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Indian Philosophy v2.c26: Chapter VII The Vedānta Sūtra

Indian Philosophy v2.c26

Language
English

Contents

Chapter VII The Vedānta Sūtra

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The Vedānta and its interpretations—Authorship and date of the Sūtra—Relation to other schools—Brahman—The world—The individual self—Mokṣa—Conclusion.

I Introduction

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The Vedānta philosophy deserves closer attention not only on account of its philosophical value, but also because it is closely bound up with the religion of India and is much more alive in that continent than any other system of thought. In one or the other of its forms the Vedānta determines the world view of the Hindu thinkers of the present time.

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The term "Vedānta" means literally "the end of the Veda," or the doctrines set forth in the closing chapter of the Vedas, which are the Upaniṣads. The views of the Upaniṣads also constitute "the final aim of the Veda," or the essence of the Vedas.¹ The Vedānta Sūtra is called Brahma Sūtra, because it is an exposition of the doctrine of Brahman, and also Śarīraka Sūtra,² because it deals with the embodiment of the unconditioned self. While the Karma Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini investigates the duties (dharma) enjoined by the Veda, together with the rewards attached thereto, the Uttara Mīmāṃsā of Bādarāyaṇa describes the philosophico-theological views of the Upaniṣads.³ Together, the two form a systematic investigation of the contents of the whole Veda. The Upaniṣads are but a series of glances at truth from various points of view, and not an attempt to think out the great questions consecutively. Yet those who look upon them as revealed truth are under an obligation to show that their teaching forms a consistent whole, and Bādarāyaṇa attempts this work of systematisation. His work is not so much systematic philosophy as theological interpretation. "The work of Bādarāyaṇa stands to the Upaniṣads in the same relation as the Christian Dogmatics to the New Testament; it investigates their teaching about God, the world, the soul in its conditions of wandering and of deliverance, removes apparent contradictions in the doctrines, binds them systematically together, and is especially concerned to defend them against the attacks of opponents."¹ In five hundred and fifty-five sūtras, which consist mostly of two or three words each, the whole of the system is developed. The sūtras are unintelligible by themselves, and leave everything to the interpreter. They refuse, Proteus-like, to be caught in any definite shape. Their teaching is interpreted sometimes in the bright hues of personal theism, sometimes in the grey abstractions of absolutism. In different theological schools different traditions became established very early, which thinkers like Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja reduced to writing. The commentators, of whom the chief are Śaṃkara, Bhāskara, Yādavaprakāśa, Rāmānuja, Keśava, Nīlakaṇṭha, Madhva, Baladeva, Vallabha, and Vijñānabhikṣu,² do not all develop the same view, and it is not an easy question to settle which of them can be accepted as a guide to the right understanding of the Sūtra, for their commentaries were written at a time when the tenets had become matters of grave doubt and serious discussion. They develop their interpretations in the light of their own preconceived opinions, and sometimes overlook the literal and the obvious sense of the words in the effort to force the texts to bear testimony to the truth of their own philosophic theories. The Sūtra is one of those rare books where each, in accordance with his merits, finds his reward.

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¹ "Tileṣu tailavad vede vedāntas supratiṣṭhitaḥ" (Muktikopaniṣad). Gautama distinguishes between the Upaniṣads and the Vedānta (xxii. 9), but the tradition has always held that the Aupaniṣadas are the followers of the Vedānta.

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² Śarīra, body.

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³ Cp. Vedāntavākyakusumagrathanārthatvāt sūtrāṇām (S.B., i. 1. 1).

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¹ D.S., v. p. 21.

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² Indian tradition also makes Śuka one of the earliest commentators. Śabara, in his P.M.B., called the Vṛttikāra Upavarṣa. It is the view of Śaṃkara also (iii. 3. 53). Rāmānuja and his followers call him Bodhāyana. Vedāntadeśika declares that the same man is called by both the names. The commentaries of Drāmiḍa, Ṭaṅka, Bhartṛprapañca, Bhāruci, Kapardi, Brahmānanda and Guhadevas do not seem to be available. See S.B., i. 1. 4; i. 2. 23; i. 3. 19; i. 4. 12; iv. 3. 14.

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References to the other teachers of the Vedānta in Bādarāyaṇa’s work clearly make out that independent interpretations of the Upaniṣads different from Bādarāyaṇa’s were also in vogue.¹ Even when Bādarāyaṇa formulated his Sūtra, there were differences of opinion about such central topics as the characteristics of the released soul² and the relation of the individual soul to Brahman.³ Āśmarathya holds the bhedābheda view of the relation of the soul to Brahman, that it is neither absolutely different nor absolutely non-different from it.⁴ Auḍulomi is of opinion that the soul is altogether different from Brahman up to the time of final release, when it becomes merged in it,⁵ and Kāśakṛtsna thinks that the soul is absolutely identical with Brahman, which, in some way or other, presents itself as the individual soul.⁶ The later interpreters accept one or more of these views. The Upaniṣads obviously were subjects of considerable discussion and Bādarāyaṇa’s view of the Vedānta seems to be the outcome of a very prominent school of thought, though other schools of considerable repute also flourished.

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¹ Bādari (i. 2. 30; iii. 1. 11; iv. 3. 7; iv. 4. 10), Auḍulomi (i. 4. 21; iii. 4. 45; iv. 4. 6), Āśmarathya (i. 2. 29; i. 4. 20), Kāśakṛtsna (i. 4. 22), Kārṣṇājini (iii. 1. 9), Ātreya (iii. 4. 44), and Jaimini. Even the M.B. does not state their views.

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² iv. 3. 7–14; iv. 4. 5–7.

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³ i. 4. 20–22.

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⁴ i. 4. 20.

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⁵ i. 4. 21.

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⁶ i. 4. 22.

II Authorship and Date

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Tradition from Śaṃkara downwards attributes the Sūtra to Bādarāyaṇa. The fact that the name of the latter is mentioned in several places in the third person⁷ inclines one to think that Bādarāyaṇa is not its author.⁸ Such a use of the third person is not, however, an uncommon practice in ancient India, and it need not imply a different authorship. Indian tradition identifies Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the Sūtra, with Vyāsa. Śaṃkara’s followers, Govindānanda, Vācaspati and Ānandagiri identify Vyāsa with Bādarāyaṇa; Rāmānuja, Madhva, Vallabha and Baladeva ascribe the Sūtra to Vyāsa. Sometimes this view is contested on the ground that Jaimini, whom Bādarāyaṇa quotes a number of times, is a pupil of Vyāsa, if we believe the Mahābhārata, Viṣṇu Purāṇa and the Bhāgavata, and so the cross references in the works of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa are not consistent with the relation of disciple and master. Śabara, Govindānanda and Ānandagiri hold that there is nothing inconsistent.¹ It is not, however, clear what opinion Śaṃkara himself held.²

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⁷ i. 3. 26; i. 3. 33; iii. 2. 41; iii. 4. 1; iii. 4. 8; iii. 4. 19; iv. 3. 15; iv. 4. 7; iv. 4. 12.

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⁸ Deussen, for example, argues that the works of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa, each of whom quotes both himself and the other, were compiled by a later editor into one work, which was commented upon by Upavarṣa, and that the last work was the basis of the Śabarabhāṣya on the P.M. and the Śaṃkarabhāṣya on the B.S. (D.S.V., p. 24, fn. 17).

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¹ See Belvālkar, “Multiple Authorship of the Vedānta Sūtras,” Indian Philosophical Review, October 1918, and Abhay Kumar Guha’s Jīvātman in Brahma Sūtras, p. 8.

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² In one passage of his commentary on the B.S., Śaṃkara states that at the time of the transition from the Dvāpara to the Kali age, an ancient sage and Vedic teacher named Apāntaratamas was born as Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana by direction of Viṣṇu. Since Śaṃkara does not say that this Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana is the author of the B.S., Windischmann, and after him Telang, conclude that in Śaṃkara’s eyes the two personages were distinct (“A Note on Bādarāyaṇa,” J.A.S., Bombay, vol. xvi, 1883, p. 190). Wherever Śaṃkara quotes Vyāsa, he does so without implying that Vyāsa is the author of the Sūtra (ii. 1. 12; ii. 3. 47). There are many references to the B.G. and Śāntiparva of the M.B. in the B.S., if we accept the testimony of the commentators, which cannot be easily understood if the author of the Sūtra and the writer of the M.B. were one.

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The Sūtra alludes to the views of the Sāṃkhya and the Vaiśeṣika schools and the Jains and the Buddhists. Śaṃkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva and Vallabha are unanimous in understanding references to the Gītā (xv. 7; viii. 24), in ii. 3. 45 and iv. i. 10 respectively, and the first three see a similar reference to the Gītā (vii. 11) in iv. I. 10. Many of the names mentioned in the Sūtra are also found in the Śrauta Sūtra, Āśmarathya in the Āśvalāyana, Bādari, Kārṣṇajini and Kāśakṛtsna in the Kātyāyana, Ātreya in the Taittirīya Prātiśākhya Sūtra. Ātreya, Kāśakṛtsna, Bādari are mentioned in Bodhāyana’s Gṛhya Sūtra and Ātreya in Bhāradvāja Gṛhya Sūtra as well. Kāśakṛtsna is a very old Vedic commentator. Auḍulomi is referred to in the Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇini.³ Garuḍa Purāṇa, Padma Purāṇa and Manu refer to the Vedānta Sūtra and Hariwaṃśa, assigned by Hopkins to A.D. 200, contains clear references to it. Keith holds that Bādarāyaṇa cannot be dated later than A.D. 200.⁴ Indian scholars are of opinion that the Sūtra was composed in the period from 500 to 200 B.C. Fraser assigns it to 400 B.C.⁵ Max Müller says: “Whatever the date of the Bhagavadgītā is, and it is a part of the Mahābhārata, the age of the Vedānta Sūtra and of Bādarāyaṇa must have been earlier.”⁶

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³ iv. 1. 14.

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⁴ Karma-Mīmāṃsā, pp. 5-6. Jacobi, however, believes that the Sūtra was composed between A.D. 200 and 450 (J.A.O.S., 1911).

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⁵ Literary History of India, p. 196.

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⁶ S.S., p. 113; Guha: Jīvātman in the Brahma Sūtra

Relation to Other Schools

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The exact relation of Bādarāyaṇa's Vedānta to Jaimini's Mīmāṃsa is interpreted in different ways by the different commentators.¹ Rāmānuja, after Vṛttikāra, holds that the two Mīmāṃsās belong to one work, while Śaṃkara is of a different opinion. It may be that the two originally formed parts of the same treatise.² The two Mīmāṃsās are pre-eminently orthodox systems, and were originally and primarily exegeses of Śruti or Veda or revelation. Bādarāyaṇa does not mention the Nyāya anywhere. The Yoga is linked with the Sāṃkhya, and the criticisms against the Sāṃkhya are said to hold good against the Yoga as well.³ The Sāṃkhya receives elaborate refutation,⁴ and is mentioned in many places.⁵ It is the one system which is treated with great respect, partly because some of its doctrines are acceptable to Bādarāyaṇa and partly because it is supported by sages like Manu and Vyāsa.⁶ The Vaiśeṣika doctrines are criticised,⁷ and we gather that, in Bādarāyaṇa's time, the Vaiśeṣika system was not in great repute. The several schools of Buddhism, the Lokāyata and the Bhāgavata doctrines are also discussed.⁸ The author of the Sūtra is considerably influenced by the theism of the Bhagavadgītā and the Bhāgavatas.

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¹ Bādarāyaṇa refers to Jaimini in several places: i. 2. 28; i. 2. 31; i. 3. 31; i. 4. 18; iii. 2. 40; iii. 4. 2; iii. 4. 18; iii. 4. 40; iv. 3. 12; iv. 4. 5; iv. 4. 11.

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² See R.B., i. 1. 1; Jacobi: J.A.O.S., 1910. Deussen has suggested an analogy in the sequence of the N.T. upon the old, when life under the law passes into life in spirit (D.S.V., p. 20).

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³ ii. 1. 3.

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⁴ i. 1. 5-11; i. 4. 1-13; ii. 1. 1-12; ii. 2. 1-10.

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⁵ i. 1. 18; i. 2. 19; i. 2. 22; i. 3. 3; i. 3. 11; i. 4. 28; ii. 1. 29; ii. 3. 51; iv. 2. 21.

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⁶ See S.B., i. 4. 28.

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⁷ ii. 2. 11-17.

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⁸ See ii. 2. 1-45; i. 4. 28; iii. 3. 53-54.

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IV

Metaphysical Views

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The Vedānta Sūtra has four chapters. The first deals with the theory of Brahman as the central reality. Its purpose is samanvaya or reconciliation of the different Vedic statements on this subject. Any interpretation of religion, any explanation of God, soul and the world is bound to take account of the religious experiences of those who declare that they have seen the eternal, and all conflicts among the recorded experiences of the sages of the past require to be reconciled if the theory put forward is to be looked upon as a satisfactory one. We have, in the first chapter, an account of the nature of Brahman, its relation to the world and the individual soul. The second (avirodha) meets objections brought against this view and criticises rival theories. It also gives an account of the nature of the dependence of the world on God and the gradual evolution from and reabsorption into him, and in the latter part¹ there are interesting psychological discussions about the nature of the soul, its attributes, its relation to God, body and its own deeds. The third discusses the ways and means (sādhana) of attaining Brahma-vidyā. We have in it an account of rebirth and minor psychological² and theological³ discussions, together with many exegetical comments. The fourth deals with the fruits (phala) of Brahma-vidyā. It also describes in some detail the theory of the departure of the soul after death along the two paths of the gods and the fathers and the nature of the release from which there is no return. Each chapter has four parts (pādas), and the sūtras in each part fall into certain groups called adhikaraṇas. Some textual differences in the readings adopted by the different commentators are found, though they are not all of great importance.⁴

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¹ ii. 3. 15 onwards.

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² iii. 2. 1. 10.

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³ iii. 2. 11-41.

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⁴ See Belvālkar: The Multiple Authorship of the Vedānta Sūtras, pp. 144-145, I.P.R.

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For Bādarāyaṇa the Veda is eternal⁵ and the śāstra is the great authority.⁶ He declares openly that there is no possibility of discovering metaphysical truth by means of tarka or reflection.⁷ He admits that there are two sources of knowledge, śruti and smṛti, and calls them pratyakṣam (perception) and anumānam (inference)⁸ possibly because the latter, as Śaṃkara suggests, requires a basis of knowledge (prāmāṇyam), and the former not. The revealed śruti, which is self-evident, is called pratyakṣam. By śruti Bādarāyaṇa understands the Upaniṣads, and by smṛti he means the *Bhagavadgītā*, the *Mahābhārata*, the *Code of Manu*. As in the world of secular knowledge, inference rests on perception, so is smṛti dependent on śruti. Bādarāyaṇa admits of no other pramāṇas. He makes a distinction between two spheres of existence, the thinkable, which is the region of prakṛti, with the elements, mind, intellect and egoity, and the unthinkable, which is Brahman. In the latter, śāstras are our only guide.¹ Any reasoning which is not in conformity with the Veda is useless for Bādarāyaṇa. Reasoning proceeds from characteristic marks. But of Brahman we cannot say that it is characterised by this or that to the exclusion of other attributes. Reasoning, therefore, is subordinate to intuitional knowledge,² which can be obtained by devotion and meditation.³

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⁵ i. 3. 29.

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⁶ i. 1. 3.

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⁷ ii. 1. 11.

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⁸ i. 3. 28; iii. 2. 24; iv. 4. 20.

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¹ i. 1. 3; ii. 1. 27.

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² ii. 1. 6; ii. 1. 11.

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³ iii. 2. 24.

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According to the *Vedānta Sūtra*, the puruṣa and prakṛti of the Sāṃkhya are not independent substances, but modifications of a single reality. A plurality of true infinites is not possible. The one infinite substance, Brahman, is identified with the highest reality set forth in the Upaniṣads. In the first chapter we have a discussion of the several descriptions of Brahman given in the Upaniṣads.⁴ He is the origin, support and end of the world,⁵ the efficient and the material cause of the universe. He creates without implements.⁶ A psychological proof of the reality of Brahman is offered on the evidence of dreamless sleep.⁷ Brahman is not to be confused with the unintelligent pradhāna, or the individual soul. He is possessed of all dharmas,⁸ and is the inner law and guide.⁹ He has the qualities of purity, truth of purpose, omniscience, omnipotence, etc.¹⁰ His cosmic aspects are also brought out. He is the cosmic light, the golden person in the Sun, the cosmic space or ākāśa, and the cosmic breath or air or prāṇa.¹¹ He is also the light in the soul.¹² He is to be contemplated as residing in the heart of man,¹³ and we are allowed to look upon the omnipresent God as occupying a limited space. The ultimate ground of things is a single supreme spirit, which is the source of everything, and an adequate object of unqualified adoration and worship.¹

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⁴ i. 2 and 3.

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⁵ i. 1. 2.

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⁶ ii. 1. 23-27

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⁷ i. 1. 9.

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⁸ ii. 1. 37.

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⁹ i. 1. 20.

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¹⁰ i. 2. 1-2; ii. 1. 30.

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¹¹ i. 1. 20-23.

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¹² i. 1. 24.

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¹³ i. 2. 7.

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¹ i. i. 7.

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How are unintelligent things and intelligent souls to be related to the one supreme? Are we to regard them, as the Gītā does, as the higher and the lower manifestations of the one reality? The Sūtra does not give a clear lead. The vagueness of the Upaniṣad view of creation remains in it. Brahman, itself uncreated and eternal,² is the cause of the whole universe.³ Every material element is created by Brahman.⁴ If, through the activity of the primary elements, the evolution of the world takes place, even then it is Brahman that conferred the power through the exercise of which the evolution takes place. As it is said, Brahman, after creating the elements, enters them; and it is Brahman dwelling in the elements that effects the production of other things.⁵

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² ii. 3. 9.

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³ i. i. 5; i. 2. i; ii. i. 22; i. I. 22.

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⁴ ii. 3. 7.

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⁵ ii. 3 .13.

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It has already been said that Brahman is the material cause as well as the instrumental cause of the world.⁶ Brahman is the creator of all things, and transforms himself into all things, as clay or gold becomes things of clay or of gold. In the Sūtra⁷ the nature of the relation between the cause and the effect, Brahman and the world, is discussed. The identity of cause and effect is brought out by two illustrations. Just as a piece of cloth, when rolled up, does not show its nature properly, but shows its nature fully when spread out, though the same piece of cloth is present in the two cases, so cause and effect are the same though their qualities differ.⁸ Just as, when breath is held up, the individual is not able to perform any action, though he continues to live, and, when the breath is let loose, he is able to move the limbs, the breath remaining the same throughout, similarly cause and effect produce different actions, though they really are the same.⁹ Brahman and the world are not different (ananya),¹⁰ even as the clay pot is not different from clay.¹¹ While the commentators agree that the cause is not different from the effect, the nature of the identity of Brahman and the world is differently explained by them. To Bādarāyaṇa, ananya does not mean absence of difference or change. For the explanation of this change Śaṃkara postulates avidyā. The world exists only for those who are under the influence of avidyā, even as the imagined serpent exists only for the man who has the wrong view of the rope. The other commentators hold to the theory of pariṇāma or transformation. The instances of cause and effect given in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad are earth, gold and iron, and things made of them, and not rope and snake or shell and silver. Finite things are real as determinations of Brahman. The statement that Brahman is the material cause of the world suggests that the world is a modification of the substance of Brahman.¹ The world is not an illusion or a dream-like structure, but a real, positive something which has its origination, existence and absorption in Brahman.² Bādarāyaṇa believes that the power of creation belongs to the pure, stainless Brahman, even as heat belongs to fire.³ Brahman for its own sport⁴ develops⁵ itself into the world without undergoing the least change⁶ and without ceasing to be itself. Bādarāyaṇa does not care to explain how this is possible. He does not even say, as Rāmānuja and others urge, that Brahman has wonderful powers by which even the inconceivable might be achieved. He invites our attention to the apparently contradictory statements contained in the śruti, and warns us that we have no right to question the authority of the śruti. From a philosophical point of view this answer is unsatisfactory. Śaṃkara explains the situation and shifts the contradiction from the śruti to the individual mind, and contends that Brahman is not transformed into the world. We, the victims of the confusion, believe that the one changes into the other. He holds that the ultimate reality is Brahman, the indeterminate spirit, and argues that the world of knower, known and knowledge is somehow in Brahman. Rāmānuja is of a different opinion. He resorts to śruti when he is confronted by the difficulty of a pure, secondless Brahman having the beginningless (anādi) course of the world (jagatpravāha) for its second. The impossible is possible with God,¹ who has wonderful powers.²

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⁶ i. 4. 23-27.

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⁷ ii. I. 14-20.

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⁸ ii. i. 19, S.B.

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⁹ ii. i. 20, S.B. The effect, according to Rāmānuja, is a transformed condition of the cause. Even Śaṃkara owns that the world is only an avasthāntara of Brahman as cloth of threads.

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¹⁰ ii. i. 14.

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¹¹ i. i. 4; i. 4. 22.

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¹ i. 1. 26. See also ii. 3. 7.

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² iii. 2. 3.

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³ i. 3. 1.

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⁴ ii. 1. 33.

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⁵ i. 4. 26.

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⁶ ii. 1. 27.

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¹ See R.B., ii. 1. 27.

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² According to the B.S. (iii. 2. 3), the world is not māyā as dreams are. The word "māyā" is, as is clear from the later Vedānta, highly ambiguous. We may take it to mean arthapratyayaśūnyatva with Bhāskara, or dṛṣṭanaṣṭasvarūpatva with Śaṃkara, or āścaryātmakatva with Rāmānuja, or sarvabhāvanāsāmarthya with Vallabha.

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Bādarāyaṇa³ says that the soul is jña, which Śaṃkara interprets as intelligence, while Rāmānuja takes it as an intelligent knower. Vallabha agrees with Śaṃkara, while Keśava thinks that the soul is both intelligence and knower. The individual soul is an agent (kartā).⁴ Birth and death refer to the body and not the soul,⁵ which has no beginning. It is eternal.⁶ The jīvātman is said to be aṇu, of the size of an atom. Rāmānuja, Madhva, Keśava, Nimbārka, Vallabha and Śrīkaṇṭha accept this view. Śaṃkara is of opinion that the soul is all-pervading or vibhu, though it is considered to be atomic in the worldly condition.⁷ Bādarāyaṇa holds that Brahman is in the individual soul, though the nature of Brahman is not touched by the character of the soul.⁸ As the jīva and Brahman are different as the light of the sun and the sun, and as when the light is covered by clouds the sun is not affected, even so, when the jīva is subject to pain, Brahman is not.⁹ The embodied self acts and enjoys, acquires merit and demerit, and is affected by pleasure and pain, while the highest self has an opposite nature and is free from all evil.¹⁰ The statements "That art thou" and "This ātman is Brahman" attempt to show that the two, Brahman and ātman, God and man, are in reality one. If Brahman be the cause of everything, it must be the cause of the individual soul as well. The absolute divine essence is present in all its manifestations. Every individual shares in the spirit of God. It is not clear, from Bādarāyaṇa's account, in what exact manner the individual is related to Brahman, as a part (aṃśa) or reflection (ābhāsa) of the universal self.¹¹ Bādarāyaṇa points out that Āśmarathya, Auḍulomi, and Kāśakṛtsna take up different positions with regard to the relation of the individual soul to Brahman. Āśmarathya thinks that the soul is a part of Brahman, even in a spatial sense. Auḍulomi holds that, in deep sleep, the soul is temporarily in union with Brahman. Kāśakṛtsna, whose opinion Śaṃkara upholds, believes that Brahman exists, whole and undivided, in the form of the individual soul, and Bādarāyaṇa simply mentions these different opinions, but does not say which view he supports.¹ The passage that the jīva is a part (aṃśa) of the highest reality is taken by Śaṃkara to mean "a part as it were" (aṃśa iva).² Since Brahman, who is not composed of parts, cannot have parts in the literal sense, Bhāskara and Vallabha assert that the jīva is a part of the Lord because there is difference as well as identity between them. Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Baladeva and Śrīkaṇṭha think that the jīva is a real part of Brahman, even as the light issuing from a luminous object like the fire or the sun is a part of that object. The view that the jīva is both different and not different from the supreme, even as a serpent is both different and not different from its folds,³ is refuted. Rāmānuja, however, takes the sūtra as dealing with the relation of Brahman to matter, and disputes the view that matter is only a different posture of Brahman and not different from it, even as the folds of the serpent are only a different position of and not different from the serpent. Rāmānuja contends that both jīva and matter are parts of Brahman. Keśava argues that matter is both different from and one with Brahman, even as the serpent and its hood are different and also not different when the serpent is viewed as a whole. Matter is identical with Brahman inasmuch as its very existence depends on Brahman, and it is different from Brahman since it has name and form. The jīva is also different and not different from Brahman, and the difference is certainly real.⁴ There is strong support for the view that Bādarāyaṇa looks upon the difference between Brahman and the individual soul as ultimate, i.e. something which persists even when the soul is released. The jīva, though minute in size, pervades the whole body even as a little sandal ointment refreshes the whole body.⁵

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³ ii. 3. 18.

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⁴ ii. 3. 33-39.

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⁵ ii. 3. 16.

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⁶ ii. 3. 18.

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⁷ See ii. 2. 19-28. The jīvas, according to the B.S., are of four classes: those born of uterus (jarāyuja), of eggs (aṇḍaja), or moisture (svedaja), and of plants (udbhijja). All of them are considered to be conscious, though in different degrees. The plants are not able to express their consciousness on account of the predominance of tamas.

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⁸ i. 2-8.

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⁹ ii. 3. 46. See Keśava on it.

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¹⁰ i. 1. 17. See also ii. 1. 22.

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¹¹ ii. 2. 43 and 50.

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¹ i. 4. 19-22.

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² ii. 3. 43, S.B.

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³ iii. 2. 27.

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⁴ Keśava on iii. 2. 27-28.

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⁵ ii. 3. 23. According to the Sūtra, the jīva has its seat in the hṛdaya or the hṛtpadma, which is a subtle centre of the spinal cord of the nervous system, where different nerves, 101 in number, meet. Of them all, the suṣumṇā passes up to the cranium. At the approach of death, the knowing soul, through the grace of the Lord, breaks open the knot of the hṛdaya and enters the path suṣumṇā, and passes out of the body, piercing the skull (iv. 2. 17). When the jīva passes out of the body, it does so enveloped by the subtle senses, mind (manas), and the chief prāṇa (iii. 1. 1-7; iv. 2. 3-21). It takes rebirth along with them.

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The world is due to the will (saṃkalpa) of God. It is his līlā, or play. It does not, however, mean that he created sin and suffering for his joy or, as it is sometimes put in some religious schemes, that there may be inferior creatures who will praise and glorify him for his eternal greatness. A God all blissful, who delights in the suffering of creatures, is no God at all. The diversity of mankind is determined by the karma of the individuals.¹ God is limited by the necessity of taking into account the previous lives of men. The unequal distribution of happiness is the expression of the moral order of which God's will is the embodiment. So Brahman is neither partial nor pitiless, and has not the delightful freedom and irresponsibility which some theologians would like to attribute to him. If God's inexorable impartiality is saved by the doctrine that he renders unto every man according to his work, the other view that God himself is the causal agent of right and wrong conduct² remains unexplained. If God pulls the strings for every kind of action, then he is the agent as well as the patient. He seems to be inextricably involved in the endless succession, and is also the giver to himself of the fruits of good and evil. Here again the Sūtra resorts to śruti, but does not attempt to remove the contradiction.

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¹ ii. i. 34.

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² iii. 2. 41; Kauṣītaki Up., iii. 8.

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In chapter iii of the Sūtra it is pointed out how ethical discipline can secure for the individual a body fit for the acquirement of absolute knowledge or Brahmajñāna. The general rules of the Upaniṣads regarding the purification of the instruments in our possession are accepted.³ The three upper classes are, as a rule, allowed the right to perform sacrifices, etc., and even śūdras and women attain salvation through the grace of the Lord.⁴ The author finds that active service and renunciation of the world get equal support from the scriptures,⁵ and is himself inclined towards the combining of the spirit of renunciation with strenuous life.⁶ Action done out of ignorance, but not all action, impedes the rise of spiritual perception or jñāna.⁷ Whatever freedom we might have after attaining release, on earth, even in the jīvanmukta condition, action is enjoined.⁸ Following the Upaniṣads, the Sūtra allows worship of gods who grant blessings to their devotees, though even these are governed by the supreme.⁹ The reality is beyond and not contained in the pratīkas, or symbols, which are permitted in view of the weakness of man.¹⁰ The absolute is avyakta or unmanifested, though he is seen in the state of *samrādhana*.¹ The highest kind of religion is the possession of God-vision. Those who are incapable of developing this spiritual intuition rely on the *śāstras*. The ultimate end of the individual is the attainment of the self.² We cannot say whether this union with the self is of the nature of identity or communion and fellowship. Bādarāyaṇa believes in *jīvanmukti* or liberation in life. Knowledge of Brahman puts an end to the karmas which have not begun to operate,³ though the body lasts until the karmas which have started to operate (*ārabdha*) are exhausted.⁴

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³ ii. 3. 40-42.

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⁴ i. 3. 34-38; iii. 4. 38.

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⁵ iii. 4. 9.

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⁶ iii. 4. 32-35.

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⁷ iii. 4. 26.

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⁸ iii. 4. 32.

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⁹ iii. 2. 38-41.

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¹⁰ iv. i. 4.

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¹ iii. 2. 23-24.

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² i. 1. 9.

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³ iv. 1. 13-15.

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⁴ iv. 1. 19.

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In chapter iv we have an account of how the individual soul reaches Brahman through the *devayāna*, whence there is no return. In iv. 4. 5-7, the characteristics of the released soul come up for discussion. According to Auḍulomi, its chief feature is thought. Jaimini maintains that it has a number of exalted qualities, and the author of the *Sūtra* declares himself in favour of a combination of these two views. After mentioning the almost infinite power and knowledge which will come to the liberated soul on attaining *mokṣa*, the author remarks that none, however, will get the power of creating, ruling and dissolving the universe,⁵ since that belongs to God alone. Madhva and Rāmānuja easily explain this passage, since it is in line with their doctrine of the eternal distinction of soul and God.⁶ Bādarāyaṇa, however, is not explicit on this question. While some passages declare the difference to be permanent,⁷ others explain it away.⁸

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⁵ iv. 4. 17.

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⁶ i. 1. 17.

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⁷ iv. 4. 17 and 21.

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⁸ iv. 2. 13 and 16.

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V

Conclusion

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Bādarāyaṇa affirms a monistic view of the world. He will have nothing to do with polytheism or a plurality of independent and equally ultimate reals or unoriginate souls or a dualism between God and the Evil One. He accepts the two views of Brahman as the indeterminate intelligence (*nirviśeṣa* cinmātra) held by Bādari, Kāśakṛtsna and Auḍulomi, and determinate personal Lord (saviśeṣa) held by Āśmarathya and Jaimini. From the nature of the Sūtra, it is not possible to set forth the way in which these two accounts are reconciled in the mind of the author. The Upaniṣads declare that Brahman is avikārī or changeless, nityam or eternal. The world is changing and impermanent. How can such an effect issue from such a cause? The Sūtra simply asserts on the basis of śruti that Brahman develops itself into the universe and remains transcendent.¹

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¹ i. 4. 27.

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The attempt at a more adequate definition of the causality of Brahman (brahmakāraṇatā) leads to divergent views. Śaṃkara argues that Brahman produces the world without undergoing any substantial change, Rāmānuja and Vallabha believe that the world is the actual product of Brahman, i.e. Brahman is really transformed into the world. Again, Bādarāyaṇa says, though Brahman is in the individual soul, still, there is no pollution of Brahman by the defects of the individual on account of the difference in nature between the two.² He asserts both identity and difference between Brahman and the individual soul. There is no logical statement of this position. Śaṃkara finds it impossible to make the Sūtrakāra’s ideas of Brahman applicable to the nirguṇa, nirviśeṣa Brahman of the Upaniṣads, while the other commentators are willing to take the Sūtrakāra’s definitions as relevant to the highest Brahman. The latter argue that the Sūtrakāra is unaware of the theory of a twofold Brahman or of the unreality of the world. The author of the Sūtra could not have refuted the Sāṃkhya and discussed the theories of creation so seriously, if he had held that the world was an appearance, in which case its creatorship was out of the question. It may well be that Bādarāyaṇa believes in a really changing aspect of the Divine nature, a svagatabheda, which enables Brahman to manifest itself in various objects and under the limitations of individual life. A clear statement is, however, lacking.

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² i. 2. 8.

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The state of the released soul is one of non-separation (avibhāga) from Brahman. This simple formula of non-separation is capable of varied interpretations which it gets from the later commentators. Śaṃkara takes it to mean a complete identification with the universal self, while Rāmānuja interprets it as a partial assimilation to God. Room is found for both in Śaṃkara’s system. On the question of ethics, Bādarāyaṇa does not discuss the relation of renunciation to action and the efficacy of these to the attainment of the end. In religion, he looks upon Brahman as unmanifested (avyakts), and yet as an object of spiritual perception. The two require to be reconciled.

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The *Sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa reflects the indecision and vagueness characteristic of the Upaniṣads, whose teachings it attempts to set forth, and harbours within it many seeds of doubt and discussion. Any attempt at a more precise characterisation of the views of the sūtras is bound to contain many rocks of offence and sources of spiritual disturbance. We shall see in the sequel how identical formulas give rise to various interpretations through the differences of spiritual setting into which they are received.

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THE ADVAITA VEDĀNTA OF ŚAṀKARA

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Introduction—Date—Life and personality of Śaṁkara—Literature—Gauḍapāda’s Kārikā—Buddhist influence—Analysis of experience—Causation—Creation—Ethics and religion—Relation to Buddhism—General estimate of Gauḍapāda’s position—Bhartṛhari—Bhartṛprapañca—Śaṁkara’s relation to the Upaniṣads and the Brahma Sūtra—Relation to Buddhism and other systems of philosophy—The reality of Ātman—Its nature—Theory of knowledge—Mechanism of knowledge—Perception, its nature and varieties—Inference—Scriptural testimony—Refutation of subjectivism—Criterion of truth—Inadequacy of logical knowledge—Self-consciousness—Adhyāsa—Anubhava—Scriptural authority—Higher wisdom and lower knowledge—Śaṁkara and Kant, Bergson and Bradley—The objective approach—Reality and existence—Space, time and cause—The world of phenomena—Brahman—Saguṇa and Nirguṇa—Īśvara—Proofs for the existence of God—Brahman and Īśvara—Personality—Creation—The phenomenal character of Īśvara—Being, not-being and becoming—The phenomenality of the world—The doctrine of māyā—Avidyā—Is the world an illusion?—Avidyā and māyā—The world of nature—The individual self—Sākṣin and jīva—Brahman and jīva—Avacchedavāda—Bimbapratibimbavāda—Īśvara and jīva—Ekajīvavāda and Anekajīvavāda—Ethics—Charges of intellectualism and asceticism considered—Jñāna and Karma—Karma and freedom—Mokṣa—Future life—Religion—Conclusion.

I Introduction

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THE Advaitism of Śaṁkara is a system of great speculative daring and logical subtlety. Its austere intellectualism, its remorseless logic, which marches on indifferent to the hopes and beliefs of man, its relative freedom from theological obsessions, make it a great example of a purely philosophical scheme. Thibaut, who cannot be charged with any partiality for Śaṁkara, speaks of his philosophy in these words: "The doctrine advocated by Śaṁkara is, from a purely philosophical point of view, and apart from all theological considerations, the most important and interesting one which has arisen on Indian soil; neither those forms of the Vedānta which diverge from the view represented by Śaṃkara, nor any of the non-Vedāntic systems can be compared with the so-called orthodox Vedānta in boldness, depth and subtlety of speculation.” ¹ It is impossible to read Śaṃkara’s writings, packed as they are with serious and subtle thinking, without being conscious that one is in contact with a mind of a very fine penetration and profound spirituality. With his acute feeling of the immeasurable world, his stirring gaze into the abysmal mysteries of spirit, his unswerving resolve to say neither more nor less than what could be proved, Śaṃkara stands out as a heroic figure of the first rank in the somewhat motley crowd of the religious thinkers of mediæval India. His philosophy stands forth complete, needing neither a before nor an after. It has a self-justifying wholeness characteristic of works of art. It expounds its own presuppositions, is ruled by its own end, and holds all its elements in a stable, reasoned equipoise. The list of qualifications ² which Śaṃkara lays down for a student of philosophy brings out how, for him, philosophy is not an intellectual pursuit but a dedicated life. The first, “discrimination between things eternal and non-eternal,” demands of the student the power of thought, which helps him to distinguish between the unchanging reality and the changing world. For those who possess this power, it is impossible to desist from the enterprise of metaphysics. “Renunciation of the enjoyment of the reward here and in the other world” is the second requirement. In the empirical world and man’s temporal life within it there is little to satisfy the aspirations of spirit. Philosophy gets its chance, as well as its justification, through the disillusionment which life brings. The seeker after truth must refuse to abase himself before things as they are and develop an austere detachment characteristic of the superior mind. Moral preparation is insisted on as the third requisite,³ and, lastly, longing for liberation (mumukṣutvam) is mentioned. We must have a mind disposed, as St. Luke expresses it, “for eternal life.”¹ Śaṁkara presents to us the true ideal of philosophy, which is not so much knowledge as wisdom, not so much logical learning as spiritual freedom. For Śaṁkara, as for some of the greatest thinkers of the world, Plato and Plotinus, Spinoza and Hegel, philosophy is the austere vision of eternal truth, majestic in its freedom from the petty cares of man’s paltry life. Through the massive and at the same time subtle dialectic of Śaṁkara there shows forth a vivid, emotional temperament, without which philosophy tends to become a mere game of logic. A master of the strictest logic, he is also master of a noble and animated poetry which belongs to another order. The rays of his genius have illumined the dark places of thought and soothed the sorrows of the most forlorn heart. While his philosophy fortifies and consoles many, there are, of course, those to whom it seems to be an abyss of contradiction and darkness. But whether we agree or differ, the penetrating light of his mind never leaves us where we were.

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¹ Introduction to B.S., p. xiv. The system of Śaṃkara, according to Sir Charles Eliot, “in consistency, thoroughness and profundity, holds the first place in Indian philosophy” (Hinduism and Buddhism, vol. ii, p. 208).

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² S.B., Introduction.

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³ S.B., ii. 1.1.

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¹ Acts, xiii.

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DATE AND LIFE OF ŚAṀKARA

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According to Telang, Śaṁkara flourished about the middle or the end of the sixth century A.D.² Sir R. G. Bhāndārkar proposes A.D. 680 as the date of Śaṁkara’s birth, and is even inclined to go a few years earlier.³ Max Müller and Professor Macdonell hold that he was born in A.D. 788, and died in A.D. 820. That he flourished in the first quarter of the ninth century is also the opinion of Professor Keith.⁴

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The picture of a solitary ascetic thinker, at home in austere meditation as well as in practical work, touches our imagination. Some of Śaṁkara’s disciples compiled biographical accounts of which the chief are Mādhava’s Śaṃkaradigvijaya and Ānandagiri’s Śaṃkaravijaya.¹ Śaṃkara belonged to the simple, learned and hardworking Nambūdri sect of Brahmins of Malabar, and is generally supposed to have been born at Kāladi, on the West Coast of the peninsula.² Though there is a tradition that Śiva was the family deity of Śaṃkara, it is also held that he was by birth a Śākta. Early in his youth he went to a Vedic school, presided over by Govinda, the pupil of Gauḍapāda. In all his works, Śaṃkara subscribes himself as the pupil of Govinda, who evidently taught him the main principles of the Advaita system. Even while a young boy of eight he is said to have devoured with avidity and delight all the Vedas. Apparently he was a youthful prodigy of Vedic learning and free intelligence. He was impressed with the mystery and importance of life, and had an early vision of the beauty of holiness. Before he learned the ways of the world, he rejected them and became a saññyāsin. But he was no passionless recluse. The pure flame of truth burned within him. He wandered as a teacher from place to place, engaging in discussions with the leaders of other schools of thought. According to the traditional accounts, he met, in the course of these tours, Kumārila ³ and Maṇḍana Miśra, who later became his disciple under the name of Sureśvarācārya.⁴ The story of his entering the dead body of Amaruka shows that Śaṃkara was an adept in yogic practices. He established four mutts or monasteries, of which the chief is the one at Śringeri in the Mysore Province. The others are those at Pūri in the East, Dvārakā in the West, and Badarināth in the Himalayas. A touching incident, about which tradition is unanimous, shows how full of the milk of human kindness and filial affection Śaṃkara was. In open defiance of the rules which govern the order of Saññyāsins, Śaṃkara performed the funeral rites of his mother, and thus incurred the serious opposition of his community. He died at Kedārnāth in the Himalayas at the age of thirty-two, according to the tradition. To us, men of life and feeling, there seems to be a certain bareness in the life of Śaṃkara lacking the colour and joy of cheerful fellowship and social amusement, but this is generally the case with those who pursue the higher life and feel called to exalt God’s righteousness and the claims of spirit. He was a prophet commissioned to lead a people along the paths of virtue, and nobody in India can undertake this task if he does not back his message with a life of detachment from the cares of the world.

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⁴⁸ See I.P., pp. 45-46. ² His argument is that Pūrṇavarman referred to in Śaṁkara’s commentary on the B.S. was a Buddhist king of Magadha about that time. ³ See the Report on the Search for Sanskrit MSS., 1882, p. 15. ⁴ I.L.A., p.

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³⁰ In the Nāndiśloka of Prabodhacandrodaya of Kṛṣṇa Miśra (middle of sixth century A.D. circa), the most popular illustrations of the conception of māyā as those of the mirage and the snake-rope are given; but they need not be taken as borrowings from Śaṁkara, since they are to be met with in Buddhist writings also.

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¹ Cidvitasa and Sadānanda wrote some accounts. Skanda Purāṇa gives a few facts (see ix). A Madhva writer, Nārāyaṇācārya, relates some details in his Madhvavijaya and Maṇimañjari. But many of the facts mentioned in these are legendary and of doubtful historical value. See Life and Times of Śaṃkara, by C. N. Kṛiṣnaswāmi Aiyar, Madras.

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² Ānandagiri holds that Śaṃkara was born at Cidambaram in 44 B.C. and died in 12 B.C. His views have not received much support.

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³ A South Indian tradition states that Śaṃkara was a disciple of Kumārila.

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⁴ Professor Hiriyanna of Mysore has urged cogent arguments against the identification of Sureśvara with Maṇḍana Miśra. See J.R.A.S., April 1923, and January 1924.

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In a few years Śaṁkara practised several careers, each enough to satisfy an ordinary man. His great achievement in the field of speculation is the Advaita system which he developed by means of commentaries on the ancient texts. He found it the best way to reconcile contemporary standards of knowledge and belief with the ancient texts and traditions. The sixth and the seventh centuries saw the rise of popular Hinduism. In the South, Buddhism had begun to decline¹ and Jainism was at its zenith. The Vedic rites were falling into disrepute. Śaivite bhaktas (adiyārs) and Vaiṣṇavite devotees (aḷvārs) were popularising the way of devotion to God. Festivals and temple worship connected with Purāṇic Hinduism were spreading everywhere. In South India the Pallava sovereignty was supreme, and in the freedom and peace afforded by a central government, Brahmanism was being transformed into Hinduism. The religious persuasions of the Pallava kings give a clear indication of the reconstruction then taking place. While the earliest rulers of the Pallava dynasty were Buddhists, those next in order were Vaiṣṇavites, while the latest were Śaivites. As a reaction against the ascetic tendency of Buddhism and the devotional one of theism, the Mīmāṁsakas were exaggerating the importance of Vedic rites. Kumārila and Maṇḍana Miśra denounced the value of jñāna and saññyāsa, and insisted on the value of karma and the stage of the householder. Śaṁkara appeared, at one and the same time, as an eager champion of the orthodox faith and a spiritual reformer. He tried to bring back the age from the brilliant luxury of the Purāṇas to the mystic truth of the Upaniṣads. The power of the faith to lead the soul to the higher life became for him the test of its strength. He felt impelled to attempt the spiritual direction of his age by formulating a philosophy and religion which could satisfy the ethical and spiritual needs of the people better than the systems of Buddhism, Mīmāṁsā and Bhakti. The theists were veiling the truth in a mist of sentiment. With their genius for mystical experience, they were indifferent to the practical concerns of life. The Mīmāṁsaka emphasis on karma developed ritualism devoid of spirit. Virtue can face the dark perils of life and survive only if it be the fine flower of thought. The Advaita philosophy alone, in the opinion of Śaṁkara, could do justice to the truth of the conflicting creeds, and so he wrote all his works with the one purpose of helping the individual to a realisation of the identity of his soul with Brahman, which is the means of liberation from saṁsāra.² In his wanderings from his birthplace in Malabar to the Himālayas in the north he came across many phases of worship, and accepted all those which had in them the power to elevate man and refine his life. He did not preach a single exclusive method of salvation, but composed hymns of unmistakable grandeur addressed to the different gods of popular Hinduism—Viṣṇu, Śiva, Śakti, Sūrya. All this affords a striking testimony to the universality of his sympathies and the wealth of natural endowment. While revivifying the popular religion, he also purified it. He put down the grosser manifestations of the Śākta worship in South India, and it is a pity that his influence is not perceptible in the great temple of Kālī in Calcutta. In the Deccan, it is said that he suppressed the unclean worship of Śiva as a dog under the name of Mallāri, and the pernicious practices of Kāpālikas whose god Bhairava desired human victims. He condemned branding or marking the body with hot metallic designs. He learned from the Buddhist church that discipline, freedom from superstition and ecclesiastical organisations help to preserve the faith clean and strong, and himself established ten religious orders of which four retain their prestige till to-day.

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¹ While Fahian saw Buddhism flourishing in the fifth century, Yuan-Chwang, who came later, i.e. in the sixth and seventh centuries, witnessed evident signs of decline. Bāṇa's Harṣacarita confirms this impression.

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² "Saṁsārahetunivṛttisādhanabrahmātmaikatvavidyāpratipattaye." See S.B., i. 1. 1.

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The life of Śaṃkara makes a strong impression of contraries. He is a philosopher and a poet, a savant and a saint, a mystic and a religious reformer. Such diverse gifts did he possess that different images present themselves, if we try to recall his personality. One sees him in youth, on fire with intellectual ambition, a stiff and intrepid debater; another regards him as a shrewd political genius, attempting to impress on the people a sense of unity; for a third, he is a calm philosopher engaged in the single effort to expose the contradictions of life and thought with an unmatched incisiveness; for a fourth, he is the mystic who declares that we are all greater than we know. There have been few minds more universal than his.

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The central texts of the school are Śaṃkara’s commentaries on the principal Upaniṣads,¹ the Bhagavadgītā and the Vedānta Sūtra. Upadeśasahasrī and Vivecacūḍāmaṇi reflect his general position. His popular hymns to the different forms of Godhead, such as Dakṣiṇāmūrti Stotra, Harimīḍe Stotra, Ānandalaharī and Saundaryalaharī, explain to us his faith in life and justify his love of it. Other works attributed to him are Āptavajrasūcī, Ātmabodha, Mohamudgara, Daśaślokī, Aparokṣānubhūti and commentaries on Viṣṇusahasranāma and Sanatsujātīya. The many strands of the complex texture of his personality found their expression in his writings. The great point about his style is the way in which it mirrors the qualities of his mind, its force, its logic, its feeling and its sense of humour. The philosophy set forth by Śaṁkara has a long history which is yet in progress. The upholders of other views generally support their positions by refuting those of Śaṁkara. This has rendered necessary a defence of Śaṁkara’s position in every age. It is not possible for us to trace adequately the fortunes of his system in times later than his own.¹

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