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The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c5.s5: V. Source of the Vedânta

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c5.s5

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V. Source of the Vedânta

1. General Remarks on the Indian Pramânas or Canons of Knowledge

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WHAT are the sources from which we draw our knowledge? This question, of which every philosophy has to give an account, meets us in the Indian systems largely in the form of a consideration of the *Pramânas*, literally, “measures” or “canons,” of our knowledge; in which, therefore, not the concept of a source from which we draw is the basis, but on the contrary that of a means of control, by which we are to measure the knowledge already existing in us, and test its correctness, a concept which is explained by the fact that Indian philosophy did not start, as far the most part the Grecian did, from an investigation, free of assumptions, into “the existent,” but rather, like modern philosophy, from the critical analysis and testing of a complex of knowledge handed down (through the Veda)⁵². As such *Pramânas*, or canons of knowledge, the systems, as a rule, enumerate: 1) *Pratyaksham*, also called *drishtam*, the sensuously perceptible, as it is known to us by direct perception; 2) *Anumânam* “the measuring after something,” inference, by which that part of “the existent” which does not fall within direct perception,⁵³ becomes accessible; we know of it only because the perceptible points to something else, not perceptible, with which it is connected. This connection can be threefold, according as the element to be inferred is either the cause of the element perceived, or its effect, or as, thirdly, the two stand in a relation which does not fall under the conception of causality, for example, in that of analogy.

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⁵² An essential difference consists in modern philosophy in its fundamental character, even up to-day, being a toilsome struggle and gradual shaking off of the fetters of mediæval scholasticism,—while the Indian philosophy through all time has been the better, the more closely it has adhered to the basis laid down in the Vedic Upanishads. But in truth this basis is also of an eminently philosophical character.

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⁵³ By this is explained the fundamental proposition of the theory of knowledge, that where *Pratyaksham* exists, there is no *Anumânam* p. 657, 9: *pratyakshatvâd anumâna-apravritteh*.

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These two spheres of knowledge, the perceived and the inferred, embrace naturally the whole complex of "the existent." The position of the Cârvâkas (materialists) who will only allow validity to the first is crude but correspondingly little objection can be raised, when the Vaiçeshikas and Bauddhas (Buddhists) will not go further than these two pramânas. For it is very strange that the Sânkhyas and others add to these also 3) Âptavacanam, that is "right communication," which then, again, according as it is understood, means secular or religious tradition. For the former goes back again to Pratyaksham and Anumânam and the latter is, in philosophy, no legal component, and is one of the means by which the Sânkhyas and others, with all their heresy, were yet able to keep up an appearance of orthodoxy. Through further splitting up of Anumânam, not to the advantage of clearness, the adherents of the Nyâya reached four, the Mîmânsakas of the school of Jaimini six, and others even nine Pramânas (cf. Colebr. Misc. Ess. p. 240, 266, 303-304, 330, 403).

2. Insufficiency of the secular Canons of Knowledge

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Like the Pûrva-mîmânsâ, the Vedânta also accepts six canons of knowledge, according to Colebrooke (loc. cit. p. 330), who appeals for support to the (modern) Vedântaparibhâshâ. As far as our Vedânta-sûtras are concerned, there is, neither in the text nor in the Commentary, any discussion of the Pramânas at all; on the contrary they are everywhere presupposed as well known, and set aside as inadmissible for the metaphysics of the Vedânta, and in reality a fundamental account of the fact that metaphysics attains its contents only through a right use of the natural means of knowledge, is very difficult, and presupposes a greater ripeness of thought than we find in the Vedânta, which helps itself out of the difficulty by the short cut of substituting a theological for the philosophical means of knowledge, as we shall now further show.

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⁵¹ p. 49, 2: "Only from the canon of scripture as means of knowledge "is the Brahman known as the cause of the coming into being and "[existence and passing away] of the world;" p. 488, 1: "only through

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As for Bâdarâyaṇa, he expresses his rejection of the secular means of knowledge, *Pratyaksham* and *Anumânam* with the drastic brevity which characterises him, in this, as we have already remarked (above p. 23), that he uses the two words to indicate something altogether different, namely the *Çruti* and *Smriti*; thus in the Sûtras 1, 3, 28. 3, 2, 24. 4, 4, 20 (supposing, naturally, that Çankara has explained them correctly). The *Çruti*, therefore, the holy scriptures, in the narrower sense the *Brâhmaṇas* and *Upanishads*, but also the *Mantras* presupposed by them, that is, hymns and formulas,⁵⁵ are for Bâdarâyaṇa the *Pratyaksham*; the revealed is for him self-evident, needing no further authority. It is otherwise with the *Smriti*,⁵⁶ under which name Çankara quotes testimonies from the Sâṅkhya and Yoga systems, from the law-book of Manu, from the Mahâbhâratam and Purâṇas, as also from the Vedic Sûtra literature. For while the Veda, like the sun, which has its own light, possesses unconditional authority (*nirapeksham prâmâṇyam* p. 414, 6), the *Smriti* is called *Anumânam* because, as Çankara, p. 287, 11, explains, for its support another basis of authority (*prâmâṇyam*) is necessary. As, namely, the secular "the scripture can one plunge into this deepest, highest Brahman; one "cannot plunge into Him by reflection." Of passages where the *Pramâṇas* are mentioned, we have noted, besides these the following: the *pramâṇâni, pratyaksha-âdîni* are *avidyâvad-vishayâṇi* (p. 17, 13); they are frail (p. 448, 1); are common to us and animals (p. 19, 6): *pratyaksham* is *rûpa-âdi, anumânam* &c. is *liṅga-âdi* (p. 426, 8. 438, 1); of different character is *anubhava*, permissible, according to 42, 4, in the investigation of Brahman, cf. 419, 2 *anubhava-avasânam brahma-vijñânam*; the monstrosity of an absolute perception (subject without object) occurs on p. 671, 2; cf. 96, 5.

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⁵⁵ Thus, for example, passages of the Ṛigveda-Saṃhitâ are quoted as *Çruti* p. 208, 13. 212, 1. 304, 4; on the contrary the *mantra* is opposed to the *çruti*, p. 303, 4.

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⁵⁶ As also with the *Âcâra* (above p. 24); cf. p. 990, 1: *smṛiti-âcârâbhyâm, na çruteḥ*.

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*Anumânam* rests on the *Pratyaksham*, and only has the force of proof so long as it is rightly inferred therefrom, the *Smriti* also is only so far valid as an authority, as it confirms the *Çruti* by its testimony, and completes it by right inference. Therefore it is frequently quoted in confirmation, but not seldom also rejected; as for instance 4, 2, 21, in reference to the departure of the soul, the ideas of the *Smriti* (Bhagavadgîtâ 8, 23) are only so far rejected as they are in contradiction to the *Çruti* (p. 1109, 5). For the rest Bâdarâyaṇa declares himself, 2, 1, 11, as opposed in principle to any possibility of basing the metaphysical verities on reflection (*tarka*), which is commented on by Çaṅkara as follows (p. 435, 11):—"And, therefore, mere reflection (*kevalas tarkaḥ*) must not be quoted in opposition in a matter which is to be known by [sacred] tradition (*âgama*); for reflections which, without [sacred] tradition, rest only on the speculation (*utprekshâ*) of men, are untenable, since this speculation is unbridled. For instance the reflections thought out by some experts after great trouble are recognized by others, still more expert, as [merely] apparent, and those of the latter in the same way by others. Therefore one cannot rely on it, that reflections have stability, because the opinions of men vary.

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But [it may be objected], when there is a man of recognised greatness, a Kapila or another, who has made a reflection, one could at least rely on it as well-founded. Even here a sound foundation is lacking, since even the recognised pioneers (*tîrthakara*) such as Kapila, Kaṇâda and the like, openly contradict each other." To this the opponent objects: "Yet one can, perhaps, come to a well-founded reflection, in reflecting in a different way, for that there can be no well-founded reflection at all is in itself a law based on reflection alone (p. 436, 7); and because one reflection is false, the other need not also be false; the opinion that all reflection is unreliable, would make an end of all worldly action resting thereon (p. 436, 10)." Reflection, he says, might have in view the consideration of the words of scripture, in order to reach in this way the full truth (p. 437, 1); even *Manu* (12, 105) recommends, besides the tradition of scripture, perception and inference; and the excellence of reflection is precisely this, that, unbound by previous reflections, in case they are untenable, other reflections may be made (p. 437, 7). To this Çañkara replies (p. 437, 10): "Even though it appear that in many provinces reflection is well-founded, yet, in the province here spoken of, reflection cannot be freed from the reproach of baselessness;

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for it is impossible to know at all this extremely profound essence of being (*bhāva-yâthâtmyam*), without the [sacred] tradition, connected with liberation; for this subject does not fall within the province of perception (*pratyaksham*), because it is without form and the like, and therefore also not within the province of inference (*anumânam*) and the other [Pramâṇas], because it has no characteristics [*liṅgam*] and the like." Here, as our author further develops the question, where the full truth and the liberation which results from it—as all admit--are being considered, the subject of knowledge must be identical, and the knowledge of it uncontradictable. But reflections do not fulfil these conditions, because they contradict each other, and what the one maintains, another overthrows, and what the latter puts in its place, yet another overthrows (p. 438, 9). Besides, the Sâṅkhya system is not in any way recognised by everyone as the highest, and in any case it is impossible to bring together all the thinkers of all lands and times, to establish firmly the final truth of reflection among them. But, on the other hand, the Veda, as a source of knowledge, is eternal; its subject stands fast; the full knowledge of it formed therefrom cannot be turned aside by all the reflecters of the past, present and future (p. 439, 5).

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By this the full validity of the Upanishad teaching is proved, and by this it is established, "in virtue of the [sacred] tradition and the reflection which follows it" that (which was to be proved) the spiritual Brahman is at once the *causa efficiens* and the *causa materialis* of the world (p. 439, 7).

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Çañkara expresses himself even more strongly in discussing the same point in another place. To the objection that the Brahman can only be *causa efficiens* and not also *materialis*, because experience (*loka*) shows that only a *causa efficiens*, as for instance, the potter, can be endowed with knowledge.¹ he answers (p. 403, 7): "It is not necessary that it should be here the same as in experience; for this subject [Brahman] is not known by inference (anumânam), but only by revelation (çabda), and it is therefore [only] necessary here that [which is to be proved] it should be in accordance with revelation, and this shows that the knowing Îçvara (Lord) is the causa materialis [of the world]" (cf. p. 1144, 13).

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In these circumstances it is possible occasionally to make such statements about the Brahman as would be, according to worldly standards, absolutely contradictory; for example, that the Brahman does not wholly enter into the phenomenal world, and yet is without parts: (p. 481, 13) "in the scripture the Brahman is rooted; in the scripture it has its ground of knowledge, not in sense-perception and the like; therefore it must be taken as scripture gives it; and scripture teaches of the Brahman both that it is not wholly [used up in forming the world of appearances], and that it is yet without parts. Nay, even in the case of worldly things, such as amulets, spells, drugs and the like, it happens that, in virtue of difference of place, time, and cause, they manifest powers with various contradictory effects, and even these cannot be known by mere reflection without instruction, nor can it be determined, what powers, with what accompaniments, referring to what, for what available, a given thing may have,—how can it then be possible to know the nature of the Brahman, with its unthinkable perfections of might, without the scripture?"

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This advantage, however, of being allowed occasionally to ignore experience, holds good only in the case of the Vedânta teacher, but not of his opponent (p. 595, 8): "The follower of the Brahman investigates the being of the cause [of the world] and the like, relying on the [sacred] tradition, and it is not unconditionally necessary for him to accept every thing in accordance with perception (na avaçyam tasya yathâ-drishtam eva sarvam abhyupagantavyam); but the opponent, who investigates the being of the cause [of the world] and the like, relying on the examples of experience (drishtânta), must accept everything according to experience,—that is the difference."

3. The Revelation of the Veda

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To mitigate the severity of these declarations, we must call to mind the details given in Chap. II, 2 (reading especially the passage in n. 32, above p. 56), according to which all empirical means of knowledge, and all the world produced by them, belong to the realm of *Avidyâ*, as also, on the other hand, that in the Veda, especially in the Upanishads, there are philosophic conceptions which have their like neither in India, nor, perhaps, anywhere else in the world. Therefore we can well understand our author's view that the Veda is of superhuman origin (*apaurusheya* p. 170, 2); that it is infallible (p. 618, 1); that, as we saw above p. 69 ff., the Gods are created, but the Veda, on the contrary, is ever-present in the spirit of the creator of the world, as the timeless rule of being; that it was "out-breathed" by him⁵⁷, concerning which the two chief passages are (p. 47, 2): "The great canon of scripture beginning with the Rigveda, which, enforced by many branches of knowledge, lights all things like a lamp, and in a certain measure is omniscient, has the Brahman as its origin and cause. For such a canon as the Rigveda and the rest, which is endowed with the quality of omniscience, can come from none but an omniscient source." And further (p. 48, 4): "The great being which, according to the scripture [Brih. 2, 4, 10] brought forth unwearying in sport, like the outbreathing of a man, the Rigveda and the rest, as a mine of all knowledge, which is the basis of the division into Gods, animals, men, castes, *Âçramas* and the like, this being must possess an unsurpassable omniscience and omnipotence."

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⁵⁷ We have thus in India, as analogy of our Inspiration, an Expiration, through which the Vedic texts were revealed to their composers, who are therefore called *Rishis*; the Mantras and Brâhmanas "appear" (*pratibhânti*) to them, are "seen" (*drishta*) by them; cf. p. 301, 6: "Çaunaka and the other [composers of Prâtiçâkyas] teach, that the Decades [of the Rigveda] were seen by *Madhucchandas* [the composer of the opening hymns of the Rigveda] and the other *Rishis*." In the same way, according to p. 314, 13, the Brâhmanas were also seen by the *Rishis*: *rishînâm mantra-brâhmana-darçinâm*; cf. p. 119, 3: *mantra-brâhmanayoc ca ekârthatvam yuktam, avirodhât*.

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As the Brahman itself is free from all differences, so also is the knowledge of the Brahman, as we gain it from the Upanishads, uniform throughout and without contradiction (p. 834, 4): "Has it not been established that the Brahman, the object of knowledge, is free from all differences, as before, behind, and the like, uniform, and, like the lump of salt [Brih. 4, 5, 13], of one taste? How, then, can the thought arise of a difference or non-difference of knowledge? For that, like the variety of [pious] works, a variety with reference to the Brahman could be taught by the Vedânta, can by no means be affirmed, since the Brahman is one and uniform. And if the Brahman is uniform, then the knowledge of the Brahman cannot be manifold; for the assumption that the subject can be one thing and the knowledge of it another, is necessarily erroneous. And if, on the other hand, there were to be taught different doctrines of the one Brahman in the Vedânta, of which some were true and others false, we should have the case of disbelief in the Vedânta [that is, the Upanishads] [cf. p. 104, 1],—therefore one cannot assume that there are in the Vedânta differences in the knowledge of Brahman." In conformity with this principle, the numerous contradictions in the Upanishads are explained away (1, 1, 27 may serve as an example), or hidden under the broad mantle of exoteric doctrine, of which we shall speak in the next Chapter. However, occasionally minor contradictions in the parallel texts of the Upanishads are admitted with the remark, that they are not important.⁵⁸ Where the sense of the scripture is doubtful, the rule of experience (laukiko nyâyaḥ) decides, p. 1064, 5: "But still it is unseemly to check the view of the scriptures by a rule of experience? To this we answer: this is so, where the sense of the scripture is certain; but where it is doubtful, it is permissible to have recourse to a rule of experience, for the sake of clearing up the question;"—as generally the worldly means of knowledge are helpful to the investigation of the sense of the scriptures (p. 40, 6): "The knowledge of the Brahman is gained by the sense of the word of the Veda “being considered and determined; it is not gained by other means of knowledge, such as inference (*anumānam*) &c. But “although it is the Vedānta texts which inform us of the “cause of the world’s coming into existence &c., yet, to make “sure that we have grasped their sense [correctly], an inference “which does not contradict the words of the Vedānta is not “excluded as a means of knowledge. For by the scripture “itself [Bṛih. 2, 4, 5. Chând. 6, 14, 2] reflection is called in as “a help.”—(p. 42, 3): “For in the investigation of the Brahman, “the scripture is not, as in the investigation of duty [the Pūrva-“*mīmānsā*], the exclusive authority, but the authorities here “are, according to circumstances, the scripture and the [inner] “perception (*anubhava*) and the like. For the knowledge of “the Brahman reaches its final point in perception, as far as “it refers to a really existing subject.”—(p. 44, 6): “But does “not the Brahman, so far as it is something really existing, “alone belong to the province of other means of knowledge, “and is not the consideration of the words of the Vedānta “consequently aimless? By no means the Brahman, for, as “it is not an object of sense, the [causal] connection with “the world would not be grasped [with certainty]. That is to “say, the senses, according to their nature, have as their object “external things, and not the Brahman. If the Brahman were “an object of sense, then the world might be grasped as an “effect connected with Brahman. Now, we only perceive the “effect, so that [without revelation], it cannot be decided whether “the world is connected with Brahman [as cause], or with “something else [for the same effect can have different causes].”

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⁵⁸ For example p. 222, 2. 849, 11. 855, 6: *na hi etâvatâ viçeṣeṇa vidyâ-ekatvam apagacchati.*—418, 12 *çrutînâm paraspara-virodhe sati, ekavaceṇa itarâ nîyante.* This especially holds good in the case of contradictions in things where the aim of man (*purusha-artha*) does not come into question, p. 374, 7.

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Of the possibility here suggested, of bringing in reflection as an aid, our author makes a far more extensive use than might appear from these expressions. Since this side of Ṣaṅkara’s work has for us the chief interest, we will, as far as possible, pass over his endless quotations from the Veda, but, on the other hand, bend our whole attention to the philosophic reflection. The perfection of the latter, as it meets us in Ṣaṅkara’s Commentary, may itself speak for the fact that we have to do here with a monument of Indian antiquity not merely theological, but also in the highest degree philosophical.

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