Mimamsasutra 2.2

He sets forth the first topical section of the second quarter:
Is a corroborative statement such as 'Vāyu indeed [is the swiftest deity]' an authoritative means of valid cognition / regarding dharma which is to be enjoined, or is it not; or rather, does it exist with respect to that?

Because words of injunction and corroborative statement have their mutual expectancy exhausted, / there is no single sentencehood; whence could authoritativeness with respect to dharma arise?

Injunction and corroborative statement have mutual expectancy regarding praise and human purpose; / therefore, they have single sentencehood; hence, corroborative statements have authoritativeness regarding dharma.

In the section on optional animal sacrifices, an injunction and a corroborative statement are heard: "One desirous of prosperity should sacrifice a white [beast] dedicated to Vāyu" is the injunction; "Vāyu, indeed, is the swiftest deity; he runs to Vāyu himself with his own share; he alone leads him to prosperity" is the corroborative statement. There, the words 'dedicated to Vāyu' and so on situated in the injunctive sentence enjoin a qualified object quite independently of the words of the corroborative statement. And the words of the corroborative statement narrate an established fact quite independently of the other. When it is said, "Vāyu, who moves swiftly, being gratified by his proper share, grants prosperity to the giver of the share," some narrative is understood just as in the Rāmāyaṇa, Mahābhārata, and the like, but no action to be performed [is understood]. Hence, since there is no unified sentencehood, a corroborative statement has no validity with regard to dharma—this having been arrived at,

we reply: Let there not be unified sentencehood of words; but unified sentencehood of sentences does exist. First, the injunctive sentence requires the praiseworthiness of the enjoined object in order to motivate a person. And the corroborative sentence requires a human goal, because it is encompassed by the injunction of study which terminates in the understanding of meaningful objects. There, the corroborative sentence, presenting through secondary signification the praiseworthiness required by the injunction that terminates in a human goal, attains unified sentencehood with the injunctive sentence. The syntactic connection of the two sentences is: "Since Vāyu, by his nature of moving swiftly, is a grantor of swift fruit, [and] is the deity of this animal, therefore one should sacrifice this praiseworthy animal dedicated to Vāyu." Therefore, corroborative statements are a means of valid cognition with regard to dharma.

In this very topical section, following another view, he states the prima facie and conclusive views: / If it is said that the injunction lacks validity because it requires a reason stated in the corroborative statement, / the Guru declared that there is no requirement [of a reason], since the connection exists through praise.

"Since Vāyu swiftly grants fruit, therefore one should sacrifice [a beast] dedicated to Vāyu"—in this way, requiring the reason stated by the corroborative statement, the injunction prompts a person. Hence, because it is dependent [on another], it is not a means of valid cognition: this is the prima facie view.

If the inference, "The disputed ritual act is to be performed, because it is accompanied by a deity that grants fruit, like service to a king, etc.," were intended to be expressed in the corroborative statement, then the injunctive sentence, which is a verbal means of valid cognition, would depend on another means of valid cognition. But this is not intended. Rather, through the presentation of gratifying a deity that grants fruit, the praiseworthiness of the ritual act is metaphorically indicated. That being so, since the injunction along with the corroborative statement terminates in this sense, "A praiseworthy ritual act is to be performed," unified sentencehood is obtained. In that case, whence any dependence? Therefore, the injunction is a means of valid cognition: this is the conclusive view.

(In the second topical section on assertions resembling an injunction: aphorisms 19–25)

1.2.19 Or it may be an injunction because of conveying something not known before; for a mere corroborative statement is meaningless.

1.2.20 If it is said that it is like ordinary worldly usage;

1.2.21 No, because [the fruit] is not prior [to the action].

1.2.22 But its being a supplementary part of the sentence has been stated.

1.2.23 And an injunction is meaningless in some cases; therefore, praise should be understood; from its similarity [to those], it is so in the other [cases].

1.2.24 A transference of context, though possible, should not be assumed; for there would be meaninglessness of the injunction with respect to it; / 1.2.25 And in the case of an injunction, there would be a split of the sentence.

He composes the second topical section: / Is this assertion resembling an injunction, "for the securing of vigor," not [a praise]? / Does it praise the post's being made of udumbara wood, or does it praise [it] with the intention of enjoining it?

Because its being a fruit is obtained through the dative case, the post's being made of udumbara wood has a fruit; / stating the securing of vigor, how could it be aimed at praise?

Because the unpraised state of being made of udumbara wood is not enjoined, whose fruit would that be? / If there is duality of meaning, there would be a split of the sentence; hence, it is solely laudatory.

This is handed down in the sacred text: "The sacrificial post is made of udumbara wood; udumbara is vigor; animals are vigor; with vigor itself he obtains for him vigor, [namely] animals, for the securing of vigor." Vigor is said to be the extremely essential, subtle essence of food denoted by the word 'amṛta'. By means of vigor in the form of the udumbara, the Adhvaryu obtains for the sake of the sacrificer vigor in the form of animals. Therefore, the post's being made of udumbara wood serves to accomplish vigor—this is the meaning. Here, "for the securing" (avarudhyai) is in the dative case signifying purpose. By that, its being a fruit is understood, because that is seen in expressions like "service to a king for the attainment of wealth." And it is not proper that a statement aimed at a fruit should be laudatory; otherwise, in the case of "one desirous of heaven," even the word "heaven" would unacceptably be laudatory of the Jyotiṣṭoma—this having been arrived at,

we reply: Whose fruit would this securing of vigor be—of the state of being made of udumbara wood which is not enjoined, or which is enjoined? Not the first, because without performance,

a fruit cannot arise from a mere substance. In the second case, is the injunction here direct, or is it to be inferred? Not the first, because the optative suffix is not heard in "The sacrificial post is made of udumbara wood." In the second case, it would have to be inferred through praise; and you do not admit praise here. If it should be said: "The state of being made of udumbara wood is praised for the sake of being enjoined, and its fruit is made known," then there would be a split of the sentence. Hence, even though it is asserted like an injunction of a fruit, this sentence is solely laudatory.

On this very point, he states the prima facie and conclusive views according to the view of the Guru: / Because whether "he obtains" is an injunction or a corroborative statement is undetermined, / the verbal direction is not a means of valid cognition; this [view is rejected]: for it is a corroborative statement through unified sentencehood.

"He obtains vigor, [namely] animals"—because it conveys something not known before, its being an injunction appears; because of the absence of the optative and so forth, its being a corroborative statement [appears]. Therefore, being doubtful, the verbal direction is not a means of valid cognition: this is the prima facie view.

By obtaining unified sentencehood, its being a corroborative statement is determined. Therefore, the verbal direction is a means of valid cognition: this is the established conclusion.

(In the third topical section on assertions resembling a reason: aphorisms 26–30)

1.2.26 Or it may be a reason, because of meaningfulness and plausibility.

1.2.27 But it is praise, because [the action] is preceded by the word; there is no verbal direction for it.

1.2.28 If it is said that praise with respect to a purpose is improper;

1.2.29 But the purpose is as a subsidiary part to an injunction, as in ordinary worldly usage.

1.2.30 And if a reason were established by virtue of direct statement, [and] if it is said to be from similarity, there would be lack of settled order among injunctions.

He composes the third topical section: / Is the corroborative statement uttered as "for by it food [is prepared]" a reason or a praise? / Since its causality is directly heard through the word 'for' (hi), a winnowing basket as well as another [instrument] would be the means.

The instrumentality of the winnowing basket is directly revealed by Vedic text; it is not optional with non-Vedic means; / therefore, the reason is purposeless; hence, praise is the motivator.

This is handed down in the Veda: ‘He offers with a winnowing basket, for food is made with that.’ This corroborative statement is connected as a reason for the winnowing basket which is to be enjoined, because the word ‘for’ (hi) expresses a reason. When it is stated, ‘Since it is a means for food, therefore one should offer with a winnowing basket,’ what is obtained is: ‘Whatever is a means for food, such as a ladle or a cooking pot, one should offer with all that.’ Consequently, the prima facie view being reached that ‘cooking pots and the rest are optional alternatives alongside the winnowing basket’—

We reply: The winnowing basket’s being a means for the oblation is directly stated in Vedic text, because it is known from the instrumental case ending. But that of the cooking pots and the rest is inferred. Therefore, because their strength is not equal, an optional alternative is not proper. Hence the reason is purposeless. Praise is useful for instilling interest; therefore the connection is by way of praise. || 9

(In the fourth topical section on the indicatory marks of mantras, aphorisms 31–53)

Because of injunctions regarding their purpose;

Because of the restriction of sentence-order;

Because of instruction of what is already known;

Because of statement of what does not exist;

Because of addressing an inanimate object;

Because of contradiction of sense;

Because of the statement regarding learning one's own recitation;

Because of unintelligibility;

Because of connection with transient things, the mantras are purposeless.

But the meaning of the sentence is not distinct;

The restatement is for the purpose of a secondary detail;

It is an exclusive specification;

Or it is a corroborative statement;

The subsequent [phrase] is not contradictory;

In a command, there is no apprehension of blameworthy ritual action, because it is a purificatory rite;

In the case of designation, it is a corroborative statement;

It cannot be a negation, on account of a secondary quality;

Because of connection with the statement of knowledge;

The non-comprehension relates to something beyond the existent;

And connection with transient things has been explained;

And there is the instruction of the indicatory mark, because they have that purpose;

Because there is adaptation;

And there are words of injunction.

He sets forth the fourth topical section:
Are mantras such as ‘Spread wide’ solely the cause of unseen results
in sacrifices, or do they illuminate the spreading of the sacrificial cake and the like?

Because that illumination occurs also through the Brāhmaṇa portion, mantras are causes only of religious merit;
Not so, because the illumination thereof is visible; a visible result is better than an unseen one.

‘Spread wide’ is a certain mantra. Its meaning is: ‘O sacrificial cake, expand yourself in such a way that there is great breadth.’ Mantras such as this, being uttered during the performance of a sacrifice, produce only an unseen result. Their recitation is not for revealing the meaning, because the matter characterized by the spreading of the cake is revealed even by the Brāhmaṇa sentence. For indeed, the Brāhmaṇa sentence is: ‘With “Spread wide,” he spreads the sacrificial cake’—[if this is argued,] / this is not proper. Because, when a visible purpose consisting in conveying the meaning is possible, it is impossible to postulate a purely unseen result. / Therefore, the visible recollection of the meaning alone is the purpose of reciting the mantra during the sacrificial performance. Even though recollection of the meaning is possible through the Brāhmaṇa sentence as well, the restriction that ‘it must be recollected only by means of the mantra’ may have an unseen purpose, since no visible purpose is possible. / In this very matter, according to another opinion, he states the prima facie and final views:
Or rather, there is a dispute between the mantra and the Brāhmaṇa with regard to ritual employment;
Not so, since the other merely reiterates the meaning established by the mantra's indicatory mark.

If this mantra is employed through its indicatory mark, the Brāhmaṇa sentence would have an unintended meaning. If it is employed through the sentence, the mantra's indicatory mark would not be intended. Thus, because of the conflict of both, the injunction lacks validity—this is the prima facie view.

This conflict does not exist, because, the employment being established by the stronger indicatory mark, the sentence is a reiteration—

This is the established conclusion.