成唯識論了義燈 3.45

3.45

《論》：現在彼聚等者，量破於他准文可知。然《二十唯識論》云：他心智云何？知境不如實，如知自心智，不知如佛境。此文有徵有解，有遂有答。初二句外徵，以前答他除佛已外，雖知他心，然不如實，以他為質，相分少似，不能稱實，與本質異。故不如實，故今外徵。他心智云何知境不如實，　如知自心智？論主為解，不取見分，緣自見分，已除佛外，皆不能緣，據一剎那，非前後量故，如實知故，亦非自證，取前後緣，及緣別識，亦變相故，不如實知。他復遂云：云何知自他，俱不能如實？頌第四句不知二字，是論主答：若他心智除佛已外，由法執蔽，若現行、若種子，有此無知，覆心及境，故不能知。即由此覆，不知如佛淨智所行，離言說境，一不知言。通答前遂，并顯不知，如佛所由。准此《論》意，頌不知言，無知、不知，合名不知，通遂及答。疏云：然上座等，計同聚心相應之法，亦互能緣。《婆沙》第九云：如法密部，彼作是說，惠等能了相應受等。此意不說，各能自緣，俱互相緣。《婆沙》復云：或復有執，心、心所法能了俱有，如化地部。彼作是說，惠有二種俱時而生，一、相應；二、不相應。相應惠知不相應者，不相應惠知相應者。俱舍法師釋云：言相應者，與同時起心聚相應。不相應者，即前後念，不與同時心聚相應。此之二惠更互相知。今猶未了緣俱有法言，及西方師義，待後檢文。今又釋云：言相應者即四蘊，不相應者即是色蘊。及前後四蘊，與四蘊俱。不緣自相應，能緣俱起不相應蘊，名了俱有。智相應蘊前後智知，前後起智。即是不與此智相應，能知此智相應四蘊，即前後相應智更互相知。大眾部說，智等能了為自性故，能了自他，如燈能照為自性故，能照自他。

Regarding the treatise saying, "[the five and other consciousnesses] at present [do not cognize] that aggregation [of other minds]," the refutation of others by inference can be known according to the text. However, the *Viṃśikā-vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* states: "How does knowledge of other minds / know objects not as they truly are? / Like the knowledge knowing one's own mind, / it does not know them like the Buddha's domain." This text contains an inquiry, an explanation, a rejoinder, and an answer. The first two lines are an opponent's inquiry: because the previous answer was that, aside from the Buddha, although one knows other minds, yet it is not as it truly is—taking the other mind as the archetype (bāhyārtha / maula-dravya), the objective aspect (nimittabhāga) merely slightly resembles it and cannot match reality, being different from the archetype, hence it is not as it truly is—therefore the opponent now inquires: "How does knowledge of other minds know objects not as they truly are, / like the knowledge knowing one's own mind?" The author of the treatise provides the explanation: it does not take the seeing aspect (darśanabhāga) as cognizing its own seeing aspect, for aside from the Buddha, none can cognize that—this is stated in terms of a single moment, not of inference across earlier and later moments, so it does not truly know—nor is it self-awareness (svasaṃvedana); and when it cognizes across earlier and later moments or cognizes another consciousness, it also transforms an objective aspect, and hence it does not know as it truly is. The opponent further rejoins: "Why is knowledge of both self and other not as it truly is?" The two characters "does not know" (不知) in the fourth line of the verse are the author's reply: for knowledge of other minds, aside from the Buddha, owing to obscuration by attachment to dharmas, whether active or dormant, this ignorance covers both mind and object, and therefore it cannot know. Precisely due to this obscuration, it does not know the domain transcending verbal expression that is traversed by the Buddha's pure wisdom; the single phrase "does not know" collectively answers the preceding rejoinder and reveals the reason why it does not know as the Buddha does. Based on the treatise's intent, the word "does not know" in the verse combines "ignorance" (ajñāna) and "does not know" into the term "does not know," covering both the rejoinder and the reply. The commentary says: "However, the Sthaviras and others hold that the associated dharmas of the same mental aggregate can also mutually cognize one another." Fascicle nine of the *Vibhāṣā* states: "For example, the Dharmaguptakas make this assertion: wisdom and so forth can cognize the associated sensation and so on." The meaning here is not that each can cognize itself, but that they mutually cognize each other. The *Vibhāṣā* further states: "Or there are those who hold that mind and mental factors can cognize co-existent (sahabhū) dharmas, as the Mahīśāsakas do. They make this assertion: wisdom arises at the same time in two kinds: first, associated; second, unassociated. The associated wisdom knows the unassociated, and the unassociated wisdom knows the associated." Master Kuśa explains: "'Associated' means associated with the mental aggregate arising at the same time. 'Unassociated' means the preceding and succeeding mind-moments, which are not associated with the simultaneous mental aggregate. These two wisdoms mutually cognize each other." At present, the phrase "cognizing co-existent dharmas" and the doctrine of the Western masters are not yet fully understood, pending later examination of texts. A further explanation now states: "associated" refers to the four aggregates, and "unassociated" refers to the form aggregate. As for the preceding and succeeding four aggregates, they are simultaneous with the four aggregates; not cognizing their own associated dharmas, but capable of cognizing the co-arising unassociated aggregate—this is called cognizing what is co-existent. The aggregates associated with wisdom are known by preceding and succeeding wisdoms, and preceding and succeeding wisdoms arise—that is, they are not associated with this wisdom—and can know the four aggregates associated with this wisdom; that is, the preceding and succeeding associated wisdoms mutually cognize each other. The Mahāsāṃghikas state that since the intrinsic nature of wisdom and so forth is comprehension, it can comprehend both itself and others, just as the intrinsic nature of a lamp is illumination, and it can illuminate both itself and others.