Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c6.s3: IX. The Brahman in itself

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c6.s3

Language
English

Contents

IX. The Brahman in itself

1. Brahman as the non-Existent

c6.s3.t1.1

Sûtram 1, 4, 14—15.

c6.s3.t1.2

It is asserted, Çankara says (loc. cit.), that the Vedânta texts referring to the derivation of the world from Brahman, as well as those referring to the nature of Brahman itself, are frequently contradictory; in the former case, sometimes the ether, sometimes fire, sometimes breath is named as the first created, while in the latter, Brahman is in some passages described as the "non-Existent," in others as the "Existent." With regard to the first point, he says, it will be discussed further on (cf. Chap. XVII, 1); here we have only to do with the latter. It is true that it is said (Taitt. 2, 7):

c6.s3.t1.3

"Non-Existent was this in the beginning, thence the Existent arose"

c6.s3.t1.4

while on the other hand it is said (Chând. 6, 2, 1): "Existent "only, dear one, was this in the beginning, alone and without "a second. Some, verily, say: non-Existent was this in the "beginning, and without a second; from this non-Existent "arose the Existent. But how could this be, dear one? How "could the Existent arise from the non-Existent."

c6.s3.t1.5

Here, in the one passage, as in the other, the all-knowing, almighty, all-animating Being without a second is indicated as the cause of the world (p. 372, 7); and if the Taitt. Up. speaks of a non-Existent, it is not an essenceless non-Existent that is to be understood, as the preceding verse (Taitt. 2, 6) proves:

c6.s3.t1.6

"He is but non-Existent⁷⁰ who knows Brahman as non-Existent;
"He who knows Brahman as Existent becomes himself by this Existent."

c6.s3.t1.7

⁷⁰ Çankara always reads: asann eva sa bhavati, p. 375, 13. 124, 9. 128, 7. 823, 4.

c6.s3.t1.8

The word "Existent" is commonly used to indicate the world extended in names and forms; now in order to suggest, that this development did not exist before the creation, it is metaphorically said of Brahman which alone is: it was, as it were, a non-Existent (p. 376, 7).

2. Brahman as the primordial Light

c6.s3.t2.1

Sûtram 1, 3, 22—23.

c6.s3.t2.2

Muṇḍ. 2, 2, 10 (= Kâṭh. 5, 15 = Ҫvet. 6, 14) says:

c6.s3.t2.3

“There shines not sun nor moon nor stars, nor shine these lightnings, far less earthly fire: after Him the shining One, all shines, from His light is lighted this whole world.”

c6.s3.t2.4

In this passage, as Ҫaṅkara explains, it is not some kind of light-element that is to be understood, but the highest Âtman, of which Chând. 3, 14, 2 says: “Light is his form, truth his resolve” (p. 272, 9), and which is spoken of (p. 274, 2) in what goes before (Muṇḍ. 2, 2, 5. 9). A Light-element is not to be thought of, because from such an element the sun etc. [hence the moon also!] cannot borrow their light, since they are themselves just as much light-elements (p. 272, 11); but they can all very well borrow their light from the Brahman, for a borrowing can also take place in the case of things of different kinds, as a glowing ball of iron burns after the fire, and as the dust blows after the wind (p. 273, 2); moreover, besides the light-elements named, the sun etc., no other exists (p. 274, 8).—From the shining of the Âtman “all this” would borrow light, that is, either: the sun, etc., in the sense in which Bṛih. 4, 4, 16 says: “Him the Gods honour as immortal Life, as the light of lights,” or it means: this whole world-development, as it has arisen in names and forms as “the reward of works to the doer” (kriyâ-kâraka-phala, p. 273, 12; the same formula p. 291, 6. 447, 3. 987, 6), has as cause the light-nature of the Brahman, just as the revelation of all forms has as its cause the light-nature of the sun (p. 273, 13). All that is perceived, is perceived through the Brahman as light, but the Brahman is perceived through no other light, because its own being is to be Self-shining, so that the sun etc. shine in him (tasmin). For the Brahman reveals the other, but the Brahman is not revealed by the other (p. 275, 1).

3. Brahman as the last, unknowable origin of the Existent

c6.s3.t3.1

a) Sûtram 1, 2, 21-23.

c6.s3.t3.2

In the Introduction of the Muṇḍaka-Upanishad two doctrines are distinguished (in another sense than above, p. 98 ff.), a lower, which, as Śaṅkara remarks, has as its fruit ascent (abhyudaya, cf. p. 82), and a higher, which has as its fruit salvation (p. 203, 5). Under the lower the four Vedas besides the six Vedâṅgas (Phonetics, Grammar, Etymology, Metre, Ritual and Astronomy) are enumerated, and then it is said further, Muṇḍ. 1, 1, 5:

c6.s3.t3.3

"But the higher is that through which that Imperishable is known: the invisible, intangible, unoriginated, colourless, without eyes and ears, without hands and feet, the eternal, all-pervading, all-present, very subtle, this is the Unchanging which the wise know as the womb of beings. As the spider puts forth [the threads] and draws them back again, as herbs grow up upon the earth, as from a living man the hair on head and body, so from this Imperishable arises all the world."

c6.s3.t3.4

Here, as Śaṅkara develops it, the highest God is to be understood, not primordial matter or the individual soul. For though the examples brought forward, the spider's body and the man's body, are only directed by an intelligent power, but are themselves non-intelligent (p. 200, 12), yet these are only comparisons, which must not be pressed too far (p. 204, 14); that an intelligent original Being is to be understood, is proved by what immediately follows, and is therefore to be applied here, "he who understands all, who knows all" (Muṇḍ. 1, 1, 9), which cannot be applied to a non-intelligent primordial matter (p. 201, 3).—One might also think of the individual soul, because it certainly according to its moral nature (p. 201, 9) conditions what arises as being, but what follows further on, shews clearly that only the highest Brahman can be meant. For it is said further, Muṇḍ. 2, 1, 1:

c6.s3.t3.5

"This is the truth:—As, from a well lit fire, sparks, of like nature to it, arise thousandfold, so, dear one, from the

c6.s3.t3.6

“Imperishable go forth manifold beings, and return into it “again. For divine is the spirit (purusha), the formless, who “is within and without, unborn, breathless, wishless, pure, yet “higher than the highest Imperishable. From him arises “breath, the understanding with all the senses, from him arise “ether, wind, and fire, the water, and earth the support of “all. His head is fire, his eyes the moon and sun, the cardinal- “points are his ears, his voice is the revelation of the Veda. “Wind is his breath, his heart the world, from his feet the “earth;—he is the inner Self in all beings.”

c6.s3.t3.7

From this passage, says Çañkara, it is clear, that neither the individual soul, to which such majesty of body does not belong, nor primordial matter is to be thought of, because it is not the inner Self in all beings (sarva-bhûta-antarâtman), (p. 207, 12). If at the same time an individualised form is attributed to the invisible womb of beings, this is not in order to ascribe to it a real individuality, but only to make it clear that it is the Self of the universe (sarva-âtman) (p. 208, 1).— A difficulty is caused by the fact that the Âtman, which (above p. 131) is called “the Imperishable,” is here spoken of as “higher than the highest Imperishable.” The way in which Çañkara tries to solve this difficulty, by here understanding the “Imperishable as the undeveloped subtle body [Chap. XXXI, 3], “forming the seed-power for names and forms, which serves as “the ground-work for the Lord, and is only a limitation (upâdhi) “ascribed to himself” (p. 206, 1), as well as the opinion of some, considered by Çañkara (p. 208), that in the concluding words of the text Prajâpati (a cosmogonic personification of Brahman) is to be understood, we may very well pass by.

c6.s3.t3.8

b) Sûtram 1, 3, 10–12.

c6.s3.t3.9

In the Brihadâranyaka-Upanishad (3, 8) Gârgî, the daughter of Vacaknu (not the wife of Yâjñavalkya, as Colebrooke, M. E.¹ p. 343 erroneously supposes) asks Yâjñavalkya in what is woven and interwoven that which exists above heaven, beneath the earth, and between heaven and earth, in what the past, the present, and the future, and receives as answer: in the ether (space) all this is woven and interwoven.—“But in what,”

c6.s3.t3.10

¹ p. 343 erroneously supposes

c6.s3.t3.11

she asks further, “is ether (space) then woven and interwoven?”—To this Yâjñavalkya:

c6.s3.t3.12

“It is that, o Gârgî, which the Brahmans call the Imperishable (*aksharam*); it is neither gross nor fine, nor short nor long, nor red [like fire] nor adhering [like water], not shady nor dark, not wind nor ether, not sticky [like gum], without taste, without smell, without eye or ear, without voice, without understanding, without vital-force, and without breath, without mouth and without measure, without inner or outer; nothing whatsoever does it consume, nor is it consumed by any. At the bidding of this Imperishable, o Gârgî, sun and moon are kept asunder from each other; at the bidding of this Imperishable, o Gârgî, heaven and earth are kept asunder from each other; at the bidding of this Imperishable, o Gârgî, the minutes and the hours, the days and nights, the half-months, months, the seasons, and the years are kept asunder. At the bidding of this Imperishable, o Gârgî, the streams run downward from the snowy mountains some to the east, some to the west, and whithersoever each one goes; at the bidding of this Imperishable, o Gârgî, men praise the generous man, gods strive for the sacrificer, the fathers for the offerings for the dead. Verily, o Gârgî, he who knows not this Imperishable, though in this world he offers and has offerings made, though he suffers penance many a thousand years, gains an unenduring [reward]; but he who knows not that Imperishable, o Gârgî, and departs from this world, he, indeed, is miserable; but he who, o Gârgî, knowing this Imperishable, departs from this world, he, indeed, is a Brâhmaṇa. Verily, o Gârgî, this Imperishable is seeing, not seen, hearing, not heard, understanding, not understood, knowing, not known. For outside him there is no seer, outside him there is no hearer, outside him there is no none with understanding, outside him there is none with knowledge. In this Imperishable, verily, o Gârgî, is the ether woven and interwoven.”

c6.s3.t3.13

In this passage, as Çañkara explains, the Imperishable (*aksharam*) means not “the syllable,” as usually is the case, generally the sacred syllable “*om*,” of which it is said (Chând.

c6.s3.t3.14

2, 23, 4) “the sound *om* is all this,” but the highest divinity (p. 242, 10); for of it only is it true that in it the ether and thereby the universe is woven (p. 242, 14), as even in the passage mentioned (Chând. 2, 23, 4) the sound “*om*” signifies Brahman (p. 243, 3), whose properties of eternity and all-permeation are signified etymologically by *aksharam* (*na ksharati*, *aṇnute ca*, p. 243, 4). Primordial matter can also not be understood as the Imperishable, for it is said: “at the bidding of this Imperishable,” and “this is seeing not seen” etc., which must refer to an intelligent power (p. 243, 12. 244, 8); but it cannot refer to the individual soul, because in the words: “without eye and without ear” etc., all limitations (*upâdhi*) are excluded, and without these the individual soul cannot exist (p. 244, 13).

c6.s3.t3.15

All the properties of the Brahman, which we have dealt with hitherto, were (so far as they are not to be taken figuratively) purely negative; now we turn to the two positive determinations of the being of the Godhead, which show it as 1) pure intelligence, 2) pure bliss.

4. Brahman as pure Intelligence

c6.s3.t4.1

Sûtram 1, 1, 5--11.

c6.s3.t4.2

Prefatory Remark. When we consider the weakness and frailty of man's intellect, we can only wonder at the unanimity with which, in Indian, Greek and modern philosophy, Intelligence is ascribed as an essential attribute to “the Thing-in-itself.” It is well worth while to follow out the motives which have led the thinkers of ancient and modern times to declare so feeble a faculty, which works only intermittently, is bound up with organic life and perishes with it, to be the essence of the being of Beings. These motives are especially clearly seen in the deeply founded structure of the Vedânta philosophy. Metaphysics must above all seek a firm and immovable point of certainty, in order to attack the subject, and this can only be found in the consciousness of the philosophising subject; hence the Cartesian: *cogito, ergo sum*, and the corresponding statement of our work, which we have given above p. 127 ff. Here, within our own Self, we gain an infallible guide to the absolute Being which we are seeking: that which cannot be laid aside must also be the imperishable, the unchangeable must also be that which lies at the basis of every thing changeable, a conviction, which is most clearly expressed by calling the Principle of all Being the *Âtman*, that is, the Self. We reach it as, in the manner described above p. 58, and in note 29, we gradually separate from our "I" everything which is "not-I," hence not only the outer world, the body and its organs, but also the whole apparatus of *Buddhi* or intellect (the *indriyas* and the *manas*). What remains, should consequently be spoken of only as unconscious; but they could not go so far, without removing the whole phenomenon from the region of perceptibility. Consciousness, therefore, in which all this process of elimination proceeds, was left as the terminus, so that not only was the necessity avoided of abandoning, along with the organs of perception, their function also,—perception,—but also the very noteworthy objections of the adversary, which we shall presently detail, were set at defiance.

c6.s3.t4.3

Many times, as *Çaṅkara* says in the passage, with which we are concerned, intellect is ascribed to the Principle of world-creation in the Veda. So when it is said: "He designed (*aikshata*): I will become many, I will procreate" (Chând. 6, 2, 3);—"He designed: I will create worlds" (Ait. 1, 1, 1);—"He formed the design, then he created Breath" (Praçna 6, 3. 4);—"He who knows all, understands all" etc. (Muṇḍ. 1, 1, 9).—From this it follows that we must ascribe to the Brahman omniscience, absolute, unlimited knowledge, that, as a later passage (3, 2, 16) explains, Brahman is pure spirituality (*caitanyam*) and this alone.—Against these arguments the Sâṅkhyas raise the following objections:

c6.s3.t4.4

First Objection: An eternal cognition in Brahman would take away the freedom of Brahman with reference to the action of cognition (p. 93, 1).—To this *Çaṅkara* replies: to begin with, it is to be held that only an eternal actual, and not a potential, cognition (such as the Sâṅkhyas ascribe to the *sattva-guṇa* of their primordial matter) satisfies the demands of omniscience.⁷¹ A cognition of this kind does not take away the freedom of Brahman; for in the case of the sun also, although it continually gives forth heat and light, we say "it warms," "it shines" and thereby indicate that it does this of itself, of its own accord [p. 95, 16; that is to say: the following out of the law of its own nature does not take away the freedom of a being].

c6.s3.t4.5

⁷¹ p. 95, 10. The passage seems corrupt; it would be a help if we might read: katham nitya-jñāna-akriyatve asarvajñatva-hānir, by which what follows becomes consistent.

c6.s3.t4.6

Second Objection: a cognition is only possible, if there is also an object of perception (karman, literally "a product," in contrast to karaṇam, organ), which was not the case before the creation (p. 96, 1).—Answer: as the sun also shines, when there is nothing for it to shine on, so Brahman might know without having an object of cognition (cf. p. 649, 10). Yet one existed, even before the creation. What is this pre-cosmic object?—It is (p. 96, 6) "the Names and Forms which are neither "to be defined as beings nor as the opposite, which are not "evolved, but striving towards evolution (avyākrite, vyācikîrshite), "the Names and Forms" of the world [which as the words of the Veda, as we saw above p. 71, hovered before the spirit of the Creator before the creation].

c6.s3.t4.7

Third Objection: Cognition cannot proceed without organs of perception, body, senses, etc. (p. 93, 4. 96, 11).—Answer: because cognition inheres in Brahman, as shining in the sun, as an eternal law of its nature, it requires no organs to this end, like the individual soul (p. 97, 1), which, as is provisionally set forth on p. 98, is nothing but the Brahman itself, limited by the Upādhis like the body etc., and therefore only separate from the Brahman from the standpoint of Ignorance (cf. above p. 58 ff.). The individual soul (p. 100—101) is the Self of Brahman, and the Brahman is the Self of the individual soul; for of Brahman it is said: (Chând. 6, 3, 2) "this "divinity designed: good! I will enter into these three divinities "[Fire, Water, Earth] with this living self!" and again it is said (Chând. 6, 8, 7): "whose being is this universe, that is the “Real, that is the soul (the Self), that art thou, o Çveta-ketu!”—That Self means the own nature; a spiritual power, like the individual soul, cannot have an unspiritual as its own nature (p. 100, 18. 104, 9).—On this ground, which for our authors is unassailable, they take their stand further on, when, to prove the spirituality of the Existent or the Godhead, they refer to two phenomena, that of liberation, and that of dreamless sleep. Liberation is a return into Brahman (p. 102, 8); and from another point of view it is only a coming to consciousness of one’s own Self (p. 103, 7), it follows, therefore, that Brahman is simply this Self, and therefore spiritual. As Liberation is an eternal union with the Existent, that is, with Brahman, the cause of the world, so deep, dreamless sleep according to the scripture (Chând. 6, 8, 1) is a temporary union with the Existent (p. 109, 2); the word “he sleeps” (svapiti) means, however, “he has entered into himself” (svam apita); a spiritual power, like the individual soul, cannot enter into an unspiritual as into its own self (p. 108, 10).

5. Brahman as Bliss

c6.s3.t5.1

Sûtram 1, 1, 12–19; cf. 3, 3, 11–13.

c6.s3.t5.2

Brahman is the inmost essence of man.—This thought is exhibited in the second part of the Taittirîya Upanishad by the theory (which plays a large part in the later Vedântasâra, but not yet in Bâdarâyaṇa and Çaṅkara) of the different coverings (koça), by which our Self is surrounded, and through which we must break, in order to reach the inmost essence of our nature, and thereby the Brahman.

c6.s3.t5.3

After Taitt. 2, 1 has briefly explained, how from the Âtman the ether proceeded, from this the wind, from this the fire, from this the waters, from these the earth, from this plants, from these food, from this seed, from this man, and further it is said: this man consists of food (annarasamaya), in this self of food indwells, another, filling it, the Self of breath (prâṇamaya), in this again the self of understanding (manomaya), in this the self of intellect (vijñânamaya), in this lastly, as inmost, the self of bliss (ânandamaya). For each of these five sheath-like selves, indwelling one in the other, are distinguished and specified (perhaps while the form of a bird is present to the thought) the head, the right and left sides (wings), the body, and "the support (literally: the tail), the base." In the case of the self of food, these parts are formed by the parts of the body, in the case of the self of breath, by the vital spirits with the ether (in the heart) and the earth, for the self of understanding by the four Vedas and the Upanishads (âdeça), for the self of intellect by faith, truth, right, piety (yoga) and lordship; for the self of bliss it is said finally: "Love [literally: what is dear] is his head, joy "his right side, rejoicing his left side, bliss his body, Brahman "his support, his base" (Taitt. 2, 5).

c6.s3.t5.4

In this passage, according to Bâdarâyaṇa's Sûtras and the accompanying interpretation, by the "self of bliss" we are to understand Brahman; as is proved p. 116 from the connection of the passage, and from the frequent description of Brahman as bliss in the Taitt. Up. and elsewhere (Bṛih. 3, 9, 28), and finally, because it is spoken of as the innermost of all. The word "of bliss" do not here mean "made of bliss," but indicate only the fulness of the bliss of Brahman (1, 1, 13 p. 117), which is the source of all bliss (1, 1, 14 p. 118). Neither the individual soul (1, 1, 16—17 p. 119—120) nor the primordial matter of the Sâṅkhyas (1, 1, 18 p. 121) can be understood here, from the connection of the whole; moreover the union of the individual soul with the being "of bliss" is required (1, 1, 19, p. 121—122) in the words of Taitt. Up. 2, 7: "For "when one finds his resting-place and peace in this invisible, "bodiless, ineffable, unfathomable [literally: baseless], then he "has entered into peace; but if on the contrary, he assumes "a hollow in this [as in the four others]—[Commentary: if he "makes a difference between himself and this], then has he "unrest; it is the unrest of him, who thinks himself wise."

c6.s3.t5.5

But in direct contradiction to this interpretation, (which is to be applied when the subject is resumed 3, 3, 11—13) another explanation of the Upanishad passage is introduced at the end of our extract by the words: "Here, however, the following is to be noted," (p. 122, 9) explaining that the interpretation of -maya as "consisting of" and then as "having the fulness,” is as inconsequent as if one had only half-digested his food,⁷² and then, entering into the discussion, declares that it is not by the “self of bliss” that Brahman is to be understood, but only by that which is indicated as “its support, its basis;” the self of bliss is not yet the kernel, but only the inmost shell, of which, therefore, we should have counted not four but five (p. 123, 10: annamaya-âdaya’ ânandamaya-paryan-tâh pañca koçâh kalpyante). In conclusion, the representative of this opinion gives an explanation—extremely forced—of the sûtras in his sense.

c6.s3.t5.6

⁷² p. 122, 13: arddha-jaratîya-nyâyena; similarly p. 176, 11: na tatra arddha-jaratîyam (with this reading) labhyam. Differently and very naïvely Govinda explains the latter passage: arddham, mukhamâtram, jaratyâ vriddhâyâh kâmayate, na aṅgâni, iti, so ’yam arddhajaratîya-nyâyah.

c6.s3.t5.7

As both interpretations agree in recognising Bliss (ânanda) as the being of Brahman, this difference is of no particular consequence for our purpose. But it is interesting for the literary character of our work, as well as for the history of the Vedânta, that here in Çaṅkara’s commentary two opinions stand side by side, of which, as it seems to us, the former alone corresponds to the text of the Upanishads and Bâdarâyaṇa’s Sûtras, while on the side of the latter are ranged the Commentary to the Taittirîya-Upanishad, which goes under Çaṅkara’s name, as well as the Vedântasâra, which likewise interprets the self of bliss as only a shell (Vedântasâra, § 56, ed. Boehtl.) and thus counts five shells on which, in combination with the three Guṇas of the Sâṅkhya Philosophy, the whole of its psychology is built up.

c6.s3.t5.8

Either the latter interpretation is due to a later interpolator, not to Çaṅkara, in which case the Commentary to the Taittirîya-Upanishad also must not be attributed to him (cf. in it p. 25, 14 sushumnâ, and above note 8);—or it is Çaṅkara’s: in the latter case, we may suppose that he copied the first interpretation given to the separate Sûtras from an earlier commentator (a possibility, which would be of great importance for the character of his whole work, cf. notes 17. 45), or we can also suppose, that Çaṅkara disagrees with Bâdarâyaṇa here, that he therefore interprets the Sûtras first in Bâdarâyaṇa's sense, and then rejects this interpretation, in order to give another in its place in the sense of which he finally interprets the Sûtras as the standard authority of the school, consciously changing their original meaning.

6. Brahman as Free from all Evil

c6.s3.t6.1

Sûtram 1, 1, 20-21.

c6.s3.t6.2

As is well known, the hymns of the Sâmaveda, with but few exceptions (above p. 5) rest on those of the Rigveda. The composer of the Chândogya-Upanishad (which belongs to the Sâmaveda) takes advantage of this circumstance, to show how, in the provinces of cosmology and psychology, certain phenomena rest on others, while on the contrary Brahman, which is symbolically represented as the man in the sun and the man in the eye, is raised above everything else, and free from all evil.

c6.s3.t6.3

As the Sâman rests on the Ric (so is explained Chând. 1, 6), so fire rests on earth, wind on atmosphere, the moon on the stars, on the clear light of the sun rests the black, very dark in it (which, according to the scholiast, is seen by looking very intently at the sun; possibly: the sun-spots are to be understood?). "But the golden man (purusha) who is seen in the interior of the sun with golden beard and golden hair, to the tips of his nails all golden,—his eyes are like the flowers of the Kapyâsa-lotus, his name is "high" (ud), for high above all evil is he; he raises himself high above all evil, who thus knows;—his songs (? geshnau) are Ric and Sâman, therefore [it is said] the high-song (ud-gîtha), therefore also the high-singer (ud-gâtar), for he is his singer; the worlds, which lie upwards from the [sun],—over these he rules, and over the wishes of the gods."

c6.s3.t6.4

What is here set forth in the province of cosmology (adhidaivatam), is then developed in that of psychology (adhyât-mam). As the Sâman rests on the Ric, so rests breath on speech, the image (âtman) on the eye, understanding on the ear, the black, very dark on the bright appearance in the eye. "But the man who is seen in the interior of the eye, “he is this Ṛic, this Sâman, this praise, this sacrificial sentence, “this prayer (*brahman*). The form which the former has, this “also has the latter, the songs of the former are his songs, “the name of the former is his name; the worlds which lie “beneath him,—over these he rules, and over the wishes of “men. Therefore those who sing here to the lute, sing him, “therefore good is their lot.”

c6.s3.t6.5

Here, explains Çaṅkara, we must by no means understand by the man in the sun and in the eye, an individual soul raised through knowledge and works (p. 130, 3), but Brahman; for when form and position are attributed to him (p. 130, 6. 9), and the boundaries of his might are spoken of (p. 130, 13), all this happens only for the sake of worship (p. 133, 10. 13. 15), since we are dealing here with the attribute-possessing Brahman, not with the attribute-free (p. 133, 7). Of Brahman alone it can be said that he is “high above all evil” (p. 131, 10), and that he, the all-animating, is indicated as the subject of spiritual as well as of secular songs (p. 132, 1. 8). For of him it is said in the Bhagavadgîtâ (10, 41):

c6.s3.t6.6

“All that has might and beauty, vital force,
“Know thou that of my power ’tis a part.”

c6.s3.t6.7

We must distinguish between this sun-purusha and the individual soul embodied in the sun (p. 134, 2; cf. above p. 66); for thus says the scripture: (Bṛih. 3, 7, 9) “He who, dwelling “in the sun, is different from the sun, whom the sun knows “not, whose body is the sun, who rules the sun within,—he is “thy soul, thine inner ruler, the immortal.”

7. Brahman as Free from Causality and Affliction

c6.s3.t7.1

Sûtram 3, 3, 35—36.

c6.s3.t7.2

Just as Kant declares theoretical speculation insufficient, and turns the human soul with its demands away from speculation back to the practical way, so already did Yâjñavalkya, in a highly remarkable passage in the Bṛihadâranyaka Upanishad 3, 4—5, the consideration of which we shall transfer from 3, 3, 35—36 into the present connection.

c6.s3.t7.3

(Bṛih. 3, 4:) “Then asked him Ushasta, the descendant of “Cakra. ‘Yâjñavalkya,’ said he, ‘the immanent, non-transcen- “dent Brahman, which as soul is innermost of all, that shalt “thou declare to me.’—‘It is thy soul, which is innermost of “all.’—‘Which, o Yâjñavalkya, is innermost of all?’—‘That “which inbreathes by inbreath that is thy soul, the inner“most of all, that which outbreathes by outbreath that is “thy soul, the innermost of all, that which interbreathes by “interbreath that is thy soul, the innermost of all, that which “upbreathes by upbreath that is thy soul, the innermost of “all,—this is thy soul, which is innermost of all.’—Then said “Ushasta, the descendant of Cakra: ‘It is only indicated by “this, as when one says: that is a cow, that is a horse; but “the immanent, non-transcendent Brahman, the soul, which is “innermost of all, that shalt thou declare to me!’—‘It is thy “soul which is innermost of all.’—‘Which, o Yâjñavalkya, is “innermost of all?’—‘Thou canst not see the seer of seeing, “nor canst thou hear the hearer of hearing, nor canst thou “understand the understander of understanding, nor canst “thou know the knower of knowing. He is thy soul, which “is innermost of all.—What is different from him is afflicted.’ “—Then Ushasta, the descendant of Cakra, was silent.”

c6.s3.t7.4

(Brih. 3, 5:) “Then asked him Kahola, the descendant of “Kushîtaka. ‘Yâjñavalkya,’ said he, ‘even that immanent, “non-transcendent Brahman, which as soul is innermost of “all, that shalt thou declare to me.’—‘It is thy soul which “is innermost of all.’—‘Which, o Yâjñavalkya, is innermost “of all.’—‘That which overcomes hunger and thirst, affliction “and madness, age and death.—Truly, after they have found “[Caṅk.: recognised] this soul, the Brahmans cease from long“ing after children, and longing after possession, and longing “after the world, and wander about as beggars. For the “longing after children is a longing after possessions, and “the longing after possessions is a longing after the world; “for both are mere longings.—Therefore after the Brahman “has put off his erudition, let him abide in childlike sim“plicity; and after he has put off both his learned and his “childlike estate, then he becomes a silent one (Muni); after “he has put off keeping silence and not keeping silence, then “he becomes a Brâhmaṇa.—By what does this Brâhmaṇa

c6.s3.t7.5

“live?—By whatever it may be, by that he lives.—Whatever
“is different from him is afflicted.’—Then Kahola, the descen-
“dant of Kushitaka, was silent.”

c6.s3.t7.6

Çañkara’s remarks on this passage are limited to showing that both extracts belong to the unity of the same Vidyâ (cf. above p. 99), which appears from the beginnings and endings containing the same words (p. 923, 14), from the use of the particle *eva* “even” (p. 923, 16) as introductory conjunction of the second piece, as also from the fact that in both cases the inner soul is treated of (p. 922, 7), as there are not two inner souls, but one (p. 922, 9). The repetition is due to the difference of the instruction (p. 923, 7): the first time the Âtman is depicted as lying beyond cause and effect (*kârya-kâraṇa-vyatirikta*), the second time as overcoming hunger and the other qualities of Samsâra (*aṣanâyâ-âdi-saṃsâra-dharma-atīta*) (p. 924, 2. 3).

c6.s3.t7.7

That the two extracts make up a harmonious whole is evident from their parallel construction; moreover a comparison of them may teach us whether, with our recollections of Kant, we have rightly hit the central thought. The Brahman, so teaches the first extract, is theoretically unknowable: for because, in all knowing, it is the knowing subject, it can never be an object of knowledge for us. To the mind which, not resting content with this, puts forward the same question anew, it is, in the second extract, pointed out that Brahman is to be grasped practically. This happens as one raises oneself step by step from the estate of erudition (*pâṇḍityam*) to that of childlike simplicity (*bâlyam*, cf. Matth. 18, 3), from this to the state of the Muni, from this to that of the Brâhmaṇa [in its emphatic meaning, as Bṛih. 3, 8, 10. Chând. 4, 1, 7], who renounces family, possessions and worldly pleasure, because these are different from the Brahman, and therefore subject to affliction.

c6.s3.t7.8

Touching the nature of the steps mentioned, and especially the meaning of Bâlyam one may compare the investigations in 3, 4, 47—50 (p. 1034—1041), from which we take only the following beautiful passage of Smṛiti (p. 1041, 8):

c6.s3.t7.9

“Whom no one knows as high nor lowly born, “No one as erudite nor yet not erudite, “No one as of good deeds nor evil deeds, “He is a Brâhmana, in very truth! “Given up to hidden duties well fulfilled, “In secrecy let all his life be spent; “As he were blind and deaf, of sense bereft, “Thus let the truly wise pass through the world.”

Linked texts (10)