Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon c22: Chapter XV. The Doctrine of the Absolute in Buddhism and the Vedānta

Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon c22

Language
English

Contents

Chapter XV. The Doctrine of the Absolute in Buddhism and the Vedānta

1. Suchness as the Absolute

c22.s1.1

THE realistic implications of both the Vijñānavāda and the Madhyamaka must doubtless not be exaggerated; these schools have both specific doctrines which they fully accepted, and it is only as tendencies that we can see a movement to substitute for the negativism of the void or of empty thought, which is hardly more than the void, an absolute comparable to the absolute of the Vedānta. The further development of this tendency is seen in the *Mahāyānaçraddhotpāda* which tradition, as we have seen, ascribes to Açvaghoṣa, but which cannot be attributed to him with any confidence. It centres in the doctrine of suchness (*tathatā*), as the expression for the reality which must be held to remain when we discount al illusory appearances and leave the realm of relativity and contingency for that of absolute truth.¹

c22.s1.2

¹ In addition to his translation, see Suzuki, BM. ch. v; vi.

c22.s1.3

It follows from the fact that we are not concerned with relative knowledge that any definition of suchness is utterly impossible; to apply to it empirical determinations is wholly misleading; to say that it is void is to ascribe to it the character which belongs to the phenomena of this world; to say that it exists is to suggest something individual like ourselves which, however, leads an eternal existence. It is necessary, then, to content ourselves either with silence or to choose the simple term suchness or suchness of being, an idea which in a simple form is known to the Hīnayāna. Suchness is above existence or non-existence or both or neither; similarly also it is neither unity nor plurality nor again both or neither.² It can, therefore, most easily be expressed by negations like the ‘Not so, not so’ of the Upaniṣads, and hence it is natural to treat it as the void. But we must not make the error of thinking this a real definition; the void is as void as anything positive.

c22.s1.4

² Trans. p. 59; cf. MK. i. 1; xxv. 17 f.

c22.s1.5

Suchness in its ineffable absoluteness is thus beyond all comprehension and expression. Its real importance for us is that it comes into contact with empirical reality; by some mysterious act of self-determination, no better defined than as spontaneous, the absolute self affirms itself in the form of the receptacle intelligence (*ālaya-vijñāna*), which presents the two aspects of enlightenment and non-enlightenment. These, it must be remembered, have no separate and independent existence, but have being merely as relative to each other, and neither has any absolute existence, so that from the standpoint of absolute truth they can be identified. The origin of ignorance in the receptacle intelligence results in that which sees, that which represents, that which apprehends an objective world, and that which constantly particularizes, the entity which performs these functions being styled mind (*manas*). Five different aspects of its operations are distinguished. The first is activity intelligence (*karma-vijñāna*), when the unenlightened mind begins to be disturbed by the agency of ignorance; the second is intelligence as particular or evolving (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*), for, when the mind is disturbed, there arises the vision of an external world; the third is representation intelligence, when the mind reflects an external world as presented by the means of the senses; the fourth is particularization intelligence, which discriminates between things pure and infected; the fifth is succession intelligence: the mind directed by attention retains all experiences, securing the retribution of action, providing for the possibility of memory, and of the anticipation by imagination of the future. We see thus that from the absolute under the influence of ignorance we have the production of the self as a perceiver; of an external world, which exists for him and has no independent being as in the view of the Vijñānavāda; and of the constant round of births which mean misery. The unreal external world is the source of the origin of six phenomena on which misery depends. In the first place the mind, affected by the external world, becomes conscious of the distinction between what is agreeable and what is disagreeable. Secondly, it retains these feelings in a constant succession of changing states. Thirdly, from the retention and succession of feelings arises the desire of clinging. By clinging there is attachment to names and ideas which are ascribed to reality; from attachment to these concepts action is produced, and from action arises suffering. Every form of existence, the worlds of desire, of matter, and of non-matter, is merely a mental creation due to ignorance, precisely as in the Vijñānavāda.

c22.s1.6

We are, however, not condemned for ever to suffer from non-enlightenment, for suchness does not stand absolutely apart from the empiric world. The relation between it and ignorance is that of mutual perfuming (vāsanā) or impression. Ignorance affects suchness and produces those impressions (smṛti) which persist and maintain ignorance in being, creating an external world, and various modes of individuation, leading to action and misery. But suchness also affects ignorance; it thus induces in the mind of the individual in transmigration the hatred of the round of birth and death, and inspires in him the longing for release. Hence arises in the individual the conviction that he is really in possession of the pure nature of suchness, and that phenomena are merely the illusory manifestations of intelligence and have no absolute reality. The way is now open to practise with success the means of liberation, refraining absolutely from particularization, and from clinging to objects of desire. Ignorance can be overcome, because it is not absolutely distinct from enlightenment. The waves of the sea of consciousness which have been disturbed into motion by the wind of ignorance can be stilled, so that there remains only suchness in itself, unassociated with the mysterious disturbance which produces the manifestation of the individual and the world. It is freed from the coverings or obscuration of infections or ignorance (kleçāvaraṇa, jñeyāvaraṇa) and is immutable, calm, pure, and eternal.

c22.s1.7

The attainment of enlightenment and release is open to all beings, since there is always the perfuming of ignorance by suchness, but the intensity of ignorance with the principle of individuation accompanying it varies enormously, and thus accounts for the very diverse spiritual attainments of beings in the world. The inherent tendency of each mind to seek suchness is supported and promoted by the love and compassion of Bodhisattvas and Buddhas, who are higher embodiments of suchness; by hearing or seeing the Bodhisattvas man is enabled to acquire spiritual benefits, to win purity, to lay aside all hindrances, and to attain that clear insight which enables them to recognize the oneness of the universe and to see innumerable Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. There are stages in the degree of perfuming: adherents of the Hīnayāna or Śrāvakas, solitary Buddhas, and novice Bodhisattvas do not attain the state of non-particularization in unison with the essence of suchness, but Buddhas win this eminence. At this stage an end is put to the perfuming of ignorance, but the perfuming of suchness works on for ever and ever. Suchness is the effulgence of great wisdom, the illumination of the universe (*dharmadhātu*), true knowledge, the mind pure in its nature, eternal, calm, free, the womb of the Tathāgata, where the essence of Tathāgataship dwells, or the body of the law (*dharmakāya*). We have thus attained a more positive conception of suchness, but we are warned not to misunderstand the doctrine. The epithets of the idea are possible because there is in truth one reality only, so that there can be no question of particularizing or distinction which is utterly inapplicable to suchness; if it is said to be wisdom or knowledge, we must not suppose it has any object; if it is called universal illumination, we must not suppose there is anything to illumine.

c22.s1.8

Here we have, it is clear, something comparable with the absolute of the Vedānta, but at the same time there is much more reality in the new conception, and for all practical purposes a fundamentally novel mode of presenting the operation of the divine essence is revealed. We have in the conception of the activity of suchness as realized in the Bodhisattvas and Buddhas, unfolding itself in order to induce all beings to bring their store of merit to maturity, a much more effective version of the suggestion of the *Katha Upaniṣad*¹ that the attainment of deliverance is due to the grace of the Lord; the absolute itself is ever co-operating with the individual to secure him attainment of itself both directly and through the means of others.

c22.s1.9

¹ ii. 20; Çvet. Up. iii. 20; Taitt. Ār. x. 10. 1; Oldenberg, LUAB., pp. 245, 273 ff.; Suzuki's trs., pp. 62, 70.

2. Cosmic and Individual Consciousness

c22.s2.1

In the form¹ in which it has deeply influenced Chinese and Japanese thought the doctrine of the Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda has a formal view of consciousness in its development which is far more positive than negative. We may regard the receptacle consciousness as the foundation both of the external and the internal world; it is the essence or energy that lies behind inanimate nature, the life that strives upwards in the vegetable world; in this aspect it is the form or essence of the material world. The next higher stage is that in which it attains sensation and perception, and distinguishes objects, a power possessed by animals and men; thus one phase of the underlying unity becomes aware of another, one current of another current in the stream of being. The power of sensation and perception develops; by retention, comparison, and association of impressions there arises thought and ideation, found only in the higher animals and man, while finally the highest order of sentient beings develops self-consciousness or reflection.

c22.s2.2

¹ Cf. McGovern, *Intr. to Mahāyāna Buddhism*, pp. 144 ff., Suzuki, MB. ch. vi. ; *Muséon*, v. (1904), 370 ff. In this aspect the Vijñānavāda is parallel to the Viçiṣṭādvaita school of Vedānta, while when the evolution is regarded as illusory it is parallel to the Vivartavāda.

c22.s2.3

This may be regarded as the cosmic evolution of consciousness; in the individual the process is traced from the receptacle consciousness in the following mode. The receptacle consciousness gives rise to the corresponding receptacle consciousness of the individual, as well as to the sense organs and sense objects. Then develops—from the influence of past impressions—the infected or defiled mind (*kliṣṭa-manas*), which distinguishes subject and object; fecundated by the receptacle consciousness, it becomes aware of a world as external, and confers on it mental determinations of form and shape. Then develops mind or normal consciousness (*mano-vijñāna*), which discriminates between the various phenomena, and it, fecundated by the receptacle consciousness, develops the conception of like and dislike, associating it with other matters as cause and effect, &c. Then come the five forms of consciousness corresponding to the sense organs, visual, oral, nasal, taste, and touch consciousness, which, fecundated by the receptacle consciousness, give the presentation of the world of experience. The interaction of the whole body of these factors is necessary for the knowledge of the world; without, for instance, sight consciousness there could be no vision of colour, but mind is necessary for the discrimination of phenomena; without the infected mind one could not discriminate form or size, and without the receptacle consciousness neither the individual nor the world would exist. Or, in the terminology of causation, mind is the cause proper (hetu), infected mind and the receptacle consciousness the conditions (pratyaya), and the experienced world the fruit. The ordinary mind sees in the infected mind the final reality; Bodhisattvas recognize beneath it the receptacle consciousness as its prius.

3. Nirvāṇa as the Absolute

c22.s3.1

With the development of the positive side of the Mahāyāna there appears inevitably a certain change in the sense attributed to Nirvāṇa.¹ In the Vijñānamātraçāstra four forms of Nirvāṇa are distinguished. The first aspect is that in which Nirvāṇa is equivalent to the body of the law (dharmakāya); it is thus possible to view it in two aspects; in the one it is the absolute wholly simple, above all determinations of any empirical kind; in the other it is the reality which underlies the whole of existence, and in this sense, as a commentator on the Çāstra says, it is present in every man in whatever stage of mental development. The second form is Nirvāṇa with residue (upādhi-çeṣa) which denotes the state achieved in life by the man who achieves complete enlightenment, but who still continues to work out his accumulated action. On death the result is Nirvāṇa without residue (anupādhi-çeṣa).² The fourth form of Nirvāṇa is that without basis or stay (*apratiṣṭhita*),¹ which is the state superior to that of the Śrāvakas and the solitary Buddhas; in it the adept rises superior to the ideas of transmigration (*saṃsāra*) and Nirvāṇa itself. He lays aside the idea of contenting himself with the Nirvāṇa of the Śrāvaka and determines to deliver his fellow creatures from all misery and bring them to final emancipation and supreme bliss.

c22.s3.2

¹ See Suzuki, MB. ch. xiii.

c22.s3.3

² MSA. iii. 4; MKV., p. 519 (xxv. 1).

c22.s3.4

¹ Lévi, MSA. ii. *21, 27, n. 4.

c22.s3.5

There are in fact in the Mahāyāna two strains of thought regarding Nirvāṇa. The negativism of Nāgārjuna asserts that it is not created, not liable to destruction, not eternal, not passing away, not acquired, not wanting, and leaves it therefore in the same condition of negativism as anything else, so that it can be asserted to be the same as Saṃsāra, since both are purely negative in character, and two negations can be identified. But the doctrine can be given a positive aspect, and this is clearly seen in the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra*,² in which insight is said to grow amid the defilement of passion and sin, even as the lotus grows in the watery mire, as the seed springs up in muddy soil, not in the air. Passion is intelligence; Nirvāṇa is Saṃsāra; the two are vitally connected, and the attainment of Nirvāṇa must be in and through life, not in annihilation or abstention from its activities. Hence in Asaṅga’s *Mahāyānasaṃparigrahaśāstra* we have the character of a Buddha including superiority to attachment and defilement and yet connected with the passions of mankind, since depraved souls are to be rescued by the compassion of the Buddha. It is wrong, Vasubandhu explains, to see either the transitoriness of existence alone or the eternity of Nirvāṇa; from the standpoint of suchness the implications of both are essentially connected.

c22.s3.6

² Cf. Ç., pp. 325 f. (as courtesans); *Ratnolkadhāraṇī*, Ç., pp. 330 ff.

c22.s3.7

The advantage of this metaphysical conception of existence and release as inseparably connected is that it affords a moderately sound foundation on which to base the importance both of intuition and compassion in the process of attainment of the end. Intuition destroys egoistic thought, compassion encourages altruism; intuition destroys the attachments to self inherent in ordinary minds, compassion uproots the intellectual attachment of the Śrāvakas and solitary Buddhas which lead to seeking annihilation in Nirvāṇa; by virtue of intuition Nirvāṇa in its transcendental sense is not rejected, by virtue of compassion existence with its round is not rejected; by virtue of insight the truth of Buddhism is attained, by virtue of compassion other beings are made ripe for its attainment also. It is not difficult hence to rise to a more complete conception of Nirvāṇa as the absolute and to insist on the importance of compassion as bringing about the realization of that absolute which is the true Nirvāṇa.

4. The Pre-eminence of the Mahāyāna

c22.s4.1

It is now possible to understand the claims of pre-eminence over the Hīnayāna insisted upon for the Mahāyāna by both Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. In the *Mahāyānasamparigrahaśāstra* Asaṅga enumerates seven points in which his school surpasses the Śrāvakas.¹ The Mahāyāna is comprehensive; whatever has been taught by Buddhas, not by Śākyamuni in one life alone is accepted; nay more, as we have seen, whatever is well said is to be deemed the word of a Buddha. Secondly, the Mahāyāna aims at general salvation, not at individual release, thus excelling in love for all created-things. Thirdly, the Mahāyāna is intellectually wider in range than the Hīnayāna; the latter denies the reality of the self, the former goes so far as to deny all phenomenal reality whatever. Fourthly, the Mahāyāna inculcates spiritual energy; to seek swift release for oneself is not its aim as it is that of the Śrāvaka. Fifthly, the Mahāyāna is skilled in the manifold means (*upāya*)² to lead men to salvation; it is unwearied in their varied application. Moreover, it leads to a far higher ideal; the adept aims to become, not a mere saint, but a Buddha in his complete perfection. Lastly, when an adept becomes a Buddha, he has the infinite power of manifesting himself throughout the universe in a body of bliss.

c22.s4.2

¹ See Suzuki, MB. ch. ii.

c22.s4.3

² The *Upāyakauśalya Sūtra* is cited in Ç., pp. 66, 165, 167, 168 on committing even sin to save beings.

c22.s4.4

A different presentation of the important aspects of Mahāyānism is given in another treatise which is specially concerned with the aspect of the Mahāyāna represented by Asaṅga and his brother.

c22.s4.5

Ten points here are given. The first is the conception of the receptacle consciousness and its relation to the mind as defiled by ignorance. The second is the threefold classification of knowledge and degrees of reality. Thirdly, comes the idealistic conception of the world, underlying which is the further recognition of even this as the product of ignorance and illusion. Fourthly, the school inculcates the practice of the six perfections of generosity, not clinging to worldly goods; of non-violation of moral precepts; of not feeling dejected in the face of evils (kṣānti); of not being indolent in well doing (vīrya); of practising meditation and concentration (samādhi); and of intuition (prajñā), recognizing only the existence of an ideal world. Fifthly, the school has the scheme of ten stages of spiritual progression. Sixthly, it practises a morality which is spiritual, not merely physical or literal; the Çrāvaka follows the letter, not the spirit, and for a selfish end; the Bodhisattva will violate the letter to save the souls of others. Seventhly, the Bodhisattva aims at conformity with the essence of suchness and the body of the law.¹ Eighthly, his insight is free from non-particularism (anānārtha); he is not deceived either by Saṃsāra or Nirvāṇa, but reaches the absolute, as the abode of non-particularization. Ninthly, he realizes that Nirvāṇa which is without stay; that is, he does not end his existence, but takes part in the life of the world, without, however, even being defiled by that life. Lastly, the school has the sublime doctrine of the body of the law as well as of the other two bodies of the Buddha.

c22.s4.6

¹ A different account seems to be given in Muséon, v. (1904) 372 where Samādhi is the excellence.

5. Vedānta and Mahāyāna

c22.s5.1

The appearance of a tendency to recognize an absolute in the Mahāyānaçraddhotpāda has been naturally enough attributed, on the theory that the author of that treatise is Açvaghoṣa, to the Brahmanical training of that accomplished poet. In any case the parallel between Vedāntic absolutism and Mahāyāna tenets is striking and undeniable. In the Vijñānavāda we have definitely the conception of void intellect as the final reality, and, though the Vedāntic absolute is being, thought, and bliss, we are aware that thought here has no object and is therefore, if intelligible in any sense, nothing essentially different from the void intellect of the Vijñānavāda. The bliss of such a void intellect is too mysterious a matter to inquire into, and its existence is clearly on a par with the existence of the void intellect of the Vijñānavāda.

c22.s5.2

The similarity of result, however, does not necessarily mean borrowing on either side, for parallel developments of different initial conceptions, one of absolute reality, one of absolute nothingness, might lead to results not dissimilar, and it is, of course, true that there is a vital difference between the two doctrines. The truth of convention or appearance (*vaiyavahārika*) of Śaṅkara is certainly false from the point of view of absolute truth, but it rests on a reality, for illusion (*māyā*) is, and the magician who causes it is a Lord, while Nāgārjuna’s truth of obscurity is utterly unreal, like the horn of a hare or the son of a barren woman.¹

c22.s5.3

¹ See Poussin, JRAS, 1910, pp. 129 ff.; Jacobi, JAOS. xxxiii. 51 ff.; Sukhtankar, VOJ. xxii. 136 ff.

c22.s5.4

It is, however, of importance that the later supporters of the doctrine of duality, adherents of the Sāṃkhya as well as of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, do not hesitate to pronounce judgement against the monist Vedānta by accusing it of being nothing but Vijñānavāda Buddhism concealed; in this Puranic evidence concurs with Vijñānabhikṣu, and the earlier testimony of Yamunācārya, spiritual grandfather of Rāmānuja, so that the accusation was evidently current shortly after Śaṅkara had established the orthodoxy of the Māyāvāda.² On the other hand, it is obvious that the Buddhists themselves were aware of the approximation of the Vijñānavāda in some of its aspects to the Vedānta; we have in the *Laṅkāvatāra*³ a direct challenge of the similarity of the doctrine of the Tathāgatagarbha and the Vedānta self, though the Buddha repudiates the charge of plagiarism by insisting that his teaching is merely *ad populum*. Again in the *Ṣuklavidarçaṇabhūmi*⁴ it is shown that a famous Buddha’s utterance: ‘This threefold world is only thought’, is equivalent to the doctrine of the Upaniṣads: ‘Verily all this universe is Brahman.’ Similarly, a verse in the Pitāputriyasaṃhitā (elsewhere attributed to Vārṣagaṇya’s Ṣaṣṭitantra):¹ ‘The real nature of things does not fall within sight, and what is visible is absolutely void and illusion,’ is identical in sense with the doctrine of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.

c22.s5.5

² *Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, i. 22; *Padma Purāṇa*, Bodl. Cat. i. 14; *Siddhitraya*, p. 19; *Çribhāṣya*, ii. 27.

c22.s5.6

³ pp. 80 f.

c22.s5.7

⁴ JRAS. 1908, p. 889; *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, iii. 14.

c22.s5.8

¹ Garbe, Sāṃkhya-Philosophie, p. 76.

c22.s5.9

There is, however, clear evidence of a direct influence of Buddhist conceptions on Gauḍapāda whose Kārikās certainly are of importance in the development of the Vedānta, and who passes for the spiritual grandfather of Caṅkara.² The origin of plurality is explained by the simile of the firebrand, whose point waved in a circle produces the appearance of fiery lines without the addition of anything to the brand itself; so, too, the conclusion is, the many phenomena of the world are merely vibrations of the one consciousness, and this consciousness, we find, is without distinction of subject, object or knowledge, and thus is hardly other than the Vijñānavāda absolute. The simile is Buddhist; the Laṅkāvatāra³ and the Abhidharmakoçavyākhyā, Vijñānavāda and Sautrāntika sources, apply it to show the nothingness of things; cloth is not real because the grasping of it depends on the grasping of its parts as in the case of the firebrand circle. The whole content is also Buddhist in tone; birth and destruction are hotly denied; the cause cannot be identical with or different from the effect since neither being nor not-being nor being and not-being can exist, and so causation is impossible. In absolute truth there is no destruction or birth, no bound, no accomplishing release, no seeking release, and no release. From a magic seed is born a magic sprout and there is no permanence, just as from void things void things ever arise without abiding substance. Things come into being neither by themselves, nor by another, nor by both, nor by neither.⁴ These and numerous other phrases are conclusive of close relationship, and if Gauḍapāda¹ and his commentator—whose identity with Śaṅkara need not be assumed²—deny that the Buddha taught as finally real that knowledge without duality which has no distinction of knower, known and knowledge, the fact goes flatly in the face of all Buddhist evidence. Gauḍapāda in fact borrows without wishing to admit his debt in full. But in a sense he had, of course, the right as an Aupaniṣada in his Kārikās, whatever his earlier faith, to borrow; the Mahāyāna in its turn had doubtless drawn from the stream of Aupaniṣada tradition in its conception of the final reality of the world.

c22.s5.10

² Walleser, Der ältere Vedānta (Heidelberg, 1910), pp. 24 ff.; cf. JRAS. 1910, pp. 1361 ff. Walleser (pp. 16 ff.) gives substantial grounds for placing Gauḍapāda before Bhāvaviveka (before A. D. 600) and Ṣāntirakṣita (c. A. D. 730), and renders the alleged relationship implausible. He knows the Vijñānavāda; JAOS xxxiii. 53 f.

c22.s5.11

³ p. 95; AKV. (Paris MS.) f. 267a. Cf. Maitr. Up. vi. 24; Wassilieff, (Bouddhisme, p. 284) gives it as illustrating the illusion of simultaneity of consciousness from swiftness of motion.

c22.s5.12

⁴ ii. 32; iv. 59; 7; 22.

c22.s5.13

¹ iv. 99.

c22.s5.14

² Cf. Deussen, Sechzig Upanishads, p. 478, n. 1.

c22.s5.15

The attitude of Śaṅkara is interesting, as he expounds with much clearness the Vijñānavāda position, in opposition to the realistic doctrines of the Sarvāstivādins, whether Vaibhāṣikas or Sautrāntikas, and explains fully his own objections to the Vijñānavāda.³ The Vijñānavāda maintains the sole existence of the threefold process of knowledge, which may be analysed as apparent subject, object, and consciousness or knowledge. The existence of external things is denied on the score of impossibility; they must either be atoms or aggregates of atoms; if the former they are incomprehensible on the score of minuteness; if aggregates, they must either be different from the atoms, which is a contradiction in terms, or they must be non-different, in which case they cannot produce impressions of gross non-atomic bodies. Moreover, our cognitions constantly differ in content; this is impossible unless they take the form of the objects, and, if this is so, it is needless to assume external things. Further, we are always conscious simultaneously of the act and the object of knowledge which proves identity, since else we could at one time know the object, at another know consciousness. Again, we have the fact of dream consciousness without external things, whence we deduce that all consciousness exists without such things; the variety of our experience is explained by the presence in our consciousness of the impressions of ideas, the stream of ideas and impressions continuing unbroken for ever, and excluding any need of external reality.

c22.s5.16

³ On BS. ii. 2, 28 ff. For Nyāya criticism cf. Jacobi, JAOS. xxxi. 9 ff. ; Keith, JRAS. 1914, p. 1090 ; ILA., pp. 22 f., 99 f., 208 ff. ; NM., pp. 536 f., 548 f. ; for Mīmāṃsā, Keith, KM. pp. 46 ff. For a formal examination from a Kantian standpoint see Walleser, Der ältere Vedānta, pp. 40 ff. For Rāmānuja’s critique, see Śrībhāṣya, ii. 2. 27. Of the original sense of the Sūtra it is difficult to be certain ; cf. JAOS. xxxi. 13 ff. ; V. S. Ghate, Le Vedānta, pp. 44 f. For Sāṃkhya criticism see Aniruddha on SS. i. 42 f. ; in v. 77-9 it is shown that on either Madhyamaka or Vijñānavāda principles liberation is inconceivable ; in v. 91-3 the existence of genus is defended.

c22.s5.17

The Vedānta reply is that the analysis given is artificial; in our perception of external reality we have the consciousness and the object as two distinct and irreducible psychological elements. This is in effect admitted by the Vijñānavāda which admits that objects appear as if external (*bāhyavat*), an expression which is explicable only because those who use it at the bottom of their hearts recognize the existence of that which is external. It is useless to urge that the expression is justified, because external things are impossible: possibility must be judged on the basis of the operation of the means of correct knowledge, and not made to depend on *a priori* ratiocination. Possible is whatever is apprehended by perception or other means of cognition, and external things are essentially so apprehended, a fact which outweighs the sophistical dilemma of difference or non-difference from atoms. Examination of perception reveals that the idea is the means of knowing the external object which dictates its shape; the distinction of consciousness and external reality can be made clear, if we consider the perception and recollection of a jar, where there is change in consciousness with permanence of object, or the successive consciousness of two different objects, when consciousness remains in principle the same, but its distinctive attributes differ.

c22.s5.18

More fundamental still is the onslaught on the momentary character of ideas; this doctrine, if logically followed out, is fatal to the distinction of ideas, to the differentiation of classes and individuals, to the conception of the leaving of impressions on the mind, to the doctrine of the confusion owing to nescience of existence and non-existence, and consequently to the doctrine of bondage and release, for all these matters depend on the possibility of comparison of ideas, which is inconceivable unless there is a permanent knowing subject and not merely momentary ideas. It is idle to seek to evade this result by holding that the idea knows itself, as a lamp illuminates itself. But this is false;

c22.s5.19

nothing can act on itself, the lamp cannot manifest itself save with the concurrence of the eye; the idea must be known by the self. Nor is there any regress ad infinitum here; the self is self revealed, not the object of an idea, and is not an idea.

c22.s5.20

The argument from the nature of dreams or illusions is effectively refuted by insisting, first, that dreams and illusions are shown to be different from waking consciousness because their objects are negated by that consciousness, while waking consciousness has objects which are not negated by any other state. Secondly, dream consciousness is founded on remembrance as opposed to immediate consciousness and the distinction between the two is felt by all to be based on the absence and presence of the object respectively. To argue that waking consciousness is false, because it resembles dream consciousness, is as absurd as to argue that water is hot, because it shares attributes with fire or vice versa.¹

c22.s5.21

¹ On BS. ii. 2. 29.

c22.s5.22

The attempt to deduce the external world from mental impressions is also refuted. It involves an idle regressus ad infinitum in order to avoid the normal admission that impressions are derived from external things. Moreover, it is impossible for any impression to be left when there is no permanent substratum like a self on which the impression is to be recorded. If the receptacle intellect (ālayavijñāna) is put forward as the substratum, then the Buddhist either contradicts the doctrine of momentariness and supplies a quasi-self, or, if he maintains momentariness of this intellect also, his position is impossible; remembrance, recognition, and so on require some permanent reality. Recognition of ‘this’ as similar to ‘that’ cannot be made without the presence of a self which can remember and compare; recognition of a thing as the same attests also the permanence of the object, and is illustrated completely by the recognition of the permanence of the self on which no one is mistaken.² The Vijñānavāda, therefore, is no more tenable than the view of the realists which fails utterly to account for the existence of the aggregates making up the self, which advances a theory of causation absurd on account of the parallel theory of momentariness, and which asserts the origin of existence from non-existence, while at the same time it holds that all mental complexes are derived from the four psychical aggregates and material complexes from the atoms. The Madhyamaka doctrine fares even worse, being dismissed contemptuously on the ground that its tenet of vacuity is contradicted by every means of knowledge.¹

c22.s5.23

² On BS. ii. 2. 30, 31.

c22.s5.24

¹ On BS. ii. 2. 32. Rāmānuja (ii. 2. 30) points out that nothingness is merely a form of existence, and that its proof involves the existence of the proof, and contradicts the result.

Linked texts (16)