is positive evidence in some of the *Jātakas* which enables writers on Hindu polity to say with certainty that sharing, appraisement and measurement existed in India before the Muslim conquest.⁴

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¹ *Shukranīti*, p. 149; *Vishnu*, iii, pp. 22, 23, etc.

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¹ Moreland, p. 7.

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² I am indebted for most of these ideas to Moreland and *Ā'in-i-Akbarī*.

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³ *Ā'in-i-Akbarī*, Book iii, *Ā'in* v.

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⁴ *Agrarian System in Ancient India*, pp. 26, 27.

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There was nothing in these methods which could be repugnant to Islamic law. Sharing was the same as *kharāj-i-muqāsimah*. Appraisement was only a development of sharing; it was technically called *hazr*.⁵ The Muslims had come to recognize a custom which had grown up under the Abbasids called *kharāj-i-muqāṭi'ah*, under which the peasant paid a sum of money or a quantity in kind fixed for a term of years.⁶ This says that it was no longer necessary to take into account calamities and differentiate between the areas which had produced a harvest and those which had not.¹ This is really an important statement, and in spite of its cryptic nature shows that not only was the area where the crops had failed set apart so that no revenue be charged on it, but some allowance was also made for partial failure.² The method of leaving a margin in favour of the peasant was not unknown as is shown by Sher Shāh's maxim that one should be liberal at the time of assessment and strict at the time of collection; but it is doubtful if no concession followed a moderate assessment at the time of collection.³ It was also necessary for the state to compile schedules for different regions giving the standard demand for each.⁴ These schedules must have been based on past experience and revised from time to time. A schedule of Sher Shāh has been preserved by Abū'l-Faḍl.⁵ Former schedules which have perished must have contributed to the knowledge of subsequent administrators. An examination of Sher Shāh's schedule shows that the state demand was based on average produce. This was calculated by adding the best, the middling and the lowest yields and dividing the total by three.¹ It was the existence of such schedules in local areas which made it possible to valuate whole parganahs for the purpose of assignments. Besides, ‘Abbās Sarwānī mentions a very significant fact. “Before Sher Shāh’s time,” says the chronicler, “it was not the custom to measure the land, but there was a qānūngū in every parganah, from whom was ascertained the present, past and probable future state of the parganah.”² This statement may be regarded as true for the period just preceding Sher Shāh’s reign, and the method was probably taken over by the Mughuls under Bābur and Humāyūn. The qānūngū must have possessed statements showing the areas cultivated, the crops grown, and, what is more important, the average yield per unit area of the various kinds of land.³ On the basis of these schedules, a fairly equitable assessment could be made without fresh measurement, for reasonably full data must have been available. It is quite obvious that there must have been different schedules for the different parts of the sultanate. A single schedule could not work for regions which differ so greatly in the nature of soil, rainfall and other climatic conditions.

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⁵ D.A., p. 50.

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⁶ *History of the Saracens*, pp. 427, 428.

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¹ Baranī, p. 429. The words are "محدثات و قسمات بود و نابود". Moreland, p. 227 translates محدثات as 'innovations'; there was no innovation in the rule of measurement, which was older than Muslim rule in India. Sirat-i-Firūzshāhī, p. 124, uses محدثات for taxes. The meaning which suits the text better is given by D.A., p. 36 which defines محدث as anything charged on agriculture beyond the customary demand or with severity. This applies admirably to 'Alā-u'd-dīn Khaljī's demand. قسمات (qismāt) is obviously the same as تقسيمات (taqsīmāt) in Ā'in-i-dahsālah (Ā'in-i-Akbarī, I, p. 347) which Moreland (p. 244) identifies with schedules. قسمات بود و نابود, therefore, should be taken to mean 'schedules of yield' or, more accurately, 'statements of the actual produce.' These would be necessary only when concession is made for partial failure or an unexpectedly low yield.

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² This was called naẓr which is defined by D.A. as foregoing a part or the whole of state demand, p. 36. Khusraw states that 'Alā-u'd-dīn Khaljī remitted large sums of money; Khazā'in-u'l-futūḥ, p. 15.

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³ Sarwānī, ff. 8b, 9a. D.A., p. 36 mentions such concession which was technically called musāmaḥat.

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⁴ In Fīrūz Shāh's reign a schedule was called qānūn, D.A., p. 35.

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⁵ Ā'in-i-Akbarī, Book iii, Ā'in xi.

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¹ For a Sikandarī bigah, good produce in wheat=18 mans; middling=12 mans; bad=8 mans 35 sers; total=38 mans 35 sers; divide by three; average produce=12 mans 38¼ sers; the figure adopted is 12 mans 38¼ sers. Vide Appendix C.

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² E. and D., iv, p. 414.

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³ The qānūngū was the repository of qānūns, or schedules of customary demand.

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It should not be thought that the system of measurement can work only when the state demand is paid in cash. There is nothing in the system to make it necessary for the cultivator to pay in money, for the basic principle is the fixing of the average produce per unit area. Its resemblance to kharāj-i-muqāṭi‘ah consists in the fixity of the demand for a certain period, but measurement ensures a more equitable arrangement between the state and the cultivator, even if the demand is in kind.

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and the cultivator.¹ The state could realize its share of the average produce either in kind or in money. The demand could be fixed in grain and then the state could ask for money at the current level of prices; or the share of the state could be defined in money on the basis of prices prevailing over a certain period in the past.² The ancient Hindu system seems to have been a combination of the two systems; the state demanded part of the revenue in kind called *bhāga* and part of it in cash called *hirānya*, or some paid the one and some the other.³ The sultanate does not seem to have fixed a cash demand. There were two periods when measurement was in force in the greater part of the empire: in ‘Alā-u’d-dīn Khaljī’s reign, the peasants were encouraged to pay in kind, and Sher Shāh’s schedule mentions no cash basis for grain.⁴ Fīrūz Shāh persuaded peasants in certain areas to pay a half of the demand in cash and the other half in kind.⁵ In one instance, however, there must have been fixed or standard cash demands for different administrative units. It is quite obvious that the state could never accept its share of perishable products in kind; and by their very nature, perishable articles had to be sold at widely varying prices in different localities. To work out the share of the state in a precise sum of money would involve too much work and the result would not justify the trouble. It was here that the state share was probably fixed in cash on the basis of average prices and a margin must have been left in favour of the peasant.⁶ Similarly when sharing was adopted, the revenue could be paid either in cash or kind. The state sometimes preferred the one, sometimes the other in view of its own needs or the facilities of the peasant. When ‘Alā-u’d-dīn demanded the revenue in kind, he wanted to have a liberal supply of foodstuffs for his economic planning; when the Lodīs did the same, it was because of the scarcity of specie and the inability of the peasant to obtain a reasonable cash price for his produce.¹ Generally, however, it must have been a question of convenience and adjustment. A natural consequence of payment in kind was that the state had to maintain granaries in various parts of the empire.²

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¹ For *kharāj-i-muqāṭi‘ah*, *vide supra*.

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² This process was called *tas‘īr*, D.A., p. 45

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³ *Hindu Revenue System*, pp. 37, 38, 61, 62. The nature of *hirānya* is very controversial.

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⁴ *Ā‘īn-i-Akbarī*, Book iii, *Ā‘īn* xi. *Vide* Appendix C.

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⁵ *Inshā-i-Māhrū*, Letters XXXI, CXXI.

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⁶ A lenient assessment was necessary for the working of the system.

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¹ Baranī, pp. 305, 306; Moreland, pp. 68, 69.

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² Tārīkh-i-Alfi, ii, f. 32a.

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A controversial problem of this period is the proportion of the produce taken by the state. The deductions of modern writers on the topic are based on inconclusive evidence. It will be helpful to examine the question in the light of Hindu tradition and Muslim law. The writers on Hindu legal theory say that the state should demand a sixth of the produce as its share; but this figure soon became a stereotyped term to denote the state demand.³ Later foreign observers like al-Bīrūnī were misled by the persistent use on the part of Hindu writers of the term ‘one-sixth’ for the land revenue.⁴ There is concrete proof that the state demand was higher. Oppressive assessment finds mention in the Jātakas, and even Kautilya increases the state demand if there were irrigation facilities.⁵ The Shukranīti says that one-sixth should be taken only from barren and rocky soils, whereas “the king should raise one-third, one-fourth or one-half from lands which are irrigated by tanks, canals, and wells, by rain and by rivers respectively.”⁶ It is true that the date of this work is uncertain, yet the view it takes of a legitimate demand is of considerable value. A modern writer on ancient Hindu polity has estimated that the cultivator had to pay from forty to fifty-seven per cent. of his produce to the state as land revenue and irrigation charges.⁷ This is a very high charge when it is realized that the water was not supplied by the state, but only theoretically belonged to it.¹ The irrigation charges ranged from a fifth to a third of the produce.² This applied to Kautilya’s days; it is very difficult indeed to find any fixed rule for the whole of Hindu India. New taxes and cesses grew up which were gradually added to the main demand which only nominally remained at a sixth of the produce; when old taxes were compounded by an increased land-revenue, new ones raised their head.³ Towards the end of Hindu rule in Northern India, the burden on the cultivator had grown almost unbearable, and yet in theory it was only one-sixth of the gross produce.⁴ This was the situation which faced the Muslim conquerors when they had to fix their own demand. It was a question bristling with difficulties, and it required an Alexander’s sword to cut the Gordian knot.

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³ E g., Viṣṇu, iii, pp. 22, 23.

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⁴ Al-Bīrūnī, text, p. 276; Hiuen Tsang, i, p. 176.

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⁵ Jātaka, iii, p. 9; v, p 98; Arthashāstra, p. 140.

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⁶ Shukranīti, pp. 147, 148

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⁷ Political Institutions of the Hindus, p. 124.

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¹ *Arthashāstra*, p. 140, footnote 5.

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² *Idem.*, p. 140.

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³ *Agrarian System of the Hindus*, p. 65.

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⁴ *History of Medieval Hindu India*, iii, p. 140; *Political Institutions of the Hindus*, pp. 115-116; al-Birūnī, text, p. 276.

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Three factors would count most in the adoption of an agrarian policy by the Muslims: their own background of thought and custom; their desire to meddle as little as possible with the existing system; and the natural difficulty experienced by foreigners in finding out all the intricacies of a complex system. Muslim ideas on agrarian questions are dispersed over a mass of literature, and yet there is a striking similarity of sentiment. The cultivator is the very foundation of the state, it is better to encourage him by reducing the demand than to drive him away from the land by extracting too much out of him, for if he is harshly treated, he will certainly give up cultivation.⁵ In the matter of fixing the proportion in a new country where it would be more necessary than ever to reconcile the cultivator to the state, it would be natural for the conquerors to adopt the lowest scale levied on *dhimmis* in Muslim countries.¹ This is a double *‘ushr* or a fifth of the gross produce which was not too great a departure from the theoretical one-sixth of the Hindus, particularly when the conquerors did not charge the more vexatious cesses.² The question of cesses will be discussed later; as far as land revenue was concerned, the Muslims would rely for their information regarding Hindu custom and usage on the information given by the local officials and by their own interpreters of the Hindu law. Al-Bīrūnī’s writings would exercise great influence on Muslim administrators. The local officials would not be too anxious to tell a foreign conqueror how much he should expect from the land; they would be inclined to hide the possibility of a bigger revenue and to put a part of the amount thus saved into their own pockets. Thus all probabilities were in favour of the earlier sultans demanding a fifth of the produce.³

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⁵ A.M. ff. 33b, 39a; *Qābūs-nāmah*, p. 160; *Siyāsat-nāmah*, p. 18; *Tāj*, (f. 144b) records instructions from Quṭb-u’d-dīn Aibak to a governor to reconcile a newly conquered area by reducing the state demand.

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¹ Aghnides, pp. 373, 378; *History of the Saracens*, p. 427.

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² *Vide infra*; also a list of Hindu taxes given in Appendix H.

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The beginning. This question, however, would have remained in the realm of conjecture but for fresh evidence which has now come to light. The *Tārīkh-i-Fakhr-u’d-dīn Mubārakshāh* says that Sulṭān Quṭb-u’d-dīn Aibak left the (landed) property of the Muslims in their hands and “abolished the *kharāj* which was taken from their lands against the *shar‘* and the injunction of God and amounted to one-fifth, and fixed in some places the *‘ushr* and in other areas the *nīm-‘ushr*.”³ The writer is using legal terminology. The sultan’s measure was that the Muslims were excused from *kharāj* and were henceforth asked to pay *‘ushr*; but the author also definitely informs us that the *kharāj* was one-fifth of the produce. Of course the ordinance applied to the small population of Muslims in Lāhor. Later sultans were very niggardly in recognizing new lands as *‘ushrī*; but the importance of the passage lies in the fact that it confirms the opinion that the state demand was fixed at one-fifth of the gross produce. This is the only clear and unambiguous mention of the state demand in normal times under the sultanate of Dehlī. The only other explicit mention is that ‘Alā-u’d-dīn Khaljī demanded one-half of the produce.¹ This he did in times of great difficulty, because the state had to deal with foreign invasion and internal trouble; the demand is abnormal. This excessive rate could not be continued indefinitely and we read that Sulṭān Quṭb-u’d-dīn Mubārak Shāh “abolished the heavy *kharāj* and heavy demands.”² It is not undue restraint which induces the usually loquacious Baranī to keep silence about the new demand; he does not mention it for there is nothing new to say. The old normal demand was restored, and the historian has left us to infer this.

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³ *Tārīkh-i-Fakhr-u’d-dīn Mubārakshāh*, pp. 33, 34.

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¹ Baranī, p. 287.

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² Baranī, p. 383.

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The next monarch to interest himself in agrarian matters was Ghiyāth-u’d-dīn Tughluq, the description of whose measures by Baranī has produced a controversy.³ The relevant sentence has been considered to be ambiguous; it has been taken to mean either that the state demand was not to exceed a tenth of the produce or that it was not to be increased by more than ten per cent.³ The first view finds favour in the *Cambridge History*, and may now be supported by the arguments that Quṭb-u’d-dīn Aibak reduced the state demand on certain properties from a fifth to a tenth of the produce, that the double *‘ushr* is a fifth for some lands and a tenth for others, and that Fīrūz Shāh also mentions that he charged ‘*kharāj* on tithes paying lands’.⁴ But it should be remembered that Quṭb-u’d-dīn’s measure amounted to giving the Muslim residents of Lāhor, comparatively few in number at that period, the right of paying *ushr* instead of *kharāj*, which could not seriously affect the exchequer, but Ghiyāth-u’d-dīn’s instructions to the effect that the demand should be reduced to a tenth would greatly affect the income. There is no definite record of a double *nīm-ushr* being in force in India; Fīrūz Shāh’s statement will be discussed later to show that in his case also the demand was not one-tenth of the produce. The context of the sentence deals with the question of increasing the revenue and Baranī’s remark can refer only to a limit to such increase; a critical examination of the text confirms this.¹ Historical probability also is in favour of this opinion. Since the normal state demand hitherto had been a fifth of the produce, it seems incredible that Ghiyāth-u’d-dīn reduced it to a tenth and so diminished the state income by one-half. It can be argued that he preferred a low demand which could be easily collected to a higher demand which was not possible to realize in its entirety. This argument can hardly hold ground, for one-fifth was not too high a demand; it could only apply to the reduction of the demand when it was as high as fifty per cent. of the produce. It is also unlikely that the sultan should act against the ruling of the jurists that the minimum *kharāj* is, in normal conditions, a double *ushr* or a fifth of the produce. Muḥammad bin Tughluq did not disturb the proportion except in the Doāb; where he wanted to curb the rebellious activities of the prosperous population, whom he also suspected of collusion with Mongol invaders. Besides, as the result of his extravagance, he was hard pressed for money and increased the demand in the rich ‘river country’ with disastrous consequences. It is very difficult to determine the proportion of his demand, for in doing this we are again face to face with a controversial passage.¹ Moreland thinks that the demand was increased inordinately; the actual level of this increase, however, could not be very high.² The demand was, in all probability, increased by five to ten per cent. Probably he himself reduced the demand when he tried to rectify his mistake by

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³ *Idem*, p. 429. The relevant sentence is:— دیوان وزارت را فرمان داد که زیادت از یک ده یازده در اقطاعات و ولایت بظن و تخمین و یا بسعایت ساعیان و نمودار موفران نپذیرند.

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⁴ C.H.I., iii, p 128; *Futūḥāt-i-Fīrūzshāhī*, p. 6.

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¹ D.A. makes the meaning of the sentence clear. On p. 37 نمودار is defined as ‘valuation based on mere estimate.’ It adds that such valuation is worthless. موفر is from توفير which is defined on p. 35 as increasing the revenue. The purport of this passage, therefore, can only be that no valuation should be increased on the reports of interested people.

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¹ The sentence is:-- خراج ممالک در دو آب یکے بده و یکے بہ بیست می باید ستد (Baranī, p. 473).

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² Moreland, p 48, footnote.

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This can be translated as (i) "The kharāj of the provinces in the Doāb should be assessed at one part in ten or one part in twenty"; or (ii) "The kharāj... should be increased by one in ten or one in twenty"; or (iii) "The kharāj should be levied in the proportion of ten to one and twenty to one." (i) can be dismissed, for the peasantry could not be ruined by such a measure; (iii) really distorts the passage, because یکے بده و یکے بہ بیست cannot be translated as 'ten for one and twenty for one'; it can only mean 'one in ten and one in twenty'. Thus only (ii) seems to be possible; it may, however, be questioned how ستد can be translated as 'increased'. The literal translation can be: (In) the kharāj of the provinces (an additional) one be charged along with every ten or twenty." Even if the translation suggested in (ii) be permissible, it can be merely a figure of speech. It is more likely, however, that Firishtah and Ḥājī Dabīr are using figurative language when they say that the demand was increased threefold or fourfold. Muḥammad bin Tughluq was not so foolish as not to understand that such an increase could never be realized. These later historians were writing at a time when the peasants paid a much higher percentage of their produce, therefore they could not understand how a small increase in the state demand could result in discontent and rebellion. The reasons for the discontent can, however, be explained easily: (i) the population felt that there was no justification for the increase; they had submitted to 'Alā-u'd-dīn Khaljī's demand because of the Mongol danger; (ii) as Dr Mahdī Ḥusain (Rise and Fall of Muḥammad bin Tughluq, p 152) points out, there was already discontent among the disbanded Hindu soldiery who had been recruited for the proposed Khurāsān expedition and who had chiefly been drawn from the Doāb. Taking these factors into consideration it seems that (ii) is the correct interpretation. It has the added advantage that it gives the exact percentage of enhancement.

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giving advances of money and encouraging cultivation.¹ In other areas the sultan demanded a fifth of the produce.² Some historians believe that Fīrūz Shāh charged a tenth; a more critical examination of the evidence shows that this sultan as well maintained the old proportion. Baranī tells us nothing beyond saying that the monarch exercised great moderation.³ The belief that he charged a tenth is based on Fīrūz Shāh’s own statement contained in *Futūḥāt-i-Fīrūz-shāhī*, where he has been taken to speak of the *kharāj* from ‘the tithes paying lands’, so-called by the sultan for they were assessed for revenue on the scale recommended by the jurists for tithes.⁴ This reading seems to be incorrect; even it were correct, the word *kharāj* would obviously be used in the general sense of revenue, which, according to the tithes system, would be half a tenth, a tenth and a fifth from different kinds of land. On the *‘ushrī* lands the former two rates would apply and on the *kharājī* lands, the last. However, the parallel passage in *Sīrat-i-Fīrūzshāhī* makes this reading of the text doubtful; it is more probable that Fīrūz Shāh is referring to *kharāj* and *‘ushr* separately. The evidence contained in *Dastūr-u’l-albāb fī ‘ilm-i’l-ḥisāb*, when examined critically, also confirms the opinion that except for a few well defined areas, which paid the half or single tithe, the general charge on land was a fifth of the produce, which was maintained from the earliest days of the sultanate until, at least, the end of Fīrūz Shāh’s reign; the only

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¹ Baranī, p. 482.

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² *Qaṣā’id-i-Badr-i-Chāch*, p. 7. رع ربع جار ربع و شش جهت را خمس یافت عاشر نه تختہ باغ از عشر یک انبار من

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³ *Vide* Appendix D.

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⁴ *Vide* Appendix E.

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If it be permissible to hold that the poet’s similes are based on contemporary practice, the proportions of state demand alluded to in this couplet are a fourth, a fifth and a tenth. The last is the *‘ushr*; a fifth was the general level of demand; a fourth was probably demanded in the Doāb. If 5 per cent is added to the prevailing 20 per cent it makes 25 per cent.

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exception was ‘Alā-u’d-dīn Khaljī’s special demand of a half. There might, of course, have been variations in some outlying parts of the empire as the result of different local traditions.

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We do not hear of any change until the days of Sher Shāh, when Elliot’s translation of ‘Abbās Sarwānī tells us that one share was to be given to the cultivator and a half to the headman.¹ This may imply that a third was claimed by the state as its share. The manuscripts in general do not support this assertion, which seems to be based on some exceptional copy. To counterbalance this doubt is advanced Sher Shāh’s schedule incorporated in the Ā’īn-i-Akbarī; but the language of the Ā’īn does not justify the conclusion that Sher Shāh demanded a third.² A critical examination of the passage lends weight to the opinion that Abū’l-Faḍl is referring to Sher Shāh’s figure of average produce as the lowest available in the empire at that time. Besides, Sher Shāh asked Haibat Khān, governor of Multān, to levy a fourth of the produce as revenue and to charge no other taxes or cesses. It is, however, argued that Multān was treated with exceptional leniency in view of its previous devastation.³ The reduction of the rate of the land revenue would be a highly exceptional favour; besides, the language of the chronicler implies that the concession lay in the exemption from a number of taxes, not in the reduction of the land revenue.⁴ There is evidence to show that it was Akbar who first demanded a third of the produce. Akbar’s ancestor Tīmūr realized a third of the produce as land revenue in some of his domains.⁵ He was not in India long enough to influence agrarian administration. We, however, know that Bābur demanded a hundred and thirty instead of a hundred.¹ This would raise the demand roughly to a fourth of the produce; thus Sher Shāh's demand from the people of Multān was not exceptional. It was, therefore, Akbar who raised it to a third. Abū'l-Faḍl finds it necessary to justify this measure by saying that Akbar abolished various taxes including the jiziyah.² It is not improbable that the kharāj was some times considered to cover the jiziyah as well.³

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¹ E. & D., iv, pp. 413-414.

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² Vide Appendix C.

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³ Moreland, p. 75.

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⁴ Dorn’s History of the Afghans, Pt. I, p. 135.

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⁵ Tuzūkāt-i-Tīmūrī, p. 362.

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¹ *Memoirs of Bābur*, ii, p. 345.

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² *Ā'īn-i-Akbarī*, i, pp. 300, 301.

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³ D.A., pp. 66, 67. The evidence is not conclusive. This authority divides jiziyah into two kinds; one is in the form of a capitation tax, the other is kharāj-i-muqāsimah. I have not come across this view elsewhere, hence D.A., might be referring specifically to the practice under the sultans. With other forms of kharāj jiziyah should have been levied separately. D.A., p. 64.

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An important factor in the agrarian system of any country is the position of the middlemen. These fall into two distinct categories. The first were the old Hindu chiefs who had long traditions of authority and could command the loyalty and support of peasantry living in their territories. These families were semi-independent even under Hindu rulers and kings, and were by no means easy to control; they were left in the same state by the early Muslim rulers on the promise to pay the fixed tribute.⁴ Whenever he could defy the central government, the chief withheld tribute; when brought to heel, a fresh agreement was made either with the same chief or another set up in his place. But this was a losing game, and the sultans were able to make their force felt more and more widely. The tribute they paid to the state only roughly depended on the area under their control, for its amount was often decided by an armed conflict and thus depended on their strategic position or fighting power, but some consideration must have been paid to their capacity for payment. If they happened to be strong, their tribute would be only nominal. The tributaries in the areas near the capital were the first to be reduced to submission; ultimately only the very distant chiefs with impregnable mountain fortresses were tempted to measure their strength against the sultan. Balban's energetic rule considerably weakened them, and the process went on until ‘Alā-u’d-dīn Khaljī was able to reduce their power. Quite a number of these chiefs had been reduced to the position of mere headmen, and by cutting off their special perquisites the sultan considerably reduced their power even further.¹ Yet, though ‘Alā-u’d-dīn humiliated the refractory chiefs nearer the capital, he treated the newly subjugated rulers of the South with consideration. Even in Hindustān, the tributary chiefs continued to flourish and we read of their privileged position at the court of Firūz Shāh.² In the anarchy after Tīmūr’s invasion, these leaders took part in the political game of dividing the spoils; when Sher Shāh and Humāyūn came to grips for the throne of Dehlī, the Hindu chiefs were able to give effective help to the combatants.³ Humbler in status were the village headmen who helped the officials to assess and collect the revenue, for which they received a commission.⁴ They can hardly be termed middlemen, for they were expected to collect only the state demand from the cultivators. They did sometimes endeavour to squeeze more out of the peasant, but the state always frowned on such practices and tried to stop them.⁵

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⁴ *Tuḥfat-u'l-kirām*, f. 260b; *Tāj*, f. 59. The tribute was called mālguzārī, marāsim-i-khidmatī, wajūh-i-māl, etc.

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¹ Baranī, p. 287.

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² E.g., Rāi Bhairo Bhattī who escorted Firūz Shāh after the sultan had escaped from the trap laid for him in Khudāwandzādah’s house; ‘Afīf, p. 103.

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³ Tārīkh-i-Mubārakshāhī mentions several Hindu chiefs, e.g., pp. 187, 225, etc.

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⁴ E.g., Baranī, p. 430.

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⁵ E.g., Baranī, p. 288.

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Sometimes the headmen undertook to pay a fixed amount on behalf of the village, and thus they acted as tax-farmers. Very different from such headmen was the tax-farmer who undertook to pay the state a fixed sum of money for a considerable area.¹ There can be little doubt that this method was open to abuse and often resulted in loss to the state and hardship to the cultivator. There were various kinds of tax-farmers. The village headman might act as a tax-farmer by undertaking to pay a fixed amount to the state on behalf of the peasant. This sum would naturally be based on local records and neither the state nor the peasants could be great losers, for, in lieu of the risks involved, the headman would get a favourable figure and the state would be saved from the bother of assessment and collection. Sometimes it might be a good policy to make the governor of a province responsible for the collection of the revenue and come to terms with him regarding the sum of money which he was to pay. In efficient and conscientious hands, this arrangement might lead to a unified control of the administrative machinery and produce better results. The tributary chiefs were tax-farmers in a sense, for they paid only a fixed tribute. They were permanent; they had local ties and their claims were based on immemorial custom. The worst tax-farmer was the speculator whose one idea was to make money and who had no scruples about robbing the state or oppressing the peasant. The system of farming dates back to Hindu times and was known to Muslims as well before they came to India.² During the earlier days of the sultanate, when the rulers did not know much of local conditions, this system must have found favour, though it is not possible to estimate its extent. ‘Alā-u’d-dīn Khaljī, who even objected to assignments, was not likely to encourage farming, but the system seems to have grown under his successors. Ghiyāth-u'd-dīn Tughluq took stringent measures against it, and the historian's language shows this was a great reform.¹ Muhammad bin Tughluq's financial difficulties led to a recrudescence of the system; under him we see the system at its worst. Speculative farmers of no substance offered high prices which they could not pay, and being afraid of the sultan's chastisement rebelled. Of course, the state was not able to recover anything.² Fīrūz, in his turn, suppressed tax-farming; but it seems to have revived in certain parts of the sultanate after Tīmūr's invasion, though the growth of assignments in that period did not favour extensive farming.³ Sher Shāh's efficiency did not brook farmers.⁴

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