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Indian Philosophy v2: Volume 2

Indian Philosophy v2

Language
English

Contents

Volume 2

Front matter

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This image appears to be the cover or a blank endpaper of a book, with no text to transcribe.

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in 2016

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https://archive.org/details/indianphilosophy02radh_0

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INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

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Library of Philosophy

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GENERAL EDITOR: PROFESSOR J. H. MUIRHEAD, LL.D.

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ANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGY By Prof. G. F. STOUT. Two Vols. 4th Impression. APPEARANCE AND REALITY By F. H. BRADLEY. 8th Impression. ATTENTION By Prof. W. B. PILLSBURY. 2nd Impression. CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY By Prof. G. VILLA. HISTORY OF ÆSTHETIC By Dr. B. BOSANQUET. 4th Impression. HISTORY OF ENGLISH UTILITARIANISM By Prof. E. ALBEE. HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY By J. E. ERDMANN. Vol. I. ANCIENT AND MEDIÆVAL. 4th Impression. Vol. II. MODERN. 6th Impression. Vol. III. SINCE HEGEL. 6th Impression. HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY By Prof. G. S. BRETT. Vol. I. ANCIENT AND PATRISTIC. Vol. II. MEDIÆVAL AND EARLY MODERN PERIOD. Vol. III. MODERN PSYCHOLOGY. MATTER AND MEMORY By Prof. HENRI BERGSON. Translated by N. M. PAUL and W. S. PALMER. 3rd Impression. NATURAL RIGHTS By D. G. RITCHIE. 3rd Impression. PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY By Dr. J. BONAR. RATIONAL THEOLOGY SINCE KANT By Prof. O. PFLEIDERER. THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND By G. W. F. HEGEL. Translated by Prof. J. B. BAILLIE. Two Vols. THOUGHT AND THINGS; OR, GENETIC LOGIC By Prof. J. M. BALDWIN. Vol. I. FUNCTIONAL LOGIC. Vol. II. EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC. Vol. III. REAL LOGIC (I., GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY). TIME AND FREE WILL By Prof. HENRI BERGSON. Translated by F. L. POGSON. 3rd Impression. VALUATION: THE THEORY OF VALUE By W. M. URBAN. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE By Prof. G. M. STRATTON. THE GREAT PROBLEMS By Prof. BERNARDINO VARISCO. Translated by Prof. R. C. LODGE. KNOW THYSELF By Prof. BERNARDINO VARISCO. Translated by Dr. GUGLIELMO SALVADORI. ELEMENTS OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY By W. WUNDT. Translated by Dr. EDWARD L. SCHAUB. 2nd Impression. GIAMBATTISTA VICO By BENEDETTO CROCE. Translated by R. G. COLLINGWOOD. ELEMENTS OF CONSTRUCTIVE PHILOSOPHY By Prof. J. S. MACKENZIE. 2nd Impression. SOCIAL PURPOSE By Principal H. J. W. HETHERINGTON and Prof. J. H. MUIRHEAD. INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY By BERTRAND RUSSELL, F.R.S. 3rd Impression. GOD AND PERSONALITY (GIFFORD LECTURES) By Prof. CLEMENT C. J. WEBB. (Part I.) DIVINE PERSONALITY AND HUMAN LIFE (GIFFORD LECTURES) By Prof. CLEMENT C. J. WEBB. (Part II.) MODERN PHILOSOPHY By GUIDO DE RUGGIERO. Translated by A. HOWARD HANNAY, B.A., and R. G. COLLINGWOOD, M.A., F.S.A. THE ANALYSIS OF MIND By BERTRAND RUSSELL, F.R.S. 3rd Impression. DIALOGUES ON METAPHYSICS By NICOLAS MALEBRANCHE. Translated by MORRIS GINSBERG, M.A. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY By Prof. S. RADHAKRISHNAN. Two Vols. CONTEMPORARY BRITISH PHILOSOPHY Edited by Prof. J. H. MUIRHEAD. Two Vols. THE WAYS OF KNOWING; OR, THE METHODS OF PHILOSOPHY By Prof W. P. MONTAGUE, Ph.D., of Columbia University, New York. A THEORY OF DIRECT REALISM; AND THE RELATION OF REALISM TO IDEALISM By J. E. TURNER, M.A., PH.D.

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BY

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S. RADHAKRISHNAN

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KING GEORGE V PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

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VOLUME II

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LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD. RUSKIN HOUSE, 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C. 1 NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

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First published in 1927 (All rights reserved)

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Printed in Great Britain

Preface

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IN this volume, which is devoted to the discussion of the six Brahmanical systems, I have adopted the same plan and method of treatment as in the first. I have tried to adopt, what is acknowledged to be, the true spirit of philosophical interpretation, viz., to interpret the ancient writers and their thoughts at their best and relate them to the living issues of philosophy and religion. Vācaspati Miśra, who commented on almost all the systems of Hindu thought, wrote on each, as if he believed in its doctrines. In presenting intelligently tendencies of thought matured long ago and embodied in a number of difficult works, it has been necessary to select, emphasise and even criticise particular aspects, which naturally betrays the direction in which my own thinking runs. Involving as the work does so many decisions on points of detail, it is, perhaps, too much to hope that the book is free from errors of judgment; but I have endeavoured to give an objective treatment and avoid playing tricks with the evidence.

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I should repeat here that my discussion is not to be regarded as complete in any sense of the term, for almost every chapter deals with a subject to which a fully equipped specialist devotes a lifetime of study. Detailed discussions of particular systems require separate monographs. My task is the limited one, of sketching in broad outlines the different movements of thought, their motives and their results. I have made practically no attempt to deal with secondary variations of opinion among the less important writers of the various schools. My treatment of the Śaiva, the Śākta and the later Vaiṣṇava systems, which belong more to the religious history than to the philosophical development of India, has been brief and summary. I shall be thoroughly satisfied if I succeed in conveying an idea, however inadequate, of the real spirit of the several phases of Indian speculative thought.

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If this volume is slightly more difficult than the previous one, I hope it will be felt that the difficulty is not entirely of my making, but is to some extent inherent in the subject and in the close thinking which its study involves. To condense a mass of facts into a clear narrative which can be followed by the reader without bewilderment or boredom is a task which I felt to be more than what I could compass. It is for the reader to judge how far I have succeeded in my attempt to steer a middle course between looseness and pedantry. To help the general reader, the more technical and textual discussions are printed in small type.

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In the preparation of this volume I have found, not only the Sanskrit texts of the different schools, but also the writings of Deussen and Keith, Thibaut and Garbe, Gaṅgānāth Jhā and Vidyābhūṣaṇ, very helpful. I am greatly indebted to my friends, Mr. V. Subrahmanya Aiyar and Professor J. S. Mackenzie, for their kindness in reading considerable parts of the MS. and the proofs, and making many valuable suggestions. Professor A. Berriedale Keith was good enough to read the proofs, and the book has profited much by his critical comments. My deepest thanks, however, are due, as in the case of the first volume, to the General Editor, Professor J. H. Muirhead, who gave to the work much of his time and thought. But for his generous assistance, the defects of the book—whatever they may be—would have been very much greater. The printing of the work involved considerable trouble, and I am glad that it has been extraordinarily well done.

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December 1926.

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experience—Causation—Creation—Ethics and religion—Relation to Buddhism—General estimate of Gauḍapāda’s position—Bhartṛhari—Bhartṛprapañca—Śaṃkara’s relation to the Upaniṣads and the Brahma Sūtra—Relation to Buddhism and other systems of philosophy—The reality of Ātman—Its nature—Theory of knowledge—Mechanism of knowledge—Perception, its nature and varieties—Inference—Scriptural testimony—Refutation of subjectivism—Criterion of truth—Inadequacy of logical knowledge—Self-consciousness—Adhyāsa—Anubhava—Scriptural authority—Higher wisdom and lower knowledge—Śaṃkara and Kant, Bergson and Bradley—The objective approach—Reality and existence—Space, time and cause—The world of phenomena—Brahman—Saguṇa and Nirguṇa—Īśvara—Personality—Creation—The phenomenal character of Īśvara—Being, not-being and becoming—The phenomenality of the world—The doctrine of māyā—Avidyā—Is the world an illusion?—Avidyā and māyā—The world of nature—The individual self—Sākṣin and jīva—Brahman and jīva—Avacchedavāda—Bimbapratibimbavāda—Īśvara and jīva—Ekajīvavāda and Anekajīvavāda—Ethics—Charges of intellectualism and asceticism considered—Jñāna and Karma—Karma and freedom—Mokṣa—Future life—Religion—Conclusion.

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THE THEISM OF RĀMĀNUJA . . . . . . . . . 659

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Introduction—The Purāṇas—Life—History and literature—Bhāskara—Yādavaprakāśa—The Pramāṇas—Implications of Rāmānuja’s theory of knowledge—God—The individual soul—Matter—Creation—Ethics and religion—Mokṣa—General estimate.

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CHAPTER X

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THE ŚAIVA, THE ŚĀKTA AND THE LATER VAIṢṆAVA THEISM 722

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Śaiva Siddhānta—Literature—Metaphysics, ethics and religion—The Pratyabhijñā system of Kashmir—Śāktaism—The dualism of Madhva—Life and literature—Theory of knowledge—God—Soul—Nature—God and the world—Ethics and religion—General estimate—Nimbārka and Keśava—Vallabha—Caitanya, Jīva Gosvāmī and Baladeva.

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B.G. . . . Bhagavadgītā.

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B.S. . . . Brahma Sūtra.

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D.S.V. . . . Deussen's System of the Vedānta--E.T.

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I.P. . . . Indian Philosophy, Vol. I.

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N.B. . . . Nyāya Bhāṣya.

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N.S. . . . Nyāya Sūtra.

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N.V. . . . Nyāyavārttika.

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N.V.T.T. . . . Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā.

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P.P. . . . Padārthadharmasaṃgraha of Praśastapāda.

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M.S. . . . Mīmāṃsā Sūtra.

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R.B. . . . Rāmānuja's Bhāṣya on the Brahma Sūtra.

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R.B.G. . . . Rāmānuja's Bhāṣya on the Bhagavadgītā.

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S.B. . . . Śaṃkara's Bhāṣya, or the Brahma Sūtra.

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S.B.G. . . . Śaṃkara's Bhāṣya on the Bhagavadgītā.

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S.K. . . . Sāṃkhya Kārikā.

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S.P.B. . . . Sāṃkhyapravacana Bhāṣya.

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S.P.S. . . . Sāṃkhyapravacana Sūtra.

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S.D.S. . . . Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha.

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S.S.S.S. . . . Sarvasiddhāntasārasaṃgraha

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S.V. . . . Ślokavārttika.

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V.S. . . . Vaiśeṣika Sūtra.

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Y.B. . . . Yoga Bhāṣya.

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Y.S. . . . Yoga Sūtra.

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* *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*
* *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*
* *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I.
* *Yajur Veda*
* *Ṛg Veda*
* *Nyāya Sūtra*
* *Nyāya-vārttika*
* *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* of Praśastapāda
* *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*
* *Rāmānuja’s Bhāṣya on the Brahma Sūtra*
* *Rāmānuja’s Bhāṣya on the Bhagavadgītā*
* *Śaṅkara’s Bhāṣya on the Brahma Sūtra*
* *Śaṅkara’s Bhāṣya on the Bhagavadgītā*
* *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*
* *Sāṅkhya-pravacana Bhāṣya*
* *Sāṅkhya-pravacana Sūtra*
* *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*
* *Ślokavārttika*
* *Vedānta Sūtra*
* *Yoga Sūtra*
* *Yoga Bhāṣya*

Part III The Six Brahmanical Systems

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PART III

Chapter I Introduction

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The spirit of the age—The Darśanas—Āstika and Nāstika—Sūtra literature—Date—Common ideas—The six systems.

I The Rise of the Systems

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THE age of Buddha represents the great springtide of philosophic spirit in India. The progress of philosophy is generally due to a powerful attack on a historical tradition when men feel themselves compelled to go back on their steps and raise once more the fundamental questions which their fathers had disposed of by the older schemes. The revolt of Buddhism and Jainism, even such as it was, forms an era in the history of Indian thought, since it finally exploded the method of dogmatism and helped to bring about a critical point of view. For the great Buddhist thinkers, logic was the main arsena where were forged the weapons of universal destructive criticism. Buddhism served as a cathartic in clearing the mind of the cramping effects of ancient obstructions. Scepticism, when it is honest, helps to reorganise belief on its natural foundations. The need for laying the foundations deeper resulted in the great movement of philosophy which produced the six systems of thought, where cold criticism and analysis take the place of poetry and religion. The conservative schools were compelled to codify their views and set forth logical defences of them. The critical side of philosophy became as important as the speculative. The philosophical views of the presystematic period set forth some general reflections regarding the nature of the universe as a whole, but did not realise that a critical theory of knowledge is the necessary basis of any fruitful speculation. Critics forced their opponents to employ the natural methods relevant to life and experience, and not some supernatural revelation, in the defence of their speculative schemes. We should not lower our standards to let in the beliefs we wish to secure. Ātmavidyā or philosophy is now supported by Ānvīkṣikī or the science of inquiry.¹ A rationalistic defence of philosophic systems could not have been very congenial to the conservative mind.² To the devout it must have appeared that the breath of life had departed since intuition had given place to critical reason. The force of thought which springs straight from life and experience as we have it in the Upaniṣads, or the epic greatness of soul which sees and chants the God-vision as in the Bhagavadgītā give place to more strict philosophising. Again, when an appeal to reason is admitted, one cannot be sure of the results of thought. A critical philosophy need not always be in conformity with cherished traditions. But the spirit of the times required that every system of thought based on reason should be recognised as a darśana. All logical attempts to gather the floating conceptions of the world into some great general ideas were regarded as darśanas.³ They all help us to see some aspect of the truth. This conception led to the view that the apparently isolated and independent systems were really members of a larger historical plan. Their nature could not be completely understood so long as they were viewed as self-dependent, without regard to their place in the historic interconnection.

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¹ N.B., i. 1. 1.; Manu, vii. 43. Kauṭilya (about 300 B.C.) asserts that Ānvīkṣikī is a distinct branch of study over and above the other three, Trayī or the Vedas, Vārtta or commerce, and Daṇḍanīti or polity (i. 2). The sixth century B.C., when it was recognised as a special study, marks the beginning of systematic philosophy in India, and by the first century B.C. the term Ānvīkṣikī is replaced by "darśana" (see M.B., Śāntiparva, 10. 45; Bhāgavata Purāṇa, viii. 14. 10). Every inquiry starts in doubt and fulfils a need. Cp. Jijñāsayā saṃdehaprayojane sūcayati (Bhāmatī, i. 1. 1).

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² In the Rāmāyaṇa, Ānvīkṣikī is censured as leading men away from the injunctions of the dharmaśāstras (ii. 100. 36) (M.B., Śānti, 180. 47-49; 246-8). Manu holds that those who misled by logic (hetuśāstra) disregard the Vedas and the Dharma Sūtras deserve excommunication (ii. 11); yet both Gautama in his Dharma Sūtra (xi) and Manu (vii. 43) prescribe a course of Ānvīkṣikī for kings. Logicians were included in the legislative assemblies. When logic supports scripture, it is commended. By means of Ānvīkṣikī, Vyāsa claims to have arranged the Vedas (Nyāyasūtravṛtti, i. 1. 1).

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³ Mādhava : S.D.S.

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RELATION TO THE VEDAS

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The adoption of the critical method served to moderate the impetuosity of the speculative imagination and helped to show that the pretended philosophies were not so firmly held as their professors supposed. But the iconoclastic fervour of the materialists, the sceptics and some followers of Buddhism destroyed all grounds of certitude. The Hindu mind did not contemplate this negative result with equanimity. Man cannot live on doubt. Intellectual pugilism is not sufficient by itself. The zest of combat cannot feed the spirit of man. If we cannot establish through logic the truth of anything, so much the worse for logic. It cannot be that the hopes and aspirations of sincere souls like the ṛṣis of the Upaniṣads are irrevocably doomed. It cannot be that centuries of struggle and thought have not brought the mind one step nearer to the solution. Despair is not the only alternative. Reason assailed could find refuge in faith. The seers of the Upaniṣads are the great teachers in the school of sacred wisdom. They speak to us of the knowledge of God and spiritual life. If the unassisted reason of man cannot attain any hold on reality by means of mere speculation, help may be sought from the great writings of the seers who claim to have attained spiritual certainty. Thus strenuous attempts were made to justify by reason what faith implicitly accepts. This is not an irrational attitude, since philosophy is only an endeavour to interpret the widening experience of humanity. The one danger that we have to avoid is lest faith should furnish the conclusions for philosophy.

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Of the systems of thought or darśanas, six became more famous than others, viz., Gautama’s Nyāya, Kaṇāda’s Vaiśeṣika, Kapila’s Sāṃkhya, Patañjali’s Yoga, Jaimini’s Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Bādarāyaṇa’s Uttara Mīmāṃsā or the Vedānta.¹ They are the Brahmanical systems, since they all accept the authority of the Vedas. The systems of thought which admit the validity of the Vedas are called āstika, and those which repudiate it nāstika. The āstika, or nāstika character of a system does not depend on its positive or negative conclusions regarding the nature of the supreme spirit, but on the acceptance or non-acceptance of the authority of the Vedas.² Even the schools of Buddhism have their origin in the Upaniṣads; though they are not regarded as orthodox, since they do not accept the authority of the Vedas. Kumārila, a great authority on these questions, admits that the Buddhist systems owe their inspiration to the Upaniṣads, argues that they were put forth with the purpose of checking the excessive attachment to sensuous objects, and declares that they are all authoritative systems of thought.³

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¹ Haribhadra, in his Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, discusses the Buddhist, the Naiyāyika, and the Sāṃkhya, the Jaina, the Vaiśeṣika, and the Jaiminīya systems (i. 3). Jinadatta and Rājaśekhara agree with this view.

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² Prāmāṇyabuddhir vedeṣu. Manu says that a nāstika is he who despises the Vedas. Nāstiko vedanindakaḥ (ii. 11). See M.B., xii. 270. 67.

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³ Tantravārttika, i. 3. 2, p. 81.

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The acceptance of the Veda is a practical admission that spiritual experience is a greater light in these matters than intellectual reason. It does not mean either full agreement with all the doctrines of the Veda or admission of any belief in the existence of God. It means only a serious attempt to solve the ultimate mystery of existence; for even the infallibility of the Veda is not admitted by the schools in the same sense. As we shall see, the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya accept God as the result of inference. The Sāṃkhya is not a theism. The Yoga is practically independent of the Veda. The two Mīmāṃsās are more directly dependent on the Vedas. The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā derives the general conception of deity from the Vedas, but is not anxious about the supreme spirit. The Uttara Mīmāṃsā accepts God on the basis of śruti assisted by inference, while realisation of God can be had through meditation and jñāna. Theistically minded thinkers of a later day declined to include the Sāṃkhya under orthodox darśanas.⁴

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⁴ In Bhīmācārya’s Nyāyakośa the āstika is said to be paralokādyastitva-vādi and nāstika as Vedamārgam ananurundhānaḥ. He includes Sāṃkhya and the Advaita Vedānta under the latter. “Māyāvādivedānty api nāstika

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The philosophical character of the systems is not much compromised by the acceptance of the Veda.¹ The distinction between śruti and smṛti is well known, and where the two conflict, the former is to prevail. The śruti itself is divided into the karmakāṇḍa (the Saṃhitās and the Brāhmaṇas and the jñānakāṇḍa (the Upaniṣads). The latter is of higher value, though much of it is set aside as mere arthavāda or non-essential statements. All these distinctions enable one to treat the Vedic testimony in a very liberal spirit. The interpretations of the Vedic texts depend on the philosophical predilections of the authors. While employing logical methods and arriving at truths agreeable to reason, they were yet anxious to preserve their continuity with the ancient texts. They did not wish it to be thought that they were enunciating something completely new. While this may involve a certain want of frankness with themselves, it helped the spread of what they regarded as the truth.² Critics and commentators of different schools claim for their views the sanction of the Veda and exercise their ingenuity in forcing that sanction when it is not spontaneously yielded. In the light of the controversies of subsequent times, they read into the language of the Vedas opinions on questions of which they knew little or nothing. The general conceptions of the Vedas were neither definite nor detailed, and so allowed themselves to be handled and fashioned in different ways by different schools of thought. Besides, the very vastness of the Vedas, from

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¹ What Keith says of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika is true of the other systems as well. “The systems are indeed orthodox and admit the authority of the sacred scriptures, but they attack the problems of existence with human means, and scripture serves for all practical purposes but to lend sanctity to results which are achieved not only without its aid, but often in very dubious harmony with its tenets” (I.L.A., p. 3).

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² Cp. Goethe: “Some very intelligent and brilliant men appeared, in this respect, like butterflies which, quite oblivious of their chrysalis state, threw away the covering in which they had grown to their organic maturity. Others, more faithful and more modest, could be compared with flowers, which, though developing into beautiful blossoms, do not leave the root nor separate themselves from the mother stem, but rather through this connection bring the hoped-for fruit to ripeness” (quoted in Merz: *Europe an Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, vol. iv, p. 134, fn. 1).

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eva paryavasāne saṃpadyate.” Kumārila regards the Sāṃkhya, the Yoga, the Pañcarātra and the Pāśupata systems as being opposed to the Veda as much as Buddhism (Tantravārttika, i. 3. 4).

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which the authors could select out of free conviction any portion for their authority, allowed room for original thought. The religious motive of philosophical speculations accounts for the apparently miscellaneous character of the contents of the systems. The eternity of sound doctrine is more a theological than a philosophical problem, related as it is to the doctrine of Vedic infallibility. Every system is an admixture of logic and psychology, metaphysics and religion.

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THE SŪTRAS

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When the Vedic literature became unwieldy and the Vedic thinkers were obliged to systematise their views, the Sūtra literature arose. The principal tenets of the darśanas are stated in the form of sūtras or short aphorisms. They are intended to be as short as possible, free from doubt, able to bring out the essential meaning and put an end to many doubts; and they must not contain anything superfluous or erroneous.¹ They try to avoid all unnecessary repetition and employ great economy of words.² The ancient writers had no temptation to be diffuse, since they had to rely more on memory than on printed books. This extreme conciseness makes it difficult to understand the Sūtras without a commentary.

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¹ Alpākṣaram asaṃdigdhaṃ sāravad viśvatomukham Astobham anavadyam ca sūtraṃ sūtravido viduḥ (Madhva on B.S., i. 1. 1). See Jayatīrtha's Nyāyasudhā, i. 1. 1; Bhāmatī, i. 1. 1.

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² The sarcastic remark cited in Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya that "a grammarian rejoices in the economising of half a short vowel as much as he does on the birth of a son" points to the ideal of the rigid economy of words.

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The different systems developed in different centres of philosophical activity. The views had been growing up through many generations even before they were summed up in the Sūtras. They are not the work of one thinker or of one age but of a succession of thinkers spread over a number of generations. As the Sūtras presuppose a period of gestation and of formation, it is difficult for us to trace their origin. There are no absolute beginnings for spiritual possessions.

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The Sūtras are the outcome of a series of past efforts and “ occupy a strictly central position summarising, on the one hand, a series of early literary essays extending over many generations, and forming, on the other hand, the headspring of an ever-broadening activity of commentators as well as virtually independent writers, which reaches down to our days and may yet have some future before itself.”¹ The systems must have evolved at a much earlier period than that in which the Sūtras were formulated. The whole tone and manner of the philosophical Sūtras suggests that they belong approximately to the same period.² The authors of the Sūtras are not the founders or originators of the systems but only their compilers or formulators. This fact accounts for the cross references in the philosophical Sūtras, and it must be noted that the various systems had been growing side by side with one another during the period which preceded the formation of the Sūtras. To the early centuries after Buddha and before the Christian era belongs the crystallisation of the different systems out of the complex solution. Oral tradition and not books were the repositories of the philosophical views. It may be that, through lapse of oral tradition, several important works perished, and many of those that have reached us are not even pure. Some of the earlier important Sūtras, as the Bṛhaspati Sūtras, Vaikhānasa Sūtras and Bhikṣu Sūtras, as well as large quantities of philosophical literature, are lost to us, and with them also much useful information about the chronological relations of the different systems. Max Müller assigns the gradual formation of the Sūtras to the period from Buddha to Aśoka, though he admits that, in the cases of the Vedānta, the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga, a long previous development has to be allowed. This view is confirmed by the evidence of Kauṭilya’s Arthaśāstra. Up till then, the orthodox Ānvīkṣiki or logical systems were divided mainly into two schools, the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and the Sāṃkhya. Though the references in Buddhist texts are very vague, it may be said that the Buddhist Sūtras assume a knowledge of the six systems. The vivid intellectual life of the early centuries after Buddha flowed in many streams parallel to one another, though the impulse to codify them was due to the reaction against the systems of revolt. These systems of thought undergo modifications at the hands of later interpreters, though the resultant system is still fathered on the original systematiser. The philosophy of the Vedānta is called Vyāsa’s, though Śaṁkara, Rāmānuja and a host of others introduced vital changes of doctrine. The greatest thinkers of India profess to be simply scholiasts; but in their attempts to expound the texts, they improve on them. Each system has grown in relation to others which it keeps always in view. The development of the six systems has been in progress till the present day, the successive interpreters defending the tradition against the attacks of its opponents.

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¹ Thibaut: Introduction to S.B., p. xii.

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² In some form the different systems must have existed before the Christian era. The early sacred literature of the Jainas mentions the systems of Vaiśeṣika, Buddhism, Sāṃkhya, Lokāyata and Ṣaṣṭitantra (Weber’s Sanskrit Literature, p. 236, n. 249) See also Lalitavistara, xii; Carakasamhitā; M.B., Nārāyaṇīya section.

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In the case of every darśana, we have first of all a period of philosophic fermentation, which at a particular stage is reduced to sūtras or aphorisms. This is succeeded by the writing of commentaries on the aphorisms, which are followed by glosses, expositions and explanatory compendia, in which the original doctrines undergo modifications, corrections and amplifications. The commentaries use the form of the dialogue, which has come down from the time of the Upaniṣads as the only adequate form for the exposition of a complex theme. The commentator by means of the dialogue is enabled to show the relation of the view he is expounding to the diverse trains of thought suggested by the rival interlocutors. The ideas are restated and their superiority to other conceptions established.

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COMMON IDEAS

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The six systems agree on certain essentials.¹ The acceptance of the Veda implies that all the systems have drawn from a common reservoir of thought. The Hindu teachers were obliged to use the heritage they received from the past, in order to make their views readily understood. While the use of the terms avidyā, māyā, puruṣa, jīva shows that the dialect of speculation is common to the different systems, it is to be noted that the systems are distinguished by the different significations assigned to those terms in the different schools. It frequently happens in the history of thought that the same terms and phrases are used by different schools in senses which are essentially distinct. Each system sets forth its special doctrine by using, with necessary modifications, the current language of the highest religious speculation. In the systems, philosophy becomes self-conscious. The spiritual experiences recorded in the Vedas are subjected to a logical criticism. The question of the validity and means of knowledge forms an important chapter of each system. Each philosophical scheme has its own theory of knowledge, which is an integral part or a necessary consequence of its metaphysics. Intuition, inference and the Veda are accepted by the systems. Reason is subordinated to intuition. Life cannot be comprehended in its fulness by logical reason. Self-consciousness is not the ultimate category of the universe. There is something transcending the consciousness of self, to which many names are given—Intuition, Revelation, Cosmic Consciousness, and God-vision. We cannot describe it adequately, so we call it the super-consciousness. When we now and then have glimpses of this higher form, we feel that it involves a purer illumination and a wider compass. As the difference between mere consciousness and self-consciousness constitutes the wide gulf separating the animal from man, so the difference between self-consciousness and super-consciousness constitutes all the difference between man as he is and man as he ought to be. The philosophy of India takes its stand on the spirit which is above mere logic, and holds that culture based on mere logic or science may be efficient, but cannot be inspiring.

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¹ "The longer I have studied the various systems, the more have I become impressed with the truth of the view taken by Vijñānabhikṣu and others that there is behind the variety of the six systems a common fund of what may be called national or popular philosophy, a large mānasa lake of philosophical thought and language far away in the distant North and in the distant past, from which each thinker was allowed to draw for his own purposes" (Max Müller : S.S., p. xvii).

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All the systems protest against the scepticism of the Buddhists, and erect a standard of objective reality and truth as opposed to an eternal, unstable flux. The stream of the world has been flowing on from eternity, and this flow is not merely mental, but is objective; and it is traced to the eternal prakṛti or māyā or atoms. "That in which the world resides, when divested of name and form, some call prakṛti, others māyā, others atoms."¹ It is assumed that whatever has a beginning has an end. Everything that is made up of parts can be neither eternal nor self-subsistent. The true individual is indivisible. The real is not the universe extended in space and time; for its nature is becoming and not being. There is something deeper than this—atoms and souls, or puruṣa and prakṛti, or Brahman.

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¹ Vijñānabhikṣu quotes from Bṛhadvāsiṣṭha in his Yogavārttika: Nāmarūpavinirmuktaṃ yasmin saṃtiṣṭhate jagat Tam āhuḥ prakṛtiṃ kecin māyām anye pare tv aṇūn.

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All the systems accept the view of the great world rhythm. Vast periods of creation, maintenance and dissolution follow each other in endless succession. This theory is not inconsistent with belief in progress; for it is not a question of the movement of the world reaching its goal times without number, and being again forced back to its starting-point. Creations and dissolutions do not mean the fresh rise and the total destruction of the cosmos. The new universe forms the next stage of the history of the cosmos, where the unexhausted potencies of good and evil are provided with the opportunities of fulfilment. It means that the race of man enters upon and retravels its ascending path of realisation. This interminable succession of world ages has no beginning.

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Except the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, all the systems aim at the practical end of salvation. The systems mean by release (mokṣa) the recovery by the soul of its natural integrity, from which sin and error drive it. All the systems have for their ideal complete mental poise and freedom from the discords and uncertainties, sorrows and sufferings of life, "a repose that ever is the same," which no doubts disturb and no rebirths break into. The conception of jīvanmukti, or liberation in life, is admitted in many schools.

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It is a fundamental belief of the Hindus that the universe is law-abiding to the core, and yet that man is free to shape his own destiny in it.

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Our actions still pursue us from afar,
And what we have been makes us what we are.

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The systems believe in rebirth and preexistence. Our life is a step on a road, the direction and goal of which are lost in the infinite. On this road, death is never an end or an obstacle but at most the beginning of new steps. The development of the soul is a continuous process, though it is broken into stages by the recurring baptism of death.

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Philosophy carries us to the gates of the promised land, but cannot let us in; for that, insight or realisation is necessary. We are like children stranded in the darkness of saṃsāra, with no idea of our true nature, and inclined to imagine fears and to cling to hopes in the gloom that surrounds us. Hence arises the need for light, which will free us from the dominion of passions and show us the real, which we unwittingly are, and the unreal in which we ignorantly live. Such a kind of insight is admitted as the sole means to salvation, though there are differences regarding the object of insight.¹ The cause of bondage is ignorance, and so release can be had through insight into the truth. The ideal of the systems is practically to transcend the merely ethical level. The holy man is compared to the fair lotus unsullied by the mire in which it grows. In his case the good is no more a goal to be striven after, but is an accomplished fact. While virtue and vice may lead to a good or bad life within the circle of saṃsāra, we can escape from saṃsāra through the transcending of the moralistic individualism. All systems recognise as obligatory unselfish love and disinterested activity, and insist on cittaśuddhi (cleansing of the heart) as essential to all moral culture. In different degrees they adhere to the rules of caste (varṇa) and stages of life (āśrama).

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¹ Even the Buddhist thinker Dharmakīrti opens his Nyāyabindu with the remark that all fulfilment of human desires is preceded by right knowledge. Samyagjñānapūrvikā sarvapuruṣārthasiddhiḥ (i)

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A history of Indian philosophy, as we noted in the Introduction,² is beset with innumerable difficulties. The dates of the principal writers and their works are not free from doubt; and in some cases the historicity of well-known authors is contested. While many of the relevant works are not available, even the few that are published have not all been critically studied. A historical treatment of Indian philosophy has not been taken up by the great Indian thinkers themselves. Mādhava in his *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* treats of sixteen different darśanas. In the first volume we dealt with the materialist, the Buddhist and the Jaina views. In this we propose to deal with the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṃkhya, the Yoga, the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta darśanas. The four schools of Śaivism and those of Rāmānuja, the Pūrṇaprajña are founded on the Vedānta Sūtra and attempt to interpret it in different ways. Pāṇini’s system is of little philosophical significance. It accepts the Mīmāṃsā view of the eternity of sound and develops the theory of sphoṭa or the indivisible unitary factor latent in every word as the vehicle of its significance. Of these six systems, the Vaiśeṣika is not very much in honour, while the Nyāya on its logical side is popular and finds many devotees, especially in Bengal. The Yoga in its practical form is practised by a few, while the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā is closely related to Hindu law. The Sāṃkhya is not a living faith, while the Vedānta in its different forms pervades the whole atmosphere. In dealing with the six systems of Hindu thought, we shall confine our attention to the great classics, the Sūtras as well as their chief commentators. With regard to almost all the thinkers of recent times—of course there are exceptions—their metaphysical contributions do not seem to be sufficiently impressive. Their learning is prodigious; but they belong to the period of decadence, where the tendency to comment and recast ceaselessly takes the place of creation and construction. There are too many concessions to dogma, too much attachment to the mystifying elaboration of the obvious and, by reason of the warping theological bias and metaphysical sterility, do not deserve any great attention.

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² I.P., vol. i.

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In obedience to custom, which it would be vain to try to unsettle, we shall start with the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika theories, which give us an analysis of the world of experience, and pass on to the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga, which try to explain experience by bold speculative ventures; and we shall conclude with a discussion of the Mīmāṃsās, which attempt to show that the revelations of śruti are in harmony with the conclusions of philosophy. Such a treatment has at least the support of sound logic though not of sound chronology.

Chapter II The Logical Realism of the Nyāya

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The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika—The beginnings of the Nyāya—Literature and history—Aim and scope—The nature of definition—Perception—Its analysis and kinds—Inference—Syllogism—Induction—Causation—Plurality of causes—Asatkāryavāda—Criticism of the Nyāya view of causation—Comparison—Verbal knowledge—Authoritativeness of the Vedas—Other forms of knowledge—Aitihya and Arthāpatti, Sambhava and Abhāva—Tarka, Vāda, Nigrahasthāna—Memory—Doubt—Fallacies—Truth, its nature and criterion—Theories of error—The Nyāya theory of knowledge examined—The world of nature—The individual soul—Saṃsāra—Mokṣa—Criticism of the Nyāya theory of soul and its relation to consciousness—Ethics—Proofs for the existence of God—Conclusion.

I The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika

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WHILE the other systems of Indian thought are mainly speculative, in the sense that they deal with the universe as a whole, the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika represent the analytic type of philosophy, and uphold common sense and science, instead of dismissing them as "moonbeams from the larger lunacy." What is distinctive of these schools, is the application of a method, which their adherents regard as that of science, to material which has hitherto been treated in quite a different way. Applying the methods of logical inquiry and criticism, they endeavour to show that these do not warrant the conclusions which the Buddhist thinkers derived from them, and that logic does not compel us to disperse the unity and pattern of life into its fleeting moments. They are interested mainly in averting the sceptical consequences of the Buddhist phenomenalism, which merged external reality in the ideas of mind. They seek to restore the traditional substances, the soul within and nature without, but not on the basis of mere authority. The general scepticism which set in like a flood, could not be checked by a mere resort to faith, when its citadel was attacked by the heretical thinkers who presumably took their stand on the evidence of the senses and the conclusions of reason. Only by a thorough examination of the modes and sources of correct knowledge can the ends of life and religion be truly met. What is supplied to us by scripture or the evidence of the senses must be submitted to a critical inquiry, as the etymological meaning of the word ānvīkṣikī suggests.¹ The Naiyāyika is willing to admit as true whatever is established by reason.² Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara urge that if the Nyāya philosophy dealt only with the nature of the soul and its released condition, there would not be much to distinguish the Nyāya from the Upaniṣads which also treat of these problems. That which gives distinction to the Nyāya is its critical treatment of metaphysical problems. Vācaspati defines the purpose of the Nyāya as a critical examination of the objects of knowledge by means of the canons of logical proof.³

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¹ Pratyakṣāgamābhyām ākṣiptasya anvīkṣā tayā vartata ity ānvīkṣikī (N.B., i. 1. 1). Again: "It is called anvīkṣā or investigation, since it consists of the reviewing (anu-īkṣaṇa) of a thing previously apprehended (īkṣita) by perception and verbal testimony" (N.B., i. 1. 1). Logic is the science of second intentions, as Aristotle would say. It is essentially the reflection of knowledge on itself.

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² Buddhyā yad utpannam tat sarvaṁ nyāyamatam.

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³ Pramāṇair arthaparīkṣaṇam (N.V.T.T., i. 1. 1).

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The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika take up the ordinary stock notions of traditional philosophy, as space, time, cause, matter, mind, soul and knowledge, explore their significance for experience, and set forth the results in the form of a theory of the universe. The logical and the physical departments become the predominant features in these traditions. The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika take up respectively the world within and the world without. The Nyāya describes at great length the mechanism of knowledge and argues vigorously against the scepticism which declares that nothing is certain. The Vaiśeṣika has for its main objective the analysis of experience. It formulates general conceptions which apply to things known, whether by the senses or by inference or by authority. Adopting such an attitude, it is no wonder that the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems advocate belief in individual souls as substantial beings, interacting with a whole environing system of things.

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The two systems had been for long treated as parts of one whole. It is sometimes suggested that they branched off as independent streams from the same original source, which treated of things known and the means of knowledge. It is, however, difficult to be certain on this point. The later works regard these systems as forming parts of one discipline.¹ Even in the Nyāya Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, the two are not kept distinct. The Vaiśeṣika is used as a supplement to the Nyāya.² Uddyotakara’s Nyāyavārttika uses the Vaiśeṣika doctrines. Jacobi observes that “the fusion of these two schools began early and seems to have been complete at the time when the Nyāyavārttika was written.”³ Many of the Nyāya sūtras presuppose the tenets of the Vaiśeṣika. They are called samānatantra or allied systems, since they both believe in a plurality of souls, a personal God, an atomic universe, and use many arguments in common. While there is no doubt that the two systems coalesced very early, a difference in the distribution of emphasis on the logical and the physical sides distinguishes the one from the other.⁴ While the Nyāya gives us an account of the processes and methods of a reasoned knowledge of objects, the Vaiśeṣika develops the atomic constitution of things which the Nyāya accepts without much argument.⁵

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¹ See Varadarāja’s Tārkikarakṣā, Keśava Miśra’s Tarkabhāṣā, Śivāditya’s Saptapadārthī, Viśvanātha’s Bhāṣāpariccheda and Siddhāntamuktāvalī, Annam Bhaṭṭa’s Tarkasaṃgraha and Dīpikā, Jagadīśa’s Tarkāmṛta, and Laugākṣi Bhāskara’s Tarkakaumudī. The Buddhist thinkers Āryadeva and Harivarman did not look upon the Nyāya as a system independent of the Vaiśeṣika (Ui : Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, pp. 54 and 56).

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² N.B., i. 1. 4 Vātsyāyana quotes V.S., iii. 1. 16 in N.B., ii. 2. 24; V.S., iv. 1. 16 in N.B., iii. 1. 33 and iii. 1 67.

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³ E.R.E., vol. ii, p. 201 b.

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⁴ Uddyotakara says that “the other sciences are not meant to deal with the subjects (of pramāṇas), though they deal with things made known by them (N.V., i. 1. 1).

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⁵ Garbe looks upon the Vaiśeṣika as prior to the Nyāya (E.R.E., vol. xii, p. 569; see also Philosophy of Ancient India, p. 20; Jacobi : J.A.O.S., xxxi), while Goldstucker regards the Vaiśeṣika as a branch of the Nyāya. Keith inclines to the former view (I.L.A., pp. 21-22). It is more logical, since critical investigations generally follow dogmatic metaphysics. The more systematic character of the N.S., the greater attention paid to the problems

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The Nyāya philosophy has been held in great reverence for a very long time past. Manu includes it under śruti. Yājñavalkya regards it as one of the four limbs of the Veda.¹ The classical studies of the Hindus comprise the five subjects of Kāvya (literature), Nāṭaka (drama), Alaṃkāra (rhetoric), Tarka (logic), and Vyākaraṇa (grammar). Whatever other specialised studies a student may take up later, the preliminary course includes logic, which is the basis of all studies. Every system of Hindu thought accepts the fundamental principles of the Nyāya logic, and even in criticising the Nyāya system, uses the Nyāya terminology and logic. The Nyāya serves as an introduction to all systematic philosophy.²

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¹ Yājñavalkya Smṛti, i. 3. Cp. Ātmopaniṣad, ii, and Viṣṇu Purāṇa, iii. 6.

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² Cp. Kauṭilya (i. 2), quoted in N.B., i. 1. 1.

II The Beginnings of the Nyāya

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THE BEGINNNGS OF THE NYĀYA

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Ānvīkṣiki, as we have seen, is the treatment in a consciously critical manner of the ultimate problems of spirit; and it has been used in a comprehensive sense, so as to include all systematic attempts to solve the problems of philosophy, the Sāṃkhya, the Yoga and the Lokāyata. Soon attention was directed to the nature of logical procedure and criticism, used in common by these different systems of thought. Every science is a nyāya, which means literally going into a subject

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of the eternity of sound, the nature of the self and the process of inference support Keith's view. The explicit reference to Īśvara in N.S., iv. 1. 91, is more than what the Vaiśeṣika has to say on this question. The argument for the existence of the self from bodily activities is cruder than the Nyāya view of self as the basis of mental phenomena. The absence of any direct reference to the Nyāya in the B.S., which criticises the Vaiśeṣika theory (ii. 2. 12-17), supports the view of the greater antiquity of the latter. This position will be considerably strengthened if the Nyāya reference to pratitantrasiddhānta is taken as an allusion to the Vaiśeṣika. The more elaborate account of the grounds of inference and the simpler scheme of fallacies in the V.S. are not of great value on the question of date. We find a number of coincidences between the N.S. and the V.S. Cp. N.S., iii. 1. 36; ii. 1. 54; i. 1. 10; iii. 1. 28; iii 1. 35; iii 1. 63; iii. 1. 71; iii. 2. 63, with V.S., iv. 1. 8; vii. 2. 20; iii. 2. 4; iv. 2. 3; iv. 1 6-13; vii. 2. 4-5; viii. 2. 5; vii. 1. 23, respectively. If some of the V.S. seem to be elaborations of the Nyāya views, it only shows that those sūtras were compiled later than the N.S. The priority of V.S. is not affected thereby.

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or analytic investigation. The system of Nyāya, which studies the general plan and method of critical inquiries, may be called the science of sciences. Such purely logical studies were encouraged by the Mīmāṃsakas, who were not merely exegetes but also logicians. It may well be that logic arose out of the necessities of the sacrificial religion, especially out of the need that existed for interpreting correctly the Vedic texts regarding sacrificial rites, rules and results; and that hence the thinkers who founded and developed the Mīmāṃsā helped the growth of logic.¹ When Gautama expounded the logical side more carefully than other thinkers, his view became identified with the Ānvīkṣikī. Thus a term which was used for long in the general sense of systematic philosophy became narrowed down in signification.²

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¹ From the names of the Mīmāṃsā works, like Mādhava's Nyāyamālāvistara, Pārthasārathi Miśra's Nyāyaratnākara, and Āpadeva's Nyāyaprakāśa, it is evident that the term Nyāya was used as a synonym for Mīmāṃsā. See also Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra, ii. 4. 8. 23; ii. 6. 14. 3.

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² See also Manu, vii. 43; Gautama's Dharma Sūtra, xi; Rāmāyaṇa, Ayodhyākāṇḍa, 100. 36; M.B., Śāntiparva, 180. 47.

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In the long chain of antecedents out of which the Nyāya evolved, an important place will have to be assigned to dialectical discussions.³ The Nyāya is called sometimes Tarkavidyā or the science of debate, Vādavidyā, or the science of discussion. Discussion or vāda is the breath of intellectual life. We are obliged to use it in the search for truth, which is complex in character and yields only to the co-operation of many minds.⁴ The Upaniṣads speak of learned assemblies or pariṣads where philosophical disputations were carried on.¹ Greek logic owed much to the Sophistic movement, which adopted the mode of disputation called Dialectic, the game of question and answer. In the practice of the art of discussion, the Sophists not only discovered the true principles of reasoning but also invented tricks of argument and sophisms. From the Dialogues of Plato we learn that Socrates used the art of debate for the purpose of eliciting the truth. Aristotle devoted two of his logical treatises, the Topics and the Sophistical Refutations to the guidance of disputants, questioners as well as respondents, though he distinguished logic from rhetoric, the principles of reasoning from the rules of debate. There is no doubt that Gautama’s logic sprang from the dialectical tournaments, the sound of which filled the durbars of kings and the schools of philosophers. The attempt to regulate the use of debates led to the development of logical theory. Gautama, like Aristotle, systematised the principles of reasoning, distinguished the true from the false, and gave an elaborate account of the various forms of sophisms and argumentative tricks. The sixteen topics mentioned in the first sūtra may be regarded as representing stages in dialectical controversy intended to lead up to knowledge.² Many of the later works on logic discuss the rules of debate,³ while all of them refer to dialectical problems.⁴

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³ The first sūtra enumerates the topics considered in the system, which are: (1) pramāṇa, the means of knowledge; (2) prameya, the objects of knowledge; (3) saṃśaya, doubt; (4) prayojana, purpose; (5) dṛṣṭānta, example; (6) siddhānta, accepted truth; (7) avayava, members of the syllogism; (8) tarka, indirect proof; (9) nirṇaya, determination of the truth; (10) vāda, discussion; (11) jalpa, wrangling; (12) vitaṇḍā, cavil or destructive criticism; (13) hetvābhāsa, fallacious reasons; (14) chala, quibbling; (15) jāti, futile objections; and (16) nigrahasthāna, occasions for reproof. The first nine are more strictly logical than the last seven, which have the negative function of preventing erroneous knowledge. They are more weapons for the destroying of error than for the building up of truth.

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