俱舍論疏 17

English (machine translation) 17

Language: English

17.3

On the Śāstra's stating: "Having thus differentiated [...] are called karmapathas", from here down is half a verse, which is the second major section, explaining the name "karmapatha".

"The Śāstra says [...] because they act": this explains the latter three karmapathas of covetousness, ill will, and wrong view. Covetousness and the others are in essence not karma, but they are associated with volition (cetanā); volition is of the nature of karma, and it operates based on covetousness and the others, proceeds based on covetousness and the others, and acts based on the force of covetousness, just as a person relies on a path. Thus, although covetousness and the others are in essence not karma, they are karmapathas.

17.5

On the Śāstra's stating: "The first seven are karma [...] the name karmapatha is established", this explains the first seven karmapathas. Because the first seven karmapathas are of the nature of karma, they are called karma; and because karmic volition operates by taking them as its objective support, they are called karmapathas. These seven are karma and are the path of karma, so the name karmapatha is established for them.

17.6

On the Śāstra's stating: "Therefore herein [...] because both are thoroughly established", this explains that the name karmapatha here applies to both categories. The first seven possess both—namely, they are both karma and karmapathas; the latter three possess only one—namely, they are karmapathas alone. Although they are not of the same category, a single name, karmapatha, applies to both places due to common usage, and so both categories together receive the name karmapatha. As for "like worldly scriptures", the Nyāyānusāra states: "Worldly chronicles (lokāyata). In worldly chronicles as well, they are not of the same category, yet one serves to share a common designation with the other; just as in heaven and on earth, distinct categories share the same name 'form' and so forth."

17.7

On the Śāstra's stating: "The seven abstentions from killing and so forth [...] should be explained by analogy with this", this explains the wholesome karmapathas by analogy with the unwholesome karmapathas.

17.8

On the Śāstra's stating: "For what reason are their preliminary and subsequent stages not karmapathas?", this is a question. The preliminary and subsequent stages ought to be called karmapathas, because volition also operates by taking them as its objective support.

17.9

On the Śāstra's stating: "Because it is for the sake of this, relies on this [...] otherwise it would not be so", this is the answer. There are three answers here. The Nyāyānusāra states: "Logically it should also be stated, yet it is not stated, because it is for the sake of the primary action and relying on the primary action that they then operate (Commentary: The preliminary stage arises for the sake of the primary action, and the subsequent stage exists relying on the primary action; the primary action obtains this name, while the secondary ones are not called paths). A second explanation states: The primary action is coarse and prominent, and the coarser category is called the karmapatha. A third explanation states: Because they cause internal and external things to decrease or increase, as killing, stealing, and the like cause things to decrease or increase. The preliminary and subsequent parts are not like this, and therefore these two parts are not called karmapathas." Fascicle one hundred and thirteen of the Vibhāṣā states: "One's dwelling is called external; lifespan and the like are called internal." The Vibhāṣā states: "Question: Why is it called a karmapatha? Answer: Volition is called karma; that through which karma traverses and operates to completion is the karmapatha. Question: If so, all indeterminate [phenomena]..."

17.10

On the Śāstra's stating: "One should question that master", the author of the Śāstra means: This is not my own position, so why question me? One should question that master.

17.11

On the Śāstra's stating: "Yet one could also say [...] are all called karmapathas", the author of the Śāstra explains on behalf of that master. These factors of covetousness, ill will, and the like are the causes of bad destinies; cause has the meaning of a path, acting as the path to bad destinies. Alternatively, covetousness, ill will, and the like arise as mutual causes and ride upon one another, so they are all called karmapathas.

17.12

On the Śāstra's stating: "Among those so stated [...] what is the distinction?", from here down are two verses, which as a third point explain the severance of wholesome roots.

17.13

"The Śāstra says [...] can sever wholesome roots": this cites the first line to answer. The previous question asked: By which karmapatha are wholesome roots severed? The answer states: Only by the superior grade of the wrong view karmapatha; this explains what is capable of severing.

17.14

On the Śāstra's stating: "If so, for what reason [...] is eliminated first?", this is an objection. If one claims that wrong view alone severs wholesome roots, this contradicts the root treatise: "What are the superior unwholesome roots? They refer to those that can sever wholesome roots; the intrinsic nature of unwholesome roots refers to covetousness, ill will, and delusion." Wrong view is not an unwholesome root; how can it be said to sever wholesome roots?

17.15

On the Śāstra's stating: "Due to unwholesome roots [...] the village is burned by thieves", this is the answer. The karma that is led is designated by the place that leads it.

17.16

On the Śāstra's stating: "Which wholesome roots are severed by this?", this asks about the wholesome [roots] that are severed.

17.17

On the Śāstra's stating: "It refers only to the desire realm [...] because they were previously not possessed", this is the answer. When one is about to sever wholesome [roots], the volitions in the desire realm, as well as the wholesome [roots] of the form and formless realms, have already fallen away and are not possessed; wrong view cannot sever the wholesome [roots] of the higher realms, and so forth.

17.18

On the Śāstra's stating: "The Prajñaptiśāstra [...] the wholesome roots of the three realms", this objects against not severing the wholesome roots of the higher two realms.

17.19

On the Śāstra's stating: "In reliance on higher wholesome roots [...] because this is not their vessel", severing desire-realm wholesome roots causes the wholesome roots of the higher two realms to be further alienated, and this physical basis is not a vessel for higher wholesome roots.

17.20

On the Śāstra's stating: "For what reason are only innately acquired wholesome roots severed?", this asks why the effort-acquired wholesome roots of the desire realm are not severed.

17.21

On the Śāstra's stating: "Because effort-acquired wholesome roots have already fallen away beforehand", this is the answer. The Nyāyānusāra states: "When one is about to sever wholesome roots, effort-acquired wholesome roots are abandoned first."

17.22

On the Śāstra's stating: "Conditioned by what wrong view are wholesome roots severed?", this is a question.

17.23

On the Śāstra's stating: "It refers to definitively repudiating [...] their fruition and vipāka", this is the answer. The Nyāyānusāra states: "By what cause and in what state are these wholesome roots severed? It refers to a type of person who has previously developed violent, evil inclinations and latencies (anuśaya), and later, aided by the reinforcing power of bad companions, these become increasingly intense, so that wholesome roots diminish and unwholesome roots increase. Later, generating the wrong view that repudiates cause and repudiates fruition, all wholesome roots are caused to disappear completely; thereby the mental continuum remains devoid of the wholesome. Through this cause and in this state, all wholesome roots are severed."

17.24

On the Śāstra's stating: "Other masters say [...] the distinction between paths of liberation", this recounts a divergent view on the severance. Dividing the wrong view that repudiates cause and repudiates fruition, the two paths are distinct.

17.25

On the Śāstra's stating: "Other masters say [...] because their force is weak", this recounts another master's position. Those that take the unconditioned (anāsrava) as object or take another realm as object do not increase among latencies as objects, but increase only when associated; because their force is weak, they cannot sever wholesome roots.

17.26

On the Śāstra's stating: "The correct explanation is [...] because they possess strong force", this sets forth the orthodox view. Defilements are not uniform; those that increase in accordance with causes can also reach the superior grade because they possess strong force. Those that take the unconditioned as object or another realm as object also reach the superior grade and can sever wholesome roots.

17.27

On the Śāstra's stating: "Other masters say [...] defilements abandoned through seeing", this recounts a divergent view.

17.28

On the Śāstra's stating: "The correct explanation is [...] severed by wrong view", this sets forth the orthodox view.

17.29

On the Śāstra's stating: "If it is explained thus [...] is called the severance of wholesome roots", this cites the root treatise to prove that the severance of wholesome roots in nine grades is correct. Since there are those abandoned at the very end, there must also be those abandoned in preceding grades; hence one knows that they are not severed in a single grade.

17.30

On the Śāstra's stating: "If so, that passage [...] those capable of severing wholesome roots", another master cites the root treatise to object. Since the root treatise states that "superior unwholesome roots are capable of severing wholesome roots", one knows that they are severed in only a single grade; thus the two passages of the root treatise contradict each other.

17.31

On the Śāstra's stating: "That is based on culmination [...] are called capable of severing wholesome roots", this is the answer. Because superior unwholesome roots can sever inferior-inferior wholesome roots, it is on this basis said that superior unwholesome roots can sever wholesome roots. The Nyāyānusāra states: "Following the preceding as a question, its logic is already established: that is, following the preceding subtle wholesome roots that are severed, it asks about the superior unwholesome roots capable of severing them. Since the former subtle wholesome roots are subsumed under the inferior grade, logically those that subsequently sever them are included in the superior grade. Therefore, one need not labor to raise an objection against it."

17.32

On the Śāstra's stating: "Other masters say [...] as in the path of seeing", this recounts a divergent view.

17.33

On the Śāstra's stating: "The correct explanation is that it applies to both emerging and not emerging", this sets forth the orthodox view.

17.34

On the Śāstra's stating: "Other masters say [...] because the branch is easily abandoned", this recounts a divergent view. That master means: Due to those wholesome roots, one generates and acquires vows (saṃvara); the vows are the branches and the wholesome roots are the root; the branches are abandoned more easily than the root, and therefore they are abandoned first.

17.35

The treatise says, "The correct opinion is [...] because their categories are identical": this sets forth the orthodox position. The Nyāyānusāra states: "The fruits of the saṃvaras are either produced from an intentional good mind or produced from an innate good mind. If produced from an intentional good mind, the saṃvara is relinquished first, and subsequently the good roots are severed. However, regarding the severing of the good roots, both the preparatory stage and the fundamental stage are called severing the good roots; relying on this, it is said that all saṃvaras are relinquished at the point of severing the good roots. If produced from an innate good mind, whenever any grade of root capable of producing it is severed, the saṃvara produced by it is relinquished at that very moment. Because that which can originate them is relinquished, those [saṃvaras] are relinquished accordingly."

17.36

The treatise asks, "In what realm are the good roots capable of being severed?": this asks about the location.

17.37

The treatise says, "In the three continents of the human realm [...] because of the intention": this is the answer. "Āśaya" means "intention" (yile) here.

17.38

The treatise says, "Other masters say [...] only in Jambudvīpa": this introduces an alternative view.

17.39

The treatise says, "If that were so, it would contradict [...] the same applies to the eastern and western continents": this refutes the other master. If good were not severed in those two continents, on what basis would the minimum number of faculties possessed be eight?

17.40

The treatise asks, "In what kind of physical embodiment is the good severed in this way?": this is a question.

17.41

The treatise says, "Only in male and female bodies, because their resolve is determinate": this is the answer. The resolve of [eunuchs like] ṣaṇḍhas and the like is indeterminate, so they cannot sever the good.

17.42

The treatise says, "Other masters say [...] because they are all dull and obtuse": this introduces an alternative view.

17.43

The treatise says, "If that were so, it would contradict [...] the male faculty is also like this": this refutes the alternative view. Since men and women are identical in having a minimum of eight faculties, one therefore knows that both are capable of severing the good.

17.44

The treatise asks, "What kind of practitioner is capable of severing the good roots?": this asks about the practitioner.

17.45

The treatise says, "Only one who pursues views [...] like the bad destinies": this is the answer.

17.46

The treatise asks, "What is the intrinsic nature of this severing of the good roots?": this asks about the intrinsic nature.

17.47

The treatise says, "The severing of the good should be known [...] has non-possession as its intrinsic nature": this is the answer.

17.48

The treatise asks, "Once the good roots are severed, by what are they reconnected?": this asks about the reconnecting of the good.

17.49

The treatise says, "Due to doubt or views [...] it is called reconnecting the good roots": this is the answer. Fascicle 35 of the Vibhāṣā states: "Who reconnects while abiding in a mind of doubt? Who reconnects while abiding in right view? Some say: those who reconnect across lives reconnect while abiding in a mind of doubt; those who reconnect in the present life reconnect while abiding in right view. The critique says: it should be stated that this is not fixed. It also says: if the good roots are reconnected, can they immediately become active? The critique says: it should be stated that this is not fixed." The Nyāyānusāra states: "Namely, at the time of reconnecting the good, either through the power of causes or relying on a spiritual friend, some suddenly give rise again to doubt regarding cause and effect, [wondering] whether the future life to be incurred exists or does not exist. Some suddenly give rise to right view regarding cause and effect, [recognizing that] definitely there is a future life, and that what was grasped previously was wrong. At that time, the acquisition of possession of the good roots arises again, and the acquisition of non-possession ceases; this is called reconnecting the good roots." The commentary says: As for "doubt", it necessarily involves indecision regarding the two cognitive objects of existence and non-existence, hence it is called "doubt". It is either first [presuming] existence and later non-existence, or first non-existence and later existence. If it is first existence and later non-existence, it can produce wrong views and cannot reconnect the good; if it is first non-existence and later existence, it can produce right views, and this can reconnect the good. Therefore the Nyāyānusāra says: "[wondering] whether the future life to be incurred exists or does not exist?" When this treatise says, "this might perhaps exist", it also refers to having first grasped it as non-existent and later [thinking that] it might perhaps exist.

17.50

The treatise says, "Other masters state that they are gradually reconnected in nine grades": this explains an alternative view.

17.51

The treatise says, "The correct opinion is [...] its strength gradually increases": this sets forth the orthodox position. The Vibhāṣā states: "The critique says: it should be stated that the nine grades are reconnected simultaneously and become manifest gradually; up to those who are to die from hell and be reborn into hell, the acquisition of the three [lower] grades of good roots is both possessed in the body and also made manifest; for those to be reborn among animals or ghosts, six grades; for those to be reborn among humans or gods, nine grades."

17.52

The treatise asks, "Can they be reconnected in the present body or not?": this asks about the reconnecting of the good.

17.53

The treatise says, "There are also those capable of reconnecting [...] because it is not in other states": this is the answer. There are two categories: if one severed the good roots without having committed an unpardonable transgression, one can also reconnect them in the present life. If one severed the good roots having committed an unpardonable transgression, one definitely cannot reconnect them in the present life; that person definitely reconnects them when about to die in hell or when about to take birth [there]. Relying on this textual evidence, although the good roots are reconnected when taking birth in hell, having reconnected the good roots, one still experiences hell, because a person who committed an unpardonable transgression definitely reaches the intermediate existence and persists for an eon and so forth.

17.54

The treatise says, "The phrase 'when about to take birth' [...] means when that person is about to die": this explains "when about to take birth" and "when about to die". That person dying means reconnecting when about to die in hell.

17.55

The treatise says, "If by the power of causes [...] it should be known that the same also applies": this explains the reason for the difference in reconnecting the good at the two times.

17.56

The treatise says, "Furthermore, the corruption of intention [...] it should be known that the same also applies": this explains why those who do not commit unpardonable transgressions differ regarding reconnecting the good in the present life. The Vibhāṣā states: "If one experiences the vipāka fruit of the wrong view of severing the good roots during the intermediate state of hell, one reconnects upon birth in hell. If one does not experience it [there], one reconnects at the time of death, because when that fruit is exhausted, one can reconnect the good roots. Why is this? Just as wrong view obstructs the good roots, so does its fruit." If one relies on the Prajñaptiśāstra, none of those who sever the good reconnect in the present [life]. The Nyāyānusāra states: "When someone in the world denies the future life, this is called corruption of intention. Yet not acting in accordance with that intention is not corruption of application; their views are corrupted, but their morality is not corrupted. If their views are corrupted and their morality is also corrupted, those who sever the good roots should be known to be likewise. There is no severing of the good roots when the eon is about to be destroyed or when the eon is first forming, due to the predominant power of the destruction of the receptacle world and because the continuum is moist [with defilement]. Those who practice sublime conduct do not sever the good roots, because their minds are firm and have aspirations."

17.57

The treatise says, "There are those who have severed the good roots [...] means excluding the previous characteristics": below is the fourfold permutation. "Pūraṇa" means "Full"; the old translation was "Fulouna", which is corrupt. This person severed the good without committing unpardonable transgressions, so he is not in the wrongly determinate group. This is the first permutation. "Ajātaśatru" is King Ajātaśatru. Because he committed an unpardonable transgression, he is in the wrongly determinate group (according to the Mahāyāna, he is not wrongly determinate); because he had faith in the Three Jewels, he did not sever the good roots. This is the second permutation. "Devadatta", previously translated as Tipodaduo: this person caused a schism in the Saṃgha, shed the Buddha's blood, and killed an arhat, so he is wrongly determinate and also severed the good roots; thus this is the permutation of both. The permutation of neither can be understood. The Nyāyānusāra states: "The wrong view of severing the good and the false speech of causing a schism in the Saṃgha should be known to definitively incur the vipāka of the Avīci [Hell]. The remaining unpardonable karmas either incur the Avīci or incur the vipāka of other hells." According to fascicle 35 of the Vibhāṣā, there are further questions and answers. The Prajñaptiśāstra says: "If someone destroys an ant's egg without the slightest remorse, it should be said that this person severs the good of the three realms. Question: If one reconnects the good roots in the present life, does that person take birth in hell after life ends? Answer: It is not determinate that they take birth in hell; only those who reconnect the good roots across lives definitely take birth in hell. Question: If one reconnects the good roots in the present life, can that person enter the correct determination of abandonment of birth in the present life or not? The critique says: it should be stated that they can induce the aids to penetration, and later can also enter the correct determination of abandonment of birth, up to being able to attain the fruit of an arhat. Question: Between killing a person who has severed the good and destroying an ant's egg, which offense is heavier? The critique says: it should be stated that, according to punitive transgression, killing a person who has severed the good incurs a heavier offense, because one incurs an extreme transgression. According to karmapatha, destroying an ant's egg is heavier, because that [creature] is endowed with good dharmas. Question: Where does one experience the fruit of severing the good roots? Answer: One experiences that vipāka fruit in the Avīci Hell (this is also identical to the Nyāyānusāra). Question: Regarding the wrong view that severs the good, in terms of nikāya-sabhāga, can it only complete it, or can it also project it? Answer: It can both project and complete. Some say: it can only complete, but cannot project. Why is this? Because karma projects the nikāya-sabhāga. The critique says: the former explanation is better. Because there is karma of intention associated with wrong view, wrong view and that [karma] share the same single fruit."

17.58

The treatise says, "Having taken advantage of the context [...] operate together with intention": the verse below constitutes the fourth major division, explaining the co-occurrence of karmapathas.

17.59

The commentary says: "From one up to eight only": this generally points out that unwholesome karmapathas operate only from one up to eight, not reaching nine or ten, because unwholesome karmapathas do not arise concurrently. Since it says "operate together with intention", it definitely refers to intentional karmapathas operating in the same instant; this admits of no other interpretation.

17.60

The treatise says, "Operating together with one [...] any one reaches completion": this explains operating together with one. Without the seven of body and speech, any one among the three—greed and so forth—arises. If one previously engaged in preparatory action performing unwholesome physical karma, any one reaches completion during an unsoiled mind. The Nyāyānusāra states: "When remaining soiled minds such as greed or an unsoiled mind are manifest, any one reaches completion." Because this treatise is abbreviated, it does not mention remaining soiled states such as greed. The Nyāyānusāra states: "Other masters say: each of the three bodily karmapathas operates together with a single intention, namely killing, stealing, and sexual misconduct. This is refuted: logically it should not be so; sexual misconduct necessarily involves two, because one never sends another to perform it, and it necessarily reaches completion through greed; killing and stealing performed by oneself also necessarily involve two. Even if based on sending another to do it, a distinction should be stated, namely that greed and so forth do not arise at the time of completion." In this treatise's text, the earlier explanation that greed reaches completion, etc., was based on actions done by oneself, while now stating that they operate together with intention applies also to sending another to do it.

17.61

The treatise says, "Operating together with two [...] or frivolous talk": this explains operating together with two, which can be understood from the text. The Nyāyānusāra criticizes: "The author of the treatise speaks here as follows: 'Namely, at the time of an angry mind, the karma of killing reaches completion; if at a time when greed arises, taking what is not given, or sexual misconduct, or frivolous talk is accomplished.' This is also illogical. If completed by oneself, then with respect to killing there would be no need to specify anger, since there is no possibility of any other completing it. Specifying greed with respect to stealing and sexual misconduct is also like this. Stating that frivolous talk is accomplished when greed arises is deficient, because it can be accomplished through three. If based on prior preparatory action, at the time of completion, it should in each case be said to be any one among greed and the rest."

17.62

The treatise says, "Operating together with three [...] killing and stealing at the same time": the three karmapathas of anger, killing, and stealing operate at the same time.

17.63

The treatise says, "If so, what was said [...] logically ought not to be established": this is an objection.

17.64

The treatise says, "Relying on the absence of a different mind [...] should be known as a definite determination": this is spoken relying on performing two karmas without a different mind. If one performs two karmas by oneself with different minds, their completion must be different.

17.65

The treatise says, "If by prior preparatory action [...] any two reach completion": this is operating together with three. The phrase "prior preparatory action" does not refer only to sending another; performing it oneself is also acceptable. As when one previously performs the preparation for killing, and the death occurs later, etc. Or first lighting a fire, and the object burns later, etc. Or first speaking words, and the other understands later, etc. Examples such as these.

17.66

The treatise says, "Operating together with four [...] any three reach completion": this is operating together with four.

17.67

The treatise says, "Thus five, six, and seven should all be understood properly": this can be understood by following the explanations.

17.68

The treatise says, "Operating together with eight [...] reach completion at the same time": this explains operating together with eight.

17.69

The treatise says, "The last three karmapathas [...] therefore there are no nine or ten": this explains why it reaches only up to eight. Because greed, anger, and wrong view do not arise together.

17.70

The treatise says, "Thus has been explained [...] excluding one, eight, and five": this concludes the preceding and introduces the following. If one also discriminates the adoption of abstinence, then there is co-occurrence. This can be understood from the text.

17.71

The treatise says, "Operating together with three [...] without the seven physical good": this clarifies operating together with three.

17.72

The treatise says, "Operating together with four [...] the śrāmaṇera saṃvara": this clarifies operating together with four.

17.73

The treatise says, "Operating together with six [...] obtaining the higher three vows": this clarifies operating together with six. The higher three vows have four karmas, and the first five consciousnesses have two, therefore making six.

17.74

The passage of the śāstra from "When seven operate simultaneously" up to "one obtains the bhikṣu vows" explains the simultaneous operation of seven. When a wholesome mental consciousness has three, and the three kinds of vows have four, this is one variety of seven. The statement that when an unwholesome or indeterminate mind is currently present one obtains the bhikṣu vows, is the second [variety of] seven. That it does not speak of obtaining the bhikṣu vows in the mindless state is because this [section] clarifies simultaneous operation with volition (cetanā); obtaining vows in the mindless state is not what is clarified here, because it does not operate simultaneously with volition.

17.75

The passage of the śāstra from "When nine operate simultaneously" up to "at the time when it is currently present" explains the simultaneous operation of nine. The wholesome five consciousnesses [with two] and the bhikṣu vows of seven form one variety of nine. When, relying on the knowledge of exhaustion (kṣayajñāna) and the knowledge of non-arising (anutpādajñāna) of the formless [realm], one obtains the bhikṣu vows: mental wholesomeness has two (excluding right view), and the bhikṣu vows have seven; this is the second variety of nine. In accordance with this, right when receiving the vows one may attain the stage of the non-learner (aśaikṣa). Or, when the knowledge of exhaustion and the knowledge of non-arising subsumed under dhyāna are currently present, at that time the mind has two, and the vows concurrent with the path (mārgasahabhū-saṃvara) have seven; this is the third variety of nine.

17.76

As for the passage of the śāstra from "When ten operate simultaneously" up to "one obtains the bhikṣu vows": wholesome mental consciousness has three, and the vows further have seven; this is one variety of ten.

17.77

As for the passage of the śāstra from "Or when any other [wholesome mind]" up to "the state where that mind is directly arising": there are seven branches of following form (anuparivartin-rūpa), which are seven, and the mind associated with right view has three; this is the second variety of ten. The reason it says "associated with right view" is to exclude the knowledge of exhaustion and knowledge of non-arising, as they lack right view.

17.78

The passage of the śāstra from "[The above] is according to the distinct, manifest features" up to "there are one, eight, and five" concludes the distinctive, manifest features preceding, and introduces the general features below.

17.79

The passage of the śāstra from "When one operates simultaneously" up to "one obtains the abstention of a single branch" explains the simultaneous operation of one. This refers to someone who is unable to fully receive the five precepts, etc., but merely makes a vow and sets their mind only on not killing, etc. When directly initiating the action, an unwholesome or indeterminate mind is currently present, and therefore there is only one.

17.80

The passage of the śāstra from "When five operate simultaneously" up to "one obtains two branches, etc." explains the simultaneous operation of five. This also refers to someone setting their mind to receive only two branches: when a wholesome mental consciousness is present, there are five. "Etc." includes receiving three branches when the wholesome five consciousnesses are currently present, and receiving five branches when an unwholesome or indeterminate mind is present.

17.81

As for the passage of the śāstra from "When eight operate simultaneously" up to "one obtains five branches, etc.": this also refers to aiming to receive five, while the mental [consciousness] further has three, thus making eight. "Etc." includes receiving six branches when the five consciousnesses are currently present. What has been explained above all refers to simultaneous concurrence at the same time, not concurrence across before and after. If one explains directly simultaneous operation with volition, it would be inappropriate to include mindless states, because there is no volition there. If one concurrently explains simultaneous operation of karma, then it extends to mindless states, because at that time karma also operates simultaneously. The Vibhāṣā and Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya, taking advantage of explaining simultaneous operation with volition, concurrently explained the simultaneous operation of karma, and therefore generally spoke of mindless states. This śāstra and the Nyāyānusāra solely speak of simultaneous operation with volition, and thus do not speak of mindless states. On the above śāstra text, the Nyāyānusāra has refutations and the Kośa has defenses; as these are not essential doctrinal definitions, they are omitted and not recounted.

17.82

The passage of the śāstra "In which realms, destinies, and places do the wholesome and unwholesome courses of action [exist]?" is followed by three verses; the fifth [section] explains the places in which courses of action are accomplished.

17.83

The text from "The explanation says" up to "therefore malice exists" clarifies that among the ten unwholesome karmas, these three in the hells (naraka) extend both to current activity (samudācāra) and possession (samanvāgama).

17.84

The passage of the śāstra from "Covetousness and wrong view" up to "because they visibly see the fruits of karma" clarifies that the two mental ones are only possessed. Because there are no desirable objects, covetousness is not currently active. Because they visibly see the fruits of karma, wrong view is not currently active. Because in the hells there is no freedom from desire (vairāgya), although they are not currently active, they are definitely possessed.

17.85

The passage of the śāstra from "Because one dies when karma is exhausted" up to "there is no divisive speech" clarifies that the remaining five unwholesome karmas are neither currently active nor possessed. If these physical courses of action are not currently active, they are also not possessed. In these hells there are in total three cases: first, extending both to current activity and possession, namely harsh speech, frivolous talk, and malice; second, possession only, namely covetousness and wrong view; third, neither currently active nor possessed, namely the three physical and two vocal, [which are] divisive speech and false speech.

17.86

The passage of the śāstra from "In Uttarakuru" up to "because there is no unwholesome intention" clarifies that the three mental unwholesome courses of action are only possessed and not currently active. To conceive of another's property as one's own is called the course of action of covetousness. Since they do not grasp anything as "mine", there is no covetousness. When body and mind are harsh and one desires to afflict and harm others, this is called malice. Since body and mind are pliant and there is nothing afflicting or harmful, there is no malice. Disbelieving in cause and effect and forming an unwholesome intention is called wrong view. Having no unwholesome intention, there is no wrong view. These three are abandoned through freedom from desire. Since Uttarakuru lacks freedom from desire, they are definitely possessed.

17.87

The passage of the śāstra from "Only frivolous talk" up to "singing with an afflicted mind" clarifies that frivolous talk extends to both current activity and possession.

17.88

In the passage of the śāstra from "Because there is no unwholesome intention" up to "as appropriate", the absence of the three physical karmas can be understood from the text. Regarding "because body and mind are soft, and because of lack of utility, as appropriate", the Nyāyānusāra says: "Because they have no deceptive mind, there is no false speech, or it is due to lack of utility. Because they are always harmonious, there is no divisive speech. Because their words are pure and pleasant, there is no harsh speech. Uttarakuru has three cases: first, the three mental courses of action are only possessed and not currently active; second, frivolous talk extends to both possession and current activity; third, the three physical courses of action and three vocal courses of action are neither possessed nor currently active."

17.89

The question and answer in the passage of the śāstra from "How do those people [mate]?" up to "they part in mutual shame" can be understood.

17.90

The passage of the śāstra from "Except for the aforementioned hells" up to "all extend to possession and current activity" explains that, with the exception of the preceding two places, in the remaining destinies and places all ten unwholesome courses of action extend to both current activity and possession. This clarifies their commonality.

17.91

The passage of the śāstra from "However, there are differences" up to "both kinds exist" explains the differences. It can be understood from the text.

17.92

Regarding the passage of the śāstra from "Although among the hosts of devas" up to "only then is their life cut off", the Nyāyānusāra says: "Other masters say: Devas also kill devas. Although when a deva's limbs are severed they emerge again, if their head is cut off or their trunk is bisected, they do not regenerate; therefore, in the desire realm heavens there is the course of action of killing."

17.93

The passage of the śāstra from "The unwholesome having been explained" up to "meaning possession and current activity": having explained the unwholesome, it explains the wholesome courses of action of mind. The three wholesome courses of action extend to both current activity and possession throughout the three realms and five destinies.

17.94

The passage of the śāstra from "The seven physical and vocal branches" up to "the saṃvara of dhyāna" explains the seven wholesome karmas. In these two places, they are definitely possessed and definitely not currently active. According to this śāstra text, those born in the heaven of non-conception definitely do not enter meditative absorption, because the seven wholesome karmas are definitely not currently active.

17.95

The passage of the śāstra from "However, the noble one, according to whatever [stage] they rely upon" up to "all are possessed" explains that when a noble one is in the formless realm, their possession of past and future differs: as for the past, they possess only what was previously arisen; as for the future, [vows of] all five stages are possessed. The Nyāyānusāra says: "However, according to whichever stage of dhyāna a noble one relied on when they previously arose and previously extinguished uncontaminated morality (śīla), when born into the formless realm they possess that past [morality]; as for the future, all six stages are possessed. That both places have no meaning of current arising is because the formless realm has only the nature of four skandhas, and beings without conception have no concentrated mind. If one is a non-learner in the formless realm, they definitely do not possess the past seven branches, because upon attaining the fruit of the non-learner they abandon the path of the candidate, and it definitely does not arise in the body of a non-learner." Regarding learners in the formless realm, there are two differing explanations. The Vibhāṣā, fascicle 122, says: "Question: If learners attain the fruit of non-returner via the worldly path, never having currently arisen an uncontaminated saṃvara, and then take birth in the formless realm, how do they possess past non-informative physical karma? If they do not possess it, why does this text state: 'If learners take birth in the formless realm, they possess past non-informative physical karma'? There is an explanation saying: There are also learners born in the formless realm who do not possess past non-informative physical karma. However, this text merely speaks relying on those who do possess it, so there is no fault. Other masters say: Having attained the noble fruit, they must arouse the superior fruit, because the noble path is brought to presence. Thus, learners born in the formless realm definitely possess past non-informative physical karma." Fascicles 132 and 134 both share these two explanations. Now, examining the two explanations, the latter explanation is correct. The concluding text of the second master in fascicle 134 says: "Therefore, the root treatise states: 'If learners are born in the formless realm, they possess past and future conditioned physical karma. If they attain the fruit of arhatship there, they possess future conditioned physical karma, but not past conditioned physical karma.' If one claims this is not so, the root treatise should have stated that learners born in the formless realm include those who do not possess past conditioned physical karma." The former master resolved this text by saying: this text solely speaks relying on those who possess it, so there is no fault. However, the former master did not explain why the root treatise would not speak exhaustively according to the truth, but merely speak based on one side; there is no justification. Since merely relying on one side lacks cogent reason, one should follow the root treatise. Therefore, both this śāstra and the Nyāyānusāra agree with the root treatise's statement, and do not say that learners in the formless realm include those who do not possess the past seven branches.

17.96

The passage of the śāstra from "In the remaining realms, destinies, and places" up to "and possession": this explains that, of the realms, excluding the formless realm; of the places, excluding the place of non-conception; and among the remaining places, excluding the hells and Uttarakuru—they are excluded because of the seven wholesome courses of action.

17.97

The passage of the śāstra from "However, there are differences" up to "both kinds are fully present" explains the differences. Ghosts (pretas) and animals have intermediate courses of action free from saṃvara. The form realm has only wholesome physical and vocal karmas arisen from the saṃvara of the path and the saṃvara of dhyāna, which do not constitute courses of action. The three continents have the arising of the three saṃvaras as well as the intermediate. The devas of the desire realm have the saṃvaras of the path and dhyāna, as well as the intermediate—both kinds.

17.98

The question of the śāstra, "What are the fruits obtained from unwholesome and wholesome courses of action?", is followed by one verse; the sixth [section] explains the distinction of the three fruits of the ten courses of action.

17.99

The text from "The explanation says" up to "due to the distinction of the dominant" lists generally the names of the three fruits.

17.100

The passage of the śāstra from "Namely, in the ten kinds" up to "is the fruit of maturation (vipākaphala)" explains the fruit of maturation of the ten unwholesome courses of action.

17.101

The passage of the śāstra from "After being born from there" up to "the distinction of the fruit of outflow (niṣyandaphala)" explains the fruit of outflow. Because one personally experiences its fruit due to the cause of harming others, it is called outflow.

17.102

The passage of the śāstra "A short lifespan among humans ... is the outflow of killing" asks: The life-faculty in a wholesome destiny, regardless of whether it is short or long, is the fruit of wholesome karma; how can a short life be the fruit of outflow of killing?

17.103

The passage of the śāstra from "It does not say that human lifespan" up to "causes it not to abide for long" answers. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Reasonably, it should be explained: It is not said that human lifespan is the maturation of killing; rather, it should be said that it is the proximate dominant fruit (adhipatiphala) of the karma of killing. That is to say, although human lifespan is attracted by wholesome karma, by the dominant power of killing, it causes that continuum to endure for only a short time, because in the desire realm the unwholesome overcomes the wholesome, possessing dominant power capable of suppressing the wholesome. If so, why is it called a fruit of outflow? It reveals that among dominant fruits it is the most proximate. If both were designated with the name 'dominant fruit', it would not reveal that fruits have the distinction of proximate and remote. If one claims otherwise, how could the unwholesome have the undefiled indeterminate abandoned by cultivation as its fruit of outflow? There is no contradiction with reason; therefore, it can be said that this short lifespan of humans is the outflow induced by the karma of taking life."

17.104

The passage of the śāstra from "The dominant fruits obtained from these ten" up to "the distinction of the dominant fruits" is the third part, explaining the dominant fruit. Due to killing, luster is scarce, because one destroyed the luster of others. Due to taking what is not given, there is much frost and hail (because one harmed others' goods). Due to sexual misconduct, there is much dust and dirt (because one defiled another's reputation). Due to false speech, there is much foul stench (because one deceived others and they do not wish to hear it; this should be checked further). Due to divisive speech, one's dwelling is treacherous and winding (because travel among relatives is difficult). Due to harsh speech, fields have many thorns, etc. (because one's speech wounded others, etc.). Due to frivolous talk, the seasons and norms change (because one stated what is not so). Due to covetousness, fruits are few (because one desired to diminish others' property). Due to malice, fruits are pungent (hot and pungent like malice). Due to wrong view, fruits are few or non-existent (if light, fruits are few; if heavy, fruits are non-existent).

17.105

[On] the treatise's: "Is it by a single karma of killing... or are there others?": this is a question.

17.106

[On] the treatise's: "Other masters say... later it experiences this outflowing [fruit]": this master speaks of it being the same karma.

17.107

[On] the treatise's: "Others again say... the primary and the retinue": this explains [them as] distinct.

17.108

[On] the treatise's: "What is explained here... is metaphorically called an outflowing [fruit]": this resolves a difficulty. Among the five fruits, what is direct is ripening (vipāka), and what is indirect is the predominant [fruit] (adhipati-phala). That an outflowing fruit (niṣyanda-phala) is distinguished here is stated on the basis of the fruit resembling the cause.

17.109

[On] the treatise's: "For what reason do these ten each incur three fruits?": this is a question.

17.110

[On] the treatise's: "To begin with, the first, the karma of killing... should be considered according to reason": this is the answer.

17.111

[On] the treatise's: "From this one should infer... it should be stated according to reason": this inverts the three fruits of the unwholesome to explain the three fruits of the wholesome. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "In reality, at the time of killing, one is able to make the one being killed undergo suffering, [have their] life cut off, and lose their majestic splendor. Because of causing suffering to another, one is born in the hells. Because of cutting off another's life, [one's] lifespan is short among humans. The former is the fruit of the preliminary preparation (prayoga), and the latter is the fruit of the primary [action] (maula). Both the primary and the preparatory stage are called killing. Due to destroying [another's] majestic splendor, one incurs inferior external requisites; therefore, the karma of killing obtains three kinds of fruits. The remaining unwholesome courses of karma (karmapatha) should be considered according to reason." Following the explanation of the two treatises, [the view that] the causes are distinct is correct.

17.112

[On] the treatise's: "Moreover, the sūtra speaks of eight wrong limbs": below there is one verse; section eleven of the main text separately clarifies wrong livelihood (mithyājīva). Regarding "inverting the eight noble path-limbs [into] eight wrong limbs," the *Vibhāṣā*, fascicle 45, says: "Question: Of these eight wrong limbs, how many are bound to the desire realm? How many to the form realm? How many to the formless realm? Answer: Wrong view, wrong effort, wrong mindfulness, and wrong concentration are bound across all three realms. Wrong thought, wrong speech, wrong action, and wrong livelihood are bound only to the desire and form realms. Within the form realm, [they are found] only in the first dhyāna, because they are absent in higher grounds. Question: Of these eight wrong limbs, how many are abandoned by seeing (darśana-heya)? How many are abandoned by cultivation (bhāvanā-heya)? Answer: One is abandoned by seeing, namely wrong view. Three are abandoned by cultivation, namely wrong speech, action, and livelihood. The remaining four are abandoned by both seeing and cultivation."

17.113

[On] "The treatise says... because the requisites belong to others": this explains that because [actions] born of greed are grave, they are separately designated as wrong livelihood.

17.114

[On] the treatise's: "Other masters maintain... because they do not sustain life": this recounts an alternative explanation.

17.115

[On] the treatise's: "Because this contradicts the sūtra... should be known by inverting this": this cites a sūtra to refute the other master's explanation. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "For what reason, among karmas, is bodily [action] first and vocal [action] second, whereas within the eight path-limbs vocal is first and bodily is second? Because among karmas they are stated according to coarse and subtle, whereas the sequence of the path-limbs is based on their conforming to mutual arising. A sūtra says: 'Having investigated and examined, one subsequently utters speech.'"

17.116

[On] the treatise's: "As stated previously, fruits are of five kinds": below is the third major section within this chapter, miscellaneous explanations of karmas. Within it there are ten [topics]: 1. clarifying the fruits obtained by karma; 2. explaining the karmas of the root treatise (*Jñānaprasthāna*); 3. clarifying projecting (ākṣepaka) and fulfilling (paripūraka) causes; 4. clarifying the three grave hindrances; 5. clarifying the three-time hindrances; 6. clarifying the bodhisattva marks; 7. clarifying giving, morality, and cultivation; 8. clarifying the three factors conducive [to penetration]; 9. clarifying the seal-nature; 10. clarifying the different names of dharmas. Within the first, clarifying the fruits obtained by karma, there are: 1. generally clarifying the five fruits obtained by all karmas; 2. fruits relative to the three moral qualities; 3. fruits relative to the three periods of time; 4. fruits relative to the various levels; 5. fruits relative to the three [stages of] trainees; 6. fruits relative to the three abandonments. The two verses below first generally clarify all karmas obtaining the five fruits.

First 116 of 187 passages. Read on

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俱舍論疏 — Classical Chinese