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Fall of the Mughal Empire v4: Volume 4

Fall of the Mughal Empire v4

Language
English

Contents

Volume 4

Front matter

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लाल बहादुर शास्त्री प्रशासन अकादमी Lal Bahadur Shastri Academy of Administration मसूरी MUSSOORIE पुस्तकालय LIBRARY अवाप्ति संख्या Accession No.......6683115967 . . . . . वर्ग संख्या Class No . . . . . 954:029........ पुस्तक संख्या Book No . . . . . Sar 2nd ed. V.4 the *Gesta Romanorum*, the *Legenda Aurea* of Jacobus de Voragine, and the *Speculum Historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais. These were the books that fed the imagination of the Middle Ages, and they were the books that the Church, in its wisdom, provided for the instruction and edification of the faithful.

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But the Church did not merely provide books; it also provided the means of their dissemination. The monastic scriptoria, where monks labored in silence to copy the sacred texts, were the precursors of the printing press. And when the press finally arrived, it was the Church that first harnessed its power, using it to spread the word of God to the corners of the earth. The Gutenberg Bible, the first major book printed in Europe, was a testament to the Church's commitment to the written word.

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Yet, even as the Church championed the spread of knowledge, it also sought to control it. The *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*, or List of Prohibited Books, was a tool used by the Church to suppress ideas it deemed dangerous or heretical. This tension between the desire to educate and the need to control would define the Church's relationship with literature for centuries to come.

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It is a complex history, one that is marked by both enlightenment and suppression. But it is a history that cannot be ignored, for it is the history of the very foundation of Western civilization. The Church, in its role as the guardian of knowledge, has shaped the way we think, the way we write, and the way we understand the world around us.

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SIR JADUNATH SARKAR, Kt., C.I.E., *Honorary Member, Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain.*

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IN FOUR VOLUMES

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VOLUME IV 1789—1803

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M. C. SARKAR & SONS, LTD. CALCUTTA

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*Copyrighted by the author*

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Price—Rs. 10/-

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Printed by P. C. Ray at Sri Gouranga Press, 5, Chintamani Das Lane and Published by S. C. Sarkar of M. C. Sarkar & Sons, Ltd., 11, Bankim Chatterjee Street, Calcutta.

Preface

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The study of the Mughal Empire which I began with my *India of Aurangzib : Statistics, Topography and Roads* (printed in 1901), has come to its end with the extinction of that empire which is the subject-matter of the present volume. The events of nearly half the reign of Shah Jahān and the whole of Aurangzib’s are covered in my *History of Aurangzib* in five volumes, with a supplementary work *Shivaji and His Times*. Then follows W. Irvine’s *Later Mughals* (1707—1738) in two volumes edited and continued by me, and lastly this *Fall of the Mughal Empire* (1738—1803) in four volumes. Such a long survey, always on the basis of original sources in many languages, could be completed only by the rigid exclusion of those provinces of India which had broken away from the Mughal Empire, and also by ignoring events not directly related to the fate of that empire, such as the Anglo-French rivalry for the dominion of India, and the dynastic struggles in the provinces that had renounced the suzerainty of Delhi. A more serious defect is that the social and economic history of this long stretch of time has been crowded out of the present series, though I have made many short excursions into that field in my minor works and essays.

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During the half century that has passed since I started my investigation, a marvellous expansion of our available sources has taken place. Nearly the whole of the Statepapers and other valuable records in the Marathi language have been printed ; the records of the Central Government of India and the National Archives of France have at last been thrown unreservedly open to scholars, and both of them have begun valuable publication work. The Bombay Government’s achievement has been most creditable, as the cream of their Marathi records and all the English Residency correspondence have been made available in print. Even Rajput jealousy has been disarmed, and the priceless Jaipur records of the Mughal times are now allowed to be read. Every Marātha State now considers it a duty to publish its historical papers under careful editorship.

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Advances in cheap photography (such as rotary bromide prints and photostats, as well as micro-filming) have brought the most jealously guarded documents of European libraries within the reach of poor private scholars in India, and libraries containing such replicas are being built up in India, which was beyond the dream of our workers in 1901. Persistent search for half a century, mostly by our own people, has led to the discovery of many important historical manuscripts unknown before, so that Elliot and Dowson has ceased to be our sole stay. The India Government's Survey Department has given invaluable—but little utilised—aid to Indian historical study, by the publication of accurate and detailed maps of every part of India.

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Above all, there is a vigorous awakening among our reading public and university students, as to the charm and practical usefulness of original research into our country's storied past. This will lend solid support to my more fortunate successor in the next half century.

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JADUNATH SARKAR.

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10, LAKE TERRACE, CALCUTTA, 23rd May, 1950.

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PAGES Preface . . . . . iii

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Ch. 38. Hindustan during 1789 and 1790 ... 1—39 Mahadji Sindhia's problems and measures during 1789-1791, 1—Tukoji Holkar's rivalry with Sindhia and Nana Fadnis's wrong policy, 2—how Maratha interests were ruined, 5—Mahadji Sindhia's illness in Mathura, magical art suspected, 9—Himmat Bahadur seeks asylum with Ali Bahadur, 10—Tukoji's demands and opposition, 11—later history of Himmat B., 14—Ismail Beg fights Najaf Quli, 14—why Ismail Beg quarrelled with Sindhia, 16—Jaipur and Jodhpur Rajas against Sindhia, 19—Marathas against Rajputs at Patan, 21—battle, 23—Sindhia invades Marwar, 27—battle of Merta, 28—*Appendix A*. Mahadji's letter of resignation, 37—*Appendix B*. No Kachhwa treachery at Patan, 38.

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Ch. 39. Rajputana in 1791—1793 ... ... 40—74 Ismail Beg invades Sirohi and Gujrat, 40—flees to Kanud, 43—submits to Sindhia and is imprisoned, 45—end of Munim Beg and Najaf Quli, 46—disputes about Jaipur tribute, 48—final settlement with Sindhia, 50—Marwar, nobles overthrow Raja's government, 52—Bijay S's concubine dominates, 54—is murdered, 56—Sindhia's relations with Marwar, 57—Mewar, baronical anarchy, 60—Mahadji invited to save Mewar, 62—subdues rebel governor of Chitor, 65—Mewar administration organised by Sindhia, 66—causes of Rajput decadence, 68.

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Ch. 40. Sindhia--Holkar Rivalry ... ... 75—101 Founders of the two families, 75—Mahadji Sindhia's elevation and Tukoji Holkar's jealousy, 76—how Tukoji thwarted Mahadji, 77—open rupture, Suraoli affair, 81—Holkar arms for revenge, 84—Malhar Holkar II's hot-heated aggression, 85—battle of Panchilas, 87—Lakheri described, 89—battle of Lakheri, 92—*Appendix C*. Origin of the Holkar Myth, 96—*Appendix D*. Tukoji Holkar's arguments, 99.

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Ch. 41. European Military Adventurers in India 102—126 Defects of Maratha guerilla war, 102—why European military system under Indian princes failed, 104—indigenous war system really inferior, 108—India lacks pre-requisites of European military system, 109—Fortunes made in India by French generals, 111—why Maratha princes turned insolvent, 112—De Boigne's Corps, organisation, 116—De Boigne's career, 120—character, 123—Samru's corps, 124—Peshwa's paltan, 125.

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Ch. 42. The Sindhias in Puna ... ... 127—142

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Mahadji's objects at the Peshwa's Court, 127—Nana Fadnis, his wrong policy, 130—settlement with Mahadji, 131—Nana Fadnis tries to exclude Baji Rao, 134—Baji Rao II made Peshwā, 137—Tukoji Holkar dies, war among his sons, 138—Mahadji's widows make war on Daulat Rao, 140.

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Ch. 43. Lakhwa Dada's Governorship in Hindustan 143—164

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The Shenvi generals of Sindhia, 143—Lakhwa appointed viceroy of North, 145—mismanagement and misery, 146—fear of Durrani invasion, 148—Sharzā Rao Ghātgé gains influence on Daulat Rao, 150—Sindhia family war begins, 152—Lakhwa Dada fights for the Widows, 154—his campaign in Mewar, 155—Lakhwa reappointed by Daulat Rao, 158—wins battle of Mālpurā, 159—Widows' war renewed (1800), 163.

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Ch. 44. Jaswant Holkar in the North ... ... 165—193

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Early adventures of Jaswant, 165—crowns himself, 169—his relations with Lakhwa, 171—joins the Widows, 173—leaves their side, 176—Lakhwa defeated at Scondha, 177—dies, 178—Daulat Rao Sindhia's wrong policy and delay, 178—battles of Newri and Satwas, 180—Jaswant's victory at Ujjain, 183—is defeated at Indore, 186—his movements afterwards, 189.

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Ch. 45. Civil War in Maharashtra ... ... 194—216

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Baji Rao II's political folly, 194—Jaswant Holkar invades Maharashtra, 195—Mané's campaign, at Dond, 196—Nasik district plundered, 198—Jaswant Holkar's tactics, 200—battle of Baramati, 202—rival armies assemble near Puna, 205—Baji Rao's futile diplomacy, 206—Battle of Hadapsar, 207—Puna after Holkar's victory, 211—desolation of Maharashtra, 213.

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Ch. 46. Delhi Province, Sikhs, and George Thomas 217—244

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Sindhia's Hindustani dominions how governed, 217—Shah Nizam-uddin, the Delhi Resident of Sindhia, his character, 218—Shah Alam II's vices, 222—his domestic discords, 224—Mahadji's relations with the Sikh misls, 226—with Patiala and other States, 229—George Thomas, early career, 232—under Apa Khandé Rao, 233—battle of Fathpur, 235—founds kingdom of Hariana, 236—fights Sikhs and Bhatis, 240—is crushed by Perron, 242.

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Ch. 47. General Perron's Indian Career ... 245—260

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Perron's early life, 245—becomes Sindhia's supreme commander, 249—secretly turns traitor to Sindhia, 251—was no agent of the Government of France, 252—Perron's duplicity, 254—how De Boigne's army was ruined by Perron, 257.

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Ch. 48. War Preparations of the English and the Marathas ... ... ... 261—279

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Maratha reaction to Treaty of Bassein, 261—Daulat Rao's hesitating policy, 263—Marquess Wellesley acquires N. W. Province, its administrative improvement under Henry Wellesley, 265—how Lake trained his army to fight Marathas, 268—Governor General matures war-plans beforehand, 271—seduces Sindhia's European officers and Hindustani sepoys, 273 and 278—Ambaji Inglé's treachery, 274.

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Ch. 49. Anglo-Maratha War ... ... 280—312

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Lake routs Perron, 281—storms Aligarh fort, 283—Perron's downfall, 287—at Delhi, revolt of Bourquien, 289—battle of Delhi (Patparganj), 291—fall of Agra, 294—Ambaji Inglé arrives with army, 295—Laswari, described, 297—rival armies, 298—battle, cavalry attack, 300—infantry attack, 303—causes of the destruction of De Boigne's army, 308—Appendix E. Strength of the two armies at Laswari, 311.

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Ch. 50. Defeat of Sindhia in the South ... 313—337

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General Wellesley's difficulties, 313—his forces and plan of war, 314—Daulat Rao's plans and first movements, 316—the war, 1-10 sept., 318—lull in the fighting, 11-21 Sept., 320—Wellesley's march on Assaye, 321—Maratha armies at Assaye described, 323—Wellesley's first plan of attack at Assaye, 324—battle, first stage, disaster, 326—battle, second stage, victory, 328—end of the battle, 330—effect of the battle of Assaye, 331—Sindhia and Bhonslé make peace, terms of treaties, 332—End of the Mughal Empire, the Padishah's real status, 334—Sindhia's battalions at Assaye, 337.

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Ch. 51. The Old Order and the New ... ... 338—350

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Mughal imperialism contrasted with the English, social changes, 338—changes in economic life of India, 340—degeneracy of rulers and stagnation in protected States, 341—why England failed to form a nation in India, 342—causes of the fall of the Mughal Empire, 343—India modernised by the English, 346—the Indian Renaissance under British rule, 348.

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the *Gesta Romanorum*, the *Legenda Aurea* of Jacobus de Voragine, and the *Speculum Historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais. These were the books that fed the imagination of the Middle Ages, and they were the books that the Church, in its wisdom, provided for the instruction and edification of the faithful.

v4.c44.33

But the Church did not merely provide books; it also provided the means of their dissemination. The monastic scriptoria, where monks labored in silence to copy the sacred texts, were the precursors of the printing press. And when the press finally arrived, it was the Church that first harnessed its power, using it to spread the word of God to the corners of the earth. The Gutenberg Bible, the first major book printed in Europe, was a testament to the Church's commitment to the written word.

v4.c44.34

Yet, even as the Church championed the spread of knowledge, it also sought to control it. The *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*, or List of Prohibited Books, was a tool used by the Church to suppress ideas it deemed dangerous or heretical. This tension between the desire to educate and the need to control would define the Church's relationship with literature for centuries to come.

v4.c44.35

It is a complex history, one that is marked by both enlightenment and suppression. But it is a history that cannot be ignored, for it is the history of the very foundation of Western civilization. The Church, in its role as the guardian of knowledge, has shaped the way we think, the way we write, and the way we understand the world around us.

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CHAPTER XXXVIII

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HINDUSTAN DURING 1789 AND 1790

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§ 1. *A brief survey of Mahādji Sindhiā's problems and measures from January 1789 to January 1792.*

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When Ghulām Qādir was captured at the end of 1788, people naturally thought that Mahādji Sindhiā would once again become the supreme controller of the Delhi Empire that he had been before the Ruhela's usurpation. But in truth Sindhia's position had been very much weakened during the four years that had passed since the Emperor created him Regent in December, 1784. First and foremost, his financial distress had been greatly increased in the meantime. His ill-judged invasion of Jaipur in 1787, ending in the retreat from Lālsot and the overthrow of his power in Hindustan had dried up his revenue and stopped his tribute collection. At the same time, his army expenditure had been more than doubled in effecting the reconquest of Agra and Delhi which filled the year 1788. Thus, the beginning of 1789 found him owing three years' pay to his Deccani troops, and they refused to set out on any new campaign unless their arrears were paid. But no money was within sight; the vast areas of Upper India and Rajputana had been devastated in consequence of long years of war and plunder by rival armies and robber bands. The effect of anarchy was aggravated by a drought and famine which raged in Rajputana and Western Hindustan throughout the years 1790 and 1791.

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The sudden rise of Ghulām Qādir had shown that the anti-Maratha party at the Delhi darbār was not dead, and even after the Ruhelā chief had fallen that party had a formidable leader still left. Of the four lieutenants of Mirzā Najaf Khan, only two were now alive: his adopted son, Najaf Quli Khan, who did not count on account of his incompetence and lack of spirit, and Mirzā Ismail Beg, the nephew and worthy successor of Muhammad Beg Hamadāni in the leadership of the mercenary foreign troops popularly called the Mughaliās. Ismail, by reason of his war experience, courage, and power of command, was the greatest living champion of Muslim domination in the Delhi Empire and the only hope of the Rajput princes in building up an anti-Maratha coalition.

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Therefore, while the struggle with Ghulām Qādir was still undecided and Delhi had yet to be regained, Sindhia deemed it good policy to win Ismail Beg over (7th October 1788) and keep him harmlessly employed in wresting from Najaf Quli Khan the jāgir which he was building up for himself in the Rewāri Nārnaul area, (Ch. 36, § 7). This estate was now transferred by Sindhia to Ismail Beg. Mahādji Sindhia himself arrived at Mathurā on 4th July, 1788. In this holy city and its neighbouring village of Vrindāvan he remained till December, 1790, when he set out for Rewāri en route to Rajputana. During this long halt of two years and a half, he never once visited the Emperor, though so near at Delhi, nor marched to anywhere else in his Hindustan dominions. Though seemingly triumphant in arms, he was pinned down to one place by a series of difficulties. First, the complete suppression of Ghulām Qādir engaged his resources for the six months from July to December, 1788. Next year, his severe illness, beginning in March and ending in August, 1789, made any work impossible for five months. An offshoot of this illness was his animosity to Himmat Bahādur Gosāin, whom he ordered to be arrested on 21st July, but who took sanctuary with Ali Bahādur, and as a consequence of this step a civil war threatened to break out between these two Maratha Chiefs assembled in Mathurā.

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The mischief was made worse by Tukoji Holkar, who reached Mathurā at the end of July 1789 and immediately sided with Ali Bahādur in defying Sindhia.

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This daily widening rift between the two supreme Deccani leaders in Hindustan was utilized by the Rajput Rajahs to delay and finally to evade the payment of their long-promised tribute. They also hired Mirzā Ismail Beg and his Mughaliā mercenaries as their shield to prevent Mahādji from collecting the Emperor's and the Peshwā's dues from them by force. So, in March 1790, Sindhia had to decide on war. By two swift blows, at Patan and Mertā, he knocked Jaipur and Jodhpur successively out of the ring. But immediately after his second decisive victory (at Mertā on 10th September 1790), its political effect was destroyed by Holkar openly withdrawing his contingent from Sindhia's army, and intriguing with the Rajput princes for thwarting every move of Sindhia.

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In the face of this development Mahādji could no longer stay in Mathurā. He started from his cantonments at Shāntanu-kund (near Mathurā) on 30th October, 1790, entered Rajputana, and by various stages reached Chitor on 28th September, 1791.

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He met the Mahārānā of Udaipur near his capital, and then after settling the disturbed government of that State, he set out for the Deccan, leaving Rajputana at Pratāpgarh on 13th January, 1792 and reaching Ujjain, *en route* to Punā, on the 21st of that month.

§ 2. Maratha interests in North India how ruined by Tukoji Holkar's cantankerous opposition to Sindhiā and Nānā Fadnis's lack of statesmanship

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The Peshwā Bālāji Rao had assigned to Holkar and Sindhiā equal shares in the *chauth* due from Northern India. At that time these two houses used to send equally large armies on the Northern campaigns of the Marathas, and make equal sacrifices. But after the death of Malhar Holkar (1766), the armed strength of the Holkars had grown less and less, while the power of the Sindhias, thanks to Mahādji's genius, had totally eclipsed their rival's. Indeed, the recent victories over Ghulām Qādir, Ismail Beg, Jaipur and Jodhpur (1788-1790) had all been won by Mahādji’s New Model army.

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Holkar had done nothing to put down Ghulām Qādir or Ismail Beg, and even where he fought as an ally of Sindhia, namely at Patan and Mertā, his contribution had been no trained infantry, no guns, and only 4,000 old-type light cavalry against four to five times that number of horsemen supplied by Sindhia. And yet, now in 1790, Tukoji Holkar claimed that, as the equal of Sindhia in the Peshwā’s service, he was entitled to half the territory acquired, half the tribute paid, and half the spoils taken as the fruits of these recent victories. Mahādji Sindhia could not satisfy such an absurd claim, and immediately after Mertā, the Holkar contingent withdrew from service with Mahādji’s army and Tukoji openly intrigued with every prince and minister who wanted to defy or thwart Sindhia. Thus, the Maratha power and prestige in Rajputana and the Doāb was threatened with collapse, just after such a decisive victory as Mertā.

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Mahādji again and again wrote to Nānā Fadnis at Punā, pointing out how the general interests of the Marathas and the Peshwā’s position in the North were being endangered by the recalcitrancy of Ali Bahādur and the hostility of Tukoji Holkar. But his appeals remained unheeded. In fact, Nānā Fadnis, the dictator of the Central Government of the Marathas, was jealous of Mahādji Sindhia’s rise to the first place in the political world of India and suspected that this general was carving out an empire for his own family in the north, and throwing his master into the shade with the help of the troops and authority supplied by the Peshwā. Nānā, therefore, deliberately kept the Holkar-Sindhia quarrel open, in order to weaken Mahādji and apply a brake to his rise. (PRC. i. 249.)

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No policy could have been more blind or unpatriotic. This open sore drained away all the life and energy of the Maratha power in the Mughal dominions; it paralysed the hands of Mahādji and made it impossible for him to impose Maratha suzerainty over North India as a generally accepted change. Such a public belief alone could have awed the refractory vassals of Delhi into obedience and averted the necessity of war and war’s inevitable consequences—the drain on the finances and the interruption of revenue collection. Thus even after Patan and Mertā the subdued North gained no real peace and time for recuperation.

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For full one year, from July 1789 to June 1790, Sindhia waited for a peaceful solution of his dispute with Holkar by their common master’s award; but he waited in vain. Then he used the sword to cut the knot. Jaipur was crushed for good at Patan (20 June 1790) and Mārwar at Mertā (10 September), and Ali Bahādur bribed to go away and conquer Bundelkhand. And then at last was Mahādji Sindhia free to leave Mathurā and assert his mastery in Rajputana.

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But not yet fully. For, the mischievous activities of the Holkar agents continued to obstruct the smooth working of Sindhia’s policy. So, he was forced to take recourse to the sword again: at Lakheri (1 June 1793), Holkar was decisively knocked out of the North-Indian ring.

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But it was now too late. Precious years had been wasted in delay and futility caused by Holkar’s opposition and Nānā Fadnis’s double-dealing, and after Lakheri Mahādji had only eight months of life left to him. With his death the empire he had built up for the Marathas under the mask of the regency of Delhi, began to break up.

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One cannot help feeling that Nānā Fadnis’s wrong policy was due even more to his ignorance of North Indian conditions and people than to the crooked working of his Machiavellian mind. He saw the things of the Delhi empire through his ears. His sole visit to North India had been made more than 30 years before, as an obscure and sickly lad, in the disastrous Pānipat campaign. Thereafter, neither he, nor any first-grade agent of the Peshwā was sent to visit Mathurā personally, see things for himself, and give a final decision in the Holkar-Sindhia dispute with all the authority of the Peshwa's Government. Such a course alone could have averted so much waste of blood and money by the Maratha race.

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Nānā Fadnis was obsessed by the narrow ideas of the age of Bālāji Rao, the third Peshwā, when Maratha armies were irresistible and every expedition brought back vast amounts of treasure or fertile new territory. He could not realise that North India had been sucked dry by ceaseless civil war, foreign invasion, and rebellion, ever since 1752. He could not adequately recognise that the balance of power in the North had shifted completely in consequence of the English rushing in to fill the vacuum caused by the Maratha eclipse at Pānipat. He knew not that the old Maratha policies of war and diplomacy which had succeeded under Bāji Rao I and Bālāji Rao (1720-1760) were now hopelessly out of date and that an entirely new orientation of Maratha policy in Hindustan and a new type of Maratha generals and administrators were required for carrying out the new policy. Nānā Fadnis lived blind to the moving outer world, like the proverbial frog in the well, and yet the central power of the Maratha Government during these eventful twenty years (1775-1795) was wielded by him with dictatorial authority.

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Mahādji Sindhia was the man on the spot. He knew by long years of personal experience the problems of North India better than any other Maratha leader then living. Therefore, the unwise conduct of Nānā Fadnis filled Mahādji with despair. He repeatedly wrote to Punā offering to resign his northern responsibilities to some other agent of the Peshwā, and himself retire to the long-sought repose of private life.*

§ 3. Why Sindhia ultimately failed

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The British victories at Aligarh and Delhi in 1803 were immediately followed by the establishment of a generally acknowledged British overlordship and normal civil administration in Agra, Delhi and the Doāb. But though Mahādji Sindhia gained equally brilliant victories at Agra, Patan and Mertā in 1788-1790, the conquests of his troops could not be consolidated into a stable Maratha province in the same regions. And with the withdrawal of the master from the scene of his triumph in January 1792, even the temporary recognition of Maratha hegemony ceased, military occupation could not solidify into orderly civil administration, and anarchy again raised its head. Thus Mahādji Sindhia's work was undone even before he closed his eyes.

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∗ The representatives of Nānā Fadnis in Mahādji's camp reported this again and again. *HP.* 517, 535-540, 552, 554, 557, 602. *Aiti Tipné*, iv. 13, p. 19. *PRC.* i. 266, 244.

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The Maratha recovery in Northern India after Ghulām Qādir's downfall had no natural basis. The economic and administrative foundations of a stable paramount authority could not even be started by Mahādji Sindhia or his successor. Let not the brilliant victories of DeBoigne's trained battalions over every anti-Maratha army they met with, hide this fact from us.

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Stable peace and acknowledged sovereignty alone could have enabled the Marathas to organise a new administration, and create a competent and honest civil service, in the conquered provinces of Hindustan and Central India. These alone could have given permanence to the Maratha paramountcy and enabled it to increase the wealth and happiness of the people in a few years, and the growing revenue from good administration would have met the cost of defence and thus doubly ensured the imperial peace. That was the achievement of the British as regents of Delhi; the Marathas failed in this task.

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§ 4. Mahādji in Mathurā, clash with Himmat Bahādur Gosain and Ali Bahādur.

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Delhi having been won and Ghulām Qādir caught before the year 1788 ended, Mahādji Sindhia was at last free to undertake his plan of work in Hindustan. Setting Mirzā Ismail Beg and Najaf Quli Khan to fight for the same jāgir (Rewāri-Nārnaul) and thus neutralise each other for a time, Sindhia turned his leisure at Mathurā to securing his special objects. One of these tasks was to carry out the order of the Punā Government to get the holy places of Mathurā transferred to the Peshwā’s administration by an imperial rescript. But Mathurā City and its satellite village of Vrindāvan did not between them make up all the shrines in the Vaishnavs’ Holy Land. The whole district, called Braja, was dotted with countless scenes of the Divine Cowherd’s antics ; and devout pilgrims make it a point to visit all the spots in this area of about 200 square miles. The district was interlaced with the jāgirs of several former Mughal grantees, and it took Mahādji years to persuade the imperial Chancellory to transfer the whole of the district to the Peshwā’s agents. The formal grant for it actually reached Mahādji’s hands in January 1791. (H.P. 588.)

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But Mahādji’s more immediate concern in Mathurā was a personal quest. He had gained power and fame beyond the dreams of ambition, but Providence had denied him a son, and a stranger would, therefore, enjoy all his life’s earnings after him. In September 1784 he had cherished the hope of getting an heir, but that hope had been dashed down to the ground when his rani Gangā Bāi brought forth a daughter. (Ch. 32 § 18.) And now, back in Mathurā, Sindhia began to woo the gods for the gift of a son. For this he made large gifts to the temples and the Brāhmans, and did worship in person, composing Hindi hymns in praise of his deity.

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Thus the first two months of 1789 wore on. At last he received a sharp letter from Shah Alam II telling him that if he did not extract Ghulām Qādir’s eyes, the Emperor would abdicate the throne and retire to Mecca in a beggar’s garb. Mahādji, with equal humanity and policy, had been so long pampering and humouring Ghulām Qādir in order to induce him to reveal the hiding-places of his Delhi loot ; but now that plan had to be given up. So, on 3rd March the Ruhela's eyes were dug out and sent in a casket to Shah Alam, whose revenge was gratified as the blind old man fumbled the contents of the casket and felt that his wronger had been paid back in his own coin. Islam is a by-product of Judaism. The Mosaic law of an eye for an eye was thus fulfilled. (Ibrat, iii. 296; DY. i. 378.)

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Immediately afterwards, as all people believed, the curse of Ghulām Qādir's mother began to work on the Maratha Chief. His malady started in the form of a slight fever, which was at first neglected. Then it grew into a swelling of the face, neck and chest. No medicine had any effect. On the 8th of June he censured his Hindu and Arabic physicians for their ill-success, and threatened to call in a European doctor. But though the help of the British Residency surgeon, Mr. Cochrane, was offered to him he would not trust a foreigner with his life.

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His disease was really "painful eruptions", or a malignant form of the summer boils of Mathurā. For three weeks after 20th June, Sindhia was in great pain and danger. Suppuration had set in and the slough was falling away, and nothing could give him any relief.

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A conference of physicians was held and they decided that as the best medicines known to their science had been employed in vain, the disease was not a bodily but an unearthly attack. A syndicate of learned astrologers confirmed the doctors' finding. A search was then set on foot for the workers of the diabolical conspiracy. Where evidence is so eagerly sought, it is always found. On 14th July spies reported that a woman of Vrindāvan had been boasting to her cronies that Sindhia's illness was the triumph of her witchcraft, and that she had practised it at the instigation of Gosain Himmat Bahādur's agents. She was brought before Sindhia, when she admitted her guilt. Later she identified the two servants of Himmat Bahādur (one disciple and one eunuch) who had paid her money and supplied the necessary materials for her infernal art. On being plied with promises of high reward, she performed then and there magical rites for counteracting the mischief already done, and lo! it had immediate effect in decreasing Sindhia's pain. Thus the charge was publicly proved true.

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The Maratha Chief was justly indignant with Himmat Bahādur. He had overlooked the Gosain's repeated acts of disloyal intrigue and even his open rebellion during the rise of Ghulām Qādir, and given him estates for maintaining himself and his contingent. But the recent agonies of his disease made him vow vengeance on such an implacable enemy. He sent some officers to call Himmat Bahādur to his darbār. On the way the Gosain slipped away and riding into Ali Bahādur's camp, took sanctuary under the Peshwā's flag.

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When Mahādji sent his minister to demand the surrender of his escaped criminal, Ali Bahādur replied that he had neither invited the offender nor was detaining him, and that Sindhia might come and take him away. But the backs of the officers of the Punā contingent under Ali Bahādur were now up; they cried out that as the Gosain had sought asylum under the Peshwā's zari patkā, the honour of their master demanded that he should be protected with their own lives. For three days (21st to 24th July) Sindhia's troops invested Ali Bahādur's camp, the latter's men stood to arms, and a civil war between the two servants of the Peshwā seemed imminent. But again Rānā Khan's moderate counsels prevailed and Mahādji was induced to recall his troops and after long wrangling finally to refer the dispute to the Peshwā for decision.

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The immediate effect of this incident was to ruin Mahādji's prestige in Hindustan. Ali Bahādur had come to the North as the Peshwā's representative, but up to now he had appeared to the public as a mere child under the guardianship of Sindhia, because he had no money, no strong force or position of authority, and every one used to look up to Sindhia alone. But now their relative position was reversed: "by this injudicious effort of Sindhia the superiority of Ali Bahādur, which was regarded as merely nominal, has been proved to be real and substantial”, as Resident Palmer was quick to notice. Sindhia was clearly shown to be a mere servant and Ali Bahādur, by virtue of his position as their common master’s Vicar-General on the spot, his superior. [PRC. i. 251-252.]

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A more material injury soon followed. Like a vulture who sees a dying cow from afar, Tukoji Holkar who had been hovering close to the Mathurā border without coming to Mahādji’s side in spite of orders from Punā, now hastened to that city in order to stiffen Ali Bahādur’s defiance of Sindhia’s authority. Fully two years earlier, immediately after his reverse at Lālsot, Mahādji had sent urgent appeals to Punā for armed aid. Nānā Fadnis, after long and fruitless palavers, had ordered Tukoji Holkar and Ali Bahādur to march to Mahādji’s side as soon as possible. But the two generals delayed, and started from Punā only in the December of that year (1787). Then they idled away six months at Indore, after which, instead of proceeding to Mathurā, they diverted their course to Rajputana, where Tukoji continued for twelve months squeezing the Rajput Rajas. At last, when the pressure from Punā became too strong, he detached Ali Bahādur alone with a small force to Mathurā in October 1788, but himself lingered in Rajputana. In the first week of June 1789 he was at Brahmanābās, only 80 miles west of Mathurā, but did not stir from that place for a month and a half, till he heard of Mahādji’s open discomfiture in the attempt to cut Himmat Bahādur out of Ali Bahādur’s camp. He now hastened to Mathurā and had his first, formal interview with Sindhia on 31st July. He immediately demanded an equal sharing of the Maratha territorial gains and spoils between the two houses, as arranged by the Peshwā in the days of their fathers. Mahādji replied that his gains were more nominal than real, and his inflated army bill had swallowed up all his income from the North-Indian conquests and still left him owing 34 months’ salary to his troops. Moreover, these districts were too unsettled by war and too much desolated by drought to yield more than a tenth of their standard revenue. But Holkar would not listen, he insisted on an immediate partition on paper, and joined the other malcontent, Ali Bahādur. Mahādji had the whip hand of Ali Bahādur, as the latter enjoyed no independent source of income, but depended entirely on Mahādji’s favour for the expenses of his household and troops. He demanded a vast jāgir and a large cash payment, and on Mahādji’s making a much lower offer, he went away and joined his forces with Tukoji Holkar’s.

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This open breach between the two highest servants of the Peshwā’s Government in Hindustan utterly undid Sindhia’s great work in crushing Ghulām Qādir and neutralising Ismail Beg, and made the restored Maratha empire of the North totter for a fall. The following chapters will show how such a calamity was averted only by Mahādji’s cool and far-sighted diplomacy and the valour of his New Model army (in 1790). This assertion of his indisputable supremacy was effected only on the field of Lakheri, in June 1793.

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We may conveniently conclude the story of Himmat Bahādur here. Ali Bahādur steadily refused to surrender the Gosain to Sindhia even on the assurance that his life would be spared. From Punā Nānā Fadnis proposed early in September 1789, that the Gosain should be held in honourable detention in Jhānsi fort, his estates and contingent kept intact and administered by the State (and not by Mahādji), and the final decision of the Gosain’s fate would depend upon his future conduct. This letter threw Mahādji into a rage, and he replied to Nānā, “Your orders are issued in compliance with Ali Bahādur’s suggestions, and you pay no heed to my repeated letters. This man had practised diabolic arts on my life, and kept me in the agony of disease for two or three months. And yet you cherish him. This is indeed worthy of the brotherhood which you profess for me!” (HP. 561.) Ali Bahādur continued to keep the Gosain with himself. At last his own want of funds and Holkar’s failure to give him the promised subsidy, drove Ali Bahādur to blame the Gosain as the sole cause of his misery; he started negotiations with Mahādji in January 1790 for handing the Gosain over to him.

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Himmat Bahādur told Ali Bahādur, “Send me to Punā or keep me with yourself. If you try to send me elsewhere (as a prisoner in the fort of Jhānsi), which Mahādji is demanding, I shall kill myself rather than be dishonoured.” There were some three hundred armed retainers with the Gosain himself and an equal number with his concubines and children whom Mahādji detained as prisoners in his camp. These were all desperate fighters, being Naga monks of the Rājendragiri type (Ch. 11 § 17.) Hence Sindhia did not venture to press the question to a decision by force. The case therefore dragged on for months. At last near the end of January 1790, Tukoji and Ali Bahādur warned Mahādji to make a settlement with the Gosain without further delay, for (they argued) “if the Peshwa now sends a robe of honour to Himmat Bahādur, what face would be left to Sindhia?” Mahādji softened, and agreed to pardon the Gosain if he was brought to his tent. But Himmat Bahādur held out in his proud defiant attitude, he replied that he was prepared to be the servant of the Peshwā or of the Peshwā’s local agent Ali Bahādur, but would never appear before Mahādji as a suppliant. So, Mahādji had to climb down: On 6th February 1790, he paid a visit to Ali Bahādur’s tent, where the Gosain was introduced to him by Ali Bahādur. Sindhia gave Himmat Bahādur a robe of honour in sign of amity, declared that he had pardoned all his offences, presented a horse and an elephant to him, and withdrew his piquet from around the family of the Gosain detained in his camp. [Kalé Akh.]

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At last in Aug. 1791, Ali Bahādur was sent away by Sindhia who paid him some money and set him to carve out a principality for himself in Bundelkhand, where the old Maratha claims had been long disregarded. So, crossing the Chambal on 1st September 1791, Ali Bahādur marched into Danghāi, carrying Himmat Bahādur with himself The Gossain raised fresh troops for him and in the end Ali Bahādur established himself as the Nawāb of Bandā, and gave Himmat Bahādur a jāgir there. Ali Bahādur died on 28th August 1802; his son Shamsher Bahādur fought the English in the Anglo-Maratha War of 1803, was defeated and forced to become a British vassal, residing at Bandā on a pension of four lakhs a year. Himmat Bahādur sided with the English in this war and thus preserved and enlarged his vast jāgir (worth 20 lakhs). On his death without legitimate issue in 1804, his jāgir as held on military tenure, lapsed to Government. The line of the Nawābs of Bandā was extinguished for rebellion during the Mutiny of 1857. (Satara, i. 300, 308. Thorn's Memoir of the War, 240-245. Kaye & Malleson's Indian Mutiny, Cabinet ed., Vols. V. & VI., Atkinson's N.W.P.G., i. 31-41, 130-132.)

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§ 5. Ismail Beg fights Najaf Quli (1788-89) and at last breaks with Sindhia (1790).

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On being commissioned by Sindhia to expel Najaf Quli Khan from his newly-built jāgir, Ismail Beg started from Delhi (c. 10th Oct. 1788) and took Gurgāon city after an investment of eight days, levied a contribution from the people, and placed his own outpost there. He next seized Beri, 13 miles south of Rohtak town and taking ransom from it, proceeded to Rewāri, which submitted to him. Placing his father Munim Beg in the fort of Gokulgarh (two miles north of Rewāri town), with orders to repair its neglected walls and turn it into a base and refuge for himself, the invader advanced further west. Meantime, Najaf Quli Khan, on hearing of this invasion of his jāgir, had come out of his fort of Kanud, and now gave battle. After two days' exchange of gun-fire in which several officers were wounded, Ismail Beg dashed forward carrying his artillery before him, and Najaf Quli was routed with the loss of 10 guns, some elephants and baggage and about 200 men, (early in November).

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Ismail Beg, instead of pursuing his vanquished rival to his stronghold of Kanud, began to take possession of the district and set up his own collectors and outposts there. Then for several months there was desultory fighting between small parties on the two sides, but no more pitched battles. In December we find Ismail Beg occupying Kosli (midway between Rewāri and Dādri), while Najaf Quli held Dādri (20 miles north-west of Ismail’s position), but keeping his family and treasures in the stronghold of Kanud (24 miles south of Dādri). The stalemate in the war was due to both sides having increased their armed forces far beyond their means of paying them, and in consequence the starving soldiers, as soon as their plunder was exhausted, began to rise in mutiny against their bankrupt employers or desert them for a more alluring offer.

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Towards the end of March 1789, Ismail Beg drove back Najaf Quli’s forces and advanced to Dādri. Najaf Quli, leaving a subordinate to defend Dādri, himself took refuge in Kanud, whither his rival followed him, after appointing Shaikh Haidar with two battalions to invest Dādri. Kanud is situated in the midst of a sterile waterless country of sand hills. The natural difficulties of the terrain were increased by Najaf Quli having sealed all the wells within 8 miles of the fort.

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Ismail Beg contented himself with subjecting Kanud to a sort of blockade from a distance of 15 or 16 miles, so as to stop its food-supply, while he employed his captains more profitably in conquering as much of Shekhāwati and Tonwār-wati in the west and south-west and Hariānā in the north of Rewāri as they could. In this way Nārnaul, Kot Putli and Rohtak were occupied by his agents. Patan was attacked; but its chieftain (a kinsman of the Rajah of Jaipur), offered a long resistance and at last an accommodation was arranged and Ismail’s men withdrew from that town.

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At this point Ismail Beg’s operations were interrupted by a domestic trouble. Najaf Ali Khan (the son of the late Muhammad Beg Hamadāni) was so long a refugee in Jaipur. In concert with Najaf Quli, he now made an attempt to disturb Ismail Beg’s recent conquests, but was repulsed at Nasirpur (two miles from Nārnaul) and driven back with the loss of his artillery, munitions etc. Ismail Beg gave chase and on 30th July severely defeated him outside Kanud, capturing forty guns and all his camp and baggage, munition carts, elephants, horses, etc. Najaf Ali and his patron Najaf Quli were now shut up in the fort of Kanud, while the city below that fort passed into Ismail Beg’s possession. For this signal success, the victor received a dress of honour from the Emperor, on 6th September, 1789 (Ibrat, iii. 330-337).

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The so-called siege of Kanud continued languidly for three months more, and was finally abandoned on 27th November, owing to a change on the political chess-board, which will be now described.

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After the overthrow of Ghulām Qādir the financial difficulties of Sindhia could no longer be evaded; they at last overwhelmed him. So he was driven to raise money by every possible means and also to break his promise of giving aid to his subordinates, such as Ismail Beg. His first fiscal measure was to demand revenue from the jāgirs of his captains on behalf of the Delhi Emperor. In March 1789, it was ordered that out of the collections made in the jāgir lands, one-third must be paid to the State and only two-thirds to the assignees, and settlement officers were sent from the Central Government to every village to carry out this order. In a land devastated by war and brigandage for over a generation, this meant a sudden impoverishment of the grantees, the Hindusthani military officers, whom it was impossible to pay in cash (DY. Sup. 49).

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In addition to this, Ismail Beg had some personal grievances too. Towards the end of 1789, Sindhia had sent Tukoji Holkar’s contingent to hold Mewat (the west Delhi country) against Sikh raids, but Holkar’s men wrongfully seized one of Ismail Beg’s *thānahs* (Nuh-nimaksar) situated there. A protest to Mahādji brought no remedy as Holkar’s men did not recognise Sindhia’s authority. So, Ismail Beg had to send a force from his own army which quickly drove out the usurpers. This heightened his anger and distrust of Maratha good faith.*

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Ismail had secured from Mahādji Sindhia a promise to assist him with troops in gaining the fort of Kishangarh, which he proposed to convert into the stronghold of his new dominion for keeping his family and treasures in. Throughout 1789 he kept urging Mahādji for the supply of money and troops to effect this conquest, but Sindhia was in no position to send him either kind of aid. Indeed, it would have been clearly against his best interests to see a man of Ismail Beg’s ambition, ability and doubtful loyalty lodged in security on the border of the Jaipur State, from which advantageous position he could most easily join the hostile Rajput princes and either raid the Delhi territory or rob the loyal Rajah of Macheri. The broken promise further exasperated Ismail Beg.

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Ismail abandoned the siege of Kanud on 27th November 1789; his rupture with Sindhia took place early in March 1790. The intervening three months were filled with confusing intrigues and changes of policy among all the parties concerned. Mahādji could always play off Ismail Beg and Najaf Quli against each other, while Ismail in the last resort could always throw up Sindhia and close with the Jaipur and Jodhpur Rajahs in an anti-Maratha league, a thing which actually happened at the end of this period of uncertain relations. The Rajah of Mācheri, ever in fear of his former suzerain the Jaipur Rajah, clung to Mahādji, though he was never entirely free from fear of his protector being driven by bankruptcy to squeeze money out of him, or of Holkar’s men robbing him of his frontier villages. In the end, Ismail Beg’s uncertainty ended, the balance was tilted in favour of the party that could pay down money to enable Ismail Beg to keep his starving troops together under his banner; and this money came from Jaipur.

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∗ In the settlement which Mahādji proposed to Tukoji in November 1789, he demanded that as Mewat and the Panjab [*i.e.*, Panipat] fell to Holkar’s share, the latter should occupy those districts now. So, Kashi Rao Holkar was detached from Mathurā northwards to Mewat. His agent Gopāl Hari, the *thānahdār* of Nuh (25 m. s. of Gurgaon City), advanced to seize the adjoining mahal of Nimaksar, but was killed by Ismail’s men who then occupied Nuh. After this Ismail wrote to Mahādji censuring him for his duplicity,—“If you want to dismiss me, say so, and I shall go elsewhere for service. If you want to fight me, come on. But do not set other people against me.” [Kalé *Akh.* DY. i. 371. HP. 570 and 571.] Ismail Beg had recently married the daughter of his uncle Md. Beg Hamadāni.

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Ismail Beg’s Rajput alliance was formed (in February 1790) on the following terms: The Rajahs of Jodhpur and Jaipur agreed to pay him seven and five lakhs of rupees respectively, out of which two lakhs were to be advanced immediately and the balance after the war with Sindhia had actually commenced. As a security for the Mirzā’s good faith, his family would be lodged in Jaipur. A Rajput contingent of five thousand men, horse and foot, was to be supplied from Jaipur. The Mirzā’s own strength consisted of 15 battalions of trained sepoys, five battalions of Najibs, and 3500 cavalry with 300 guns.* But his captains were always on the verge of desertion owing to his inability to pay them; they only waited to be sure that their new employer would be a better paymaster.

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§ 6. Sindhia goes to war against Ismail Beg and the Rajput coalition, 1790.

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We shall now study the policy of the Jaipur State from the battle of Tungā to the final triumph of Mahādji Sindhia’s arms in Rajputana three years later. After the Maratha retreat from Lālsot, the Jaipur Rajah forbade any pursuit of the enemy. Later when Ismail Beg and other Mughalia captains urged him to attack Sindhia’s stronghold of Agra fort and drive the Deccanis beyond the Narmadā, Pratāp Singh restrained them by saying that he would maintain these Muslim mercenaries for the defence of his own realm only, but would not undertake any adventure outside his frontiers, unless commanded by the Emperor and supported by imperial troops. (Ch. 36, § 2). The Jaipur Rajah’s first task was to recover the old territories of his house on the eastern border, which had been usurped by his vassal, the chief of Macheri (Alwar), during twenty years of successful aggression. But this he could not do with his unaided resources.

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∗ Ibrat, iii. 347. But Hingané’s letter (DY. ii. 2) gives “12,000 paltan and 7,000 cavalry (Mughalia and others); in addition he is enlisting new men as sebandi.”

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The Lālsot campaign brought no final deliverance to the Rājputs. It was public knowledge that Mahādji when retreating from that place, had turned his face back to the country and sworn, “If I live I shall reduce Jaipur and Jodhpur to ashes.” On 29th December 1787, the Maratha envoy at Delhi wrote to Punā, “Patil Bābā’s determination is to sell everything he has, and punish the Rajahs of Jaipur and Jodhpur, and administer the Delhi Empire as Regent.” Therefore, the Rajput States had every reason to expect his vengeance if ever he recovered his position in Hindustan. (Akhbarat. DY. I. 234).

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