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Theory of Government in Ancient India (Post-Vedic) c14: Chapter XI. Theory of the Government of Corporations

Theory of Government in Ancient India (Post-Vedic) c14

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Contents

Chapter XI. Theory of the Government of Corporations

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Corporations in Hindu Literature. The bulk of the political matter which occurs in Hindu literature and inscriptions from the earliest times to our own days refers to Government, its necessity, its purpose, its machinery and its relation to various classes of the population. But the Epics, if not the Rigveda, allude to other organisations which served some particular needs of the community and developed a quasi-governmental form. In the Dharma Sûtras, Buddhist and Jaina literatures, Kautalya’s Arthaśāstra, the Smṛtis and Nīti-śāstras, corporations occupy a more prominent place and stand in definite relations towards the state. A large number of inscriptions in the north and a yet larger number in the south throw additional light on their constitution and actual working. Recently, the subject has been treated by several scholars,¹ but there is room for a re-statement of their theory.

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¹ Fick, Social Organisation in North-Eastern India in Buddha’s time, tr. Maitra, Chap. X. E. W. Hopkins, India Old and New (1901). Chapter on Ancient and Modern Hindu Guilds. R. C. Majumdar, Corporate Life in Ancient India (1918, second edition, 1922). R. K. Mookerji, Local Government in Ancient India (1919, second edition, 1920). For a criticism of the last two works, F. E. P. in J. R. A. S., 1920, pp. 114—118.

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The Sphere of Corporations. It is clear that in Hindu social philosophy, government has an importance not merely political in the strict sense of the term but also social and spiritual. All government, however, must conform to Law—law of which it is not the maker. Theory insists that it must conform to divine injunctions and, in doubtful cases, make sure of their exact significance with the help of pious scholars. It must, in the second place, respect popular usage except, of course, where it directly contravenes divine commands. There were large spheres of life which divine legislation had left untouched or which it had barely touched. Here the state might issue its decrees usually, of course, in accordance with the prevailing practice, or it might simply undertake the duty of normally enforcing the usage which communities had evolved. The affairs in which people were normally independent of state-control were not only religious but also social and economic. Their regulation was undertaken by corporations, generally spontaneous in origin and differing widely in rigidity of organisation. Or it happened that a corporation claimed to have received its law from the same source as the state itself. The Buddhist Saṃgha for instance, based itself on the solid rock of Buddha's word. In any case, the nature, functions and privileges of these corporations, their internal organisation and procedure and their relations with the government demanded the attention of political and legal writers.

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Geldner detected references to guilds in the Ṛigveda. His conclusions have been called in question, but, even if correct, they furnish no indication of any theory of guilds in the period of the Ṛigveda. In the Brâhmaṇas and Upaniṣads occur the words Śreṭhin and Gaṇa but they carry us no further in the elucidation of guild theory.¹ Firmer ground is reached with the Dharma Sûtras² which must needs lay down aphorisms on every aspect of social organisation.

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¹ For the discussion of the Vedic Evidence on Guilds, see Macdonell and Keith, Vedic India, p. 403. Majumdar, Corporate Life in Ancient India (second edition), pp. 14-16. Mookerji, Local Government in Ancient India (second edition); 42-44.

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² For the dates of Dharma Sûtras, ante, Ch. VI.

Guilds in Gautama

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The Mahābhārata contains numerous allusions to guilds and makes it clear that their headmen occupied an influential position in the community. The Mahābhārata reckons them among the principal supports of the monarchy. It insists on their internal cohesion. No expiation can remove the sin of forsaking one’s duty towards one’s guild. Guilds of warriors appear to have been very important in the heroic age. A king is enjoined to avail himself of Śreṇivala which is described as equal to that of hired soldiers. The Rāmāyaṇa also refers to Sayodhaśreṇis. A passage in the Śāntiparva discusses the conditions which gaṇas must fulfil in order to prosper. But the word gaṇa here refers to political groups, oligarchic republics, which flourished for a while in the north. To the theory of guilds proper, the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa make little contribution.

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The Buddhist records are slightly better. The Vinaya Piṭaka shows that the functions of guilds had transcended the economic sphere. A guild could, on certain occasions at least, arbitrate between a member and his wife. Again, its sanction was necessary for the ordination of the wife of any of its members.¹ A woman thief was not to be ordained without the permission of the king and the guilds. The guild thus tends to become a social corporation. The Jātakas throw some light on guilds. As Fick observes, they reveal clear difference between the organizations of merchants and those of artisans. From the heredity of occupations, the localisation of the different branches of industry and the institutions of jetthakas or aldermen, Fick infers the presence of an administrative organisation. From the very nature of their callings, a group of artizans permanently settled in a definite area were

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¹ Vinaya Piṭaka, J.R.A.S., 1901, p. 865.

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far better organised than a group of wandering merchants. In the Jâtakas there are whole villages of artisans, for instance, a village comprising 1,000 families of dealers in wood. That the office of aldermen carried some authority is clear: that it was sometimes hereditary is apparent, but the Jâtakas do not enable us to determine the exact amount of control which the aldermen exercised in practice or which was allowed to them in theory. Nor again is it possible to ascertain to whom they were responsible. A Jâtaka, indeed, brings before us a state officer, Bhândâgârika, Treasurer or Superintendent of Stores, who also acted as judge for members of merchant guilds.¹ It is thus clear that the guilds were not perfectly autonomous, that the state was entitled to some sort of supervision over them and that in particular it undertook to award justice, at any rate in the more important cases. The Mûgapakkha Jâtaka speaks of 18 guilds, eighteen being a mysterious number in India. But since most of the occupations organised themselves, the actual number of guilds far exceeded that figure. From literary and epigraphic sources, Majumdar has made a list of 27 guilds.²

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¹ Fick, op. cit., Ch. X.

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² Majumdar, Corporate Life in Ancient India, 18-19. The following is the list of guilds:—

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1. Workers in wood (Carpenters, including cabinet-makers, wheelwrights, builders of houses, builders of ships and builders of vehicles of all sorts).
2. Workers in metal, including gold and silver.
3. Workers in stone.
4. Leather-workers.
5. Ivory-workers.
6. Workers fabricating hydraulic engines (Odayantrika).
7. Bamboo-workers (Wasakara).
8. Braziers (Kasakara).
9. Jewellers.
10. Weavers.

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After the Jātakas, the Arthaśāstra of Kauṭalya is the most important source of information on the position of guilds. He stands for a strong energetic state government and is not disposed very favourably towards organisations which divide the allegiance of subjects. He is willing to grant them privileges and concessions. He would reserve accommodation for them in his plan of a city. He would protect local guilds from outside competition. To members of artisan guilds he would grant seven days' grace in fulfilling engagements. He would give them special privileges in the adjudication of law suits. But he wants the state to keep a tight hand on all corporations. The Superintendent of Accounts should keep regular registers for noting the professions, customs and transactions of various guilds. Three ministers or commissioners, enjoying the confidence of guilds, should be appointed to receive their deposits which, he grants,

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11. Potters.
12. Oilmillers (Tilapishka).
13. Rush-workers and basket-makers.
14. Dyers.
15. Painters.
16. Corn-dealers (Dhamñika).
17. Cultivators.
18. Fisher folk.
19. Butchers.
20. Barbers and shampooers.
21. Garland-makers and flower-sellers.
22. Mariners.
23. Herdsmen.
24. Traders, including caravan traders.
25. Robbers and freebooters.
26. Forest police who guarded the caravans.
27. Money-lenders.

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The above list is compiled from the Gautama, the Jātaka and the Nāsik Inscriptions.

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should be returned in times of distress. On the other hand, when the state is in trouble, it may, according to Kauṭalya, surreptitiously depute its secret agents to borrow money from guilds and then have them robbed of the loan by other agents. In another passage, Kauṭalya seriously discusses whether the troubles caused by a guild or its leaders are greater. He concludes that the latter are the more dangerous, because, when backed by popular support they may injure the life and property of others. On the other hand, Kauṭalya wants the state to get some useful service out of guilds. They can be engaged in the colonisation of waste lands. Guilds of warriors can be enlisted in the king's service.¹

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¹ The Arthaśāstra, tr. Shamasastry, pp. 69, 253, 190, 223, 61, 66, 234, 305, 403, 363, 341, 376, ante, Ch. IV.

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Kauṭalya gives some idea of the relation of guilds to the state. It is, on the whole, one of subordination of the former to the imperative demands of the latter. It is, however, not from Kauṭalya but from the Dharma Śāstras that we can extract the theory of the constitution and inner working of guilds. Bṛihaspati observes that the purpose of guilds is to ward off dangers. He counsels written agreements and practical tests of the honesty of members to inspire confidence. During this period the guilds also served as banks, as a number of inscriptions, for instance, the Nāsik Inscription of 120 A.D. and another of the following century prove. The rate of interest, by the way, ranges from 9 to 12 p.c. They receive bequests and undertake to carry out the instructions of the donors. Here is a piece of striking testimony to the stability, efficiency and honesty of these corporations.² testimony is borne out by the Junnar Inscription, the activities of guilds and village communities extend also to the construction of assembly halls, temples, gardens, sheds for water, tanks, and paths, to relief of distress and performance of sacrifices. They acted as subordinate courts of justice in ordinary cases. Bṛihaspati lays down that “relations, guilds, assemblies of cohabitants and other persons duly authorised by the king, should decide law-suits among men, excepting violent crimes.” From each of these an appeal lies to the one above. Inscriptions and seals recently discovered prove that corporations realised their personality. They certainly held a good deal of property in common. Manu, Nārada, Yājñavalkya, Bṛihaspati and others repeat Gautama’s injunctions that the laws of local and functional groups must be respected by the state. Nārada would like their rules of attendance also to be sanctioned by the king. If a person steals the property of a corporation or wantonly breaks an agreement concluded with it, he should, according to Yājñavalkya, not only be banished by the king but his property should also be confiscated. Those who sow dissensions among members of a corporation should be punished with special severity by the king. Such mischief-makers “would prove extremely dangerous, like an (epidemic), if they were allowed to go free.” On the other hand, if a member of a corporation is led by avarice to break a sworn agreement, he should, according to Manu, be exiled. Guilds are not to misuse their power to violate the peace of the country. Resort to arms on their part, says Nārada, is never to be tolerated by the king. If members of corporations combine to defraud the state of its dues, they should, according to Bṛihaspati, be compelled to pay eight times as much and, if they take to flight, they should be punished. A commentary on Nārada emphasises that seditious, immoral or absurd regulations of a guild are not to be recognised by the King. Yājñavalkya is perfectly clear on the point. All groups which have strayed from their own laws, whether they be families, castes, guilds, associations or groups in districts, must be disciplined and established again on the path of duty. It thus falls to the state to keep the guilds within bounds and to ensure fair dealing between them and the community. But according to the Dharma Śāstras it should go further and see that the affairs of guilds are managed properly. Yājñavalkya accords a high position to guild representatives at the royal court but he wants all leaders or executive officers of guilds to conform to guild rules and usages. If they don't, the king should step in and rectify matters. If dissensions arise between leaders and members of guilds, it is, according to Bṛhaspati, for the state to arbitrate and bring every one back to his duty. If the heads of corporations, actuated by hatred, injure the interests of any of their members, they should be restrained by the king. If they do not mend their ways, they should be punished.¹

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² Epigraphia Indica, Vol. VIII, 82–86. Ludwig, No. 1133 ; Manu, VIII, 41, 46 : XIX, 7. Majumdar, op. cit, 34–36. Bṛihaspati, XVII, 11–12 ; I, 28, 30.

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¹ Yājñavalkya Saṃhitā, II, 186–192, 15; I, 361. Manu, VIII, 218, 219, 220, 5. Nārada, X, 2-3, 5-6. Bṛhaspati, XVII, 5–7, 19–21.

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Turning to the internal organisation of guilds, we gather form Nārada and Bṛhaspati that guilds had a general assembly which met from time to time to transact business. But it is to the executive officers of guilds or village communities that the Dharma Śāstras chiefly devote their attention. Bṛhaspati prescribes high qualifications for them. They must belong to noble families, must be self-controlled, able and honest, acquainted with the Vedas and their duty and skilled in business. Their number is fixed

Internal Organisation

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at two, three or five. According to Kātyāyana the assembly has the right to punish the officers, but the latter seem generally, or at any rate in important disputes, to have been dealt with by the king. If they acted according to the law, all their dealings, harsh or kind, towards their own people should be approved by the king. But if they were swayed by malice, or if they were guilty of misappropriation of money, they fell into the clutches of the king. For members in general Bṛihaspati prescribes a rigid discipline to be enforced by various penalties. All must abide by the terms of agreement of the corporation and fulfil their share of undertakings. He who wilfully refuses to adhere to the agreement "shall be punished by confiscation of his entire property and banishment from the town." For wrangling with fellow-members and neglect of work, one is to be heavily fined. For breaking a mutual agreement, injuring the common stock, as for insulting a Brāhmaṇa acquainted with the three Vedas, one is to be banished from the town.¹

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¹ Nārada, X, 3. Bṛihaspati, XVII, 11–19.

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From the context in which these passages occur, it is apparent that these serious punishments are to be enforced by the king. In theory, then, the state is closely associated with corporations, guiding them, protecting them, restraining them. In practice, the amount of state control must have varied with distance from state or provincial capitals, the strength of the central government, the prestige of guilds and the character of their work. Unfortunately, the inscriptions which furnish copious descriptions of the activities of guilds throw little light on their administrative practice. But, in theory at any rate, the guilds are not so autonomous as one or two modern writers incline to think.

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Perhaps the greatest amount of self-government was enjoyed by guilds on the technical side of their affairs.

Rules of Apprenticeship in Craft-guilds

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Nârada and Yâjñavalkya laid down some interesting rules of apprenticeship and work. Nârada treats them as part of the law on Breach of Contract of service and thus seeks to invest them with legal force. An apprentice shares the condition of dependence with students, hired servants and officials—all alike being looked upon as labourers. A young man who, with the consent of his relations wanted initiation into the art of his craft, should go to live with a master for a fixed term. The master should treat him like a son, feed him and teach him at his own house and refrain from employing him in any other work. An apprentice, who forsakes a master of unexceptionable character, may be compelled by force to return, and may be corporally punished and confined. He must remain with his master until the expiry of his term, even if he completes his course of instruction beforehand.

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The master is remunerated for his labours in two ways. The profits from the apprentice's work belong to him. On the completion of the term, the apprentice "shall reward his master as plentifully as he can," or pay him a stipulated fee. Yâjñavalkya endorses these rules but condones an apprentice's desertion of his master if it is a protest against a mortal sin or heavy crime on the part of the latter.¹

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¹ Nârada, V, 16—21, Yâjñavalkya Samhitâ, II, 187.

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It is remarkable that guilds occupy a much larger space in the early than in the late Dharma Śâstras. Hopkins remarks that guild life is a characteristic of Buddhist and Jaina environment.² Another reason may be the comparative

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² Hopkins, India, Old and New, p. 171.

Guilds in Later Times

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decline of industry and commerce in the last centuries of the ancient age. But guilds have never altogether vanished from India. Śukranīti emphasises the principle of trial with the help of one's peers. Foresters are to be tried with the help of foresters, merchants by the help of merchants and so on.¹ Guilds have survived in some parts of the country up to the present day. They or rather their headmen still claim to be courts of justice. They still have their rules of apprenticeship, membership, business and expenditure. They still seek to guide the life of their members.²

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¹ Śukranīti, IV, 5, 24, cf. Bṛihaspati, I, 25–27.

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² Ibid., 176.

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Craft-guilds and merchant-guilds have been the most enduring of all corporations in the country. But Buddhist India witnessed the formation of a remarkable order of monks and nuns with definite, minute rules to meet every possible contingency. Renunciation was nothing new to the country in the days of Buddha. After the zest of life which is redolent in the Ṛigveda had given way to meditation, Brāhmaṇas expatiated on the nothingness of this world, the incalculable importance of the life after death, the necessity of release from bondage and, as a result, the desirability of renunciation and asceticism. The Upaniṣads reveal numbers of devout men who had retired into the forest to contemplate the divinity or practise austerities. The Buddha himself had forsaken home and hearth one solemn night and betaken himself to severities, which almost wore out his health, and to contemplation which at last brought the flash of the Truth. He forbade excesses of asceticism but founded an order of recluses for men as well as for women. The new element which he introduced was that of organisation. Brāhmaṇism has always fought

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The Buddhist Saṃgha.

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shy of organisation. It is, on its spiritual side, too individualistic for corporate life. The Buddha on the other hand, partly perhaps because he had to establish a new church on secure foundations, organised his monks and nuns into fraternities and told them how to manage their affairs. How far he borrowed his rules from any existing economic or social corporations or political assemblies is difficult to determine. But it is remarkable that in the Chullavagga and the Mahâvagga, he is represented as announcing his regulations to meet the exigencies of practical life as they arose. Whatever his debt to others, he or his successors must be credited with a good deal of originality. From the point of view of political theory, the most striking feature of the Buddhist monastic code is that it practically ignores the state and touches it at very few points. In the third century B.C., Aśoka appears from his own edicts and the general testimony of Buddhist literature, to have actually assumed something like the headship of the Buddhist Church. But his ascendancy was due to the personal factor and did not imply any theoretical recognition of the state as ecclesiastical sovereign. The Saṃgha has its own rules of membership, of administration and of life in general. It derived its constitution from the Buddha alone and recognised him alone as its lawgiver. The great teacher himself had not been anxious to fetter the discretion of his followers completely. “When I am gone, Ānanda,” he said to his chief disciple, “let the saṃgha, if it should wish, revoke all the lesser and minor precepts.” But when the regulations came up for discussion at a council, the brethren could not come to any decision on proposed alterations and innovations. The differences became so acute that the council resolved, as the only way out of the difficulty, that they should adhere to all the precepts laid down by the Buddha, “not ordaining what has not been ordained and not revoking what has been ordained.”¹ So, in theory, at any rate, the Buddha remained the sole lawgiver. In the domain of practical administration, the general assembly of monks was the sovereign. But it must act in conformity with the procedure laid down by the Buddha. Nor was it empowered to alter the law of the Buddha. The Chullavagga definitely lays down that the vote of the majority was invalid, if it conflicted with the law. The tenth chapter of the fourth Khandhaka of the Chullavagga enumerates ten cases in which the taking of votes is invalid, inter alia, “when the taker of votes knows that those whose opinions are not in accordance with the law will be in the majority, or probably may be in the majority.” The fourteenth chapter of the same section, when describing the secret method of taking votes, lays down that if the taker of votes ‘ascertains that those whose opinion is against the Dhamma are in the majority, he is to reject the vote as wrongly taken. If he ascertains that those whose opinion is in accordance with the Dhamma are in the majority, he is to report the vote as well taken.”² The fiction of the right or wrong taking of votes is transparent. It is the supremacy of the Dhamma which is to be assured somehow. But we are not told who was to decide on the conformity of an opinion to the law. The taker of votes though, as we learn from another passage, was to be a very responsible and reliable person, could hardly take that role entirely on himself. Difficulties must have arisen in practice but the theory is perfectly clear that not even the Assembly could override or alter the law.

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¹ Chullavagga, XI, 1, 9.

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² Chullavagga, IV, 10, 1, 14, 26, translated by Rhys Davids and Oldenberg in Vinaya Texts, Part III, pp. 26-27, 56.

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Nowhere in this account is the state called in. In the rest of the rules, too, it appears extremely rarely. The references to it are of a trivial nature. For instance, the Pātimokkha, describing various offences to be confessed by Bhikkhus in the assembly, could be recited only by a learned brother and only in a full assembly. If a Bhikkhu had been seized by the king, robbers or relations, a request should be made for his temporary release or for bringing him outside the boundary so that the congregation might be complete.¹ Otherwise the monastic rules hardly refer to the state. Buddhist theory, as worked out elsewhere, expects the state to protect the monks from all molestation, to afford them all facilities, and to endow their institutions with lavish generosity but it does not contemplate any interference in their internal affairs. Even Brahmanic political theory respects the autonomy of heretical associations. Yājñavalkya only wants the king to see that they continue to manage their affairs according to their own rules and traditions.² Nārada wants the king to maintain the usages settled among heretics as among others.³ This is one of the most remarkable points of difference between the theory of economic organisations and that of religious association. The former were interwoven with the communal economic life with which the state was intimately concerned at every point. They constituted a plentiful source of revenue. They handled vast sums which might be turned to the service of the state in emergencies. Religious corporations, on the other hand, had only to be encouraged and patronised.

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¹ Mahāvagga, II.

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² Yājñavalkya Saṃhitā, II, 192.

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³ Nārada, X, 2, 3.

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Left pretty much to itself, the Buddhist Saṃgha tried some experiments in administration which are unique in Indian history. In the first place, all its rules are practically common to monks and nuns. The Buddhist texts are at pains to repeat them for both. In the second place, the order believed in the communism of property for itself. All the property of the Saṃgha was open to the use of all brethren from wheresoever they might come.

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Communism in the Buddhist Saṃgha.

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In the third place, the order, spread out in communities big or small, over the whole country and had no central government. In organisation it had left the Brahmanical Hindus far behind, but it never approached the Roman Catholic Church or even the Franciscan and Dominic orders. It never had a real head, there was no hierarchy connecting the various communities together. The Buddha and his word were the only universally acknowledged guides throughout the centuries. An intense spirit of localism therefore pervaded the order. Here lay its strength and its weakness.

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Localism.

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Within each community, was naturally a distinction between novices and full-fledged monks or nuns. The latter controlled and supervised the former. Otherwise the form of government was eminently democratic. There developed a regular parliamentary procedure and jargon which, at several points, are startling in their coincidence with modern practice. It lies beyond the scope of this work to trace the practical working of these institutions but their theory may be briefly recapitulated from Buddhist records. Fortunately, the material in the Mahâvagga and the Chullavagga is abundant.¹

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¹ This evidence has been worked at from the point of view of political assemblies by K. P. Jayaswal in "The Introduction to Hindu Polity," Modern Review, Calcutta, 1913, and in his recent work "Hindu

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Democracy in the Saṃgha.

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It was the duty of the Gaṇapûraka or the whip to see that the necessary quorum was forthcoming.¹ As the members entered the Hall, they were to be directed to their seats, allotted in the order of seniority by the Āsanapaññāpaka or the Regulator of Seats.² If a number of members proceeded to business in anticipation of a quorum, an act of indemnity had to be passed subsequently. But high authority denied the legality of such indemnity altogether, and pronounced the rule of quorum essential and inviolable.³ Every motion must pass two or four readings. Jñapti, as the first reading was called, announced the proposal and briefly explained the reasons thereof, that is, furnished, a sort of preamble. The Praṭijnā or the second reading took the form of a definite

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¹ Mahâvagga, III, 6, 26; IX, 3, 2. Sacred Books of the East, XIII, 307. Gaṇapûraka literally means ‘the securer of the number. Thus गणपूरको वा भविष्यामीति ‘or I will be the securer of the number.’

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² Rhys Davids’ Dialogues of the Buddha, I, 113. “Now at that time a Bhikkhu named Ajita, of ten years’ standing, was the reciter of the Pâtimokkha to the Saṃgha. Him did the Saṃgha appoint as seat-regulator (Āsanapaññāpaka) to the Thera Bhikkhus. Chullavagga, XII, 2, 7. Sacred Books of the East, XX, 408. Jayaswal, Modern Review, 1913, June, p. 664.

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³ “Is the indemnity-licence, Lord, allowable?” “What, Sir, is this indemnity-licence?” “Is it allowable, Lord, for a Saṃgha which is not legally constituted, to perform an official act, on the ground that they will afterwards obtain the sanction of such Bhikkhus who may subsequently arrive?” “No, Sir, it is not allowable.” Chullavagga, XII, 1, 10.

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Polity.” He starts with the assumption that the monastic procedure was borrowed from political assemblies, but sufficient evidence is not forthcoming to connect the two.

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resolution and put the straight question whether the motion was approved. In the more important cases, the query should be repeated thrice. Silence implied consent. But it was the right of every member to discuss and freely criticise a proposal. Acute differences of opinion often manifested themselves.

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A way of amicable settlement was discovered in a system of committees—a system that, in ancient as in modern times, has formed a necessary concomitant of every living assembly. When irrelevant and pointless speeches were made, the matter should be referred to a committee. The proposal for a committee thus partly answers to the closure. But if the committee failed to arrive at a compromise, the matter returned to the full assembly. Here, if the quest for unanimity failed once more, the motion was finally put to the vote. A teller, fearless, impartial, and clever should be appointed by the Assembly itself. He should distribute Śalākās or wooden-pins to the members, and explain the significance of their various colours. Three methods of voting were known—the secret, the whispering, and the open. According to the first, the choice of a pin by a member was not disclosed to any one else. Provision was made for recording the votes of absent members. The votes collected and counted, the voice of the majority should ordinarily prevail. Yebhuyyasi-kassa was the high-sounding name for the rule of majority, one of the master inventions of the political art. It was familiar

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Second,

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Third and Fourth Readings.

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Free discussion.

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Committees.

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The Teller.

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Voting wooden-pins.

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The secret, whispering, and open methods of voting.

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The votes of absent members recorded.

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to all. Any infringement of the rules of procedure invalidated the proceedings. According to the Chullavagga, the voting was invalid in ten cases: When the matter in dispute is trivial—when the case has not run its course—when regarding the matter in dispute the Bhikkhus have not formally remembered, or been formally called upon to remember the offence, when the opinion of the majority is likely to be an infringement of the law—when the voting may result in a schism of the Samgha—when the votes are irregularly given—when all do not vote equally—and when they do not vote in accordance with the view which they really hold.”¹ When duly passed by a majority, the resolution became a Kamma which, literally translated, means an Act, an astounding coincidence with modern parliamentary jargon. A question that had once been decided could not be reopened, but the sovereign assembly, a law unto itself, sometimes disregarded the salutary rule.²

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¹ Chullavagga, IV, 10, 1, tr. pp. 26-27.

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² A few of the passages, from which the rules of procedure have been gathered, may be cited here.

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Moving the Jñapti once and the Pratijñā once, was called Nattidutiya—the two-Natti procedure. When the Pratijñā was moved thrice, it was called Natti-chatuttha, or the four-Natti procedure. Putting the resolution or Pratijñā to the Assembly was called Kammavāchā.

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“If one performs, O Bhikkhus, a Nattidutiyā act with one Natti, and does not proclaim a Kammavāchā, such an act is unlawful. If one performs, O Bhikkhus, a Nattidutiya act with two Nattis and does not proclaim a Kammavāchā......with one Kammavāchā, and does not proclaim a Kammavāchā, such an act is unlawful. If one performs, O Bhikkhus, a Nattichatuttha act with two, etc . . . . . ” Mahâvagga, tr. Rhys Davids and Oldenberg, IX, (3), 2, 3, 4, 7, 8.

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The Teller’s qualifications:—

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“A Bhikkhu, who shall be possessed of five qualifications, shall be appointed as taker of the voting tickets—one who does not walk in partiality, one who does not walk in malice, one who does not walk Of the Buddhist theory of monastic government it is possible to obtain a full and, on the whole, clear idea.

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The materials for its Jaina counterpart are not equally copious. In spite of metaphysical differences, Jainism and Buddhism developed side by side on parallel lines. Like in folly, one who does not walk in fear, one who knows what votes have been taken and what have not been taken.

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"And thus shall he be appointed..."

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The Bhikkhu's consent was obtained, and then some able and discreet member proposed:—

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"Let the venerable Saṃgha hear me. If the time seems meet to the Saṃgha, let the Saṃgha appoint a Bhikkhu of such and such a name as the taker of the voting tickets."

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*Voting*—

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"By that Bhikkhu, the taker of the voting tickets, are the votes to be collected. And according as the larger number of the Bhikkhus who are guided by the Dhamma shall speak, so shall the case be decided.

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"I enjoin upon you, Bhikkhus, three ways of taking votes in order to appease such Bhikkhus—the secret method, the whispering method, and the open method. And how, O Bhikkhus, is the secret method of taking votes? The Bhikkhu who is the teller of the votes is to make the voting tickets of different colours, and as each Bhikkhu comes up to him he is to say to him thus: 'This is the ticket for the man of such an opinion; this is the ticket for the man of such an opinion. Take whichever you like.' When he has chosen (he is to add), 'Do not show it to anybody.'"

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Chullavagga, IV, 9, 5; 14, 24; 14, 26, 25. Sacred Books of the East, XX, pp. 25, 54.

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"If, O Bhikkhus, while the case is being enquired into by those Bhikkhus, pointless speeches are brought forth, and the sense of any single utterance is not clear, I enjoin upon you, O Bhikkhus, to settle the case by referring it (to a jury or commission).

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"And thus, O Bhikkhus, is he to be appointed. First, the Bhikkhu asked (whether he be willing to undertake the office). Then some discreet and able Bhikkhu should address the Saṃgha thus:

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"May the venerable Saṃgha hear me. Whilst this case was being enquired into, pointless speeches were brought forth, and Buddhism, Jainism branched off into several sects a few centuries after the nirvâṇa of its founder. Towards the close of the first century A.D., the Jainas were divided into Digâmbaras and Śvetâmbaras. Before two centuries had elapsed the former split into Nandisaṃgha, Devasaṃgha,

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the sense of no single utterance was clear. If the time seems meet to the venerable Saṃgha, let it appoint Bhikkhus of such and such a name on a Committee. This is the motion * *

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"If those Bhikkhus, O Bhikkhus, are not able by the Committee to settle that case, those Bhikkhus ought to hand over the case to the Saṃgha, saying, 'We, sirs, are not able, by a committee, to settle this case; let the Saṃgha settle it.'

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"I enjoin upon you, O Bhikkhus, to settle such a case by the vote of the majority.

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"But if you, Sirs, should not be able to do so, then will we ourselves retain the custody of the case."

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Again: Then the Saṃgha met together with the intention of enquiring into this legal question. But while they were enquiring into it, both were such pointless speaking brought forth and also the sense in no single speech was clear. Then the venerable Revata laid a resolution before the Saṃgha:

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" * * * If it seems meet to the Saṃgha, let the Saṃgha settle this question by referring it (to a jury)."

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And he chose four Bhikkhus of the East, and four Bhikkhus of the West. "Let the venerable Saṃgha hear me. During the enquiry into this matter there has been much pointless talk among us. If it seems meet to the Saṃgha, let the Saṃgha delegate four Bhikkhus of the East and four Bhikkhus of the West to settle this question by reference. Whosoever of the venerable ones approves thereof, let him keep silence. Whosoever approves not thereof, let him speak. The delegation is made accordingly. The Saṃgha approves thereof. Therefore it is silent. Thus do I understand."

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Chullavagga, V, 14, 24; IV, 14,18; XII, 2, 7-8. Jayaswal, Modern Review, June, 1913, p. 666.

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An example of a motion:—

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"Let the venerable Saṃgha hear me. This Bhikkhu Uvâla, being examined in the midst of the Saṃgha with an offence, when he has Senasaṃgha and Siṃhasaṃgha, among whom the differences turn on trivial points.¹ Later came a totally different sect, that of the Sthânakavûsins or Ḍhuṇḍhiyâs, altogether more rational than the others and sternly opposed to idol worship. In their contempt of the petty splendours of this world and in their emphasis on the sovereign importance of release from Karma, the Jainas surpass the Brâhmaṇas and Buddhists. The number of monks and ascetics in their ranks has always been large. But Jainism is, on

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¹ Indranandisûri, Samayabhûṣaṇa, 6-8.

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denied it, then confesses it; when he has confessed it, then denies it, makes countercharges and speaks lies which he knows to be such. If the time seems meet to the Saṃgha, let the Saṃgha carry out the Tassapâpiyyasikâkamma against the Bhikkhu Uvâla. This is the motion:
"Let the venerable Saṃgha hear me. This Bhikkhu Uvâla, etc. The Saṃgha carries out the Tassapâpiyyasikâkamma against Uvâla the Bhikkhu. Whosoever of the venerable ones approves thereof, let him keep silence. Whosoever approves not thereof, let him speak. A second time I say the same thing. The Bhikkhu Uvâla let him speak.
"The Tassapâpiyyasikâkamma has been carried out by the Saṃgha against Uvâla the Bhikkhu. Therefore it is silent. Thus do understand."
Chullavagga, IV, 11, 12, tr. Rhys Davids and Oldenberg, pp. 27-31.
Another instance :-
"Then the venerable Mahâkassapa laid the resolution before the Saṃgha: 'Let the venerable Saṃgha hear me. If the time seems meet to the Saṃgha, let the Saṃgha appoint that these five hundred Bhikkhus take up their residence during the rainy season at Râjagaha to chant over together the Dhamma and the Vinaya, and that no other Bhikkhus go up to Râjagaha for the rainy sesaon. This is the resolution. Let the venerable Saṃgha hear. The Saṃgha appoints accordingly. Whosoever of the venerable ones approves thereof, let him keep silence. Whosoever approves not thereof, let him speak. The Saṃgha has appointed accordingly. Therefore it is silent. Thus do I understand.
"And the venerable Mahâkassapa laid the resolution before the Saṃgha: 'If the time seems meet to the Saṃgha, I will question Upâli concerning the Vinaya.' And the venerable Upâli laid a resolution before the Saṃgha: 'Let the venerable Saṃgha hear me If the time seems meet to the Saṃgha, I, when questioned by the venerable Mahâkassapa, will give reply.'"
Chullavagga, 11, 1, 4; 1, 7.

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On other aspects of procedure, see also Mahâvagga, IX, 3, 5-6 Sacred Books of the East, XVII, 266. Chullavagga, V, XII, 1, 10.

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its spiritual side, rigidly individualistic and counsels solitude. It holds that even good action has a tendency to bind the soul to matter. The less of it, the better. As a result, the corporate side of its monasticism did not receive the same development as in Buddhism. The orders which arose followed the lines of the numerous sects. They resembled the Buddhist Saṃgha in independence of state, in absence of central government, or a graded hierarchy. The supremacy of the Jaina Dharma is, of course, unquestioned and whatever is resolved or done by any individual or group must conform to it. Within the four corners of the sacred injunctions, the monks are to manage their affairs on democratic principles.

Social Organisations

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The Brâhmanic Hindus left their religious life unorganised. On the social side they display some corporate activity. It was in those days physically impossible for any of the four castes, spread all over the country, to set up a central organisation. But the local sections and subsections of the sub-castes into which Hindu society had split up offered scope for organisation. In Brâhmanical theory, the state is constantly urged to keep all castes to their duties. But it is also enjoined to respect the laws and usages of families and castes, as of village communities and corporations. The province of caste usage includes marriage, commensality, rites and ceremonies and often ordinary morality. A breach of the rules may be visited by censure, imposition of penances and, lastly, excommunication. To be an outcast is a dreadful calamity which sends a shudder of horror through a whole family and the entire circle of friends. In most cases, however, provision is made for re-admission into the community. These rules of caste governance which are still in operation go back to great antiquity. Three or four hundred years before the Christian era, Gautama, the earliest of the Dharma Sûtra writers, relies partly on penances and excommunication for deadly sins as well as for what appear trivial offences or no offences at all to modern minds. He counsels a son,—apparently a Brâhmaṇa young man—to cast off a father who may have murdered a king or a Brâhmaṇa scholar, who may have sacrificed for a Śûdra from monetary motives, who may have divulged the Veda to the unauthorised, or who may have dwelt with men of the lowest castes. In another general list of offences in the following chapter, atheism is reckoned among the sins to be punished with excommunication. The excommunication should be performed to the accompaniment of certain solemn rites. Spiritual teachers and kinsmen shall assemble and perform the sinner’s funeral rites beginning with the libation of water.

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Excommunication.

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“3. And (afterwards) they shall overturn his water-vessel (in the following manner):

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“4. A slave or a hired servant shall fetch an impure vessel from a dust heap, fill it (with water taken) from the pot of a female slave and, his face turned towards the south, upset it with his foot, pronouncing the (sinner’s) name and saying: I deprive N. N. of water?

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“5. All (the kinsmen) shall touch him (the slave) passing their sacrificial cords over the right shoulder and under the left arm, and untying the locks on their heads.

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“6. The spiritual Gurus and the relatives by marriage shall look on.

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“7. Having bathed, they (all) shall enter the village.

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“8. He who afterwards unintentionally speaks to the (outcast sinner) shall stand, during one night, recitin the Savitri.

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“9. If he intentionally (converses with the outcast, he must perform the same penance) for three nights.¹

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¹ Gautama, XX, 2–9; XXI, 1. Sacred Books of the East, Vol. II, pp. 278-9.

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It will be observed that to associate with an excommunicated person was to invite excommunication on one’s head. In the next chapter, Gautama is at pains to add that a year’s company of outcasts or instigating others to acts causing loss of caste led to excommunication. The consequences of excommunication were not merely moral but also material and spiritual. An outcast was deprived, after death, of the rewards of his meritorious deeds. He lost the right to follow the lawful occupations of the twice-born—a penalty which could be enforced only by public opinion or government.² No wonder there were those who described this condition as hell.

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² Ibid., XXI, 2–6.

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Not less significant is the ceremony of re-admission or purification by penances. One kinsman shall fill a golden vessel with water from a very holy lake or river, and make the penitent bathe in it.

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Re-admission.

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“11. Then they shall give him that vessel and he, after taking it, shall mutter (the following Mantras): ‘cleansed is the sky, cleansed is the earth, cleansed and auspicious is the middle sphere, I here take that which is brilliant.’

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“12. Let him offer clarified butter, (reciting) these Yajus formulas, the Pâvamânis, the Taratsamandis and the Kûşmândas.

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“13. Let him present gold or cow to a Brâhmaṇa.

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“14. And to his teacher.”³

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³ Gautama, XX, 2–9; XXI, 1. Sacred Books of the East, Vol. II, p. 279.

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There were, however, some offences for which a life-long penance was necessary and from which one could be purified only after death.¹

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¹ Ibid., XX, 16--18.

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Caste Usage. Gautama and the other lawgivers are full of similar descriptions of offences and expiations but each small subsection of a sub-caste tended to develop a usage of its own. It was to be enforced by the public opinion of the group, generally expressed at a meeting for the purpose. In the towns and villages of India one may still see these assemblies at work. They have no permanent organisation, no regular chairman or secretaries, no written rules of procedure within the group, so to say there is a latent force which springs into action to meet a contingency. It works informally but expeditiously.

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Other Organisations. Besides religious, economic and social organisations, there were academic and philanthropic institutions in ancient India. Their working can be studied in foreign travellers, inscriptions and incidental notices in literature but there was no special theory of their administration.

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