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State and Government in Ancient India c10: Chapter III: Nature, Aims and Functions of the State

State and Government in Ancient India c10

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Chapter III: Nature, Aims and Functions of the State

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We saw in the last chapter how the state came into existence in ancient India and what were the different theories advocated about its origin. Let us now see what according to the ancient Indians were to be the nature, aims and functions of the state.

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While discussing the origin of the state in the last chapter, we have passingly referred to the conception of ancient Indians about the nature of the state. They regarded it as essentially a beneficient institution evolved in prehistoric times for the efficient protection of human life and for the better realisation of its higher ideals. The idea that it was a necessary evil to be tolerated, as there was no other alternative, was not subscribed to by any ancient Indian thinker.

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State was no doubt an unwelcome institution to evil-doers, but they had no right to expect that their convenience and feelings should be respected by society, which they were out to disorganise and destroy.

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It is owing to the presence of this anti-social element that *daṇḍa* or force becomes the ultimate sanction of government. Ancient Indian thinkers do not desire that *daṇḍa* should make its appearance, every now and then; on the other hand they regard that state as an ideal one where its exercise is rendered almost unnecessary by the willingness of the people to accept the scheme of a righteous life, determined by the code given to humanity by God. This code was binding alike upon the people and the king. If the people were to be guilty of its breach, they were to be punished by the king. If the latter contravened its provisions, he would forfeit his subjects' allegiance, who would be at liberty even to kill him if necessary. In the ideal state both the king and the subjects were expected to follow the provisions of the divine code for peace and prosperity both here and in the life to come.

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The historic method being then unknown, the evolution of the state through various stages is not discussed by ancient Indian writers. The available evidence, however, shows that the state in the early Vedic period was still tribal. The Yadus, the Turvaśas and the Bharatas, for instance, who played a prominent part in the Vedic history, had for a long time no permanent territorial basis for their states; the latter moved along with the peoples of their tribes and had thus only a tribal basis. In the later Vedic period, however, the state became territorial; we have clear references to the different tribes settling down in the different parts of the country,¹ and to kings becoming masters both of their people as well as their country (*rāshtra*).² In the later Vedic period the emperor is described as one who rules over the earth bounded by the oceans.³ The different stages, however, by which the state gradually became territorial cannot be clearly visualised from the scanty evidence available to us at present.

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¹ *A. Br.*, VII. 3. 14.

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² *T. S.*, II. 3. 3-4

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³ *A. Br.*, VII. 3. 14.

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What are to be the constituents of a territorial state and how are they inter-related and held together is the question that we have to consider next.

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Vedic literature does not enable us to get any idea of what were the contemporary notions about this topic; we, however, begin to get welcome light from *c.* 4th century B.C., when the political thought had become fairly developed. Both Kauṭilya (VI, 1) and Manu (IX. 294-7) held that the state was not a loose assemblage of parts, each having its own interests and moving at its own will; it was characterised by an organic unity. The king, the ministry, the territory, the resources, the forts, the military forces and the allies constitute, according to these writers, the seven constituents of the state.⁴ Later writers like Kāmandaka (I. 10) and Śukra (I, 122-4) regard this as a self-evident truth, and epigraphs also often describe how the kingdoms acquired by the heroes, whom they eulogise, possessed all the seven constituents.¹

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⁴ Some of these seven constituents like the king, the ministers, and high officials (*ratnins*), forts (*purah*) and resources (*bali*) are no doubt mentioned in the Vedic literature, but their mutual relationship as well as their relation to the state have not been discussed there as in later works on the political science.

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¹ *E. C.*, V. Channarayapattana, 149 (1183 A. D.).

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Let us now compare these constituents of the ancient Indian state with those postulated by modern thinkers. According to the latter territory population and central government having a juristic personality, a common will and sovereign powers, are the main constituents of the state.

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Let us now see how far any of these constituents find their counterpart in ancient Indian list of the seven constituents, given above.

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Of the seven constituents, *svāmin* (king) and *amātyas* (ministers) constituted the central government, which exercised the sovereign powers and imparted the central unity. *Rāshṭra* (territory), *durgas* (forts), *bala* (army) and *kosha* (treasury) constituted the resources of the state. The stage of the tribal state had long passed,² and so territory was regarded as an essential element of the state. Forts and armed forces were vitally necessary to defend the very existence of the state and so are regarded as its essential constituents. The defence of the country and the proper discharge of the constituent and ministrant functions of the state required ample resources, and so *kosha* (treasury) is also regarded as indispensable to the very existence of the state. The inclusion of its allies among the constituents of a state strikes us as rather strange. The existence of a state, however, depends, as contemporary history has been showing in a forcible manner, upon its securing a proper balance of power by making suitable alliances. A large number of small states existed in the Indian sub-continent, and our political thinkers felt that the existence of none could be guaranteed for a long time unless a proper balance of power was secured by wise alliances. It is a little surprising to note that population as such is not mentioned as one of the constituents of the state; that was probably because it was realised that it was too evident a truth to be specifically mentioned.

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² The Mālava state was to the north-east of Multan in *c.* 325 B. C., in the Ajmer-Udaipur tract in *c.* 200 B. C. and in modern Mâlwā about 400 years later. These migrations were however due to political pressure and were exception and not the rule for the contemporary times.

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³ We must not forget that our writers wrote when aeroplanes and atomic bombs did not exist; forts could, down to the 19th century, defy mighty armies for a number of months and years.

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The seven constituents of the state are regarded as the limbs (*aṅgas*) of the body politic by the Indian thinkers. Some of them like the king and the ministers may be more prominent than others like the forts and the allies.¹ Each limb, however, though by itself it may look unimportant, is indispensable to the body politic, for its functions cannot be efficiently discharged by any other.² The state can exist and function properly only if all the limbs of its body politic become mutally integrated and cooperate with each other.³ No limb of the body politic can strictly be regarded as more important than any other. The body politic cannot stand if one of them is missing, just as three sticks poised properly against one another will collapse, if one of them is taken away.⁴

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¹ It cannot be argued that this assumption militates against the organic conception of the state; for in human body too, some limbs like the brain and the eyes, are more important than others like the ears or hands.

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² तेषु तेषु तु कृत्येषु तत्तदंगं विशिष्यते । येन यत्साध्यते कर्म तस्मिंस्तच्छ्रेष्ठमुच्यते ॥ *Manu*, IX, 297.

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³ परस्परोपकारीदं सप्तांगं राज्यमुच्यते । *Kāmandaka*, IV, 1. स्वाम्यमात्यजनपददुर्गकोशदंडमित्राणि प्रकृतयः । अरिवर्जाः प्रकृतयः सप्तैताः स्वगुणोदयाः । उक्ताः प्रत्यंगभूतास्ताः प्रकृता राज्यसंपदः । *Arthaśāstra*, VI, 1.

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⁴ सप्तांगस्येह राज्यस्य विष्टब्धस्य त्रिदण्डवत् । अन्योन्यगुणवैशेष्यान्न किंचिदतिरिच्यते ॥ *Manu*, IX, 296.

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It is thus clear that ancient Indian thinkers regarded the state as an organic whole. They no doubt regarded the king and the government as the most important limbs of the organism, but others, if less important, were also indispensable for the proper functioning of the body politic. We should not also forget to note that the organic conception of the state is only partially true. The cells and limbs of an organism have no separate existence of their own and cannot function independently. Such is obviously not the case with at least some of the constituents of the state. Forts and resources can exist independently and may be wielded into a new state by some groups of the subjects, who may not be able to see eye to eye with the old government.

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Our authorities devote considerable space to describe the seven constituents of the state referred to above, and the excellences and strong points that should be developed in each. Of these the forts and the armed forces need not detain us, as they are constitutionally unimportant. The king, the ministry, the resources and the allies will be discussed in later chapters dealings with the Kingship (Chap. V), the Ministry (Chap. VII), Income and Expenditure (Chap. XIII) and Interestate Relations (Chap. XIV) respectively. As far as the territory is concerned, our authorities point out that the prosperity of a state will to a great extent depend upon the natural resources of its territory and the ease with which it can be defended. It must of course be populated by an energetic and industrious population, for the character of its people determines the destiny of a state more than any other fact or consideration. The territorial size of an ideal state is not discussed by our authorities. They, however, regarded the whole country from the Himalayas to the sea as the proper sphere for the activity of an emperor. As far as the smaller kingdoms were concerned, there were no natural boundaries in India to separate them in most cases ; they were usually small enough to be well-governed and large enough to be self-sufficient.

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Whether an ideal state should consist of people of exclusively one nationality, having the same race, religion and language, or whether it can be a composite political unit of people of different nationalities, belonging to diverse races, professing many creeds and speaking several languages is a question which has not been discussed by ancient Indian thinkers. This need not surprise us, because it did not arise at all in the ancient period. It is true that a number of foreigners like the Greeks, the Parthians, the Scythians, the Kushāṇas and the Hūṇas invaded and conquered the country and settled down in it as its governors. But they did not remain foreign nationals with a different language, religion and culture for a long time. Within a generation or two all of them used to become completely Indianised and converted into Hinduism or Buddhism. They did not create any problems for the Indian states. The latter used to repose implicit confidence in their new Indianised subjects,¹ who also used to entertain no extra-territorial loyalties.

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¹ Aśoka had appointed a Greek named Tushāspa as a viceroy over the frontier province of Kathiawar, though there was a Greek kingdom in Persia and Bactria at that time. The Scythian Rudradāman had appointed a Parthian named Suviśhākha as his governor over the same province in *c.* 150 A. D., even though the Parthians were then in power in Persia.

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A state no doubt becomes homogenous if there is unity of language, race and religion among its subjects. Ancient Indian writers have not emphasised upon this point, because there was no necessity whatsoever to do so. Most of the states in ancient India did not differ from their neighbours either in race or in language or in religion. Hindus, Buddhists and Jains lived in all states peacefully and harmoniously. Sanskrit was the international language and Prakrits had not differentiated from one another to such a degree as to become mutually unintelligible. All the foreigners who were coming into the country, used to be rapidly Indianised and completely absorbed into the Hindu community. Thus the different states in ancient India did not at all differ in race, language or religion. Most of them had developed into separate entities primarily owing to individual ambition, administrative convenience or geographical considerations. It did not, therefore occur to our thinkers that they should emphasise upon the advisability of racial, linguistic or religious uniformity in the population of a state.

The Aims of the State

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The Vedic literature does not specifically discuss the aims or ideals of the state. Incidental observations made therein, however, enable us to gather that peace, order, security and justice were regarded as the fundamental aims of the state. The king or the head of the state was to be like god Varuṇa, the upholder of the law and order (*dhṛitavrata*); he was to punish the wicked and help the virtuous. Religion was to be promoted, morality was to be encouraged and education was to be patronised.¹ The state, however, was to secure not only the moral but also the material wellbeing of its citizens. The kingdom of king Parīkshit, idealised in the *Atharvaveda* (XX. 127), flowed with milk and honey. All round welfare of the public was clearly regarded as the chief aim of the state during the Vedic and Upanishadic ages, *i.e.* down to *c.* 600 B. C.

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¹ न मे स्तेनो जनपदे न कदर्यो न मद्यपो नानाहिताग्निनाविद्वान्न स्वैरी स्वैरिणी कुतः। *Cha. U.*, V. 11. 5.

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When the literature on politics proper began to be developed, we find that promotion of *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma* are usually mentioned as the aims of the state. The state was to promote *dharma*, not by championing any particular sect or religion, but by fostering a feeling of piety and religiousness, by encouraging virtue and morality, by extending help to the establishments belonging to all religions and sects, by maintaining free hospitals and feeding houses for the poor and the decrepits and last but not least, by extending patronage to literature and sciences. The promotion of *artha* was to be procured by encouraging trade, industry and agriculture, by developing national resources, by bringing fresh land under cultivation, by building dams and canals to make agriculture independent of rain, and by encouraging extensive and systematic working of mines. The state was to promote *kāma* by ensuring peace and order, so that each individual may enjoy life undisturbed, and by offering encouragement to fine arts like music, dancing, painting, sculpture and architecture in order to promote aesthetic culture. The state was thus expected to maintain peace and order and promote moral, material and aesthetic progress of society.

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Our writers have thus practically recognised the ideal of perfect development of the individual to the full development of the society, when they laid down that it was the business of the state to promote Dharma, Artha, Kāma and Moksha; only they have not used the modern terminology. The ideal of *sarvabhūtahita*, which is emphasised in several places, refers not only to the spiritual but also to the mundane sphere.

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² कृपणानाथवृद्धानां विधवानां च योषिताम्। योगक्षेमं च वृत्तिं च नित्यमेव प्रकल्पयेत्॥ *Mbh*, XII, 86, 24.

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The inclusion of the promotion of *dharma* among the aims of the state has given rise to a considerable misunderstanding in modern times, which has been to some extent caused by the habit of later writers of describing the king as the champion of *varṇas* and *āśramas*. It is contended¹ that *varṇadharma* or the caste-system in particular is based upon iniquitous principles; it exhalts the Brāhmaṇa and confers almost divine honours upon him, while it reduces the Śūdras and Chāṇḍālas almost to the position of slaves, denying them the most elementary rights of ordinary citizenship. The Śūdras were prevented from holding property and were subjected to more heavier punishments than those meted out to the Brāhamaṇas for identical offences. The Chāṇḍālas were treated worse than dogs. When the state became a champion of *varṇas* and *āśramas*, it became a party to all these iniquities. It enforced the iniquitous *varṇāśrma-dharma* at the point of the sword to the detriment of the lower classes. It was thus based upon social injustice. It confounded *dharma* with the existing iniquitous social order. It idealised the actual instead of trying to actualise the ideal.

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¹ Anjaria, *The Nature and Ground of Political Obligation in Hindu State*, pp. 175-188.

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The above criticism is mostly based upon a misunderstanding of the factors that have promoted the development of the Hindu social institutions. Customs and traditions changed in ancient India by the silent operation of social approval or disapproval and not by the noisy process of a legislative enactment or repeal. The state only enforced what had been previously approved by the social conscience. When society in early period was sanctioning intercaste dinners and marriages, the state had no objection to them. When later on it disapproved both these practices, the state did not propose to encourage them. In early days widows had no right of inheritance; the property of a person having no heir other than a widow escheated to the state. Later on society decided to recognise widow as an heir of her deceased husband, and though this change adversely affected the interest of the excheqor, the state cheerfully sanctioned it. The recognition of the promotion of *dharma* as one of the duties of the state did not result in the apotheosis of the *status quo*; every student of Hindu social institution will concede that changes were gradually and continously taking place in them. Levirate (*niyoga*), once approved, was later stamped out of existence; not only the proprietary rights of women, but also those of the Śūdras were being constantly enlarged in spite of the opposition of the earlier writers.

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It would, therefore, be unfair to attribute the existence of certain iniquities in the Hindu social order to *dharma* being considered as one of the aims of the Hindu state. The state no doubt claimed to be the champion of *varṇadharma*, but it did not support the Brāhmaṇas’ claim to their exemption from the taxation and the capital punishment. It is extremely doubtful whether many cases had occurred in ancient India of the state punishing the Śūdras and Brāhmaṇa women for presuming to study the Vedas. The prohibition was regarded by the society, including the Śūdras, as divinely ordained, and as there was no material benefit whatsoever to be gained by its violation, there was no incentive to break it. The number of Brāhmaṇas themselves, who studied the Vedas, was microscopically small and provision was made to meet the needs of the religiously minded persons among the Śūdras and Brāhmaṇa women by throwing open the epics, the *Gītā* and the Purāṇas to them.

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There is no doubt that some iniquities existed in the Hindu social order and their number increased in the first millennium of the Christian era. But that was due to the narrowmindedness of the Hindu society of that age and not to the state’s making *dharma* as one of its aims. Of course it can be argued that the state should have given a lead in the matter by encouraging a more liberal policy. We should, however, not forget that legislation did not come within the normal activities of the state. Recent experience in our country about the Sharda Act also shows that legislation, far in advance of the social views on the point, tends to remain dead letter. The state was not interested in enforcing caste iniquities; if any cases actually arose, they must have been decided by the caste or the village Panchāyats, which were purely non-official bodies. The state sought to encourage *dharma* by promoting piety and religiousness, by extending equal patronage to all sects and religions and their establishments and by financing works of public utility like tanks, canals, wells, poor houses and hospitals, and not by becoming an instrument in the hands of the church or the priests.

Was the Ancient Indian State Theocratic?

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It would be convenient here to examine how far the ancient Indian state was under the influence of theology and to what extent it can be described as theocratic. A theocracy may arise when a king usurps the functions of the Church, as was the case with the Khalifas, or when the head of the Church becomes the king as is the case with the Dalai Lama of Tibet and the Pope of the Vatican kingdom. Or, the king may be a mere agent or instrument of the church, as was the case for some time in Europe during the 8th and the 9th centuries A. D. The Pope and the bishops at this time claimed the right to punish the king, if he was not ruling according to the will of God. Some rulers like Charles the Bold admitted the right and even the duty of the prelates to suspend the execution of the orders of the state regarded as objectionable by them. Orders of the Pope were to be regarded as of greater moment and validity than those of the Emperor, as they had the authority over the soul as well. Of course, the majority of the emperors were not disposed to recognise this claim and the early medieval European history presents an interesting tussle between the Church and the State.

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Faint echoes of a similar conflict between the king and the church can be heard in the early Indian literature. *Gautama-Dharmasūtra* (*c.* 500 B. C.) claims that the royal authority does not touch the priest¹ and reminds the king that he can prosper only if supported by the latter. If he does not employ a qualified Brāhmaṇa priest, says the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*,² gods will not at all accept his oblations. At the time of the coronation, the king three times bows before the Brāhmaṇa ; he thereby accepts his subordinate position, and as long as he does so, he will prosper.³ Priests like Vasishṭha exercised profound influence of the royal court. Rituals were also devised to ensure the subordination of the Kshatriyas and the Vaiśyas to the Brāhmaṇas.⁴ In the *Ṛigveda* there is a clear passage to show that a king, who honoured his chaplain properly, could secure an easy mastery over his subjects and a smashing defeat over his enemies.⁵ In Europe the Pope claimed the right to confirm the election of the emperor made by the nobles ; we do not know whether such a right was advanced in ancient India.

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¹ राजा वै सर्वस्येष्टे ब्राह्मणवर्जम् । I. 11.

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² न वै अपुरोहितस्य देवा बलिम्नुवन्ति । *A. Br.*, VII. 5, 24.

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³ स (नृपः) यन्नमो ब्रह्मणे इति……त्रिष्कृत्वो ब्रह्मणे नमस्करोति ब्रह्मण एव तत्क्षत्रं वशमेति तद्राष्ट्रं समृद्धं तद्वीरवदाह । *A. Br.* VI II. 1.

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⁴ तद्यत्र वै ब्रह्मणः क्षत्रं वशमेति तद्राष्ट्रं समृद्धं तद्वीरवदाह । *A. Br.* VIII. 9 ब्रह्मणे क्षत्रं च विशं चानुगे करोति *P. Br.* XI, 11, 1.

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⁵ तस्मिन्विशः स्वयमेवानमन्त यस्मिन्ब्रह्मा राजनि पूर्वमेति । स इद्राजा प्रतिजन्यानि विश्वा शुष्मेण तस्थौ अभि वीर्येण । *R.V.* IV, 50-7-9

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The above evidence shows that down to the end of the Brāhmaṇa period (*c.* 1000 B. C.) the priests tried to extend their sway over the monarch and through him over the state. It is natural that many kings, should have opposed this tendency ; the bitter curses that are pronounced against the rulers who confiscate the cows, *i.e.* the wealth of the Brāhmaṇa⁶, seem to be directed against those monarchs who were opposing the efforts of the priests to forge a theocratic state, where their voice was to reign supreme. Unfortunately we have no detailed information about any specific and individual cases, as we have in the case of early medieval Europe.

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⁶ *A. V.*, XII, 5; XIII. 3. 1-25.

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In the course of time, however, the church and the state or the Brāhmaṇas and the Kshatriyas made up their quarrel. It was realised that the two could prosper only if they cooperated with each other. Each conceded a qualified divinity to the other, as both realised that they could prosper only if there was a complete harmony between them. It is interesting to note that this view agrees closely with that of Gregory VII, who maintained that the kingship and the Popedom were both divine, their position being comparable to that of the two eyes of the human body.

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The general trend of the evidence of the Brahmanical literature is to show that the prince or the state was under the leading strings of the Brāhmaṇas or the church. The royal chaplain (*purohita*) knew rituals which could either promote or retard the welfare of the king and the state. The aim of the government, as shown already, was to promote *dharma*, and the laws which it enforced were regarded as divine in origin or inspiration. *Varṇāśramadharma*, which the state had to enforce, was largely moulded by the priests, who were the writers of the books on the subject. They not only claimed to be above the state, but they also put forth the right for exemption from taxation and capital punishment. The punishments that could be given to them were to be milder than those to be inflicted upon others. The appointment of the *dharmamahāmātras* by the Mauryas and the *vinayasthitisthāpakas* by the Guptas to regulate religious practices and moral conduct of the population would be a natural corollary of the swing towards theocracy.

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There is, therefore, a considerable force in the view that the ancient Indian state was theocratic to a great extent. We should, however, note the limits to the theocracy and the period during which it was operative. The claims that have been put forth on behalf of the Brāhmaṇas in the Brahamanical literature are to a great extent exaggerated. They represent the wish more than the reality. There is no doubt that the influence of the royal chaplain over the king was great during the age of the Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas. Its extent, however, should not be judged merely by the implications of the passages referred to above. For there are other passages in the Brāhamaṇa literature itself, which give the other side of the picture. A passage in the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* confesses that a king, at his sweet will, can lord it over the Brāhmaṇas.¹ Another in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* admits that a king can expel the Brāhmaṇas at will². The *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad* states that it is the Kshatriya or the king who enjoys the highest status in society ; the Brāhmaṇa sits lower than and next to him³ When princess Śarmishṭhā suspected that Devāyanī, the daughter of the royal chaplain, was assuming an air of superiority, she sharply reprimanded her:— 'Enough of presumptuousness. Sitting in a humbler place your father goes on flattering my father day and night. You are the daughter of him who begs and flatters, I am the daughter of him who donates and is praised.⁴

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¹ यदा वै राजा कामयते अथ ब्राह्मणं जिनाति । III. 9. 14.

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² (ब्राह्मणः) आदायी आप्यायी अवसायी यथाकामं प्रयाप्यः । VII. 29.

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³ तस्मात्क्षत्रात्परं नास्ति तस्माद्ब्राह्मणः क्षत्रियमधस्तादुपास्ते । I. 4. 10.

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⁴ आसीनं च शयानं च पिता ते पितरं मम । स्तौति बन्दीव चाभीक्ष्णं नीचैः स्थित्वा विनीतवत् ।। यांचतस्त्वं हि दुहिता स्तुवतः प्रतिगृह्णतः । सुताहं स्तूयमानस्य ददतोऽप्रतिगृह्णतः ।। *Mbh.* I. 72. 9-10.

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It would, therefore, be wrong to suppose that even in the Vedic period, the king or the state was under the leading strings of the Brāhmaṇa or the Church. Generally speaking the priest was treated with decorum ; the spiritual help offered by his rituals and sacrifices was welcome. But the king was far from becoming a mere instrument in the hands of the priest ; he could show him his proper place or even expel him, if he tended to become presumptuous. Brāhmaṇas no doubt claimed a number of privileges including exemption from the taxation and the capital punishment, but it will be shown in Chap. XIII how they existed more in their law books than in actual practice. In the course of time, the divinity of the king was recognised as will be shown in Chap. V. This, however, did not make the king infallible or even the sole interpreter of the divine will. Laws, though regarded as divine, were really based upon social customs and traditions. By sanctioning their operation, the state did not become an instrument in the hands of the Church or the priests ; it rather became the mouthpiece of the social will.

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From about the 4th century B. C. the influence of theology on the state began to decline further. The Vedic sacrifices themselves fell into disgrace and disuse, which naturally undermined the influence of the chaplain . Politics developed into a special science and princes naturally studied it assiduously in preference to the Vedic lore or the Upanishadic philosophy. Positive law began to be differentiated from religious rituals and traditional customs ; and the school of politics began to aver that the former was more important than the latter.¹ Hindu polity thus succeeded in emancipating itself from the leading strings of theology by the beginning of the Christian era. The king was no doubt regarded as the protector and enforcer of Dharma, but we have shown already how this did not make the state theocratic. His duty was to promote piety and religiousness by extending equal patronage to all sects and religions and to enforce customary laws approved by the social conscience ; he discharged this function through officers like the *dharmamahāmātras* and the *vinayasthitisthāpakas*. He was not to be an agent of a particular religion or sect working to promote its interests or seeking to carry out its commands. The crusade of a Hindu state against Bauddhism or Jainism is rarely met with in ancient Indian history.

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¹ धर्मश्च व्यवहारश्च चरित्रं राजशासनम् । विवादार्थश्चतुष्पादः पश्चिमः पूर्वबाधकः ॥ *Arthaśāstra* III. 1. धर्मशास्त्रविरोधे तु युक्तियुक्तो विधिः स्मृतः । व्यवहारो हि बलवान्धर्मस्तेनावहीयते ॥ *Nārada* I. 41.

The Influence of Religious Concepts on Polity

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The influence of theological, religious and philosophical concepts on Hindu polity may be briefly noticed here. The concept of Dharma as the ultimate and supreme power was responsible for the king being struck by the Dharmadanda thrice on the occasion of his coronation; it was also responsible for the exhortation to him to lead his whole life as dedicated to duty, *dhṛitavrata*. The duties of the king were conceived as Rājadharna. The violation of Dharma was ultimately punishable by God. So the king became ultimately accountable to God, who was to punish him in a suitable manner; our political writers therefore usually did not encourage the subjects to seek to punish the king for his delinquencies. This concept of the supremacy of Dharma prevented the development of a reasoned philosophy of the rights of the people or opposition to tyranny.

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The doctrine of Karman also has left some influence on the polity. At one stage of its development this doctrine believed in the possibility of an individual’s *karman* being transferrable to another; the political thinkers therefore regarded it as possible for the sages to pay off their dues to the state by transferring one sixth of their *punya* or merit to it. The threat that was held out to the king that if he misgoverned, the sin of the crimes of the subjects would be visited on him was also another corollary of the same doctrine. The usual view however was that a person reaps as he sows; this was responsible for the threat of a long sojourn in hell held before a vicious king or a false witness. Three days’ respite that Aśoka had granted to condemned criminals was for the purpose of enabling them or their relations to undertake pious acts, so that the criminals may benefit by them after their execution.

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The theory of the supremacy of the moral order suggested the ideal of a moral state which should have no sinners or thieves among its subjects. It was also responsible for the enunciation of the code of righteous war, *dharma-yuddha*, which was followed to some extent at one stage of our history. The state was to strive for the realisation of the moral and religious ideals along with those in the spheres of social and economic life. It was thus to secure both the moral and material development of the people and the country.

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The theory that God is omnipresent and is the giver of all good things has left its own influence here and there on the polity. The *Gītā* preaches that whatever is preeminent, striking or brilliant is particularly surcharged with the Divine Presence and illustrates the point by recognising the divinity in the king.

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Alternatively the king began to be regarded as Divine Guardian. When the theory of incarnation became popular, the king was regarded as an incarnation of Vishṇu. Some kings (e.g. king Gautamīputra of the Bhita seal, *c.* 1st century A. D.) regarded their kingdom as a gift from God; other states like the republic of the Yaudheyas regarded themselves as presided over by their favourite deity like Kārtikeya, though there is no evidence to show that the rulers in these cases regarded themselves as agents of God. All this was a natutal consequence of regarding God as the giver of all good things and protector of all good persons or states.

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The gospel of *Aparigraha* is responsible for the ideal of self-denial placed before the king. The freedom from taxation that was conceded to pious and poor Brāhmaṇas was due to the view that those who practised *aparigraha* should not be made to bear avoidable economic burdens.

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The Vedāntic doctrine that soul is identical with or similar to God should have led to the spread of the doctrine of social, economic and legal equality. Strangely enough this did not happen. The theory that every thing here is Brahman was effectively counterpoised by the gospel of the caste system, which permitted social and economic inequalities. Buddhism is sometimes assumed (though quite wrongly) to be opposed to the caste system; but in the Lichchhavi republic which was under marked Buddhist influence, there were sharp economic and political inequalities.

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To conclude, we have to admit that religious and philosophical dogmas and concepts did not deeply influence the Hindu political thought, practice or institutions.

Functions of the State

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Having finished our discussion of the nature and aims of the state, let us now consider its functions.

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Modern writers usually divide the functions of the state into two categories, constituent and ministrant. Under the former class fall those functions of the state which are absolutely necessary for the orderly organisation of society, viz., defence against foreign aggression, protection of person and property, preservation of peace and order and adjudication. Under the latter class fall those activities of the state which it undertakes to promote the welfare of the people, to increase their wealth by a cooperative effort, and to add to their amenities of life. Education, sanitation, postal services, trade regulations, roads and communications, development of mines and forests, care of the poor and invalid, etc. would come under the ministrant functions of the state. The modern tendency of the state is to increase its ministrant functions.

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The available evidence shows that for a long time the state in ancient India confined itself only to the constituent functions. The Vedic state protected citizens from foreign aggression. It also maintained internal order by enforcing respect for the traditional law. Like Varuṇa, the celestial king, the Vedic monarch was *dharmapati*,¹ the protector and enforcer of law, morality and *dharma*. Even the civil and criminal cases were decided by popular bodies (*sabhās*); whether they were presided over by a royal officer is not definitely known.

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¹ *S. Br.* V, 3. 3. 6 and 9.

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With the development of the political literature from *c.* 4th century B. C., we begin to get greater information about the functions of the state. The evidence of the *Mahābhārata*² and the *Arthaśāstra*³ shows that the sphere of the state activity was very extensively extended between the Vedic and the Mauryan age; we, however, are unable to trace the different stages of this development owing to the lack of evidence.

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² Sabhāparvan, Chap. V.

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³ Books II.

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The activity of the state, as envisaged by the *Mahābhārata* and the *Arthaśāstra*, relates to all the aspects of human life,—social, economic and religious. The state was not regarded as a necessary evil, whose coercive activities were to be reduced to the minimum. The *laissez faire* theory, which advocates that the sphere of the state activity should be reduced to the narrowest functions consistent with the preservation of law and order, was not at all popular. The activity of the state was to embrace the whole of human life, both here and hereafter. The state was to offer facilities to religions and sects to develop on their own lines and foster and inculcate piety, morality and righteousness. It was to improve the social order and to encourage learning, education and art by subsidising learned academies and extending patronage to scholars and artists. It was to establish and maintain rest houses, charity halls and hospitals and relieve the distress due to floods, locusts, famines, pestilences and earthquakes. It was to see that the population is evenly distributed and encourage colonisation of fresh lands. It was to enrich the resources of the country by developing forests, working mines and constructing dams and canals in order to make agriculture independent of rain as far as possible. It was to offer active help to trade and industry, but also to protect the population against capitalistic selfishness, if merchant princes sought to corner the market and raise the prices. It was to regulate the vices of the community by appointing its own officers to supervise over wine booths, gambling houses and prostitutes.

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The well-organised governments in ancient India like those under the Mauryas and the Guptas discharged most of the above functions. It is, however, possible that the smaller states may have confined themselves to a restricted sphere of state activities, especially in troubled times.

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The jurisdiction of the state in ancient India thus extended over almost all the spheres of life. Did it not interfere with individual liberty? Did it become possible because the very conception of liberty was not properly developed¹ or because people were disposed to accept the state's claim to omniscience or infallibility?

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¹ This is the view of Prof. Anjaria, *Nature and Ground of Political Obligation*, p. 245.

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State in ancient India was regarded as the centre of society and the chief instrument for its welfare, and hence it was permitted to have a wide sphere of activity. Individual liberty did not appreciably suffer in consequence, primarily because the state discharged its multifarious functions not exclusively through its own bureaucracy. The market superintendents and trade officers belonged to the state bureaucracy, as also the superintendents of morality, but these worked in close co-operation with trade guilds and Brāhmaṇa or Śramaṇa assemblies, where the voice of the people had the upper hand. The state and its officers only tried to harmonise the divergent interests after full consultation with the guilds and local assemblies, which were more stable institutions than the state itself and, therefore, enjoyed very considerable prestige and confidence. It encouraged education by liberal grants to colleges and universities, but never thought of controlling these institutions by its own Director of Public Instruction and his subordinate staff. It made liberal grants to Hindu temples and Buddhist monasteries, but never cared to dictate the dogmas or tenets that were to be encouraged under their auspices. The principle of decentralisation was carried to a very great extent and extensive powers were delegated to the village *Panchāyats*, city councils and trade guilds; and the state carried on its socialistic activities with the active cooperation of these popular bodies. There was hardly any encroachment on the individual liberty. Ancient Indians permitted the state a wide sphere of activity, not because they did not value individual liberty, but because they felt that state could organise them best by reconciling conflicting interests, if its bureaucracy worked in closer co-operation with well-established popular bodies like the trade guilds and village councils.

Distribution of Functions

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In the modern state, the executive, the legislative and the judicial powers and functions are usually distributed in different bodies. In theory the king in ancient India was like the President of the new Indian Republic, the final source of all the executive, legislative and judicial powers. In actual practice, however, the situation differed from age to age. In Vedic age, it would appear that the Samiti or the Parliament shared the executive powers with the king; in some cases it could overrule him also. The king was the supreme judicial functionary in ancient India from the post-Vedic period; but in actual practice considerable powers were delegated to the local popular courts or Panchāyats. Kings and Government officers usually declined to entertain a suit at first instance. The Parliament or the popular assembly disappeared as an effective body in the post-Vedic period; this led to the increase in the influence and authority of the king in executive and administrative matters. Legislation in the modern sense of the term was not the function of the Samiti in ancient India; laws, if secular, were sanctioned by custom and if religious, by the sacred texts. For a very long time the Ancient Indian State used to enforce laws which were not formally approved by any limb of its body politic. The scheme of taxation also was usually the one approved by the usage of the land, as codified in the Smṛitis. The Smṛitis however permitted a considerable variation in the incidence of taxation; the land tax could be anything between 12 to 33%. The actual amount of the tax could thus be varied by the executive, which usually meant the king and the officers appointed by him and holding office during his pleasure. There is sufficient evidence to show that kings soon began to claim the power to make ordinances if not laws; Śukra expressly concedes this power to the king. With the disappearance of the Parliament or Samiti, the executive, the judicial and the legislative powers (as far as they could be exercised by the state) tended to be concentrated in the hands of the king and the ministry nominated by him. The village councils and town corporations, which were largely popular bodies, could successfully contest with the king to some extetnt in the exercise of the judicial, executive and taxation powers in the limited sphere of their jurisdiction, during the Gupta and post-Gupta period.

Vesting of the Sovereignty in Ancient Indian State

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It would be convenient to make a few observations about the vesting of sovereignty in the Ancient Indian State. It has first to be noted that the modern conception of sovereignty was probably not fully developed. There is no Sanskrit term exactly corresponding to it, though *svāmitva* in the *Arthaśāstra* may be partly approaching its meaning. In the Vedic period sovereignty was probably vested jointly in the king and the Samiti; in the republican states it was vested in the Central Executive, which worked under the general superintendence of the republican Parliament, where however only the aristocracy was usually represented. When Samitis or Parliaments disappeared, the sovereignty became vested in the king alone. In the republican state, the presidents tended to become more and more powerful; their posts often became hereditary and they began to enjoy royal titles also. Republics however disappeared from India at *c.* 400 A. D.; and the king's position became very strong from this time.

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One school held that the king was not above the law or Dharma; but that the latter constituted the essence of kingship. Dharma was the sovereign over the sovereign¹ and it may therefore be said that the sovereignty vested in it.

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¹ १. तत् (ब्रह्म) श्रेयो रूपमत्यसृजत् धर्मम् । तदेतत्क्षत्रस्य क्षत्रम् यद्धर्मः। तस्माद्धर्मात्परं नास्ति । *S. Br.* 1. 4. 14.

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But though the king was below the Dharma and was bound by it, though it was the law (Dharma) which made the king, the ancient Indian polity provided no constitutional means or checks to call the king to account if he transgressed the law.

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Another school however pronounced the king to be *adaṇḍya* or above punishment.² If he broke the law, the punishment was left to God. In extreme cases extra-constitutional remedies like the rebellion or regicide were suggested ; but they were usually impracticable. Village councils and town corporations often enjoyed almost complete freedom in their local affairs ; the courts, whether royal or popular, usually administerd the traditional law as embodied in the *jātidharama* (caste rules), *śreṇidharma* (guild rules) and *janapadadharma* (local customs). But a wilful king could set all these at nought and rule in a tyrannical way, as is shown by the pages of the *Rājatarangiṇī* dealing with the history of medieval Kashmir. From *c.* 400 A. D. the sovereignty was vested in the king and it was not controlled by constitutional checks of the modern types. Of course it should not be forgotten that most of these checks were evolved in Europe only in the post-Reformation period.

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² अथैनं पृष्ठतः तूष्णीमेव दण्डैर्ध्नन्ति । तं दण्डैर्ध्नन्तो दण्डवधमतिनयंति । तस्माद्राजाऽदण्डयो यदेनं दण्डवधमतिनयंति । *Ibid,* V. 4. 7.

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Manu no doubt pronounces¹ that a king was to pay a fine of a thousand coins when an ordinary man had to pay that of one coin only, but he does not specify the offence, nor indicate the agency which was to try the king. The commentator Kullūka says that the fine was to be self-imposed and was to be given to Brāhmaṇas or to be thrown into water in the name of Varuṇa.² It is thus clear that Manu's statement is a merely idealistic one and hardly provides any real and practicable constitutional check.

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¹ कार्षापणो भवेद्दण्डयो यत्रान्यः प्राकृतो जनः । तत्र राजा भवेद्दण्डयः सहस्रमिति धारणा । VIII. 336.

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² स्वार्थदण्डं त्वप्सु प्रवेशयेद्ब्राह्मणेभ्यो वा दद्यात् । ईशो दण्डस्य वारुण इति वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् ।

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