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Hindu Administrative Institutions c9: Chapter IV. Fiscal Administration

Hindu Administrative Institutions c9

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Chapter IV. Fiscal Administration

Sec. i. Sources of Revenue

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(Revenue in ancient India was derived partly from taxation and partly from sources other than taxation. An appreciable proportion of revenue came from the land, the principle governing this being that a fixed share of the produce of the land should be given to the state either in cash or in kind, preferably the latter. It was generally one-sixth of the produce.) This seems to have been a *fixed* legal tax for the same rate is repeated in the epics, in law-books, the *Arthaśāstras* and even in miscellaneous literature including *kāvya* and the dramatic works.¹ On this account one of the king's names was the sixth-taker (*ṣaḍbhāgabhak*). In later times he was called *ṣadaṃśavṛtti*, one who depended for this living on the sixth part.² The classical Tamil work *Kural* mentions the same rate.³

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¹ *Śānti Parvan*, xxiv. 16 ; lxviii. 27 ; *Viṣṇu*, iii. 10.

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² See *History of India*, part 1, p. 27, by P. T. Srinivasa Aiyangar, (Third Edition.)

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³ "தென்புலத்தார் தெய்வம் விருந்தொக்கலென்றாங் கைம்புலத்தாறோம்பல்." 43. This indicates how tradition has been a potent force in India from very early times.

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But this rate was but the maximum allowable; for Gautama speaks of three different rates, one-tenth, one-eighth, and one-sixth, to be taken from the land. Manu's rates are one-twelfth, one-eighth, and one-sixth.⁴ Sukra shows himself a sound economist and practical statesman when he recommends one-half from one-third of the produce from the fields irrigated by tanks and wells (irrigation being undertaken by the state), one-fourth from lands which depend for water mainly on rainfall,¹ those richly fed by rivers and streams, and one-sixth from other soils—a sort of graduated taxation according to the nature of the soil and the cost of water-supply. Kauṭalya recommends one-third, or one-fourth, only in cases of financial stringency, but this impost was not to affect the middling, or the inferior qualities of land, and again the field-labourers and forest tribes. In order to realize more revenue it is said that the revenue-officer commonly prevailed upon the labourers to raise summer crops also and thus to increase the produce, so that the one-sixth part to the king might increase in amount.²

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⁴ Manu, vii. 130

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¹ Śukra, iv. 2. 113-15.

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² कोशमकोशः प्रत्युत्पन्नार्थकृच्छ्रः संङ्गृह्णीयात् । जनपदं महान्तं अल्पप्रमाणं वा देवमातृकं प्रभूतधान्यं धान्यस्यांशं तृतीयं चतुर्थं वा याचेत । यथासारं मध्यमवरं वा..........अल्पप्राणं वा न याचेत । . . . . . समाहर्तृपुरुषाः ग्रीष्मे कर्षकाणां उद्वापं कारयेयुः । (Arthaśāstra, Bk. v, Sec. 2.)

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In the opinion of modern Western writers like Sir John Strachey and John Stuart Mill, the land-revenue of ancient Hindu administration did not enter into the sphere of taxation so-called. Evidence, literary and epigraphical, points to the fact that the king was not regarded as the proprietor of the land. The idea that the state owned all land was the feudal conception of the land-law prevalent in western Europe in the middle ages. Ancient Indian literature speaks eloquently of the rights of private property in land. There are a number of texts in favour of this statement—Nīlakaṇṭha, Mādhava, Kātyāyana and Miṭramiśra.³

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³ See Jayaswal, Hindu Polity, part ii, pp. 17 ff.

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Granting then that the institution of private property in land existed, it is necessary to examine the position of the state in relation to these lands. The king had nothing more than protective control over the practice of *dharma* both in his state and the subject-states as well.¹ This means the central state had the right to punish the misbehaved in their kingdom including the tributary states. On the strength of this Rāma argued that he was right in killing the unrighteous Vāli.²

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¹ *Śānti Parvan*, lvi. 42.

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² > इक्ष्वाकूनां इयं भूमिः सशैलवनकानना ।

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There is also the fact of the existence of crown lands, (स्वभूमि:) that is, lands owned by the state and cultivated under the direct superintendence of the state³ (*sītādhyakṣa*). From the existence of this office certain writers have wrongly inferred that the state was the owner of all land. Such inference confuses the real issue involved. We must make a distinction between crown lands and private lands. If this were made, the other question is automatically solved. That the right of lordship to the private lands was confined only to protective control is further obvious from a statement of the *Kauṭalīya*.⁴ This means that if a king has received wages in the shape of taxes and does not afford protection, then, that king might be abandoned, and another might be chosen in his stead.⁵

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³ *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. ii, Sec. 24.

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⁴ ‘राजानं अनुग्रहं याचामहे । निरनुग्रहाः परत्र गच्छाम इति ’ । (Bk. xiii. 1.)

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⁵ The *Mahābhārata* mentions six persons that are to be abandoned : 1. A teacher who does not teach. 2. A Brahman not versed in the Veda. 3. A king who affords no protection. 4. A wife who is not a loving partner. 5. A cowherd who desires to live in the village. 6. A barber who wants to live in the woods.—(*Śānti Parvan*, lvi. 43-5.)

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मृगपक्षिमनुष्याणां निग्रहप्रग्रहौअपि ॥ (*Kiṣkindā Kāṇḍa*, 18. 6 ff.)

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From this it would appear that the king was only a servant of the people and his duty was to keep law and order for which he was paid wages in the shape of taxes. A similar idea is expressed in a stanza of the *Purapporul Veṇbāmālai*.¹ There it is said that the king who is expected to receive one-sixth of the produce must afford protection by following the path pursued by his forefathers. If he should misbehave, two courses were open to the people. First they might join in an open revolt and have the king deposed and substitute another on the throne. Or the allegiance which the people owed to this unrighteous monarch might be transferred to another, wellknown for the practice of *dharma*. These further confirm the fact that the king held no proprietary right over the soil of the land. The Government was then a contract of service entered between the subjects of the state and the sovereign power, for they had the right to terminate the contract at any period or time.

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¹ ஊர்தி னுகையுள் வைகவுயிரோம்பி பாதிவொன்றணா தவித்துவண்டு-மாறின்றி வான்காவல் கொண்டான் வழின்று வைகலுந் தான்காவல் கொண்டறம். 179.

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This is borne out by a whole chapter of the *Śānti Parvan* of the *Mahābhārata*. To Manu, the first king, people agreed to give as wages of protection, one cow for every fifty cows bought or sold, one-fiftieth of gold, one-tenth of grains, besides other favourable terms.² Bhīṣma on the authority of Bṛhaspati and others characterizes this idea as very important and equalizes protection with the *rājadharma* itself.³ The means towards the end of protection are then narrated; policemen and servants, gifts intime and place, reasonable demands, valour, skill and truth on the part of the king, dissension among the enemies, proper justice, protecting the good, collecting the grains, serving the learned, increasing the treasury, enthusiasm among the soldiers, good means of defence, diplomacy, self-confidence, in a word, pursuit of *nīti* and *dharma*.¹

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² Chap. lxvi. 23-29.

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³ Chap. lvii. 1 and 4.

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¹ Chap. lvii. 5-12.

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It was realized that the spring of all action is wealth. It is the perennial source of all *dharma*,² and in the *Rāmāyaṇa* the importance of *artha* to *dharma* is well brought out by the speech of Lakṣmaṇa addressed to his brother Rāma in the field of Laṅka.³ Friends, relatives, manhood, learning, strength of will, wisdom, greatness and goodness, are all said to be the natural

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² *Vana Parvan*, xxxiii, 48.

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³ > अर्थेभ्यो हि विवृद्धेभ्यः संवृत्तेभ्यस्ततस्ततः ।

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क्रियाः सर्वाः प्रवर्तन्ते पर्वतेभ्य इवापगाः ॥
अर्थेन हि विमुक्तस्य पुरुषस्याल्पतेजसः ।
व्युच्छिद्यन्ते क्रियाः सर्वा ग्रीष्मे कुसरितो यथा ॥
सोयमर्थं परित्यज्य सुखकामः सुखैधितः ।
पापमारभते कर्तुं ततो दोषः प्रवर्तते ॥
यस्यार्थास्तस्य मित्राणि यस्यार्थाः तस्य बान्धवाः ।
यस्यार्थाः स पुमान् लोके यस्यार्थाः स च पण्डितः ॥
यस्यार्थाः स च विक्रान्तो यस्यार्थाः स च बुद्धिमान् ।
यस्यार्थाः स महाभागो यस्यार्थाः स महागुणः ॥
अर्थस्यैते परित्यागे दोषाः प्रख्याहता मया ।
राज्यमुत्सृजता वीर येन बुद्धिस्त्वया कृता ॥
यस्यार्था धर्मकामार्थास्तस्य सर्वं प्रदक्षिणम् ।
अधनेनार्थकामेन नार्थः शक्यो विचिन्वता ॥

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corollary of wealth (artha). To a man whose wealth is on the increase, work undertaken goes on as a rivulet from the hills. To a man of no wealth, however, works undertaken prove impossible as water in a summer river.

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It is then clear that artha is useful, nay, indispensable for the moral and the material progress of the land. What are the sources from which the king generally enriched his treasury? Mention has already been made of the traditional land revenue which contributed the major portion of the income to the state. Inscriptional evidence proves mild rates of land-assessment (kānikka-ḍan), about the commencement of the eleventh century in the Chola kingdom of South India. It was roughly 100 kalams per veli (about 6½ acres), equal to about 80 kalams of the present day,¹ in kind from good lands, and fifty to eighty from less fertile ones. In cash it varied from four to nine kalañju of gold. The revenue assessed was invariably in proportion to the produce: dry-lands one-fifth, and wet-lands one-third.² Those who were in charge of the land revenue are called the dhruvādhikaraṇas (No. 38 of Fleet). The tax-collectors were generally known as the Utkhetavita in an inscription of Bhāskaravarman.³ Other sources of revenue to the state were from commerce, forts, transports, mines, salt, śulka, ferry dues, fines and the produce of forests. Added to these heads of income are the voluntary contributions, tributes from the subject states, and unclaimed property.⁴

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¹ S. K. Aiyangar, Ancient India, pp. 176 and 182.

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² Epigraphica Carnaṭaca, No. 492 of Mulbagal of Kulottunga I.

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³ Epigraphica Indica, xii. 75.

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⁴ Cf. Śānti Parvan, lxxi. 10.

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हर्ष:कामश्च दर्पश्च धर्म:क्रोध: शमो दम: ।
अर्थादेतानि सर्वाणि प्रवर्तन्ते नराधिप ॥ (Yuddh. lxxxiii. 32-39.)

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*Commerce.*—Commerce came in for the largest contribution only next to that of the land revenue. Taxes on commerce were not imposed indiscriminately but on the strength of the difficulty or otherwise, of purchase and sale of goods by merchants, their standard of life and family expenses besides the incidental charges on intermediaries and labour.¹ It varied from one-tenth to one-fiftieth. But one-tenth seems to have been the general rule like the one-sixth for the land tax.² Among others which contributed towards the material advancement of the state are mentioned ample means of commerce (प्रचारसमृद्धिः), increased production of grains and gold, and diminution of remissions.³ According to the *Kauṭalīya* there was a superintendent of commerce (पण्यध्यक्षः) who would ascertain the demand for various articles and also the rise or fall in their prices.⁴ Such of those merchants who dealt in

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¹ > विक्रय्यं क्रयमध्वानं भक्तं च सपरिष्ययम् ।

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² > पञ्चाशद्भाग आदेयो राज्ञा पशुहिरण्ययोः।

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³ *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. ii, Sec. viii.

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⁴ *Ibid.*, Bk. ii. 16.

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योगक्षेमं च संप्रेक्ष्य वणिजां कारयेत्करान् ॥
उत्पत्तिं दानवृत्तिं च शिल्पं संप्रेक्ष्य चासकृत् ।
शिल्पं प्रति करानेवं शिल्पिनः प्रति कारयेत् ॥
(Śānti Parvan, lxxxvii. 13, 14.)

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धान्यानामष्टमोभागः षष्ठो द्वादश एव वा ।
आददीताथ षड्भागं द्रुमांसमधुसर्पिषां ।
गन्धौषधिरसानांच पुष्पमूलफलस्य च ॥
पत्रशाकतृणानां च चर्मणां वैदलस्य च ।
मृन्मयानां च भाण्डानां सर्वस्याश्ममयस्य च ॥
Manu, vii. 130-32; cf. Gautama, 24-27; Vasiṣṭha, ix. 26-27; Āpastamba, xi. 10. 26. 9, etc.

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foreign merchandise were generally favoured by remission of taxes on those commodities. The state itself undertook some of the manufactures and there was both a selling and purchasing department which submitted daily accounts to the superintendent in charge. There were trade associations and partnership firms.¹ Distinction was made between the transactions by these companies and by individuals. Favourable concessions were always shown to the latter. The weights and measures in use were to bear the stamp of the state.²

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¹ *Ibid.*

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² *Ibid.*, Sec. 19.

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The regulation of tolls bears testimony to the prevalence of an excellent code of commercial morality. Wholesale markets are known as the ‘ध्वज.’ The state had the wholesale prices fixed and any merchant getting an enhanced sum would be deprived of that amount which would go to replenish the treasury. There were toll-houses situated at the entrances to the city or fortress. Toll-keepers were to examine the goods, their destination and the seal-marks, and impose dues according to their value. Consideration was also shown for useless articles. Again there were no tolls for commodities intended for marriages, ceremonies, gifts or sacrifices. Forbidden articles if imported would be forfeited and the dealers punished.³ Tolls varied according as the articles were necessaries or luxuries. Fruits, flowers, meat, etc., came under the category of luxuries. Commonly the toll levied was one-sixth, while necessaries like clothes and metals were assessed at one-twentieth or one-twenty-fifth. Besides the tolls there was another due *dvāradeya*, literally the gate-dues. (Another regulation of the department of commerce was the prohibition of retail sale at manufacturing places.¹) This would, in the course of nature, affect prejudicially the proper distribution of trade as well as the revenues to the state. This reminds us of the practice in vogue to-day of wholesale manufacturers not dealing directly with individual traders but with established distributing firms and houses.

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³ शस्त्रवर्मकवचलोहरथरत्नानिपशूनामन्त्यतमानिर्वाह्यं निर्वाहयतो यथा-वधुषितो दण्डः पण्यनाशश्च। (*Arthaśāstra*, ii, 21.)

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¹ जातिभूमिषु च पुण्यानामविक्रयः। (*Arthaśāstra*, Bk. ii, Sec. 22.)

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Under this department of commerce there was another tax, the road-cess.² The collector of these dues was known as the *antapāla*. He was perhaps a little away from the toll-house. He received one-fourth *paṇa* for every load of merchandise, one *paṇa* for each head of cattle and other animals. He would examine foreign commodities, and if found useful, would send them to the toll-officer. Useless and harmful articles were shut out by him. The really useful things such as valuable seeds were let in free of charge.³ Another feature of this useful department was the weaving home. The proverb ‘let the women spin and not preach’ found a practical illustration in the economics of Kauṭalya. Women of various grades from young to the aged took to spinning and weaving of cotton, wool, hemp and flax. This was one aspect of the ancient cottage industries. Women could spin in their homes. There were special arrangements for taking raw materials to them, and taking back finished goods from them.⁴ The state paid them both time and piece wages. There were special days which were observed as holidays and those who worked in the holidays were also entitled to special allowances.¹ On the one hand this system found employment for the weaker sex and on the other hand the profits which accrued from these manufactures went to swell the treasury.

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² *Ibid.*

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³ सारं ततो ग्राह्यं अपास्य फल्गुः। (*Ibid.*, Sec. 21.)

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⁴ याश्चानिष्टासिन्यः प्रोषितविधवा न्यङ्गाः कन्यका वाऽऽत्मानं विभ्रत्यस्ताः खदासोभिरनुसार्थ सोपग्रहं कर्म कारयितव्याः। (*Ibid.*, Bk. ii, Sec. 23.)

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¹ तिथishu प्रतिपादनमानैश्च कर्मकारयितव्याः। (Ibid.)

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Under the control of this department was again the ocean and river traffic. Fishermen were allowed to go fishing in these waters, and for this they were required to furnish a licensing fee which amounted to one-sixth of the value of their haul. Customs were collected in port-towns from ships touching their shores, though favour was shown in the case of weather-beaten ships. Again there were boats and other accessories in both navigable and small rivers. Fording these, or taking goods through them was only by previous permission. Śrotriyas, ascetics, children, the aged, royal messengers and pregnant women were allowed to cross free. This is one of the numerous references to show that the Kauṭalīya is often swayed by humane considerations. Others were to ford with passes previously obtained.² To obtain them perhaps a small fee was paid. The ferry-men were to remit their daily incomes to the superintendent. There were both water-routes and land-routes as well as routes for coastal traffic (कूलपथ). There is again evidence of commercial intercourse with China and Ceylon.³ Baudhāyana lays down a duty of ten per cent. in general on all goods imported by sea.

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² बद्धतोर्थश्चैताः कार्याः राजद्विष्टकारिणां तरणभयात्। (Arthaśāstra, Bk. ii, Sec. 28.)

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³ N. N. Law, Ancient Indian Polity, p. 87.

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Bühler translates it as ‘*ad valorem* duty’. And again just duties are recommended on other marketable goods.¹ The recommendation of Viṣṇu is more moderate: one-tenth of profits on indigenous articles, and one-twentieth on imported ones.² Śukrāchārya’s rates vary from one-sixteenth to one-thirty-second.³ It would thus appear that state regulation of commerce was progressive in character and prevented much of the economic distress which would otherwise have disturbed the even course of ancient Hindu administration.

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¹ i. 10, 14 and 15.

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² iii. 16.

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³ द्वात्रिंशांशं हरेद्राजा विक्रेतुः क्रेतुरेव वा । विंशांशं वा षोडशांशं शुल्कं मूल्याविरोधकम् । (Śukra, iv. 2. 108.)

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*Mines.*—There were both land and ocean mines (खन्य). The state had the monopoly in mining and in metals.⁴ Mines were granted to corporations or individuals for fixed terms of lease and mining operations should be carried on by previous licenses obtained. In that case the Government need not spend on their outlay. Besides there were other mines worked by the state itself. There was an officer in charge of these mines. He collected conch-shells, diamonds, corals, salt and so on from the ocean mines. One branch of this department was the office of the mint. Coins of gold, silver and copper, were minted here under the direction of the superintendent of the mint (लक्षणध्यक्षः). There was, besides, the examiner of coins (रूपदर्शकः) who regulated the currency as a medium of exchange (व्यावहारिकों). It was for him to fix legal tender (कोशप्रवेश्यां).⁵ Brahmans guilty of offences were to work in mines as a punishment.¹ Thus these mines added considerably to the state treasury.

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⁴ *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. ii, Sec. 12.

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⁵ रूपदर्शकः पणयाज्ञां व्यावहारिको कोशप्रवेश्यां च स्थापयेत् । (*Ibid.*)

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¹ *Arthaśāstra*, Bk iv, Sec. 8; cf. Viṣṇu, v. 2-8.

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Excise.—The superintendent of the excise department (सुराध्यक्षः) was to centralize or decentralize the sale of manufactured liquor. These spirits were manufactured in the ports, country-parts and camps set apart for the purpose. Six varieties of liquor are mentioned; *medaka* from rice, *prasannā* from spices and fruits, *āsava* from sugar and honey, *ariṣṭa* (perhaps a special medicinal preparation), *maireya* from jaggery, pepper, and barks, *madhu* from grapes. Besides these there is the *sahakārasurā* extracted from the juice of mango fruits. The daily sales of each variety were examined by special officials. The manufacture of liquor was a royal monopoly denied to private people. Toddy or juice of palms does not find mention, but only the fermented juice of grapes and other syrups.²

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² *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. ii, Sec. 25.

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The regulations of this department were severe. Sukrāchārya lays down that liquor houses must be fixed outside the limits of the village so as not to be a public nuisance. Again drinking was not allowed in day-time.³ It was also forbidden to take the stock outside the limits of the village. It was sold to men of character and that too in small quantities, a *prastha* or half in each case, ‘lest workmen should spoil the work on hand, *āryas*

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³ (Sukra, iv. 4. 44-45.)

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ब्राह्मगं पापकर्मणमुद्दुष्याङ्क कृतव्रणम् ।
कुर्यान्निर्विषयं राजा वासयेदाकरेषु वा ॥

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चौराणां पितृभूतास्ते स्वर्णकारादयस्त्वतः ।
गत्वागृहं पृथग्रामात्तस्मिन् रक्षेत्तु मद्यपान् ॥

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न दिवा मद्यपानंहि राष्ट्रे कुर्याद्धि कर्हिचित् ॥

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stray from virtue, and the wicked do indiscreet acts by over-indulgence.’ Another healthy regulation was that all were allowed to drink in the houses established and were not permitted to go out immediately after. Only good liquor was sold and the spoilt one was given to draught animals and hogs. Further if anybody under the influence of drink got himself robbed of his property in the premises, it was for the dealer in charge to make good the loss.¹ Brahmans were forbidden from drinking. Only a limited number of people were allowed to take part in liquor traffic. These regulations show unmistakably that temperance was the aim of the state in ancient India.

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¹ *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. ii, Sec. 25.

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*Gambling.*—Kauṭalya like Yājñavalkya recommends centralization of gambling.² Betting and challenging are also included in this category.³ There was an officer in charge who supplied dice for hire. Other receipts under this head were a share of 5 per cent on what was won by every respective winner, fees for license and fees for supplying water and accommodation. Besides these there were fines levied upon false players, deceitful winners and the use of artifice in games.⁴ That the state centralized this play is evident from Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra where it is said that in a portion of the assembly house only could the players play at this game.⁵ According to Haradatta this was confined to the first three castes who took fixed contracts, daily, monthly, or yearly. These swelled the exchequer.⁶

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² द्यूतमेकंमुखं कार्यं तस्करज्ञानकारणात् । एष एव विधिज्ञेयः प्राणिद्यूते समाज्ञये ॥ (Yāj., ii. 203; *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. iii, Sec. 20.)

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³ Yāj., ii. 199-202.

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⁴ *Ibid.*

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⁵ ii. 10. 25.

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⁶ *Ibid.*, ii. 12-13.

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*Duty on Salt.*—This occupies much of the attention at present of the members of the Indian Legislative Assembly. The unanimous public opinion in India is that salt so essential for life must not be taxed heavily. It will be interesting to examine the amount of revenue charged by the ancient Indian state on this necessary article of life. There was both rock salt and that manufactured from the waters of the ocean. Besides the salt manufactured in the state manufactories, it was imported also from the neighbouring states. The Government was entitled to a fixed share of the former, while one-sixth portion of the imported quantity of salt went to the king. Private individuals and firms were allowed to manufacture only with the previous and express sanction of the Government. Persons proceeding without license, and persons adulterating salt were to have the highest amercement as punishment. Dealers in salt were to pay the toll charge in addition to other fees. Those who took salt for private use were allowed toll free. Even here *śrotriyas*, penance-performers and labourers were exempted from toll dues.¹ It is justifiable if from these we infer that the Kauṭalīyan recommendation of taxes was in no way unscrupulous.

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¹ *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. ii, Sec. 12.

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*Miscellaneous.*—The other sources of income to the state were from the office of state-goldsmith, the institution of prostitutes, building-sites, guilds of artisans, handicrafts, religious and charitable endowments, water-tax, income-tax, flower, fruits and vegetable gardens (here it was one-sixth), game-forests, timber and elephant forests, heads of cattle, asses, camels, horses, hides and

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श्रोत्रियास्तपस्विनो विष्टयश्च भक्तलवणं हरेयुः । अतोऽन्यो लवणक्षार-वर्गः शुल्कं दद्यात् ।

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skins, etc. There were no absolute and fixed rates for all time as one could easily gather from the several texts of the extant treatises on the Arthaśāstra.¹ Levies were also accepted in kind even in the case of clothes and heads of cattle. Artists and artisans who would not pay in cash were expected to work a day in a fortnight for the king, and thus commute their payment by labour.² That the artisans were also subject to certain kind of taxes is evident from the Mahābhārata.³ In taxing them the nature of their work of art, their difficulty, and their skill⁴ were taken into consideration.

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¹ Arthaśāstra, Bk. iv, Sec. 2; Yāj. i. 132; Viṣṇu, iii. 19-12; Śukra, iv. 2. 236-41.

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² Arthaśāstra, Bk. ii, Sec. 2.

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³ Śanti Parvan, lxxxvii. 14.

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⁴ Ibid.

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There were other sources of income which could not be classified under the regular head of revenue but which nevertheless enriched the treasury. These were spoils of war, tributes, and voluntary contributions. The last were raised when financial embarrassments occurred so as to replenish the treasury, the first line of defence for the kingdom. Willing contributors were entitled to special honours and presents at the hands of the monarch.⁵ Unclaimed property was another source of income to the state.⁶ Sukra's sources of revenue include the amount recovered from thieves (तस्कराहृत) also.

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उत्पत्तिं दानवृत्तिंच शिल्पं संप्रेक्ष्य चासकृत् ।
शिल्पं प्रतिकरानेवं शिल्पिनः प्रतिकारयेत् ॥

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यथोपकारं वा खवशा वा यदुपहरेयुस्थान-
छत्रवेष्टनविभूषाक्षैषां हिरण्येन प्रयच्छेत । (Arthaśāstra, Bk. v, Sec. ii.)

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अस्वामिकं कति प्राप्तं नाष्टिकं तस्कराहृतं ।
संचितं तु विनिश्चित्यामात्यो राज्ञे निवेदयेत् ॥
(Śukra, ii. 107; Agni, ccxxiii. 16 ff.)

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More or less the same sources of revenue are found in the inscriptions, dated A.D. 571 and 766.¹ The inscription (38) mentions *udranga* or land tax, *uparikara* or ‘a tax levied on cultivators who have no proprietory rights on soil,’ *vātabhūta*? (a tax levied on fruit and flower gardens), *dhānya* (grains), *hiraṇya* (gold), *ādeya* (windfall?), *viṣṭika* (of workmen who were fed by the state). To these, No. 39, adds *daśāparādhaḥ* (fines from ten kinds of offences, three of body, four of speech, three of mind), *bhoga* (usufruct) and *bhāga* (one-sixth of land revenue).²

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¹ Nos. 38 and 39 of *F. G. I.*

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² Some of these terms have been left untranslated by Fleet. Most of them occur in Bk. ii, chap. viii of the *Arthaśāstra* as sources of revenue. According to the *Śrīmūlam* commentary ‘*vāta*’ includes the fruit and flower gardens from which revenue went to the king’s exchequer. The interpretation of the term *bhūta* is a little difficult as it does not occur in the technical literature so far to our knowledge. It may mean ‘a tax that has been given up and revised now’. But the other question is on what it was assessed. Hence it is advisable to treat *vūta-bhūta* as a compound term, *bhūta* meaning—‘produced or obtained from’. The term *ādeya* Kauṭalya explains सुप्राप्यानुपाल्यः परेषा मप्रत्यादेय इति आदेयः । (Bk. ix. 4) and भोगः is interpreted as ‘राजभागः’ (Bk. xii. 5 ; Trivandrum edition, vol. iii, p. 210). भागः = धान्यषड्भागः (Ibid., vol. i, p. 136 ; Bk. ii, 6).

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South Indian inscriptions throw much light on the sources of income of the ancient kingdoms like those of the Pallavas, the Cholas, the Pāṇḍyas and others. The Taṇḍantōṭṭam plates refer to a number of taxes such as those on oil-presses, looms, stalls, grains, areca-nuts, animals like bulls, toddy-drawers and shepherds. The Kāsākuḍi plates mention irrigation tax, professional tax

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Jīvananda Vidyāsagar in the commentary writes अस्वामिकं = स्वामिहीनं उत्तराधिकारिरहितं च द्रव्यं ॥ (p. 111).

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and trading licenses. Also a share of the cloth woven of cotton thread and of corn ears, are mentioned as dues to the state. There is a long list of subsidiary taxes (kaḍamai) given in the Chola inscriptions attributed to Tribhuvan Chakravartin Kōnerimaikon; Fees (kāśukaḍamai); oḍukku paḍi: uṟaināḷi: pāḍi kāval (village watch); share of the karaṇam (measurer); dues on looms (taryirai); oil-presses (śekkiṇai), on profits (śeṭṭirai): taṭṭoli on goldsmith (taṭṭarpaṭṭam): animals (māvaḍai), tanks (kuḷavaḍai), water-courses (oḷukkunīrpaṭṭam), fees (vāri-āyam), caste dues (inavari): weights (iḍaivari), fine for bad articles (aḷugaḷśarakku): shops and stalls (aṅgāḍipaṭṭam), salt-tax (uppāyam): dues from potters (kuśakāṇam), marriage (kaṇṇāiakkāṇam), washing places (vaṇṇārapārai), ferry-keepers, cattle-sheds, ānaikkūḍam, kudiraip-pandi, or temporary stables to the state elaphants and horses when the king was on tour. There are others that could not be identified.¹

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¹ S. I. I., vol. iii, part i, pp. 112-17.

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Besides these generally accepted heads of revenue for the state there were others which are seemingly immoral but nevertheless dharmic (moral) from the view point of rāja-dharma whose keynote is protection which depends entirely on a well-furnished treasury. To this end the following methods among others could be adopted according to the Arthaśāstra: (1) contribution from wealthy persons could be requested under the false plea of executing this work, or that. Such of those whose donations were handsome enough were to be honoured with titles and special gifts. (2) Again spies in the disguise of sorcerers could deprive the heretics and even temples of their funds provided the latter are not enjoyed by the śrotriyas. (3) The secretary in charge of religious endowments could collect funds under various items and send them on to the exchequer. (4) The image of a god or an altar might be secretly set up in some place, or an evil-omen might be pointed out and sums may be collected therefrom; also by celebrating festivals or festivities. (5) By pointing to untimely fruits and flowers in the sacred trees of the palace-garden, the king might cite it as an evil omen, to avert which he might raise enormous wealth by big processions in honour of gods. (6) He might again set up a man in secret in the hidden portion of a tree, and announce the arrival of an evil spirit, to propitiate which he could gather wealth from the public. (7) He could collect a number of precious and rare beings such as a serpent with several heads, and set them up for public exhibition and thus realize some wealth. (8) Special spies might offer a drink of anæsthetic ingredients, make people temporarily insensate and, offer remedial measures for which money could be collected. (9) Spies might deprive merchants, goldsmiths, of their illegetimate earnings in the disguise of partners. (10) If a quarrel arose among two seditionists, prostitute spies or poisoners could administer poison to one, accuse the other of the guilt, and deprive both of their property.¹

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¹ *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. v, Sec 2.

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Some of these have been referred to by Dr. Jolly in his introduction to the scholarly edition of the *Arthaśāstra*² in favour of his theory that the *Kauṭalīya* mentions immoral and unscrupulous ways of taxation, thus departing from the *Dharmaśāstras*.³ These taxes, though raised by practice of fraud, need not be regarded unscrupulous for the following reasons:—

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² Punjab Sanskrit Series.

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³ रक्षणार्थवृत्तानां कण्टकानां च शोधनात् । नरेन्द्रान्दिवं यान्ति प्रजापालनतत्पराः । (Manu, ix. 253.)

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1. Kauṭalya’s treatise is a practical manual on statecraft. Practical application of administration could not be effected without treasure to fall back upon. To this end expediency dictated recourse to certain ways of raising revenue, unscrupulous under normal circumstances but justifiable as measures of desperate necessity.

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2. Even here, taking benevolences, ill-spent funds of charitable institutions, holding of public shows, punishing the seditious, could not be characterized as unscrupulous. These are to be resorted to only in extreme danger.

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3. Setting up altars, announcing evil spirits, administering ingredients, are some of the ways by which the masses could be humoured. These are the means again by which such of those landless or occupationless, who would otherwise escape the burdens of taxation, could be made to contribute their quota to the state in some way or other. People were then swayed by supernatural ideas, and the practical statesman touched their weak spots to achieve this end. In this respect the state endeavoured to equalize the taxation.

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4. Goldsmiths and similar professionists would naturally earn by illegitimate and dishonest means. Manu characterizes them as ‘प्रकाशवञ्चकाः’ ¹ ‘deceivers in open daylight.’ With ability to pay, the members of these classes would try to ‘shift’ the burdens of taxation on to the others. Kauṭalya could not tolerate this and hence recommended the use of partner-informants to deprive them of their illegitimate earnings.

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¹ Chap. ix. 257.

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5. The condition and circumstances of Kauṭalya’s days were such that unless the ever-growing class of the seditionists were put an end to with rigorous and capital punishment, the king could not reign in peace and people could not live in safety. Manu speaks of them as thorns in the way of the state, and to be removed at all costs.¹ Kauṭalya ends this section with the following :

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¹ ix. 253.

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एवं दूष्येषु अधार्मिकेषु च वर्तेत । नेतरेषु ।

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This means these various methods were to be directed against people of evil life and not law-abiding citizens of the state.² It would thus appear that these methods were not the rule but the exception. They were applied only in the case of the unrighteous, i.e., the enemies of the state. In a word the exigencies of the Mauryan administration perhaps found in their application valuable instruments to gain the end, namely, protection and peace.

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² *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. v, Sec. 2.

Sec. ii. Principles of Taxation

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That taxes were just, equitable, and reasonable is borne out by a number of literary and epigraphic evidence. It is said that a king should not have recourse to *adharmic* methods; nor should he be impelled by greed or covetousness. In either case the king’s position will become intolerable. Unrighteous tax-gatherers are compared to greedy milkmen who would cut off the udder of a cow to get all the milk.³ But to increase the milk of the cow the owner must feed the animal sumptuously with fresh, green and rich food. In the same way moderate and seasonal collection of taxes will draw the people nearer to him and will ensure the future revenues of the state.¹ Bhīṣma advises Yudhiṣṭhira to behave like the gardener who will gather flowers in season without prejudice to the growth of the plant.²

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³ *Śānti Parvan*, lxxi. 15-17; lxxxvii. 20. 21; lxxxviii. 4-5.

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¹ यो हि दोग्ध्र्युपास्ते च स नित्यं विन्दते पयः । एवं राष्ट्रमुपायेन भुञ्जानो लभते फलम् ॥ (Śānti Parvan, lxxi. 17.)

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² मालाकारोपमो राजन्भव माऽङ्गारिकोपमः । तथायुक्तश्चिरं राज्यं भोक्तुं शक्ष्यसि पालयन् ॥ (Śānti Parvan, lxxi. 20; cp. Śukra, iv. 2. 111.)

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The king is further advised to conduct himself in the matter of taxation like a bee sucking honey from flowers, a cowherd tending his cattle, a tigress swallowing her cubs, a leech sucking blood and so forth.³ But here again a caution is given that the people should not be emasculated. It simply means that springs of productive energy must not in the least be disturbed; for to disturb them is to lay the axe at the very root.⁴ Enlightened though these regulations are, still they were not able to observe them to the very letter in practice as is illustrated from the mass of the Buddhist literature and especially the Jātakas. It is said that force was resorted to in case of delay or wilful evasion, and the tax-gatherers harassed the people by forced labour in the fields and gardens.⁵ Unable to bear the burdens people fled from the country and town parts for refuge on the borders of the realm.⁶

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³ Śānti Parvan, lxxxviii. 1-7. ⁴ Śānti Parvan, lxxxvii. 20-21. ⁵ Jātaka 77. ⁶ The Jātakas, vol. v, p. 520.

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Hindu texts on polity always advocate the principle of equity in the matter of collecting taxes. It is said that the weaknesses of the people must be played upon by soft tricks. This must be like the ‘long nosed rat eating the flesh from the feet of sleepy persons, and like the increasingly heavy loads on the back of a young bull’. Hence taxation must keep well within the limits of taxable capacity. In this way it is recommended that the treasury ought to be increased by means of a graduated system of taxation. It is further said that before imposing fresh taxes the leaders of the people must be conciliated so that the masses may not rise to resist.¹ Taxes should then be light. As occasion demanded they must be raised little by little having regard to time and place.² This was possible as the administration was designed with a view to ensure rigorous economy. Machinery was devised to carry on duties efficiently and economically as circumstances allowed.³ Prof. Banerjee’s remark in this connection seems just. ‘The principles on which the tax-system was based were sound

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¹ न चास्थाने न चाकाले करास्तम्यो निपातयेत् । आनुपूर्येण सान्त्वेन यथाकालं यथाविधि ॥ (*Ibid.*, lxxxviii. 12.)

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² *Ibid.*, lxxxvii. 18-19.

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अल्पेनाल्पेन देयेन वर्धमानं प्रदापयेत् ।
ततो भूयस्ततो भूयः क्रमवृद्धिं समाचरेत् ॥
दमयन्निव दम्यानि शश्वत्भारं विवर्धयेत् ।
मृदुपूवं प्रयत्नेन पाशानम्यवहारयेत् ॥
सकृत्पाशावकोणास्ते न भविष्यन्ति दुर्दमाः ।
उचितेनैव भोक्तव्यास्ते भविष्यन्त्ययततः ॥
तस्मात्सर्वसमारम्भो दुर्लभः पुरुषं प्रति ।
यथामुख्यान्सान्त्वयित्वा भोक्तव्या इतरेजनाः ॥
(*Śānti Parvan*, lxxxviii. 7-10.)

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and reasonable. To use the language of modern economists, ability and least sacrifice were the guiding principles of the framers of the financial regulations of ancient times.¹ This statement is supported by unquestionable proofs. Bhīṣma advises Yudhiṣṭhira in similar terms and says that special consideration should be shown to the Vaiśyas who formed the wealthy class of the state. Pointing out to them the necessity of expenses either for administration or defences of the state, without which there will be no peace or protection, a king must exact taxes from the Vaiśyas. They must not be disregarded lest they should leave the capital for the woods. They must be conciliated, and the king must endeavour to please them and win their affection and good will. They must be assured of safety and security for their life and property. The King must adopt such other means by which they would increase their wealth. They are the mainstay of agriculture and commerce, and consequently the mainstay of a state. Hence they must be treated kindly, leniently and sympathetically. There is nothing else which does greater good to the kingdom.²

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¹ Public Administration in Ancient India, p. 180.

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² Mbh., Śānti Parvan, lxxxvii. 35-40.

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It has already been shown that Kauṭalya has not sacrificed scruples of conscience in enunciating principles of taxation. As befits a statesman, he realizes the full responsibility and has advocated a graduated system of taxation. The devices suggested are based on the principle of least sacrifice and they are at once simple and popular. They are, in other words, ‘the soft tricks’ that find mention in the Rājadharma section of the Mahābhārata. By them the burden was made to fall proportionately on all, and they subserved the ends of even distribution. That is, people did not feel taxes to be a strain on their purse.¹

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¹ पक्वं पक्मिवारामात् फलं राज्यादवाप्नुयात् । आमच्छेदभयादामं वर्जयेत्कोपकारकम् ॥ (*Arthaśāstra*, Bk. v, Sec. 2.)

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Kauṭalya fully realizes the danger from the tax-collecting officials. In his opinion the state may promulgate ameliorative measures; but the officials at the lower rung of the ladder might continue the old rates, take to corrupt practices, and indulge in *adharmic* measures of extorting money. Special Commissioners were hence appointed to watch them, and such of those as were found guilty were severely dealt with.²

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² *Śanti Parvan*, lxxxviii. 26; cxxx. 26-27; *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. iv, Sec. 9.

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In his opinion the officer collecting twice the fixed sum as revenue would be sucking the life-blood of the people by his action. It is for the state to prevent such offences of a grave nature; for to tolerate them is tantamount to digging the grave of the administration. Further Kauṭalya enunciates the principle of granting remissions in deserving cases such as cultivators under unfavourable circumstances.³ In this and other respects Kauṭalya shows himself a practical man; but at the same time he does follow the beaten track of the *Dharma Śāstras*.

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³ *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. v, Sec. 2.

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Another aspect of the ancient system of taxation was the grant of immunities from taxes and escheat. This was perhaps actuated both by religious and political considerations; for example, *śrotriyas*, ascetics, women, religious establishments, were exempted from taxes. The right of escheat was in operation to properties other than those enjoyed by *śrotriyas*.⁴ Conformably to the

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⁴ *Manu*, vii. 133-36; viii. 394.

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पक्वं पक्मिवारामात् फलं राज्यादवाप्नुयात् ।
आमच्छेदभयादामं वर्जयेत्कोपकारकम् ॥
(*Arthaśāstra*, Bk. v, Sec. 2.)

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above rule, Kauṭalya lays down that the *śrotriyas*, *ṛtviks*, *purohits* would be granted *brahmadeya* lands exempted from all rates and fines (अदण्डकराणि).

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Most of the available inscriptions record gift of land, free of taxes made by the kings to Brahmans versed in the Vedas. The following may be quoted: ‘These 77, 6/20ths and 1/160ths (*veli*) of land more or less we gave including the trees over ground, the wells under ground, in the land and all other benefits (*prāptis*) of whatever kind having first excluded the former owners and the hereditary proprietors, and having purchased (it) as tax free property (*kāṇi*) for the 106 Bhaṭṭas of this village and for the two shares (of the image) of Sāmantanārāyaṇa-viṇṇagar Emberumān from the rainy season of the thirty-fifth (year of our reign) as a meritorious gift (*dharma-dāna*) with libations of water with the right to bestow mortgage or sell (it) as a tax free grant of land to last as long as the moon and the sun.’¹

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¹ S.I.I., vol. ii, part 1, No. 22.

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An interesting question may be raised here. Is not Kauṭalya perpetrating an economic atrocity by showing partiality towards the *śrotriyas*, by exempting their lands from taxes? An examination, however, of the various duties which devolved on them will be sufficient to justify such a recommendation. According to the *Mānava Dharma Śāstra*,² learning, and teaching, performing sacrifices and causing sacrifices to be performed, receiving gifts and giving gifts, are the six duties of the Brahman (the Brahman was then invariably a *śrotriya*). The same is found in the learned commentary of Nacchi-nārkkiniyar on the first line of the *Sūtram 75*.³

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² अध्यापनमध्ययनं यजनं याजनं तथा । दानं प्रतिग्रहं चैव ब्राह्मणानामकल्पयत् ॥ (i. 88 and x. 75)

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³ அறவகைப்பட்ட பார்ப்பனப்பக்கம். (*Purattiyal of Tolkāppiyam.*)

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The six duties are: ஓதல் (Sans. अध्ययनं), ஓதுவித்தல் (Sans. अध्यापनं), வேட்டல் (Sans. यजनं), வேட்பித்தல் (Sans. याजनं), கொடுத்தல் (Sans. दानम्), கோடல் (Sans. प्रतिग्रहं).

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The learned Tamil commentator pursues the subject further and divides education into three classes: superior, middling, and inferior. The three Vedas, Rig, Yajus, and Sāman belong to the first class. The second constitutes Atharva Veda, the six aṅgas: niruktam, vyākaraṇam, kalpam, gaṇitam, jyotisham and chhandas, and the eighteen Dharmaśāstras of Manu and others. Under the last category come the itihāsas, purāṇas and other miscellaneous literature. Instructions would be fructifying if the Guru first understood the capacity and the taste which the student possessed and then imparted him lessons according to his grasp and understanding.¹ The object of this education is to discipline the mind, speech, and body.² Further it will tend to increase the intelligence, fame and even the age of a person.³

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¹ ஓதுவித்தலாவது கொள்வோ னுணவுவகை அறிந்து அவன் கொளவாக்கொடுக்கும் ஈவோன் தன்மையும் ஈதலியற்கையுமாம். Ibid.

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² इदं शास्त्रमधीयानो ब्राह्मणः शंसितव्रतः । मनोवाग्देहजैर्नित्यं कर्मदोषैर्न लिप्यते ॥ (Manu, i. 104.)

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³ इदं स्वस्त्ययनं श्रेष्ठमिदं बुद्धिविवर्धनं । इदं यशस्यमायुष्यमिदं निःश्रेयसं परम् ॥ (Ibid., 106.) இம்மையயக்குமாலைப் பக்குறைவின்றத் தம்மை விளக்கு மாற்றமுணாராக் கேடின்ற வெம்மை யுலகத்தும் யாற்காணேல் கல்விபோன் மம்மை றறுக்கு மறந்து. (Nālaḍiyār, st. 132.)

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Of the six duties mentioned, three duties—partaking in other’s sacrifices, teaching students, receiving good gifts are the means of a *śrotriya's* livelihood.¹ These three, in the opinion of Naccinārkkiniyar, belong of right to the Brahmans only.² The other three functions are intended for his own elevation. These are reading, performing sacrifices, and bestowing gifts. Those who fulfil these duties were known as *śrotriyas* and deserved the best consideration of the authorities of the state.³ From the nature of the duties expected of them it was impossible for them to earn their livelihood by taking to other callings. After all they discharged these duties for the benefit of the society at large. They spread the light of knowledge without expecting any reward in return whatever be the number of students who approached them. Again by sacrifices they assured the prosperity of the land and people. According to the then prevalent notions, sacrifices were deemed important as, by them alone the earth could enjoy the benefit of good and timely showers, which is the cause of abundance of crops, on which again people depend for their existence.⁴ Perhaps Naccinārkkiniyar entertains the same opinion when he interprets. ‘வேள்வி’ or (sacrifice), as ‘வேளாண்மைபற்றி வேள்வியாயிற்று.’

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¹ > अध्यापनमध्ययनं यजनं याजनं तथा ।

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² ஓதுவித்தலும் வேட்பித்தலும் ஈதலும் அந்தணர்க்கே உரிய. (*Tolkāppiyam Commentary.*)

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³ *Manu*, vii. 82; *Yāj.*, i. 314-15.

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⁴ > अन्नाद्भवन्ति भूतानि पर्जन्यादन्नसंभवः ।

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Gifts are then the means to realize these two ends, namely, education and religion, on which depends the progress of society. Realizing their invaluable services to the society, kings and people bestowed upon

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दानं प्रतिग्रहश्चैव षट्कर्माण्यग्रजन्मनः॥ (*Manu*, x. 75.)

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यज्ञाद्भवति पर्जन्यो यज्ञः कर्मसमुद्भवः ॥ (*Bhagavat Gīta*, iii. 14.)

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these *śrotriyas* lavish gifts of money and lands tax-free, much like modern grants-in-aid furnished for educational and other improvements, no income-tax being charged on these grants.

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These and other considerations indicate Kauṭalya’s great regard for the welfare of the people. Far from being selfishly autocratic, the Mauryan state must have taken an abiding interest in the well-being of its citizens. It is not difficult to infer from these various regulations that the principles of taxation were sound and the administration was efficient. The theories of early writers like Maine who called the Hindu States ‘tax-collecting institutions’, have little justification at any rate in regard to Mauryan times.

Sec. iii. Items of Expenditure

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Economy is the key-note of expenditure by the state, and still the vast total expenditure was very great. The expenditure was, however, for the realization of the three ends of life.¹

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¹ काले चास्य व्ययं कुर्यात् त्रिवर्गपरिवृद्धये । (Kāmandaka, v. 76.)

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The reasons for expenditure are obvious. The functions of the state as analysed in the *Kauṭalīya* necessitated² the maintenance of an elaborate fisc. The following is the categorical list of functions mentioned in the *Arthaśāstra*; the army and navy including other defences of the kingdom against external attacks and internal dangers, the police, justice and law-courts, sanitation, medical relief, public works of utility including irrigation, religion and learning, other allied departments such as standardization of weights and measures, the census, etc., aid to industries and manufactures, and other items of development. With such large political, social, and other functions, it would be reasonable to assume that the expenses incurred by the state were great.

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² *Vide* Prof. K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar, *Aspects of Polity*, p. 68.

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Śukra, the economist, agrees with Kauṭalya the politician in distinguishing two kinds of expenditure: the every-day expenses which had to be incurred to satisfy the absolutely necessary wants, and expenditure in services of public benefit which are profitable investments in the long run.¹ Referring to expenditure in a general sense Śukrāchārya speaks, of ordinary consumption² or that which is destroyed in the act of consuming, and productive consumption, which is an outlay of expenses on a particular undertaking to yield profit in the long run. The first division includes items of expenditure which are required for every-day consumption and for the running of all departments functioning in the state. These include expenses incurred for the royal household, the harem, the kitchen, storehouse, firewood, fodder, museum of birds and beasts, manufactories, labourers, military establishments, warehouses, civil and other officials, gifts to temples and other charitable institutions, and such other expenses which are essential for carrying on the work of administration.¹

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¹ नित्यो नित्योत्पादिकोलाभो लाभोत्पादक इति व्ययः । दिवसानुवृत्तो नित्यः । पक्षमाससंवत्सरलाभो लाभः । तयोस्तपन्नो नित्योत्पादिको लाभोत्पादक इति । (Arthaśāstra, Bk. ii, Sec. 6.)

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² यन्निमित्तो भवेदायो व्ययस्तन्नामपूर्वकः । व्ययश्चैवं समुद्दिष्टो व्याप्यव्यापकसंयुतः ॥ पुनरावर्तकस्त्वनिवर्तक इति द्विधा । व्ययो यन्निध्युपनिधुकृतो विनिमयोकृतः ॥ (Śukra, ii, 337-38.)

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¹ देवपितृपूजादानार्थं स्वस्तिवाचनमन्तःपुरमहानसं दूतप्रावर्तिमं कोष्ठागारमायुधागारं पण्यगृहं कुप्यगृहं कर्मान्तो विष्टिः पत्यश्वरथद्विपपरिग्रहो गोमण्डलं पशूमृगपक्षिव्यालवाटाः काष्ठातृणवाटश्चेति व्ययशरीरम् ॥ (Arthaśāstra, Bk. ii, Sec. 6.)

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The following civil list is found in the *Kauṭalīya*:

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| | *paṇas.* |
| Annual allowances for *ṛtvik, guru,* minister, *purohita, senāpati,* crown prince, king’s mother and queen.... each | 48,000 |
| For the chamberlain, controller of the house-hold, *praśāstr,* Revenue Officer, *sannidātṛ* .... | 24,000 |
| For other sons of the king, nurse, *nāyaka* (army officer), superintendent of the city, judge, superintendent of manufactures, members of the ministry, superintendents of country parts and of boundaries .... | 12,000 |
| Managers of military corporations, masters of elephants, horses, chariots . . . . . | 8,000 |
| Captains of infantry, cavalry, chariots, and forests . . . . . | 4,000 |
| Chariot-driver, doctor, horsetrainer, carpenter, trainers of other animals. | 2,000 |
| Astrologer, *purāṇa* reader, bards, assistants of *purohita* and all superintendents of other departments . . . . . | 1,000 |
| Soldiers, accountants and clerks .... | 500 |

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Musicians, 250, artisans, etc., 120, servants, etc. .... .... each 60 paṇas. Honorarium for the learned 500 to 1,000. Messenger for a yojana 10, and up to 100 yojanas 20, special officer, 1,000, Intelligence, etc., 500.¹

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¹ Arthaśāstra, Bk. v, Sec. 3.

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It must be remembered that these items constitute the category of consumption, the utility of which consists in satisfying the needs of the day and can be characterized as non-productive consumption. The second division of expenditure is such that returns are expected from it. They are expended perhaps in productive enterprises² such as irrigational works. For this a certain amount was to be earmarked beforehand. Kauṭalya insists on this head of profitable expenditure. For any curtailment under this account would be suicidal to the interests of the state.³ This presupposes the existence of annual budget estimates. Budget-estimates are spoken of to-day as the barometer of the financial organization. It is striking to see that such budget estimates have been in existence in the days of Kauṭalya. A general review of the Kauṭalīya shows notions of control of expenditure by regulating resources. Besides the two broad classifications of expenditure, the Arthaśāstra recommends a provision for emergency purposes (व्ययप्रत्ययः). It is expenditure to meet emergencies when some untoward calamities befall the country, such as the outbreak of war, ravages of epidemics, or huge, useful and productive works already undertaken and yet remain to be accomplished.⁴ This provision is of capital importance, for the state realized that the material well-being of the society was the end of the state. It brought relief to the doors of the poor, the suffering and the diseased,—in a word improved the health of the community. It nationalized industries and manufactures, thus avoiding creation of a capitalist class as in modern industrial society.

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