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Studies in the Origins of Buddhism c18: Chapter XII. Nirvāṇa

Studies in the Origins of Buddhism c18

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Chapter XII. Nirvāṇa

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Controversies regarding Nirvana, and the historical perspective.—From ancient times there has been a great diversity of interpretations concerning the nature of Nirvāṇa as taught by Buddha. Partly at least it has been due to the fact that in the light of the later developed philosophic thought the original texts appeared to be deficient in precision. The interpreter therefore concerned himself with determining the unexpressed implications of his texts, and in this he naturally took the assistance of his own philosophy about things. Since different interpreters had different philosophies, a diversity of interpretations was the inevitable consequence. Further, in accordance with their philosophic predilections, different interpreters emphasized different texts, even to the extent of composing new ones and suppressing some of the more disagreeable ones.¹ Still it must be said that some at least of these later philosophic theories do have some basis in the original or Nikāyan texts. And but for the wealth of these later ideas, indeed, the catholicity and profound suggestiveness of some of the Nikāya texts would have been partly lost. We have here a historical relation which has some parallels to that between the Upaniṣads and the later schools of Vedānta. One is inclined to say that Nāgārjuna is to “Buddhavacana” what Śaṅkara is to the Upaniṣads. The demonstration of this opinion, it is hoped, will emerge from the following pages as a whole.

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¹ Thus the greater part of the Mahāyāna sūtras, which claim to be authentic, is recognized to be "late". Even before Mahāyāna, the sects occasionally quarrelled about the authenticity of particular sūtras—See Ab. K. Vol. V. p. 251.

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The interpretations of Nirvana: (i) Ancient (a) Theravadin.—Commentarial tradition identifies the “Asaṅkhatadhātu” of the Dhs with Nirvāṇa but according to Mrs. R. Davids this represents a later development.² The Asaṅkhata-dhātu is described in the Dhs as ethically “abyākata”, “void of the working of conception or thought discursive”, infinite (appamāṇa), not a cause nor associated with one, invisible and non-impinging, without material form, supramundane, not of the intellect, not derived, not joyous, unaccompanied by joy, ease or disinterestedness, and something having no Beyond.³ It is contrasted with all Form (Sabbaṃ rūpam)⁴ and distinguished from Arahatta by “neither pertaining nor not pertaining to studentship....”⁵

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² B. P. E. p. 166—fn. 1; 367.

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³ Ib. pp. 368-369.

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⁴ Ib. p. 166—fn. 1.

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⁵ Ib. pp. 264-265.

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The word “Nibbāna”, on the other hand, occurs but once in the Dhs and that too in its closing sentences where Nibbāna is called one of the two kinds of Vimutti.⁶

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⁶ Ib. p. 259 & fn. 2. Cf. “Tattha aṭṭha samāpattiyo sayaṃ vikkhambhitakilesehi vimuttattā vimuttīti vuttā, nibbānaṃ pana sabbakilesehi accantavimuttattā vimuttīti” (Aṭṭhasālinī—p. 322 ed. Bapat & Vadekar).

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May it not be suggested that the Asaṅkhata and Nibbāna of Dhs are the same thing viewed in two ways: metaphysically or “an sich”, and as the ultimate goal of spiritual efforts?

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Kathavatthu.—In the age of Kv. (or rather, in one of the periods represented by Kv) the Theravādins rigorously insisted on the oneness of Nibbāna⁷ which was conceived as “Dhuvam sassatam avipariṇāmādhammam”⁸ anārammaṇa,⁹ cittavippayutta.¹⁰

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⁷ Points of Controversy p. 137—fn. 4. ⁸ Kv. 1.6. ⁹ Ib. 9.5. ¹⁰ Ib. 14.6. ¹¹ MP. (Nāgarī ed.) p. 265. ¹² Ib. p. 316; 264. ¹³ Ib. p. 317, 72, 306 (It is called paramam sukham, ekanta-sukham). ¹⁴ Ib. p. 263, 265. ¹⁵ Ib. p. 309-310. ¹⁶ Vm. p. 355. ¹⁷ Ib. ¹⁸ Ib. 356 cf. Dutt, Aspects pp. 170-71. ¹⁹ Sacchikātabba. ²⁰ Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho pp. 124-125 (ed. Kosambi).

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In the Milindapañho Nibbāna is considered to be something positive,¹¹ non-temporally eternal¹² and supremely beatific.¹³ It can be experienced¹⁴ though not described.¹⁵

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Buddhaghosa.—Buddhaghosa describes Nibbāna as “Santilakkhaṇam, accutirasam assāsakaraṇarasam vā, animittapaccupaṭṭhānam nippapañcapaccupaṭṭhānam vā.”¹⁶ He vigorously combats the view that Nibbāna is a non-Ens, or a mere absence or annihilation of the passions etc.¹⁷ The terms sa-upādisesa and anupādisesa are only upādāyapaññattis of Nibbāna, the essence of which is indescribable (though experienceable).¹⁸

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Anuruddhacariya.—The view of Anuruddhācariya is basically the same, though more clearly and briefly expressed. Nibbāna is, for him, eternal, transcendental, supreme, “realizable”¹⁹ and unique. It is the “ārammaṇa” of the “maggaphalas”.²⁰

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Theravāda, thus, throughout its long history, consistently held Nibbāna to be positive, experienceable, indescribable and supreme—the most worthwhile.

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The three Nirodhas: (b) Vaibhasikas.—According to the Vibhaṣā there are three kinds of Nirodhas—Pratisaṅkhyā°, a°°, anityatā°.²¹ The first two are asaṃskṛta while the third is saṃskṛta. The Jñānaprasthāna explains the first as "tout Nirodha qui est disjonction (viṣamyoga)."²² This Viṣamyoga is not produced; there is only a "prāpti" of it through pratisaṅkhyā.²³ Apratisaṅkhyā° is defined as "tout Nirodha qui n'est pas disjonction."²⁴ Anityatānirodha is "la dispersion, la brisure, la cessation, la chute, la mort, la perte des saṃskāras." By this one only wants to indicate that the activity of the Saṃskāras comes to an end. Their "svabhāva" is, however, not destroyed.

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²¹ La Vallée Poussin B. L'Ec. Fr. 1930 p. 1.

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²² Ib. p. 2.

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²³ Ab. K. Vol. I. pp. 8-9. Pratisaṅkhyā is unique as a class (Ib); La Vallée Poussin op. cit. p. 6.

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²⁴ Loc. cit. cf. Ab. K. I. p. 10: Sogen, Systems—pp. 164-165.

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Nirvana.—The first Nirodha is termed Nirvāṇa which is Asādhāraṇa in the sense that all do not acquire it simultaneously and asabhāga in the sense that it has no sabhāga-hetu. It is Kuśala and Nitya.²⁵ It is neither a Skandha, nor merely the absence of the Skandhas, but "c'est seulement relativement aux skandhas impurs (Sāsrava) qu'il obtient son existence propre."²⁶ One of the explanations offered for its being called Avaṛṇa is that it is realized by the Aryas "dans une conaissance immédiate" (Pratyakṣa).²⁷ It is Parama, Prativedha, Paṇḍitapremaṇīya, Praṇīta and Nissaraṇa; when it is "Nirupādhi" there remains nothing but Dharmatā.²⁸

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²⁵ La Vallée Poussin op. cit. pp. 8-9.

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²⁶ Ib. p. 10.

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²⁷ Ib. p. 16. Pratisaṅkhyā or Prajñā is non-discursive (Atiraṇa) and intuitive—Ab. K. I. p. 81.

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²⁸ Ib. p. 27, cf. Ab. K. I. pp. 70-71.

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Nirvana as “noumenal”.—Nirvāṇa is thus conceived as real and eternal. It is the Dharmasvabhāva which alone remains on the cessation of Dharmalakṣaṇa. Stcherbatsky aptly compares it to the Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhyas.²⁹ It is impersonal and inexplicable. “La nature des choses est profonde; certainement, elle ne peus pas être établie par le raisonnement.”³⁰ It is, in short, the non-temporal nature of the elements which we experience as active in time.³¹

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²⁹ Nirvāṇa—pp. 27-28. Some Vaibhāṣikas, however, believed in the “survival” of a pure spiritual principle—See Obermiller—I. H. Q. X. p. 235.

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³⁰ Ab. K. IV, p. 65.

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³¹ Prof. Dutt says that the interpretation of Stcherbatsky is “unsupported by the canonical as well as the non-canonical texts” (op. cit. p. 163) i.e. there are no reasons to identify the Asaṃskṛta dhātu called Nibbāna with the Dharmasvabhāva of the saṃskṛta elements. Prof. Dutt would find an analogue of Nirvāṇa in the Puruṣa of Sāṅkhya in case the innumerable Puruṣas formed one Asaṃskṛta Dhātu (Ib. p. 164).

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(c) Sautrantikas.—They believed generally in the purely negative character of ‘Nirvāṇa’;³² although they at the same time believed in the “survival of a subtle consciousness merged in the plane of complete quiescence.” But some denied this (Obermiller, op. cit. pp. 235–37; Stcherbatsky, op. cit. pp. 29–31; Dutt, op. cit. pp. 177–82).

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³² It is apparently this view that Śaṅkara criticizes in his comy. ad. BS. 2.2.24: “Avastu nityam ceti vipratiṣiddham Na hyavastuno nityatvamanyatvam vā sambhavati, vāstavāśrayatvāddharmadharmivyavahārasya.”

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(d) Vijnanavadins or the Yogacaras.—According to Yogācāra, the Bodhisattva acquires Mahāparinirvāṇa through the manifestation of Parāvṛtti. Nirvāṇa is in its nature essentially pure but like the moon covered with clouds it becomes visible only when the wind of the Way dissipates its adventitious veils. This manifestation is called the attainment of Nirvāṇa. Four kinds of Nirvāṇa are distinguished in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. (of Hiuan Tsang, tr. La Vallée Poussin, Vol. II. pp. 670 ff.).

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(1) *Anādikālika-prakṛti-śuddha-nirvāṇa*.—It is pure in itself; provided with numberless and measureless excellent qualities; free from production and destruction, like space; equal (sama) and common (sādhāraṇa) for all beings (cf. Saddharmapuṇḍarīka V. 83); neither identical nor different from the Dharmas (being Dharmatā itself); free from all ‘nimitta’ and ‘vikalpa’; beyond ‘vitarka-vicāra’; beyond words; realised within. It is the eternally quiescent (prakṛtiśānta) Tathatā.

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(2) *Sopadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa*.—It is equivalent to Tathatā freed from the veil of Kleśas (Kleśāvaraṇa-parimukta). Upadhi, however, remains, i.e., “des Dharmas de rétribution, qui sont le support d’une douleure subtile, n’ont pas encore pris fin.”

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(3) *Nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa*.—This is Tathatā freed from the suffering of Saṃsāra; not only are Kleśas exhausted but also all Upadhi which is ‘sāsravaduḥkhaphalāśraya’.

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(4) *Apratiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa*.—Which is Tathatā freed from Jñeyāvaraṇa, and hence ever-assisted by Mahākaruṇā and Mahāprajñā. By virtue of the latter, it is not fixed (pratiṣṭhita) in Saṃsāra, and Karuṇā prevents it from becoming ‘pratiṣṭhita’ in ‘nirvāṇa’. It is ‘aparāntakoṭiniṣṭha’, although ever quiescent. Of these the last three are the successive manifestations in spiritual experience of the first, which is Nirvāṇa in its eternity. (Vide Siddhi II. 679).

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Nirvāṇa is, thus, the ultimate essential reality (paramārtha, pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa). It is Nirāvaraṇa-Tathatā, Suviśuddha-Dharmadhātu (Siddhi. loc. cit.). It is a monistic spiritual principle i.e., there is no ultimate difference between Nirvāṇa and Saṃsāra. "In their imputed aspect......the causally dependent elements constitute phenomenal life......in their absolute aspect......the same elements represent Nirvāṇa. The transition from Saṃsāra to Nirvāṇa consists in the change of the main point of view."³³ Concentrating on the absolute essence the Yogin is fully absorbed in it. This process does not destroy the phenomenal elements but "only conveys....their perfect transformation (āśraya-parāvṛtti) into component elements constituting the personality of the Buddha."³⁴ This is the Dharmakāya which is equivalent to Prapañcopaśama, is eternally quiescent (ādiśānta) beyond the forms of the quadrilemma (catuṣkoṭi-vinirmukta), the unique essence of the elements (Paramātman).³⁵

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³³ Obermiller op. cit. p. 241.

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³⁴ Ib. p. 242. See Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, 98; Siddhi II. pp. 610-11; 661ff.

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³⁵ Ib. pp. 256-257 cf. Stcherbatsky—op. cit. pp. 31-34; Suzuki—Outlines,—Chap. XIII, esp. pp. 345-346 and pp. 349-352 on the important conception of Apratiṣṭhita Nirvāṇa, on which also cf. Stcherbatsky op. cit. p. 185, fn. 3 and Obermiller—op. cit. pp. 254-255, and Suzuki—Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra—pp. 127f. Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra 184-5. Cf. Buddhist Texts pp. 206-7 (ed. Conze).

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(e) Madhyamikas.—The correct interpretation of their views has been only a little less subject to controversy than that of the views of Buddha himself. The Brāhmaṇic philosophical tradition and many European scholars have represented them as utter nihilists. The consensus of Japanese scholars is, on the other hand, definitely opposed to such an interpretation, and Prof. Stcherbatsky, who has examined the question at length, supports them.³⁶ He thinks that Śūnyatā meant only the relativity of individual things and ideas. The Mādhyamikas showed the dialectical and discrepant character of all our ideas about reality only with the intention of showing that although the picture of the world as constructed by the senses and intellect is valid for practical purposes, it is not ultimately satisfactory. Thus it is that one is constrained to say that absolute or independent reality cannot belong to individual or finite objects i.e. all dharmas are svabhāvaśūnya. Of absolute reality itself it is impossible to say anything, for to speak about it will be to determine it, to make the absolute relational.³⁷

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³⁶ Op. cit. p. 35f.

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³⁷ See below....where other explanations of the “silence” are also discussed.

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Nāgārjuna in his treatment of Nirvāṇa seems to offer a consistent philosophical explanation of the traditional silence of Buddha when asked to define transcendental objects like the Tathāgata beyond death and the Attā in terms of existence, non-existence etc. Buddha kept silent because the asked for determinations were inapplicable. Thus Nirvāṇa cannot be non-existence, else it will cease to be uncaused and unconditioned.³⁸ It cannot be existence for the same reason.³⁹ It cannot be both, for both are conditioned (Saṃskṛta) while Nirvāṇa is unconditioned (a°).⁴⁰ To call Nirvāṇa “neither existence nor non-existence” will be tantamount to speaking the unspeakable.⁴¹ It is just the eternal quiescence of all phenomena (Prapañcopaśamaḥ) the utterly well (śivaḥ).⁴²

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³⁸ See e.g. M. K. XXV 8. On the supposition of an absolute non-existence (anupādāya abhāvaḥ) Candrakīrti says “Vandhyāputra iti śabdamātramevaitannāsyārtha upalabhyate” (Ib. p. 196. Cal. ed).

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³⁹ Ib. Kārikās 4-7.

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⁴⁰ Ib. Kārikā-13. Candrakīrti says “svahetupratyayasāmagrisambhūtatvāt saṃskṛtaḥ....”

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⁴¹ See Stcherbatsky--op. cit. p. 210 fn. 2; and Candrakīrti’s Comment on MK. XXV. 16.

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⁴² M. K. XXV. 24 & Candrakīrti’s comm. upon it. Cf. Śvet. Up. 4.18. Stcherbatsky says that Nāgārjuna has in effect three Nirvāṇas “The first represents the world sub specie aeternitatis. . . The second is the condition of the Mahāyānistic saint . . . The third corresponds to his disappearance in final Nirvāṇa. The first alone is ultimately real, the two others are immanent in it, they are not separately (svabhāvataḥ) real” (op. cit. p. 185 fn. 2). Cf. Suzuki—Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra—p. 129—“True Nirvāṇa is that which is realized in the oneness of Nirvāṇa and Saṃsāra, absolute or Śūnya in its nature, and above the relativity of eternalism and nihilism.”

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The Buddhist conception of Nirvana: “Santa” and “Asamskrta”.—This survey shows that hardly ever did the Buddhists regard Nirvāṇa as just the blank of annihilation. Even the Sautrāntikas generally admitted the survival of a subtle spiritual consciousness. Further, there is a complete unanimity among the schools about the Asaṃskṛtahood of Nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is eternally beyond the pale of causes and conditions. The schools, further, agree that since Nirvāṇa presents no particularizing traits, it is impossible to properly express it in speech; it can only be intuited. Finally, it is the ultimate Good, the end of all restlessness and striving. We may generalize and say that the Buddhist conception of Nirvāṇa always includes that of eternal and ineffable peace.⁴³

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⁴³ Sogen calls “Nirvāṇam śāntam” one of the three cardinal principles of all Buddhism—op. cit. p. 7, 28f; Rhys Davids compares Nirvāṇa to the advent of the kingdom of Heaven within a man, “the peace that passeth understanding”. (American Lectures—p. 164); Dutt op. cit. pp. 46-47.

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(II) Modern: Wassiljew.—Wassiljew says “Der ursprüngliche Begriff des Nirvāṇa oder desjenigen Zustandes . . . ist nichts anders als der Begriff der vollständigen Vernichtung oder des Austritts aus der Reihe der Existenzen.”[44] The cessation of Saṃsāra, however, is not the same as “complete annihilation”.

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Kern.—Kern distinguishes a cosmological and a philosophical meaning of Nirvāṇa.[45] The former is threefold, the divisions corresponding to Nirvāṇa, Parinirvāṇa and Mahāparinirvāṇa. The latter is not a specifically Buddhist concept, and in spite of the divergences between the schools, according to the orthodox opinion ‘chez les philosophes bouddhiques aussi bien que chez les autre, la délivrance, quel que soit le mot qui la désigne, se ramène à un état d’inconscience absolue.”[46]

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La Vallee Poussin.—In his “Way to Nirvāṇa” Poussin stated that Nirvāṇa could be regarded as immortality, as annihilation, or as the cessation of pain, without further qualifications.

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The first he considered impossible, the second as following logically from the doctrine of Anatta and the third as the actual attitude of Buddha. The opinion of Rhys Davids as expressed in his American Lectures seems to resemble this.[47] At another place Poussin stated “Je crois l’interprétation des Mādhyamikas conforme à l’esprit des textes palis . . . . .”[48] Finally, however, Poussin came to believe “Je suis actuellement très certain que le Nirvāṇa est une “chose en soi” un Absolu eschatologique, le refuge éternel.”[49] The idea of Nirvāṇa was derived from Yogic ecstasy. In the Saññāvedayitanirodha “l’élément ‘immortal se manifeste”, this being the foretaste of the final beatitude.⁵⁰ Yet, Poussin thought that for the European, Nirvāṇa must remain utter annihilation since “nous ne pouvons, en occident, concevoir l’existence indépendamment des choses corporelles ou mentales; car nous ne pouvons concevoir une béatitude, sukha, qui ne soit pas conscience de la béatitude, sukhasamvedana.”⁵¹ The remark is significant and deserves to be noted as the probable explanation of why many European writers have called Nirvāṇa purely “negative”.

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⁴⁴ Der Buddhismus I. p. 101.

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⁴⁵ L’histoire du Bouddhisme (French tr.) I. pp. 384-385.

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⁴⁶ Ib. pp. 385-387.

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⁴⁷ p. 164.

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⁴⁸ JA. 1902. t. XX. p. 247 fn.

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⁴⁹ L’Inde Jusqu’en 300 avant J. C. 312 fn; cf. also Opinions . . . p. 75.

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⁵⁰ Dogme—p. 46-47.

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⁵¹ Ib. p. 51.

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Stcherbatsky.—Stcherbatsky in his “Nirvāṇa” criticizes Poussin severely, but himself adopts the very unhistorical procedure of attributing to Buddha the views of the Vaibhāṣikas without further ado. He has been criticized by Prof. N. Dutt.⁵²

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⁵² See Aspects p. 154 ff.

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N. Dutt.—Prof. Dutt concludes that the conception of Nirvāṇa in the Nikāyas is threefold—ethical, psychical and metaphysical. In the first aspect it implied the destruction of evil propensities etc. and the attainment of the highest bliss. In the second aspect it is the same as the Saññāvedayitanirodha “provided that the adept complied with the other necessary conditions of Arhat-hood.” In its third aspect it appears to be something positive although infinite and indescribable like Ākāśa.⁵³

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⁵³ Op. cit. pp. 167-169.

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Keith.—Although Dr. Keith admits that a section of the early disciples probably did accept the existence of an absolute reality as the basis of their depreciation of the world,⁵⁴ he thinks that there are no reasons whatever to regard Buddha himself as anything but an agnostic in the sense of one who studied the various prevalent systems of ideas “without deriving any greater satisfaction from them than any of us to-day do from the study of modern systems.”⁵⁵ This opinion appears to be the product of prejudice coupled with a failure to appreciate the really “deep sayings of the Tathāgata”.⁵⁶

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⁵⁴ BP. p. 64.

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⁵⁵ Ib. p. 63.

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⁵⁶ The sayings are discussed below. For an eloquent refutation of Dr. Keith see Radhakrishnan I. P. I. p. 679f; Schrader JPTS—1904-5. pp. 157-158.

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Oldenberg.—Oldenberg seems to think that although logically the Nirvāṇa beyond death ought to have signified just Nothing⁵⁷ and although the official position on the subject was to refuse to answer the question,⁵⁸ there are some texts which would interpret the silence of Buddha to have been really due to the indescribable character of Nirvāṇa. Thus “Das Verlangen des nach Ewigem trachenden Herzens hat nicht Nichts, und doch hat das Denken kein Etwas, das es festzuhalten vermöchte.”⁵⁹

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⁵⁷ Buddha (9th German ed.) p. 312.

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⁵⁸ Ib. p. 315.

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⁵⁹ Ib. p. 328.

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Mrs. Rhys Davids.—Mrs. Rhys Davids suggests that the first Buddhists worded the Goal as “Attha”, not Nirvāṇa. The latter indeed is “an end without the man in it; it is negative; it prejudges the as yet inconceivable.” These are precisely the features which ought to have been avoided by a message meant, “not for the monk as such, not for the academic sophist” but for the “manyfolk (Bahu-jana).”⁶⁰ She has, however, only succeeded in showing that Attha was also one of the many earlier words for the Goal, that an exclusively “negativist” interpretation of the goal as conceived in early Buddhism does not do justice to all the evidence, and that the message of Buddha must not be interpreted entirely from the standpoint of the monk as understood in mediaeval Ceylon. These are, of course, valuable contributions.

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⁶⁰ What was the Original Gospel—I. pp. 79-84; Sakya—112-114.

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Radhakrishnan.—Prof. Radhakrishnan points out that if Buddha believed in an absolute reality not subject to the changes of this world, then Nirvāṇa is its attainment and the “Enlightened One” the permanent Self. If, however, Buddha did not believe in an absolute reality, then Nirvāṇa is nothingness and a permanent self apart from the changing aggregates an illusion.⁶¹ Like Mrs. Rhys Davids, Prof. Radhakrishnan and Schrader appeal to forcible *a priori* considerations against regarding Buddha an agnostic or a “nihilist”.⁶² How could so profound a thinker as Buddha see nothing “behind or above or beside this transitory world we conceive by our senses and supply by our fancy?”

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⁶¹ Op. cit. pp. 676-677.

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⁶² Ib. p. 679; 690-691; JPTS 1904-’5—p. 159. Prof. Radhakrishnan’s ref. to Burnet—Greek Philosophy pp. 1-2—on the place of faith in the interpretation of philosophies of an earlier age is extremely just.

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Schrader.—Prof. Schrader further argues that since the theory of Anatta applies only to the five khandhas and the three Avacaras it fails to touch the Absolute. Hence it cannot be claimed as an argument against the positive alternative of the problem of Nirvāṇa.⁶³ The usual formula of Anatta—Netam mama etc. was meant only “to reduce to cause (Pratyaya) everything in nature, and thereby to prove that our real entity must not be looked for in, but beyond the world.”⁶⁴ The Absolute has a cosmic and an acosmic aspect. The former found its classical expression in the Upaniṣadic “Tattvamasi”, the latter in “Neti Neti” and reached its climax in Buddha,⁶⁵ who for the first time saw clearly that “only ignorance can devise any relation at all between nature and the supernatural one.”⁶⁶

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⁶³ Op. cit. pp. 160-161.

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⁶⁴ Ib. p. 164.

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⁶⁵ Ib. pp. 161-162.

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⁶⁶ Ib. p. 163.

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Barua.—Prof. Barua’s views are considered below but he clearly repudiates the “negativist” version of Nirvāṇa.⁶⁷

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⁶⁷ The Mahābodhi—1944—March-April. p. 61f.

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Conclusion.—It appears thus that the weight of recent scholarly opinion also is against regarding Buddha an agnostic or a “nihilist”.

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The problem of Nirvana.—With respect to Nirvāṇa the following questions must be answered if its nature is to be understood:—(a) How is Nirvāṇa realised? This involves the analysis of Sambodhi and its content. (b) How is Nirvāṇa related to being and experience? Can it be adequately described as non-being or non-experience? If it is an infinite principle, what is its relation to finite life and existence? This involves an analysis of the relation of Nirvāṇa to Dharma and Pratītyasamutpāda. (c) Who realises Nirvāṇa? Or, is such a question impermissible? This involves an analysis of the vexed question of Attā and of Buddha’s “silence”.

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Sopadhi and Nirupadhi.—From the standpoint of the Nikāyas the distinction between Sopadhisesa Nibbāna and Nirupadhi° does not appear to be very early. At one stage of its history upadhi had no reference to the khandhas.⁶⁸ Even while living one could be Nirupadhi°,⁶⁹ and there could be no Nibbāna unless one “abandoned” the upadhis.⁷⁰ After the realization of Nibbāna the Worthy could undergo only an external transformation. For him, death was quite inconsequential.⁷¹

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⁶⁸ MN I. 262 contrasts upadhī with Nibbāna equating the former to wife and children, slaves....wealth (cf. Ib. p. 106); SN. I. 6, 107-8; Sn Dhaniyasutta—verses 16-17.

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⁶⁹ This seems to be implicit in the Dhaniya sutta where home life is contrasted to homelessness, not a state to be attained after death. Cf. Itv. sutta 44 where the prose might really contain a different view than the verse. In AN. IV. 75 Bhikkhuṇīs, indicated as these (Etā) are called some Vimuttā and some anupādisesā suvimuttā; obviously these latter also were living.

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⁷⁰ SN. I. 117, 118, 136, 124, 134, II. 107, 108-9, III. 132. Ib. V. 226; MN. I. 136f, 167, 436, 453, III. 245.

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⁷¹ Cf. Candrakirti on MK. XXV 1f. One can argue that if the destruction of upadhi in the sense of the Khandhas were essential to it, Nirvāṇa would cease to remain uncaused. If the said destruction were essential only to the knowledge of Nirvāṇa, it would follow that even in the moment of perfect Awakening Buddha did not know Nirvāṇa properly. As a matter of fact the Arahant is described in a recurrent formula as “anuppattasadattho”. After Enlightenment, death must be regarded as really irrelevant from the standpoint of spiritual progress. As conceived in later scholasticism the distinction between Sopadhisesa and Nirupadhisesa is relevant neither to the nature nor “realization” of Nirvāṇa. It is relevant only to the biography of particular Arhants.

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Buddha and Arahant.—It is improbable that there was originally any distinction between the Buddha and the Arahant.⁷² Having become enlightened Gotama preached to others the way to attain to the same status as he himself had done and become a Buddha, an Arahant. Later on a distinction came to be effected between Arahatta and Buddhahood, the latter being considered unnecessary to the attainment of Nirvāṇa. The Mahāyānists appear to have rightly protested against this view.⁷³ Only the Buddha can be said to realize Nirvāṇa, and Buddhahood is potentially open to all. At any rate, since we are only concerned with Buddha’s conception of Nirvāṇa, let us not judge it wholly with reference to the experience of those Hīnayānist Arahants who themselves admitted that they had not become Buddhas.⁷⁴

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⁷² Dialogues II intr. to the Pāṭika sutta.

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⁷³ A similar feeling would appear to underlie Mrs. Rhys Davids' distrust of the “narrow-minded monk-aftermen” as adequate guides to Buddha's thought.

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⁷⁴ Cf Dutt. op. cit. p. 135, 198-210. In spite of their lateness, the Mahāyānist interpretations would appear to be in some cases nearer Buddha than the corresponding Hīnayānist ones. Cf. "Religious faith often seems able to break through the barriers of space and time, and so to apprehend its object directly". (Burnet-Greek Philosophy—1943—p. 1).

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Sammāsambodhi and Nibbāna should, in short, be considered to be essentially associated.⁷⁵

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⁷⁵ Cf. "Religion means both experience and its expression in thought and action....It is essential to correlate the expression with the experience to which it testifies." J. Wach in Twentieth Century Sociology—p. 425. (ed. G. Gurvitch & W. E. Moore).

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Bodhi.—In the Bhayabherava sutta, the Saṅgārava sutta and the Mahāsaccaka sutta of the MN, we are told that during his Enlightenment Buddha, having reached the fourth Jhāna, attained the three Vijjās in the three successive watches of the night. In the Tevijjavacchagottasutta of the MN, Buddha denies the possession of omniscience in any sense other than that of possessing the three Vijjās.⁷⁶ The Sāmaññaphala sutta of the DN implies that the attainment of the three Vijjās is the final fruit of Śramaṇaship, and a large number of suttas in the DN, as well as the MN echo the opinion. In the SN⁷⁷ Susīma, a recent convert, hearing that some monks had declared their attainment of Aññā,⁷⁸ questions them, among other things, about the three Vijjās.

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⁷⁶ II. 121. f.

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⁷⁷ At another place, however, he denies only simultaneous omniscience (sakideva sabbaṃ ñassati—MN. II. 127). The view refuted here was the one that was later held by the Mahāsāṅghikas and the Vātsīputrīyas—see Ab. K. V. pp. 254-5. The Jainas also held a similar view, but their very claim to omniscience, let alone simultaneous omniscience, was ridiculed .(see

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⁷⁸ Aññā.—Aññā appears to be on the whole, the knowledge that leads on to the Highest. The Sambuddhas are Sammadaññas (SN. I. 4); through Sammadaññā the Ariyas enter Parinibbāna (SN. IV. 128). Aññā follows khayañāṇa, but precedes Aññāvimuttassa (vimutti-) ñāṇa (Itv. Sutta 62. cf. SN. V. 204, DN. III. 219). Emancipation—through Aññā (Aññāvimokkha) destroys Ignorance (Avijjā)—AN. I. 134. See also SN. I.. 24; SN. V. 129; AN. III. 82, 143, V. 108 (where “diṭṭheva dhamme aññā” is contrasted with “upādisesa anāgāmitā”); SN. II. 267, AN. III. 437 cf. Mrs. Rhys Davids. “The Birth of Indian Psych.” p. 264.

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The Vijjās.—We may conclude that there existed a tradition which identified Sambodhi as well as the last stages of the march to Arhatship with the attainment of the three Vijjās.⁷⁹ The story of Susīma further shows how many non-Buddhist Paribbājakas unacquainted with what were probably more recent developments⁸⁰ still continued to entertain this opinion about the Buddhist belief on the subject.

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⁷⁹ Lalitavistara also describes the Sambodhi as attained through the Four Dhyānas followed by the Three Vidyās (I. pp. 343-50). The three Vidyās are described as “Sattvānāpaśyati sma cyavamānānupapadyamānān....”, Pūrvanivāsānusmṛti-jñānadarśana and Āśraya (sic.)—kṣayajñānadarśana. The last is attained through the knowledge of Pratītyasam°. The description of Āśravakṣaya is much “expanded” (cf. N. Dutt. E. M. B. I. p. 97).

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⁸⁰ On the distinction between the Paññāvimutta and the Ubhatobhāga° cf. Dutt. op. cit. pp. 250-251. 279.

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Vimutti.—The culmination of the three Vijjās⁸¹ is reached in the self-conscious freedom of the Citta resting in the satisfaction of having attained the end. The recurrent formula thus states “Cittaṃ vimuccati, vimut-

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⁸¹ For an exceedingly able, though brief and general, description of the Vijjās see Barua—op. cit. pp. 64-65.

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MN. I. Sandaka Sutta). The Sarvāstivādins thought Buddha omniscient in the sense that he could know immediately whatever he wanted to (Ab. K. l. c.).

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tasmiṃ vimuttaṃ ti ñāṇaṃ hoti, khīṇā jāti vusitaṃ Brahmacariyaṃ Kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ nāparaṃ itthattāyāti pajānāti.”⁸² This freedom is called Cetovimutti and Paññāvimutti.⁸³ It is the emancipation of the cita from the Āsavas and through Paññā.⁸⁴

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⁸² Cf. MN. Sutta 76 where it is stated “Tassa carato ceva tiṭṭhato ca suttassa ca jāgarassa ca satataṃ samitaṃ ñāṇadassanam paccupaṭṭhitaṃ hoti-khīṇā me āsavāti”. The knowledge of freedom is a constant possession.

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⁸³ Cf. the expression Vijjāvimutti—SN. V. 28, 73, 329, 333-5, 340.

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⁸⁴ MN. Sutta 71, sutta 6; cf. Ab. K. 6, 76; AN. II. 214; Pali Dictionary (P.T.S.); cf.—Vyāsabhāṣya ad. Y. S. II. 27. The fourfold Vimukti has contents corresponding to those of the fourfold insight into Dukkha and Āsava referred to in the Buddhist formula for Āsavakhaya. According to MN. Sutta 80 “Evaṃ kira sammābandhanā vippamokkho hoti yadidaṃ avijjābandhanā”.

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Sambodhi and intuitive knowledge.—In the context of Sambodhi sometimes Ñāṇa,⁸⁵ Vijjā and Paññā have the same meaning. Thus we are told “Pubbe ananusutesu dhammesu cakkhumudapādi ñāṇamudapādi paññā udapādi vijjā udapādi āloko udapādi.”⁸⁶ The talk here is of knowledge in its intuitive level.⁸⁷ It is repeatedly stated how the following are to be directly realized (sacchikātabbo)—sāmaññattho brahmaññattho,⁸⁸ brahmacariyapariyosānaṃ,⁸⁹ paramassāso,⁹⁰ tisso vijjā,⁹¹ alamariyañāṇadassanaviseso,⁹² saccāni,⁹³ arahattaphalaṃ,⁹⁴ vijjāvimuttiphalaṃ,⁹⁵ cetovimutti, paññā,⁹⁶ anuttarā vimutti,⁹⁷ amataṃ,⁹⁸ Nibbāna.⁹⁹ This is in line with the distrust of discursive rational knowledge which is often expressed in the older texts.¹⁰⁰

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⁸⁵ MN. Sutta 102. speaks of “Paccattaṃ yeva ñāṇaṃ parisuddham pariyodātaṃ” (II. 234). The expression ñāṇabhūto (MN. I. 111, III. 195, 224) suggests an experience where thought and being meet. As in the early Jinist so in the early Buddhist works also Ñāṇa often occurs in conjunction with Dassana. In the Sn., esp. in the Aṭṭhakavagga, it is important to note, Ñāṇa is apparently often taken in the sense of discursive knowledge and deprecated. The Mādhyamikas, on the other hand, gave this meaning to Viññāṇa, reserving for Ñāṇa the meaning of transcendental knowledge. (cf. Stcherbatsky—Nirvāṇa p. 202 fn. 3).

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⁸⁶ SN. II. 105, DN. II. 33 etc.

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⁸⁷ Cf. Barua—op. cit. 65-66 where the reference to W. James is apposite.

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⁸⁸ SN. II. 15, 44, 129, III. 50, 192, V. 195, 433.

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⁸⁹ Ib. II. 278.85.

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⁹⁰ Ib. IV. 254-'5.

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⁹¹ Ib. IV. 63.

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⁹² Ib. IV. 337-'9; cf. MN. II. 203.

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⁹³ Ib. V. 10-11, 49, 141, 167, 185, 206, 422 ff.

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⁹⁴ Ib. IV. 252, V. 202.

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⁹⁵ Ib. V. 93, 95, 126; Cf. MN. III. 290.

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⁹⁶ Ib. II. 214, V. 203, 257, 266, 356.

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⁹⁷ Ib. I. 105.

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⁹⁸ Ib. V. 181-'2.

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⁹⁹ Ib. 251-'2.

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¹⁰⁰ Thus Sn. Āmagandhasutta, verse 12, Ib. Sabhiyasutta v. 29, the four “aṭṭhaka” suttas, Māgandiya sutta, Cūḷaviyūha sutta. Cf. Itv. p. 25 (Nāg. ed. Sarnath) where the expression “Phuṭṭhuṃ sambodhimuttamaṃ” is suggestive.

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Panna.—Paññā is described as noble—Ariyā.¹⁰¹ It is the “eye” that is superior to the eye of flesh or of the Gods.¹⁰² Ordinarily in a turbid state, it is the intuitive faculty which must be cultivated.¹⁰³ Guiding man in his spiritual journey,¹⁰⁴ it finally enables him to see directly into reality (Yathābhūtaṃ),¹⁰⁵ abandon the Āsavas¹⁰⁶ and attain to Aññā¹⁰⁷ and Bodhi.¹⁰⁸

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¹⁰¹ MN. III. 245; Ib. I. 144, II. 260 (where it is said to have “Satthamti Adhivacanaṃ”) MN. III. 29, 245; Ib. I. 81.

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¹⁰² Itv. Suttas 61, 62, cf. M. I. 293.

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¹⁰³ MN. II. 12, III. 72; I. 293, II. 180; AN. II. 187, 189.

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¹⁰⁴ “Saddhā dutiyā purisassa hoti paññā cenam pasāsati” SN. I. 38. This reminds one of the function of “Buddhi” in the Kaṭhopaniṣad (see the paper on “The status and role of Buddhi in Kaṭhopaniṣad and Bhagavadgītā” by Mr. Jaidev Singh read at the Ind. Phil. Cong. held at Madras in Dec. 1940) (In the Chāgaleyopaniṣad the Prājña Ātman is given the function of the charioteer which is here conceived differently. See Four Unpublished Upaniṣads by S. K. Belvalkar pp. 11-12. In SN. V. 6 Paññā is along with Saddhā yoked to the Dhammayāna).

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¹⁰⁵ Paññāya abhisamayo—SN. II. 5-9, 104; Paññāya suphussitam. Ib. I. 128, °suppaṭividdho Ib. II. 68, III. 6, °ativijjhati—Ib. V. 226-’7, 278, 378-’9; Nibbedhikā (Paññā) Ib. V. 392, 395, 402 cf. AN. II. 178 Mrs. Rhys Davids treatment of Paññā (The Birth of Indian Psychology etc. pp. 265-’70) is able, although her interpretation of "Yathābhūtaṃ" does not carry conviction. On Paññā and "Yathābhūtaṃ" see, e.g. SN. III. 45: "Evaṃ etaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya daṭṭhabbam" cf. "Tato'sya Prajñā Yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti" (Vyāsa on YS. II. 45); on Abhisamaya see Ledi Sadaw quoted in Points of Controversy p. 382. Cf. Vyāsa ad Y. S. I. 49 where also Prajñā is called "Viśeṣārthā".

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¹⁰⁶ MN. I. 479, III. 28; SN. III. 45 "Evaṃ etaṃ sammapaññāya passato cittaṃ virajjati vimuccati anupādāya āsavehi".

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¹⁰⁷ SN. V. 223.

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¹⁰⁸ Bodhi.—Ib. V. 231, 237. According to the Vibhāṣā, Bodhi appears to be "la science necessaire au Nirvāṇa et la certitude du Nirvāṇa—mais lui (Buddha) manque l'omniscience, la pitié" etc. La Vallée Poussin—Dogme—p. 169). According to Ab. K. Bodhi is the knowledge (Jñāna) of Āsravakṣaya and Anutpāda. (Ab. K. 6.67). Anutpādajñāna, it may be remembered, has a different meaning in Mahāyāna (see Suzuki—Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra—pp. 122-7). According to the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra (chap. IX) Bodhi is omniscience (Sarvākārajñatā) and "Suchness" (Tathatā). According to Buddhaghosa "Bodhi vuccatī catusu maggesu ñāṇaṃ" Vimutti is apparently its result. (Samantapāsādikā V. pp. 952-4. P. T. S. ed). Cf. MN. sutta 44 where Vimutti is called the Paṭibhāga of Vijjā.

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Paticcasam° and Sambodhi.—The week following Enlightenment (Abhisambodhi) is said to have been spent by Buddha in experiencing the bliss of emancipation (Vimuttisukhapaṭisaṃvedi).¹⁰⁹ After this he reflected over Paticcasam° in three ways during the three watches of the night. This is curious. Were there two different traditions such that according to one the night of Enlightenment was spent in learning the three Vijjās while according to the other it was spent in learning Paticcasam°? Or was the sequence of events thus: the night of Enlightenment (Abhisambodhi) when the 3 Vijjās were learnt; a week of experiencing the bliss of emancipation (vimutti) resulting from Enlightenment; a night over Paṭiccasam°? But this would imply that the knowledge of Paṭiccasam° was not necessary to Abhisambodhi. This is contradicted by SN. II. 105 and is against the general presumption.¹¹⁰ The destruction of avijjā—one of the three cardinal āsavas—or Paññāvimutti is hardly conceivable apart from the knowledge of Paṭiccasam°. It would thus seem advisable to suppose that the texts from Mvg. and Ud. just referred to have in mind only a reflective revision of the principle of Paṭiccasam°. The words “Sādhukaṃ manasākāsi” also suggest that we have here not a novel intuition but the retrospective conceptualization of a previous intuitive experience.¹¹¹ For the first direct experience of Paṭiccasam° the expression has a quite different tone “yoniso manasikārā ahu paññāya abhisamayo.”¹¹² The knowledge that resulted is likened to the dawn of light.¹¹³

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¹⁰⁹ Mvg. (Vin. I. pp. 1-2), Ud. the first three suttas; cf. Rockhill, Op. cit. p. 33; Lalita Vistara I. 369.

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¹¹⁰ In Lalita Vistara the knowledge of Pratītyasam° definitely and explicitly precedes Āsravakṣayajñānadarśana (loc. cit).

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¹¹¹ Retrospection (Paccavekkhaṇa) over jhānic experience was an essential part of Jhānic practice—see Vm. p. 93.

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¹¹² SN. loc. cit.; DN. II. p. 35.

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¹¹³ Ib.

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Sambodhi.—In successive watches of the night of Sambodhi, Buddha realized Pubbenivāsañāṇa, Dibbacakkhu, Paṭiccasam°, and, finally, at dawn, Omniscience (LV, l.c; Nidāna Kathā). He then surveyed¹¹⁴ suffering humanity (sokāvatiṇṇaṃ janataṃ) with great compassion¹¹⁵ (Kāruññataṃ Paṭicca Buddhacakkhunā¹¹⁶ . . . volokesi). Knowledge, freedom, bliss and compassion—these, then are the aspects of Buddha’s supreme experience (Sammā Sambodhi). The knowledge (Paññā) is intuitive and synoptic, involving an insight into phenomenal contingency (Paṭiccasamuppāda).¹¹⁷ As a result

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¹¹⁴ “Sele yathā pabbatamuddhaniṭṭhito yathā pi passe janataṃ samantato Tathūpamaṃ dhammamayaṃ sumedha pāsādamāruyha samantacakkhu Sokāvatiṇṇaṃ janataṃ apetasoko avekkhassu jātijarābhibhūtaṃ (MN. Ariyapariyesana sutta. Bodhirājakumāra°; DN. Mahāpadāna°; SN. I. p. 136ff; Mvg. (Vin); Itv. sutta 38). The balladic form of the group of verses among which these lines occur may be noted cf. “Paññāpāsādamāruyha asoko sokiniṃ pajaṃ Pabbataṭṭho va bhūmmaṭṭho dhīro bāle avekkhati”. (Dhp. verse 28).

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¹¹⁵ Through developing his as yet imperfect knowledge and compassion the Bodhisattva in time attains to the supreme knowledge and compassion of Buddha. Thus both Prajñā and Karuṇā have a twofold aspect. In the Hinayāna the emphasis is mainly put on these as means or faculties. But it is clear that the Mahāyāna doctrine is present in a germinal form even in the oldest texts.

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¹¹⁶ “Buddhacakkhunāti indriyaparopariyattiñāṇena ca āsayānusayañāṇena ca. Imesaṃ hi dvinnam ñāṇānaṃ Buddhacakkhūti nāmam . . .” (Samantapāsādikā loc. cit. below).

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¹¹⁷ Panna and Dhammapatubhava.—On the verse just quoted Buddhaghosa comments thus “sumedha sundarapañña sabbaññutañāṇena samantakkhu bhagavā dhammamayaṃ paññāmayaṃ pāsādaṃ . . .” (Samantapāsādikā loc. cit.) with this may be compared the verse quoted in Vyāsa-bhāṣya ad. Y. S. II. 47 “Prajñāprāsādamāruhya aśocyaḥ śocato janān Bhūmiṣṭhāniva śailasthaḥ sarvān prājñonupaśyati”. The verse is practically identical with Dhp. (loc. cit.), and is attributed in the Tattvavaiśāradī and the Vārtika to “Paramarṣi”. The gāthā, as it has been called, is doubtless very old. With reference to this “Prajñā” Vyāsa says “Bhūtārthaviṣayaḥ kramānanurodhī sphuṭaprajñālokaḥ”. This reminds one of the common enough phrase in the context of “Saccābhisamaya”—Yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti & of “Paññā udapādi....āloko udapādi....”. The comparison with light indicates the intuitive or immediate character of Prajñā just as the term “Kramānanurodhī”, the comparison with vision from the mountain top, and the expression “samantakkhu” point out its synoptic and simultaneous character [Cf. “Sarvaṃ tadekacittekṣaṇasamāyuktayā prajñayānuttaraṃ samyaksambodhimbhisambudhya traividyādhigatā” (Lalita Vistara I. p. 350. N. Dutt has “Ekacittakṣaṇa” E.M.B. I. p. 98) ]. Consciousness is here non-temporal and all-embracing. Cf. Vm. pp. 490-491 (Nāg. ed.); Oldenberg—Buddha p. 132, fn. where the “Weltganzen überschauenden Intuition” of Buddha is compared to what W. James calls “Cosmic consciousness”.

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In this experience are revealed all phenomena in their contingency—“Yadā have pātubhavanti dhammā ātāpino jhāyato there is an emancipation (Vimutti) from ill (dukkha) and its sources (āsavas). This freedom is beatific (sukha), though its bliss is not inconsonant with compassion towards the still suffering.

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Nirvana and experience.—As to the relation of Nirvāṇa to experience one may now conclude thus: there is a certain supreme noetic and beatific experience which alone makes the attainment of Nirvāṇa possible. On the basis of the ancient texts further precision is impossible. Later schools offer varying interpretations. At one pole the Theravādins regard Nirvāṇa as only the object of experience, while, at the other, the Yogācāras would annul the distinction between the two. The question would have been soluble for the ancient texts only if they had indicated their epistemological position clearly.

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The problem of Dhamma and its significance.—Now in Sambodhi Buddha is said to have ‘obtained’ Dhamma profound, quiescent and beyond intellect.¹¹⁸ Paṭicca-sam°, and Nibbāna are the two sides or aspects of this Dhamma. The meaning we put on Dhamma will con-

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¹¹⁸ “Adhigato kho me ayaṃ dhammo gambhīro duddaso duranubodha santo paṇīto atakkāvacaro nipuṇo paṇḍitavedanīyo . . . ”; “Kicchena me adhigataṃ halaṃ dāni pakāsituṃ, rāgadosaparetehi nāyaṃ dhammo susambuddho” (DN. Mahāpadāna sutta; MN. suttas 26 and 85; S. I. Brahmasaṃ° sutta 1. Mvg. loc. cit.; cf. M. I. 487). With the second quotation, cf. Lal. Vist. I. p. 397; with the first cf. Ib. p. 392, 395-6.

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brāhmaṇassa yato pajānāti sahetudhammam (Ud. s. 1; Vin I. 2). Buddhaghosa says “Athavā pātubhavantīti pakāsenti abhisamayavasena byattā pākaṭā honti dhammāti caturāriyasaccadhammā . . . ” (Samantapāsādikā V. pp. 952-954). “Dhammapātubhāva” is at least a major aspect of the final Paññā cf. S. IV. p. 79. “Samāhite citte dhammā pātubhavanti” i.e., truths are revealed. Cf. W. James “They are states of insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect” (Varieties of Rel. p. 380 cf. Barua op. cit. pp. 65-66).

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dition, not necessarily determine, our attitude to the problem of the relation of Nibbāna to experience,—whether Nibbāna is a sentient or an insentient, a personal or an impersonal, a concretely existing or a merely abstractly “subsistent” principle.

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Interpretations of Dhamma—Rosenberg.—According to Prof. Rosenberg the concept of Dharma is to Buddhist philosophy what that of “idea” is to the philosophy of Plato.¹¹⁹ It is found to be used in the following senses in Buddhist literature. “Eigenschaft, Attribut, Prädikat. 2. Substantieller Träger, transzendentes Substrat des einzelnen Elementes bewuszten Lebens. 3. Element, d.h. Bestandteil des bewuszten Lebens. 4. Nirvāna, d.h. <<dharma>> par excellence, das Object der Lehre Buddhas. 5. Das Absolute; das wahrhaft Reale u.s.w. 6. Die Lehre, die Religion Buddhas. 7. Sache, Gegenstand, Object, Erscheinung.”¹²⁰ Of these the second meaning—“transzendenter Träger”—is the most important and usual.¹²¹ Underlying the apparently stable entities of experience are sequences of momentary elements. These are irreducibly simple though mutually conditioned.¹²² Even these are, however, only the phenomenal appearances of noumenal substrata; they are dharmalakṣaṇas as distinguished from the dharmas. The relation envisaged here is different from that between substance and quality, since in a substance a number of qualities inhere whereas each dharma bears only its specific mark. So far, we are told, the Buddhist schools agree but they differ when it comes to defining the nature of the transcendental dharma or dharmas. The Vaibhāṣikas hold them to be many and ever-present. The Sautrāntikas make them immanent in the phenomena. The Śūnyavādins insist on impredicability while the Vijñānavādins posit behind every world of individual experience a single Ālayavijñāna.¹²³

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¹¹⁹ Die Probleme der buddhistischen Philosophie—p. XIII.

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¹²⁰ Ib. p. 83. See the Pali Dictionary on the meanings given by Buddhaghosa.

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¹²¹ Ib.

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¹²² They are “Prthak” though “Sapratyaya”—see Glasenapp ZDMG. 1938 pp. 392-393.

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¹²³ Ib. Chapters V, VI & XVIII esp. pp. 72; 101: "dharma heiszen die wahrhaft-realen, transzendenten, unerkennbaren Träger oder Substrate derjenigen Elemente, in welche der Bewusztseinsstrom mit seinem Inhalt zerlegt wird". This definition clearly implies the principles of Vijñaptimātratā and the three Lakṣaṇas; pp. 231-235.

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Phenomenal unrest has no absolute first beginning, yet is itself merely an appearance due to Ignorance, although subject to the force of karman and "causal" relationships. Underlying it is dharma in its timeless nature or the Absolute (if the Dharmas be many, the Absolute becomes a sort of system)¹²⁴—the eternal rest that is Nirvāṇa. "Dann hört die gegebene Persönlichkeit auf, empirisch zu sein, dann wird schon kein dharma mehr geboren. Ein Teil des Lebensmeeres hört auf zu tosen und versenkt sich in ewige Ruhe, ins wahre Sein, auf welches man die Ausdrücke des empirischen Seins nicht anwenden kann, aber welches dessenungeachtet für den kontemplativen Mystiker die höchste Glückseligkeit bedeutet."¹²⁵

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¹²⁴ Cf. Ib. p. 239.

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¹²⁵ Ib. pp. 241-242.

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The whole theory may be thus summarized: Nirvāṇa is the eternally restful state of reality as distinguished from appearance. It depends on attributing to Dharma the basic meaning of "non-empirical ground of temporal appearances." The data consist of the Abhidharma literature of Sarvāstivāda and Vijñānavāda.

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In essentials Prof. Stcherbatsky agrees with this view.¹²⁶

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¹²⁶ See his Central Conception of Buddhism.

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Whatever might be its validity with respect to the Abhidharma stage of Buddhism, it clearly remains a merely interpretative hypothesis as far as the earlier Nikāya period is concerned. In fact, the ‘Dharma-theory’ in this sense seems to have been a product of the growing vogue of metapsychological analysis in the Post-Nikāya period.∗

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∗ See below.

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Keith and Schayer.—Dr. Keith espouses Prof. Schayer’s view that in “pre-canonical” Buddhism the elements of Rūpa alone were considered impermanent.¹²⁷ In contrast to Rūpadhātu, Dharmadhātu represented the eternal supersensuous reality which formed the object of the Dharmacakṣus of the Omniscient Buddha alone.¹²⁸ Salvation is conceived as the passage from the perishable Rūpadhātu to the imperishable Arūpadhātu (of eternal Dharma).¹²⁹

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¹²⁷ I. H. Q. Vol. XII—1936.

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¹²⁸ Cf. the views of the Prājñika Svābhāvikas referred to in Schrader—Über den Stand der indischen Philosophie etc. pp. 31-32.

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¹²⁹ See Mlle Marcelle Lalou in IHQ. 1949.

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Here again, as in the previous view, Dharma tends to approach in meaning the Mahāyānic dharmadhātu. In fact, Schayer considers Mahāyāna directly connected with Primitive Buddhism. Such a supposition needs more extensive substantiation. It is true, however, that the expression “dhammacakkhu” seems to mean in the Nikāyas supernormal insight of a religiously saving charucter.¹³⁰

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¹³⁰ DN. I. 86, 110; SN. IV. 47; AN. IV. 186 etc. See Pali Dictionary (PTS). In AN. I. 242 the attainment of Dhamma-cakkhu is compared to the breaking forth of the autumnal sun.

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Geiger.—Geiger assimilates Dhamma to Upaniṣadic Brahman.¹³¹ The arguments may be thus summarized: a verse¹³² speaks of Brahmapatha, which is probably equivalent to Amatapatha; this taken with the recurrent expression “Brahmabhūtena Attanā” implies that Nirvāṇa must be similar to merging in Brahman.¹³³ Dhamma and Brahman are apparently interchangeable in a number of expressions. These are: Dhaṇmacakka-Brahma°, Dhammayāna-Brahma°, Dhammajāla-Brahma°, Dhammakāya-Brahma°, Dhammabhūta-Brahma°, Dhammaja-Brahmaja, Dhammanimmita-Brahma°, Dhammadāyāda-Brahma.¹³⁴ It is concluded that Dhamma stepped in the place of Brahman and necessarily turned into the highest “übersinnlichen Begriff”, the “rein geistigen kosmischen und sittlichen Potenz”, the highest impersonal Being.¹³⁵ It is clear that in certain

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¹³¹ Dhamma und Brahman.

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¹³² Thag. 689, AN. III. p. 346.

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¹³³ Op. cit. p. 5.

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¹³⁴ Ib. pp. 6-8.

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¹³⁵ Brahman.—Ib. There is no definite evidence to suppose that the Nikāyas show acquaintance with the monistic conception of Brahman. The expression “Brahmabhūto” sometimes used for Buddha (DN. III. 84; AN. V. 226; SN. IV. 94,, AN. II. 206, V. 256; MN. III. 224) is, however, suggestive. The meaning of Brahma in Brahmapatti (SN. I. 169, 181; IV. 118) and Brahmayāna (SN. V. 4-6) is also not perfectly clear.

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The Upaniṣadic word “Brahmaloka” occurs many times (e.g. DN. II. 241, SN. 141, 155, V. 265, 282) but is supposed to mean something lower than Nirvāṇa (This is very clear in SN. V. 410. Cf. DN. pt. II. pp. 186-7. Nāg. ed.). The Brāhmaṇas are declared to be “Brahmalokādhimutta” (MN. p. 402—Nāg. ed.).

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Brahmā is described as the highest of gods, but not the Highest (AN. III. 202, IV. 105). The way to “Brahmasahavyatā” is stated to have been preached by teachers of old like Sunetta, Mūgapakkha, Aranemi, Kuddāla, Hatthipāla, Jotipāla, and Araka. Buddha himself taught it in the shape of the “Four Brahmavihāras” (DN. I. Tevijjasutta).

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Between the ideas associated with Brahman in the Upaniṣads and the Nikāyas the differences are of a character as to sugcontexts the Nikāyic use of Dhamma is parallel to the Upaniṣadic use of Brahman, both the words referring to the Highest Reality. But this generic similarity of literal usage does not entitle us to conclude that the Upaniṣadic conception of the ‘highest reality’ agreed with its Nikāyic conception. The use of the same word in the same dictionary-meaning does not imply the identity of technical signification.

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