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Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s4: (d) The Doctrine of Truths

Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna c7.s4

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(d) The Doctrine of Truths

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The Āryasatyas, as commonly known, are *dukkha* (misery), *samudaya* (origin of misery), *nirodha* (cessation of misery) and *magga* (means of the cessation of misery). The underlying teaching of these four truths is that they are to be treated as formulæ for application to everything perceived. That these four truths constitute merely a formula and not a doctrine has been brought out very clearly in many Buddhist texts. In the *Majjhima Nikāya*¹ while giving an exposition of what the right view (*sammādiṭṭhi*) is according to the Buddhists, Sāriputta takes up, for instance, *āhāra* (food), *dukkha* (misery), *jarāmaraṇa* (old age and death), *taṇhā* (desire), *nāmarūpa* (name and form) and *avijjā* (ignorance) and applies to each of them the fourfold formula, examining it in this way: Take up for consideration a material or an immaterial thing. Ascertain its origin. Inquire how it decays. In pursuance of this method Sāriputta defines Sammādiṭṭhi through *āhāra* thus: One who knows *āhāra* (food), *āhārasamudaya* (how food originates), *āhāranirodha* (how food decays) and *āhāranirodhagāminipaṭipadā* (the way in which the decay of food happens) possesses Sammādiṭṭhi. The first truth relates to Āhāra which, in the Buddhist philosophy, is of four kinds.² The second truth is *āhārasamudaya*, *i.e.*, *āhāra* comes into existence on account of *taṇhā*. The third truth is *āhāranirodha*, *i.e.*, the ceasing of *āhāra* when the *taṇhā* is extinct. The fourth truth is the way in which *āhāra* ceases; it happens by the practice of the eightfold path, *viz.*, *sammā diṭṭhi*, *saṅkappa*, *vācā*, *etc.* One who knows correctly these truths gets rid of hatred and attachment, rises above the belief in a self, drives out ignorance, and attains freedom from misery. So, we see that in these four truths there is nothing particularly Buddhistic. They are found in the Brahmanical systems of philosophy as well.³ For instance, the *Yoga-sūtra* of Patañjali (II, 15)

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¹ *Majjhima*, I, p. 261. See also *Lal. Vis.*, pp. 349, 416-7; *Miu.*, II, p. 288; III, p. 53.

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² *Digha*, III, pp. 228, 276; *Dhs.* 71-3; *Vis. M.*, p. 341.

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³ Prof. Stcherbatsky remarks; "These four topics--the four noble truths as the term has been very inadequately translated and re-

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says: Yathā cikitsāśāstram caturvyūham, rogo rogahetur ārogyam bhaiṣajyam iti evam idam api śāstram catur vyūham eva tad yathā saṃsāraḥ saṃsārahetur mokṣo mokṣopāya iti (just as the science of medicine has four sections dealing with the diagnosis, cause and cure of diseases, and their remedies, so also this science of spiritual healing has four sections dealing with an examination of the nature of the things of the world, the cause of their origin, their removal, and the factors that bring about the removal). The Abhidharmakośa also follows up this interpretation by coalescing the four truths into two, viz., cause and effect, saṃsāra (world) and nirvāṇa (cessation). Duḥkha and samudaya relate to saṃsāra, while nirodha and mārga to Nirvāṇa. Saṃsāra (world) is the effect while samudaya is its cause; so also Nirvāṇa (cessation) is the effect while mārga is its cause.¹

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¹ Kośa, VI. 4; see also Sogen, Sys. of B. Thought, pp. 69ff; Sūtrā., pp. 137-8; it supports the interpretation of the Kośa, see infra.

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This position of the Hīnayānists with regard to the Āryasatyas is logical, for their cardinal tenet is that a being suffers by wrongly assuming the existence of a self, and thus conceiving himself as a separate entity, standing in some form of relation to every other being or thing of the world, to which again he ascribes an individuality similar to his own. The chief aim of Hīnayāna teaching is to expel from one’s mind all ideas of individuality, whether of himself or of any other being or thing of the world, and this can only be effected by an examination of the things of this world under the four aspects mentioned above. Scrutinizing everything in this way, a being gets rid of his wrong assumption and sees things as they really are. This is called sammādiṭṭhi (right view) or vijjā (true knowledge). Once this is reached he can be said to have attained freedom from misery, or Nirvāṇa.

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presented as a fundamental principle of Buddhism—contain in reality no doctrine at all.” Con. of N., p. 55.

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THE ĀRYASATYAS

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The Āryasatyas, as commonly known, are *dukkha* (misery), *samudaya* (origin of misery), *nirodha* (cessation of misery) and *magga* (means of the cessation of misery). The underlying teaching of these four truths is that they are to be treated as formulæ for application to everything perceived. That these four truths constitute merely a formula and not a doctrine has been brought out very clearly in many Buddhist texts. In the *Majjhima Nikāya*¹ while giving an exposition of what the right view (sammādiṭṭhi) is according to the Buddhists, Sāriputta takes up, for instance, āhāra (food), dukkha (misery), jarāmaraṇa (old age and death), taṇhā (desire), nāmarūpa (name and form) and avijjā (ignorance) and applies to each of them the fourfold formula, examining it in this way: Take up for consideration a material or an immaterial thing. Ascertain its origin. Inquire how it decays. In pursuance of this method Sāriputta defines Sammādiṭṭhi through āhāra thus: One who knows āhāra (food), āhārasamudaya (how food originates), āhāra-nirodha (how food decays) and āhāranirodhagāminipaṭipadā (the way in which the decay of food happens) possesses Sammādiṭṭhi. The first truth relates to Āhāra which, in the Buddhist philosophy, is of four kinds.² The second truth is āhārasamudaya, *i.e.*, āhāra comes into existence on account of taṇhā. The third truth is āhāranirodha, *i.e.*, the ceasing of āhāra when the taṇhā is extinct. The fourth truth is the way in which āhāra ceases; it happens by the practice of the eightfold path, *viz.*, sammā diṭṭhi, saṅkappa, vācā, *etc.* One who knows correctly these truths gets rid of hatred and attachment, rises above the belief in a self, drives out ignorance, and attains freedom from misery. So, we see that in these four truths there is nothing particularly Buddhistic. They are found in the Brahmanical systems of philosophy as well.³ For instance, the *Yoga-sūtra* of Patañjali (II, 15)

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¹ *Majjhima*, I, p. 261. See also *Lal. Vis.*, pp. 349, 416-7; *Mtu.*, II, p. 288; III, p. 53.

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² *Dīgha*, III, pp. 228, 276; *Dhs.* 71-3; *Vis. M.*, p. 341.

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³ Prof. Stcherbatsky remarks; "These four topics—the four noble truths as the term has been very inadequately translated and re-

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says: Yathā cikitsāśāstram caturvyūham, rogo rogahetur ārogyam bhaiṣajyam iti evam idam api śāstram caturvyūham eva tad yathā saṃsāraḥ saṃsārahetur mokṣo mokṣopāya iti (just as the science of medicine has four sections dealing with the diagnosis, cause and cure of diseases, and their remedies, so also this science of spiritual healing has four sections dealing with an examination of the nature of the things of the world, the cause of their origin, their removal, and the factors that bring about the removal). The Abhidharmakośa also follows up this interpretation by coalescing the four truths into two, viz., cause and effect, saṃsāra (world) and nirvāṇa (cessation). Duḥkha and samudaya relate to saṃsāra, while nirodha and mārga to Nirvāṇa. Saṃsāra (world) is the effect while samudaya is its cause; so also Nirvāṇa (cessation) is the effect while mārga is its cause.¹

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¹ Kośa, VI. 4; see also Sogen, Sys. of B. Thought, pp. 69ff; Sūtra., pp. 137-8; it supports the interpretation of the Kośa, see infra.

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This position of the Hinayānists with regard to the Āryasatyas is logical, for their cardinal tenet is that a being suffers by wrongly assuming the existence of a self, and thus conceiving himself as a separate entity, standing in some form of relation to every other being or thing of the world, to which again he ascribes an individuality similar to his own. The chief aim of Hinayāna teaching is to expel from one’s mind all ideas of individuality, whether of himself or of any other being or thing of the world, and this can only be effected by an examination of the things of this world under the four aspects mentioned above. Scrutinizing everything in this way, a being gets rid of his wrong assumption and sees things as they really are. This is called sammādiṭṭhi (right view) or vijjā (true knowledge). Once this is reached he can be said to have attained freedom from misery, or Nirvāṇa.

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presented as a fundamental principle of Buddhism—contain in reality no doctrine at all.” Con. of N., p. 55.

The Pratītyasamutpāda

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Of the four truths, the second and the third comprise the *Pratītyasamutpāda*. The chief object of this formula of causation is to establish that things of this world have only a dependent origination and hence are impermanent and productive of sufferings, and that there is nothing except Nirvāṇa and Ākāśa that does not depend upon cause and condition. This formula of causal law has been utilised by the Hinayānists to show that all constituted things have a preceding cause and condition and as such they are without any substantiality, while it has been used by the Mahāyānists to establish that the world being relatively existent is unreal like the objects seen in a dream. The formula explains the fixed, unchangeable, and this-conditioned (*idappaccayatā*) nature of things; hence it is a key to the eternal truth. The moment a being realises in his life the truth of this formula he sees the Reality. We find for this reason that the Buddhist texts identify the formula with Buddha and Dhamma.¹ It was this solution of the problem of life and the world that appealed to Sāriputta and proved a fruitful source for Nāgārjuna’s speculations.²

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¹ See *ante*, p. 51.

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² Nāgārjuna devoted his first chapter to the explanation of only this aspect of the law of causation.

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Many scholars, who have dealt with this formula, have attempted to elicit from it Buddha’s theory of the origin of a being and some of them have actually drawn parallels between the links of the formula and the causal series of the Sāmkhya.³ It is noteworthy that such attempts were also made in Buddhaghosa’s time. Buddhaghosa has, however, pointed out that *avijjā*, the first link of the chain, must not be regarded as similar to *pakati* (Prakṛti) of the Pakativādins (Sāmkhya) because *avijjā* is neither uncaused (*akāraṇam*) nor is it the primary cause (*mūlakāraṇam*) of the world. It owes its origin to *āsavas* (impurities). The reason adduced by Buddhaghosa for its being made the first link in the chain is that Buddha used ‘avijjā’ or ‘bhavataṇhā’ for commencing (sisabhāvam) his discourses on topics which by their nature are without any beginning or end (vattakathā or anamatagga)¹. It is apparent from Buddhaghosa’s remark that avijjā need not necessarily be the first link in the chain of causation but that it is one of the terms found suitable by the author of the formula to begin the chain. It could as well be commenced by bhavataṇhā.² In the Samyutta Nikāya³, the formula starts with āhāra as the first link. Hence, we see that the Pratītyasamutpāda is not meant to be an explanation of the origin of the world but just a chain of instances to illustrate the law of idappaccayatā (this-conditioned nature, i.e., dependent origination) of things. Those scholars, who expected to find in it a key to the origin of the world, have been disappointed and have condemned it as illogical and incongruous. The author of the formula could not anticipate that his arrangement of the illustrations in a series would give rise to confusion. That the chain was not meant to demonstrate a line of evolution is also apparent from the last two links, viz., jāti and jarāmaraṇa, as the former cannot be the cause of the latter. The underlying idea is that if there be jāti, it is inevitably followed by jarāmaraṇa. The author of the formula wanted us to take up any two links and realise from them the idappaccayatā or the relative nature of worldly things. We may therefore say that the twelve-linked Pratītyasamutpāda like the Āryasatyas is more a general principle than a doctrine peculiar to Buddhism, though undoubtedly, it owes its enunciation to the ancient Buddhist savants. It cannot be stated how far Buddha was responsible for the selection of the links though it was perhaps to his penetrating eye that the relative existence of all worldly things became apparent for the first time.

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³ See Kern, *Manual* etc., p. 46f.; for other refs., see Poussin, *Theorie des douze causes*, p. vii, fn. 2.

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¹ Vis. M., p. 525.

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² Ibid., p. 525: purimā, bhikkhave, koṭi na paññāyati avijjāya (or bhavataṇhāya), ito pubbe avijjā (or bhavataṇhā) nāhosi atha pacchā sambhavī ti. Evañ c’etam, bhikkhave, vuccati, atha ca pana paññāyati idapaccayā avijjā (or bhavataṇhā). Cf. Samyutta, II, p. 178; III, p. 149.

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³ Samyutta, II, pp. 101-3, Mahāniddesa, I, pp. 25-6.

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As the links of the formula have been explained by Profs.

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La Vallée Poussin, Keith, Oldenberg and others we shall give here only a brief exposition of them¹.

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¹ Poussin, Theorie des douze causes; Keith, B. Phil., pp. 99ff.; Oldenberg's Buddha (Hoey's transl. 1882), pp. 223 f; Gokhale, Pratītya-samutpādaśāstra des Ullaṅgha, Bonn, 1930.

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The formula runs as follows²: (1) avijjāpaccaya³ saṅkhārā, (2) saṅkhārāpaccaya viññāṇaṃ, (3) viññāṇap. nāmarūpaṃ⁴, (4) nāmarūpap. saḷāyatanaṃ, (5) saḷāyatanap. phasso, (6) phassap. vedanā, (7) vedanāp. taṇhā, (8) taṇhāp. upādānaṃ, (9) upādānap. bhavo, (10) bhavap. jāti, (11 & 12) jātip. jarā-maraṇaṃ.

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² Dīgha, II, pp. 55ff; La Vallée Poussin, Theorie des douze causes, pp. 69 ff; Vis. M., pp. 518 ff, quoting Samyutta, II, pp. 25-7.

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³ In the Samyutta (II, pp. 101-3) avijjā is replaced by āhāra or any such other thing that gives rise to viññāṇa.

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⁴ Dīgha (II, p. 56) omits the first two links and begins its formula thus:—Nāmarūpapaccaya viññāṇaṃ, viññāṇapaccaya nāmarūpam, i.e., viññāṇa and nāma-rūpa are made interdependent. Sālistambasūtra (p. 82) says that they are sahaja (concomitant).

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The first link, avijjā, usually refers to the deluded state of mind which debars a being from taking a true view of worldly things, e.g., mistaking impermanent things as permanent, misery as happiness, a being without a permanent self as possessed of a self and so forth.⁵ The second link in the chain is saṅkhārā (impressions or thought-constructions—cetanā) concerning merit (puñña), demerit (apuñña), and qualities that are neither merit nor demerit (āneñja)⁶. This is followed by the third link viññāṇa⁷ i.e., perceptions through the six organs of sense. Concomitantly (sahaja) with viññāṇa arise the four composites (khandhas) and form a complete being (nāmarūpa) in the fœtus.⁸ With its growth, the nāmarūpa (body) requires the six organs of sense for doing its work, and these organs in their turn produce six forms of contact (phassa).¹ The nature of the contact produces its corresponding feeling (vedanā) and the feeling in its turn gives rise to desire (taṇhā). Taṇhā leads to upādāna ² (grasping) of kāma (desire for objects of pleasure), diṭṭhi (wrong views like sassata, asassata, etc.), sīlabbata (religious practices like gosila and govata) and attavāda (belief in a self). This upādāna, which may also be defined as a stronger taṇhā, produces a keen desire in a being for future existence in any one of the three worlds, and for this he performs kamma through words, mind and body. According to his kamma he is reborn in one of the various spheres of existence and becomes in due course old and passes away.

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⁵ Sālistambasūtra, p. 79; see also Vis. M., p. 526.

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⁶ Sālistambasūtra, p. 82; to these three, the Vibhaṅga (p. 135) and Visuddhimagga (p. 530) add three other, viz., kāyasaṅkhāro, vacis. and cittas. The Sālistambasūtra explains in another place (p. 79) that rāga, dveṣa and moha in regard to worldly things arising through avidyā are called saṃskāras.

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⁷ Sālistambasūtra, p. 82; Vis. M. (p. 546) says that puññābhisaṅkhāro produces twenty-one kinds of viññāṇa, apuññābhi° seven, and āneñjābhi° four.

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⁸ In the Dīgha (II, p. 63) and Sālistambasūtra (p. 82) viññāṇa and

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¹ Adhivacanasamphassa and paṭighasamphassa, Dīgha, II, p. 62.

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² Dīgha, II, p. 58; Vis. M., p. 569.

Reasons Adduced by the Mahāyānists for Including the Truths and the Causal Law in Their Doctrines

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The Mahāyānists highly appreciated the teaching conveyed by the formula of causation but were not interested in the significance of its links, as their cardinal tenet was dharma-śūnyatā or non-existence of everything worldly. Similarly for the āryasatyas, they appreciated the method of analysis of all worldly things as suggested by the four satyas but these in their view have existence similar to the objects in a dream or a mirage. Thus, if everything be non-existent, the examination of a non-existent thing is absurd; hence the Mahāyānists should by reasons justify the inclusion of the Āryasatyas and the Pratītyasamutpāda in their doctrines. Nāgārjuna and Śāntideva, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu therefore have shown by forcible and illuminating arguments that they were justified in including the Truths and the twelve-linked Law of Causation in their doctrines.

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nāmarūpa are shown as resting upon each other, i.e., one cannot remain without the other.

Nāgārjuna Summarises the Position of the Hīnayānists

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Nāgārjuna has dealt with the Truths incidentally in his examination of Pratyaya, Karmaphala, Ātman,¹ etc., and at length in his treatment of the Āryasatyas². He first summarises the arguments of his opponents thus: If everything be non-existent (śūnya), there cannot arise any question about the origin and decay of a thing,—in this case, duḥkha (misery). The five constituents of beings, which come into existence through pre-existing cause and condition, are called duḥkha, because they produce suffering, being subject to change and transformation. That these constituents are a source of suffering is realised by the Āryas (i.e., Arhats) only, and not by the common people, for the latter labour under the four misconceptions (viparyāsas)³ of considering impure things as pure, impermanent as permanent, unhappy as happy, and egoless as having ego. The common people are like the sick, to whom sweet things appear bitter. A person who is not yet an arhat (anārya) does not know that the five upādānaskandhas are a source of suffering. It is for this reason that the Truths (satyas) are called truths for the perfect only. If everything be śūnya (non-existent), there cannot be the first Āryasatya called duḥkha and consequently there can be no samudaya (origin), nirodha (destruction), or mārga (means of destruction of suffering). If the four Āryasatyas do not exist, there cannot exist true knowledge, exertion, or realisation, the four fruits of sanctification or their enjoyer, the Saṅgha, Dharma, or even Buddha. The assertion of śūnyatā (non-existence of everything) goes against the existence of the three ratnas, in fact, of all things, good or bad.

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¹ M. Vr., chs. I, XVII, XVIII.

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² Ibid., ch. XXIV.

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³ Bodhic., p. 375; M. Vr., pp. 464 and 607 referring to Netti, p. 114 and Index; Śikṣā., p. 198; Aṅguttara, II, p. 52; Pātañjala-Yogasūtra, II, 5; Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha (ed. of Mm. Vasudev Abhayankar), p. 361; see also infra.

Nāgārjuna’s Arguments to Meet the Above Charges

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Nāgārjuna pities his opponents for their inability to grasp the true sense of śūnyatā, or the object of establishing śūnyatā, and for their false imagination. The object of teaching śūnyatā, he says, is to bring about a complete cessation of all prapañca (i.e., looking upon unity as manifold). The view held by his opponents that mokṣa (emancipation) is attained by the destruction of action (karma) and passion (kleśa) is incorrect. It is a known fact that ordinarily persons are ignorant of the real state of things. They conceive rūpa (form), etc. and allow passion, hatred and delusion to come into existence. From this statement as also from the Sūtras, it is evident that saṅkalpa (imagination) is the source of all these, from which it follows that karma and kleśa are only products of imagination and have no real existence. Their origin is due to the prapañca (thought-creation) which takes hold of the mind of a worldly being, who from the time immemorial is used to a variety of actions and things such as gain and loss, happiness and misery, action and the actor, known and the knower, and so forth. All these worldly thought-creations cease to exist when a person realises the non-existence of the things which are commonly supposed to have real existence. Just as a person does not form any idea (prapañca) about the ‘beauty of a barren woman’s daughter’ and consequently does not weave a net of fancies (kalpanā) around her, so also a Mahāyānist is not troubled with the conception of “I” and “Mine”, the roots of a belief in self (satkāyadṛṣṭi), nor is he troubled by any cause for the origin of passions. If a person realises that passions (kleśas) do not originate, he cannot have any idea of good or bad action and consequently birth, old age, disease and death. Therefore the Yogins (ascetics) established in śūnyatā do not conceive any real skandha, dhātu, āyatana, etc. and consequently they have no prapañca, vikalpa, satkāyadṛṣṭi, kleśa, karma or mṛtyu. Thus the realisation of śūnyatā brings about the complete cessation of all prapañcas, and so it is said that the realisation of śūnyatā is the same as the realisation of Nirvāṇa.¹

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¹ M. Vr., pp. 350-1.

Śūnyatā is Neither Nāstitva nor Abhāva

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Having dealt with the object of the teaching of śūnyatā, Nāgārjuna proceeds to an exposition of śūnyatā by stating its essentials (lakṣaṇas), which are as follows¹:—

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¹ M. Vr., pp. 372-7.

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(i) It is aparapratyaya, i.e., it cannot be imparted by one to another.² One is to realise the Truth within himself (pratyātmavedya), and not to understand it by listening to the instruction of Āryas (the Perfect), who can speak of the Truth only through superimpositions (samāropa).

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² Prof. Stcherbatsky (Con. of N., p. 41) translates it as "uncognisable from without" but the commentary of Candrakīrti does not seem to warrant the rendering.

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(ii) It is śānta, i.e., it has the nature of cessation,³ it is undisturbed by origination or destruction.

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³ See M. Vr., p. 160 where it is shown why śāntam is taken in the sense of svabhāva-virahitam. The point is that anything having real existence cannot be subject to the causal law; so whatever is subject to causal law has no real existence like the seed and the sprout. Hence both of them can be described as śānta or svabhāva-virahita. Prof. Stcherbatsky (op. cit.) uses the word "quiescent" for śānta.

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(iii) It is prapañcairaprapañcitam, i.e., it is inexpressible.⁴ The first prapañca is taken as a synonym of speech (vāk),⁵ i.e. the sense of śūnyatā is not utterable by words.

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⁴ Prof. Stcherbatsky (op. cit.) translates it "undifferentiated in words."

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⁵ M. Vr., p. 373.

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(iv) It is nirvikalpa or unrealisable in concepts. Vikalpa is thought-construction; so śūnyatā is beyond (lit. devoid of) thought-construction. And, lastly,

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(v) It is anānārtha, i.e., devoid of different meanings.

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Thus he points out that śūnyatā is not to be taken in the sense of nāstitva (nihilism) or abhāva (absence of something) as wrongly supposed by the Hīnayānists. He continues his exposition of śūnyatā by equating it with the pratītyasamutpāda, saying

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yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ taṃ pracakṣmahe, sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā. (We say that dependent origination is śūnyatā. It is in that sense that the path is middle.) All phenomenal things are relatively existent, e.g., sprout and seed, vijñānas with reference to cause and condition; hence, Nāgārjuna says that things, which are only relatively existent, have in reality no origination, and the fact of this non-origination in reality is śūnyatā. So it is asserted by the Teacher in the Anavataptahradāpasaṅkramaṇasūtra¹ that whatever is said to have come into existence through cause and condition (i.e. relatively) is really unborn; it cannot have real origination; and whatever is subject to cause and condition is śūnya. The statement made in the Laṅkāvatāra and elsewhere that all dharmas are śūnya (non-existent) refers to the non-origination of things in reality. It is in this sense that the connotation of śūnyatā has come into existence. Hence it is said that śūnyatā, which bears the sign of non-origination in reality, is the middle path. That which is really non-originated can neither be said to exist nor to vanish; hence is neither existent nor non-existent, and as such it is the Middle Path which keeps clear of the two extremes.²

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¹ M. Vr., p. 239.

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² Cf. Bodhic., p. 359 : na san nāsan na sadasan na cāpyanubhayātmakam, catuskotivinirmuktaṃ tattvaṃ mādhyamikā viduḥ.

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We may consider this topic in another way. There is nothing which originates without cause and condition and therefore there is nothing which can be called aśūnya (non-relative). It is said in the Śataka and elsewhere that nothing is ever produced without cause and condition, or, in other words, there is nothing eternal. The ignorant only conceive of eternity, etc. in regard to Ākāśa. The wise know that all things are caused and conditioned, and they never fall into the delusion of either of the two extremes. If it be admitted, as is done by some of the Hinayānists,³ that things (i.e., the elements that constitute a being) are uncaused and unconditioned, then the four Āryasatyas are contradicted, for how can there be duḥkha, the first truth, if things come into existence without cause and condition (apratītya)?

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³ Referring evidently to the Sarvāstivādins.

Buddha's Teachings were Delivered in Two Ways:

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Nāgārjuna, thus establishing that śūnyatā is neither nāstitva nor abhāva but a word signifying the relative existence of things, says that the Hinayānists, too much engrossed in the studies of texts alone, have misunderstood the sense of śūnyatā and do not understand that the Teacher delivered his teachings in two ways, viz., conventional and real, or empirical and transcendental. So it is said by Nāgārjuna :

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dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā,
lokasaṃvṛtisatyaṃ ca satyaṃ ca paramārthataḥ.¹

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¹ M. Vr., p. 492; Bodhic., p. 361. The two kinds of Truth have been dealt with in the Madhyamakāvatāra (Chs. V, VI); see Le Muséon, 1907, N.S., vol. VIII for summary of Ch. V.

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(The teachings of Buddhas are based on two kinds of truth, the truth of the world, and the truth in the highest sense).

(a) Saṃvṛti

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Nāgārjuna as well as Śāntideva points out that the words in common usage, e.g., skandha, ātman, loka, etc., being enveloped (sāṃvṛta) on all sides are called conventional. The expression Saṃvṛti has three different senses, which are as follows:—

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(1) Saṃvṛti is the same as ignorance on account of its completely enveloping the reality, or, in other words, it is identical with ignorance (avidyā).² In elucidation of this, Prajñākaramati, the commentator of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, says that ignorance superimposes a form on a non-existent thing and thus creates an obstacle to the correct view of the reality. In support of his statement he quotes from the Śālistambasūtra a stanza, in which it is stated that ignorance (avidyā) is nothing but the non-realisation (apratipatti) of the truth, and faith in falsehood.

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² Bodhic., p. 352; Saṃvriyate āvriyate yathābhūtaparijñānam svabhāvāvaraṇād āvṛta(=abhūta)prakāśanāc ca nayeti saṃvṛtiḥ. Avidyā moho viparyāsa iti paryāyāḥ. It is called saṃvṛti because it envelopes the real knowledge and also because it helps to uncover that which is, as a matter of course, enveloped. It is synonymous with ignorance, delusion, or misconception. For Paramārtha being the same as Nirvāṇa, see infra.

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(2) Saṃvṛti implies a thing which depends on another for existence, i.e., subject to cause and condition,¹ for a really self-existent thing cannot have origin and decay, or any kind of transformation; so whatever is caused and conditioned is sāṃvṛta (phenomenal).

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¹ Bodhic., p. 352: pratīyasamutpannaṃ vasturūpaṃ saṃvṛtir ucyate.

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(3) Saṃvṛti refers to signs or words current in the world, i.e., accepted by the generality of the people and based on direct perception.² Śāntideva desires to point out that rūpa (form), śabda (sound), etc. should not be supposed to be really existing on account of being directly perceived by all in the same way. Their existence is substantiated by proofs which are valid from the worldly, and not from the transcendental, standpoint. If all that is perceived by the senses be true, then a fool knows the truth, and there is no need of exerting for the acquisition of truth. In support of his statement, he cites the illustration that the body of a woman, though impure in the highest sense, is regarded as pure by a man whose mind is swayed by attachment; hence a fact cannot be established merely by experience.

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² Ibid., pp. 374-5: pratyakṣam api rūpādi prasiddhyā na pramāṇataḥ.

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It may be argued that as the expressions like dhātu, āyatana, etc. occur in the scriptures, they are real, and besides had they been non-existent, the Teacher would not have referred to them as momentary, subject to decay, etc. Śāntideva explains this away by saying that the Teacher used them only as artifices to lead men, having minds engrossed in thinking of object as existent, to the conception of śūnyatā, i.e., things as really non-existent. Whatever Buddha said about skandha, dhātu, āyatana or their transitoriness is conventional and not real; hence the existence of dhātus and āyatanas in reality is not established. If it be held that every object of experience is unreal, how can we account for the experience of kṣaṇikatva (transitoriness) of pudgala by the yogins (ascetics) who have perfected themselves in the meditation of pudgalanairātmya (essencelessness of constituted things)? Śāntideva’s answer is very simple. He said that even the experiences of yogins are not above saṃvṛti, for saṃvṛti includes everything that falls within the scope of buddhi (intelligence), and the reality lies beyond it. The experience of the yogins that a woman’s body is impure contradicts the experience of an ordinary man who considers it to be pure. Thus it is proved that the scriptural authority does not establish the reality of skandha, dhātu, āyatana, etc.

Two Kinds of Saṃvṛti-Satyas

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All that has been said above applies to loka-saṃvṛti only, i.e., truths valid in the world of convention, which are accepted as such by the generality of the people. There is however another kind of the so-called truth, which should be distinguished as Alokasaṃvṛti; i.e., truths not accepted by the generality of the people. The experiences of a man with diseased eyes or defective organs of sense are peculiar to the man and are not true for all. Such experiences should be called Alokasaṃvṛti (conventional truths but not general).

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Śāntideva calls these two kinds of conventional truths Tathya-saṃvṛti and Mithyā-saṃvṛti, and distinguishes them thus:¹ The Tathya-saṃvṛti (phenomenal truth) refers to things which originate out of a cause (kiñcit pratītyajātam) and are perceived in the same way by all persons with unimpaired organs of sense, e.g., the colour blue, etc. The Mithyā-saṃvṛti refers to those things or statements which are accepted only by individuals and not universally, though they may have originated through cause and condition, i.e., they are like things perceived by a person with a defective organ of sense.

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¹ Bodhic., p. 353.

(b) Paramārthasatya

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The truth of the Āryas who see things as they really are is quite different from the two so-called truths mentioned above. Nāgārjuna says that this truth, Paramārthasatya, is identical with Nirvāṇa.¹ It does not admit of any distinction as subject and object.² It is un-originating and un-decaying, and as such it is not an object to be grasped by the mind. It is indeterminable by speech and unknowable by knowledge.³ Hence the highest truth is inexpressible and can be realised only within one’s own self.⁴ It cannot form the subject-matter of instruction, and hence it cannot be imparted by one to another. Śāntideva explains the truth (tattva or paramārthasatya) as beyond the range of buddhi (intellection or perception) while that which comes within the range of buddhi is conventional (saṃvṛti).⁵ According to him, the truth is attainable by giving up all things which act as hindrances to knowledge, viz., impressions (vāsanā), connection (anusandhi) and passion (kleśa) through comprehension of the real nature of things. It is therefore the same as the non-existence of all dharmas and as such it may be taken as a synonym of śūnyatā (essencelessness), tathatā (thatness), bhūtakoṭi (true limit), and dharmadhātu (totality of things). All that is caused and conditioned is not really existent, because everything undergoes change with time, while in a really existent thing no change is possible; neither can the fact of coming and going be attributed to it. Things that are supposed to have existence are like an illusion or an echo, because they arise through cause and condition, and disappear when the cause and condition cease. So, in reality, there can be no origination through cause and condition, because real origination does not depend upon and is not subject to something else. All things arise subject to some preceding causes and conditions; hence they are really non-existent. How, then, can an existent thing be expected to arise out of them? Can anybody ascertain whence the illusory things produced by causes come and where they go? In this connection Śāntideva comments elaborately on the famous stanza of Nāgārjuna:

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¹ See ante. Saṃvṛti is identified with avidyā and buddhi. See Bodhic., pp. 352, 366, also Stcherbatsky, op. cit., p. 164 n.

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² Cf. Bodhic., p. 366: Paramārthasatyam sarvavyavahārasamatikrān-tam nirviśeṣam. Asamutpannam aniruddham. Abhidheyābhidhāna-jñeyajñānavigatam.

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³ M. Vr., pp. 364, 493.

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⁴ Bodhic., p. 367: āryāṇām eva svasaṃvidita-svabhāvatayā pratyā-tmavedyam.

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⁵ Bodhic., p. 354.

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¹ Bodhic., p. 357; M. Vr., p. 12.

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na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyām nāpyahetutaḥ,
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana 1.

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(Nowhere and never does a really existent thing originate out of a self or non-self or both self and non-self or without any cause).

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The aim of Śāntideva as also other writers on Mahāyāna is to assert that the real truth (paramārthasatya) is that things of this world have no more existence than the magic figures created by a magician. As these figures and their movements are taken as real by the ordinary people while the magician himself does not concern himself about their reality, so also in this world, the viparyastas i.e., those whose vision is obscured and subject to error run after, or weave their thoughts around, the various phenomenal things, while the yogin, who knows the highest reality, does not pay heed to them. In short, the Paramārthasatya is nothing but the realisation of the dream-like or echo-like nature of Saṃvṛtisatyas.²

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² Bodhic., pp. 368, 379. The Satyasiddhi school introduced the two kinds of truth, Vyavahārasatya and Paramārthasatya into the Buddhist metaphysics. In the Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra these two truths form the principal subject of discussion (Vaidya, Catuḥśatikā, p. 19). In the Mahāyāna literature there are other expressions bearing the same sense as Paramārtha and Saṃvṛti, e.g., Nītārtha and Neyyārtha, see M. Vr., p. 41; V. Sastri, I.H.Q., iv, 2 on Sandhyā-bhāṣā; M. Vr., pp. 41; Sūtrā., p. 51. For Pāramārthika and Ābhiprāyikī, see M. Vr., pp. 42 ff; Sūtrā., p. 138; Keith, B. Phil., p. 235; Journal Asiatique, 1903, ii, p. 360 for comments on Saṃvṛti and Paramārtha.

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If Paramārthasatya be of an inexpressible nature and Saṃvṛtisatya be non-existing like an illusion or echo as urged by Nāgārjuna and Śāntideva, a Hīnayānist may enquire about the necessity of preaching on the topics like skandha, dhātu, āyatana, āryasatyas, pratītyasamutpāda etc., which are conventionally true and not true in the highest sense (atattva). The reply is

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vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate,
paramārtham anāgamya nirvāṇam nādhigamyate ¹.

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¹ M. Vr., p. 494; Bodhic., p. 365; see also p. 372: Upāyabhūtam vyavahārasatyam upeyabhūtam paramārthasatyam (also in the Madhyamakāvatāra, vi, 80). Pañca. (A.S.B. ms.) leaf 56a: Na ca Subhūte samskṛtavyatirekena asamskṛtam śakyam prajñāpayitum.

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(The highest truth cannot be imparted without having recourse to conventional truths; and Nirvāṇa cannot be attained without the realisation of the highest truth). In other words, the highest truth cannot be brought home directly to a mind, which normally does not rise above the conventional distinction of subject and object, knower and known; hence it must be imparted through conventional truths, and unless it is so imparted one cannot be expected to extricate himself from worldly limitations and arrive at Nirvāṇa. It is for this reason that the Mahāyānists cannot dispense with sāmvṛta topics like dhātu, āyatana, āryasatya and pratītyasamutpāda; they are like vessels to the seeker of water.

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The other reason ² for which the Mahāyānists cannot dispense with sāmvṛta topics is that the Paramārthasatya cannot be explained to another by signs or predicates, but yet it has to be explained. So the only alternative is to explain it by the negation of sāmvṛta matters. As it is agocara (beyond the cognizance of buddhi—intellection), aviṣaya (beyond the scope of knowledge), sarvaprapañcavinirmukta (beyond the possibility of detailed descriptions), kalpanāsamatikrānta (beyond every possible form of imagination, e.g., existence or non-existence, true or untrue, eternal or non-eternal, permanent or impermanent, happy or unhappy, pure or impure, and so forth) ³, the only way to explain it to the people is through common place terms and illustrations. A person with diseased eyes sees a net of hair; he is corrected by another whose eyes are healthy, the latter negating the afflicted man's statement that there (really) is a net of hair. The man with healthy eyes does not indicate by such a negation that he is either denying or affirming something. Similarly, persons whose right vision is obstructed by ignorance conceive of the existence of skandha, dhātu, āyatana, etc., which are in reality non-existent phenomenal forms. Buddhas like the persons with healthy eyes know this, and they cannot help saying that there are in reality no skandhas, dhātus, āyatanas, but thereby they neither deny nor affirm their existence. Therefore the highest truth cannot be preached without the help of the conventional truths. So it is said

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² Bodhic., p. 363.

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³ Ibid., pp. 366-7. These terms can be easily multiplied.

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anakṣarasya dharmasya śrutiḥ kā deśanā ca kā,
śruyate deśyate cārthaḥ samāropād anakṣaraḥ¹.

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¹ Bodhic., p. 365; M. Vr., p. 264, xv. 2; cf. Laṅkā., p. 194.

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[How can there be hearing and preaching of dharma which is un-utterable (lit. cannot be articulated); it is by the superimposition of ideas on the reality which is inexpressible that the latter can be preached or heard.]

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If it be established that all mundane things are really non-existent, there is a probability of the Paramārtha (the highest truth) being conceived as nihilism. Nāgārjuna sounds a note of warning against such a conception by saying that śūnyatā should not be identified with the extinction of a thing which existed before. The question of extinction or nihilism does not arise, because the existence of something preceding is not admitted. Neither should it be regarded as something existing by having recourse to superimpositions. Those, who do not realise the real distinction between these two kinds of truth, fall into the error of either conceiving śūnyatā as the non-existence of saṃskāras (constituents of a being) or of assuming the existence of something as the basis of śūnyatā. Both are wrong views, and people of limited knowledge misunderstand śūnyatā as the one or the other. The distinction was, in fact, so very subtle that even Buddha hesitated to preach the truth at first.²

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² Buddhaghosa also uses this argument, see ante.

The Hīnayānists Mistake Śūnyatā as Abhāva

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In concluding his argument, Nāgārjuna says that the Hīnayānists, by attributing the sense of abhāva (absence or non-existence) after assuming the existence of something to śūnyatā, fall into error and fail to understand the standpoint of the Mahāyānists. The Mahāyānic conception of śūnyatā, i.e., that everything is non-existent fits in correctly with all dharmas and all statements; it is when śūnyatā is seen in this light that one can perceive the reasonableness of the formulæ of Causal Law and the Four Truths, the fruits of sanctification, saṅgha, dharma, buddha, things worldly and transcendental, deeds right and wrong, a good or bad condition and other conventional matters. Nāgārjuna having stated his position attacks the Hīnayānists for their inability to comprehend the correct sense of the Causal Law. He says that just as a rider while riding may forget his horse and revile another for stealing it, so also the Hīnayānists, because of their distracted mind, fail to grasp the truth that śūnyatā is the true sense and the chief characteristic of the Causal Law, and attack the Mahāyānists, the Śūnyatāvādins, for misinterpreting it.

The Position of the Hīnayānists with Regard to the Truths and the Causal Law is Untenable

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Nāgārjuna now proceeds to assail the position of his opponents. He says that those, who admit the reality of unconstitued things, cannot logically support the Āryasatyas and the Pratītyasamutpāda.

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It should be remembered that the Hīnayānists apply the Causal Law to constituted things only. Nāgārjuna attempts to make the position of the Hīnayānists untenable by asserting that the Law should be universally applicable, and that there cannot be anything in the world which was excepted by Buddha as beyond its range. He argues that if things exist by themselves, they are not subject to causes and conditions, and such being the case, there is no need to draw distinctions of external and internal, no need of causes and conditions, or the doer and the doing of an action. In short, the Hīnayānic theory contradicts the origin and decay as well as the fruits of sanctification. Hence, the position of the Hinayānists that things exist by themselves is untenable. It also contradicts the words of Buddha who said on many occasions: apratītyasamutpanno dharmaḥ kaścin na vidyate (there never exists anything which originated without cause and condition). This statement of Buddha, however, fits in with the definition of śūnyatā as given by the Mahāyānists.

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If all things be existent (aśūnya) and if it originates without cause and condition, there cannot be anything impermanent, and consequently no duḥkha.

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Again, if duḥkha be taken as something existing, then the truths of samudaya and nirodha (origin and decay) of misery, and mārga (the eight-fold path leading to the decay of misery) are meaningless. Nāgārjuna thus pays back the Hinayānists in their own coin.

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Then, with reference to the parijñāna (detailed knowledge) of the Hinayānists, Nāgārjuna shows that it is not logical to maintain that duḥkha, assuming it to be an existent thing, was unknown before, and that it is known subsequently because existent things remain always in the same condition (svabhāvaḥ samavasthitaḥ) and never undergo any change. If an existent thing be not subject to change, it cannot be maintained that duḥkha which was unknowable at first was known later on. From this it follows that there is no duḥkha-parijñāna (knowledge of suffering). Consequently, prahāṇa (abandonment), sākṣātkaraṇa (realisation), and bhāvanā (meditation) are meaningless.

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As it is unreasonable to claim knowledge of duḥkha, which was formerly by nature unknowable, it is wrong to assume the existence of the fruit of Srotāpatti, which did not exist before but was realised later on; and so with the other fruits of sanctification. The same reasoning—that which was by nature unattainable cannot be attained later on—is applied to show that there can be no one who enjoys these fruits, and consequently no Saṅgha. If there be no Āryasatyas, there cannot be Dharma, and in the absence of Dharma and Saṅgha there cannot be a Buddha. If it be assumed that Buddha and Bodhi exist by themselves, then one remains without any reference to the other. If Buddhahood be taken as already existing, a person, who by nature is a non-Buddha, can never attain Bodhi, however much he may practise the Bodhisattva duties, because a non-Buddha cannot be expected to change.

Mahāyānic Definition of Āryasatyas

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Nāgārjuna’s point is that if a thing exists by itself then it is absurd to speak of it as created, having a creator, and so forth. Just as nobody speaks of uncovering the sky because the open sky exists by itself, so also nobody should say that a thing, existing by itself, has been made or attained. In fact, the theory of pratītyasamutpanna (one existing with reference to another, *i.e.*, relatively) must be admitted, as otherwise even the expressions of everyday usage such as go, do, cook, read, etc., become meaningless. If the world is supposed to exist by itself, the world would be unoriginating, undecaying and unchangeable as the self-existent is changeless. The world, according to the Asūnyavādins (*i.e.* the Realists who do not admit śūnyatā), would have no concern with the Causal Law and be beyond the possibility of diversity. Had the world been so, says the Pitāputrasamāgamasūtra, it would not have been dealt with by Buddha, and the Teacher would have, as the Hastikakṣyasūtra says, gone there with all disciples.

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Nāgārjuna concludes by saying that he who realises Pratītyasamutpāda can rightly know the four truths and quotes a passage from the Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā dealing with the Mahāyanic view of the four truths. It runs as follows,—he who realises that no dharmas have originated has known duḥkha; he who realises the non-existence of all dharmas has suppressed the source (samudaya) of misery; he who realises that all dharmas are completely extinct (parinirvṛta) has comprehended the truth of nirodha (cessation), and he who realises the means by which the absence of all things is known is said to have practised the path (mārga). This has been developed thus in the Dhyāyitamuṣṭisūtra: Unable to comprehend the four truths properly on account of being troubled by the four viparyāsas (misconceptions),¹ sentient beings cannot go beyond the world of transmigration. They conceive of ātman (self) and ātmiya (things relating to a self) and thus have karmābhisamskāra (actions).² Not knowing that all things are completely extinct (parinirvṛta) they imagine the existence of themselves and others, and become engrossed therein to the extent of having affection, infatuation and ultimately delusion. They now perform actions, physically, verbally, and mentally, and after making some superimpositions of existence on non-existing things, they think that they are subject to affection, infatuation, and delusion. In order to get rid of them, they take initiation into the doctrines of Buddha, observe the precepts and hope to pass beyond the world and attain Nirvāṇa. They imagine that some things are good, some bad; some are to be rejected, some to be realised; that duḥkha is to be known, the samudaya of duḥkha to be given up, the nirodha of duḥkha to be realised, and the mārga to be practised. They also imagine that all constituted things are impermanent and endeavour to pass beyond them. Thus, they attain a mental state full of disgust (or contempt) for constituted things, having animitta (absence of sign or cause) as its preceding condition. They think that they have thus known duḥkha, i.e., the transitoriness of constituted things, become terrified by them, and shun their causes. Having imagined something as source (samudaya) of duḥkha, they conceive of cessation (nirodha) of duḥkha and decide to follow the path (mārga) to attain it. They retire to a secluded place with a mind full of disgust and attain quietude (śamatha). Their minds are no longer moved by worldly things and they think that they have done all that is to be done, they are freed from all sufferings and have become arhats. But after death they find themselves reborn among the gods and in their minds exist doubts about Buddha and his knowledge. When they die again, they pass to hell because they doubt the existence of the Tathāgata after forming some misconceptions about all dharmas which are unoriginated. The four truths are therefore to be seen in the light of the Mañjuśrīsūtra as pointed out above.

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¹ See ante, p. 212.

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² Cf. Bodhic., p. 350; Viparyāsasamjñino 'satsattvasamāropābhiniveśavāsād ātmātmīyagrahapravṛtter ayoniśomanasikāraprasūto rāgādikleśagaṇaḥ samupajāyate. Tasmāt karma, tato janma, etc.

The Prajñāpāramitā on the Āryasatyas

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The new point of view from which the Āryasatyas are looked at by Nāgārjuna’s school appears in the Prajñāpāramitās in connection with the attempt to explain the conception of śūnyatā. The Pañcavimśati-sāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā thus defines the Āryasatyas :¹

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¹ Pañca., pp. 43 f.

c7.s4.t13.3

What is duḥkhasatyāvavāda? A Bodhisattva while practising the prajñāpāramitā should not consider himself to be attached or unattached (yukta or ayukta) to any one of the five skandhas, or to any organ of sense, or to their āyatanas or to the vijñāna produced by the contact of the organs of sense with their respective objects, or to any of the four truths, twelve links of the chain of causation, eighteen kinds of śūnyatā, and so forth. He should not look upon anything as rūpa, vedanā, etc., as connected or unconnected. This is called, according to the Prajñāpāramitā, a sermon on the first truth, Duḥkha. The underlying idea is that if a Bodhisattva thinks himself as connected or unconnected with anything, which, according to the Prajñāpāramitā, is non-existent or has only a conventional existence, then the Bodhisattva is subject to duḥkha (suffering); even if a Bodhisattva considers himself as having realised the truths or the causal law or śūnyatā, he would be subject to duḥkha, though, according to the Hinayānists, the Bodhisattva thereby attains sukha or nirvāṇa.

c7.s4.t13.4

What is samudayasatyāvavāda? A Bodhisattva while practising prajñāpāramitā does not consider whether rūpa or any other skandha is subject to origination or destruction (utpādadharmin or nirodhadharmin), or to contamination or purification (samkleśadharmin or vyāvadānadharmin). He knows that rūpa does not convert (samavasarati) into vedanā, or vedanā into saṃjñā, and so forth; a dharma, in fact, on account of its nature being unreal (prakṛti-śūnyatā), cannot be converted into another dharma. Neither that which is śūnyatā (non-existence) of rūpa is rūpa, nor does the śūnyatā of rūpa take a rūpa (form); therefore śūnyatā is neither different from, nor identical with, rūpa, and in this way the other skandhas are treated. This is called the sermon on samudaya. The object of this discourse is to establish that the so-called things of the world have really no existence and hence there can be no origination, transformation, or destruction, and so a Bodhisattva should remain unconcerned with the conception of samudaya of things.

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