俱舍論疏 8

English (machine translation) 8

Language: English

8.2

Chapter 3: Exposition of the World, Part 1

As for the "Chapter on the Exposition of the World," because contaminated things in the three realms are subject to destruction, they are called "the world" (loka). Because this chapter explains it extensively, it is called "exposition." The Nyāyānusāra calls it the "Chapter on Dependent Origination" because it explains the meaning of dependent origination. The first two chapters generally explained contaminated and uncontaminated phenomena; the latter six chapters specifically explain contaminated and uncontaminated phenomena. Among the latter six chapters, the first three explain contaminated phenomena and the last three explain uncontaminated phenomena, because revulsion comes first and aspiration later. Among the first three chapters, the Exposition of the World is explained first and karma and afflictions later, because the result comes first and the cause later. Within the Chapter on the World, sentient beings are explained first and the receptacle world later, because the external depends on the internal, and that which depends is explained first and that which is depended upon later; the internal result is explained first and the external result later. In explaining sentient beings, the text has nine divisions: first, explaining the three realms; second, explaining the five destinies; third, explaining the seven stations of consciousness; fourth, explaining the nine abodes of sentient beings; fifth, explaining the four stations of consciousness; sixth, explaining the four modes of birth; seventh, explaining intermediate existence; eighth, explaining dependent origination; and ninth, explaining the four states of existence.

8.4

The treatise says: "Having already based [our exposition] on the three realms... how many distinct places are there?" The three verses below are the first section, explaining the three realms. Before this verse there are two questions: first, asking about the nature of the three realms; second, asking about the places within them.

8.5

"The treatise says: ... this is called the desire realm." This generally identifies the entity of the desire realm. Within the desire realm, whether sentient beings or the receptacle world, all are the desire realm. Destinies include only sentient beings; realms encompass also the insentient.

8.6

The treatise says: "The six desire-realm heavens... Paranirmitavaśavartin heavens." This lists individually the names of the six heavens. Because these six heavens mostly experience exquisite objects of desire, they are called desire heavens. First, the "Cāturmahārājakāyika gods": the four great kings are the rulers; "kāyika" (host) is what they govern, namely the gods on the various terraces and on the seven golden mountains, the sun, moon, stars, and so forth. Because there are diverse classes, they are called "hosts." Second, the "Trāyastriṃśa gods": located on the summit of Mount Meru, with Śakra residing in the center; eight on each of the four sides make thirty-three in total; they are also called the Daoli gods. Third, the "Yāma gods": translated here as "timely divisions"; because they experience the five objects of desire and know the divisions of time. Fourth, the "Tuṣita gods": translated here as "contentment," formerly translated as "knowing contentment"; because experiencing the five objects of desire generates joy and contentment. Fifth, the "Nirmāṇarati gods": meaning that gods in that heaven take pleasure in transforming objects of desire to enjoy them. Sixth, the "Paranirmitavaśavartin gods": meaning that in that heavenly abode, they have mastery over the enjoyment of objects of desire transformed by others.

8.7

The treatise says: "How many distinct places are there in this desire realm?" This is a question.

8.8

The treatise says: "Due to differences in hells and continents, they amount to twenty." This is an answer. Hells, humans, ghosts, animals, and so forth—the four are cited by general names without listing individual counts.

8.9

The Śāstra says: "The eight great hells ... up to the Avīci Hell." This explains the distinctions among the hells. The *Nyāyānusāra* explains: "They are pressed by manifold sufferings, repeatedly swooning as if dead, but quickly revive as before; therefore, it is named Saṃjīva (Reviving). That is, although those sentient beings suffer various cuttings, stabbings, grindings, and poundings, when they momentarily meet a cool breeze, they quickly revive as before; because they revive equal to before, the name Saṃjīva is established. First, their limbs are measured with black cords, and only afterwards are they chopped and sawn; therefore, it is named Kālasūtra (Black Cord). Manifold instruments of suffering come together to press upon their bodies, and they join in bands to slaughter one another; therefore, it is named Saṃghāta (Crushing). Pressed by manifold sufferings, they wail with sorrow in different manners and emit cries of grievance; therefore, it is named Raurava (Wailing). Pressed by acute suffering, they emit great, harsh sounds, sorrowfully crying out and naming their grievances; therefore, it is named Mahāraurava (Great Wailing). Fire turns with their bodies, blazing all around, and the suffering of heat is unbearable; therefore, it is named Pratāpana (Scorching). Whether inside or outside, from their own bodies and the bodies of others, fierce fires emerge and mutually burn and harm them; because it is the extreme among heat, it is named Mahāpratāpana (Great Scorching)." Below, this Śāstra says: "Because they experience suffering without interval (avīci), it is called Avīci. Because no pleasure intervenes in the suffering, it is called Avīci."

8.10

The Śāstra says: "Regarding the differences among the continents ... up to Uttarakuru." This clarifies the differences among the continents. Jambudvīpa derives its name from the [jambu] forest, being named the Continent of Jambu. Because their bodies are superior, it is named the Continent of Superior Bodies (Pūrvavideha). Because cattle are used in trade, it is named the Continent of Cattle-wealth (Aparagodānīya). Kuru is translated here as 'superior place,' because among the four continents this one is the most superior.

8.11

The Śāstra says: "These twelve ... places become twenty." This clarifies animals and hungry ghosts.

8.12

The Śāstra says: "If the sentient realm ... all are subsumed under the desire realm." This summarizes the desire realm.

8.13

The Śāstra says: "Above this desire realm ... collectively named the form realm." From here below explains the form realm. In this, there are three parts: first, a brief presentation; second, a detailed explanation; third, establishing the tenet. This is the first.

8.14

The Śāstra says: "The First Dhyāna ... up to the Akaniṣṭha Heaven." This is the second. The *Nyāyānusāra* explains: "Because it is produced by vast goodness, it is called Brahma. This Brahma is great, so it is called Mahābrahmā. Because he attains the intermediate concentration, is born first, and perishes last, and because his majesty and virtue are superior, he is called 'Great'. That which belongs to, is transformed by, and is governed by Mahābrahmā is called Brahmapāriṣadya (Brahma's Retinue). Those who stand in rank to attend and protect before Mahābrahmā are called Brahmapurohita (Brahma's Priests). Among the devas of their own level, their radiance is the smallest, so they are called Parīttābha (Minor Light). Their radiance becomes increasingly superior and its measure is difficult to fathom, so they are called Apramāṇābha (Immeasurable Light). Because their pure light shines universally over the places of their own level, they are called Ābhāsvara (Extreme Light-Purity). The pleasurable feeling of the mental ground is called 'purity'. Within its own level, this purity is the most inferior, so they are called Parīttaśubha (Minor Purity). This purity increasingly grows and its measure is difficult to fathom, so they are called Apramāṇaśubha (Immeasurable Purity). This purity is universal, so they are called Śubhakṛtsna (Universal Purity), intending to show that no pleasure can surpass this. Below this, the abodes of devas in space are densely joined like clouds, so they are called 'clouds'. For the devas above this, there is no longer a cloud ground; being at the head of the cloudless, they are called Anabhraka (Cloudless). Because there is a superior meritorious place where ordinary beings can be reborn, they are called Puṇyaprasava (Merit-born). Among the locations of ordinary beings' fruitions, this dwelling is the most supreme, so it is called Bṛhatphala (Vast Fruition). The noble ones who are free from desire wash away the defilement of afflictions with the water of the noble path, so they are called pure. As the dwelling place of pure bodies, they are called Śuddhāvāsa (Pure Abodes). Or, dwelling here, they exhaust the limits of saṃsāra, like repaying a debt completely, so it is called pure. As the abode of the pure, it is called the Pure Abodes. Or, in this heaven there is no mixture of ordinary beings, being the dwelling purely of noble ones, so it is called the Pure Abodes. 'Avṛha' (no turbulence) means without agitation or without expansion. Because among those without agitation this is the first, or among vast heavens this is the most inferior, it is called Avṛha. Or it is named 'Without Seeking', because they do not seek to enter the formless realm. Having skillfully subdued and eliminated the higher and middle defilements of the mixed cultivation of dhyāna, their mental inclination is compliant and gentle, free from all burning afflictions, so they are called Atapa (Without Heat). Or, afflictions that cause rebirth below are called 'heat'; being the first to be far removed from this, they obtain the name Atapa. Or again, 'heat' has the meaning of blazing; referring to the superior cultivation of dhyāna and its fruit, which they have not yet realized, they are therefore called Atapa. Having attained the superior grade of the mixed cultivation of dhyāna, the virtues of the fruit are easily manifested, so they are called Sudṛśa (Skillfully Appearing). The remaining grades of obstacles to the mixed cultivation of concentration are extremely subtle, and their vision is exceedingly clear and penetrating, so they are called Sudarśana (Skillful Vision). There is no place among those possessing form that can surpass this; thus it is called Akaniṣṭha (Form Ultimate). Or, having reached the final limit of the body that serves as the basis for manifold sufferings, it is called Akaniṣṭha."

8.15

The Śāstra says: "The Kaśmīra ... surrounded by four assemblies." This is the third. Stating that the form realm has sixteen places is the doctrine of the *Vibhāṣā*. The intention of this master is: the Brahmā King and Brahma's Priests are not divided into two places, and the Non-conceptual [Heaven] and Vast Fruition are combined into one place; therefore, they make sixteen. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "These seventeen places, including their vessel worlds and sentient beings, are collectively called the form realm. Other [masters] separately state the names of seventeen places, establishing two places in the First Dhyāna and separately stating the Non-conceptual [Heaven] in the Fourth Dhyāna. Those masters ought to say that there are eighteen places, because when comparing Mahābrahmā to the Brahmapurohita Heaven, lifespan, bodily size, freedom from vitarka, feeling, etc., are all different. Would one not say that, since the Non-conceptual [Heaven] differs from the Vast Fruition Heaven only in being [inhabited exclusively by] ordinary beings, etc., the former should also be said to have eighteen places? This objection is unreasonable. Rebirth in the Non-conceptual Heaven is precisely the fruition of karma bound to the Vast Fruition Heaven. If so, the body born as Mahābrahmā is also the fruition of karma bound to the Brahmapurohita Heaven, so it should not be separately stated as an independent heavenly place. It is precisely the superior karma bound to the Brahmapurohita Heaven that brings about the fruition of Mahābrahmā; this karma differs slightly from that one, and so the lifespan and so on that it brings about are also slightly different. If, because the lifespan and so on of the Mahābrahmā Heaven differ from those of Brahmapurohita, they were combined into one place, then although the lifespans of Parīttābha and so on differ, they too should be combined into one place, which would lead to a great fallacy. This analogy does not hold. Because Mahābrahmā is single, the name of a heavenly place must be established based on a nikāya-sabhāga (group-homogeneity), and a single Brahmā King cannot be called a nikāya-sabhāga. Although his lifespan and so on differ from the rest, because a single body does not constitute a nikāya-sabhāga, he is combined with Brahmapurohita into one heaven; although higher and lower differ, their ground does not differ. The Parīttābha Heaven and so on are contrary to this, so he should not cite them as an analogy." Based on this text, the *Nyāyānusāra* also takes sixteen as correct. Because the Brahmā King and the Non-conceptual [Heaven] are each unique, and their grounds do not differ. The Sthaviras establish eighteen heavens for the places of form.

8.16

The Śāstra says: "In the formless realm ... because the principle is definitive." From here below, the third part clarifies the formless realm. In this, there are four points: first, having no place because of being formless; second, dividing places with respect to rebirth; third, proving the absence of spatial locations; fourth, questions and answers on the basis of support. This text is the first. Because of being formless, there are no distinct locations in the formless realm.

8.17

The Śāstra says: "Merely produced by vipāka ... superiority and inferiority differ." The second divides places according to the superiority and inferiority of rebirth. In reality, however, they are not separate from the four places in the desire and form realms, nor are there distinct locations.

8.18

The Śāstra says: "How is it further known ... because intermediate existence arises." The third proves that the places have no spatial location. Attaining the four types of concentration, they are reborn in the same place; therefore, one knows that the four formless rebirths have no distinct places. Moreover, attaining the four concentrations, the nine places of the desire realm and the sixteen places of the form realm differ; if one is born into the formless realm, all are born at the place of dying in the desire or form realm. Therefore, one knows that apart from the two realms there are no other places. When dying from those four heavenly places and being born into a lower realm, intermediate existence appears right at the previous place of death and rebirth, with consciousness transmitting; therefore, one knows that they do not come from another place.

8.19

The Śāstra says: "If, as in the form realm ... the continuum of mind and so forth." From here below is the fourth part: questions and answers on the basis of support. This is the question.

8.20

The Śāstra says: "The masters of the Abhidharma ... and obtain continuity." This states the reply of the Abhidharma school.

8.21

The Śāstra says: "If so, in the [realms] possessing form ... these two continue." This is an objection.

8.22

The Śāstra says: "Because in births in realms possessing form, these two are weak." This is the reply.

8.23

The Śāstra says: "For what reason are these two strong in the formless?" This inquires into the reason.

8.24

The Śāstra says: "In that realm, the two arise from ... able to subdue the characteristics of form." This resolves [the objection].

8.25

The Śāstra says: "If so, in that realm ... what need is there for a separate basis?" This is an objection: The continuum of mind and so forth merely relies on superior concentration; what need is there to rely on nikāya-sabhāga and the life-faculty?

8.26

The Śāstra says: "Moreover, it should now be explained ... on what do they rely?" This is another objection: The life-faculty and nikāya-sabhāga have nothing to rely upon in the formless realm.

8.27

The Śāstra says: "These two mutually rely on each other to operate." The Sarvāstivādin resolves [the objection].

8.28

The Śāstra says: "Why do these two not mutually rely on each other in the [realms] possessing form?" This is an objection: Those possessing form refers to the desire and form realms. Why do this life[-faculty] and sabhāga not mutually rely on each other to operate as in the formless realm, instead of being said to rely on form?

8.29

The Śāstra says: "Because in births in realms possessing form, these two are weak." This is the reply: Because these two are weak in the desire and form realms, they rely on form to operate; in the formless realm, these two are strong, so they mutually rely on each other.

8.30

The Śāstra says: "For what reason are these two strong in the formless?" This inquires into the reason why the formless realm is strong.

8.31

The Śāstra says: "In that realm, these two ... able to subdue the characteristics of form." This answers the cause of strength: Because the concentration is superior, these two are superior.

8.32

The Śāstra says: "Then it is just the same as ... only mutually rely on each other." This explains through two alternatives. 'The objection regarding the continuum of mind' refers to the previous objection. Thus the previous objection said: If so, in that realm the continuum of mind and so forth merely relies on superior concentration, so what need is there for a separate basis? The second alternative says: Since formless mind and mental factors arise from superior concentration, then mind and mental factors should mutually rely on each other; why must they additionally rely on the life-faculty and nikāya-sabhāga? The intention of the *Nyāyānusāra* is that only the six sense faculties can act as bases of support; the rest cannot act as bases of support, but are only co-arising supports by virtue of these six consciousnesses. In the desire and form realms, the four skandhas serve as the nature of co-arising supports; in the formless realm, mental consciousness no longer has a form-support, and its co-arising supports extend only to three skandhas. If so, why is it only said that formless mind and so forth rely on sabhāga and life[-faculty]? This is said because they are definitely identical and nondisorderly supports. That is, although mind and mental factors mutually support one another, they are not definitely identical, because they do not rely on themselves, nor are they nondisorderly. Born in this ground, minds and mental factors of self and other disorderly arise. Sabhāga and life[-faculty] are the common support of mind and so forth; furthermore, being born in this ground belongs exclusively to this ground. Even if a mind of a different ground arises based on them, due to them a mind of its own ground is brought to arise again; relying solely on these two is one called born in this ground, because they are produced without interruption by the projecting karma. Verified by this text, the life-faculty is precisely the fruition of projecting karma; therefore, they are spoken of as identical, nondisorderly supports. Mind and so forth are not so, and thus are omitted from the statement. If these two did not exist, when the four skandhas of another ground were present, that sentient being should at that time be called [belonging to] another ground. And further, just as in the desire and form realms, bodily sabhāga and life[-faculty] serve as the support for mind and so forth, so that even though a mind of a different ground might sometimes arise, it relies on the body and so forth, and within this life it will definitely project the arising of a mind of its own ground later; so too in the formless realm, although there is no body, mind and so forth definitely rely on sabhāga and life[-faculty]. Therefore, the verse speaks specifically of sabhāga and the life-faculty, because these are the vipāka of projecting karma.

8.33

On the Śāstra's statement: "Therefore the Sautrāntika teachers [say] ... [proceeding without reliance on matter]": the author of the Śāstra sets forth the Sautrāntika tenet. Their school's intention is: if at the stage of the cause one is not averse to matter, the mental result that is brought about arises along with matter and proceeds relying on matter. If at the stage of the cause one is averse to matter, in the result the mind and [mental factors] do not accompany matter and proceed without reliance on matter. The *Nyāyānusāra* refutes this, saying: "This too is unreasonable. If the power of the project-cause were to make that continuity of mind and [mental factors] proceed, then at the time when good and defiled minds are present, the continuity of mind and [mental factors] would have no basis. Furthermore, just as when sentient beings are in the desire and form realms, through the power of the project-cause their continuity of mind and [mental factors] arises along with matter and proceeds relying on matter, so too when sentient beings are in the formless realm, through the power of the project-cause their continuity of mind and [mental factors] arises along with the generic similarity and the life-faculty, and without relying on matter proceeds relying solely on generic similarity and the life-faculty. Since it is admitted that for sentient beings in the desire and form realms, their mind and [mental factors] can never proceed without relying on the physical body, on what basis could the mind and [mental factors] of sentient beings in the formless realm proceed having no basis whatsoever?"

8.34

On the Śāstra's question: "Why are they called the three realms, desire and so on?": from here down the names of the three realms are explained. This is the raising of the question.

8.35

On the Śāstra's statement: "They are able to maintain their own characteristics ... as explained before": this is the reply. In the reply there are two parts: first, explaining the meaning of "realm" (*dhātu*); second, explaining the meaning of the realms of desire and so on. This is the first. Within it there are two explanations, which can be understood from the text.

8.36

On the Śāstra's statement: "The realm belonging to desire ... like a diamond ring": this explains the names of the desire realm and the form realm. Just as pepper is in a drink, the pepper belongs to the drink. Just as there is a diamond on a ring, the diamond belongs to the ring. Thereby the drink is called "pepper[-drink]" and the ring is called "diamond[-ring]".

8.37

On the Śāstra's statement: "In that realm ... the analogy is as explained before": this explains the formless realm. First it explains "formless" (*ārūpya*), and afterwards it explains "formless realm". Matter (*rūpa*) is of two kinds: that spoken of as "subject to transformation and obstruction" applies to the eleven kinds of matter; that spoken of as "manifested" refers to the matter of the visible form base (*rūpāyatana*). Because the four skandhas of the formless realm are neither of these two, it is called "formless". It is not that it merely takes the absence of matter as its essence; if it took the absence of matter as its essence, then there would be no distinct entity, or it would be empty space and not the four skandhas. The remaining text can be understood.

8.38

On the Śāstra's statement: "Furthermore, the realm of desire ... should be known likewise": this is another explanation of the desire realm. Desire is that which is sustained; the realm is that which sustains. "Realm" (*dhātu*) has the meaning of sustaining; that is, because the five skandhas of the desire realm can sustain desire, it is necessarily called the "realm of desire". The other two are also like this: that is, the four skandhas and the five skandhas are the meanings of the realms of desire and so on. Someone seems to have missed the point.

8.39

On the Śāstra's question: "Here, what phenomenon is designated by the word 'desire'?": this asks about the essential nature of desire.

8.40

On the Śāstra's statement: "Briefly spoken of as the greed induced by material food and sexual intercourse": this answers with the essential nature of desire. Following this, greed for form and for the formless are called "form" and "formless".

8.41

On the Śāstra's statement: "As a sūtra verse states ... has already eliminated desire": this cites a sūtra as proof. This verse was spoken by Śāriputra to non-Buddhists; the non-Buddhists claimed that desire is external sense-objects, whereas the Buddhadharma states that desire is precisely greed. The first line is not established by outsiders; the second line sets forth [our] own school; and the last two lines explain the reason it is not sense-objects.

8.42

On the Śāstra's statement: "The Ājīvika non-Buddhists ... because of discursive thoughts": this is the non-Buddhists interrogating Śāriputra. The first two lines cite the proposition, and the latter two lines refute it.

8.43

On the Śāstra's statement: "Then Śāriputra ... because of wonderful forms": here Śāriputra cross-examines the non-Buddhists. The first two lines restate their assertion, and the latter two lines refute it.

8.44

On the Śāstra's question: "If a phenomenon ... is it bound to the three realms?": this is the question.

8.45

On the Śāstra's statement: "Not so": this is the reply.

8.46

On the Śāstra's question: "How so?": this investigates.

8.47

On the Śāstra's statement: "That in which ... grow concurrently, is bound to the three realms": this is the reply. Although all anāsrava phenomena are active within the three realms, they are not bound to the three realms, because [defilements] do not grow concurrently in them.

8.48

On the Śāstra's question: "Here, what phenomena are called greed of the three realms?": this is the question.

8.49

On the Śāstra's statement: "They are those that grow concurrently in each of the three realms": this is the reply.

8.50

On the Śāstra's statement: "Now what is said here ... neither brings understanding": this is an objection. Previously it was asked: "What are the phenomena bound to the three realms?" The answer was: "Those in which the greed of the three realms grows concurrently." Again it was asked: "What phenomena are called the greed of the three realms?" The answer was: "Those that grow concurrently in each of the three realms." Neither of these two answers brings understanding; therefore it is said to be like the reply about tying a horse.

8.51

On the Śāstra's statement: "Now what is said here ... should be known likewise": this is the reply. Now the reply here is not like the reply about tying a horse. That is to say, among the previously explained bases of the desire realm, for sentient beings who have not separated from greed, whatever greed exists in their bodies is called desire-greed; that in which this grows concurrently is called bound to the desire realm. The greed possessed by sentient beings in the eighteen bases of the form realm and the four bases of the formless realm is called form-greed and formless-greed; it should be known likewise.

8.52

On the Śāstra's statement: "Or [the mind of] the non-concentrated stage ... is called bound to the formless realm": this is the second explanation. It can be understood from the text.

8.53

On the Śāstra's question: "How can greed arise toward a mind of magical transformation of the desire realm?": this is an objection. If being bound by desire-greed is called the desire realm, the mind of magical transformation in the desire realm is obtained only after separating from desire; if one gives rise to desire-greed, one loses the mind of magical transformation again. How can the mind of magical transformation belong to the desire realm?

8.54

On the Śāstra's statement: "Because greed and affection arise from hearing it from another ...": this is the reply. Although one has not obtained it oneself, hearing it spoken of by another, one gives rise to a greedy mind. Or having obtained it oneself, one falls back and gives rise to desire-greed; or observing another's magical transformation, one gives rise to a greedy mind.

8.55

On the Śāstra's statement: "If a mind is able to magically transform ... because it creates odors and tastes": this differentiates the distinction between minds of magical transformation in the desire realm and the form realm.

8.56

On the Śāstra's question: "Are these three realms only one?": this is the question. From here on are questions and answers on the unity or multiplicity of realms and so forth, within which there are two parts: first, inquiring about unity and multiplicity; second, inquiring about horizontal and vertical arrangement. This asks the first.

8.57

On the Śāstra's statement: "The three realms are boundless ... like empty space": this is the reply.

8.58

On the Śāstra's question: "How should it be said that worlds are situated?": this is the second part, explaining the horizontal and vertical arrangement. This is the question.

8.59

On the Śāstra's statement: "It should be said that they are situated horizontally ... above and below are not spoken of": this is one explanation, that they are situated only horizontally, because a sūtra says so.

8.60

On the Śāstra's statement: "Some say there is also ... there is Akaniṣṭha": this is the second explanation. Because sūtras of the Dharmaguptaka school and others also speak of the ten directions.

8.61

On the Śāstra's statement: "If one separates from one ... should be known likewise": this sets forth the identity in separation from defilement.

8.62

On the Śāstra's statement: "Relying on the first dhyāna ... should be known likewise": this sets forth that the five supernormal knowledges allow one only to travel to the stages cultivated through concentration in the realm of one's own birth; one cannot travel to other worlds.

8.63

On the Śāstra's question: "The three realms have already been explained; what are the five destinies?": the single verse below is the second part, explaining the five destinies (*gati*).

8.64

On the verse: "The Śāstra says ... these are called the five destinies": this explains that within the three realms there are five destinies.

8.65

On the Śāstra's statement: "Only in the desire realm ... a portion of the destiny of the devas": this states the difference in the essential nature of the five destinies across the three realms.

8.66

On the Śāstra's question: "Do all things in the three realms ... speak of five destinies?": this is the question.

8.67

On the Śāstra's statement: "There are those that are good, defiled ... non-obscured and neutral": this is the reply. That is to say: good, defiled, the external physical world, and the intermediate existence—these four phenomena are subsumed under the three realms, but are not the five destinies. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Good, defiled, neutral, sentient beings, insentient things, intermediate existence, and so on are all of the nature of realms." In saying "the essence of a destiny subsumes only the non-obscured and neutral", this is because only that which is born of maturation (*vipākaja*) constitutes the essence of a destiny. By this it has already been explained that destinies consist only of sentient beings, because among insentient things there is nothing born of maturation (the phrase "born of maturation" excludes all insentient things, and among sentient beings excludes all other phenomena besides what is born of maturation; although intermediate existence is a phenomenon born of maturation, it is not of the five destinies, having no meaning of destiny).

8.68

On the Śāstra's statement: "If it were otherwise ... its essence would not be intermediate existence": this explains by the contrary. If it were not exclusively non-obscured and neutral, then the destinies would be confused. Because within a single destiny there can exist karma and defilements belonging to all five destinies, it is clear that destinies are not subsumed under the good and defiled. "The five destinies are only counted among sentient beings", and so forth, can be understood from the text.

8.69

On the Śāstra's statement: "The *Prajñaptipāda* ... intermediate existence is a distinct destiny": this cites sacred teaching as proof that intermediate existence is not a destiny. It can be understood from the text.

8.70

On the Śāstra's question: "What sūtra is this?": this is the question.

8.71

On the Śāstra's statement: "It refers to the *Saptabhava-sūtra* ... because it is distinct from the destinies": this is the reply. Since the *Saptabhava-sūtra* speaks of intermediate existence separately from the five destinies, it is known that intermediate existence is not subsumed under destinies, and that the principle that it is subsumed exclusively under the non-obscured and neutral is fully established, because it excludes the cause of existence consisting of karma as distinct from the destinies. Since karma extends to both good and defiled and is not subsumed under destinies, it is known to be exclusively non-obscured and neutral.

8.72

On the Śāstra's statement: "Kashmir ... non-obscured and neutral": this again cites a sūtra to prove that it is non-obscured and neutral. Because this sūtra was recited by the Sarvāstivādins, it says "recited by the Vaibhāṣikas". Since the sūtra says that once maturation has arisen it is called *naraka*, it is known that the essence of a destiny is precisely of a neutral nature that is maturation. "In *naraka*" is the name of the hell location; *nāraka* is the name of the destiny of sentient beings. Karma arising from deceit is called "crooked"; karma arising from hatred is called "filthy"; karma arising from greed is called "turbid".

8.73

On the Śāstra's statement: "If that is so ... because they grow concurrently": this cites a text to object. If a destiny were exclusively neutral maturation, then it should only be defilements abandoned by the path of cultivation and all universal anuśayas that grow concurrently with it. Why does the *Prakaraṇapāda* say that all anuśayas grow concurrently? Therefore it is known that it is not exclusively neutral maturation abandoned only by cultivation, but also extends to defilements.

8.74

On the Śāstra's statement: "They say that for the five destinies ... is collectively called a village": the Sarvāstivāda resolves this. In "They say that for the five destinies, in the mind of connecting rebirth there can be all defilements of the five categories", the mind linking rebirth extends to the thirty-six, the thirty-one, and so on. That is, the mind linking rebirth is that in which the anuśayas of the five categories grow concurrently; by a designation, linking rebirth is taken to be the destiny, just as the edge of a village is metaphorically called the village.

8.75

On the Śāstra's statement: "Some say the essence of a destiny also extends to the good and the defiled": this sets forth the tenet of the Mahāsāṃghika and others.

8.76

On the Śāstra's statement: "However, the *Saptabhava-sūtra* ... therefore it is spoken of separately": the Mahāsāṃghika masters resolve the sūtra text. The Sarvāstivāda comprehensively cited multiple sūtras as proof, and here the *Saptabhava-sūtra* is resolved. Views and defilements are spoken of separately as turbidities, yet views are subsumed under defilements. Although destinies and the causes of destinies are spoken of separately as existences, what prevents both the destiny and the cause of destiny from being collectively named "destiny"? Therefore it is said that being spoken of separately does not definitively prove that it is not a destiny.

8.77

On the Śāstra's statement: "If so, intermediate existence should also be a destiny": the Sarvāstivāda objects to the Mahāsāṃghika. The *Saptabhava* speaks separately of karma, and karma is also included in destiny; the *Saptabhava* speaks separately of intermediate existence, so intermediate existence should also be subsumed under destiny.

8.78

On the Śāstra's statement: "Not so; the meaning of destiny ... because it takes birth right where one dies": the Mahāsāṃghika resolves the objection. Speaking separately of karmic existence does not contradict the meaning of a destiny, and so it is included in destiny. Speaking separately of intermediate existence contradicts the meaning of a destiny, and so it is not called a destiny.

8.79

On the Śāstra's question: "If so, the formless ... takes birth; this is an objection": intermediate existence takes birth right where one dies, and because it is not a destination (*gati*), it is not called a destiny. The formless takes birth right where one dies, so it should not be a destiny.

8.80

The commentary states: "Since it is so, intermediate existence... is therefore called intermediate existence." Having been challenged, the Mahāsāṃghika alters their explanation: because intermediate existence stands between two destinies, it is not called a destiny (the above resolves the objection concerning the first sūtra). The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "However, the author of the treatise says: 'It is not the case that because it is stated separately it is definitely not subsumed under it, just as among the five corruptions afflictions and views are stated separately as corruptions, yet it is not the case that because they are stated separately those views are definitely not subsumed under afflictions. Likewise, although karmic existence is also a destiny, it is stated separately in order to show the cause of the destinies; thus some say the essence of a destiny encompasses both good and defiled.' His statement is unreasonable, because it is stated nowhere. While in some places it is stated that views are also afflictions, and though they are stated separately as a corruption for a particular reason, one knows by reference to other statements that they are indeed afflictions. Yet nowhere has it been stated that karma, the cause of the destinies, is itself the essence of a destiny, which could serve as authentic proof. Even though it is stated separately as an existence for a particular reason, can one know by reference to that statement that karma is a destiny? How can one know for certain that karma is the essence of a destiny? Because of a particular reason, it is stated separately among existences. Yet it is not that the essence of karmic existence is not a destiny; it is spoken of as karmic existence to reveal the cause of destinies—therefore, the analogy he adduces is incapable of serving as proof." It also says: "If karma were the essence of a destiny, the destinies would be confounded, because within a single destiny there is the karma of multiple destinies. If karma, which is the cause of a destiny, were itself the destiny, then when a human has the karma and defilements of hell present, they would be both a human and a hell [being]. Nor should it be said that although the essence of a hell destiny is present, they are not a hell [being]. For this would entail a great error: namely, that when the fruit of maturation is actually present, it would not be a hell [being], since there would be no distinction. However, the sūtra states, 'Once maturation has arisen, one is called a naraka'; therefore karma is not a destiny."

8.81

The commentary states: "However, that venerable one... therefore made this statement," resolving the explanation of the second sūtra. When the sūtra states that once maturation has arisen one is called a hell [being], this means that once maturation has arisen, the wholesome, defiled, and neutral [dharmas] in the body all obtain the name 'hell' at that time; it does not mean that only maturation is called a hell. As for the statement, "Apart from the five aggregates, that naraka is not to be found," it does not mean that apart from the five aggregates that are maturation, that naraka is not to be found. This comprehensively means that apart from the five aggregates—wholesome, defiled, and neutral—no real self or pudgala capable of going to the various destinies can be found; it was not stated in order to exclude the remaining aggregates outside of maturation dharmas (therein are extensive refutations, which are omitted and not recounted). The thrust of the *Nyāyānusāra*'s refutation is: if a destiny were not solely indeterminate maturation, why must it be said that only once maturation has arisen is one called a hell [being]? Since prior to the arising of maturation there is also hell karma and so forth, they would be called hell; therefore one knows it is solely indeterminate maturation.

8.82

The commentary states: "The Vaibhāṣikas... undefiled and indeterminate," concluding with a return to the Vaibhāṣika school's tenet.

8.83

The commentary states: "Some say it is definitely determinate... also extends to nourishment," presenting divergent explanations. Among these three explanations, the second is correct. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Because it is solely born of maturation, and also because there is no error." If it extended to nourishment, then if a body abiding in the desire realm cultivates and attains the divine eye, it would be of the nature of nourishment, and destinies would be confounded. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Having thus explained the essence of the destinies in general, next the names of each individual destiny should be explained. *Nara* means human; *ka* means evil. Humans commit much evil and fall headlong into it; on this account it is called the naraka destiny (with many explanations). As for animals (*tiryañc*), it is because that destiny's bodies mostly exist horizontally, or because in that destiny there can be a small portion that walk horizontally (with many explanations). As for hungry ghosts (*preta*), it is because they have much yearning to sustain themselves (with many explanations). Humans (*manuṣya*), it is said because they have much contemplation (*manana*); hence they are called humans (with many explanations). Gods (*deva*), it is said because they are exalted, their spiritual power is sovereign, and they are prayed to by the multitude; hence they are called gods. As for asuras, they are subsumed under the ghost destiny. When Śakra, lord of the gods, says they were originally gods, these are flattering and crooked words. If one asserts that because they fight with gods they are also called gods, then King Māndhātṛ, having defeated the asuras and fought with the gods, should also be a god. If one asserts that because they intermarry with gods they are called gods, the great Kinnara king Druma had a graceful daughter named Manoramā, whom the Bodhisattva Sudhana took as his wife; the Kinnara king should then also be a human. That they are called gods on account of their superior majesty is also not a valid proof, for we have heard that King Māndhātṛ's majesty was superior to that of the gods. Although Nanda, Upananda, and others are animals, their majesty and sovereignty surpass the hosts of gods. Therefore, asuras are subsumed solely under the ghost destiny and are not a sixth destiny, as no sūtra has ever said so (with many explanations)." Some say the destinies may have mixed essences, because different destinies serve as causes for one another to give birth to offspring, as in the case of the fish-bodied one and the sage Ekaśṛṅga (*Rṣyaśṛṅga*), of which myriad kinds have been handed down from antiquity: one body belonging to two destinies, hence there is mixture. The *Nyāyānusāra* refutes this, saying: "Their statement is incorrect. A destiny is determined by one's own karma, whereas the conditions for its birth are diverse. Just as Āmrapālī was born conditioned by a tree, and the Gautama clan arose conditioned by sunlight, so being conditioned by one another is not proof of a mixture of causes. As for the sage Ekaśṛṅga, the fish-bodied ones, and so on, although their forms differ due to variations in completing karma, they are in truth humans; hence destinies are not mixed. As for the differences between causes and results in remaining karmic responses, they will be extensively differentiated in the examination of karma."

8.84

The commentary states: "Right within the three realms... what are the seven?" Below, one verse and a half constitutes the third part, clarifying the seven stations of consciousness.

8.85

"The treatise says... the first station of consciousness": this briefly explains the stations of consciousness. The humans and gods of the desire realm, the three dhyānas of the form realm, and the three heavens of the formless realm: these seven birthplaces are the essence of the stations of consciousness. Now, following the sūtra's explanation, they are divided into seven. The text of the treatise above is citing the sūtra and pointing out the places.

8.86

The commentary states: "A portion of the gods... excluding those arising at the beginning of the kalpa." Because the human destiny is fully included, it does not require a separate explanation. Since the term "a portion of the gods" refers to an obscure matter, it is separately explained. "In the first dhyāna, excluding those at the beginning of the kalpa" is because they collectively give rise to the notion of attachment to precepts and vows.

8.87

The commentary states: "Different in body means... is called different in body," explaining "different in body." "Various appearances of color" refers to distinctions such as blue, yellow, and so forth. "Various appearances of shape" refers to distinctions such as long, short, and so forth. "Or because of difference in body" specifically designates the physical body. "Or having different bodies" designates the conventional person in general.

8.88

The commentary states: "Different in perception means... is called different in perception," explaining "different in perception." In the desire realm, for humans and gods the three feelings arise mutually, which is called difference in perception. In the first dhyāna, painful feeling is excluded. "They, due to difference in perception" specifically designates the mental state of perception. "Or having different perceptions" designates the conventional person in general. The concluding text is understandable.

8.89

The commentary states: "There are sentient beings possessing form... the second station of consciousness," citing the sūtra text.

8.90

The commentary states: "Why is that... is therefore called one in perception," explaining the meaning of the sūtra. Because in the first dhyāna they share the perception of a single cause, they are called "one in perception." Not mentioning the Brahmapurohita gods is mentioning the first to indicate the subsequent ones. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "For what reason do the Brahmakāyika gods collectively produce this conception? Because they see that Brahmā's dwelling place, bodily form, spiritual powers, and so forth are all superior. Furthermore, they observe that the Great Brahmā already existed previously, whereas they themselves and the other gods were born only later. They are unable to see that he fell from a higher plane, because relying on the first dhyāna to produce the supernormal knowledge of past lives, they cannot cognize the domain of a higher plane. For what reason does the Great Brahmā also produce this conception? Because as soon as he had the intention, the multitudes were born; because he considers them his own creation and not quickly passing away; or because he is deluded about the principle of the retributive response of karmic fruits; or because he sees that his own bodily form, strength, lifespan, majesty, and so forth surpass those of the remaining multitudes. Due to these reasons, although the Brahmakāyika gods and the Great Brahmā differ in body, they produce a single perception."

8.91

The commentary states: "The Great Brahmā King's body... is therefore called different in body," explaining "different in body." As the text indicates, it is understandable.

8.92

The commentary states: "The sūtra says: the Brahmakāyika gods... within that sabhāga," citing the sūtra to prove "one in perception." By this it is proved that they know: "I depend on Brahmā," and Brahmā also thinks: "I gave birth to the Brahmakāyika gods."

8.93

The commentary states: "Where did the Brahmakāyika gods ever see Brahmā?" This is a question. The reason there is this question is that either advancing or retreating entails an error.

8.94

The commentary states: "Other masters say... because they came to be born here," presenting the first explanation. The intention of this master is that when the kalpa first formed, the Brahmakāyika gods came from the second dhyāna to be born among the Brahmakāyika gods; therefore, one knows that they had seen Brahmā in the Ābhāsvara heaven. In truth, one should say that all three heavens in the second dhyāna are possible, but stating "Ābhāsvara" is mentioning the last to indicate the first.

8.95

The commentary states: "How could they at the present time... give rise to attachment to precepts and vows?" This other master's explanation entails errors whether advancing or retreating. In the Brahmakāyika heaven, if one has not yet abandoned the defilements of the first dhyāna and has not attained the second dhyāna, then one cannot remember the affairs of the second dhyāna. If one had already abandoned the defilements of the first dhyāna and attained the second dhyāna, it would not be fitting to take Brahmā of the first dhyāna as an object and give rise to attachment to precepts and vows.

8.96

The commentary states: "Other masters say: while abiding in intermediate existence," presenting the second explanation. The intention of this master is: when falling from the second dhyāna to be born in the first dhyāna, while in intermediate existence they had seen Brahmā having a long lifespan and dwelling for a long time.

8.97

The commentary states: "Abiding in intermediate existence... having a long lifespan and dwelling for a long time," refuting the second explanation. The intermediate existence of the form realm has no obstructions with respect to the place of rebirth and does not dwell for a long time; how could one say they had seen Brahmā having a long lifespan and dwelling for a long time?

8.98

The commentary states: "Therefore, the Brahmakāyika gods... give rise to such a thought," where the author of the treatise presents the correct explanation. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "When the Brahmakāyika gods first descended and were born, seeing the brilliant majesty of the Great Brahmā, although they cherished reverence and wished to approach him in person, constrained by his majesty they had not yet succeeded in going forward, and so considerable time elapsed. Later, exerting their single-minded sincerity, they approached and looked up to him; having arrived, they all collectively formed this thought: 'We have seen him before,' and so forth at length. That is to say, when they saw the Great Brahmā close at hand, they were able to remember what had been seen before, and furthermore were able to understand that prior to the multitude's descent and birth, Brahmā alone existed along with his mental aspiration. Or, having previously seen Brahmā in the Ābhāsvara heaven, upon seeing him now they were able to remember. That is, formerly in the Ābhāsvara heaven they had seen Brahmā dwelling alone in the lower plane, and also knew of his mental aspiration to dwell together with a multitude; moved by pity, they conjured up creations of the first dhyāna, causing the conjured hosts to accompany and attend upon Brahmā. After a brief moment of creating these emanation-beings, their own merit was exhausted, and at the end of their lives they descended to be born in the first dhyāna. The Great Brahmā's body, mind, and the conjured phenomena are all objects cognized by the supernormal knowledge of the first dhyāna; upon seeing him now, they produced the recollection of past dwellings, and therefore those Brahmakāyika gods formed this thought: 'We have seen him before,' and so forth at length. Other masters say: the eye-consciousness arising in the second dhyāna that can cognize the Brahmā world is subsumed under the dharmas of the first dhyāna plane, and therefore now they can also recollect that consciousness. Some say: those Brahmakāyika gods do not experience the pain of dwelling in a womb or of the severing of the marmans; on this account they possess mindfulness free from forgetfulness, and thus remember what was seen in the previous life, and so forth."

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俱舍論疏 — Classical Chinese