肇論新疏 2

English (machine translation) 2

Language: English

2.1

Composed by Śramaṇa Wencai, founding abbot of the Great Wan Youguo Temple on Mount Wutai, head of the Great White Horse Temple at the Source of Śākya, bestowed the title Duke of Gui State, Master of Haiyin Kaifa, and Longtime Lecturer

2.2

Treatise on Prajñā Being Without Knowledge, Part Three

2.3

Explaining this divides into two: first, elucidating "prajñā"; and second, explaining "without knowing".
First, there are two kinds [of prajñā]: First is original awakening prajñā, which is the wisdom possessed by sentient beings and the like. Fascicle 43 of the Da zhidu lun translates it as "wisdom". Hence the "Manifestation" [chapter] of the Avataṃsaka Sūtra says that all sentient beings fully possess the Tathāgata's wisdom, and so on. Second is initial awakening prajñā, which is one of the six pāramitās. Yet it extends through shallow and deep: the shallow is the prajñā of the emptiness of the person, while the deep is the prajñā of the emptiness of phenomena. This again has two [aspects]: First is causal cultivation, meaning it is gradually attained across stages. Second is fruition realization, meaning awakening reaches the ultimate. Yet initial and original [awakening] are equal: there is only one awakening.
Again, there are three kinds: First is prajñā as dharmatā; because the Da zhidu lun indicates that prajñā is the dharmatā of all phenomena. Second is prajñā as contemplative illumination; because it illuminates both principle and phenomena. Third is prajñā as words and letters; because it can reveal the dhāraṇī. And in this treatise, the previous principles are fully subsumed; they will be shown as they occur in the text.
Next, regarding "without knowing": according to the treatise text below, there are generally two meanings: First is setting aside delusion; below it says, "originally there is no knowledge of delusional grasping", and so on. Second is revealing the true, which has three aspects: First, original awakening is free from conceptual thoughts; its knowing is precisely non-knowing; hence below it says, "indeed there is a knowing of animitta", and so on. Second, initial awakening is without knowing, meaning that exhaustive contemplation forgets illumination and adapting to encounters is without deliberation; prajñā as dharmatā and contemplative illumination can be understood analogously. Third, words and letters are without knowing, meaning that speech is identical to the emptiness of nature in words and letters; it is neither knowing nor not-knowing, yet is still called "without knowing". One who cultivates words and letters neither clings nor departs; this is called cultivating the mother of all Buddhas' wisdom.
One should know that profound prajñā contains all merits and brings forth inexhaustible Dharma gates, breaks open the cage of afflictions, and roams at ease in correct awakening.
According to the Liang Biographies [of Eminent Monks], when Master Kumārajīva first translated the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, the treatise master took it as his doctrinal basis to compose this treatise. When finished, he presented it to Kumārajīva, who sighed and said: "My understanding does not surpass yours, but in phrasing I must yield to you." "Treatise" means utilizing prajñā as words and letters through questions and answers to analyze principle and reveal dharmatā, and so on.

2.4

Now, prajñā, empty and profound, is indeed the ultimate宗of the three vehicles.

2.5

Being neither knowing nor seeing is called "empty"; being neither existent nor non-existent is called "profound". Again, not being subsumed by the four propositions is called "empty"; spiritual reflection forgetting illumination is called "profound". This cites the sūtra. "Ultimate" means reaching the utmost. Persons of the three vehicles all honor prajñā as their doctrine and each cultivate and learn it, but their capacities are small or large, fulfilling the bodhi of their own vehicle. Hence the "Wenchil pin" [chapter] of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā says: "Good sons! If you wish to attain the fruit of an arhat, you should train and practice in the prajñāpāramitā", and so on.

2.6

Truly, the ultimate unity is without divergence, yet heterodox treatises have long been in disarray.

2.7

The correct principle is unique; the utmost match is without divergence. Yet when people study prajñā, their views diverge according to their perspectives, and each raises different treatises; they have long been in disarray and confused their tracks.

2.8

There was an Indian monk named Kumārajīva, who in his youth set foot upon the Great Principle, ground his mind upon this purpose, stood preeminent beyond words and images, and subtly accorded with the realm of the silent and formless.

2.9

"Tianzhu" is also called Yintu or Shendu, which are the Brahmin kingdoms of the five Indias. Master Kumārajīva was born in Kucha, but because his father Kumārāyana was originally from Southern India, he is here designated according to his origin. His abundant virtues are as recorded in his biography. "Words and images" comes from the Yijing lüeli: "Words are born of images, images are born of intent"; here "words" is an analogy for the expressing capacity, and "images" is an analogy for what is expressed. "The silent and formless" (xiyi) comes from Laozi, which says: "Listening to it without hearing is called xi; looking at it without seeing is called yi." Here it is an analogy for prajñā: being free from names is called xi, and being free from marks is called yi. According to Master Kumārajīva's biography, in his youth he studied the Hīnayāna; upon awakening to Sūryasoma's exposition of the Anavatapta-sūtra, he turned to study the Great Principle, ground his mind upon this purpose, stood alone beyond words and images, and subtly united with the realm of dharmatā.

2.10

He gathered the heterodox traditions at Kapilavastu,

2.11

"Heterodox traditions" refers to non-Buddhists of the Western Regions. "Jiayi" (Kapilavastu) is the kingdom where the Buddha was born, and it also generally refers to various kingdoms. "Gathered" is like correcting. When the Master was in India, he refuted the heterodox and revealed the correct on more than one occasion.

2.12

and spread the pure teaching to the eastern regions. He was about to illuminate foreign lands, but hid his brilliance in the territory of Liang; this was because the Way does not respond in vain, and when responding, it must have a cause.

2.13

"Foreign lands" means other countries. "Territory of Liang" is present-day Xiliang. This means that Master Kumārajīva was about to raise and spread the style of teaching to transmit it east to the land of Han, but it coincided with Fu Jian losing his state and Yao Chang usurping power. Lü Guang and his son had no regard for the Dharma in their hearts, so the Master held within his deep understanding without a place to preach and transform. He remained in Liang for thirteen years; since conditions had not yet concurred, he drifted along with worldly circumstances. From this we know that the circulation of the Buddha-Dharma also awaits seasonal conditions; if it is not the right time, the Way will not proceed in vain.

2.14

In the third year of Hongshi, the year-star being Xingji, the Qin state took advantage of its scheme to march into the kingdom, dispatching an army with the intent of bringing him.

2.15

Chang's son Xing ascended the throne, and the year era was named Hongshi. Regarding "Xingji", the Yao Commentary says: "The chou month is Xingji; here the month is used to record the year." For "Qin took advantage...", the Liang Biographies says: "In the third year of Hongshi, trees in the ancestral temple courtyard grew intertwined branches, and the scallions at the Xiaoyao Garden turned into angelica. Deeming these to be auspicious omens, it was said that a wise person was due to enter. In the fifth month, Qin dispatched Shuode, the Duke of Longxi, to attack them, and Lü Long's army was thoroughly routed. In the ninth month, Lü Long submitted a memorial offering surrender." Hence it says "the scheme to march into the kingdom". By the end of the twelfth month, the Master arrived in Chang'an. Alternatively, "army" (shi) means Master (shi) Kumārajīva: the intent of the western campaign was to mobilize an army to bring him.

2.16

The ordained destiny of the northern heavens was indeed thus.

2.17

The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā says: "After the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, prajñā will first go to the south, next to the west, and next to the north where it will flourish greatly." Cīnasthāna lies to the northeast of India. Now that Master Kumārajīva's Way has reached here, it corresponds to this distant prediction.

2.18

The Heavenly King of the Great Qin: his Way harmonizes with the foremost of the hundred kings, his virtue bathes down across a thousand years; deftly maneuvering through myriad affairs, he propagates the Way the entire day; he is truly what the populace of this decadent age looks up to as heaven, and what the bequeathed Dharma of Śākyamuni relies upon.

2.19

Out of modesty, the King did not call himself Emperor, but only compared his steps to the Three Kings, following the Spring and Autumn Annals which honored Zhou as Heavenly King. "Hundred kings" merely refers generally to sovereigns of past generations. "Deftly maneuvering" comes from the Zhuangzi, where Cook Ding butchered an ox, moving his blade with practiced subtlety, hence called "deftly maneuvering the blade". That text says: "In deftly maneuvering the blade, there is bound to be room to spare." This means that the Qin King personally attends to myriad affairs daily, judging and settling them appropriately, just like skillfully maneuvering a blade. Moreover, he propagates and elucidates the Buddha-Dharma throughout the day. "Populace" (cangsheng) means sentient beings, meaning they are born in vast profusion (cangcang). Alternatively, "cang" is heaven, as they are born from heaven. This follows common usage. "Looks up to as heaven" means that the king's virtue matches heaven, and all things are sheltered under his shade. Formerly, by the Golden River (Hiraṇyavatī), the Buddha gave his final testament, commanding kings and ministers to propagate and protect [the Dharma]; now the King observes and practices it, and the Dharma gate relies upon him.

2.20

At that time, he gathered more than five hundred monks versed in the doctrinal meanings at the Xiaoyao Garden, personally held the Qin texts, and collated and verified the vaipulya scriptures together with Master Kumārajīva.

2.21

"Monks versed in doctrinal meanings" corresponds to the "explication of meaning" category among the ten sections of monastic history. The Xiaoyao Garden is the present-day Caotang Temple in Qin. Originally Yao [Xing] had established a multi-tiered pavilion here; when Master Kumārajīva entered the pass, it was bestowed as a temple. According to the Annals in the Book of Jin, the King deeply believed in the Buddha-Dharma and invited the Master to translate and elucidate it. The Master held the Sanskrit texts, while the King held the Qin texts, and they mutually collated and verified them, translating various sūtras (and so on). "Vaipulya" (fangdeng) means square, upright, and equal; that is, the vaipulya division.

2.22

What they opened up and developed—how could it be of benefit only to that era? It is indeed a bridge across many kalpas.

2.23

"Tuo" means to support an object with the hand, and also means to open a door. It means that the sūtras and treatises translated opened up and transformed everyone, which not only benefited that time, but truly serves as a bridge across the bewildered fords of accumulated kalpas. Today, the coral cases of the ocean of the canon number over five thousand scrolls, and the sūtras produced by the Master are widely propagated and praised in the world.

2.24

I, being deficient in ability, once participated in this splendid gathering, and I consider that my hearing of the extraordinary essentials from my superior began from this time.

2.25

The treatise master modestly says: "Because my talent was meager and my wisdom lacking, yet I participated in Master Kumārajīva's fine and auspicious gathering, the extraordinary and subtle meanings began from this time." Because he heard them from Master Kumārajīva, he says "hearing from my superior".

2.26

However, sage wisdom is faint, subtle, deeply hidden, and difficult to fathom; animitta and nameless, it cannot be captured by words and images. As a tentative attempt to grasp it in its obscure form, I lodge it in wild words; how could it be said that the sage mind can be debated? Let us tentatively discuss it, saying:

2.27

Sage wisdom is the essence of prajñā, free from all discriminations; hence it is called "faint and subtle". Because it is animitta, it cannot be conceived through meanings and images; because it is nameless, it cannot be discussed through verbal expressions; hence it is called "difficult to fathom". "As a tentative attempt..." below means: although prajñā cannot be reached by names and marks, in wishing to awaken beings, one must inwardly forget its images and outwardly lodge it in words to debate it. Wishing to speak of the unspeakable, he therefore calls them "wild [words]". The Zhuangzi says: "He sent the Obscure and Formless (Wangxiang) to seek it, and found it." Old editions had the character "wang" 惘, which is an error. Below "how could it be said...", principle is not subject to verbal debate, yet words are merely lodged to reveal it.

2.28

From here below, he first cites sūtras to establish the doctrinal thesis, and afterward conducts nine rounds of question and answer to resolve the meaning within the doctrine, leaving no remaining doubts.

2.29

The Fangguang [jing] says: "Prajñā has no mark of possessing anything, and no mark of arising and ceasing." The Daoxing [jing] says: "Prajñā knows nothing and sees nothing."

2.30

He briefly cites two sūtras to demonstrate what this treatise takes as its doctrinal basis. The Fangguang is the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, differing only through two translations. Fascicle 20 says: "Prajñā has no mark of possessing anything." Fascicle 15 says: "Subhūti! The prajñāpāramitā has the mark of neither arising nor ceasing." Fascicle 1 of the Daoxing says: "From what should the prajñāpāramitā be expounded? The bodhisattva can neither be seen nor known at all." "Having no mark of possessing anything" means that marks such as being, non-being, knowing, and seeing are all departed from. "Having no mark of arising and ceasing" means that it is not produced by causes and conditions. Furthermore, the four characteristics do not shift, and the three periods of time do not change. The rest is explained below.

2.31

This discusses the function of wisdom's illumination, yet why does it say animitta and without knowing? It is clear that indeed there is a knowing of animitta, and an illumination of not-knowing.

2.32

The first two lines pose a rhetorical examination. One who does not understand asks: "The two sūtras clearly elucidate the function of wisdom, yet why do they say without knowing and animitta?" The last two lines briefly indicate: a principle such as this indeed exists (and so on). It means that the spiritual reflection of the true mind knows non-knowing marks; being without knowing, it knows.

2.33

Why is this so? Where there is something known, there is something not known. Because the sage mind is without knowing, there is nothing it does not know. The knowing of not-knowing is indeed called omniscient.

2.34

The first two sentences bring up delusion. That is to say, deluded consciousness grasps objects, with subject and object clearly apparent; thus it is called having knowledge. Deluded views are not all-pervasive; thus it is called having something one does not know. Why is this? Now, the mind-master of a person merely oversees the bodily vessel; the attendant manas only maintains the seeing-aspect; the consciousnesses of the counseling ministers know in vain the domain of contamination; and the capabilities of the five generals merely strike at the realm of worldly clamor. Each has its own measure; how could their knowing be real? Therefore it is stated thus. The latter four sentences show the real. The sage mind is not like this: it is not the grasping of subject and object, so it is said to have no knowledge; original awakening is spiritually luminous, leaving no phenomenon unilluminated, so it is called all-knowing. This is precisely because the substance that is identical to wisdom is perfectly boundless, and the wisdom that is identical to substance also expands without exterior. This is because all phenomena originally abide within wisdom; how could there be phenomena within wisdom that are not known? The Buddha-Nature Treatise says: "By means of the wisdom of tathatā, one accords with the object of tathatā," and so forth. Moreover, phenomena appear in reliance upon mind, and no phenomenon is not mind. To know phenomena that are identical to mind by means of the mind that is identical to phenomena is supremely all-knowing.

2.35

Therefore a sūtra says: "The sage mind has nothing it knows, and has nothing it does not know." This is true indeed.

2.36

Chapter 1 of the Viśeṣacintibrahmaparipṛcchā-sūtra says: "By having nothing it knows, it knows."

2.37

Therefore the sage empties his mind yet solidifies his illumination, knowing all day long yet never having known. Hence he can silently and uniquely conceal his light, empty his mind in profound reflection, shut off wisdom and stop up hearing, and uniquely awaken to the profound and remote.

2.38

The text resembles the book of Laozi, but the doctrinal meaning is truly different. "Empties his mind" is because there are no characteristics of knowing. "Solidifies his illumination" is because there is the function of illumination. From "knowing all day long" downward is because knowing is identical to non-knowing. From "silently [conceal] his light" downward directly reveals animitta. However, the substance of prajñā is utterly non-conceptual; in sense it is said to be "concealed and silent," not that it intentionally hides itself. From "shut off wisdom" downward, wisdom and hearing belong to the subject wisdom that realizes; the profound and remote belongs to the object principle that is realized; by using wisdom to realize principle, illumination returns to quietude, which is also figuratively called "shut off and stopped up." "Uniquely awaken" is because wisdom is non-dual. The Suvarṇaprabhāsa says: "Among the virtues of the Buddha-fruit, only tathatā and the wisdom of tathatā uniquely abide." Tathatā is deep and obscure; thus it is called "profound and remote." Great Master Ci'en says: "Its nature is dark and obscure." The meaning is precisely the same as this. The above text does not divide the provisional and the real, and quiescence and function are both interfused: the prajñā of dharmatā encompasses everything. From here downward, it clarifies the two wisdoms based on the two truths: not two and yet two, two and yet not two, which opens dharmatā into observational illumination. In explicating the tradition, compassion and wisdom guide each other; within the power of a single thought-moment, expedient means and wisdom are fully present.

2.39

Accordingly, wisdom possesses the illumination that exhausts the hidden depths without having knowledge, and spirit possesses the function of responsive encountering without having deliberation.

2.40

The "hidden depths" belongs to the wisdom of principle; that is, real wisdom illuminates without limit, so it is said to "exhaust the hidden depths." The ultimate truth is not a characteristic, so it is said to "have no knowledge." "Spirit" refers to conventional wisdom. Its responsive application is difficult to fathom, so it is named "spirit." "Responsive encountering" means that when there is a stimulus, it inevitably responds without missing the encounter. Yet, as the moon appears in clear water, it has no mind toward transformation; thus it is said to "have no deliberation." Question: Are great compassion and great vows not knowledge? Answer: Unconditioned compassion and animitta vows both extinguish knowledge and illumination. Thus the Vajrasamādhi-sūtra says: "If you transform sentient beings, let there be no production in transformation. When non-production is without transformation, its transformation is great indeed." Question: Observing capacities and discerning transformation, is this not knowledge? Answer: According to the treatise's fundamental meaning, it is solely due to the stimulus of capacities. Though responding to the ten thousand kinds, spirit is also without thought. When teaching accords with what is suitable for faculties, one speaks of it as "observing and discerning"; throughout the treatise from beginning to end, this principle is clearly evident.

2.41

Spirit is without deliberation, so it can uniquely reign beyond the world; wisdom is without knowledge, so it can profoundly illuminate outside of phenomena.

2.42

The function of spirit involves being; because it is without thought or deliberation, being cannot bind it, so it is said to be "beyond the world." "Reign" means to flourish. Correct wisdom accords with the real; because it is not knowing, phenomena do not obstruct it, so it is said to be "outside of phenomena." As Qingliang, explaining "leaving the world," states in his commentary: "Dwelling in the world without defilement is precisely leaving it."

2.43

Though wisdom is outside of phenomena, it has never been without phenomena; though spirit is beyond the world, it remains all day long within the realm [of the world].

2.44

Fearing that upon hearing that real wisdom is outside phenomena people would say that there is realization of emptiness outside of being, it is therefore said that "it has never been without phenomena." This means that right within phenomena one sees the real. The Awakening of Faith says: "Because all phenomena are entirely real." Also, fearing that upon hearing that upāya-jñāna is beyond the world people would say that it does not transform beings, it is therefore stated thus. This means that dwelling in the world without defilement is itself being beyond the world.

2.45

Therefore, looking down or looking up, it accords with transformation and responds without end; there are no hidden depths it does not examine, yet it lacks the exertion of illumination. This, then, is that which is known by non-knowing, and that which is encountered by the sagely spirit.

2.46

The first two sentences concern the provisional function according with capacities: whether bending down or looking up, as soon as faculties are mature, it responds. Its responses are inexhaustible, and it is precisely by being without thought that it can be like this. "Bending down" means stooping down, which is speaking in accordance with the intent of others, such as human, heavenly, and Hīnayāna teachings. "Looking up" means gazing upward, which is speaking in accordance with one's own intent, such as the true teaching of the ekayāna. The next two sentences concern real wisdom awakening to phenomena without leaving any unexhausted; since it is neither knowing nor seeing, it lacks the exertion of illumination. The last two sentences conclude both: it is precisely by not knowing and not encountering that it can subsequently know and encounter; how could it merely be knowing yet not knowing, and so forth? For upāya-jñāna, one should also say "that which is encountered by non-encountering." The above discussed the two wisdoms as knowing being non-knowing, non-knowing being knowing, and so forth; the text below generally discusses the substance of wisdom as being neither existent nor non-existent.

2.47

However, as for its being as a substance: real yet not existent, empty yet not non-existent, persisting yet beyond discussion—is it not only sagely wisdom that is like this!

2.48

Wishing to distinguish the preceding meaning, he starts the momentum of the text anew, saying "However, as for its being..." and so forth. "Real yet not existent": although its true illumination is brilliant, it also does not have characteristics of existence; if one grasps it as existent, one clings to eternalism. "Empty yet not non-existent": although its wonderful stillness is profound, it is also not without mind; if one grasps it as non-existent, one falls into nihilism. Thus, because prajñā wonderfully persists, one can be a sage; if there were no prajñā, there would also be no sage. One simply cannot conceive of it in terms of existence and non-existence. From "is it not only" downward, he concludes by attributing it.

2.49

Why is this? If one wishes to say it exists, it has no shape and no name; if one wishes to say it does not exist, the sage is spiritually efficacious through it.

2.50

"Has no shape" and so on means that names are established based on characteristics, and characteristics arise from conditions; these are conditioned phenomena. Furthermore, the awakening illumination identical to mind does not arise from conditions; how could it have names and characteristics? "The sage is spiritually efficacious through it" means that the sage completely awakens to all phenomena and universally responds to all conditions precisely because the power of prajñā penetrates incomprehensibly; how could it be non-existent?

2.51

Because the sage is spiritually efficacious through it, emptiness does not forfeit illumination; because it has no shape and no name, illumination does not forfeit emptiness. Because illumination does not forfeit emptiness, it mingles without altering; because emptiness does not forfeit illumination, it moves to engage the coarse.

2.52

"Empty" means quiescent. It is precisely because it is not existent that quiescence is established, and because it is not non-existent that illumination persists; while quiescent it constantly illuminates, and while illuminating it is constantly quiescent, step by step tracing the path to explain and complete the previous meaning. "Mingles without altering" means that precisely when practicing upāya, it always abides in prajñā; hence entering the realm of sentient beings it is neither defiled nor bound. "Moves to [engage]..." and so forth means that precisely when in prajñā, it is constantly practicing upāya; hence its benefit and meaning circulate, guiding and receiving the coarse [capacities] of ordinary beings.

2.53

Therefore, the function of sagely wisdom has never been suspended for an instant, yet seeking its form and appearance, it cannot be obtained for an instant.

2.54

"Ever" refers to the initial sprout. With spiritual wisdom wonderfully persisting, how could it be suspended even for an instant? Being and non-being both negated, how could form and appearance be obtained? Speaking of "an instant" means not even for a brief moment, how much less could it be suspended for long or obtained for long? Not only can characteristics such as being and non-being not be obtained, but wisdom itself is also unobtainable: the path of speech is cut off, and the place of mental activity is extinguished.

2.55

Therefore Ratnakūṭa says: "With no thought or mind, yet active." The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra says: "Without moving from equal awakening, all phenomena are established." Thus, though the sage's traces are of myriad kinds, their purport is only one.

2.56

"Ratnakūṭa" refers to the verse in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa where the elder's son Ratnakūṭa praises the Buddha, saying: "The Buddha's thought and mind are already extinguished"—this is quiescence—"yet he displays activity"—this is illumination. Fascicle 29 of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra says: "Without moving from the limit of reality, it is the standing place of all phenomena." "The sage's traces" refers to the teachings, belonging to the above two sūtras. In ancient times, sentences were translated as "traces"; tracking the traces to catch the hare is like examining the sentences to obtain the meaning. In the treatise below it directly calls them "traces of the teachings." "Purport is one" means that while they differ in phrasing, they are not different in their intended purport.

2.57

Therefore, prajñā can be empty yet illuminate [mind]; ultimate truth can be extinguished yet known [object]; the myriad movements can be approached yet still [object]; and the sagely response can be non-acting yet acting [mind].

2.58

Because the ultimate truth that is observed wonderfully transcends all characteristics, it can only be known by non-knowing; hence when prajñā illuminates, it eliminates both subject and object, purely empty yet illuminating. The Renwang jing says: "Correctly abiding in observation, yet without characteristics of illumination." "The myriad movements..." and so forth means that because the conventional truth responded to is conditioned arising and intrinsically empty, it is still right in the midst of movement, and it also causes the responsive upāya-jñāna to act without acting. Mind and object are mentioned alternately before and after because it is acceptable whether mind is due to object or object is identical to mind; it also suits the flow of the text, not letting phrasing impair the intent.

2.59

This, then, is not knowing and yet naturally knowing [the real], not acting and yet naturally acting [the provisional]. What further knowing could there be? What further action could there be?

2.60

The first two sentences conclude the knowing and acting. From "What further..." downward, fearing that upon hearing of knowing and acting the mind would again dwell in attachment, this also dispels it. If a prajñā bodhisattva dwells even slightly, they immediately fall into deluded thought; clinging to the marks of self and person, they are not a bodhisattva. Therefore, both having attainment and having no attainment are entirely non-attainment. Eminently unattached, real wisdom appears before them, Dīpaṃkara gives prediction, and bodhi is attained.

2.61

From here downward is a major section of nine rounds of questions and answers to resolve and examine the preceding meaning. Previously, following the doctrinal purport, he roughly stated the broad outline; now, through the back-and-forth between guest and host, he makes people thoroughly understand. Hence Liu Yimin said: "If this debate is successfully penetrated, then the many streams of prajñā will almost meet without speaking." There is truly good reason for this.

2.62

The objection states: Now, the sage's true mind is uniquely luminous, illuminating every single thing; his responsiveness is without fixed direction, moving in encounter with affairs. Illuminating every single thing, his knowing leaves nothing out; moving in encounter with affairs, his encounters do not miss the opportune moment. Because encounters do not miss the opportune moment, there must be an encounter with that which can be encountered; because knowing leaves nothing out, there must be knowing of that which can be known. Because there must be knowing of that which can be known, the sage does not have empty knowing; because there must be an encounter with that which can be encountered, the sage does not have an empty encounter.

2.63

From "The objection states" down to "encounters do not miss the opportune moment" means that real wisdom exhausts the reality of all phenomena, and upāya-jñāna responds to the stimuli of all things, neither of them failing. Regarding the four sentences from "Because encounters do not miss" downward, Venerable Da of Yun'an says: "There must be wisdom capable of encountering that responds to capacities that can be encountered. There must also be wisdom capable of knowing that knows the principle that can be known." The four sentences from "Because there must be knowing" downward state that there are truly knowing and encountering.

2.64

Since there are both knowing and encountering, why do you say there is neither knowing nor encountering?

2.65

The direct objection is readily understood.

2.66

If one can forget knowing and abandon encountering, this is merely that the sage is unselfish regarding knowing and encountering in order to fulfill his own self-interest.

2.67

The first sentence sets forth the rescue, and thereafter all clarify the meaning. This is identical to Laozi. Since the previous text strictly challenged that there are knowing and encountering, fearing the rescue would say: although the sage has knowing and encountering, because he does not boast or rely on them, knowing is like not knowing, and encountering is like not encountering, and hence it is called forgetting knowing and abandoning encountering. If so, then this is merely that the sage does not take knowing and encountering as his own excellence to claim as private self-interest. However, because his empty mind does not exalt itself, he is upheld and venerated by beings, who in turn attribute knowing and encountering to the sage. Thus the sage cannot escape the excellence of knowing and encountering, and ultimately it fulfills his own self-interest. As Laozi says: "He puts his person behind, yet his person comes first; is it not because he is unselfish that he is able to fulfill his self-interest?" His meaning is: putting his person behind means not wishing to be selfish for himself; however, if he yields to others, others will inevitably yield to him, so originally wishing to be behind, he ends up in front—this is fulfilling his self-interest.

2.68

"This can only be said to mean that he does not regard his knowing as his own; how could he be without knowing?"

2.69

According to the rescue above, it is only that the sage does not take knowing and encountering for his own advantage. How could he be completely devoid of knowing and encountering? Is this not taking non-being to an extreme?

2.70

Answer: The sage's merit surpasses heaven and earth yet he is not humane (upāya); his clarity exceeds the sun and moon yet he is ever more dim (tattva).

2.71

"Heaven and earth" (lit. "the two appearances") are the shapes and forms of heaven and earth. "Not humane" derives from Laozi, though the intended meaning is different. He says: "Heaven and earth are not humane; they treat the myriad things as straw dogs." The meaning is: heaven and earth are impartial; although with humane kindness they give birth to and mature the myriad things, they expect no recompense from them. Just as when someone binds straw into a dog, they do not hold it responsible for barking and guarding. This is Laozi's idea. The meaning of the treatise is: through great expedient means [the sage] universally delivers [beings], his merit surpassing heaven and earth, yet with unconditional compassion he transforms without transforming and does not abide in the marks of transformation; therefore it is said that he is "not humane." As the Diamond Prajñā says: "Of the four modes of birth and nine classes [of beings], I deliver them all"—this is the surpassingly high merit; "and yet not a single sentient being is truly delivered"—this is being "not humane." "His clarity exceeds..." means that tattva-jñāna illuminates the principle, which is "clarity"; having no discrimination whatsoever is "dimness." Furthermore, clarity exceeding the sun and moon is universal knowing; being ever more dim is being without knowing. The Upādhyāya Guangyao of the Tang had the same intention.

2.72

How could it be said that [like] wood or stone, his mind is blinded? It is merely that in him, it is [a state of] being without knowing.

2.73

When I say "without knowing," knowing is itself without knowing; it is not like the lack of sensation in the deaf and blind, or in wood and stone.

2.74

It is truly because what differs from ordinary people is spiritual brilliance, and so one cannot seek it through phenomenal marks.

2.75

"Spiritual marvel and numinous brilliance" refers to prajñā. "Phenomenal marks" refers to the emotional views of ordinary people. What was objected to earlier—not relying on knowing and not boasting of encounters—is merely ordinary emotional consciousness humbly accommodating things, which is vastly distant from animitta-prajñā. Do not mistake not boasting for prajñā! Yanzi's open-mindedness and Meng Fan's not bragging have never been heard of as entering the principle.

2.76

Your intention is to have the sage not regard his knowing as his own, while the sage has never been without knowing.

2.77

Here he re-examines the earlier objection. Because the objector previously said, "This can only be said to mean that the sage does not regard his knowing as his own; how could he be without knowing?", he first verifies and fixes it. Below he censures him.

2.78

Is this not, then, contrary to the sage mind and missing the purport of the scriptural texts?

2.79

"Is this not, then" (wunai) is an abbreviated expression; in full it means "how could it not, then." As non-Buddhist texts say: "Is this not, then, flattery?" If there were definitely knowing, how could it not run counter to the mind and violate the teachings?

2.80

Why so? The sūtra says: "True prajñā is pure like empty space, without knowing and without seeing, without activity and without conditions."

2.81

The "Comprehension Chapter" of the Pañcaviṃśati says: "The Mahāyāna is like empty space, without seeing and without hearing, without knowing and without cognizing." The "Three Designations Chapter" says: "Prajñā has nothing seen regarding all dharmas," and so on. "True" excludes grasping in delusion. "Pure" has the meaning of having cut off marks. From "without knowing" onward explains and establishes purity. "Activity" (zuo) means making (zao). This refers to the teacherless, unconditioned knowledge that is not made through causes and not produced through conditions. The Renwang jing says: "Without practice and without conditions," which has the same meaning.

2.82

Thus, knowing is naturally without knowing; how could it wait to turn its illumination inward before being without knowing?

2.83

"Thus" points to the cited sūtra. Since it says prajñā is itself the essence of knowing, and further says it is without knowing and without seeing, then according to the meaning of this sūtra knowing is itself without knowing. How could it wait to withdraw its illumination, closing its eyes and stopping its ears, cutting off sagacity and abandoning wisdom, becoming murky like wood and stone, to be called "without knowing"?

2.84

If one claims it is pure because knowing is of empty nature (svabhāva-śūnya),

2.85

This provisionally presents their attempted rescue. Fearing that the objector might interpret the sūtra's meaning differently and rescue his position by saying: "The sūtra calls prajñā pure not because it is without knowing, but because knowing and seeing are empty of own-nature; therefore it is called pure." If one says this, then below he cross-examines him.

2.86

then without distinguishing between delusion and wisdom, the three poisons and four inversions would also all be pure. Why should purity be uniquely revered in prajñā?

2.87

If one says that prajñā possesses knowing and seeing, and the sūtra speaks of purity merely because of its nature being empty, then it would not differ from deluded wisdom. Why? The three poisons and four inversions are also all empty of own-nature and should also be pure. Knowing this, we see that it is not in terms of nature being empty, but merely in terms of being without knowing and without seeing. "Deluded wisdom" refers to the discriminations such as the three poisons being termed "wisdom." As stated below: "the non-existence of deluded wisdom." This is because the Awakening of Faith says: "The marks of wisdom among the six coarse [aspects] are delusion."

2.88

If one praises prajñā on account of the known,

2.89

"The known" is the ultimate truth. He fears that the objector might attempt another rescue, saying: "The sūtra's calling it pure is not in terms of the knowing prajñā being without knowing and without seeing, but merely in terms of the known ultimate truth being pure; hence prajñā is praised as pure."

2.90

the known is not prajñā, and the known is of itself constantly pure. Thus prajñā has never been pure, nor would there be any cause to bring about the praise of prajñā as pure.

2.91

The cognizer and the cognized are clearly distinct; how could the purity of the known make the knowing [faculty] pure as well, and lead to its being praised?

2.92

Yet when the sūtra says prajñā is pure, could it not be because the essential nature of prajñā is truly pure, originally devoid of the knowing that grasps in delusion? Since it is originally devoid of the knowing that grasps in delusion, it cannot be designated by the name "knowing." How could it merely be that the absence of knowing is called "without knowing"? Knowing is naturally without knowing.

2.93

This unifies the correct meaning of the sūtra. "Could it not be" (jiangwu) means "is it not." Since purity is not spoken of in terms of empty nature or the known, the sūtra's statement of purity has two meanings: first, the essence of wisdom is truly pure and not [conventional] knowing and seeing; second, it is originally devoid of the knowing that grasps in delusion. Since it is originally non-existent, it is difficult to designate it by the name "knowing." From "How could it merely be..." onward: fearing that a doubter hearing the earlier statement that the nature is purely without knowing might think it is inertly devoid of illumination, he now dispels this by saying: because knowing lacks the mark of knowing, and is originally devoid of delusive grasping, knowing is itself without knowing.

2.94

Therefore, the sage illuminates that animitta ultimate truth with the prajñā that is without knowing. The ultimate truth has no traces of the hare or horse; prajñā has no mirror-like illumination that fails to exhaust [reality].

2.95

The first two lines explain using wisdom to realize principle; the latter two lines explain the characteristics of realizing principle. "The hare and the horse" refers to the sūtra's teaching of the elephant, horse, and hare crossing the same river together; the river itself has no differences, but their attainment of depth varies, which serves as a metaphor for the three vehicles entering the dharmatā together with three different degrees of depth. The present meaning is: using the realized ultimate truth, which originally lacks the traces of the hare and horse's shallow and deep depths, to regulate prajñā, prajñā likewise lacks diverse and inexhaustible discriminations in its mirror-like illumination.

2.96

Therefore, it encounters without error and matches without assertion (upāya); quiescently without knowing, there is nothing it does not know (tattva).

2.97

"Without error" means that in responding it does not miss the opportune capacity; this is the "nothing it does not do" mentioned earlier. "Without assertion" means that because it responds according to stimulus, it is fundamentally not "I." From "quiescently..." onward can be understood. This merely resolves the earlier proposition that "ultimate truth can be forgotten, yet knowing...", and so on.

2.98

Objection: Things cannot make themselves understood on their own; therefore, names are established to make things understood. Although things are not names, there are indeed namable things that correspond to these names. Therefore, when seeking things through their names, things cannot remain hidden.

2.99

This raises the objection that the two names "knowing" and "without knowing" contradict each other. Here he first establishes the principle, and the text is also easy to understand. The idea is: names can summon things; when names are correct, things follow. This is based on conventional truth, where things can be obtained through names, just as when summoning fire one does not respond with water. Yet the treatise says that the sage mind is without knowing, and also says that there is nothing it does not know; the two names contradict each other. The objection uses tattva as an analogy for upāya.

2.100

The intended meaning is that "without knowing" has never known, and "knowing" has never been without knowing. This is the understanding conveyed by the teaching of names, and the original intent in establishing words.

2.101

For example, cold and warm are opposites, gain and loss are mutually exclusive; the verbal teaching evaluates this completely accessible principle, and the original intent of establishing names naturally possesses a definite substance.

2.102

Yet the author of the treatise wishes to make the sage mind uniform while diverging from the purport of the texts; seeking the reality (mind) through the texts (names), I see no correspondence.

2.103

That knowing is itself without knowing makes his mind uniform. However, the two names are mutually exclusive; how could the mind be unified?

2.104

Why? If "knowing" hits upon the sage mind, "without knowing" has nothing to distinguish; if "without knowing" hits upon the sage mind, "knowing" likewise has nothing to distinguish; if neither hits upon it, there is nothing further to discuss!

2.105

This says: if the sage mind possesses knowing, one should set aside "without knowing"; if the sage mind is without knowing, one should set aside "possessing knowing"; if the sage mind denies both, one should no longer utter the two names. Since the two names are established, their mutual negation renders all three positions inadmissible.

2.106

Answer: The sūtra says: "The meaning of prajñā is without name and without exposition, neither existent nor non-existent, neither real nor unreal; empty, it does not fail to illuminate; illuminating, it does not fail to be empty." This, then, is a dharma without name; therefore it is not something that words can express.

2.107

This also quotes the meaning of the Fangguang [bore jing] and other sūtras. Because the objector seeks reality based on names, and since the two names contradict each other, he claims that the sage mind is also divergent. Not knowing that prajñā is neither name nor mark, he cites the sūtra to refute him, causing him to forget names and meet the purport. The sūtra can be understood as apophatic discourse. From "This, then..." onward, the treatise's text briefly explains "without name and without exposition" in order to introduce the passage below.

2.108

Although words cannot express it, yet without words there is no way to transmit it; therefore the sage speaks all day long yet has never spoken. Now let me try to explain it for you with wild words.

2.109

The first fascicle of the Dafangbian fo bao'en jing says: "Dharmas have no verbal exposition. Through wonderful expedient means, the Tathāgata can expound dharmas that are without name and mark using names and marks."

2.110

Now, the sage mind is subtle and animitta, and cannot be considered existent; its application is ever more active, and cannot be considered non-existent. Because it cannot be considered non-existent, holy wisdom is preserved therein; because it cannot be considered existent, names and teachings are extinguished therein.

2.111

"Subtle..." means that the sage mind is free from the marks of knowing, seeing, making, conditioning, etc.; it is not existent. From "its application..." onward: the sage mind is numinously marvelous, illuminating principle and penetrating phenomena, its function unceasing; it is not non-existent. This also parallels Laozi. Since it is said to be subtly devoid of all marks, names and teachings cannot reach it in describing it, thereby answering the earlier objection that "seeking things through their names, things cannot remain hidden." Now, prajñā is not a thing; on what could a name be established? Would one wish to definitively name the sage mind through "possessing knowing" or "without knowing"? Chapter 37 of the Da zhidu lun says: "All the world clings to the two views of existence and non-existence," and so forth.

2.112

Therefore, speaking of "knowing" is not meant as knowing, but is intended to make understood its mirror-like illumination; "not knowing" is not non-knowing, but is intended to distinguish its marks.

2.113

From "speaking of knowing..." onward: if one speaks of possessing knowing, it is merely to make people understand its function of mirror-like illumination; how could there be a mark of knowing to be grasped? From "not knowing..." onward: if one speaks of being without knowing, it is merely to make people realize the absence of the mark of grasping in delusion; how could it mean being completely without knowing?

2.114

Distinguishing marks does not make it non-existent, and making understood the mirror-like illumination does not make it existent; because it is not existent, it knows yet is without knowing; because it is not non-existent, it is without knowing yet knows.

2.115

This means that the essence of prajñā is without knowing and without seeing, yet it is also not non-existent; it possesses mirror-like illumination and numinous awareness, yet it is also not existent. From "because it is not existent..." onward: this merely follows the preceding to explain that knowing and being without knowing are neither one nor different, only then designated as the mind of the Middle Way.

Linked texts (1)

肇論新疏 — Classical Chinese