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History and Doctrines of the Ajivikas: A Vanished Indian Religion c22: Chapter XII. Niyati

History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas: A Vanished Indian Religion c22

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Chapter XII. Niyati

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The fundamental principle of Ājīvika philosophy was Fate, usually called *Niyati*. Buddhist and Jaina sources agree that Gosāla was a rigid determinist, who exalted *Niyati* to the status of the motive factor of the universe and the sole agent of all phenomenal change. This is quite clear in our *locus classicus*, the *Sāmañña-phala Sutta*.¹ Sin and suffering, attributed by other sects to the laws of *karma*, the result of evil committed in previous lives or in the present one, were declared by Gosāla to be without cause or basis,² other, presumably, than the force of destiny. Similarly, the escape from evil, the working off of accumulated evil *karma*, was likewise without cause or basis.³

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¹ V. supra, pp. 13–14.

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² *N’ atthi hetu, . . . n’ atthi paccayo sattānam saṃkilesāya*. Dīgha i, 53.

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³ *Ahetu-apaccayā sattā visujjhanti*. Ibid.

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Fatalism proper finds no place in orthodox Hinduism, Buddhism, or Jainism. A man's fortune, his social status, and his happiness or grief, are all ultimately due to his own free will. The Indian doctrine of *karma*, as it is usually interpreted, provides a rigid framework within which the individual is able to move freely and to act on his own decision. His present condition is determined not by any immutable principle, but by his own actions performed either in this life or in his past lives. By freely choosing the right course and following it he may improve his lot and ultimately win salvation either by his own unassisted efforts, or, if he is a member of a devotional sect, with the aid of a personal deity.

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This doctrine Gosāla opposed. For him belief in free will was a vulgar error. The strong, the forceful, and the courageous, like the weakling, the idler, and the coward, were all completely subject to the one principle which determined all things.⁴ “Just as a ball of thread when thrown will unwind to its full length, so fool and wise alike will take their course, and make an end of sorrow.”¹

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⁴ *N’ atthi purisakāre, n’atthi balam, n’atthi viriyam, n’atthi purisa-parakkamo. Sabbe sattā . . . avasā abalā aviriyā niyati-saṃgati-bhāva-pariṇatā*. Ibid.

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¹ *Seyyathā pi nāma sutta-guḷe khitte nibbeṭhiyamānam eva phaleti, evam eva bāle ca paṇḍite ca sandhāvitvā samsaritvā dukkhass’ antam karissanti.* Ibid. ² *Tattha n’atthi; imin’ āham sīlena vā vatena vā tapena vā brahmacariyena vā aparipakkam vā kammam paripācessami paripakkam vā kammam phussaphussa-vyanti karissāmī ti. H’evam n’ atthi.* Ibid. ³ V. supra, p. 219. ⁴ *Niyati-saṅgati-bhāva-pariṇatā.* Dīgha i, p.

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This absolute determinism did not preclude a belief in *karma*, but for Makkhali Gosāla the doctrine had lost its moral force. *Karma* was unaffected by virtuous conduct, by vows, by penances, or by chastity, but it was not denied.² The path of transmigration was rigidly laid out, and every soul was fated to run the same course through a period of 8,400,000 *mahākalpas*. This figure is corroborated by independent testimony,³ and is a measure of the gigantic and weary universe of the Ājīvika cosmologists.

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The process of regular and automatic transmigration seems to have been thought of on the analogy of the development and ripening of a plant. All beings were “developed by Destiny (*Niyati*), chance (*saṅgati*), and nature (*bhāva*).”⁴ This ripening process was completely predetermined, thus differing from the *pariṇāma* of the Sāṅkhya, wherein “evolution follows a definite law which cannot be overstepped (*pariṇāma-krama-niyama*), or in other words there are some natural barriers which cannot be removed, and thus the evolutionary course has to take a path to the exclusion of those lines where barriers could not be removed.”⁵ Sāṅkhya accepts the proposition that progress and change are rigidly limited by natural law. Ājīvikism goes further and declares that they are completely controlled.

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The term *niyati-saṅgati-bhāva-pariṇatā* in the *Sāmañña-phala Sutta* is ambiguous and obscure. It may be translated “ripened by the nature of the lot (i.e. decreed by) Destiny”, or “brought about by the existence of union with Destiny”. But we prefer to follow Buddhaghosa and to take the three first elements of the compound as in *dvandva* relationship, translating the phrase as above.

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⁵³ Buddhaghosa interprets *pariṇatā* as “differentiated” (*nāna-ppakāratam pattā*). *Sum. Vil.* i, p. 160. ⁵ Das Gupta, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. i, p. 256.

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The terms *bhāva* and *saṅgati* appear to represent categories in the Ājīvika metaphysical system which are subordinate to *Niyati*. *Bhāva* seems in this context to be synonymous with *svabhāva*, inherent character or nature. It suggests, below the fundamental category of *Niyati*, sets of conditions and characteristics in each entity, which, acting as factors subordinate to the great principle, control growth, development, and rebirth. Some heretics exalted *Svabhāva* to the status of *Niyati* in the regular Ājīvika system. Their doctrines are mentioned by the Jaina commentators, though not in such detail as those of the *niyativādins* or Ājīvikas. Thus Jñānavimala writes: “Some believe that the universe was produced by *Svabhāva*, and that everything comes about by *Svabhāva* only.”¹ Guṇaratna quotes a verse which he attributes to the supporters of this doctrine: “What makes the sharpness of thorns and the varied nature of beasts and birds? All this comes about by *Svabhāva*. There is nothing which acts at will. What is the use of effort?”² Hence it appears that the *svabhāvavādins* agreed with the *niyativādins* on the futility of human efforts. They were classed in the group of *akriyāvādins*, or those who did not believe in the utility or effectiveness of *puruṣakāra*. It would seem that the *svabhāvavādin* differed from the *niyativādin* in that, while the latter viewed the individual as determined by forces exterior to himself, for the former he was rigidly self-determined by his own somatic and psychic nature. These ideas have much in common and we suggest therefore that *svabhāvavāda* was a small sub-sect of Ājīvikism.

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¹ *Kecit svabhāva-bhāvitam jagad manyante, svabhāven’ aiva sarvaḥ sampadyate.* To *Praśnavyākaraṇa* 7, fol. 29. V. also Śilāṅka to *Sū. kr.* i, 1, 2, 2, fol. 30.

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² *Kaḥ kaṇṭakānām prakaroti taikṣṇyam,* *Vicitra-bhāvam mṛga-pakṣiṇām ca?* *Svabhāvataḥ sarvam idam pravṛttam.* *Na kāmacāro’sti. Kutaḥ prayatnaḥ?* *Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā* to *Ṣaddarśana-samuccaya*, p. 13. V. also *Abh. Rāj.* s.v.

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*Saṅgati*, interpreted by Hoernle, on the basis of Buddhaghosa, as “environment”,³ we would translate as “lot” or “chance”. It seems to represent the principle of *Niyati* as manifested in action. The term is known to Jaina writers, and is connected by them also with the *niyativādins* or the Ājīvikas. Thus, the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, quoting the opinions of foolish philosophers, declares one of their doctrines to be that pleasure and pain are not caused by oneself or others, but are the work of chance.¹ On this Śīlāṅka comments: "Now the niyativādin declares his attitude. (The word) saṅgaīyam (in the text) implies transmigration wholly by inner development. Experience of all joy and sorrow whatever is fortuitous. Therein Niyati is its (i.e. chance's) essential nature as fortuity. They say that since joy and sorrow, etc., are not produced by human action and so on, therefore for all beings they are caused by Destiny and are fortuitous."²

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³ *ERE.* i, p. 261. *Uv. Das.* vol. ii, app. 2, pp. 16-17.

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¹ *Na tam sayaṃ kaḍam dukkhaṃ, kao annakaḍam ca ṇam? Suhaṃ vā jaī vā dukkhaṃ, sehiyaṃ vā asehiyaṃ. Sayaṃ kaḍam na annehiṃ, vedayanti puḍho jiyā. iham egesi āhiam. Sū. kr. i, 1, 2, 2-3, fol. 30.*

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² *āviṣkaroti. Saṅgaīyam ti samyak svapariṇāmena gaṇiṃ. Tasya yuuu yatra yat sukha-duḥkh'-ānubhavanaṃ sā saṅgatiḥ. Niyatis tasyāṃ bhavam saṅgatikam. Yataś c' aivaṃ na puruṣakār'-ādi-kṛtam sukha-duḥkh'-ādi, atas tut teṣāṃ prāṇināṃ niyati-kṛtam saṅgatikam ity ucyate. Śīlāṅka to Sū. kr., loc. cit.*

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The above verse and its commentary explain both the phrases n'atthi hetu in the Sāmañña-phala-Sutta passage and niyati-saṅgati-bhāva-pariṇatā. For the niyativādin causation was illusory. The European doctrine of causation conceived the universe as determined by an immense number of causes, going back to a first cause, which might or might not be expressed in theological terms. The Ājīvika theory was evidently very different from this. The universe seems to have been thought of as a continuous process, which was recognized by some later Ājīvikas to be on ultimate analysis illusory.³ The only effective cause was Niyati, which was not merely a first cause, but, in its aspects as saṅgati and bhāva, or chance and inner character, was also the efficient cause of all phenomena. Saṅgati and bhāva, the manifestations of Niyati in individuals, were only apparent and illusory modifications of the one principle, and did not in fact introduce new causal factors into the universal process. Thus, the Ājīvika was sometimes called a believer in the doctrine of causelessness (ahetukavādin).⁴ Since all human activities were ineffectual he was also an akriyāvādin, a disbeliever in the efficiency of works.

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³ V. infra, pp. 235 ff.

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⁴ E.g. Jāt. v, p. 228.

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The Ājīvika process of salvation is sometimes in the Pāli texts called *saṃsāra-suddhi*, or salvation by transmigration, a very apt definition of the doctrine. "There is no short cut (lit. door) to bliss, Bijaka. Wait on Destiny. Whether (a man has) joy or sorrow, it is obtained through Destiny. All beings are purified through transmigration, (so) do not be eager for that which is to come." ¹

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¹ *N' atthi dvāraṃ sugatiyā. Niyatim kaṃkha, Bijaka.* *Sukhaṃ vā yadi vā dukkhaṃ, Niyatiyā kira labbhati.* *Saṃsāra-suddhi sabbesaṃ, mā turittho anāgate.* Jāt. vi, p. 229. Cf. *Ime sattā saṃsāra-suddhikā.* Jāt. v, p. 228.

Niyativāda Dialectic

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The usual Buddhist criticism of the Ājīvika *Niyati* doctrine was pragmatic. Thus, the *Sandaka Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* ² condemns the four "antitheses to the higher life" (*abrahmacariya-vāsā*), which include the doctrines elsewhere ascribed to Makkhali, Pūraṇa, Pakudha, and Ajita. The fatalism of Makkhali entails the antinomianism of Pūraṇa. Since there is no possibility of modifying one's destiny by good works, self-control, or asceticism, all such activity is wasted. The Ājīvika doctrines are, in fact, conducive to luxury and licentiousness. This practical criticism of the Ājīvika philosophy might have been easily countered by the Ājīvikas with the claim that ascetics performed penances and led righteous lives under the compulsion of the same all-embracing principle as determined the lives of sinners, and that they were ascetics because *Niyati* so directed it. This very obvious argument occurs nowhere in the Buddhist scriptures, though it was known to the Jaina commentator Śīlāṅka, ³ who quoted it as one of the arguments used by *niyativādins*.

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² *Majjhima* i, pp. 513 ff. Cf. V, supra, pp. 18-19.

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³ *Ibid.*

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Although orthodox Hindu literature rarely mentions the Ājīvikas, we have some evidence that Hinduism was not wholly unaware of them. The doctrine of *Niyati* is mentioned in the compendium of Suśruta, among a number of other theories on the nature and origin of the universe. ⁴ The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* gives a list of first causes according to the unorthodox systems, which includes most of the hypothetical entities referred to with disapproval by the Jaina commentators—time, nature, destiny, chance, the elements, and the Sāṅkhya category of Puruṣa.¹ Commenting on this passage Śaṅkara ascribes belief in Niyati to the Mīmāṃsakas, no doubt erroneously, and describes it as " karma characterized by the equal (reward) of good and evil ". He briefly dismisses the theory by stating that Destiny is variable (in its operation).²

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⁴ *Ibid.*

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¹ Kālaḥ, svabhāvo, niyatir, yadṛcchā, bhūtāni, yoniḥ, puruṣ’, (sic) eti cintyāḥ. Samyoga eṣām nanu ātma-bhāvād, Ātm’ apy anīśaḥ sukha-duḥkha-hetoḥ. Śvetāśvatara, i, 2.

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² Niyatir avisaṃa-puṇya-pāpa-lakṣaṇam karma. Niyatir iti Mīmāṃsakāḥ. Niyater api anaikāntatvād dūṣitam etan matam. Śaṅkara to Śvetāśvatara, loc. cit.

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Jaina criticisms of Ājīvika determinism are based both on logic and common sense. Of the triter sort is the argument of the Uvāsaga Dasāo, attributed to the Jaina layman Kuṇḍakoliya in his debate with the Ājīvika deva.³ The latter praises Gosāla’s determinist theory and disparages Mahāvīra’s doctrine of qualified free-will. Whereupon Kuṇḍakoliya asks the deva whether he attained his own divine status by any efforts on his part. He replies that he obtained heavenly bliss without effort (anuṭṭhāṇeṇam). " Why then," asks Kuṇḍakoliya, " are not those other living beings in whom there is no effort . . . also devas ? "⁴ This argument, though blatantly illogical, is sufficient to convince the deva of the wrongness of his views, but we may be sure that the early Ājīvikas had their rejoinders to such feeble attacks.

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³ Uv. Das. vi, 166–8. V. supra, p. 133.

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⁴ Je . . . ṇam jīvāṇam ṇ’ aṭṭhi uṭṭhāṇe . . . te kiṃ na devā? Uv. Das. vi, 168.

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Another amusing argument of a similar nature is ascribed to Mahāvīra himself, in the account of his conversion of the Ājīvika potter, Saddālaputta.⁵ Mahāvīra asks whether the potter’s ware is made by dint of exertion or not, to which the Ājīvika replies that it is made without exertion. Mahāvīra then asks what Saddālaputta would do if one of his workmen stole or broke his pots, or made overtures to his wife. To this the potter indignantly replies that he would berate and strike the culprit, or even kill him. But such actions, Mahāvīra retorts, would be quite inconsistent with the doctrine of *Niyati* and of no exertion. If all things are unalterably fixed (*niyayā savvabhāvā*) and there is no exertion, no man can steal or break the pots, and the potter cannot revile or strike or kill the culprit. Yet such things do happen in everyday life, and so the claim that there is no exertion and that all things are determined is false. No doubt the Ājīvika had his answer to this appeal to common sense, which reminds us of Dr. Johnson’s famous refutation of Berkeleian idealism. We may surmise that the *niyativādin* explained the apparent existence of freedom of choice by the postulate of a double standard of truth. In other and more exalted Indian philosophical systems such a double standard of practical and empirical (*vyāvahārika*) and absolute (*pāramārthika*) truth existed, and its adoption by the Ājīvikas would solve the apparent antinomy of a postulated determinism and an inner conviction of free-will. In everyday life, and for all practical purposes, free-will existed, and the Ājīvika layman like Saddālaputta acted on that assumption. But ultimately free-will was illusory—*Niyati* was the only determining factor, and human power and effort were completely ineffectual.

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⁵ Ibid., vii, 198–9. V. supra, pp. 52, 132.

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The Jaina commentators give us a better impression than do the Buddhist and Jaina Prākrit texts of the *niyativādin*’s powers of logical argument. Thus Śīlāṅka in his commentary to the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, quotes the arguments of the *niyativādins*, who, although not expressly identified with them, must surely have been Ājīvikas. “If happiness is experienced as a result of human activity there should be no difference in the reward (of equal exertion), nor should there be lack of reward when equal effort is exerted, whether by servants, merchants, or, peasants etc. Yet it is often seen that even when no means of livelihood such as service, etc., is followed, rich reward is obtained. So nothing is achieved by human effort.”¹ This is another example of the argument used by Mahāvīra against Saddālaputta, the argument from human experience; but here it is employed by the Ājīvika against his opponents. The successes and failures of men of equal ability prove that their happiness does not depend on their own powers. Man is not an effective factor in the universal process.

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¹ *Yadi puruṣakāra-kṛtaṃ sukhādy anubhūyeta tataḥ sevaka-vaṇik-karṣak’-ādīnāṃ samāne puruṣakāre sati phala-viśeṣo na syāt, na ca phala-vaiṣamyaṃ syāt, tulyapuruṣakāreṣu ca tulyaphalatvaṃ bhavet. Kasya cit tu sev’-ādi-vināpi mahā-phalam upalabhyate, kaścit tu sev’-ādi-kṛtāyāṃ api na kiñcid upalabhyate, iti dṛśyata iti. Ato na puruṣakārāt kiñcid āsuayate.* Śīlāṅka to Sū. Kṛ. 1, 1, 2, 2, fol. 30.

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Continuing his discussion of *niyativāda* Śilāṅka, with commendable impartiality, temporarily adopts the determinist attitude, and considers possible causes of the manifest inequalities of the world. "What then (is the cause)? Only Destiny. . . . Time is not the agent, for the variety of results (of effort) in the world is inconsistent with the uniformity of time. Variation in the effect arises from variation in the cause, not from uniformity." ¹

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¹ *Kim tarhi? Niyater ev' eti . . . . N' api kālaḥ kartā, tasy' aikarūpatvāj jagati phala-vaicitry'-ānupapatteḥ. Kāraṇa-bhede hi kārya-bhedo bhavati, n'ābhede. Śilāṅka, loc. cit.* The commentator continues very tersely: *Tathā viruddha-dharm'-ādhyāsaḥ* that variations in fact occur, and that they must have a cause. Thus the kālavādin has committed the fallacy of ascribing contrary qualities to Time, since the cause must itself be variable. He simultaneously asserts the uniformity of Time and the variety of its effects.

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After thus dismissing Time as a possible prime mover, Śilāṅka considers the theistic explanation from the Ājīvika point of view. "Likewise happiness and grief do not come about through the agency of God. (If they do,) is God formed or formless? If he has form he has no more the capacity to create all things than has the ordinary man (who also has form). If he is formless, his inactivity must be greater than that of empty space (which is also formless). Moreover, if he be subject to passion and other (emotions), since he is not superior to us (mortals), etc., he is not the maker of the universe. And if he were devoid of passion the variety of good and evil fortune, of lord and poor man, which he has caused in the world, would not come about. Therefore God is not the creator." ² The logic of this passage seems to be that, as all beings, who are subject to passions, are created and ineffectual, so God, if also subject to passions, must also be created and share the ineffectuality of the creature. On the other hand, if he were devoid of passions he could not be responsible for the inequalities and injustices in the world.

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² *Tath' īśvara-kārtrke 'pi sukha-duḥkhe na bhavataḥ. Yato 'sāv Īśvaro mūrto 'mūrto vā? Yadi mūrtas, tataḥ prākṛta-puruṣasy' eva sarva-kārtrtv'-ābhāvaḥ. Ath' āmūrtas? Tathā saty ākāśasy' eva sutarām niṣkriyalvam. Api ca yady asau rāgādimāms, tato 'smad-ādy-avyatirekād viśvasy' ākart' aiva. Ath' āsau vigata-rāgas latas tatkṛtam subhaga-durbhag'-īśvara-daridr'-ādi-jagad-vaicitryam na ghaṭām prāñcati. Tato n' Īśvaraḥ kart' eti. Śilāṅka, loc. cit.*

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Śīlāṅka, still writing as a *niyativādin*, next dismisses the *svabhāvavādin*, who, as we have seen, held a doctrine very similar to that of the Ājīvika: "Moreover the causing of joy and sorrow cannot be ascribed to inherent character (*svabhāva*). For is this different from a man or the same as he? If it is different it is not capable of causing the joy and sorrow which befall him, on account of that difference. Nor (if it is) the same (as he). For, if it were, it would be a mere man, and it has been shown that man cannot be an effective agent." ¹

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¹ *Tathā svabhāvasy' api sukha-duḥkh'-ādi-kartṛtv'-ānupapattiḥ. Yato 'sau svabhāvaḥ puruṣād bhinno 'bhinno vā? Yadi bhinno na puruṣ'-āśrite sukha-duḥkhe kartum alam tasmād bhinnatvād iti. N' apy abhinnah. Abhede puruṣa eva syāt, tasya c' ākartṛtvam uktam eva. Śīlāṅka, loc. cit.*

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Karma, the favourite Indian scapegoat for all human misfortune and inequality, is disposed of similarly. "Nor is *karma* a possible cause of joy, sorrow, etc. For is a man's *karma* different from the man or the same as (he)? If the same, *karma* is mere man, and the flaw (in this argument) has already been stated. If it is different, then is it conscious or unconscious? If conscious, there are two consciousnesses in one body. If unconscious, how can it be an effective agent in the production of joy and sorrow, when it is as devoid of freedom as is a mere block of stone." ² After thus exhausting the possible causes of man's joy and sorrow Śīlāṅka states the *niyativādin's* view, that these are caused by chance or one's lot (*saṅgati*) of which Niyati is the essential nature (*bhāvam*). This passage we have paraphrased above.³

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² *N' api karmaṇaḥ sukha-duḥkham prati kartṛtvam ghaṭate. Yatas tat karma puruṣād bhinnam abhinnam vā bhavet? Abhinnam cet, puruṣa-mātrat'-āpattiḥ karmaṇaḥ, tatra c' ūkto doṣaḥ. Atha bhinnam. Tat kim sacetanam acetanam vā? Yadi sacetanam, ekasmin kāye caitanya-dvay'-āpattiḥ. Ath' acetanam. Tathā sati kutas tasya pāṣāṇa-khaṇḍasy' eva' āsvatantrasya sukha-duḥkh'-otpādanam prati kartṛtvam iti? Śīlāṅka, loc. cit.*

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³ V. supra, p. 227.

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An even more important passage on the arguments of the *niyativādins* is contained in the same text. A chapter in the second part of the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* deals with four schools of false teaching, the *Lokāyata* or materialist, the atomist, the theist, and the determinist. The chief argument of the last is paraphrased by Śīlāṅka at the outset in terms similar to those of the earlier passage. "Of those who put forth equal effort only one has material success, through the force of Fate. Hence only Fate is the cause.”¹ He then quotes one of the verses paraphrased above.²

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¹ *Samāna-kriyāṇāṃ kasya cid eva Niyati-balād artha-siddhiḥ. Ato Niyatir eva kāraṇam.* Śīlāṅka, loc. cit.

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² V. supra, p. 221.

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The text of the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* then states the thesis of the niyativādin. “Here are two men. One maintains (the efficiency of) action, the other does not. . . . Both equally and alike are affected by (a single) cause.³ To this Śīlāṅka adds: “. . . One of them maintains (the efficiency of) action, saying that action, such as going from one country to another, is (characteristic) of a man, not of something compelled by time, or by God, etc. But (actually it pertains to) one driven by Fate. And likewise with inaction. If they, not being free, follow the doctrines of action and inaction (respectively), both (may be) equal (in fortune), owing to their subservience to Fate. But if they were free, then, owing to the difference between action and inaction, they would not be equal (in fortune). Hence, being alike dependent on a single cause, by the force of Fate they have taken to the doctrines of determinism and free-will respectively.”⁴ This argument is a repetition of the previous one. The man who exerts himself and the passive believer in Destiny may both enjoy equal fortune. But if their efforts were really effective the energetic man would be more fortunate than the other. Both are, in fact, dependent on Destiny, and their very belief or disbelief in the Ājīvika doctrine of *Niyati* is also dependent on that principle.

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³ *Iha khalu duve purisā bhavanti. Ege purise kiriyam āikkhaī, ege . . . no kiriyam . . . Dovi te purisā tullā egaṭṭhā kāraṇam āvannā.* Sū. kr. ii, 1, 12, fol. 287.

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⁴ . . . *Ekaḥ kriyām ākhyāti. “Kriyā hi deśād deśāntar’-āvapti-lakṣaṇā, kāl’-eśvar’-ādinā coditasya bhavati.” Api tu Niyati-iyā ‘pi. Yadi tāv asvatantrau kriyāvādam akriyāvādam . . . Yadi punas tau svatantrau . . . Ata ekārthāv eka-kāraṇ’-aiva tau niyati-vādam aniyati-vādam c’ āśritāv ye*, fol. 288.

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The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* continues that the fool imagines that he is responsible for his own sorrow, as others are responsible for that which befalls them. But the wise man recognizes that he is not the cause of his own grief.⁵ Śīlāṅka expands this passage: “By Destiny, though against his will, he is so made that he suffers a series of sorrows. . . . So the determinist, rejecting the visible human action and having recourse to the doctrine of invisible destiny, is ironically called a wise man.”¹ This last sentence is another appeal to common sense, of the sort used by Mahāvīra in his argument with Saddālaputta.² But Śīlâṅka continues with his exposition of the Ājīvika standpoint. “In this world (*atra*) grief does not arise for a man, even though he delight in evil courses, while for another virtuous man it does. Therefore only Destiny is the cause. Thus, with the doctrine of Destiny established, in order to show everything else to be subject to Destiny, he maintains that, so determined, all beings . . . have union with new bodies; a (new) body is not obtained by anything else such as *karma*, etc. So they experience under the compulsion of Destiny (*niyatitā*) the varied stages of life from childhood to old age. Under the compulsion of Destiny they are separated from their bodies. And under the compulsion of Destiny they experience various repulsive conditions, such as being hump-backed, one-eyed, . . . a dwarf, . . . death disease, and sorrow.”³ The text of this section of the *Sūtrakṛtâṅga* concludes with a passage which is repeated for all four types of heretic, accusing them of ignorance and licentiousness.

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⁵ *Mehāvī puṇa evam vippaḍivedenti (sic) . . . “aham amsi dukkhāmi vā soyāmi vā . . . ṇo aham evam akāsi”. Sū. kr., loc. cit.

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¹ *Niyaty’ aiv’ āsāv anicchann api tat kāryate yena . . . . . . bhavati . . . Pare’ py evam eva yojanīyam . . . Sa puruṣakāraṃ parityajy’ ādṛṣṭa-niyati-vād’-āśrayeṇa manuvivek ity evam ullāṅthyate.* Śīlâṅka to above, fol. 288.

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² V. supra, pp. 229–30.

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³ *Atra . . . duḥkham utpadyate, parasya . . . iti. Tad evam niyativāde . . . iti darśayitum āha . . . ye ke ca na . . . . . . ‘arīra-sambandham āgacchanti; n’ ā . . . . . . . . . Tathā bāla- . . . vṛddh’-āvasth’-ādikaṃ vividha-paryāyaṃ niyatitā ev’ ānubhavanti; tathā niyatitā eva . . . śarīrāt pṛthagbhāvam anubhavanti; tathā niyatitā eva vividham . . . avasthā-viśeṣaṃ kubja kāṇa . . . vāmana- . . . maraṇa-roga-śok’-ādikaṃ bībhatsam . . . op. cit., fols. 288–9.*

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Śīlâṅka then proceeds to demolish the *niyativādin’s* arguments. Is *Niyati* determined by its own nature or by another *niyati*? If by its own nature, why are not all other entities so determined? If by a higher *niyati*, that too must be determined similarly, and so on in an infinite regression.⁴ Again, owing to the character of Niyati as inherent nature (Niyater svabhāvatvāt), things must come about through it (Niyati) with its determined nature, and not through (a Niyati possessing) various inherent natures. But, since Niyati itself is single that which it causes should be uniform, in which case there should be no variety in the world. This, however, is not borne out by experience.¹

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⁴ *Asau Niyatiḥ kiṃ svata eva . . . yayā niyatyā niya-myate? . . . Tatra yady asau . . . sarva-padārthānām eva tathā-svabhāvatvaṃ kiṃ na . . . yayā niyatyā tathā*

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¹ Tathā Niyateḥ svabhāvatvān niyata-svabhāvay’ ānayā bhavitavyam, na nānā-svabhāvay’ ēti. Ekatvāc ca Niyates tat-kāryen’ āpy ekākāren’ aiva bhavitavyam. Tathā ca sati jagad-vaicitry’-ābhāvaḥ, Na c’ aitad dṛṣṭam iṣṭam vā. Ibid.

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Śilāṅka dismisses the Ājīvika argument for determinism from the fact of human inequality by recourse to the doctrine of karma. The man who is prosperous and fortunate is enjoying the fruits of virtuous conduct in past lives.

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A similar but shorter discussion of Niyativāda occurs in Guṇaratna’s commentary to the Ṣaddarśana-samuccaya, where a further argument for determinism is put forward, based on the uniformity and regularity of natural processes. Niyati, declares Guṇaratna, taking the determinist point of view, is the principle by which all things are manifested in determined form. Everything whatever is found to exist in a determined form. Otherwise, in the absence of a controlling agent, there would be no laws of cause and effect, and no fixed form of anything. What man skilled in logic can deny Niyati, the existence of which is proved by the determinate nature of the effects (of like causes) ?²

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² Niyatir nāma tattv’-āntaram asti yad-vaśād ete bhavāḥ sarve ’pi niyaten’ aiva rūpeṇa prādur-bhāvam aśnuvate, n’anyathā . . . . Yad yadā yato bhavati tat tadā tata eva niyaten’ aiva bhavad upalabhyate. Anyathā kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva-niyamaḥ syāt. Tataś ca kārya-naiyatyataḥ pratīyamānām enām Niyatim ko nāma tarkikaḥ bādhitum kṣamate. Op. cit., p. 12.

The Development of the Niyati Doctrine

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For the early Ājīvikas Niyati is the ruling principle of the cosmic process. This concept of process, of the slow evolution of all entities along rigidly determined lines, is clearly stated in the Pāli and Ardha-māgadhī sources. The universe is, in fact, a dynamic one. But the Tamil texts which treat of Ājīvikism show that other views existed.

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niyamyate. S’ ápy anyayā, s’ apy anyay’ êty evam anavasthā. Śilāṅka, op. cit., fol. 289.

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We have seen that the atomic doctrines ascribed in the *Sāmañña-phala Sutta* to Pakudha Kaccāyana, which certainly had their effect on Southern Ājīvikism,¹ maintained that the elementary categories were as firm as mountains, neither moving nor developing nor in any way affecting one another.² The author of this passage conceives a static, not a dynamic universe. Similarly, Mahāvīra tried to convince Saddālaputta that his action in punishing a careless or immoral workman would be a real action, and not a mere illusion.³ Hoernle translates the phrase *niyayā savvabhāvā* not, as might be expected, as "all things are determined", but as "all things are unalterably fixed",⁴ which makes better sense of Mahāvīra's argument. Here are the germs of the static view of the universe ascribed to the Ājīvikas in *Nīlakēci*.

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¹ V. supra, p. 91.

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² V. supra, p. 16.

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³ V. supra, p. 230.

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⁴ Uv. Das., vol. ii, p. 132.

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We have no information as to the process of thought which led to the emergence of the new doctrine of *Avicalita-nityatvam*, or a completely static universe. It was probably imported into the Ājīvika system by the school of Pakudha, which seems to have played a significant part in the formation of the doctrines of the Southern Ājīvikas. The doctrine could easily be harmonized with the determinism of Makkhali Gosāla, and is, in fact, a logical development of the latter. We conceive the train of thought which led the Ājīvika teachers of the South to accept the doctrine to have been as follows: If all future occurrences are rigidly determined and there is no room for novelty in the universe, coming events may in some sense be said to exist already. The future exists in the present, and both exist in the past. Time is thus on ultimate analysis illusory, and if so all motion and change, which take place in time, must be illusory also. Thus, we have almost arrived at the system of Parmenides.

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This is the doctrine of the Ājīvika teacher in *Nīlakēci*. "Though we may speak of moments," he declares, "there is (really) no time at all."⁵ This sentence clearly shows that the Ājīvikas were well versed in the doctrine of the two orders of reality, which we have already suggested as the Ājīvika solution to the paradoxes of the Niyati theory.¹ In his sermon, however, the theory of the static universe is not explicitly stated. Such a theory is, however, criticized at length by his interlocutor, and commented on by Vāmanamuni, so it seems certain that it was held.

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⁵ Kaṇam ē-y eṉiṉ umm oru kālam ilai. Nīl. 677.

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¹ V. supra, p. 230.

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From this passage we obtain a clear idea of the theory, called by the commentator Avicalita-nityatvam, or unchanging permanence, which, for the Ājīvika, is said to obscure all knowledge of the truth.² Every phase of a process is always present. Just as the stars still exist after the sun has risen, so in a soul which has attained salvation its earthly births are still present.³ Nothing is destroyed, and nothing is produced.⁴ Events are rigidly fixed.⁵ The doctrine of Niyati had developed far from that of Makkhali Gosāla in the Pāli scriptures. Not only are all things determined, but their change and development is a cosmic illusion.

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² Avicalita-nityatvam keṭum ādaliṉ, uṇakku-t tattuvañāṉam illai-y ām. To Nil. 694.

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³ Nil. v, 695.

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⁴ [Text obscured]

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⁵ [Text obscured]

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This static view of the universe is countered by several arguments from human experience and common sense. If souls in a state of salvation retain their old incarnations in latent form the saint must from time to time show characteristics of the boar, and eat filth.⁶ If the passage of time is illusory the food we eat must already be excreta.⁷ The pragmatic argument is also used. The doctrine of unchanging permanency destroys all moral sanctions—the ascetic is still a householder, and may behave as such.⁸ The obvious unreality of the doctrine is illustrated by a number of homely examples. If it be true, ghee is on fire, and the child has already conceived. If all change is illusory, how can the elements rise and fall, as the Ājīvika doctrine itself claims ? ⁹ According to Avicalita-nityatvam a horse trots while still in its stable.¹⁰ How can the ripening of fruit be explained ? ¹¹ How can boats be hollowed from logs, or bowls be beaten from sheets of metal ? ¹² Even words undergo grammatical change.¹³ Causation must exist, for the child will not grow unless its growth is caused by adequate nourishment and care.¹ These examples show conclusively that the school of Ājīvikism treated by this text had a metaphysic very similar to that of the Eleatics.

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⁶ Ibid., comm. to 695.

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⁷ Ibid., 696.

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⁸ [Text obscured]

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⁹ Ibid., 698.

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¹⁰ Ibid., 699.

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¹¹ Ibid., 700.

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¹² Ibid., 701.

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¹³ Ibid., 703.

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¹ Ibid., 710.

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The other Tamil sources do not mention the doctrine of unchanging permanence. But the length at which it is treated in *Nilakēci*, and the reliability of that work, together with the traces of such a theory to be found in Northern works, are sufficient evidence that it was held by some Ājīvikas at least. Vāmana, the 13th-14th century commentator on the work,² seems to have understood the doctrine, and greatly expands and elucidates the elliptical verses of the text. From this we may infer that the static world view was held by some Ājīvikas until the sect lost its independent existence. It was probably conceived and elaborated by the ascetic leaders of Ājīvikism, and had little influence upon the laymen.

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² V. supra, p. 200.

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*Maṇimēkalai* and *Civañāṉa-cittiyār* stress the Ājīvikas' atomic doctrines rather than their determinism. Indeed the Ājīvika teacher in *Maṇimēkalai* is scarcely aware of the doctrine of *Niyati*, and merely states in a single line that Fate (*ūḻ*) is responsible for existence.³ *Civañāṉa-cittiyār* understands the doctrine, but here it is referred to in only one of the ten verses in which Ājīvika teaching is propounded, and in the six verses of refutation determinism is not explicitly mentioned. The text states that wealth and poverty, pain and pleasure, living in one country and travelling to another, are ordained beforehand in the womb, and that the world moves subject to a sure Fate.⁴ The reference to the womb in this verse suggests that with the school of Ājīvikas represented by this text, which is almost the latest of our sources, the orthodox Hindu and Jaina view was in process of replacing the traditional Ājīvika doctrine of *Niyati*. By this time the distinction between *Niyati* and *karma* had almost gone. In fact one verse of the *Civañāṉa-cittiyār* states that *kaṉma* is the cause of the incarnation of the soul.⁵ Ājīvika doctrine never wholly excluded *karma*, but insisted that it operated in an automatic and determinate manner.⁶ It seems that the status of karma rose as that of Niyati fell. This is strongly indicated by the commentary of Tattuvappirakācar to Civañāṉa-cittiyār, which interprets ūḻi (Fate, Sanskrit Niyati) as viṉai (action, Sanskrit karma).

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³ *Muṇnuḷa-v ūḻ' ē piṉṉum uru-v ippatu*. *Mani*., xxvii, 164.

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⁴ *Tēriya-v ūḻir paṭṭu-c celvat' ivv ulakam*. *CÑC*., p. 265, v. 9.

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⁵ *Caṇittant' ak-kaṉmaṭṭāl ē naṉṉiṭum urukkaḷ āki*. Ibid., p. 261, v. 6.

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⁶ V. supra, p. 225.

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It seems that within the later Ājīvika sect at least two schools emerged. With the first, typified by the Ājīvika teacher in Maṇimēkalai, Niyati was pushed more and more into the background. With the second, whose doctrines are discussed in Nilakēci, the Niyati doctrine developed into Avicalita-nityatvam, and new features emerged, which will be discussed in the following chapters.

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Just as the simpler Buddhists must have found the Theravāda teachings unpalatable and difficult to understand and developed for themselves a more emotional approach to their religion, taking some of their logicians and metaphysicians with them, so with the Southern Ājīvikas the sterile doctrines of Niyati and Avicalita-nityatvam seem to have been put on one side by some branches of the sect and replaced by more attractive and more intelligible teachings.

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With the decline of Niyati in importance the idea of the futility of human effort probably slipped into the background also. Nilakeci seems aware of the doctrine, and counteracts it with the usual argument, that it leads to antinomianism.¹ But Maṇimēkalai states that those who do not wish for destruction (aḻiyal vēṇṭār) will obtain the supremely white birth, and salvation.² This suggests not a mere acquiescence in Destiny, but a definite effort of will on the part of the believer. Indeed it is probable that the rigid determinism of Ājīvika theory never greatly affected Ājīvika practice, and that its influence on day-to-day life was negligible.

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¹ Nil, 697.

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² Maṇi. xxvii, 156.

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