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Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c18: Chapter XV: The Fundamental Principles

Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c18

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Chapter XV: The Fundamental Principles

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The third step of the *Majjhimā-patipadā* is the acquisition of knowledge (*paññā*), in other words, *sammādiṭṭhi* or the true view of the worldly objects. According to the Buddhists, the true view is that the five *khandhas*, which constitute the world, are without any substance (*anatta*), subject to decay (*anicca*) and so instead of being a source of happiness are really causes of grief (*dukkha*). This view of the constituted world can be developed after a long course of physical and mental discipline dealt with in the previous two chapters and a close study of the Nikāyas, which offer an analysis of the constituents and prove that these have only a fleeting existence, and that also in the eyes of a person whose vision is blurred. The aim of the Nikāya literature, therefore, is to clear up the blurred vision of its students. As it is not feasible as well as desirable to place the highest (*paramattha*) truth all at once before the eyes of a beginner, it starts with an analysis and examination of the things (*dukkha* = *pañcupādānakkhandhā*) around him, how they originate (*samudaya*) and suffer decay (*nirodha*), and the ways and means (*magga*) by which their complete decay can be effected.¹ Of these four processes,² the first two are concerned with objects which are not real in the highest sense, so these two should be treated as conventional (*sammuti* = *saṃvṛti*) truths, and for this reason, in the *Abhidharmakośa*,¹ these two are called samala-prajñā (not immaculate knowledge). The other two, *nirodha* and *magga*, are amala-prajñā (immaculate knowledge) inasmuch as these are related to the highest (*paramattha*) truth. The process of intellectual culture in Buddhism, therefore, consists in realising the highest truth, *nirodha*, through the comprehension of the conventional truths, *dukkha* and *samudaya*. By the former are meant the (i) k h a n d h a s, (ii) d h ā t u s, (iii) ā y a t a n a s, (iv) i n d r i y a s, and (v) a r i y a s a c c a s, and by the latter (vi) the theory of causation, p a ṭ i c c a s a-m u p p ā d a.

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¹ For the traditional exposition of the *ariyasaccas* see Infra.

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² See *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 206-7.

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¹ *Kośasthāna*, VII, 2.

(i) Khandhas

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The whole universe, according to Buddhism, is dichotomised into *saṃskṛta* (constituted) or *lokiya dhātu* and *asaṃskṛta* (unconstituted) or *lokuttara dhātu*.² The former includes the whole world of animate and inanimate objects and the latter *Ākāśa* (space) and *Nirvāṇa*, which is sub-divided into two as *Pratisamkhyānirodha* and *Apratisamkhyānirodha*.

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² See *Infra*, p. 259.

Saṃskṛta-dhātu

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The world of beings and inanimate objects are described as *saṃskṛta* on account of their being constituted of some elements. These elements are usually put under two heads: *nāma* and *rūpa*, *nāma* denoting the non-material or mental states of a being while *rūpa* the material parts only. All inanimate objects therefore are included in the term *rūpa*. *Nāma* is analysed into four states known as *vedanā* (feeling), *saññā* (perception), *saṅkhārā* (impressions produced through karma) and *viññāṇa* (knowledge derived through the organs of sense). The four subdivisions of *nāma* with the fifth the *rūpa* are termed *Pañcakkhandha*. It follows from this that according to the early Buddhists every being is a composite of the five khandhas (or groups of elements), each khandha comprising a particular group of elements, without a sixth the Puggala or Attā (= soul).

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The traditional interpretation of the five khandhas (skandhas) as given in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī (Bk. II), Vibhaṅga, Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga and Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa is as follows:

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Rūpakkhandha denotes the four elements: earth (pathavī), water (āpo), fire (tejo) and air (vāyu), including all that is formed out of these four.¹ It comprises all the material objects whether of the past, present or future, internal or external, gross or subtle, near or distant, good or bad. By past rūpa is meant the matter that has undergone change; by future, the matter which will come into existence; and by the present, the matter which is existing at the present moment. By internal rūpa are meant the flesh, bone and such other constituents of one's body made out of the four mahābhūtas: and by external, the same of bodies other than one's own. By gross and near rūpa are meant the six organs of sense with the sense-objects² while by subtle and distant rūpa, the masculinity (purisindriya) and femininity (itthindriya), vitality (jīvitindriya: as water is to the lotus, so is vitality to the rūpa),³ the seat of mental faculties (hadaya), the faculty of intimation by means of physical and vocal signs (kāyaviññatti and vaciviññatti), the space within and circumscribing the body (ākāsadhātu), the qualities⁴ which make the body light soft and supple, growing and decaying, and nutritive food (kabalinkāro āhāro). The good and bad rūpa indicate only the good or bad nature of the sense-objects.

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¹ Db. S. 584: Cattāro ca mahābhūtā catunnañ ca mahābhūtānaṃ upādāya rūpaṃ—idaṃ vuccati sabbaṃ rūpaṃ.

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² Vism., p. 444: cakkhu, sotaṃ, ghānaṃ, jivhā, kāyo, rūpaṃ, saddo, gandho, and raso.

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³ See Infra, p. 260.

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⁴ Vism., p. 444: rūpassa lahutā, mudutā, kammaññatā, upacayo, santati, jaratā, and aniceatā.

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Vedanākkhandha connotes all that which one feels (vedayitalakkhaṇam).¹ Though it is by nature one, it is usually treated under three aspects: kusala (good), akusala (bad), and avyākata (indifferent) and sometimes under five aspects, viz., sukham and dukkham when the object of contact is pleasant and unpleasant, somanassam and domanassam when the object of thought is pleasant and unpleasant, and lastly upekkhā when the object does not produce good or bad feeling.

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¹ In the Vibhanga, vedanā and other khandhas have been explained like rūpa as atīta, anāgata and paccuppanna, ajjhatta and bahiddhā, oḷārika and sukhuma, hīna and paṇīta, dūra and santika, but this has been omitted in the Vism., pp. 472-6.

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Viññāṇakkhandha² refers to that faculty by which a being becomes aware of things (vijānana-lakkhaṇa), viññāṇa is a synonym of citta or mano.³ Though it is of one nature, it is usually treated as of three kinds, kusala (good), akusala (bad) and avyākata (indifferent). Each of these three kinds of Viññāṇa again is subdivided in the Abhidhamma works according to the four spheres in which the world or mental states are divided viz., kāmāvacara, rūpāvacara, arūpāvacara and lokuttara.⁴ In the Kāmāvacara sphere, kusalaviññāṇa is analysed into eight kinds, according as it is associated with, or dissociated from, ñāṇa (knowledge), and saṅkhāra (persuasion by others, e.g. in offering gifts). In the Rūpāvacara it is of five kinds in accordance with the mental states developed by a meditator as he rises gradually from the first to the fourth form of meditation (jhāna). In the Arūpāvacara it is, as before, of four kinds, as the meditator rises from the fifth to the eighth jhāna called āruppas. And in the Lokuttara, it is said to be of four kinds as a person is in one of the four maggas, viz., sotāpatti, sakadāgāmi, anāgāmi and arahatta.¹ In all kusalaviññāṇa is of twenty-one kinds.

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² Though in the usual enumeration of khandhas, viññāṇa is put last, it has been treated as the third, in accordance with the arrangement of the Vism., p. 477-8, the reason being that, is the most important and subtlest of the khandhas and the interpretation of all other mental khandhas follow this more or less.

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³ Vism., 452; Saṃyutta, II, 94; see also Ante, p. 24-5.

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⁴ See IHQ., XV: The Dhamma-saṅgaṇi.

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¹ See above, pp. 241 ff.

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It should be remembered that these twenty-one kusala-viññāṇas do not belong to the good mental states of an average man. These refer only to the mental states of an individual who is following the Buddhist principles of gradual purification and whose mind rises by stages to the Arūpāvacara and ultimately to the Lokuttara region.

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In the same way Akusalaviññāṇa is explained. As a person who has practised the first form of meditation, not to speak of the higher ones, cannot have akusalaviññāṇa; it is said that akusala-viññāṇa is confined to the Kāmāvacara sphere only, and so from the standpoint of spheres (avacaras) it is of one kind only. It is of three kinds according to its source, viz., lobha (avarice), dosa (hatred) and moha (delusion). Each of them again is further subdivided into twelve in accordance with its combination with one or more of the following: lobha with or without somanassa, upekkhā, diṭṭhi (non-Buddhist beliefs) and saṅkhāra (instigation by others); dosa with domanassa, paṭigha (revenge) and saṅkhāra (instigation); and moha with upekkhā and vicikicchā (doubts).

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The Avyākata-viññāṇa has so many subdivisions that it will be easier to comprehend it in a tabular form thus:²

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² Vism., pp. 454 ff.

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The *ahetukam kusalavipākam avyākata-viññāṇam* is of eight kinds, viz., the six *viññāṇas* derived through the six organs of sense (including *mano*). The function of these *viññāṇas* is to make the object just known. Besides these six *viññāṇas*, there is the receiving faculty called *mano dhātu*, located in the heart (*hadayavatthu*). Its function is to cognize the objects. As it is associated either with equanimity (*upekkhā*), or joy (*somanassa*) it is said to be of two kinds. All these are further subdivided as shown in the above Table.

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The *sahetukam kusalavipākam avyākata-viññāṇam* is also of eight kinds. It is similar to the previously said *ahetuka-viññāṇa*, the only difference being that it is always associated with *alobhādivipāka*.¹

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¹ *alobhādi* = *alobha*, *adosa*, *amoha* and so forth; *vipāka* = result or resultant consciousness (see Transl. of the *Vism.*, p. 531).

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The *Rūpāvacara-avyākata-vipāka-viññāṇam* like the *rūpāvacara-kusaladhamma* is of five kinds. It occurs to those who are meditating (*samāpattivasena*)² and progressing along the path. It is manifest in reconception, life-continuum and death.

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² *Vism.*, Transl., p. 532, by way of right attainment. See above, p. 252.

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The *Arūpāvacara-avyākata-vipāka-viññāṇam* like the *arūpāvacara-kusala* is of four kinds and should be interpreted as above.

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The *Lokuttara-avyākata-vipāka-viññāṇam* like the *lokuttara-vipāka* is of four kinds, i.e., connected with the four kinds of mental states of four *maggas* (see above p. 252). .

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In all, the subdivisions of the *avyākata-vipāka-viññāṇas* of the four spheres (*avacaras*) amount to thirty-six.

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The *Kiriya-viññāṇa*, as indicated in the above Table, is subdivided according to the three spheres (*avacaras*) and then the *Kāmāvacara* into *ahetuka* and *sahetuka*, which are subdivided into eleven kinds, and as before, the *Rūpāvacara* and *Arūpāvacara* into nine, thus making in all twenty kinds.

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The sum total of *viññāṇas* stands thus: Kusalaviññāṇa ... ... ... 21 Akusalaviññāṇa ... ... ... 12 Vipākaviññāṇa ... ... ... 36 Kiriyaviññāṇa ... ... ... 20 --- 89

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All these 89 *viññāṇas* act in 14 ways, viz., through reconception (*paṭisandhi*), life-continuum (*bhavaṅga*), reviving (*āvajjana*), seeing (*dassana*), hearing (*savana*), smelling (*ghāyana*), tasting (*sāyana*), touching (*phusana*), receiving (*sampaṭicchana*), examining (*santīraṇa*), deciding (*voṭṭhapana*), extending (*javana*),¹ registering (*tad-ārammaṇa*) and death (*cuti*).²

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¹ Cf. *Atthas.* p. 270: *ubhosu tiresu kedārapūraṇaṃ viya javanaṃ*.

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² These are functions of mano-dhātu which is treated as the sixth organ of sense.

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Of the fourteen ways in which *viññāṇa* functions, as stated above, it is the *paṭisandhi-viññāṇa* that causes re-birth. It is said in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (I, 122; II, 67, 103) that only when *viññāṇa* obtains a footing (*patiṭṭhā*) on something (*ārammaṇa*), then only there is the possibility of the birth of a being, and not otherwise, and the moment the *viññāṇa* ceases (*cuti*), one is regarded as dead.³ During the span of life limited by the two *viññāṇas*, *paṭisandhi* and *cuti*, the remaining twelve *viññāṇas* function. Immediately after the *paṭisandhi-viññāṇa* has done its part, i.e., having given the form of birth according to kamma, appears the *bhavaṅga-viññāṇa*, which is the resultant of one's actions (*kammassa vipākabhūtam*). The *bhavaṅga-viññāṇa* however becomes inactive when the organs of sense grow strong enough to function in their respective spheres. Then those six *indriya-viññāṇas* (i.e. including *mano-dhātu*) function and give rise to the *ahetuka-kiriya-manoviññāṇa-dhātu*, making *bhavaṅgaviññāṇa* (sub-consciousness) passive. The *kiriyamano-viññāṇadhātu* is nothing but mind (*mano* = *citta*), the function of which is to revive (*avajjana*) the objects seen, sounds heard and so forth, and to make the organs of sense function and function again. The function of mind then is to receive things communicated to it through the organs of sense; it becomes good or bad according as the things communicated through the organs of sense are pleasant or unpleasant. When the mind ceases to function, *bhavaṅga-viññāṇa* renews its activity, ceasing at death when it is followed by *cuti-viññāṇa*, which in its turn gives rise to *paṭisandhi-viññāṇa*. In this way the continuity of *citta* is maintained, and the cycle of existence is continued.¹ It should be noted that the existence of *bhavaṅgaviññāṇa* or subconsciousness is not explicitly stated anywhere in the Sutta or Abhidhamma Piṭaka, though it is given prominence in the works of later expositors, like Anuruddha and Buddhaghosa.

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³ Cf. *Saṃyutta*, III, p. 143: *Āyu usmā viññāṇaṃ, ca yadā kāyaṃ jahantimāṃ* *apaviddho tadā seti, parabhattam acetanaṃ*.

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¹ This exposition of *viññāṇa* is based on the *Vism.*, pp. 452-460; Transl. *Path of Purity*, III, pp. 527 ff. See also *Atthas.*, pp. 266, 269-270. In the *Atthas.* the position of *bhavaṅga-viññāṇa* has been explained by a simile which is as follows: The course of a flowing river, if turned, by an obstruction, towards a channel (*mahāmātikā*), the water not only flows through it but floods over the two sides of the channel, and then by whatever narrow ways it finds, it moves towards the main river. The flowing river = *bhavaṅga-viññāṇa*. The obstruction turning the course of the river = *kiriyamano-dhātu* (*mind* = *citta*) The channel = *vīthicittapavatti* (mind functioning through the six organs of sense)

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*Saññākkhandha* refers to all those characteristics which make a thing known. Though it is by nature of one kind, it is, like the *vedanākkhandha* (see above, p. 251), treated as of three kinds viz., *kusala* (good), *akusala* (bad) and *avyākata* (indifferent), according as it is associated with *viññāṇa*, good, bad or indifferent. There cannot be any *viññāṇa* without *saññā* (perception), hence it has as many subdivisions as *viññāṇa* (see above). Its function is (i) to make a thing known through its characteristics, as a piece of wood is known to a carpenter; (ii) to make the characteristics engage the attention of persons, as an elephant felt by the blind; and (iii) to draw attention to the immediate function of an object, as animals know their supplier of grains as the food-giver.

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*Saṅkhārākkhandha*. It denotes that aspect of mental states (*cetanā*),¹ the main characteristics of which is to bring together (*rāsikaraṇa*) two or more mental activities. It has the virtue of putting forward the mind into action,² and engaging it in the immediate object, and has for its proximate cause the three other khandhas, viz., *vedanā*, *saññā* and *viññāṇa*. Apparently, then,

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¹ In the *Vibhaṅga* (p. 7), *saṅkhāra* is equated to *cetanā*, the *cetanā* which arises out of contact of the organs of sense with their objects, as does *vedanā*, *saññā* or *viññāṇa*.

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² In the *Expositor* (p. 540 fn. 4), it has been pointed out that the commentator on the *Vism.*, has explained *āyūhana* by *rāsikaraṇa*. This, I think, is a slip on the part of the commentator, for in the text *āyūhana* is mentioned as the second characteristic, *rāsikaraṇa* being the first

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The flooding over two sides = *javana*
Falling into the main river = *bhavaṅgotaraṇam*.

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*saṅkhārā* means the resultant mental states—the accumulated effect of the three other khandhas or mental functions. These three khandhas do not set the mind into action but leave it to *saṅkhārā* to do so. Like the other mental khandhas, it has also been sub-divided in various ways.

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Buddhaghosa concludes his exposition of khandhas by the remark that the people are prone to regard the body as one single thing and mistakenly apprehend it as a self and that it is only to warn them against this misapprehension that the Teacher spoke of the khandhas. The khandhas are to be looked upon as bubbles and tempting mirage. These are nothing but a mass of evanescent objects as substanceless as the trunk of a plantain tree.¹ Buddhaghosa offers also an explanation for the order (*kama*) in which the khandhas are enumerated. *Rūpa*, he says, is mentioned first because it is easily comprehensible to an average man. As this *rūpa* (matter, object and thing) gives rise to a feeling good, bad, or indifferent, so *vedanā* is treated as the second khandha. As this *vedanā* (feeling) that directs one's attention to the form and nature of the source of the feeling and thus engenders *saññā* (perception), so *saññā* is placed next. After *saññā*, happens the accumulation of mental states, hence *saṅkhārā* is treated as the fourth. Though *viññāṇa* precedes *saṅkhārā* it is mentioned last as it is the most important of the four mental khandhas, forming, as it does, the basis of *vedanā*.²

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¹ *Vism.*, pp. 477-480.

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² *Vism.*, p. 477: Yam vedayati tam sañjānāti ti evam vedanā-visayassa ākāragāhikam saññam; saññāvasena abhisaṅkhārake saṅkhāre; tesam vedanādīnam nissayam adhipatibhūtañ ca nesam viññāṇan ti.

(ii) Dhātus

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The term *dhātu* carries a very wide meaning in the Buddhist literature. When the *dhātu* is said to be constituted (*saṃkhata*), it means all the beings and things of the world, e.g., the three spheres of existence, Kāma, Rūpa and Arūpa; the four great elements (*mahābhūtas*) and the things formed out of these elements; the sense-organs, their objects (*āyatanas*), as also their perceptions; the material and non-material constituents (*khandhas*). The *Bahudhātuka-sutta*¹ states that for attaining nibbāna, one must be proficient in the dhātus (*dhātukusalo*), and then enumerates besides the above the following as dhātus: mental and physical pain and pleasure, equanimity, ignorance, desire, renunciation, hatred, and absence of hatred, as also Ākāsa and Nibbāna or Nirodha but the last two are called unconstituted (*asaṃkhata*) dhātus.

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¹ *Majjhima*, III, p. 216.

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Though the term *dhātu* has a very wide significance, it is applied at the present instance to the six sense-organs, their objects and the six perceptions derived through them, i.e., *cakkhu, rūpa* and *cakkhuviññāṇa*; *sota, sadda* and *sotaviññāṇa* and so forth counting in all the eighteen dhātus. Etymologically *dhātu* means those elements which uphold a being. In this sense *cakkhu* is a *dhātu* and so are the other sense-organs. The sense-organs are also *indriyas*² inasmuch these act as predominating factors in perceiving objects; again these are also *āyatanas* inasmuch as these exert (*ā-yatanti, uṭṭhahanti, ghaṭanti, vāya-manti*)³ to perceive an object.

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² See Infra.

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³ *Vism.*, p. 481.

(iii) Āyatanas

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Āyatanas include both the sense-organs and their objects, the former being distinguished as internal (*ajjhattika*) and the latter as external (*bāhira*), counting twelve in all.⁴ The function of the āyatanas is not only to develop the perceptions (viññāṇa) but also to entangle a being in saṃsāra (repeated existences). With the exception of mano, all the eleven āyatanas belong to rūpakkhandha¹ while mano alone belongs to viññāṇakkhandha. Mano therefore like viññāṇa can be subdivided into 89 states.² The scope of the five organs of sense is limited to their respective objects while the scope of mano is almost unlimited, extending over not only all the other sense-organs and their objects but also over all mental states, denoted in Pāli by the word dhamma.

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⁴ See Table facing, p. 249.

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¹ Dhātukathā, pp. 2, 117; see above, p. 250.

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² See above, p. 255; Vism., p. 483.

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The Buddhist texts, in conclusion, point out though so much attention has been paid to the analysis of dhātus and āyatanas, one must not forget that these have neither any beginning nor any end, these do not come from anywhere nor go to anywhere; these are in reality substanceless (nirīha) and functionless (avyāpāra).³

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³ Vism., p. 484.

(iv) Indriyas

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Besides the twelve āyatanas and eighteen dhātus, a being requires the twenty-two indriyas (predominating mental factors) for its existence.⁴ The six sense-organs as has been mentioned above are indriyas inasmuch as these are predominating factors in a person's appearance, protection, knowledge and distinctiveness.⁵ The seventh and eighth indriyas are masculinity (purisa) and femininity (itthi) as these are predominating factors in sex-distinction. The ninth indriya is vitality (jīvita) which sustains the body. The five mental states, sukha, dukkha, somanassa, domanassa and *upekkhā*,¹ which accompany the *jīvitindriya* are also treated as predominating states in the Buddhist psychology inasmuch as these serve to entangle beings in worldly affairs.² The next group of five mental states, viz., self-confidence (*saddhā*), energy (*viriya*), watchfulness (*sati*), concentration of mind (*samādhi*) and exertion for knowledge (*paññā*) are also treated as *indriyas* inasmuch as these serve to disentangle beings from worldly desires and help them to attain Nibbāna. The last three *indriyas* are (i) the determination to know what is unknown (*anaññātā + ñassāmi*), (ii) determination to know the highest truth (*aññā*), and (iii) determination to realise what has been attained by the previous two *indriyas* (*aññātāvī*). The first of this group acts as the predominating factor in removing wrong views and putting the adept on the right course of exercises for realising the truth while the second in helping the adept to realise the fruits of the exercises, removal of the *anusayas* (inclinations for worldly attainments) and development of insight into the truth; the third acts as the predominating factor in attaining knowledge of the cessation of rebirth (*kṣayajñāna*) and the attainment of Nibbāna in this life.³

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⁴ Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, (C.O. Series), pt. ii, p. 1: आधिपत्यर्थ- येन्द्रियते । तस्मादित्यमिन्द्रियशब्दस्य व्युत्पत्ति नैष्टवेति

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⁵ Ibid., Intro.

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¹ Sukha and dukkha = physical pleasure and pain. Somanassa and domanassa = mental pleasure and pain. Upekkhā = equanimity. 2 *Ak.-vyākhyā*, II, Intro. 3 *Ibid.*, p. 11 4 *Vism.*, p. 526.

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Though so much has been said about the *indriyas*, Buddhaghosa in conclusion observes that these do not exist in the highest sense.⁴

(v) Ariyasaccas

v1.c18.s5.1

It has been already pointed out that by *sammā-diṭṭhi* the early Buddhists meant the comprehension of the four truths, *dukkha*, *samudaya*, *nirodha* and *magga*.¹ These can be expressed in several ways, of which the following appear to be a fair generalisation; *pavattı* (origin), *nıvattı* (cessation), and *tad ubhayahetu* (causes of the above mentioned two); *ālaya* (desires), *ālayāramatā* (attachment to desires), *ālayasamugghāta* (uprooting of desires), and *ālayasamugghātupāya* (means of uprooting of desires);² *akusalam* (evil), *akusalamūlam* (source of evils), *kusalam* (good), *kusalamūlam* (source of goodness);³ *idam* (this = *dukkha*), *hīnam* (low = *dukkhasamudaya*), *paṇītam* (excellent = *dukkhanirodha*), *imassa saññāgatassa nissaraṇam* (getting rid of the misconceptions = *dukkhanirodhagāminī-paṭipadā*).⁴ These various modes of expressions show that the early Buddhists did not mean that the four truths should be confined to the four terms: *dukkha*, *samudaya*, *nirodha* and *magga*. But as these terms are widely and frequently used, their traditional interpretations are given below:

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¹ See above, p. 248; *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 206-7.

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² *Vism.*, p. 497.

v1.c18.s5.4

³ *Majjhima*, I, p. 46.

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⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

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(1) *Dukkha*: Birth is *dukkha*, so are old age, death, grief, lamentation due to the death of friends and relatives, etc.; physical and mental pain; meeting uncongenial persons; separation from dear ones; disappointment in obtaining the desired objects. In short, the congregation of five *khandhas* is *dukkha* as it is always accompanied by pain, being subject to change, and ultimately decay.⁵ (2) *Samudaya*: It is attributed to *taṇhā* (desires, thirst) which may be for (i) worldly objects, (ii) repeated existence or (iii) dissolution of bodies.¹

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⁵ Cf. *Dīgha*, II, p. 306; *Majjhima*, III, p. 249 f., *Vibhaṅga*, p. 99, *Vism.*, p. 498. See *Vism.*, p. 499 for seven kinds of *dukkha*: *dukkha-dukkha*, *vipariṇāmadukkha*, *saṅkhāradukkha*, *paṭicchannadukkha*, *appaṭicchanna-dukkha*, *pariyāyadukkha*, *nippariyāya-dukkha*. Cf. *Kośasthāna*, V.

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¹ Kāma, bhava and vibhava taṇhā. See *Digha*, II, p. 305.

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(3) *Nirodha*: It is the cessation of *samudaya*, complete detachment from *taṇhā* (desire), relinquishment of all worldly objects and desires for their possession. It is tranquil, beyond death, signless and free from all characteristics. It is not non-existent like the horns of a hare as it can be realised if the right means be adopted. It is, however, not a fruition of the right means as it exists for ever, only its realisation is effected by the right means. It is eternally existing but not like atoms (*aṇu-paramāṇu*) of the Vaiśeṣikas, for, atoms, according to the early Buddhists, are also caused. It is unborn (*ajātam*), unoriginated (*abhūtam*), uncreated (*akatam*) and unconstituted.² It is called *sa-upādisesa* when one who has removed all impurities and realised the truth but still retains the remnants of his past *upadhi*, e.g., an arhat before he lays down his mortal frame. It is called *anupādisesa* when the arhat lays down his body for ever and never takes re-birth.

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² *Itivuttaka*, p. 37; *Udaña*, p. 80 cf. *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, pp. 172 f.

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(4) *Magga*: It is the eight-fold path leading to the cessation of grief as explained above (pp. 199 ff).

v1.c18.s5.12

The effects of insight into each of the four truths (i) *dukkha* (ii) *samudaya* (iii) *nirodha* and (iv) *magga* leads to the removal of the following beliefs respectively:

v1.c18.s5.13

(i) Belief in a self (*sakkāyadiṭṭhi*); it shakes the mental tranquility of those who cling to the view that the constituted things are everlasting (*dhuva*), happy (*sukha*) and good (*subha*).

v1.c18.s5.14

(ii) Belief that there is no after-life (*uccheda-diṭṭhi*)¹ and that the world is a creation of the God or issued out of *Prakṛti* or Time (*kāla*).

v1.c18.s5.15

¹ See above, p. 71.

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(iii) Belief in the eternality of self (*sassatadiṭṭhi*)² and in the existence in *arūpaloka* as the highest.

v1.c18.s5.17

² See above, p. 49

v1.c18.s5.18

(iv) Belief in non-action (*akiriya-diṭṭhi*);³ it leads to the rejection of the path of ease and pleasure, and the path of rigorous asceticism and self-mortifications.

v1.c18.s5.19

³ See above, p. 39.

v1.c18.s5.20

After explaining in detail the *ariyasaccas*, Buddhaghosa reminds us of the non-existence of any individual (*anatta*) by quoting the following stanza:

v1.c18.s5.21

Dukkham eva hi na koci dukkhito, kārako na kiriyā va vijjati
atthi nibbuti, na nibbuto pumā, maggam atthi, gamako na vijjati ti.

v1.c18.s5.22

[There is grief but none suffering from grief, there is no doer but there is action, there is quietude but none being quieted, there is the path but none going along the path].

v1.c18.s5.23

(vi) P a ṭ i c c a s a m u p p ā d a

v1.c18.s5.24

*Paṭiccasamuppāda* or the law of causation is regarded as a contribution of Buddha to the philosophical thoughts of India of the 5th century B.C. By this law Buddha wanted to establish that the constituted world is neither a creation of God nor has issued out of the ever existing *Prakṛti* nor it is a composite of eternal atoms (*aṇu-paramāṇu*). It shows that the things of the world have only a dependent origination and hence are impermanent and sources of misery, and that there is nothing except Nibbāna and Ākāsa that is not originated by cause and condition. This law has been utilised to show that all that is caused and conditioned are without any substance. It explains the fixed unchangeable and this-conditioned (*idappaccayatā*) nature of things and as such it is a key to the eternal truth. The moment a being realises the truth of this law, he sees the reality (*yo paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passati so dhammaṃ passati, yo dhammaṃ passati so paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passati*).¹ All the Buddhist texts, whether Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna, identify this law with Buddha and Dhamma.² It was this solution of the truth that appealed to the philosophical mind of Sāriputta and led to his conversion to Buddhism.³

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¹ *Majjhima*, I, p. 191.

v1.c18.s5.26

² *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 51.

v1.c18.s5.27

³ *Ibid.*, p. 208-9.

v1.c18.s5.28

"Many scholars, who have dealt with this formula, have attempted to elicit from it Buddha's theory of the origin of a being and some of them have actually drawn parallels between the links of the formula and the causal series of the Sāṃkhya.⁴ It is noteworthy that such attempts were also made in Buddhaghosa's time. Buddhaghosa has, however, pointed out that *avijjā*, the first link of the chain, must not be regarded as similar to *pakati* (*prakṛti*) of the Pakativādins (Sāṃkhya) because *avijjā* is neither uncaused (*akāraṇam*) nor is it the primary cause (*mūlakāraṇam*) of the world. It owes its origin to impurities (*āsavas*). The reason adduced by Buddhaghosa for its being made the first link in the chain is that Buddha used '*avijjā*' or '*bhavataṇhā*' for commencing (*sīsabhāvaṃ*) his discourses on topics which by their nature are without any beginning or end (*vaṭṭa-kathā* or *anamatagga*).¹ It is apparent therefore that *avijjā* need not necessarily be the first link in the chain of causation but that it is one of the terms found suitable by the author of the formula to begin the chain. It could as well be commenced by *bhava-taṇhā*.² In the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*,³ the formula starts with *āhāra* as the first link. Hence, we see that the *Paṭiccasamuppāda* is not meant to be an explanation of the origin of the world but just a chain of instances to illustrate the law of *idappaccayatā* (this-conditioned nature, *i.e.*, dependent origination) of things. Those scholars, who expected to find in it a key to the origin of the world, have been disappointed and have condemned it as illogical and incongruous. The author of the formula could not anticipate that his arrangement of the illustrations in a series would give rise to confusion.⁴ The chain was not meant to demonstrate a line of evolution. All that is intended to demonstrate is that any two links are related to each other in one or more of the twentyfour ways (*paccayas*), for which the usual general expression is "*imasmim sati idaṃ hoti*" (this being so that happens). There are in the *Paṭṭhāna* twentyfour such relations,⁵ viz., *hetu* (root-cause), *ārammaṇa* (basis, objective cause), *anantara* (immediate c.), *samanantara* (concomitant c.), *sahajāta* (co-existent c.), *aññamañña* (interdependent c.), *nissaya* (supporting cause as earth to tree), *upanissaya* (immediately effective cause), *purejāta* (preceding c.), *pacchājāta* (succeeding c.), *āsevana* (cause which requires repetition, e.g. study), *kamma* (previous actions), *vipāka* (fruition of previous actions), *āhāra* (sustenance), *indriya* (predominating factors), *jhāna* (meditation), *magga* (the eight-fold path), *sampayutta* (associated cause), *vippayutta* (dissociated cause), *atthi* (present cause), *natthi* (non-present cause), *vigata* (absent cause) and *avigata* (non-absent cause). It is in one or more of these relations that the two consecutive links are related to each other, e.g., *viññāṇa* is related to *nāmarūpa* as *aññamañña*; *jāti* is related to *jarā-maraṇa* as *purejāta* and *upanissaya*, and so forth. The law implies that any two links should be taken up for consideration for realising the *idappaccayatā* of worldly things.

v1.c18.s5.29

⁴ See Kern, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 46 f; for other refs., see Poussin, *Theories des douze causes*, p. vii, fn. 2.

v1.c18.s5.30

¹ *Vism.*, p. 525.

v1.c18.s5.31

² *Ibid.*, p. 525: purimā, bhikkhave, koṭi na paññāyati avijjāya (or bhavataṇhāya), ito pubbe avijjā (or bhavataṇhā) nāhosi atha pacchā sambhavi ti. Evaṃ c'etaṃ bhikkhave, vuccati, atha ca pana paññāyati idappaccayā avijjā (or bhavataṇhā). Cf. *Saṃyutta*, II, p. 178; III, p. 149

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³ *Saṃyutta*, II, pp. 101-3, *Mahāniddesa*, I, pp. 25-6.

v1.c18.s5.33

⁴ *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 208-9.

v1.c18.s5.34

⁵ Cf. *Vism.*, p. 532; translation, p. 635; Intro. to *Paṭṭhāna* (P.T.S.).

v1.c18.s5.35

Buddhaghosa observes that by *samuppāda* is not meant origin (*uppāda*), pure and simple. It is not also the doctrine of nothingness (*natthitā*). It negatives the doctrines of *sassata* and *uccheda*.¹ By the word *paṭicca* is meant that a thing originates not by itself (*ekekato*) nor without a cause (*nāpi ahetuto*); it originates by depending on certain other things (*paccayasāmaggim paṭicca*) as a fruition (*phalavohārena*). By the compound word *paṭiccasamuppāda* is meant that a cause leads to an effect (*patimukham ito = gato*) unalterably, and the cause and effect are not separable from each other; cause and effect are mutually dependent and which mutual dependence is unalterably fixed.

v1.c18.s5.36

¹ See above, pp. 39, 41.

v1.c18.s5.37

The twelve terms composing the law of causation are explained thus:

v1.c18.s5.38

(1) *Avijjā* or lack of true knowledge

v1.c18.s5.39

The etymological meaning of the word *avijjā* is that it makes a person learn what should be unlearnt and unlearn what should be learnt. It debars a person from taking a true view of worldly things. It makes a person see happiness in misery, good in evil, and vice versa, regard the unreals as reals, make differentiation where no differentiation exists, and so forth. The usual meaning attributed to it in the Nikāyas is non-comprehension of the ariyasaccas¹ while in the Abhidhamma, it is non-comprehension of pubbanta and aparanta, sassata and uccheda,² and of idappaccayatā.³ Avijjā screens the truth, and it is by the removal of avijjā that the vijjā or truth (i.e. Nibbāna) flashes before the eyes of an adept.

v1.c18.s5.40

² See above, pp. 49 ff.

v1.c18.s5.41

³ See above, p. 266. Cf. Dhammasaṅgaṇi § 1162.

v1.c18.s5.42

(2) Saṅkhārā or thought-constructions, impressions

v1.c18.s5.43

By the word saṅkhārā is meant the impressions or traces left in the mind by taking wrong view of things due to avijjā.¹ On account of the lack of true knowledge, a person has the impression that desires conduce to happiness, that performance of sacrifices and practice of extreme austerities lead to liberation and so forth. The relation (paccaya) of saṅkhārā to avijjā may be one or more of the following four, viz., ārammaṇa, adhipati, kamma, and upanissaya. The impressions left on the mind by avijjā lead one to perform deeds which are (i) meritorious (puñña) such as gifts and observance of moral precepts, (ii) sinful (apuñña) such as killing and stealing, and (iii) neither meritorious nor sinful such as beliefs in sassata and uccheda. These three kinds of deeds may be (i) physical (kāyika), or verbal (vācasika) or mental (mānasika). Again, the impressions or thought constructions (*saṅkhārā*) may be limited or unlimited, high or low, right or wrong, definite or indefinite. *Puññābhisankhārā* cause rebirth in heavens, while *apuññābhisankhārā* in hells and *āneñjābhisankhārā* in the Arūpalokas.¹ The function of *saṅkhārā* is to produce the *paṭisandhi-viññāṇa* (or *citta*) (the thought with which a being is reborn) and the mental states (*viññāṇas*) that follow the *paṭisandhi-citta*, which are all dependent on its previous deeds (*kammapaccaya*).²

v1.c18.s5.44

¹ See above, p. 263.

v1.c18.s5.45

⁴ This term saṅkhārā should be distinguished from the word saṅkhārā in phrases like aniccā vata saṅkhārā, where it means all that is constituted.

v1.c18.s5.46

¹ See above, p. 255-6.

v1.c18.s5.47

² *Vism.*, p. 558.

v1.c18.s5.48

(3) *Viññāṇa* or perception &
(4) *Nāma-rūpa* or mind and matter

v1.c18.s5.49

The appearance of *viññāṇa* and *nāma-rūpa* marks the inception of the present life of a being. The very fact of a being’s having a fresh existence implies that the being could not get rid of *avijjā* and its consequence *saṅkhārā* in its past life. An Arhat or Buddha only gets rid of the same and so does not have fresh *viññāṇa* and *nāma-rūpa*. The *saṅkhārā* lead to the reappearance of *paṭisandhi-viññāṇa*, and the other *viññāṇas* immediately succeeding it, and it is around this *viññāṇa* that the other four *khandhas* cluster, forming a complete being with mind and matter.

v1.c18.s5.50

Of these four *khandhas*, one is *rūpa* (matter) and the other three are *saññā*, *vedanā* and *saṅkhārā* which along with *viññāṇa*, separately stated in the formula, are collectively called *nāma*. Buddhaghosa derives *nāma* from the root *nam*, to bend, and says *saññā*, *vedanā* and *saṅkhārā* are called *nāma* because they bend, direct the *viññāṇa* to the object (*ārammaṇa*). In the formula of twelve links, *viññāṇa* is made the *paccaya* of *nāma-rūpa*, but *nāma* also includes *viññāṇa*. In some enumerations,³ *viññāṇa* and *nāma-rūpa* are shown to be interdependent.

v1.c18.s5.51

³ *Digha*, II, p. 56.

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The reason for making viññāṇa an independent link is that saṅkhārā can be the paccaya (i.e. kamma and upanissaya) of viññāṇa only¹ and not of the other three khandhas or of rūpa. The paṭisandhiviññāṇa is of nineteen kinds.² Viññāṇas, which follow the paṭisandhicitta and cuticitta, are the five perceptions derived through the five sense-organs. Besides these five, there is the mano-viññāṇa which may be sub-divided into thirty-two kinds.³

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¹ Vism, p. 559-560.

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² For details, see Vism, pp. 547 ff.

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³ Cf. Vism., p. 555-6; kāmāvacarassa kusalassa katattā upacitattā vipākaṃ cakkhuviññāṇaṃ uppannaṃ hoti ti. See IHQ, vol. XV: The Dhammasaṅgaṇi (analysed).

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Now the viññāṇas, which appear after paṭisandhi-viññāṇa, gradually lead to saññā (perception), vedanā (feelings), and fresh saṅkhārā (thought-constructions), all of which become ultimately the paccaya of rūpa (matter).⁴ The relation of nāma to rūpa is one of the four paccayas, e.g. sahajāta, aññamañña, nissaya and vipāka.⁵ It is clearly stated in the Vibhaṅga⁶ that the sense-organs as also other matters in their subtlest state originate out of mind. This subtle rūpa is nourished by the food taken by the mother and shaped by the force of previous karma.

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⁴ Vibhaṅga, pp. 144, 147: nāmapaccayā chaṭṭhāyatanṃ.

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⁵ Vism., p. 561.

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⁶ Vibhaṅga, p. 147.

(5) Saḷāyatana or six sense-organs

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Nāma-rūpa are mentioned as the paccaya of the six sense-organs. By nāma is meant here the three khandhas, vedanā, saññā and saṅkhārā. By rūpa is taken the four great elements (mahābhūtas), the six objects (vatthus) viz., rūpa, sadda, gandha, rasa, phoṭṭhabba and dhamma, and vitality (jīvita). The above rūpa consisting of eleven elements takes its own course of evolution (sa-santanti pariyāpannam) and is related to saḷāyatana as sahajāta, aññamaññā, nissaya, vippayutta, atthi and avigata.¹ Nāma also have the above relations to the six sense-organs with the distinction that it is sampayutta and not vippayutta paccaya and it is also a vipāka paccaya.² But these two nāma and rūpa must come together to be a paccaya of the six sense-organs and not otherwise.³

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¹ Vism., p. 564.

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² Ibid., p. 563.

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³ Ibid., p. 562.

(6) Phassa or contact

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There are as many kinds of phassa (contact) as there are āyatanas, that is, six. Phasso appears as a result of the āyatanas taking their own course of evolution (sakasantati-pariyāpannam).⁴ The only point to be remembered is that phasso is put in the singular number as it is only one though there may be more than one sense-organ functioning, but one form of phasso is limited to one āyatana. The āyatanas are related to phasso in six or nine ways.⁵ The phasso can also be sub-divided like viññāṇa into thirty-two kinds.⁶

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⁴ Ibid., p. 565.

v1.c18.s5.t2.3

⁵ Ibid., p. 566.

v1.c18.s5.t2.4

⁶ Ibid., p. 565.

(7) Vedanā or feeling

v1.c18.s5.t3.1

There are as many feelings as there are doors, i.e., the sense-organs. Vedanā like viññāṇa may be sub-divided into 89 kinds.⁷ Cakkhuppasāda, etc., are related to feeling in eight ways.⁸

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⁷ See above, p. 255.

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⁸ Vism., p. 567.

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(8) Taṇhā or thirst, desire

v1.c18.s5.t3.5

There are as many kinds of thirst as there are sources i.e., the six objects of the sense-organs, viz., rūpa-taṇhā, sadda-taṇhā and sc forth.¹ Each taṇhā may be of three kinds,² kāma, bhava and vibhava. When the taṇhā rouses a taste for the objects, rūpa, sadda, etc., it is called kāma. When it is associated with the belief that the world is eternally existing (sassata) and rouses an attachment (rāga) for future existence, it is called bhavataṇhā. When it is associated with the belief that there is no after-life (uccheda), and one becomes regardless of this life, it is called vibhava-taṇhā.

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¹ Vibhaṅga, p. 380.

v1.c18.s5.t3.7

² See above, p. 263.

(9) Upādāna or strong attachment

v1.c18.s5.t4.1

The previously mentioned taṇhās lead to upādāna and are related to it in seven or eight ways.³ There are four kinds of upādāna, kāma, diṭṭhi, sīlabbata and attavāda. Kāmataṇhā is the cause of kāmupādāna, which is the firm grasping of the object, it is thirst for objects not obtained and firmly holding the objects already obtained. Diṭṭhūpādāna is the firm adherence to wrong views, i.e., firm belief in the doctrine that there is no good effects of gifts or sacrifices, or belief in any one of the indeterminable problems: sassata or uccheda, anta or ananta etc.⁴ as true. Sīlabbatupādāna is the firm adherence to the belief that rituals or particular ascetic practices lead to liberation. Attavādupādāna is the firm belief in the existence of a soul, and in its identification with one of the five khandhas.⁵

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³ Vism., p. 570-1.

v1.c18.s5.t4.3

⁴ See above, p. 45-6

v1.c18.s5.t4.4

⁵ See above, p. 85.

(10) Bhava or desire for existence

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It has two distinct meanings, one is existence according to one's past deeds, called kammabhava, and the other is the plane of existence wherein a being is reborn, called uppattibhava. The former is regulated by the three kinds of saṅkhārā, puñña, apuñña and āneñja in their two grades low and high. But *saṅkhārā* are not mentioned as the *paccaya* of *bhava*, so we are to ascertain how *upādāna* is the *paccaya* of *bhava*. Buddhaghosa points out that *kāmupādāna* leads to such actions which cause a being to be reborn in the *kāmabhava* and so it can be described as *kammabhava*. Other *upādānas* viz., *diṭṭhi*, *sīlabbata* and *attavāda* make a person adhere to wrong views, and influenced by those views he performs actions which lead to existences in *kāma* and other words, so in this sense, it can be called *kammabhava*. By *uppattibhava* is meant the several planes of existence, such as Kāma, Rūpa or Arūpa lokas. Some of these may be *asaññā* (without perception) and some may be with *saññā* (perception) but so subtle that it is incapable of perceiving any object (*nevasaññā-nāsaññā*). *Uppattibhava* may also be classified according to the number of *khandhas*, a being may possess, e.g. *kāma*- or *rūpa-bhava* have five *khandhas* while *arūpa* and *nevasaññānāsaññā* have only four, *asaññābhava* has one.

(11) Jāti or birth

v1.c18.s5.t6.1

*Jāti* is controlled by *kammabhava* and not *uppattibhava*. It is related to *bhava* in two ways, *kamma* and *upanissaya*. Birth is dependent on certain external circumstances, but assuming those as common in two beings, one notices differences between the two. This difference is due to the nature of *kamma-bhava*, in other words, deeds of past life, so it is said *kammam satte vibhajati, yad idaṃ hīnapaṇītatāyā ti*.¹

v1.c18.s5.t6.2

¹ *Majjhima*, III, p. 203.

(12) Jarāmaraṇa-soka-parideva-dukkha-domanassa or old age, death, grief, lamentation, and sorrow

v1.c18.s5.t7.1

These are all due to *jāti* but the relation of these to *jāti* is only two, viz., *upanissaya* and *purejāta*.

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