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Indian Philosophy v2.c25: Chapter VI The Pūrva Mīmāṁsā

Indian Philosophy v2.c25

Language
English

Contents

Chapter VI The Pūrva Mīmāṁsā

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Introduction—Date and literature—The sources of knowledge—Perception—Inference—Scriptural testimony—Comparison—Implication—Non-apprehension—Theory of knowledge: Prabhākara, Kumārila—The self: Prabhākara, Kumārila—Nature of reality—Ethics—Apūrva—Mokṣa—God—Conclusion.

I Introduction

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THE Pūrva Mīmāṁsā is so called because it is earlier (pūrva) than the Uttara Mīmāṁsā, not so much in the chronological as in the logical sense. Its central problem is ritual, even as that of the Uttara Mīmāṁsā is knowledge of the truth of things. The entire Veda, excluding the Upaniṣads, is said to deal with dharma or acts of duty, of which the chief are sacrifices. The performance of sacred rites is normally the prelude to the pursuit of wisdom. Even Śaṁkara, who insists on the radical opposition between karma and jñāna, allows that good karma, in this or in an earlier life, is the cause of the desire for truth.

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The beginnings of the Mīmāṁsā may be traced to the Veda itself, where it is used to denote doubt and discussion regarding the rules of ritual and doctrine. The due performance of the sacrifices depended on the correct interpretation of the Vedic texts. Doubtful cases led to the elaboration of rules which helped to a knowledge of the way in which the sacrifice was to be performed. The many problems about interpretation were discussed and decided as they arose, and these decisions are found scattered in the Brāhmaṇas. The accounts in the Brāhmaṇas are so disjointed, obscure and incomplete, that one could not understand them without other help, which was then found in the oral tradition. Vedic text and oral tradition continued for long to be the two authorities on the performance of religious duty. When the various Vedic śākhas (schools) began to form themselves, great importance was attached to the authority of the sacred books handed down by unbroken tradition. After the rise of Buddhism, the followers of the Vedic dharma were called upon to review and recast all the knowledge they possessed, prove its soundness and embody it in the form of the sūtras. Jaimini attempts the work of systematising the rules of Mīmāṁsā and establishing their validity in his work.

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The avowed aim of the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā is to examine the nature of dharma. Its interest is more practical than speculative. The philosophical speculations found in it are subordinate to the ritualistic purpose. For the sake of the integrity of dharma, it is obliged to affirm the reality of the soul and regard it as a permanent being possessing a body, to whom the results of acts accrue. The Veda enjoins the acts of duty, specifying at the same time the beneficial results which follow from their performance. The authority for the character of these acts as dharma and for their capacity to produce beneficial results is the eternal Veda, which needs no other basis to rest on. But such a dogmatic attitude is not enough when other thinkers disparage the importance of the Vedic texts, of which we cannot see the practical value. So elaborate discussions, theological and philosophical, arise. The Mīmāṁsā welcomes all philosophical views so long as they do not injure its central theme, viz. the transcendent importance of dharma interpreted in the ritualistic sense. This looseness of philosophic texture has enabled different thinkers to interpret the philosophical views of the Mīmāṁsā in different ways, even though they all agree about the supreme importance of dharma. The Veda is acknowledged as authoritative, and its validity is established against the Buddhists, who dispute it, and the seekers after knowledge, who subordinate karma to jñāna. The Mīmāṁsā is frankly polytheistic, though by implication atheistic. It accepts a realistic view of the world as against the Buddhists.

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Its importance for the Hindu religion is great. The scriptures which govern the daily life of the Hindu require to be interpreted in accordance with the Mīmāṃsā rules. Modern Hindu law is considerably influenced by the Mīmāṃsā system.

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DATE AND LITERATURE

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The Mīmāṃsā Sūtra of Jaimini presupposes a long history of Vedic interpretation, since it sums up the general rules (nyāyas) which were in use. It describes the different sacrifices and their purposes, the theory of apūrva as well as some philosophical propositions. It has twelve chapters, of which the first is of philosophical value, since it discusses the sources of knowledge and the validity of the Vedas. Jaimini tries to justify every part of the Vedas. His Saṃkarṣaṇakāṇḍa, otherwise known as Devatākāṇḍa, belongs to the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, since it bears upon upāsana (worship), which is also enjoined in the Vedas.

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The fourth century B.C. is the earliest period we can assign for Jaimini's work, which is familiar with the Nyāya and the Yoga Sūtras.¹ Śabara is the author of the chief commentary on the work of Jaimini. He lived about the first century B.C.² Evidently there were commentators on Jaimini's work prior to Śabara, such as Bhartṛmitra,³ Bhavadāsa,⁴ Hari,⁵ and Upavarṣa,⁶ but their works are not available. Śabara's work is the main basis of all later Mīmāṁsā writings.

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¹ If we accept Kumārila's view that the M.S. criticises many of the Buddhist views (see S.V., i. 1. 3, 5 and 6), it may belong to the period immediately after the rise of Buddhism. From the absence of any reference to Jaimini's work in the M.B., nothing definite can be gathered. Jaimini's work, which mentions the name of Bādarāyaṇa in five places (i. 1. 5; ii. 2. 19; vi. 1. 8; x. 8. 44; xi. 1. 64), belongs to the same period as the B.S. The latter refers to Jaimini as an authority on the Vedānta in ten different sūtras (i. 2. 28; i. 2. 31; i. 3. 31; i. 4. 18; iii. 2. 40; iii. 4. 2; iii. 4. 18; iii. 4. 40; iv. 3. 12; iv. 4. 5). Since nine of them cannot be traced to the M.S., it is sometimes urged that the Jaimini referred to in the B.S. is different from the author of the M.S. Others hold that some of Jaimini's works are lost. Jaimini in places assumes a knowledge of B.S. He adopts Bādarāyaṇa's view of ātman as non-corporeal, though he does not set forth any arguments in defence of it. The commentators suggest that he accepts Bādarāyaṇa's arguments (xi. 1. 64, and B.S., iii. 3. 53; see also M.S., ix. 1., and B.S., iii. 2. 40) and so does not re-state them.

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² Jhā: Prabhākara School, pp. 6-7. Śabara's refutations of Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda do not commit us to a later date. Jacobi thinks that the Vṛtti quoted by Śabara belongs to the period between 200 and 500 A.D., to which Śabara may also be assigned. Keith holds that 400 A.D. is the earliest date for him.

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³ Nyāyaratnākara, p, 10. See also Kāśikā, p. 10.

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⁴ S.V., i. 63.

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⁵ Śāstradīpikā, x. 2. 59-60.

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⁶ Śabara, in his commentary on i. 1. 5, transcribes a long passage from a Vṛtti (see also Śabara on ii. 3. 16 and iii. 1. 6). Kumārila refers to the

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Kumārila,¹ the vigorous exponent of Brahmanical orthodoxy which assumes the authoritativeness of the Vedas and the supremacy of the priest, commented on the Sūtra and the Bhāṣya, and his work is in three parts. The first Ślokavārttika deals with the first part of the first chapter. The second Tantravārttika takes us to the end of Chapter III, and Ṭuṭīkā covers the rest. Kumārila is earlier than Śaṁkara, and may be assigned to the seventh century A.D.² Maṇḍana Miśra, the author of Vidhiviveka and Mīmāṁsānukramaṇī, is a follower of Kumārila. He is earlier than Vācaspati (A.D. 850), who expounds the views of Vidhiviveka in his Nyāyakaṇikā. Kumārila's work has had several commentators: Sucarita Miśra, author of the Kāśikā, a commentary on the Ślokavārttika; Someśvara Bhaṭṭa, author of Nyāyasudhā, also known as Rāṇaka, a commentary on the Tantravārttika, and Pārthasārathi Miśra (A.D. 1300), author of Nyāyaratnākara, a commentary on the Ślokavārttika, as well as Śāstradīpikā, an independent manual of Mīmāṁsā system on the lines of Kumārila, and Tantraratna. Veṅkaṭa Dīkṣita's Vārttikābharaṇa is a commentary on Ṭuṭīkā.³

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¹ Kumārila, reputed to be a great champion of Hinduism, is said to be a Brahmin of Behar converted from Buddhism to Hinduism. See Eliot: Hinduism and Buddhism, vol. ii, pp. 110, 207. Tāranatha makes him a native of South India. According to the tradition, Kumārila wanted to commit himself to the flames for two sins, which are the destruction of his Buddhist guru and the practical denial of God in his anxiety to prove the eternal character of the Vedas and the exclusive efficiency of Vedic ceremonialism to salvation. See Mādhava's Saṁkaradigvijaya.

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² According to Mr. Paṇḍit, Kumārila was the guru of Bhavabhūti (A.D. 620-680), and so is assigned to A.D. 590-650. This agrees with the admitted fact that the fame of Kumārila was well established in the later days of Harṣa.

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³ Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa (author of Yuktisnehaprapūraṇī), Somanātha (author of Mayūkhamālikā), Bhaṭṭa Śaṁkara, Bhaṭṭa Dinakara, Kamalākara are followers of this school.

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Prabhākara⁴ wrote his commentary Bṛhatī on the Bhāṣya of Śabara, which it closely follows. Kumārila rejects now and then Śabara's views. From the fact that Prabhākara does not take notice of Kumārila's views, while Kumārila refers to views similar to those set forth in the Bṛhatī,⁵ it is sometimes urged that Prabhākara preceded

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⁴ According to the tradition, Prabhākara and Maṇḍana were the pupils of Kumārila, who gave Prabhākara the title of "guru" in recognition of his brilliant powers.

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⁵ i. 2. 31; i. 3. 2; i. 4. 1.

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author as Vṛttikāra. Dr. Jhā identifies him with Bhavadāsa. Pārthasārathi does not mention his name in this connection. Jacobi thinks that Bodhāyana wrote Vṛttis on both the Mīmāṁsās, even as Upavarṣa, his predecessor, did (J.A.O.S., 1911).

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Kumārila. The style of Bṛhatī is said to indicate its earlier date.¹ Śālikanātha's Ṛjuvimalā is a commentary on Bṛhatī. His Prakaraṇa-pañcikā is a popular manual of the Prabhākara system. His Pariśiṣṭa is a brief annotation on Śabara's work. Bhavanātha's Nayaviveka deals at length with Prabhākara's views. Śālikanātha, the disciple of Prabhākara, refers to Dharmakīrti.² Vācaspati, in his Nyāyakaṇikā, distinguishes between the two schools of the followers of Prabhākara.³ The third school of Mīmāṃsā, associated with the name of Murāri,⁴ is referred to in Hindu philosophical literature, though the works belonging to it have not come down to us. Mādhava's Jaiminīya Nyāyamālāvistara is an exposition of the Mīmāṃsā system in verse accompanied by a commentary in prose. Appaya Dīkṣita (1552–1624) attacks Kumārila in his Vidhirasāyana. Āpadeva (seventeenth century) wrote an elementary manual, the Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa, which is also called Āpadevī, and it is a very popular work. Laugākṣi Bhāskara's Arthasaṃgraha, which is also popular, is based on Āpadeva's work. Khaṇḍadeva (seventeenth century) wrote a work, Bhaṭṭadīpikā, which is well known for its logic. His Mīmāṃsākaustubha deals with the Sūtra,⁵

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¹ Jhā: Prabhākara School; Keith: Karma Mīmāṃsā. Professor Kuppuswāmi Śāstri supports the traditional view, and argues at some length against the position taken up by Jhā and Keith. See his paper on The Prabhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, Proceedings of the Second Oriental Conference, Calcutta. An old South Indian tradition states that Umveka was a pupil of Kumārila. Umvekaḥ kārikāṃ vetti, campūṃ vetti prabhākaraḥ Maṇḍanas tūbhayaṃ vetti nobhayaṃ vetti revaṇaḥ. Mr. Paṇḍit, in his Introduction to Gauḍavaho (Bombay Skt. Series), quotes the verse with the words Tantra and Vāmana in the places of Campū and Maṇḍana. See also Guṇaratna's Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya Vṛtti (1409). Umveka is identified with Bhavabhūti and regarded as one of the pupils of Kumārila. See also Citsukha's Advaita Pradīpikā, p. 265.

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² See Prakaraṇapañcikā, i.

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³ Jaratprābhākarāḥ and navyaprābhākarāḥ.

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⁴ Murāres tṛtīyaḥ panthāḥ.

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⁵ Rāghavānanda's Mīmāṃsāsūtradīdhiti, Rāmeśvara's Subodhinī, and Viśveśvara's (or Gāgā Bhaṭṭa) Bhaṭṭacintāmani are works of some value. Vedānta Deśika's Seśvara-Mīmāṃsā is an attempt to combine the views of the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta. The author is a follower of Rāmānuja, who holds that the two Mīmāṃsās are parts of one whole.

III Pramāṇas

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Jaimini accepts the three pramāṇas of perception, inference and śabda, or testimony. Prabhākara admits upamāna (comparison) and arthāpatti (implication). Kumārila adds anupalabdhi (non-apprehension). Aitihya (rumour) is rejected, because there can be no certainty about the validity of the resulting cognition in the absence of definite information about the source of the rumour, whether it is trustworthy or not. Recollection (smṛti) is excluded from the scope of pramāṇas, since it tells us only of things previously perceived.

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Prabhākara describes how we infer the existence of the manas and the senses. Our cognitions are ephemeral in character, and have both material (samavāyikāraṇa) and immaterial causes (asamavāyikāraṇa).¹ The material cause of cognitions is the self, and its immaterial cause cannot subsist in the cause of the self, since the self is uncaused. It must therefore subsist in the self itself. What inheres in a substance is a quality, and so the immaterial cause of cognition is a quality. If temporary qualities arise in an eternal substance, it must be due to contact with other substances. Since there is no evidence that the other substances inhere in still others, they are to be regarded as eternal. Perception, which is a positive kind of cognition, is a specific quality of the self. For such a quality to belong to eternal substances, the immaterial cause must be in the form of contact with some other substances. Such substances are either all-pervading, as space and time, or atomic. Contact with all-pervading substances cannot account for the varied nature of our cognitions. So the immaterial cause of cognition is contact with atomic substances, which is brought about by the action of motion of the atoms themselves. The atomic substance which resides in the body ensouled by the cognising self is manas, and none other could contain the substratum of the immaterial cause of the cognition of which the self is the material cause. The action of the atomic substance in the body which helps to bring about the contact is due to its contact with the self, which, in every act of cognition, puts forth an effort towards it. But, while manas can bring about such effects as pleasure, pain, it cannot give rise to qualities like colour, smell, etc. For the apprehension of these, it stands in need of other organs.² Through the contact of the external objects with the sense-organs mediated by the manas, the soul gets to know the outer world. The relation between the soul and the manas is brought about by merit and demerit, but the soul is not regarded as simply passive in its attitude to manas. Manas is included among the senses, since it perceives mental states like pleasure, pain, desire and aversion.³ It is argued that we would have a simultaneous cognition of all things at once, if we were not dependent on manas and the sense-organs.

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¹ Cp. Prakaraṇapañcikā: “Cognition of objects is temporary. Ātman is the constituent cause, and contact of ātman with manas is the auxiliary cause” (pp. 52 ff.).

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² Śāstradīpikā, p. 100.

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³ Ibid., p. 98.

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The soul brings about cognitions when it is in contact with manas. This contact is due to the action of the manas determined by the effort of the soul or the unseen destiny set in action by the previous karma of the soul. The soul is the experiencer or the enjoyer, the body is the abode of experiences, the senses are the instruments of experience. The objects of experience are of two kinds: internal, like pleasure and pain, and external, like jars and the like. Prabhākara says that our saṁvit, or consciousness, connects itself at one time with one object and not two.

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PERCEPTION

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Perception (pratyakṣa) is direct apprehension (sākṣāt pratītiḥ). It proceeds directly from sense-contact. In perception we have the contact of the object and the sense-organ, of the distinctive qualities of the object with the sense-organ, manas and the sense-organ, and the self and manas. Kumārila explains contact of the sense with the object as mere relevancy or the capacity to reveal the object, which we infer from its effect.¹ Perception relates to objects that exist, i.e. are perceptible by the senses. It cannot apprehend supersensuous objects. According to Prabhākara, objects apprehended may be substances, classes or qualities.

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¹ S.V., Pratyakṣasūtra, pp, 42-43.

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The Mīmāṁsaka accepts generally the Nyāya theory of the senses except in regard to the auditory sense. Spatial proximity and remoteness are perceived directly, not only through vision and touch, but also through hearing. Space is distinguished into deśa, or locus, and dik, or direction, and both these are directly perceived as qualifying adjuncts (viśeṣaṇas) of sounds. The auditory organ is prāpyakāri, i.e. comes into contact with the object, sound. The ear does not go out to the object, viz. sound at a distance, but the sound is propagated to the ear-drum through the air waves. This view accounts for the fact that persons near at hand apprehend sounds, while those at a distance do not. It also explains the different degrees of the intensity of sounds.² If the ear could apprehend sounds, without coming into direct contact with them, as the Buddhists imagine, then all sounds, far and near, would be simultaneously perceived through the ear, which is not the case. The ear contains a layer of air on which the current of air issuing from the speaker impinges, producing the condition under which sound is heard. The ear does not come into contact with the locus of the sound, but only with the sound which has its locus in the ear-drum. But sounds are always perceived as having their loci in different points of space, and not in the ear-drum. They reach the ear, not as mere sounds, but as coloured by the different directions from which they spring. So, sounds as well as their directions are directly perceived. Even distance is perceived through the ear, since sounds coming from a proximate point are more intense (tīvra) than those coming from a distance. So the perception of the feeble or intense character of sounds helps us to know the distance from which they issue.

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² Tīvramandādivyavasthā.

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Both Prabhākara and Kumārila adopt the distinction of determinate and indeterminate perceptions, and accept them as valid. According to Kumārila, indeterminate perception apprehends the individual, which is the substrate of its generic and specific characters, though there is no apprehension of the object as having specific or generic features.¹ Indeterminate perception is said to be due to the object itself.² In determinate perception the generic and the specific qualities are distinctly noticed.³ Pārthasārathi argues further in support of this view. On the contact of an object with the sense-organs, we have the apprehension of an object devoid of all relations. We do not as yet discriminate between the qualified and the qualifications and the generic and the specific features. If there were not indeterminate perception,⁴ for determinate perception is the apprehension of the relation between the qualified object and its qualities. The apprehension of such a relation depends on the previous apprehension of the terms of the relation. Unless these are implicitly known in indeterminate perception, they cannot be explicitly known in determinate perception. In the determinate perception of an object we remember the class to which it belongs and the name which it bears, and refer them to the object perceived. If the class and the name are not perceived at all, they cannot be remembered. So, the existence of indeterminate perception, where the genus, the name and the qualifying properties are implicitly apprehended, must be admitted.

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¹ S.V., Pratyakṣasūtra, p. 113.

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² Śuddhavastujam.

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³ S.V., Pratyakṣasūtra, p. 120.

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⁴ Śāstradīpikā, pp. 109-110. For a criticism of this view, see Jayanta's Nyāyamañjari, p. 98.

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Kumārila holds that the cognition of objects is independent of verbal expressions.¹ The class "cow" is not cognised always in the form of the word "cow," though we use the word in describing the object cognised.² While Kumārila thinks that indeterminate perception is non-determined perception, mere observation (ālocana) comparable to the apprehension of the new-born infant, where only the individual is presented to us, but not the generic or the specific features, Prabhākara believes that indeterminate perception apprehends both the class characters and the specific features; but, since other objects have not as yet entered into the apprehension, the object is not apprehended as actually belonging to a definite class. An object is apprehended as an individual only in comparison with other objects from which it is marked off; it is apprehended as belonging to a class when it is found to possess certain features in common with the other members of the class. Even though what is apprehended is actually an individual belonging to a class, its real nature cannot be cognised until it is compared with other objects of the same class.³ While class characters and specific features are present in indeterminate perception, they are not recognised as such in it. In determinate perception the self remembers other objects of the same class and notes their resemblances and differences. Prabhākara believes that determinate perception is of a mixed character, and includes in it the element of remembrance, since the other members of the class present themselves to the self by virtue of the impressions which it has had of them. But the element of remembrance does not pertain to the object perceived, but to the others with which it is compared, and so does not affect the validity of the cognition of the object itself.

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¹ S.V., Pratyakṣasūtra, p. 176.

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² Ibid., pp 180, 182.

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³ Vastvantarānusamdhānaśūnyatayā sāmānyaviśeṣarūpatā na pratīyate. See Prakaraṇapañcikā, pp. 54-55.

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Both Prabhākara and Kumārila accept the reality of universals and regard them as objects of perception. The Buddhist, on the other hand, holds that specific individuality alone is real and universality is a product of imagination.¹ The Buddhist view is criticised by Kumārila and Pārthasārathi. The universal is an object of perception, since whenever we perceive an object, we perceive it as belonging to a particular class. The act of perception involves both assimilation and discrimination. Perception is inclusive (anuvṛtta) as well as exclusive (vyāvṛtta). Inclusion depends on the reality of the universal. The act of inference is also based on it. Nor can the Buddhist contend that the universal is not real, since it is not perceived as different from the individual. For the argument that what is, must be either different or non-different,² assumes the universal being (vastutva). Nor is it correct to ask whether generality is present in its entirety in each individual or collectively in all, since such a distinction is relevant to individuals, and not to generality, which is partless. The Jaina view of the universal is also rejected.³ If universality is one with similarity, we must say “this is like a cow,” and not “this is a cow.” Besides, similarity is not possible apart from universality. Things are similar, if they possess properties in common. The universal, according to Kumārila, is not different from the individual.⁴ The relation between the two is one of identity in difference. Whether we cognise the universal or the individual depends on our interest. The universal, called also ākṛti (form) does not mean shape, but identity of character, for, ākṛti is said to belong to immaterial objects like the self. The shape of objects is destructible, but not so the class nature.⁵ “The class itself is called ākṛti, which signifies that by which the individual is characterised. It is that which is common to all the individual objects and the means of a collective idea of all these as forming one composite whole.”⁶ Pārthasārathi argues that the universal is not absolutely different from the individual. Were it so, we would not be able to perceive the universal in the individual. In the perception “this is a cow,” we have a cognition of this (iyambuddhi) as well as that of the cow (gobuddhi). The former has an individual for its object and the latter the universal. The cognitions of “this” and “cow” are different, and yet they inhere in the same object. This twofold character of perception points to the nature of the object as both universal and individual. The two are not naturally inconsistent, since both identity and difference are perceived in a single act of perception. The identity and the difference do not contradict each other, as the cognitions "this is silver" and "this is not silver" do.¹ The identity and the difference relate to different aspects of the object.

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¹ Vikalpākāramātraṁ sāmānyam. ² Yad vastu tad bhinnam abhinnam vā bhavati. ³ Na ca sādṛśyam eva sāmānyam. ⁴ S.V., Pratyakṣasūtra, p.

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¹⁴¹ Commenting on it, the Nyāyaratnākara says: “Class, etc., are not altogether different from the individual. It is a fact of common experience that the individual cow is recognised as such only when it is found to be identical with the class ‘cow.’ This could not be if the individual were totally different from the class. Such recognition of the identity of the individual with the class is the only means of knowing the class; hence there must be an identity between the individual and the class.” See also Ākṛtivāda, 8, 10, 18, 25. ⁵ Tantravārttika, i. 3. 30. ⁶ Jātim evākṛtiṁ prāhur vyaktir ākriyate yayā Sāmānyaṁ tac ca piṇḍānāṁ ekabuddhinibandhanam. (S.V., Ākṛtivāda.

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¹ *Śāstradīpikā*, p. 285.

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The followers of Prabhākara do not agree with this view. One and the same act of cognition cannot apprehend both the difference and the identity between the universal and the individual. When we perceive the difference between the universal and the individual, we must perceive the universal and the individual as distinct; when we perceive the identity between them, we should perceive only one of them, the universal or the individual. In this case a single object, the universal or the individual, would give rise to two cognitions of both the universal and the individual and their identity. But it is not possible for the universal to produce a cognition of its identity with the individual any more than for the individual to produce a cognition of its identity with the universal. It cannot therefore be said that both difference and identity are apprehended by one and the same act of cognition. Pārthasārathi contends that this argument is invalid. The cognition of two objects does not necessarily involve the cognition of their difference. When an individual member of a class is perceived for the first time, both the individual and the universal are perceived, but not the difference between them. When another individual belonging to the same class is perceived, it is assimilated to the first individual as belonging to the same class and differentiated from it as being a different individual. The cognition of two objects does not therefore involve the cognition of their difference. The cognition of a single object does not necessarily involve the cognition of its identity, as when one perceives an object at a distance and feels a doubt whether it is a post or a man.²

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² Na vastudvayapratītir eva bhedapratītiḥ; nāpy ekavastupratītir evābhedapratītiḥ (*Śāstradīpikā*, p. 287).

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The followers of Prabhākara plead that the universal and the individual cannot be identical, since the universal is eternal and common to many individuals, while the individual is non-eternal and specific. Were the universal identical with the individual, then the universal would be non-eternal and different in different individuals, and the individuals would be eternal and common to many. Pārthasāradhi argues, in reply, that a complex or multiform object may be eternal in some respects and non-eternal in others, identical with others in some features and different from them in others.³

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³ *Śāstradīpikā*, p. 288.

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Regarding the question of whole (avayavi) and part (avayava), Prabhākara believes that the whole is an object of perception. Objects as wholes exist. It is not necessary for us to perceive all the parts before the whole is perceived. If we take any physical object, atoms are the material cause of it, and their conjunction is the immaterial cause which gives the whole its uniqueness. Kumārila believes that the whole and the parts are identical, and it depends on our standpoint whether we regard an object as a whole or a number of parts.¹

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¹ S.V., Vanavāda.

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Kumārila agrees with the Naiyāyika in regarding recognition as a presentative cognition, since it is present where there is sense-activity and absent where it is not. Simply because recognition is preceded by an act of recollection, we cannot treat it as non-perceptual. Wherever we have the contact of a sense-organ with a present object we have a case of perception.²

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² S.V., Pratyakṣasūtra, pp. 234-237.

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The Mīmāṁsakas do not support the theory of Yogic intuition, by which the Yogis are said to apprehend objects which are past and future, imperceptible and distant. This intuition is either sensuous or non-sensuous. If the former, then, since the senses cannot come into contact with past, future and distant objects, there can be no cognition of them. Even the internal sense of manas can produce only cognitions of the mental states of pleasure and pain. It is meaningless to argue that the senses can comprehend objects without coming into contact with them when they attain a high degree of development, for no amount of development can change the nature of the sense-organs. If the Yogic intuition apprehends things perceived in the past, then it is a case of memory. If it apprehends objects that have not been previously apprehended, then its validity is doubtful. A knowledge of past, distant and future objects can be got only through the Vedas.³

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³ Śāstradīpikā, p. 52. See Yāmunācārya’s Siddhitraya, p. 71.

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Mental perception by which we become cognisant of pleasure, pain, and the like, is admitted by the Mīmāṁsā. A cognition, however, cannot be the object of introspection. Mental perception is restricted to non-cognitive activities. Even in dreams, what the cognition renders cognisable is some object of the external world.⁴ Though the object is not actually present at the time of dreaming, still it is something previously perceived and now revived through the impressions. The cognition that we have in dreams is of the nature of remembrance brought about by the arousing of certain impressions. Only that part of the past experience is revived in dreams which would cause happiness or unhappiness to the agent and for which he is ripe at that moment. Dreams are possible only in that form of sleep where the self is in contact with the manas, though the latter may not be in contact with the sense-organs. In deep dreamless sleep the contact of the self with the manas ceases. While this is Prabhākara’s view, Kumārila is of opinion that in deep sleep the self regains its form of pure consciousness where no dreams are possible.¹

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⁴ S.V., Nirālambanavāda, pp. 107-8; Śāstradīpikā, pp. 162-3.

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¹ Jhā : *Prabhākara School*, ii.

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INFERENCE

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According to Śabara, when a certain fixed relation has been known to subsist between two things, so that if we perceive any one of these things we have an idea of the other thing, this latter cognition is called inferential.² Śabara divides inference into two kinds: pratyakṣatoḍṛṣṭa, where the invariable relation holds between objects which are perceptible, as smoke and fire, and sāmānyatoḍṛṣṭa, where the relation is not apprehended by the senses, but known only in the abstract, as in the case of the sun’s motion and its changing position in the sky.³ According to Prabhākara, the relation must be unfailing, true and permanent, such as that which subsists between the cause and its effect, whole and part, substance and quality, class and individuals. The general principle is not derived from perception, since the latter operates only with regard to things in the present and in contact with sense-organs. It is not due to inference or implication, since these assume it. The general principle is established on the basis of experience. We observe cases where fire and smoke are present together as well as cases where they are not so present, and then infer a general principle which covers all the cases. When a permanent relation of coexistence, identity or causal nexus is fixed up in the mind, one term of it reminds us of the other.

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² Jñātasambandhasyaikadeśadarśanād ekadeśāntare ’sannikṛṣṭe ’rthe buddhiḥ. See also *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, p. 64.

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³ The sāmānyatoḍṛṣṭa of Śabara is identical with Vātsyāyana’s first explanation of it, while Vātsyāyana’s pūrvavat and śeṣavat answer to Śabara’s pratyakṣatoḍṛṣṭa.

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Inferential argument, according to Prabhākara and Kumārila, has only three members: pratijñā, or statement of the case; the major premise, which gives the general rule with the corroborative instance; and the minor premise. These three members may be stated in any order. The Mīmāṁsakas admit the distinction between inference for oneself and inference for others. The object of inferential cognition is of two kinds: dṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇa, or that which has its specific character perceived, as the inference of fire from smoke; and adṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇa, or that which has its specific character unperceived, as the inference of the burning capacity of fire. Prabhākara holds that inference involves a previous knowledge of the general relation and refers to things already known. Kumārila makes novelty an essential feature of inference. Though it is true that the smoke is seen and the perception of smoke carries with it the generic idea of fire as related to the smoke, the object of the inferential cognition is something that is not already known, i.e. the subject as qualified by the predicate, the hill as possessing fire in the usual example.¹

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¹ S.V., Anumānapariccheda, p. 50. Prabhākara accepts the four fallacies of asādhāraṇa, bādhita, sādhāraṇa and asiddha, while Kumārila’s analysis, which accepts anaikāntika and asiddha, resembles closely the Nyāya scheme.

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VEDIC TESTIMONY

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The aim of the Mīmāṁsā is to ascertain the nature of dharma. Dharma is not a physical existent, and so it cannot be apprehended through the senses. The other pramāṇas are of no use, since they all presuppose the work of perception. Perception, inference and such other sources of knowledge have nothing to say on the point that the performer of the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice will go to heaven. This knowledge is derived only from the Vedas. Though the pramāṇa of the Veda is the only source of our knowledge of dharma, the others are considered, since it is necessary to show that they cannot give rise to a knowledge of dharma. They are also found useful in repudiating wrong views.

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The kernel of the Veda consist of those declarations in injunctive form which prompt men towards certain modes of action by declaring that such action leads to beneficial results. Accepting that ritual is all in all in the Vedas, Jaimini holds that parts apparently unconnected with it are useless,¹ and so they have to be interpreted as bearing on ritual injunctions. Other texts are authoritative only in so far as they help the individual to action.² The Mīmāṃsakas attempt to prove that every part of the sacred text refers to acts of duty. The broad division of the Veda is into the Mantras and the Brāhmaṇas. The contents of the Veda are also classified into (1) injunctions (vidhi), (2) hymns (mantras), (3) names (nāmadheya), (4) prohibitions (niṣedha), and (5) explanatory passages (arthavāda).³

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¹ This view is hardly just to those portions of the Veda which deal with the ultimate problems of the universe.

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² i. 2. 1. The Vedānta admits the authority of non-injunctive Vedic texts also.

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³ Injunctions which impel one to action in expectation of certain results, such as " One who is desirous of heaven is to sacrifice " (svargakāmo yajeta), are the most important. There are subsidiary injunctions which describe the details of the sacrifice, the order in which the several parts of it are to be carried out, as well as the persons who are entitled to perform them. The mantras are largely useful in reminding the sacrificer of the different matters connected with the sacrifice, such as the deities to whom oblations are to be made. Some of the mantras are said to possess a mystical or supersensuous effect and to contribute directly to the transcendental result, apūrva. Names indicate the results to be obtained by the sacrifices. Niṣedhas are only vidhis in disguise. Arthavādas comprise the sentences which contain either praise of the things enjoined (praśaṃsa), or a censure of things prohibited (nindā), as well as description of the doings of others (parakṛti) and instances from history (purākalpa) (Arthasaṃgraha).

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Verbal cognition is defined as the cognition of something not present to the senses, produced by the knowledge of words. These words may be uttered by men or may belong to the Vedas.⁴ The former are valid if we are certain that their authors are not untrustworthy. The latter are valid in themselves. That cognition is invalid which is contradicted by a subsequent one. But the cognitions brought about by Vedic injunctions cannot be set aside at any time or place or under any conditions.¹ It is a self-contradiction to assert that the injunction expresses something which is not true. The Vedas manifest their own validity. Words used by us denote things that can be cognised by other means of knowledge; and, if we cannot know them through other means, then those who utter them must be of unquestionable authority. So non-Vedic utterances do not possess any inherent validity.² Prabhākara holds that non-Vedic verbal cognition is of the nature of inference. Only the verbal cognition afforded by the Veda is strictly verbal,³ but it is not in consistency with the other theory of the self-validity of all cognitions. Since there is no author of Vedic texts, there is no possibility of defects, and so the non-authoritativeness of the Vedas is inconceivable.⁴ As the utterances of human beings are valid, if their authors are trustworthy, Kumārila considers them also to be śabdapramāṇa.

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⁴ Apauruṣeyaṃ vākyaṃ vedaḥ (Arthasaṃgraha, p. 3).

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¹ Śabara on i. 1. 2.

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² Śastradīpikā, p. 53.

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³ Prakaraṇapañcikā, v. 3. Cp. Kusumāñjali, iii. 16.

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⁴ S.V., ii. See also ii. 62-69.

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The Vedas are eternal, since the words of which they are composed are eternal. The relationship between the word and its meaning is natural and not created by convention. That there is such a relationship between the word and its meaning is directly cognisable. If one does not recognise it, when one hears the word for the first time, it only means that the accessories are absent, but that does not make the relationship non-existent. If the eye cannot see without light, it does not mean that the eye is incapable of seeing altogether. The accessory is the knowledge that such-and-such a word denotes such-and-such an object, which is gained from experience. The expressiveness of the word belongs to it by its very nature. This is absolutely true of common names like jar and the like, where the relation of the words to their meanings is independent of any convention.⁵ Words and objects denoted by them are both eternal, and men have from time immemorial applied the same names to the same objects.

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⁵ In the case of proper names, where names are applied to things and persons after they come into existence, Prabhākara admits that the relationship between the word and the meaning is due to convention.

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According to Prabhākara, there is no such thing as mere dhvani or indistinct sound. All sounds are heard in the shape of some letter or other. The word is not different from the letters composing it. Letters are perceived by the ear, and the order in which they are perceived determines what words are cognised. There are as many perceptions as there are letters in the word, and, on account of the close proximity of the perceptions, we imagine that the perception of the word is one only. The perception of each letter vanishes as soon as it appears, and each leaves behind an impression. Impressions left by the different letters combine with that of the last and bring about the idea of the whole word which has the power to denote the meaning.¹ Since the potency of the word originates from the separate potencies of the letters, the latter are said to be the direct cause of verbal cognition. The cognition of the meaning of the word is not obtained through sense-perception. The senses present the letters which possess the power to bring about the apprehension of the thing denoted by the word composed of the letters. So Prabhākara holds that the letters are the means of verbal cognition. Words have naturally denotative powers by which they refer to objects whether we understand their meanings or not.²

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¹ Cp. Śāstradīpikā.

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² According to Prabhākara, who accepts the theory of Anvitābhidhāna-vāda, the meanings of words can be known only when they occur in a sentence enjoining some duty, and so words denote objects only as related to the other factors of such a sentence. If they are not related to an injunction, but simply remind us of meanings, it is a case of remembrance, which is not valid cognition. According to the abhihitānvayavāda accepted by Kumārila's followers, the knowledge of meanings is due to words; but this knowledge is not due to recollection or apprehension, but to denotation. Words denote meanings which, when combined, give rise to a knowledge of the sentence.

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Kumārila as well as Prabhākara argues that significance belongs to the letters themselves and not to any special sphoṭa, and therefore denies the theory according to which, apart from the momentary sounds of letters composing a word, there is a complete word-form manifestested (spota) but not produced by the passing sounds.

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Several objections against the eternal character of words in general and the Veda in particular are considered. (1) It is a fact of common experience that all verbal utterance is brought about by human effort, and so it has a beginning, and cannot be regarded as eternal. Jaimini replies that the utterance helps to make the already existing word perceptible, but it does not create it for the first time. (2) It is said that the word exists for a brief time, since it is destroyed as soon as it is uttered. The word, says Jaimini, is not destroyed, but simply reverts to its original unmanifested condition. There are many things in the world which exist unperceived. If people speak of " making " words, Jaimini holds that this " making " refers to sounds that manifest the word. (3) The same word is uttered at one and the same time by different persons at different places, and this would not be possible if the word were an eternal omnipresent entity. Jaimini replies that, as many people at different places simultaneously perceive the same sun, so do they utter the same word. (4) Words undergo modifications which cannot be the case if they were eternal. Jaimini contends that words are not modified, but others take their place. (5) The volume of the word decreases or increases according as it is uttered by one or more men, and what increases and decreases cannot be eternal. Jaimini asserts that the volume of the word never undergoes increase or decrease, though the sound proceeding from men increases or decreases.¹

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¹ i. 1. 6-17.

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Jaimini sets forth positive considerations in support of his view. The word is ever present, since the utterance of it is only for the purpose of manifesting it to others. There cannot be any effort to manifest a non-existing thing. Again, when the word " cow " is uttered, it is always recognised to be the same word. People speak of uttering the word " cow " three or four times and not of uttering three or four such words. This points to the oneness or eternal nature of the word. For non-eternal things, causes of destruction are found, but we do not find such causes for the destruction of words. The sound produced from air is distinct from the word which it serves to manifest. Besides, we have many Vedic texts insisting on the eternal nature of words.²

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² i. 18-23.

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Words denote classes and not individuals. When we say " bring a cow," we do not mean a particular cow, but any animal possessing the features of a cow. The word denotes the class or form, since it has action for its object.³ If individuals are denoted by words, a generic idea like " cow " would be impossible. Again, a word cannot denote all the individuals, since then it would possess as many potencies as there are individuals. It cannot denote a collection of individuals, since then it would be undergoing changes, as some individuals die out and others get in. Again, if the word means a single individual only, there cannot be an eternal connection between word and meaning, and action would be impossible, as it would be difficult to decide which individual is meant. If individuals are objects denoted, then since they are not omnipresent, there cannot be a relation between a word and its meaning. Ākṛti is eternal, and is therefore capable of relationship with the eternal word. While words and their significations are eternal, there is a chance of our having mistaken notions of both, and human utterances may turn out erroneous, while there is no such possibility with regard to Vedic utterances.

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³ Ākṛtis tu kriyārthatvāt (i. 3. 33).

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The Mīmāṃsakas protest against the view which regards the Vedas as the work of God. They hold that the Vedas exist for ever in their own right. God, who is incorporeal, has no organs of speech, and cannot therefore utter the words of the Veda. If it is said that he assumes a human form for the purpose of revelation, then he will be subject to all the limitations of material existence, and his utterances will not carry any authority. Besides, there is no tradition of divine or human authorship. Even on the theory of the creation of the world, the Vedas may be regarded as eternal in the sense that the creator at the beginning of any world-epoch reproduces from memory the Vedas of the last and teaches them.¹ It is sometimes contended that the Vedas are human compositions, since the names of their authors, the ṛṣis, are prefixed to them. It is said in reply that the ṛṣis made a special study of them and taught them to others. The Vedas are uncreated in the sense that they are not controlled by God or the inspired seers, who, at best, apprehend the truths and transmit them.² The authoritativeness of the Vedas is criticised on the ground that they contain references to historical names. It is said, in reply, that the hymns deal with the eternal phenomena of nature. The names occurring in them are of universal applicability and do not have any historical reference. Viśvāmitra means the all-friendly and not any historical character.

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¹ Evaṃ sraṣṭur vedapūrvatvaṃ sādhayatāṃ na kiṃcid uttaram bhavati, tena saty api sarge, suptaprabuddhanyāyena anādir eva vedavyavahāraḥ (Nyāyaratnākara). The Naiyāyikas dispute the Mīmāṃsā view. (1) Any tradition about the personal authorship of the Veda might have been interrupted at the last dissolution of the universe. (2) It would be impossible to prove that no one had ever recollected such an author. (3) The sentences of the Veda have the same character as other sentences. (4) The inference drawn from the present mode of transmitting the Vedas from teacher to pupil—that the same mode of transmission must have gone on from eternity breaks down, since it is equally applicable to any other book. (5) The Veda is, as a matter of fact, ascribed to a personal author. (6) Sound is not eternal, and when we recognise letters as the same we have heard before it does not prove identity or eternity, but only that they belong to the same species as the letters we have heard before. See S.D.S., xii.

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² See M.S., i. 1. 24-31. The views on the apauruṣeyatva of the Vedas are practically the same in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta. Cp. Bhāmatī: Puruṣāsvātantryamātram apauruṣeyatvaṃ rocayante jaiminīyā api tac cā' smākam api samānam. . . (i. 1. 3.)

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COMPARISON

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Judgments of similarity are due to comparison. When we see a certain object and remember another, the cognition that we have of the similarity of the remembered object to the seen one is said to be due to comparison. The cow that I had seen in the city is similar to the gavaya that I see now.¹ Knowledge by comparison is distinct from that by perception, since we cognise something which is not in contact with the senses by remembrance, since at the time the cow was seen the gavaya was not seen, by inference, since none of the factors necessary for inference is present.

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¹ Śāstradīpikā, p. 208.

VIII Implication

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Where the perception of a thing (artha) cannot be explained without the assumption of another thing, this assumption is a case of arthāpatti, or implication. It differs from inference, since an element of doubt enters into the facts observed, which can be removed only by the assumption of something else. The facts observed remain inconsistent or doubtful until the assumption is made. In inference there is no room for any element of doubt. While this is the view of Prabhākara, Kumārila believes that arthāpatti helps us to reconcile two apparently inconsistent facts. There is no such inconsistency between well-ascertained facts in inference. Kumārila’s view is sounder, since any doubt about the observed fact will prejudice the validity of the argument by arthāpatti. Unless we are certain that a person is alive and he is not at home, we cannot presume that he is somewhere else.

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NON-APPREHENSION

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Kumārila, after the Vṛttikāra, admits non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) as an independent source of knowledge.¹ Dissimilarity is only want of similarity, and it is accounted for by the principle of non-apprehension. When we say “There is no jar in this place,” we cognise the absence of the jar. Absence (abhāva) cannot be apprehended by perception, which stands in need of sense-contact with a present object, which is not possible in the case,² nor can non-existence be apprehended by the other pramāṇas. Non-apprehension is a means of knowledge (mānam) with reference to the object negated. We perceive the vacant space and the absence of the jar. We may say that the non-existence of the jar is as much perceived as the vacant space, yet, since perception involves contact of an actual object with the senses, we cannot identify the act of non-apprehension with perception. We perceive the vacant space, remember the jar that is absent, and then we have the knowledge of the absence of the jar, which has no reference to the act of perception. Apprehension of non-existence is through anupalabdhi.³ Abhāva is said to be a positive object.⁴ What we call emptiness is the locus unoccupied by any object.⁵

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