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The Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus: A Study in Comparative Politics c15: Chapter VIII. The Theory of the Constitution in Hindu Political Philosophy

The Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus: A Study in Comparative Politics c15

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English

Contents

Chapter VIII. The Theory of the Constitution in Hindu Political Philosophy

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The Doctrine of *Saptâmga* (Seven Limbs).

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The seven categories, *svâmin* (sovereign), *amâtya* (minister), *suṛhit* (ally), *koṣa* (finance), *râṣṭra* (territory), *durga* (fortress), and *vala* (army) constitute the basis of all political speculation among Hindu philosophers. They form the *saptâmga*,¹ or the “seven limbs” of the body politic. The theory of the constitution is epitomized in the doctrine of *saptâmga*. An analysis of each of these seven constituents of a state, as well as their mutual relations, is the specific theme of all *nîti-śâstras*, from the *Artha-śâstra* of Kautilya to the *Yukti-kalpa-taru* of Bhoja. Necessarily subsumed under this fundamental investigation is the discussion of *samaya* (compact) as the origin of the state, *dharma* (*droit*, *Recht*, justice, law, duty, etc.) as the end of government, *bali* (offerings) as the *rationale* of taxation by the state for its services to the community, *aparodha* (expulsion of tyrant), *maṇḍala*, and other concepts of *Staatswissenschaft* in Sanskrit literature.

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¹ Viṣṇu, III, 33; Śukra, I, lines 121—122, V, 1—2; Kâmandaka, I, 16, IV, 1; *Pos. Back*, Vol. II, pp. 34—39; cf. Coker’s *Organismic Theories of the State*.

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Now, to modern historians of political science, single phrases, even single words of Plato and Aristotle loom unduly large. This extravagance of interpretation is not without its justification. Every age interprets its past in the light of its own experience and conscience. Classical Hellas has thus been reborn in the modern West, since Aquinas (1225—1274)² raised his theological superstructure on Aristotelian foundations, almost as many times as there have been Machiavellis, Bodins, Montesquieus, Francks, Janets and Barkers³ to consult the ancient encyclopedias of culture. The values of every political thinker and theory in Europe have in this cumulative way been fixed definitely and in relation to one another. And the momentum is being accelerated with the sundry new experiences of recent times from Hegel and Austin to Liebknecht and Duguit,¹ the two poles of the theory of sovereignty. The political futurists of today are indeed awaiting the issue of Bolshevik versions not only of the *Plato-Samhitâ* but even of the *Aristotle-nîti* to meet the demands of the new *Novum Organum* of the current régime of the “discredited state.”

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² Article on “Aquinas” in the *Enc. Brit.*; Dunning’s *Political Theories*, Vol. I, 189—213; Franck’s *Reformateurs et publicistes de l'Europe*, Vol. I, pp. 63—70.

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³ Bluntschli’s *Geschichte des Allgemeinen Staatsrechts und der Politik*, pp. 6—46, 258—276; Barker’s *Plato*, pp. 146, 176, 389, 390; Dunning, Vol. I, p. 54; Willoughby’s *Political Theories of the Ancient World*, pp. 128—130.

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¹ Laski's *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty*, pp. 20—24, 65—68; *Authority in the Modern State*, pp. 113—114; 363.

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It is not intended here to apply this “right of interpretation” to the doctrine of *saptâmga* or to the other auxiliary doctrines of the *nîti-śâstras*, whether from the conservative, liberal, or radical view-point. Only a few dicta are being gleaned at random from the texts bearing on the *theory* of the constitution, without any comment as to its impact, if any, on *Realpolitik*. These would be enough, however, to bring out, first, that if man is a “political animal”, he is equally so in the East and in the West, both in ancient and modern times, in spite of the differences created by steam, electricity, and air-navigation, and secondly, that notwithstanding the diversity of technical terminology, it is well-nigh impossible to distinguish the methods and results of Hindu Aristotles, Senecas, Alcuins, and Hobbeses from those of their western colleagues.

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But it is necessary to remember at the outset that in the whole range of Hindu political thought there is to be found no trace of theocracy,² as embodied in the social philosophy of Augustine's *De Civitate Dei* (The City of God) or of Aquinas' *De Regimine Principum* (Government of a Prince). For no period could the political ideas of the Hindus be treated as a branch of ecclesiastical history as Figgis considers it right in regard to European political speculation during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.³ No *śâstra*-writer ever preached that some “high priest” or even the king is God’s viceroy on earth, or that the religious association, e. g., a *samgha* or temple-government, is a “self-sufficient” *svarâj*, independent of or coordinate with, nay, superior to, the secular organization of the *râṣṭra*. There is no touch of the conflicts between canon law and civil law¹ in the treatises on *nîti* and *dharma* or *smriti*, and the doctrine of *saptâmga* is absolutely undisturbed by the rivalry of the Byzantine conception (Justinian's) of the church as subservient to the state with the antithetic Gregorian doctrine of the supremacy of *sacerdotum* over *imperium*. But all the same, for purposes of historical perspective, it will be advisable in the present discussion to have an adequate orientation to the subject matter of Poole's *Illustrations of the History of Mediaeval thought* and Littlejohn's *Political Theory of the Schoolmen and Grotius*.

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² Bluntschli’s *Geschichte der neueren Staatswissenschaft*, pp. 3—7; Poole's *Illustrations of the History of Mediaeval Thought*, pp. 226—255; Mc Cabe's *Augustine and His Age*, pp. 375—410; Taylor’s *Mediaeval Mind*, Vol. I, 61—87; Gierke's *Political Theories of the Middle Age*, pp. 104—115 (notes).

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³ *From Gerson*, p. 31.

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¹ Woolf's *Bartolus*, p. 14, Carlyle II, p. 94.

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² Woolf, pp. 55, 60; Figgis' *From Gerson*, Carlyle, II, 148, 198.

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A Moslem Review.

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In the sixteenth century Abul Fazl, a Mohammedan minister of Akbar the Great, compiled an Imperial Gazetteer of India in Persian under the title of *Ayeen-i Akbari*³ (the "Institutes of Akbar"). He devoted certain sections of his book to Hindu laws (*Beyhar*, i. e. *vyavahâra*), and gave a summary of current political notions.

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³ Smith's *Akbar*, pp. 4, 459.

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The monarch should be "ambitious",⁴ according to the traditional *râja-nît* (state-craft), "to extend his dominions. No enemy is so insignificant as to be beneath his notice". A wise prince, as we read in the Persian resumé, should banish from his court all corrupt and designing men. The king's functions are described as being "similar to those of a gardener", who plucks up the thorns and briers and throws them on one side, whereby he beautifies his garden, and at the same time raises a fence which preserves his ground from the intrusion of strangers. Accordingly the king should "detach from the nobles their too numerous friends and dangerous dependents". An important maxim teaches, besides, that "in affairs of moment it is not advisable to consult with many".

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⁴ Gladwin's translation, Vol. III, pp. 194—213.

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In these political recipes we have the German idea of "self-defence", the American conception of "preparedness", the Greek theory of ostracism and the universal custom of deporting undesirables. And those who are familiar with the "secret clauses" of all treaties, and who watched the course of events leading to the great war of 1914 as well as to its close would surely ditto the Hindu dictum: "In affairs of moment it is not advisable to consult with many". For even today, in spite of universal literacy, power of the press, manhood suffrage, referendum, and ministerial responsibility to the people, all nations do really

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"Leave all God gave them in the hands of one, --
Leave the decision over peace and war
To king or kaiser, president or czar."

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And in international affairs the "Big Three" or even the "Big Two" decide the destiny of millions, e. g. of the Germans in Silesia (1921).

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The Persian synopsis of the Sanskrit texts has something to say on international relations. According to Hindu statecraft, if any monarch is more powerful than oneself, one should continually strive to sow dissension among the rival's troops, and in case of failure should prudently purchase his friendship. "The prince whose territory adjoins to his", Abul Fazl tells us further, obviously reproducing the Kautilyan doctrine of *mandala*,¹ "although he may be friendly in appearance, yet ought not to be trusted; one should be always prepared to oppose any sudden attack from that quarter. With him whose country lies next beyond the last-mentioned he should enter into alliance". In these remarks there is nothing essentially Hindu, oriental or mediaeval, nor anything distinctively Machiavellian or Bernhardian. It is substantially on this elementary psychology of international relations that the *ententes*, conventions, and interchange of diplomatic visits in the modern world are based. "Human, all too human" are these precepts of the *Artha-śâstra* popularized for the "sons of Adam" through the *Manu-Samhitâ*,² and they did not need the special pleading of a Nietzsche's *Will to Power*³ to make them current coin for the present generation of statesmen.

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¹ *Infra*, pp. 214-221.

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² VII, 158.

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³ Vol. II, Book IV, p. 183.

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Among other Hindu ideas the following is quoted by Abul Fazl: "If he finds it necessary to attack his enemy he should invade the country during the time of harvest".-This was Napoleon's military method too. He wanted the war to pay its own way as far as possible. And of course strategic necessity and cosiderations of "high politics" may justify any measure from the desecrating of the tomb of Al Mahdi in Egypt to the declaration of war by Germany against neutralized Belgium.

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We shall now proceed to single out a few of the more important tenets in the *nîti-śâstras*, without attempting, however, to be either comprehensive in treatment or exhaustive in reference. The object is only to throw light on the trend of political thinking among Hindus in the perspective of Eur-American speculation. The “personal equation” of the theorists as well as the differences in the *milieu* will be ignored in the present discussion. It is evident that no “historian” of political theory should be excused who passes without comment from the *Sabhâ-parva* to the *Śânti-parva* of the *Mahâbhârata* and from either to the *Śukra-nîti* or from *Kautilya* to *Manu* as if he were moving in the same world and speaking of the same age. But for some time yet indology will have to content itself more with the psychological analysis of the categories and concepts of political science than with the historical presentation of the growth of doctrines such as one finds in Atger’s *Histoire des doctrines du contrat social*. The following sections are being offered, therefore, subject to the fundamental fallacy implied in this “limiting condition” of archeological data.

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The *Prakriti* (People) and the State.

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John Stuart Mill in his *Representative Government* has discussed the characteristics which make a race fit for the popular institutions of self-government. One of his criteria is that the people must be able not only to appreciate and profit by such institutions but must have to be actively interested in all that relates to public life. Śukra also is strongly of opinion that it is the duty of the *prakriti*, the people, not only not to commit certain wrongs, but also to hand over to the police, or otherwise disclose to the state the existence of, the men who are in any way undesirable to the society. The whole community is thus enjoined to be an information-and-vigilance committee and an association for public safety. The demands of the state on the *prakriti* are necessarily manifold in Hindu thought.

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In Kautilya’s¹ analysis of the duties of the people we are familiar with the notion that the citizens should be on the lookout in the streets as to whether a trader has paid the toll on his commodities at the custom office. This principle of active cooperation with the state as contrasted with the passive obedience to and observance of the laws promulgated by it is laid down in the *Śukra-nîti*² in such general terms as the following: “You should never keep screened, or give protection to, men of wicked activities, thieves, bad characters, malicious and offensive persons as well as other wrong-doers”. More comprehensive touch of the people (i. e. the “society”) with the state is indeed contemplated by the theorist. For, the Śukra polity is essentially an omnipresent all-inclusive agency for the advancement of human welfare, — a *Kultur-staat*, in short. The *kâla*,¹ i. e. age or epoch (*Zeitgeist*) is as much the making of the state as its fundamental function is the promotion of *dharma*,² (law, justice, duty, culture, and what not) i. e. the “virtue” of the Greek theorists, which is as encyclopedic or extensive as life itself.

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¹ *Supra*, p. 66.

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² Ch. I, lines 595—596.

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¹ Ch. I, lines 43—44, IV, i, 116—117.

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² Ch. I, 45—51; IV, iii, 849. cf. Chinese and Japanese conception of “virtue” in Asakawa,

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Such doctrines of the *nîti-śâstras* have important bearing on the problems of political philosophy in regard to the limits of state control or the sphere of governmental activity. The new type of 100 per cent socialist state in Bolshevik Russia is undoubtedly bound to have a deep influence on the theory of the proper functions of the state. But it is questionable if Sidgwick’s “individualistic minimum” of state interference may not still be regarded as the last word, academically speaking, on rival claims between the two extremes that may be urged for the state and the individual. So far as pure theory is concerned, the issues between *laissez faire* and intervention may indeed be taken to have been finally settled in Mill’s *Liberty*. Now, the Hindu thought on the subject is quite elastic. It is not a minimum-functioned state that Kautilya and Śukra have before their imagination. Hindu theorists are no doctrinaire individualists. As champions of *dharma* they have extended the functions of the state so wide as to include whatever should be deemed expedient according to social needs, as readers of the *Sabhâ-parva* (Canto on “Council”) of the *Mahâbhârata* are aware.

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The theory of old age pensions is not indeed stated by any of the Hindu theorists. But the widows of soldiers killed in battles are to receive pension according to Vasiṣṭha.³ The *Mahâbhârata*⁴ suggests that the state should support the wives and children of men who have sacrificed their lives for it or otherwise been in distress while serving it. Protection of the weak and afflicted persons is insured in the *Artha-śâstra*.⁵ Kautilya would legislate also to forbid trade in dangerous goods,⁶ as he would likewise forbid “profiteering”, high rates of interest and so forth. The social and economic legislation⁷ recommended in the *Śukra-nîti* is sweepingly vast and wide. It leaves very little to the caprices of the individual's civic sense and patriotism. Tanks, wells, parks and boundaries must not be obstructed by the citizens. Nor must the use of religious houses, temples and roads be hindered in any way. The movements of the poor, the blind and the deformed similarly call forth the solicitude of Śukra legislators.¹

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³ XIX, 20. [p. 325.

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⁴ *Sabhâ*, Ch. V, 54, *Śânti*, Ch. LXXXVI, 24.

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⁵ *Book I*, pp. 38—39.

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⁶ *Ind. Ant.* 1905, p. 49;

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⁷ Ch. I, lines 587—626.

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¹ *Ibid*, lines 601—602.

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Besides, among the *śâsanas* or positive laws conceived by Śukra we read that without the sanction of the state the following things are not to be done: gambling, drinking, hunting, use of arms, sales and purchases of cows, elephants, horses, camels, buffaloes, men, immovable property, silver, gold, jewels, intoxicants and poisons, distillation of wines, the drawing up of deeds indicating a sale, gift or loan, and medical practice.² The important professions and economic activities which involve public safety and the future interests of the individuals concerned are thus not left to the discretion and common sense of the *prakriti* (the society). In Śukra's conception the *râjya* (the state) has to function as the Platonic "guardian" even of the citizens' self-interest.

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² *Ibid*, lines 603—608.

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Municipal by-laws and regulations relating to patents, licenses and charters are in this manner provided for in the theory of the *nîti-śâstras*. The logic of such control exercised by the *dharma-staaten* over the economic and social life of the people is essentially the same as that at the back of German state-socialism and modern "nationalization" schemes which have culminated in the "public ownership" movement. And this is all the more evident in the enumeration of the crafts and industries that the Śukra state seeks encourage.³ The list of productive and aesthetic arts that demand the "developmental" attention of the government according to the *Śukra-nîti* together with the schedule of duties⁴ that Kautilya, Manu and the *Mahâbhârata* recommend for the king furnishes the Hindu theory of "enlightened despotism" with its hydra-headed bureaucracy. Whether the *prakriti* exercise the initiative and sense of responsibility for their material and moral development or not, the state of the *nîti-śâstras* must address itself to the problem of national culture. As the promoter of *dharma*, and the creator of *kâla* (time or epoch) the state is necessarily the organizer of patriotism and the pioneer of civilization, — indeed, the chief dynamo of social engineering. French *étatisme* is identical in spirit.

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³ Ch. I, lines 734—741; Ch. II, lines 390—411.

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⁴ *Mahâ*, *Sabhâ*, Ch. V (whole), 53, 76—79. Vide the references in Law's article in the *Mod. Rev.* for Feb., 1917.

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Kingship a Public Office.

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While “*l'état c'est moi*” embodied the prevailing bible of European despots from Alexander and Augustus Caesar to Louis XVI the political philosophers were adumbrating the gospel of justice, natural equality, and sovereignty of the people. Mediaeval political theory in the West, as one can gather from Gierke's and Poole's investigations and the more “intensive” researches of the Carlyles, Figgis and Woolf, was essentially a philosophy of “pious wishes”, no matter whether conceived by the Stoics, the Roman lawyers or “civilians”, or church fathers and canonists. It is interesting to observe that such “ideals” found expression also, though under different categories, in the *śâstras* on *nîti* and *dharma* from Kautilya to Bhoja.

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The poet's definition of the king as one who ministers to the wellbeing of the *prakriti* was lifted up by Śukra into a plank of radical philosophy. In one passage of his *Politics* about the position of the king we seem to read the Bolshevistic lines of Robert Burns:

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“The rank is but the guinea's stamp,
. . . . .
Though hundreds worship at his word,
He's but a coof for a'that.”

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For, “does not even the dog look like a King”, asks Śukra,¹ “when it has ascended a royal conveyance? Is not the king justly regarded as a dog by the poets?” The sentiment is certainly much more extremistic than that in the cry of the first English socialists, the Lollards, viz., “When Adam delved and Eve span, who was then a gentleman?” Śukra wants us to understand that the King is great only from his station, but that as an individual he is just a mortal among mortals. The office of kingship, if at all, may be conceded to be sacred, but not the person who happens to hold it. As a human being he is not distinct from other men. In order that the king can command awe and reverence of the people, he is therefore advised by the philosopher to be attended by his retinue of officers. Verily, the regal insignia and paraphernalia, the royal seal,² and not the King himself is the real sovereign. American individualism does not go any further.

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¹ Ch. I, lines 745, 746.

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² Ch. II, line 587.

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This conception of the dignity of man is evident, again, in the principles of recall and plebiscite that the *Śukra-nîti* advocates. In cases of conflict between the king's officers and the subjects the king is advised to take the side of the people. He is to "dismiss the officers who are accused by one hundred men."¹ The truth *vox populi vox dei* was thus known to Hindus also. They have here given expression to the Confucian *mores* preserved in the *Shu-king*.² "The great God", said the super-man of China, "has conferred *even on the inferior people* a moral sense, compliance with which would show their nature invariably right."

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¹ Ch. I, lines 754, 755.

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² Part IV, Book III, Ch. II (Legge's translation).

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The supreme importance of the *prakriti* is never lost sight of in the speculations of Śukra. The king is a master only in the sense that he is to protect the people's interests and punish the offenders.³ Like Seneca the Stoic philosopher of the first century A.C. the Hindu theorist would accordingly exhort the ruler to remember his responsibility as "one out of all mankind who has been chosen to act in the place of the gods."⁴ The king is therefore not to enjoy any prerogatives or treat the people in any way he likes.

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³ Ch. I, lines 27—28, 239, 245—248.

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⁴ Carlyle I, pp. 31, 224; III, 109.

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In all *nîti-śâstras*, as in the writings of Alcuin and Jonas, the *rationale* of kingship is the promotion of *dharma* or justice. This dispensing of justice is to be administered by the king not only between subjects and subjects but also between himself and the subjects. He is to appoint spies as much to get secret information about the people's activities as also against his own conduct. He is to find out in what light his policies are being taken by the *prakriti*. And if the unpleasant truth comes out, viz., if his intelligence department tells him "People dispraise you, O King", it would be "un-kingly" or "un-philosophic" as Plato would have remarked, to get angry and punish the persons who condemn him.⁵ Rather, he should follow the ideal of the *Râmâyaṇa* and the spirit of Kâlidâsa's *Raghu-vaṁśa*, or that of the French epic of the twelfth century, *Le Couronnement de Louis*,⁶ which taught in quite the *nîti* style of the Hindus that the purpose of God in making the king is not to enable him to satisfy his appetite but that he should tread down all wrongs under his feet.

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⁵ Ch. I, lines 255—269.

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⁶ Carlyle III, p. 32; cf. Asakawa's *Early Inst. Jap.*, pp. 40—42.

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Śukra certainly goes far beyond the poets, when he declares categorically that the king's position is really one of *dâsyatva*, i. e. servitude “The ruler has been made by Brahmâ (the highest God) a servant of the people. His revenue is the remuneration for his services. He is sovereign or master solely in order that he may protect.”¹ The king of the *nîti-śâstras* is thus a trustee for the *prakriti*. He is a mere wage-earner in Baudhâyana’s *Institutes*² also, and is logically liable to fines according to Manu,³ for his duty is, as Hincmar (805—882)⁴ would say in Carolingian Europe, to “govern according to laws”. This conception is the farthest removed from the message of Bodin and Bossuet with their doctrine of absolute monarchy as a *gouvernement de droit divin*.

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¹ Ch. I, lines 375—376, IV, ii, 259.

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² I, 10, 18, 1.

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³ VIII, 336.

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⁴ Article in the *Enc. Brit.*; Carlyle I, 234.

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Quite consistently with the position of the king as a *dâsa* or servant is the right of petition by the subjects postulated in Hindu thought. The king, says Sukra, must personally inspect every year the villages, cities and districts. “He must investigate which subjects have been pleased and which oppressed by the staff of officers and deliberate upon matters brought forward by the people.”⁵ Altogether, then, the state of the Sukra school of politics is a people’s *râjya* under royal supervision. The majesty of the people is their political slogan. Such ideas about the dignity of the *prakriti* or *droits de l’homme* bear apt comparison with those of Azo (1150—1230), the Italian jurist, who in spite of the autocratic *milieu* of the Middle Ages wrote on the sovereignty of the *populus* or *universitas*.⁶

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⁵ Ch. I, lines 751—752; *cf.* Kâmandaka’s Confucian dictum in regard to the importance of the people (XIV, 15). The *Great Learning* says: “By gaining the people the kingdom is gained, and by losing the people the kingdom is lost” (Chang’s Commentary, Ch. X).

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⁶ Carlyle, Vol. II, 63—66; Gierke, 30—37, 45—48.

Section 5. Ministry the Pivot of National Life

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The doctrine of the sovereignty of the *prakriti* is in the thought of the *nîti-śâstras* invariably connected with that of the *amâtya* (ministry) as a check on the possible autocracy of the *svâmin*. One of the earliest landmarks in the history of this doctrine is to be noticed in Vedic writings, the *Aitareya Brâhmaṇa*⁷ and the *Śatapatha Brâhmaṇa*.⁸ In that body of literature the people are “worshipped” by the king at “election”

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⁷ VIII, 175.

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⁸ III, 4, 1, 7; III, 22, 18; V, 3, 1, 6; V, 3, 5, 31—37.

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in and through their representatives, the *Ratnins*,¹ among whom the head of the village elders is one.

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¹ Jayaswal's "Constitutional Aspects of Rituals at Hindu Coronation" in the *Mod. Rev.*, Jan. 1912.

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The *Mahâbhârata*² maintains this tradition in so far at least as it considers the priests to be the "non-official" mouth-pieces of the people, and the councillors as their "natural leaders", the Platonic "guardians". Finally, in a discussion of the *Artha-śâstra* it is even established that the state has its "sole prop" in the ministry (*mantri-pariṣat*).³ The *amâtya* of the Kautilyan theory is in essence an organ through which the folk-will can be brought to bear on the constitution.

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² *Âdi*, Ch. LXXXV, 19—22; *Śânti*, Ch. LXXXIII, 48—50, XCI, 29.

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³ Book V, Ch. IV.

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In a very elementary manner the *Agni Purâṇa*⁴ and the *Matsya Purâṇa*⁵ advise the king "not to decide on the policies alone". The arguments against one-man-rule or exclusive "personal" government are based in the *Śukra-nîti* on the conception that the monarch is not infallible. "Even if the work be a trifling one", aruges Śukra, "it can be done with difficulty by only one individual". "What can be performed by an unfriended person for a kingdom that is considerable?" is therefore his natural query.⁶ Hence his deliberate advice that "even the king who is proficient in all the sciences and a past master in state-craft should never by himself study political interests without reference to ministers. The wise ruler, the ideal "philosopher-king", or the *râjarṣi* as Kautilya would say, should ever abide by the well-thought-out decisions of councillors, office-bearers, subjects, and members attending a meeting, — never by his own opinions."⁷

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⁴ Ch. CCXXV, verse 18.

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⁵ Ch. CCXX, verse 37.

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⁶ Ch. II, lines 1, 2.

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⁷ *Ibid*, lines 3—6.

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This hypothetical case of an "all-knowing" sovereign is well known to students of European political philosophy from Plato to Mill. But the utilitarian creed of the "greatest happiness of the greatest number" on which is erected the legislation of the present day is not prepared to trust itself to the discretion of such an ominiscient benevolent individual. For according to modern political conscience the physical magnitude, if not anything else, is too much for one man. The logic of the *Śukra-nîti* is thus essentially modern. Besides, Śukra is conscious also of the complexity of moral and social relations, as well as of the diversity⁸ of intellectual attainments among the members of a community, — facts which make it all the more improbable that any single intellectual giant should be competent enough to manage a whole state.

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⁸ *Ibid*, lines 9, 12, 13.

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Such also are some of the considerations on which Kautilya, Kâmandaka, Manu and others seek to institute a council of experts as the permanent advisory instrument of monarchical polities. And in regard to their position in the state Śukra's idea is definite and clear. "If the king fears their control", says he, "they are good ministers". It is inconceivable to him that "there could be prosperity in a territory where ministers are not feared by the king".¹ The *amâtyas* in constitutional theory are thus not mere "king's men" like the ministers of England before the introduction of the Cabinet system. They must have an individuality and independence of character in order that they may control the whims and caprices of the monarch and systematically govern the course of the *râjya*. Nay, by the strength of their wisdom they are expected to "deliver a king who has gone astray".² And the acid test of their statesmanship is the "improvement of the state in extent, population, efficiency, revenue and administration".³

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¹ *Ibid*, lines 163—164.

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² *Ibid*, lines 14—18; cf. Kâmandaka, IV, 44—45, 48—50.

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³ *Ibid*, line 166.

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The *nîti*-philosophers have not neglected to consider the other side of the shield. The contingency of an arbitrary Charles I, the Chow of the Mencian radicals in ancient China, the Vena of Hindu tradition, has not been ignored either by Kautilya or by Śukra. The evils of "personal government", with their natural and necessary reactions, have been discussed in all the *śâstras*.⁴ If the monarch follows his own will, say, against the advice of Jâjnavalkya⁵ or of the *Purânas*, he will tend to be the cause of miseries, says the *Śukra-nîti*.⁶ He is likely to "get estranged from the kingdom and alienated from his subjects", in other words, to provoke a revolution. Indeed, he is no longer a "legitimate" king, for by ignoring or defying the counsels of ministers he has made himself into a "thief in the form of a ruler", an "exploiter of the people's wealth", a persecutor, a tyrant.⁷ In all respects, both negatively and positively, the ministry is thus a constitutional check in the Hindu theory of monarchy.

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⁴ Kautilya, Book I, vii; Kâmandaka, II, 60, 64, 71, 73; XI, 75.

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⁵ I, 312.

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⁶ II, lines 7—8.

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⁷ *Ibid*, lines 515—516.

Section 6. Right to Revolt

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The limitations of the king as ruler are fully admitted in the theory of the *nîti-śâstras*. Kâmandaka,¹ Manu,² and Śukra³ are never tired of moralizing, like Elyot in his *Gouvernour*, as to the failings to which the monarch as much as all other human beings is naturally liable, especially because of his high position. Moreover, the restraints on his authority implied in the conception of kingship as a public service and in that of the ministry as a body of overseers and controllers are the two checks that the philosophers offer to the doctrine of the *saptâmga*.

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¹ I, 23, 37, 56—57; IV, 46, 48; XIII, 19; XIV, 1.

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² VII, 39—41; 45—53.

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³ I, lines 181, 183—185, 197—198, 243—244.

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It has to be observed that both these restrictions are distinct from and in addition to the moral and spiritual checks that are binding upon all men as men according to normal Hindu pedagogics. The king therefore is not sacred. As a consequence Hindu thought does not seem to have ever recognized any "divine right" of kings, just as Hindu history does not know of any theocratic state, except in the Khalsa of the latter-day Sikhs.

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This secular idea of monarchy is not however inconsistent with the conception of the ruler as a "god in human form".⁴ The divine character of royalty is described in the *Manu Samhitâ* and the *Mahâbhârata* and is stated also in the *Śukra-nîti*. Royalty is indeed superhuman energy embodied in a human institution, exactly as every activity and *élan* or *śakti* of life is godly or divine in the mythological imagery of Hindu heinotheism.

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⁴ Manu VII, 4—8; *Mahâ*, Vana, CLXXXV, 27—31; Śukra, I, lines 141—143.

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But the king is not "vicar of God" as understood by mediaeval western philosophers, imperial as well as anti-imperial.⁵ The divinity that hedges the monarch is the glory and importance of the functions that he has to perform as *svâmin*. By analogizing the marks of *aiśvarya*, i. e. sovereignty with the attributes and *śakti* of the gods (or powers of nature) Śukra wants the people to understand nothing more than the fact that kingship consists in protection of person and property,⁶ administration of justice,⁶ diffusion of culture and *dharma*,⁶ philanthropy and charity,⁶ and last but not least, realization of revenues.⁶

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⁵ Carlyle, I, 147—160; III, 115, 117—123; Figgis' *Divine Right of Kings*, pp. 219—226.

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⁶ I, lines 144, 151; 147; 145, 146; 149; 148.

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Not even the thinkers of Manu's school by any means contemplate the "patristic" dogma of the state or the monarch as divine in a theological sense. Their metaphor is meant only to bring to the forefront the supreme character of Bodin's *majestas* as an abstract attribute in civil society. In order to appreciate Hindu political theory it is essential to remember this materialistic view of sovereignty (*aiśvarya*) which, so far as Eur-America is concerned, is absolutely un-Christian or pre-Christian, i. e. "modern" and Greek.

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In any event, the metaphorical sacredness of sovereignty does not carry with it, according to *nîti* philosophers, the infallibility and inviolability of the holder of the sceptre, the *danda-dhara*. Not any prince and every prince is "made out of the permanent elements" of the gods of fire, air, water, light, wealth and so forth. It is "only the king who is virtuous that is a part of the gods". How to know such a ruler? The marks of the "god in human form" are fully described in the *Kâmandakî-nîti*, *Śukra-nîti*, and the *Manu-Samhitâ*.¹ He must practise self-restraint and be valorous and skilled in the use of arms and weapons. He must be well up in statecraft and diplomacy and must be able to crush the foes. He must be learned in the arts and sciences. And he must have long-period statesmanlike views. But "otherwise, i. e. if he happens to be the enemy of *dharma* (*Kultur* or Platonic "virtue") and oppressor of the people the king is a part of the demons". Such notions are diametrically opposite to the creed of Augustine² that even Nero was ruler by divine right.

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¹ Kâmandaka, IV, 3—8; Śukra I, lines 139—140, 167—170; *cf.* Manu VII, 25, 26, 27—29, 30—32, 33—34.

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² Augustine's *City of God*, Book V, 19, 21 (Dods' transl., Vol. I, pp. 216, 219).

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One must not consequently look for a Gregory the Great in India to preach on the exemplary conduct of a "good subject" like David who would not criticize the tyranny even of a Saul. The radical tendencies of the *nîti-śâstras* are developed on postulates which are as the poles asunder to the axioms of the church fathers. In *nîti* thought the King can do wrong as any other mortal. The person, property and family of the ruler are therefore not exempt from punishment (*danda*) by the people, e. g. the fine of the *Manu Samhitâ*. The bed-rock of Hindu political philosophy in the analysis of Kingship is accordingly furnished by the differentiation of the king as "a part of the gods" from the king as "a part of the demons". This is the basis of the distinction between "legitimate Kingship" and its contrary, i. e. tyranny. In the treatises on *smriti* and *nîti* Kingship automatically ceases to be legitimate as it ceases to promote justice (*dharma*), and the drastic remedy suggested is revolution and tyrannicide.

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Kautilya observes that *prakriti-kopo hi sarva kopebhyo garîyân*, the wrath of the people is the supremest or most dangerous of all wraths. This is the Hindu counterpart of the Confucian proverb, “Of all who are to be feared, are not the people the chief?” In other words, the “fear of the people is the wisdom of the lord”. Like Mencius,¹ the Rousseau of ancient China, and Manegold of Lautenbach, the most radical anti-imperialist of mediaeval Europe, Manu has described in no uncertain terms as to the form generally taken by this “wrath of the people”. “The King who through foolishness arbitrarily tyrannizes over his own state is very soon deprived of his kingdom and life together with his kith and kin. As the lives of living beings perish through torture of the body, so the lives of kings also are lost through torturing the Kingdom.”² Such a “torturer” or persecutor is known as “ruiner” or “destroyer” in the *Mahâbhârata*. And according to its teachings he is to be executed (*nihantavyah*) by the people.³

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¹ *The Book of Mencius* (Legge’s transl.), Bk. I, pt. II, Ch. VIII, 2, 3. *Vide* the author’s “*Democratic Background of Chinese Culture*” in the *Scientific Monthly*, January, 1919. cf. Dawson’s *Ethics of Confucius*, 241—247.

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² Manu VII, 111, 112.

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³ Anuśâsana, Ch. LXI, 32—34.

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It is thus not the Gregorian doctrine of non-resistance championed by Hobbes in the *Leviathan* or by his junior French contemporary Bossuet in the *Politique* that could have found an echo in Hindu political thought. The Stuarts of England and *le grand monarque* would have been thoroughly disappointed with the *nîti* theory in regard to the status of the king. The right of resistance to the King’s “demonical”, i. e. autocratic and arbitrary (or “Satanic”, to employ Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi’s expression in 1921) rule is taken for granted, and the doctrine of expulsion of the tyrant one of the A. B. C.’s in Hindu political *Weltanschauung*. The student of the *nîti-śâstras* is thus constantly reminded of Languet’s (1518—1581) queries in the *Vindicae contra Tyrannos*⁴ as to whether it is “lawful to resist a prince who violates the laws of God and lays waste his church” and “whether one might resist a prince who oppresses and ruins the state and how far”.⁵ And the conclusion that is advanced by the European advocate of tyrannicide is identical with that of the protagonists of *dharma*.

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⁴ Dunning Vol. II, 46—55.

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⁵ Chs. II, III.

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The *tyrannos* of the Western political theory is the “mere fellow”

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(and not a "sovereign") of the Chinese Micians and "the monarch who follows his own will",¹ "a thief in the form of a ruler",¹ "the enemy of virtue, morality and strength",¹ etc. of the Hindu radicals. The *Śukranîti* is quite at one with the *Politics* of Aristotle in its investigation of the "abuses" to which monarchy degenerates under "abnormal" conditions. And neither Isidore of Seville under the influence probably of Stoic teachings nor John of Salisbury² in the *Policraticus* makes out a more pronounced antithesis between the king and the tyrant than does Manu or Śukra.

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¹ *Śukra-nîti*, II, lines 7—8, 515—516, 549—550.

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² Poole (*John of Salisbury*), 201—225, 238; Carlyle III, 111, 113, 137—140, 145; for a general account of Isidore see Brehaut's *Encyclopedist of the Dark Age, Isidore of Seville*.

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The unequivocal enunciation of the doctrine of resistance, i. e. of the rights of the *prakriti* as against the "demon" in human form is as manifest in Śukra as in Manu. Quite in keeping with the spirit of the *Mahâbhârata* Śukra gives the verdict that the people should "desert the tyrant as the ruiner of the state".³ The "alienation from the subjects"⁴ because of "repression" leads ultimately to his ruin.⁴ The "discontent" may assume larger proportions and "destroy the monarch with his whole family".⁵ The overthrow and execution of Vena and Nahûṣa, the tyrants of Hindu legends, are therefore justified as a matter of course.⁶ Only, the *Śukra-nîti* and the *Manu Samhitâ* are not explicit as to the methods of doing away with tyrants, if, for instance, as approved in England by the author of the *Policraticus*, the "poisoning" of a Tiberius could be resorted to by the people.⁷

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³ II, 550.

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⁴ II, 8, I, 319—320; *cf.* the effects of the mal-administration of justice in Kâmandaka, XIV, 13—14.

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⁵ IV, ii, 49.

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⁶ 135—138.

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⁷ Gerson, p. 170; Carlyle, III, 145.

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As a natural corollary, however, the right to "cashier kings for misconduct" is in Śukra's theory backed by the right to "elect" a ruler. In the place of the deposed tyrant the priest with the consent of the ministry should install one who belongs to his family and is qualified.⁸ This advice of the Hindu philosopher is of a piece with Menicus' commendation of the conduct of the rebel minister I Yin,⁹ and is organically related to the general theory of popular sovereignty in Asian political philosophy.

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⁹ I, XXXI. Vide "the doctrine of resistance in Hindu thought" (*Pos. Back*,

Section 7. Taxes (Bali) as Wages and Prices

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The right of the *prakriti* to revolt is essentially derived from the conception of *samaya* or compact, and this again is integrally connected with the theory of *koṣa* or public finance.

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On election, according to the *Mahâbhârata*,¹ the ruler makes a *pratijñâ*, vow or oath that he will protect the people, and the people reciprocate by promising to help him with the “root of the army”,² *i. e.* the “sinews of war” or *les nerfs de la république*. Kingship is by very nature a public office, and the masters of the king are the people who have the power of the purse. From the standpoint of the sovereign, then, as Śukra makes it clear, the revenues are but the wages for his labor, and from the standpoint of the people they are the prices offered for the service of protection.³

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¹ *Śânti*, Ch. LIX, 106—107; Ch. LXVII, 18, 24—28. Passages bearing on this subject may be seen in Kumaraswamy's “Hindu Theories of State and Social Compact” in the *Hindustan Review*, May-June, 1918.

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² Śukra, IV, ii, 28.

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³ *Supra*, p. 176.

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Taxation, according to this theory, is the “cash nexus” binding the king and the people in the *râjya*. It represents in reality the material basis of the contract between two parties who have an eye to the equalization between compensation and the benefit rendered. The right to levy a tax is dependent on the duty of protecting the people. Should, however, the taxes be ever so unjust in the realization or in the disbursement, the “discontent of the people would destroy the king with his whole family”.⁴ The right of resistance is a natural weapon of the people in Śukra's theory of finance. Recourse is had to it as the ruler ceases to discharge his functions according to the terms of the compact.

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⁴ Śukra IV, ii, 49.

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For normal times, however, i. e. as long as the people are paying the piper and the piper is willing to play the tune called for, Kâmandaka and other Hindu theorists have made provision for a considerable amount of revenue. It is not a slight Theocritean burden of taxation that the *nîti-śâstras* have in view, for the state conceived by them is not a primitive polity with functions of an idyllic character. Manifold are the services, as we have seen, rendered by the state in Hindu theory;

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the revenues (*bali*, *bhâga* or *kara*) i. e. the prices or wages therefore are necessarily varied and considerable.¹

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¹ *Supra*, pp. 172—173, *cf*. Kâmandaka’s “eightfold” sources of public income (V, 78—79), and list of appropriations (XIII, 31—32).

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Manu² and Śukra³ recommend a levy on almost every taxable resource of the people. Indirect taxes on commodities are to be paid by traders. No sale is to be left unassessed, from cattle and gold to fruits and flowers. Land of course contributes its quota. The right of preemption is also to be enforced. One day’s service per mensem and per fortnight the state is allowed, by Manu⁴ and Śukra⁵ respectively, to exact from artists, craftsmen, menial workers and independent laborers.

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² VII, 127, 130, 131, 132.

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³ IV, ii, lines 212—258.

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⁴ VII, 138.

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⁵ IV, ii, 241.

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The only limit that the *Manu Samhitâ* knows is the absolute limit furnished by the sound economic doctrine, “as far as the market will bear.” It lays down the golden rule of realizing the maximum possible without inflicting the least annoyance. For the state that shears the sheep to the skin really kills the goose that lays the egg. In Manu’s language, “excessive imposts” would lead but to the “destruction of one’s own roots.”⁶ We are told indeed that the levy is be *alpâlpa*, i. e. in small quantities. But the camouflage of these alleged negligible doses can not impose on anybody, for the theorist takes care to point out that the people are to be sucked dry in the manner in which “leeches, calves and bees” help themselves upon their food.⁷ The process of steady and patient although slow and imperceptible drain is thus suggested. Statesmen are in short to be guided by the principle analgous to the one well known in the investors’ world, viz. that of “small rates” but “quick returns.”

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⁶ VII, 139.

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⁷ VII, 129.

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We find this hint of Manu’s fully elucidated in the *Arthaśâstra*. “Just as fruits are gathered from a garden,” says Kautilya,⁸ “as often as they become ripe, so revenue shall be collected as often as it becomes ripe.” This principle of continuous levy might be indiscriminately observed in a suicidal fashion. Hence the sober advice that the collection of revenues or fruits must not be allowed “while they are unripe,” for there is a danger lest their “source be injured” to the immense peril of the state. In the *Mahâbhârata’s* phraseology the *râṣtra* must not be “over-milked.”⁹

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⁸ Bk. V, Ch. ii, *Ind. Ant*. 1909, p. 264.

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⁹ *Sânti* LXXXVII, 20—22.

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The fear of injuring the source or killing the goose, or “spoiling the market”, as economists would say, haunts likewise the financiers of the Śukra school. The cultivator is to pay the dues to the state but the state must take care that he “be not destroyed.”¹ Land revenue is to be realized, as we read in the *Śukra-nîti*, in the fashion of the “weaver of garlands” and not of that of the charcoal merchant.² The latter sets fire to the woods to make charcoal and thus destroys the whole property. But the weaver of garlands plucks from the trees only such flowers as are full blown and preserves the rest as well as the trees for future use. Fortified with this much discretion the finance minister is to test the “faculty” or taxability of the people at every conceivable point. He is to “enjoy fruits everywhere” and “collect funds by hook or by crook.”³

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¹ IV, ii, 222. The complete account of Śukra's theory of public finance is to be found in *Pos. Back*, Vol. II, pp. 111—126.

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² IV, ii, 35—36, 223.

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³ IV, ii, 3, 259.

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No resource is then left untapped in Hindu fiscal thought, and “taxes, more taxes, still more taxes” appears to be the slogan popularized by the *Kâmandakî-nîti*.⁴ But the theory of such a heavy assessment is redeemed by the postulate that the people are normally in a position to bear the burden and maintain the “root of the army.” The philosophers of finance have therefore seen to it that the state promotes by all means the economic prosperity of its members.⁵

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⁴ V, 87.

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⁵ *Ibid* IV, ii, 3—6, 15—16, 29—30; *Sabhâ*, V, 76—79; Kâmandaka, V, 80.

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The *Sabhâ-parva* of the *Mahâbhârata* is explicit about the development of agriculture by the government to such an extent as to render it independent of the monsoons. Kâmandaka wants the state to patronize the commercial classes. The people's interests are looked after in Śukra's suggestion that if “new industries be undertaken or new lands brought under cultivation” no taxes are to be demanded until the new ventures “have realized profit twice the expenditure.”⁶ Such remissions of taxes or suspensions of revenue for certain periods are however not to be permitted by Kautilya on *doctrinaire* grounds.⁷ The difficulties in the improvement effected by the peasants are to be carefully considered in fixing the rate of remission. Likewise is the wealth of the land sought to be augmented by protective duties, e. g. on foreign salts and wines.⁸ Kautilya would also recommend legislation against “profiteering.”⁸ Consumers may thereby be protected from ruinously high profits and a general level of moderate prices would encourage saving. But on the other hand Śukra does not want to be unjust to the seller.¹ The excise on sales is not to be realized if the trader receives what is less than or just equal to the cost.

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⁶ IV, ii, 242—244.

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⁷ *Supra*, p. 124.

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⁸ *Supra*, pp. 124—125.

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¹ IV, ii, 218.

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Development of national resources being thus provided for in diverse ways, the Hindu theory of taxation automatically finds its own safety-valve. This principle of replenishment or recuperation is clearly stated by Śukra in the dictum that the "collector of taxes is to be like the gardener who plucks flowers and fruits after having duly nourished the trees with care."² Kâmandaka's idea is similar.

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² *Ibid* II, 345—346; *Kâmandaki*, V, 84.

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The financiers' solicitude for the people's material prosperity is brought out in bold relief by the special arrangements they seek to devise for "hard times" in state housekeeping. Emergency finance is treated by them as something distinct from normal finance. Fines, land revenues, excise, etc., must not be enhaced, says Śukra,³ in normal times. Nor should holy places, religious establishments or properties consecrated to the gods be assessed as sources of public income under peace conditions. Extraordinary duties and fines may be levied when the state is preparing to maintain an army on war-footing.⁴ While the community at large is to be drawn upon for war-finance by regular enhancements of the rates, the pressure of the state is to be borne more distinctively by the rich. And the doctrine is laid down that loans are to be floated by the government to which the wealthy classes should be invited to contribute. The "public debt" is to be redeemed, however, with interest when the national danger is over.⁵

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³ ii, 17—18.

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⁴ 19—20.

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⁵ 1—22.

Section 8. Militarism and Machtpolitik (Śakti-Yoga)

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"A joy is it to be killed in war," says the *Mahâbhârata*,⁶ "painless is the soldier's death, and heaven is his goal." The poets of the Great Epic were but continuing the tradition of the Vedas pervaded as they had been by *śakti-yoga*, the spirit of *pouvoir* or *Machtpolitik*. For, nothing short of a world-conquest was the ideal of Young India of the Vedic period. "Mighty am I," as the earliest Hindu political philosophers set the creed of life for man, “Superior by name, upon the earth, conquering am I, all-conquering, completely conquering every region.”¹ Thus began the conception of war as a “categorical imperative” in Hindu thought, which found its most complete expression in the doctrine of *niskâma karma* preached by Kriṣṇa in the *Gîtâ*.² And naturally the militaristic philosophy of the *Gîtâ* was further popularized by works like the *Agni Purâṇa*³ for mediaeval India, when we find that the *Gîtâ* is virile enough to be cited even in 1911 by an English general in the introduction to Clausewitz’s German classic on War.

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⁶ va, XCIII, 55—59.

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¹ *Atharva Veda* (Bloomfield’s version), XII, i, 54.

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² Section II (Telang’s transl. in the *S. B. E.*), pp. 46, 47, 48.

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³ Ch. CCXXXII, 52—56, CCXLIV, 8.

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