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The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c8: The Third Part of the Vedânta System: Psychology

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c8

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Contents

The Third Part of the Vedânta System: Psychology

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OR

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THE DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL.

XXII. Proofs of the Immortality of the Soul

1. Preliminary Remarks on Psychology

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With Theology or the doctrine of the Existent, and Cosmology or the doctrine of its manifestation as the world, the foundations of the system are naturally completed; it is therefore only a further elaboration of what has already been expounded when in Psychology and the following sections we turn our attention specially to a particular side of the Universe, in order to consider more closely both in its own nature and in its two states of wandering and liberation that most important of cosmic phenomena, which is immediately present to the inner consciousness of every one, namely the soul.

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There are two factors which constitute the Universe; one of them may be properly termed the stage in this drama of cosmic evolution, the other the players who appear on it; the first factor is inorganic Nature consisting of space, air, fire, water and earth; the second is organic Nature consisting of souls that have entered into the elements and wander as plants, animals, men, and gods. Both factors are ultimately resolvable into Brahman, into "the One without a second," who according to the exoteric view creates the elements anew at the beginning of each world-period and then enters into them (above p. 231) "with the living Self," i. e., with the individual Soul; but both of them, the elements as well as the souls, are, from the higher, esoteric standpoint of the doctrine of identity, the one undivided Brahman Himself; for an existence in the highest sense real (*paramārthataḥ*) which passes beyond the one indivisible Brahman without a second cannot be predicated of the extension (*prapañca*) of the elements in names and forms as they are "laden on" the soul as "recompense of the deed on the doer" (*kriyâ-kâraka-phalam*, p. 273, 12. 291, 6. 447, 3. 987, 6), nor yet of the Brahman disguised by the Upâdhis whereby He represents a wandering, enjoying, acting soul.

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This double fundamental view of the Vedânta: the esoteric doctrine according to which every soul is the whole indivisible Brahman, who admits of nothing outside Himself, and the exoteric doctrine according to which there has from eternity existed a plurality of souls wandering but nevertheless (illogically) conceived as emanating from the Brahman—this view must be clearly kept in mind in what follows, even when (on the supposition that the reader is now sufficiently familiar with the leading conceptions) we do not treat the exoteric and esoteric Psychology in two strictly sundered sections which would involve too great a dislocation of the sequence of thought of the original. In general, it may be noted, Çañkara in the Psychology takes the esoteric view, and leaves it to the opponent whose opinion is step by step developed in detail and then refuted, to represent the exoteric view; at the same time having regard to the doctrine of metempsychosis maintained by him for the "lower knowledge." Çañkara cannot avoid descending to the exoteric standpoint himself; in doing so he appropriates partially and conditionally the arguments which he himself combats, in order thereby to gain a foundation for the doctrine of *Samsâra*, i. e., the "wandering" of the soul, which he then treats.—The individual enquiries as found in the original work will be left as far as possible untouched; only in the order will certain changes demanded by the subject be made; therefore we shall first treat of the origin and nature of the soul (chap. XXIII), of its relation to God (chap. XXIV), to the body (chap. XXV) and to its own works (chap. XXVI), all this from the esoteric standpoint; this course, however, from the continual connection with the exoteric point of view opposed to it will disclose many aspects which are true for the other doctrine also; these will be further developed when passing to the exoteric standpoint we consider the soul in relation to its empirical organs (chap. XXVII)

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and states (chap. XXVIII) in detail; to these preliminaries in the following section will be readily joined the doctrine of transmigration.

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However before we enter on these discussions, we must as an introduction produce the proofs of the immortality of the soul which are not found in the psychological part of the work (2, 3, 15—2, 4, 19, and 3, 2, 1—10) but 3, 3, 53—54 among the miscellaneous matter which forms the sections 3, 3 and 3, 4. Though Çañkara tries to justify artificially the interpolation of this episode at the place in question, it does not naturally belong there but to Psychology, and that as an introduction; for a *conditio sine qua non* of the doctrine of the soul is the proof that the soul exists, that there is in man a part which "reaches" beyond the body and is not affected by its dissolution.

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The word "immortality" is here to be understood in its western sense as, used by us, of "indestructibility by death." The Indians as a rule understand by the corresponding *amritatvam* as has already been emphasised (above p. 149) something different, namely "the deliverance of the liberated soul from dying."¹⁰⁸ What we call immortality is commonly called by them *vyatireka* the "reaching" (beyond the body); and this idea is the subject of the following controversy between the materialists and Vedântins, which, for the high interest of the question discussed, we add in a unabbreviated translation.

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¹⁰⁸ Martyatvam on the contrary means, p. 193, 7 "the necessity of dying again and again" of the individual soul.—However *amrita* too is occasionally found in our sense; *e. g.*, p. 197, 12, where it means the soul "which cannot die" (because there still exist works to be atoned for); cf. also p. 241, 14.

2. Arguments of the Materialists against the Immortality of the Soul

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"Some, namely those materialists (*lokâyatika*) who see the "Self in the body only, believe that there is no Self which "persists beyond the body; they assume that consciousness "though indiscoverable in the external elements, earth, etc., “taken individually and collectively, is contained in them when they take the form of the body; therefore they maintain that consciousness proceeds from them in the form of intellect, just as the power of intoxication [from fermenting matter], and that man is only a body which is distinguished by this consciousness. On the other hand they deny a Self which persists beyond the body, by virtue of which consciousness is in the body and which is capable of entering into heaven or into salvation; on the contrary they assume that the body alone is the conscious being and the Self, and cite as a proof that this conscious being only continues as long as the body. For when anything exists only as long as something else exists, and ceases to exist with it, this is completely expressed by terming it a quality of the other, just as heat and light are qualities of fire. It is just the same with breath, motion, spirit, memory, etc. which are considered qualities of the soul by believers in the soul; for they too are perceived only within the body and not without it, and as no bearer of these qualities which reaches beyond the body can be proved, therefore they can be nothing but qualities of the body. Therefore the Self does not persist beyond the body” (p. 954, 5--955, 2).

3. Proofs of the Immortality of the Soul

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“To this we reply: it is not true that the soul does not persist beyond the body; on the contrary its persistence beyond the body must be assumed because its Existence does not depend on the Existence (of the body). For if from the fact that the qualities of the Self persist as long as the body, the conclusion is drawn that they are qualities of the body, then also from the fact that they do not persist while the body persists must be concluded that they are not qualities of the body because they differ essentially from the qualities of the body. For what is a quality of the body, e.g., shape, etc., must persist as long as the body. Breath, motion, etc. on the other hand do not persist though the body does, namely in the state of death. Not only so but “the qualities of the body, as shape, etc., are perceived by others, but this is not so with the qualities of the Self, Spirit, Memory, etc.”

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“Further: it is true that from the existence of the body in a living state can be proved the existence of those [qualities of the Self], but from its non-existence the reverse cannot be proved; for there is always the possibility that whenever this body perishes the qualities of the Self persist by entering into another body; the opponents' opinion therefore is excluded by its being a mere hypothesis (saṃcaya).”

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“The opponent must further be asked how he imagines consciousness if he assumes its origin from the elements; for beyond the four elements the materialists of course admit nothing existing. If he says: consciousness is the perception of the elements and the products, consciousness has the latter as its objects and consequently cannot be a quality of them, for an activity directed towards one's own Self is a contradiction; for though fire is hot, it does not burn itself, and however skilled a dancer is, he cannot climb on his own shoulders; if consciousness is a quality of the elements and their products, the elements and their products cannot be objects of consciousness; for e.g. shapes cannot have their own shape or another as object, while on the other hand consciousness has as objects the elements and their products whether without or within the Self. As the existence of the elements and their products is concluded from the fact that they are perceived, so the conclusion must also be drawn that this perception is different from them [perception makes the material world known, not vice versa]; and the proper nature of perception is just what we call soul. Thus the independence of the soul from the body and its eternity follow from the unity of perception; and recollecting etc. is possible through the recognition in a different condition of a thing once perceived because the percipient is identical [with himself].”

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“Now if it be said that perception is a quality of the body because it persists as long as the body, the method of replying has already been indicated; perception continues as long “as the means e.g. the lamp, exists, and continues no longer “when it does not exist; but from this cannot be concluded “that perception is only a quality of the lamp; just in the “same way because perception continues as long as the body “exists and ceases when it ceases, it does not need to be a “quality of the body; for the body like the lamp serves only “as a means. Moreover the help of the body is not un- “conditionally necessary in perception, for while the body lies “motionless in sleep we perceive many things.—Therefore the “existence of a soul persisting beyond the body is indisputable” (p. 955--957).

4. On the Doctrine of Immortality in general

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If human thought were what it is not and perhaps never will be—completely logical, there would probably be only two philosophical standpoints: Idealism which holds the world which surrounds us as not real in the strict sense, and Realism which regards it as real. If these standpoints are logically adhered to, there is place in neither system, as it seems to us, for the immortality of the soul. For it is essential to Idealism to reach by one of the ways indicated by us in chap. II, 1, above p. 47 ff. the conviction of the unreality of all plurality as well as of all origination and dissolution and to grasp as the sole certainty the existence of the Self (*ego*): the logical consequence of this standpoint is the consciousness of the identity of the Ego with “Being-in-itself” and of the identification with it as soon as the dream of this existence is past—an identification which is not to be conceived so much as an absorption of the Self in the All, but rather (if we may speak spatially of the spaceless) as an absorption of the all into the Self, as a generalised realisation of what is in detail realised in every moral action. From this point of view the doctrine of immortality is superfluous; for it says us only what is self-evident. From the point of view of Realism on the other hand it is logically impossible. If nature is real, its dicta are real; and they tell us unmistakably that we arise out of nothing by procreation and at death return to nothing.—These considerations seem to show that the doctrine of immortality is a compromise between Idealism and Realism; it is an attempt to maintain from the realistic standpoint which is the natural one for the human intellect the idealistic certainty, rooted in self-consciousness, of the unchangeableness of the Self—a vain effort as the history of the doctrine of immortality sufficiently demonstrates.

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In the Vedânta system Idealism is represented by the esoteric view of the doctrine of identity, Realism by the exoteric doctrine of the Creation of the world. For the esoteric view the soul is identical with the Brahman and to grasp this only the right knowledge of the Self is needed, and no proof of immortality. The exoteric view makes us emerge from and return to Brahman; with this conception no doctrine of immortality can be reconciled but only the view of the Upanishads, expressed in the words (Mund. 2, 1, 1).

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"Just as the sparks from out the glowing flame
"In thousand forms, all glowing skywards mount,
"All creatures from the changeless one emerge,
"And thus, dear friend, return unto their fount."

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According to this doubtless original view the soul had an origin, and is as a necessary consequence, perishable. For what is so constituted that it can originate, is so constituted that it can perish. Τὸ μηδὲν εἰς οὐδὲν ῥέπει.—

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But the soul is the point in the universe where the veil (woven of time, space, and causality) that covers "Being-in-itself" becomes so transparent that we perceive facts through it, which protest against the cosmic laws of Realism and oppose themselves to a logical elaboration of it. Such a fact is above all the metaphysical significance of human action, reaching as it does beyond the grave. When a human being dies and his body is scattered to the elements, there is something in him which does not leave him; that is his works, as the Veda (Brih. 3, 2, 13) says; and this conviction of the indestructibility of the moral part of man by death compels the Vedânta to maintain inconsistently instead of the absorption into Brahman demanded by the exoteric view a persistence of the soul in its individual character beyond the Brahman into whom it enters at death.

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We shall return later to these questions of exoteric Psychology. The first question is not as to the empirical soul affected by Upâdhis and therefore wandering, acting and suffering, but as to the definition of the metaphysical nature of the soul free from all this; we shall however often enough have occasion to refer beforehand to this disguising of the soul by the Upâdhis.

XXIII. Origin and Nature of the Soul

1. Origin of the Soul

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Sûtras 2, 3, 16–17.

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ONE could imagine, says Çankara, that the soul (*jīva*) also originates and perishes like all else, because experience shows how man is born and dies and even celebrates his birth by special ceremonies (p. 641, 6). But that idea is contradicted by the Scripture which accompanies its commands and prohibitions with promises and threats, and they are only accomplished in a future existence (641, 9). Therefore being born and dying refer only to the body; for the soul on the other hand they mean no more than the entering into the phenomenal world as body and passing out of it again (*prâdurbhâva* and *tirobhâva*, p. 642, 4); therefore birth is only to be regarded as the union of the soul with the body, death as the separation from it (642, 8). But by this only the independence of the soul from the gross (material) origin and dissolution is demonstrated; the question is, what is the relation of the soul to Brahman, does it originate from him or not (642, 11)?—

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—It is clear that up to the present we have been speaking exoterically of the soul involved in transmigration. We might expect to find further the proof that it does not originate from Brahman on the ground that when in deep sleep and death and at the end of the world it enters into him, it persists in the form of seed-force (cf. above pp. 228 ff. 238. 276. 279). Instead of this in what follows Çankara passes over to the esoteric doctrine in order to prove the non-origination of the soul from the fact of its identity with Brahman.

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The origination of the soul from Brahman might be maintained on the following grounds: *Firstly*: If Brahman is recognised, it is said in Mund. 1, 1, 3, all is recognised. This passage forbids us to assume anything existent outside Brahman.—*Secondly*: Brahman and the soul are different in essence; Brahman is free from all evil [e. g. origination and dissolution] and the soul is not.—*Thirdly*: Everything divided and manifold in the world is transformed (not original); when the soul does good and evil and feels pleasure and pain, it is individualised according to the bodies and manifold; therefore it must have an origin (cf. note 43).—*Fourthly*: It is equally true of enjoyers (*bhoktar*) and of the things to be enjoyed (*bhogyam*), i. e., the Prāṇas and Elements, that they proceed from Brahman as sparks spring from a fire (above p. 131 ff.); by this passage other passages are to be supplemented and explained; thus the passage as to the entrance of Brahman into the elements (Taitt. 2, 6. Chând. 6, 3, 3; cf. above p. 280).—Therefore the soul has originated from Brahman (p. 643, 7 to 644, 11).

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To the *fourth* assertion is to be replied first that in most passages an origination of the soul is not taught [as for the others, they will be treated immediately]; and then that an origination is impossible because in many passages (Çaṅkara cites no fewer than ten) the eternal nature of the soul is maintained.—To the *third* of the above assertions that the soul must have originated because it is manifold, it is to be replied, that the soul in itself (*svatas*) is by no means manifold (p. 645, 8), for it is said (Çvet. 6, 11):

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"One God alone in every being hid,
"Pervadeth all, the inner soul of each."

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The plurality of the soul is only phenomenal and is conditioned by the Upâdhis such as Buddhi etc., just as the plurality of space by the vessels (note 106) which bound it. In the same way we must take it as referring to the Upâdhis when the Scripture occasionally seems to speak of an origin and dissolution of the soul; this means only an origin and dissolution of the Upâdhis; *e. g.* in the passage (above p. 175) "after death there is no consciousness." 109—By the identity of the soul with Brahman the first of the above assertions is met.—Lastly, as regards the second it is to be remarked that the difference in essence of the soul and Brahman refers only to the Upâdhis, as is to be seen by the passage Chap. XII, 4, in which all qualities of Samsâra are denied to the soul "consisting of knowledge." Thus it is proved that the soul 110 does not originate nor perish (p. 644, 12—647, 5).

2. Nature of the Soul

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Sûtram 2, 3, 18.

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How is the nature of the soul to be imagined? Is it, as Kanâda maintains, in itself not intellectual, so that its intelligence is only accidental (*âgantuka*), or must we assume with the Sânkhyas that the Soul is in its essence an eternally intellectual being (p. 647, 7)?—

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For the first eventuality, that the intelligence of the soul is accidental and produced by its association with the Manas, just as the heat of the pot is produced by its connection with the fire, we may adduce the fact that were the soul essentially intellectual it ought to be so in the case of sleepers, fainting persons, and madmen (*graha-âvishta*); but they affirm that in this condition they have had no consciousness. Therefore, since the intelligence of the soul is only temporary, we must assume that it is not essential but accidental (p. 647, 9 to 648, 2).

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To this we reply: the soul is an eternally intellectual being; this follows from the fact that, as we have proved, it does not originate but is the highest unchangeable Brahman itself, which when disguised by the Upâdhis appears as the individual soul. Now the highest Brahman is as we have proved (chap. IX, 4 above p. 134 ff.) naturally intellectual; consequently to the soul also intellectuality is as essential as heat and light to fire. Yet the organs of perception are not for this reason superfluous; for they are the gates through which the intellect receives the specifically different sense-impressions, e. g. the perception of smells by the sense of smell etc.—If sleepers etc. do not perceive, this is to be explained by the passage: "If he then sees not, yet is he seeing, though he does not see" etc. (above p. 191); i. e., the soul does not then perceive, not because perception is wanting but because the objects are wanting; just as light does not become visible in space, as long as there are no objects to be illuminated (648, 2—649, 13).

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¹⁰⁹ Here p. 646, 8 and 391, 3 an annihilation of the Upâdhis, *upâdhi-pralaya* is taught. But according to the system only the gross body is annihilated; the remaining Upâdhis (the subtle body and the Prânas) did not originate and (except in liberation) are imperishable; but by them the plurality of souls is conditioned, from which the opponent concluded their origination. His objection therefore remains unanswered.

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¹¹⁰ That is, as we must add, the soul which the esoteric doctrine recognises as identical with Brahman.—The indestructibility of the soul affected by Upâdhis follows on moral grounds as is developed *e. g.* above p. 112 ff.

XXIV. Relation of the Soul to God

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UNDER this heading, making a change in the arrangement of the Sûtras we treat the section 2, 3, 43—53, which, like the concluding sections in several other cases, makes the impression of a later addition, and in respect of its contents stands in close relationship to the thoughts of the preceding chapter; therefore we include it here; it is impossible in our presentation to avoid completely the numerous repetitions of the original if we wish to avoid too great a departure from the original line of thought.

1. Non-identity and Identity

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pp. 684, 13—688, 3.

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The relation of the soul to God is presented by the Scripture in two ways, partly [exoteric] as the relation of a servant to his master and of the part to the whole, and partly [esoteric] as a relation of identity.

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The position of the soul as servant with God as its master can be conceived in the following way: God (îçvara) by virtue of his connection with unsurpassable (niratiçaya) Upâdhis exercises authority over the soul which is affected only by imperfect (nihîna) Upâdhis (p. 688, 1; our author contents himself here with the remark that the whole relationship depends on the Upâdhis; for greater detail see chap. XX, 3, e, above p. 271).—The soul is further conceived as a part of God; *e. g.* by the simile of the Fire and the sparks (p. 685, 6; cf. above p. 131); further in the passage of the Rigveda X, 90, 3 (cf. chap. XI, 3):

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“ However great is nature's majesty,
“ The spirit is yet higher raised by far
“ Of it but one foot do all beings make
“ Three feet are immortality in heaven.”

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where under one foot all animated beings, the immovable (plants) and the movable, are to be understood (p. 687, 3). The passage of *Bhagavadgîtâ* 15, 7 affirms the same (p. 687, 9).

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However this view of the soul as a part of Brahman is not to be taken strictly, for Brahman has no parts (p. 685, 7); and the case is the same with the passages in which the soul appears as different from Brahman (p. 685, 9); for it is taught on the other hand that all souls, as they have entered “into the complex of organs formed of names and shapes” (*nâma-rûpa-kṛita-kârya-karaṇa-saṅghâta*, i. e. the body), are Brahman Himself (p. 686, 5). Not even the lowest creatures are to be excepted here, as a verse of the Brahman song of the *Atharvanikas* (not found in our collection of Atharva songs) says:

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“ Brahman are fishers and slaves, and even the players are Brahman”

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and another (*Çvet*. 4, 3 = *Atharva-V*. X, 8, 27):

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“ The woman art thou, and the man, the maiden and the boy,
“ Thou art born, and growest in every form, thou totterest in old age.”

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Thus the soul is sometimes regarded as identical with Brahman, sometimes as a part of Him (p. 686).

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The passages p. 1127, 14—1128, 14 (translated above p. 111) serve to complete what this passage leaves uncertain; it is there proved from the esoteric standpoint that the soul can be conceived neither a part nor a transformation of Brahman nor as different from him but only as identical with Brahman.—An explanation of this is offered by the image (used pp. 690, 3. 695, 1. 809, 12) of the sun and its reflections in the water (above p. 208) and that of cosmic space, whose local divisions depend only on the limitations of vessels which produce no change in its nature (note 106, above p. 277); cf. also p. 120, 13: “It is however forbidden, in the sense of the “highest reality (*paramârthatas*) to assume a seer or hearer “different from the highest God, when we read (*Bṛih*. 3, 7, 23): “ ‘There is no seer besides him,’ etc. (above p. 149); on the “contrary the highest God differs from the individual soul

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"created by Ignorance and termed *Vijñânâtman* (cf. note 82)
"which acts and enjoys only in the same way as the magician,
"who in reality remains upon the earth, is different from the
"magician, who with sword and shield climbs up the rope."

2. Illusion of all Pain

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pp. 688, 3--691, 3.

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One might imagine that, if the soul is a part of God, God must feel the pains of the soul also, just as when one member of the body suffers, the whole body suffers with it (p. 688, 3); nay the sufferings of God must be much greater than those of the individual soul, and it is better for us to remain as individual souls in the state of *Saṃsâra* than by the gaining of perfect knowledge to rise to a consciousness of identity with God (p. 688, 6).

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To this is to be replied (in connection with what was brought forward above p. 154): only through Ignorance does the soul fall into the illusion of seeing the Self in the body, and upon this illusion (*abhimâna*) alone, from which God is free, depends the sensation of pain. Pain is consequently a delusion (*bhrama*) which arises from our not distinguishing the Self from the limitations, such as body, senses, etc. which have their origin in the realm of names and shapes created by Ignorance (p. 689, 1). Therefore pain depends only on a mistaken idea, as is proved by the fact that it persists even beyond the body. If for example a son or friend of ours dies, we feel pain from the mistaken idea that they belong to us. The *Parivrâjaka* (above p. 17) on the other hand, who has delivered himself from that illusion, feels no pain at it. In the same way he too feels no more bodily pain who has by perfect knowledge delivered himself from the illusion that his body belongs to him (p. 689, 9).

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Just as sunlight falling on the finger appears straight when the finger is straight, and crooked when it is crooked but in reality is neither the one nor the other—just as space in vessels seems to move when they are moved but in reality remains motionless—just as the sun does not quiver when its reflections quiver in the water—so God does not suffer when the individual soul suffers, and even the suffering of the individual soul depends, as we saw, only on Ignorance. Such words of the Vedânta as *tat tvam asi*, "that art thou," serve to drive away this illusion of the existence of the individual soul and to produce the consciousness of the Brahmanhood of the soul (p. 689, 16—690, 9).

3. Subjection to and Freedom from Law

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pp. 691, 3—694, 3.

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"If there is only one soul in all beings, how then are the worldly and Vedic prohibitions possible?"

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—So far as the individual soul is a part of God.

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"But the Scripture teaches also that it is not simply a part of him but also identical with him!"

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—The difference and identity consists exactly in its being a part of Him.

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"But where the Scripture speaks seriously, it surely teaches the identity of God and the soul and reproves the natural view of difference! It still remains therefore to be explained how commands and prohibitions are possible."

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—Let us take commands such as: a man shall visit his wife at a fit time—a man shall ask his consent of the sacrificial animal—a man shall stand by his friend; and prohibitions such as: thou shalt not commit adultery,—thou shalt not kill,—thou shalt avoid thy enemy, such commands and prohibitions are valid in spite of the unity of the Âtman, on account of the connection with the body. For on this connection with the body depends the mistaken opinion that we see the Self in the body, which is and remains common to all creatures with the exception of such as attain to perfect knowledge. The commands and prohibitions refer to this distinction [of the Ego from the non-Ego] though it depends on Ignorance and is caused by the connection with the body and the other Upâdhis; and only for him who has attained perfect knowledge do they cease to hold good; as he has no further object to aim at, he has also no further obligations. For him there is nothing to be toiled after or avoided because there is nothing that reaches beyond his own Self (ātman); but a duty towards one's own Self is meaningless (na ca ātmā ātmani eva niyojyaḥ syāt). It is true he has a body, but he knows that its structure (saṃhalatvam) is a mere illusion. Only for him who is still subject to the illusion of the body does the illusion of duty still persist: how should it persist for him who has recognised the unity of the soul?

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"But if the sage has no duties, can he do what he will?"—Not at all! For it is only illusion that moves to action and it is just this illusion that exists no more for this sage.—But in spite of the unity of all existence, command and prohibition exist for him who has not attained knowledge. For as one shrinks from the fire which has burnt a corpse, though it is as much fire as any other—as one avoids sunlight in unclean places, though it comes just as much from the sun—as one flees from a human corpse though it consists of the same materials as the living body—so there are certain things to be avoided, though all things are one in the Ātman.

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4. How are the individual Souls separated from each other? Sûtras 2, 3, 49—50.

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The works of souls are individually different, and so are the fruits (reward and punishment in the succeeding existence) which correspond to the works in each case. How is this possible if the soul is in reality only one?—How can it happen that works and fruits of different souls (which at death return to unity and proceed out of it again to a new existence Chând. 6, 10, above p. 264) do not mutually intermingle?

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To this we have two replies:

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1) The soul is, it is true, as a result of its unity with Brahman (as we shall soon see more in detail) omnipresent (i.e. spaceless); but this omnipresence does not mean that the acting and enjoying soul also pervades every thing and is thus connected with all bodies. For this individual soul is only conditioned by the Upâdhis; as these Upâdhis are not all pervading, the individual soul is not so either, and no confusion of works and fruits happens (p. 694, 5—10).—Compare with this what has been said above pp. 228 ff. 276 as to the persistence of the power of differentiation after entrance into Brahman.

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2) Individual souls are to be regarded only as phantoms (*âbhâsa*) of the highest soul, comparable to images of the sun in water. Just as when one of these reflected suns quivers, the others do not quiver too, the deeds and fruits of one soul do not concern the others. These phantoms and with them the whole of *Samsâra* with its deeds and fruits depend on Ignorance (*avidyâ*). Only when this is removed, is unity with Brahman attained (p. 694, 12—695, 5) and thereby, as we may add, a point of view, from which questions as to works and fruits and consequently as to their intermingling, have no meaning.

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Of these two answers the one refers the plurality of souls to the Upâdhis, the others to *Avidyâ*. What is the relation of these two to each other? This question leads us to collect here the most important passages on the Upâdhis, a fundamental idea of the system, which is however nowhere treated connectedly by Çañkara.

5. Brahman and the Upâdhis

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In reality (*paramârthatas*) there is nothing else besides Brahman alone. If we imagine we perceive a transformation (*vikâra*) of Him into the world, a division (*bheda*) of Him into a plurality of individual souls, this depends on *Avidyâ*. But how does this happen? How do we manage to deceive ourselves into seeing a transformation and a plurality, where in reality Brahman alone is?—On this question our authors give no information.

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Since *Avidyâ* is, as we saw above (p. 55) innate, and our birth depends on the works of a previous existence, one might imagine the innate obscuration of our knowledge was a result of previous offences reaching back *ad infinitum*. But the system gives no real ground for this assumption. Avidyâ cannot properly be a result of Samsâra, for on the contrary the reverse is the case and the whole of Samsâra depends on Avidyâ. Under these circumstances nothing remains but to recall the negative character of the idea of Avidyâ. It needs no explanation so far as it is not a positive defect, but only Ignorance, the absence of knowledge. It is true something very positive depends on Avidyâ; viz. the whole existence of the world and of the individual soul. It is however just the meaning of this reference of all empirical existence to Ignorance, that this whole world, the whole beginningless and endless Samsâra, is only for us something positive and real, but is in actuality non-Brahman and (as Brahman alone is the Existent) non-Existent, a mere mirage (mâyâ, mṛigatṛishṇikâ), a product of Ignorance.

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The extension of the world and the plurality of wandering souls, this hybrid which is neither Being nor non-Being (tattva-anyatvâbhyâm anirvacanîyam) and comparable to an hallucination or to a dream, is produced by Ignorance by virtue of the Upâdhis, the limitations, literally "the ascription" (with the secondary idea of the unpermitted) by means of which we "ascribe" to Brahman what does not naturally belong to him, and through which, as we shall show in detail, he becomes 1) a personal God, 2) the world, 3) the individual soul. All this depends on the Upâdhis, and the Upâdhis on Avidyâ. Avidyâ alone is the cause of the origin of the Upâdhis (they are avidyâ-kṛita p. 1133, 12, avidyâ-nimitta p. 692, 14, avidyâ-pratyupasthâpita pp. 199, 5. 690, 5) and is the cause of their persistence so far as the essence of Avidyâ is the non-discrimination of Brahman from the Upâdhis (upâdhi-aviveka p. 473, 17. 689, l. 98, 8, cf. 185, 10); Brahman himself on the other hand is not in the least affected or changed by the Upâdhis, just as little in fact as the crystal by the red colour with which it is painted p. 265, 7. 803, 14. It is in this sense that a contact of the Upâdhis (upâdhi-samparka p. 389, 2. 794, 7) and a contamination (p. 389, 2) by them is spoken of. Brahman is merged in the Upâdhis (upâdhi-antarbhâva p. 811, 5. 9) and thereby his nature is hidden (svarûpa-tirobhâva p. 837, 2) and his natural omniscience (in his existential form as soul) suffers a limitation (the knowledge of the soul is *upâdhi-paricchinna* p. 231, 1).

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On this connection of the Brahman with the Upâdhis depend, as we have said, three phenomena, and it is characteristic that all three are included under this conception without distinction: 1) Through the Upâdhis the higher Brahman becomes the lower, the object of worship p. 111, 3. 662, 13. 1142, 9; the Upâdhis of the Îçvara are however perfect (*nir-atiçaya*) in contrast with those of the individual soul which are imperfect (*nihîna*) (p. 688, 1); details of this distinction are not given. 2) The extension of nature too (*nâma-rûpa-prapañca*) which is commonly referred directly to Avidyâ (e.g. 1132, 10. 507, 1. 473, 17. 787, 13) seems occasionally to be reckoned among the Upâdhis of Brahman; this is the case p. 803, 12. 807, 4 (*prithivî-âdi-upâdhi-yoga*), 391, 2 (*upâdhi-âçraya-nâmarûpam*), 1133, 12 (*nâmarûpa-upâdhika*) just as external objects (*vishaya*) also appear among the Upâdhis of the soul (p. 265, 6, cf. 787, 10. 1056, 1. 739, 7). This description of nature however as Upâdhi of Brahman is uncertain and at any rate seldom. 3) But so much the more frequently is everything regarded as Upâdhi, which makes Brahman into a Jîva or Çarîra, *i.e.*, individual soul, whose existence as a being different from Brahman depends solely on the Upâdhis, p. 735, 3. 244, 13. 360, 2. 199, 8. 836, 8. 799, 5. 982, 5. 173, 16. 162, 16. The best explanation of this relationship is the comparison of the Upâdhis with vessels which limit cosmic space locally (cf. note 106 above p. 277). In this sense can be considered as Upâdhis firstly all psychic organs or Prâṇas (*Mukhya prâṇa*, *Manas*, and the *Indriyas*; for details see chap. XXVII) together with the subtle body and the moral determination of the soul (p. 1091, 9) which all share together in transmigration; further the gross body which only exists until death (*kârya-karaṇa-saṅghâta* or *deha*, cf. 473, 17. 199, 5. 787, 13. 389, 2. 98, 4. 9. 692, 14. 811, 5. 9); and finally to these are added occasionally external objects and sensation (*vishaya-vedanâ* p. 265, 6. 787, 10. 1056, 1, where it must be taken as a Dvandva). In waking and dreaming contact with the Upâdhis (*upâdhi-samparka*) takes place, in deep sleep release (*upaçama*) from them (p. 794, 7. 836, 6). Frequently only such are to be understood as Upâdhis as share in transmigration; then for example p. 793, 14, where veins and pericardium are termed receptacles of the Upâdhis (*upâdhi-âdhâra*); thus the definition of the Upâdhis fluctuates and must in each case be settled by the context.

XXV. Relation of the Soul to the Body

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In the section 2, 3, 19-32, which we propose to analyse in the present chapter, the question raised by this heading is handled chiefly from the quantitative side, in so far as the enquiry into the size of the soul holds the foremost place. This leads however to discussions which are of considerable help to us in gaining in the sequel a clear idea (so far as this is possible) of the relation of the soul 1) to its organs (*Mukhya prâna*, *Manas*, and *Indriyas*), 2) to the subtle body which consists of the seed of the elements and shares in transmigration, 3) to the gross body which consists of the elements themselves.

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A clear idea of the spacelessness of Being-in-itself is wanting in our system; in its place we find the doctrine of the infinite size (*vibhutvam*) or omnipresence (*sarvagatatvam*) of the soul; two other views are opposed to this; that according to which the soul is of minute size (*anu*), and the opinion of the Jainas, according to which the soul is of a certain, moderate size, *viz.* as large as the body. We begin with the discussion of the last view, which we take over from 2, 2, 34-36 to insert it here.

1. The opinion of the Jainas that the Soul is as large as the Body

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If the soul is, as the *Ârhatas* affirm, as large as the body, it is limited and therefore, like all limited things, not eternal (cf. note 43, above p. 68ff.). Moreover the size of the body changes. If, *e. g.* the human soul, as a fruit of works, enters into the body of an elephant, it cannot completely fill it; and if it enters the body of an ant, it has no room in it. The same objection may be raised in respect of the varying size of the body in youth and manhood (p. 587, 6).

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Or does the soul consist of an infinite number of corpuscules (*avayava*) which in a small body close up, and in a large one open out? Then there is a question whether these corpuscules possess impenetrability (*pratighâta*) or not. If they are impenetrable there is no room in a limited space for an infinite number of corpuscules; if they are not, they take all together no more room than one corpuscule, they cannot produce the [necessary] extension and the whole soul is of minute size (p. 587, 12).

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Or must we assume that with the increase and diminution of the body the soul gains new or loses old corpuscules? But then the soul is subject to change and perishable like the skin; and the doctrine [of the Jainas] of binding and liberation cannot hold good; the doctrine namely which asserts that the soul, clad in the eight kinds of its works and sunk in the ocean of Samsâra, rises like a gourd (*alâvu*) after the connection is broken (p. 588, 9). Moreover such changing corpuscules belong as little to the Self (*âtman*) as the body does; and if a part of him remain as soul, we cannot determine which (p. 588, 12). And where do the new parts come from and the old go to? Not from the elements and not back into them; for the soul does not consist of the elements; and another common receptacle of soul-corpuscules is not demonstrable (p. 589, 5).

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Or does the soul perhaps persist through all change of parts like a stream whose waters change? This is not admissible either; for if this continuity is not real, there is no soul at all; if it is real, the soul is subject to change (p. 590, 4).

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If the dimensions of the soul remain for ever, as the Jainas maintain, as they were at the moment of liberation, this final state is to be regarded as its real dimensions; and therefore a given body and not every former body is to be taken as its measure; but then it is not discoverable why it should not have just as much right to remain in every former state as in that final state (p. 590, 9). We come therefore to the conclusion that the soul is unchangeable, whether it is minute (*aṇu*) or large (*mahant*), but it cannot be taken to be of the (changing) size of the body, as the Jainas assert (p. 591, 2).

2. The Opinion that the Soul is of minute (aṇu) size

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Sûtras 2, 3, 19–28.

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¹ That the soul is as large as the body has been refuted in the examination of the doctrine of the Jainas (p. 651, 2). Therefore it is only possible to regard it as either very large (*i. e.* infinite, *vibhu*) or as minute (*aṇu*). The infinitely large cannot move (p. 651, 1), and we must assume of the soul that it moves because a passing (out of the body), a going (to the moon) and a return (to a new incarnation) are ascribed to it by the Scriptures (p. 650, 9). And even if the passing, so far as we regard it as a cessation of lordship over the body, could possibly be reconciled with immovability (p. 651, 5) a going and return could not; but they must certainly be recognized as motion (p. 651, 7) and we are thus compelled to regard this passing as a real going away (p. 651, 9). Since the soul, being mobile, cannot therefore be infinitely large, nor yet, as shown, of middle size, we must assume (p. 651, 8) that it is minute (*aṇu*).

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² The soul is, it is true, termed by the Scripture large, omnipresent, infinite, but these expressions refer only to the highest, not the individual soul (p. 652, 9); and when we read Bṛih. 4, 4, 22 (above p. 195): "Truly this great, unborn Self, is that among the life-organs which consists of knowledge" the individual soul is certainly termed "the great" but only so far as, in virtue of an innate power as seer, such as Vâmadeva had (Rigv. IV, 26, 1. 27, 1. Bṛih. 1, 4, 10. Ait. 2, 5; cf. above p. 180 and note 83) its identity with the highest soul is perceived (p. 653, 1). On the other hand in other passages the soul is expressly termed minute; *e.g.* Muṇḍ. 3, 1, 9 "the subtle Self" (*aṇur âtmâ*), Çvet. 5, 8 "large as the point of an awl," and Çvet. 5, 9 as large as the hundredth of a hundredth of the end of a hair.

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3. But if the soul is minute, it can only be at one place in the body; how comes it thus that it perceives throughout the body? For after a bath in the Ganges one feels the cold, and in summer one feels the heat all over one’s body (p. 653, 11).—We answer: just as a piece of sandalwood, even when it only touches the body at one spot, refreshes it all over (p. 654, 2) so the soul is only in one spot, *viz.*, as the Scripture teaches in many places, in the heart (p. 655, 5) and from here it feels throughout the body (p. 654, 3). This comes about by means of the sense of touch (*tvac*); the soul is connected with the sense of touch everywhere and the sense of touch pervades the whole body.¹¹¹ Or perhaps this power of the minute soul to feel throughout the body can be explained (p. 655, 10) from its spirituality (*caitanya-guṇa*) which here extends beyond the substance; just as we see in other cases in experience that the quality extends further than the substance, when *e.g.* the light of a jewel or of a lamp, which is only in one place in a room, extends from there through the whole room (p. 655, 11) or when we smell the scent of flowers without touching them (p. 656, 9). So too the Scripture teaches of the Soul, that though it is minute and dwells in the heart, by means of its quality of spirituality it penetrates the body (p. 658, 1) “to the hair and nails” (Kaush. 4, 20; cf. Bṛih. 1, 4, 7) and also in other passages (Kaush. 3, 6. Bṛih. 2, 1, 17) the soul is distinguished from the intellect (*prajñā, vijñānam*) with which it pervades the body (p. 658, 4).

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¹¹¹ p. 654, 5: *tvag-ātmano hi sambandhaḥ kṛtsnāyāṃ tvaci vartate, tvak ca kṛtsna-śarīra-vyāpinī*. As the soul according to this view is minute and dwells in the heart, the outer skin cannot possibly be understood [if the passage really belongs to the context in which it stands; p. 654, 14—655, 1 *aṇutvam* seems to be opposed to *tvak-sambandha*; it is true that in this enquiry there is in places terrible confusion] but only the Indriyam termed *tvac*; for by this *Manas* and by *Manas* the soul feels cold, heat, pain, pleasure, etc. in the whole body. At Death this *tvac* or more accurately the *tvagvṛtti* enters into the *Manas* and like all the *Indriyas* shares in transmigration.

3. The Soul is infinitely great (vibhu)

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The soul has not originated (chap. XXIII, 1) but depends only on the entrance of the highest Brahman into the elements (above p. 231); from this the identity of both follows; the individual soul is nothing but the highest Brahman himself (p. 658, 11). If this is so, the soul must be as large as Brahman and therefore all pervading (p. 658, 13) as is expressly asserted in the passage Bṛih. 4, 4, 22: "truly this great unborn "ledge" (p. 659, 1). To the arguments of the opponent we reply:

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(To 3.) If the soul were minute, it could not feel throughout the whole body. The connection with the sense of touch (*tvac*) does not suffice to explain this; the thorn too, on which one has trodden, is connected with the whole sense of feeling (p. 659, 5) and yet one feels the pain from it only in the sole of the foot and not in the whole body (p. 659, 6). That the quality extends beyond the substance, we do not admit; the flame of the lamp and its light are not related as substance and quality; on the contrary both are fiery substances, but in the flame the corpuscules (*avayava*) are drawn closer together, and in the light which radiates they are more widely separated (p. 656, 5). Just in the same way the perception of smell depends on the subtle atoms (*paramāṇu*) streaming out in all directions from the objects without diminishing their volume (p. 657, 1) and penetrating into the nasal cavity (p. 657, 4). If this is not admitted, because atoms are not perceptible by the senses (p. 657, 5), because not the objects but their odours are smelt (p. 657, 6), or because what is perhaps true of the sense of sight may not be transferred to the sense of smell (p. 657, 8)—we must dispute the assertion that smell is only a quality; for if it were, it could only disseminate itself from its own substance and from other substances to which it has been transferred (p. 659, 10). That this is so the sublime *Dvaipāyana* testifies when he (*Mahābhāratam* 12, 8518) says:

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"To water the unlearned folk ascribe,
"The odour which their senses show them there;
"But ever to the earth leads back its trace,
"And thence it goes to water and the air."

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If it were true therefore that the spirituality of the soul pervaded the whole body, the soul could not be minute, for spirituality is not related to it as a quality to its substance but is its very essence, as warmth and light are of the fire (p. 660, 3); and we have proved that the soul is not of the same size as the body: therefore it is only possible that it is infinitely great (p. 660, 5).

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(To 2.) But how can the soul be termed *aṇu* by the Scripture?—As answer to this serves the following: *because in the state of Saṃsâra it is the nucleus (sâra) of the qualities of the Buddhi.*¹¹² Such qualities of the Buddhi are: Love, hate, pleasure, pain, etc. (p. 660, 7). For we must distinguish the soul outside the state of Saṃsâra, which means that it is not acting, not suffering and eternally free, and the soul in the state of Saṃsâra, when it acts and suffers only through the qualities of the *Upâdhi* of Buddhi being transferred to it (p. 660, 10). In this state the soul has the dimensions of the Buddhi (p. 661, 1), is therefore (according to Çvet. 5, 9) as large as the ten thousandth part of the end of a hair, (p. 661, 4) or (according to Çvet. 5, 8) as large as the point of an awl (p. 661, 11) and dwells like the Buddhi in the heart (p. 662, 7). The minute size of the soul is therefore to be taken figuratively (*aupacârika*); from the point of view of the highest reality (*paramârtha*) it is infinitely great (p. 661, 7). We therefore find in the passages to which the opponent appeals (Çvet. 5, 8–9):

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¹¹² Under *Buddhi* (Intellect) *Manas* is to be understood from here to the end of the chapter, as will be evident further on.

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"Through qualities of Buddhi and the body,
"The other seems as large as an awl's point.
"Divide a hundred times a human hair, and take thereof the hundredth part,
"That know thou as dimension of the soul, and this enlarges to infinity."

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When on the contrary Muṇḍ. 3, 1, 9 the epithet *aṇu* (minute) is applied to the soul, this either does not imply its smallness but the difficulty of perceiving it which is possible only by the grace of knowledge (p. 661, 13) not by sensual perception, or it refers here also to the *Upādhis*.

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(To 1.) So too the passing, going and return of the soul only refer to it so far as it is connected with the *Upādhis* and therefore infinitely small (p. 662, 8); for in the same way for the purpose of worship the highest soul is represented in the *Saguṇa vidyāḥ* as connected with *Upādhis* and therefore (Chând. 3, 14, translated above p. 153) as "smaller than a grain of rice or barley" (p. 662, 13).

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