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Indian Philosophy v2.c24: Chapter II The Logical Realism of the Nyāya

Indian Philosophy v2.c24

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English

Contents

Chapter II The Logical Realism of the Nyāya

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The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika—The beginnings of the Nyāya—Literature and history—Aim and scope—The nature of definition—Perception—Its analysis and kinds—Inference—Syllogism—Induction—Causation—Plurality of causes—Asatkāryavāda—Criticism of the Nyāya view of causation—Comparison—Verbal knowledge—Authoritativeness of the Vedas—Other forms of knowledge—Aitihya and Arthāpatti, Sambhava and Abhāva—Tarka, Vāda, Nigrahasthāna—Memory—Doubt—Fallacies—Truth, its nature and criterion—Theories of error—The Nyāya theory of knowledge examined—The world of nature—The individual soul—Saṃsāra—Mokṣa—Criticism of the Nyāya theory of soul and its relation to consciousness—Ethics—Proofs for the existence of God—Conclusion.

I The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika

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WHILE the other systems of Indian thought are mainly speculative, in the sense that they deal with the universe as a whole, the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika represent the analytic type of philosophy, and uphold common sense and science, instead of dismissing them as "moonbeams from the larger lunacy." What is distinctive of these schools, is the application of a method, which their adherents regard as that of science, to material which has hitherto been treated in quite a different way. Applying the methods of logical inquiry and criticism, they endeavour to show that these do not warrant the conclusions which the Buddhist thinkers derived from them, and that logic does not compel us to disperse the unity and pattern of life into its fleeting moments. They are interested mainly in averting the sceptical consequences of the Buddhist phenomenalism, which merged external reality in the ideas of mind. They seek to restore the traditional substances, the soul within and nature without, but not on the basis of mere authority. The general scepticism which set in like a flood, could not be checked by a mere resort to faith, when its citadel was attacked by the heretical thinkers who presumably took their stand on the evidence of the senses and the conclusions of reason. Only by a thorough examination of the modes and sources of correct knowledge can the ends of life and religion be truly met. What is supplied to us by scripture or the evidence of the senses must be submitted to a critical inquiry, as the etymological meaning of the word ānvīkṣikī suggests.¹ The Naiyāyika is willing to admit as true whatever is established by reason.² Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara urge that if the Nyāya philosophy dealt only with the nature of the soul and its released condition, there would not be much to distinguish the Nyāya from the Upaniṣads which also treat of these problems. That which gives distinction to the Nyāya is its critical treatment of metaphysical problems. Vācaspati defines the purpose of the Nyāya as a critical examination of the objects of knowledge by means of the canons of logical proof.³

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¹ Pratyakṣāgamābhyām ākṣiptasya anvīkṣā tayā vartata ity ānvīkṣikī (N.B., i. 1. 1). Again: "It is called anvīkṣā or investigation, since it consists of the reviewing (anu-īkṣaṇa) of a thing previously apprehended (īkṣita) by perception and verbal testimony" (N.B., i. 1. 1). Logic is the science of second intentions, as Aristotle would say. It is essentially the reflection of knowledge on itself.

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² Buddhyā yad utpannam tat sarvaṁ nyāyamatam.

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³ Pramāṇair arthaparīkṣaṇam (N.V.T.T., i. 1. 1).

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The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika take up the ordinary stock notions of traditional philosophy, as space, time, cause, matter, mind, soul and knowledge, explore their significance for experience, and set forth the results in the form of a theory of the universe. The logical and the physical departments become the predominant features in these traditions. The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika take up respectively the world within and the world without. The Nyāya describes at great length the mechanism of knowledge and argues vigorously against the scepticism which declares that nothing is certain. The Vaiśeṣika has for its main objective the analysis of experience. It formulates general conceptions which apply to things known, whether by the senses or by inference or by authority. Adopting such an attitude, it is no wonder that the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems advocate belief in individual souls as substantial beings, interacting with a whole environing system of things.

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The two systems had been for long treated as parts of one whole. It is sometimes suggested that they branched off as independent streams from the same original source, which treated of things known and the means of knowledge. It is, however, difficult to be certain on this point. The later works regard these systems as forming parts of one discipline.¹ Even in the Nyāya Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, the two are not kept distinct. The Vaiśeṣika is used as a supplement to the Nyāya.² Uddyotakara’s Nyāyavārttika uses the Vaiśeṣika doctrines. Jacobi observes that “the fusion of these two schools began early and seems to have been complete at the time when the Nyāyavārttika was written.”³ Many of the Nyāya sūtras presuppose the tenets of the Vaiśeṣika. They are called samānatantra or allied systems, since they both believe in a plurality of souls, a personal God, an atomic universe, and use many arguments in common. While there is no doubt that the two systems coalesced very early, a difference in the distribution of emphasis on the logical and the physical sides distinguishes the one from the other.⁴ While the Nyāya gives us an account of the processes and methods of a reasoned knowledge of objects, the Vaiśeṣika develops the atomic constitution of things which the Nyāya accepts without much argument.⁵

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¹ See Varadarāja’s Tārkikarakṣā, Keśava Miśra’s Tarkabhāṣā, Śivāditya’s Saptapadārthī, Viśvanātha’s Bhāṣāpariccheda and Siddhāntamuktāvalī, Annam Bhaṭṭa’s Tarkasaṃgraha and Dīpikā, Jagadīśa’s Tarkāmṛta, and Laugākṣi Bhāskara’s Tarkakaumudī. The Buddhist thinkers Āryadeva and Harivarman did not look upon the Nyāya as a system independent of the Vaiśeṣika (Ui : Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, pp. 54 and 56).

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² N.B., i. 1. 4 Vātsyāyana quotes V.S., iii. 1. 16 in N.B., ii. 2. 24; V.S., iv. 1. 16 in N.B., iii. 1. 33 and iii. 1 67.

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³ E.R.E., vol. ii, p. 201 b.

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⁴ Uddyotakara says that “the other sciences are not meant to deal with the subjects (of pramāṇas), though they deal with things made known by them (N.V., i. 1. 1).

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⁵ Garbe looks upon the Vaiśeṣika as prior to the Nyāya (E.R.E., vol. xii, p. 569; see also Philosophy of Ancient India, p. 20; Jacobi : J.A.O.S., xxxi), while Goldstucker regards the Vaiśeṣika as a branch of the Nyāya. Keith inclines to the former view (I.L.A., pp. 21-22). It is more logical, since critical investigations generally follow dogmatic metaphysics. The more systematic character of the N.S., the greater attention paid to the problems

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The Nyāya philosophy has been held in great reverence for a very long time past. Manu includes it under śruti. Yājñavalkya regards it as one of the four limbs of the Veda.¹ The classical studies of the Hindus comprise the five subjects of Kāvya (literature), Nāṭaka (drama), Alaṃkāra (rhetoric), Tarka (logic), and Vyākaraṇa (grammar). Whatever other specialised studies a student may take up later, the preliminary course includes logic, which is the basis of all studies. Every system of Hindu thought accepts the fundamental principles of the Nyāya logic, and even in criticising the Nyāya system, uses the Nyāya terminology and logic. The Nyāya serves as an introduction to all systematic philosophy.²

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¹ Yājñavalkya Smṛti, i. 3. Cp. Ātmopaniṣad, ii, and Viṣṇu Purāṇa, iii. 6.

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² Cp. Kauṭilya (i. 2), quoted in N.B., i. 1. 1.

II The Beginnings of the Nyāya

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THE BEGINNNGS OF THE NYĀYA

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Ānvīkṣiki, as we have seen, is the treatment in a consciously critical manner of the ultimate problems of spirit; and it has been used in a comprehensive sense, so as to include all systematic attempts to solve the problems of philosophy, the Sāṃkhya, the Yoga and the Lokāyata. Soon attention was directed to the nature of logical procedure and criticism, used in common by these different systems of thought. Every science is a nyāya, which means literally going into a subject

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of the eternity of sound, the nature of the self and the process of inference support Keith's view. The explicit reference to Īśvara in N.S., iv. 1. 91, is more than what the Vaiśeṣika has to say on this question. The argument for the existence of the self from bodily activities is cruder than the Nyāya view of self as the basis of mental phenomena. The absence of any direct reference to the Nyāya in the B.S., which criticises the Vaiśeṣika theory (ii. 2. 12-17), supports the view of the greater antiquity of the latter. This position will be considerably strengthened if the Nyāya reference to pratitantrasiddhānta is taken as an allusion to the Vaiśeṣika. The more elaborate account of the grounds of inference and the simpler scheme of fallacies in the V.S. are not of great value on the question of date. We find a number of coincidences between the N.S. and the V.S. Cp. N.S., iii. 1. 36; ii. 1. 54; i. 1. 10; iii. 1. 28; iii 1. 35; iii 1. 63; iii. 1. 71; iii. 2. 63, with V.S., iv. 1. 8; vii. 2. 20; iii. 2. 4; iv. 2. 3; iv. 1 6-13; vii. 2. 4-5; viii. 2. 5; vii. 1. 23, respectively. If some of the V.S. seem to be elaborations of the Nyāya views, it only shows that those sūtras were compiled later than the N.S. The priority of V.S. is not affected thereby.

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or analytic investigation. The system of Nyāya, which studies the general plan and method of critical inquiries, may be called the science of sciences. Such purely logical studies were encouraged by the Mīmāṃsakas, who were not merely exegetes but also logicians. It may well be that logic arose out of the necessities of the sacrificial religion, especially out of the need that existed for interpreting correctly the Vedic texts regarding sacrificial rites, rules and results; and that hence the thinkers who founded and developed the Mīmāṃsā helped the growth of logic.¹ When Gautama expounded the logical side more carefully than other thinkers, his view became identified with the Ānvīkṣikī. Thus a term which was used for long in the general sense of systematic philosophy became narrowed down in signification.²

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¹ From the names of the Mīmāṃsā works, like Mādhava's Nyāyamālāvistara, Pārthasārathi Miśra's Nyāyaratnākara, and Āpadeva's Nyāyaprakāśa, it is evident that the term Nyāya was used as a synonym for Mīmāṃsā. See also Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra, ii. 4. 8. 23; ii. 6. 14. 3.

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² See also Manu, vii. 43; Gautama's Dharma Sūtra, xi; Rāmāyaṇa, Ayodhyākāṇḍa, 100. 36; M.B., Śāntiparva, 180. 47.

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In the long chain of antecedents out of which the Nyāya evolved, an important place will have to be assigned to dialectical discussions.³ The Nyāya is called sometimes Tarkavidyā or the science of debate, Vādavidyā, or the science of discussion. Discussion or vāda is the breath of intellectual life. We are obliged to use it in the search for truth, which is complex in character and yields only to the co-operation of many minds.⁴ The Upaniṣads speak of learned assemblies or pariṣads where philosophical disputations were carried on.¹ Greek logic owed much to the Sophistic movement, which adopted the mode of disputation called Dialectic, the game of question and answer. In the practice of the art of discussion, the Sophists not only discovered the true principles of reasoning but also invented tricks of argument and sophisms. From the Dialogues of Plato we learn that Socrates used the art of debate for the purpose of eliciting the truth. Aristotle devoted two of his logical treatises, the Topics and the Sophistical Refutations to the guidance of disputants, questioners as well as respondents, though he distinguished logic from rhetoric, the principles of reasoning from the rules of debate. There is no doubt that Gautama’s logic sprang from the dialectical tournaments, the sound of which filled the durbars of kings and the schools of philosophers. The attempt to regulate the use of debates led to the development of logical theory. Gautama, like Aristotle, systematised the principles of reasoning, distinguished the true from the false, and gave an elaborate account of the various forms of sophisms and argumentative tricks. The sixteen topics mentioned in the first sūtra may be regarded as representing stages in dialectical controversy intended to lead up to knowledge.² Many of the later works on logic discuss the rules of debate,³ while all of them refer to dialectical problems.⁴

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³ The first sūtra enumerates the topics considered in the system, which are: (1) pramāṇa, the means of knowledge; (2) prameya, the objects of knowledge; (3) saṃśaya, doubt; (4) prayojana, purpose; (5) dṛṣṭānta, example; (6) siddhānta, accepted truth; (7) avayava, members of the syllogism; (8) tarka, indirect proof; (9) nirṇaya, determination of the truth; (10) vāda, discussion; (11) jalpa, wrangling; (12) vitaṇḍā, cavil or destructive criticism; (13) hetvābhāsa, fallacious reasons; (14) chala, quibbling; (15) jāti, futile objections; and (16) nigrahasthāna, occasions for reproof. The first nine are more strictly logical than the last seven, which have the negative function of preventing erroneous knowledge. They are more weapons for the destroying of error than for the building up of truth.

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⁴ Socrates practised it. Plato's works illustrate its value for the attainment of truth. Aristotle says: "Some see one side of a matter and others another, but all together can see all sides" (Politics). Milton's Areopagitica and Mill's Essay on Liberty praise the method of free discussion.

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¹ See Chān. Up., v. 3. 1; Bṛh. Up., vi. 2. 1; Praśna, i. 6. See also Manu, vi 50; viii. 269; xii. 106; M.B., Śāntiparva, 180. 47; 246. 18. In Manu, xii. 110-111, Parāśara, viii. 19, and Yājñavalkya, i. 9, Parivāra of the Vinaya Piṭaka, details regarding the pariṣads are mentioned.

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² See also N.B., i. 1. 1.

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³ Tārkikarakṣā.

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⁴ Kauṭilya mentions thirty-two technical terms called Tantrayukti, and this list is also found in Carakasamhitā, Siddhisthāna, xii, and Suśrutasamhitā, Uttaratantra, lxv. The ānvīkṣikī portion of Caraka’s work deals extensively with the rules of debate (Vimānasthāna, viii).

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Jayanta asserts that, though Gautama’s work provides the most satisfactory account of the subject, there was logic before Gautama, even as Mīmāṃsā was before Jaimini and grammar before Pāṇini.⁵

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⁵ Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇ is of opinion that a number of writers made contributions to Indian logic before the author of the Sūtra. He mentions the names of Dattātreya, Punarvasu Ātreya, Sulabhā the lady ascetic, and Aṣṭāvakra (History of Indian Logic, pp. 9-17).

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The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* refers to Vākovākya,¹ which Śaṃkara interprets as *Tarkaśāstra*.² The *Mahābhārata* refers to *Tarkaśāstra* and *Ānvīkṣikī*,³ and states that Nārada was familiar with the Nyāya syllogism as well as the Vaiśeṣika principles of conjunction and inherence. Viśvanātha quotes from some *Purāṇa* a passage to the effect that the Nyāya is counted among the subsidiary parts (*upāṅgas*) of the Veda.⁴ Though Buddha’s system was eminently rational, we do not come across any systematic treatment of logical theory in the early canonical works. There are, however, references to men skilled in logic. The *Brahmajāla Sutta* refers to Takki (sophist), and Vīmaṃsi (casuist).⁵ The name *Anumāna Sutta* of *Majjhima Nikāya* perhaps indicates the use of the word “anumāna” in the sense of inference. *Kathāvattu* uses the terms *patiññā*, *upanaya*, *niggaha* in their technical signification.⁶ The *Yamaka* knows of the distribution of terms and the rules of conversion. The *Paṭisambhidāmagga* refers to the analysis of words and things. *Nettipakaraṇa* shows a great appreciation of logical theory. In the *Questions of Milinda* the Nyāya system is perhaps referred to under the name *Nīti*.⁷ *Lalitavistara* mentions logic under the name of *Hetuvidyā*. The Jaina Āgamas testify to the antiquity of Indian logic. *Anuyogadvāra* composed by Āryarakṣita who lived about the first century A.D. has the same division of *anumāna* into *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatoḍṛṣṭa* as the *Sūtra* of Gautama. Āryarakṣita seems to have been only a redactor of an earlier work referred to in the *Bhagavatī Sūtra*, one of the *aṅgas* of the Jaina canon settled at the Pataliputra Council in the beginning of the third century B.C. Probably the doctrine of the three kinds of inference is earlier than the third century B.C.

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¹ vii. I 2.

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² See also *Subāla Up.*, ii. Some of the later Upaniṣads use the term *pramāṇa* in the technical sense. See *Maitrī Up.*, 6. 6, 24; *Nṛsiṃhottaratāpanī*, 8; *Sarvopaniṣadsāra*, 4; *Kālāgnirudropaniṣad*, 7; *Muktikopaniṣad*, 2. The *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* refers to *smṛti* or scripture, *pratyakṣa* or perception, *aitihya* or tradition, and *anumāna* or inference as the four sources of knowledge. See also *Rāmāyaṇa*, v. 87-23; *Manu*, xii. 105. Many Nyāya terms, such as *Tarka* or reasoning (*Kaṭha Up.*, ii. 9; *Manu*, xii. 106; *M.B.*, ii. 153), *Vāda* or discussion (*Manu*, vi. 50; *Rāmāyaṇa*, i. 13-23; vii. 53-60), *Yukti* or continuous argument (*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, vi. 23; *Rāmāyaṇa*, ii. 1. 13), *Jalpa* or wrangling (*M.B.*, xiii. 4322), *Vitaṇḍā* or cavilling (*M.B.*, ii. 1310; vii. 3022; and *Pāṇini*, iv. 4. 102), *Chala* or quibbling (*Manu*, viii. 49; *Rāmāyaṇa*, iv. 57. 10), *Nirṇaya* or ascertainment (*M.B.*, xiii. 7553, 7535), *Prayojana* or purpose (*Manu*, vii. 100; *M.B.*, i. 5805), *Pramāṇa* or proof (*Manu*, ii. 13; *Rāmāyaṇa*, ii. 37. 21; *M.B.*, xiii. 5572), *Prameya*, the object of knowledge (*Rāmāyaṇa*, i. 52. 13; *M.B.*, i. 157; vii. 1419), are to be met with in earlier works. See Vidyābhūṣaṇ’s *History of Indian Logic*, p. 23.

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³ *M.B.*, i. 70. 42; xii. 210. 22.

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⁴ *Nyāyasūtravṛtti*, i. I. I.

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⁵ See also *Udāna*, vi. 10.

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⁶ See also *Vibhaṅga*, pp. 293 ff.

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⁷ S.B.E., pp. 6-7.

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The beginnings of the Nyāya belong to the pre-Buddhistic period, though a scientific treatment of it was undertaken some time about the period of early Buddhism, and the main principles were well established before the third century B.C. We know little about the historical development of the Nyāya prior to the composition of the Sūtra.

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LITERATURE AND HISTORY

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The history of the Nyāya literature extends over twenty centuries. The Nyāya Sūtra of Gautama, divided into five books, each containing two sections, forms the first textbook of the Nyāya. According to Vātsyāyana, this treatise follows the method of enunciation, definition and critical examination. The first book states in general terms the sixteen topics to be considered in the other four. The second book deals with the nature of doubt, the means of proof and their validity. The third book discusses the nature of self, body, senses, their objects, cognition and mind. The fourth treats of volition, sorrow, suffering and liberation. Incidentally, it refers to the theory of error and the relation of whole and parts. The last book discusses jāti or unreal objections and nigrahasthāna or occasions for rebuke. The Nyāya Sūtra attempts to combine the results of Brahmanical thought in the department of logic with their religious and philosophical dogmas; and we have, as a result, a logical defence of theistic realism. The Sūtras of Gautama, at any rate the earlier of them, belong to the third century B.C., the age of the Āhnikas, or daily lessons like the Navāhnikas of Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya, though some of the contents of the Nyāya Sūtra are certainly of a post-Christian era.¹

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¹ Jacobi believes that the N.S. and N.B. belong to about the same time, perhaps separated by a generation. He places them between the second century A.D., when the Śūnyavāda developed, and the fifth century A.D., when the Vijñānavāda became systematised (see J.A.O.S., xxxi. 1911, pp. 2, 13). He thinks that the Buddhist views criticised in the N.S. are those of Śūnyavāda advocated by Nāgārjuna, who is placed about the third century A.D., and not Vijñānavāda of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, who are assigned to the middle of the fourth century A.D. It is, however, difficult to accept this view. Both Vātsyāyana and Vācaspati hold that N.S., iv. 2. 26, is directed against the Vijñānavāda. We need not deny that the Śūnyavāda is attacked in the N.S. (cp. N.S., iv. 1. 40; iv. 1. 48, with the Mādhyamika Kārikā, xv. 6, and vii. 20, respectively, and also N.S., iv. 1. 34-35, with Candrakīrti's Vṛtti, pp. 64-71). But Śūnyavāda is earlier than Nāgārjuna, who is familiar with the Nyāya terminology and denies the doctrine of atoms (cp. N.S., iv. 2. 18-24, 31-32, with the Mādhyamika Kārikā, vii. 34, and N.S., iii. 2. 11 and iv. 1. 64). All that we can say is that the N.S. is of an earlier date than Nāgārjuna, though later than the Mādhyamika tradition (see also I.P., vol. i, p. 643 n.; Ui: Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, p. 85). The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra refers to Tārkikas and Naiyāyikas, and if we remember

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Vātsyāyana's Nyāya Bhāṣya is the classic commentary on the Nyāya Sūtra. Evidently, Vātsyāyana is not the immediate successor of Gautama, since his work contains passages of the character of vārttikas, which state in a condensed form the results of discussions that some of the cosmological views refuted in the N.S. are as old as early Buddhism, Jacobi's date, which is supported by Suali, who refers the N.S. to A.D. 300 or 350, seems to be much too late (see also Ui: Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, p. 16). Garbe inclines to the view that the N.S. belongs to the first century A.D., since they were known to Pañcaśikha, whom he believes to have been a contemporary of Śabara, who lived some time between A.D. 100 and 300. Gautama is familiar with the terminology of the B.S. (cp. N.S., iii. 2. 14-16, with B.S., ii. 1. 24) and the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini (see N.S., ii. 1. 67; BODAS: Introduction to Tarkasaṃgraha). Bodas believes that the V.S., iv. 1. 4-5, have in view Bādarāyaṇa's criticism of the theory of atoms, and V.S., iii. 2. 9 (cp. also N.S., iii. 1. 28-30), is aimed at the Vedānta view that the self is known only through the śruti. Similarly, V.S., iv. 2. 2-3, controvert the view of B.S., ii. 2. 21-22, that the body is the result of the union of five or three elements. Gautama propounds views very similar to those of Bādarāyaṇa in several places. See N.S., iv. 1. 64, and iii. 2. 14-16. The absence of any direct reference to the Nyāya in the B.S. and the M.S. is sometimes emphasised. It may be that Vyāsa, reputed to be a disciple of Gautama, did not care to criticise the Nyāya view, especially as it was agreeable to the admission of Īśvara. Again, it is sometimes held that the B.S., ii. 1 11-13, attempt to disprove the Nyāya view of establishing God by reasoning. The doctrines of atomism and asatkāryavāda are examined in B.S., ii. 2. 10-16, and ii. 1. 15-20. Early Buddhist works do not contain information for assigning the date of the N.S. Kātyāyana (fourth century B.C.) and Patañjali (whose great work was written about 140 B.C.) knew the Nyāya system. See Goldstucker's Pāṇini. Śabara's quotations from Bhagavān Upavarṣa, who is said to have written commentaries on both the Mīmāṃsās, indicate Upavarṣa's familiarity with the Nyāya views. Harivarman (A.D. 260) knows about the sixteen topics of the Nyāya. Aśvaghoṣa uses the five-membered syllogism. See Ui: Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, pp. 56 and 81. We may therefore conclude that the N.S. existed in the fourth century B.C., though not in the present form. M. M. Haraprasād Śāstri says: "I am not sure if the work N.S. had not gone through several redactions before it assumed its present shape" (J.A.S. of Bengal, 1905, p. 178; see also pp. 245 ff.). Vācaspati made two attempts to collect the Sūtras in his Nyāyasūcī and Nyāyasūtroddhāra, thus suggesting doubts about the authenticity of the N.S. Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇ believes that Gautama wrote only the first chapter of the work, and he was a contemporary of the Buddha, the same as the author of the Dharma Sūtra, who lived in Mithilā in the sixth century B.C. (see S.B.H: N.S., pp. v-viii, and Bhāndārkar Commemoration volume, pp. 161-162) He suggests that Gautama's original views are those contained in the Caraka Saṃhitā (Vimānasthāna, viii). The N.S. and Caraka Saṃhitā have much in common; but it is said, "Caraka's references to the Nyāya principles and the Vaiśeṣika categories are of little value in fixing the date of the N.S., since the work has suffered considerable re-fashioning, and its date is also uncertain" (I.L.A., p. 13).

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There are doubts expressed even about Gautama's authorship of the N.S. Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Mādhava credit Akṣapāda with the authorcarried on in the school of Gautama. Vātsyāyana offers different explanations of some sūtras, indicating thereby that there were earlier commentators who did not all agree on the interpretations of the sūtras.¹ Besides, Vātsyāyana refers to Gautama as a sage of the remote past, and quotes from Patañjali’s *Mahābhāṣya* and Kauṭilya’s *Arthaśāstra*,² and also from the Vaiśeṣika *Sūtra*.³ Nāgārjuna, the author of *Upāyakausalya* and *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, is certainly earlier than Vātsyāyana, who attempts to combat the views of Nāgārjuna. Diṅnāga criticised Vātsyāyana’s interpretation from the Buddhist point of view. From all this, we may infer that Vātsyāyana lived some time before A.D. 400.⁴

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¹ See N.B., i. 1. 5. Vātsyāyana refers to other interpreters in i. 1. 32 and i. 2. 9, in the usual style: eke, some; kecit, certain; anye, others. See M.B., Ādiparva, 42-44.

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² N.B., i. 1. 1, and *Arthaśāstra*, ii; N.B., v. 1. 10, and *Mahābhāṣya*, i. 1. 3.

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³ Cp. V.S., iv. 1. 6, and N.B., iii. 1. 33, iii. 1. 67; V.S., iii. 1. 16, and N.B., ii. 2. 34.

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⁴ Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇ believes that Vātsyāyana was a native of South India of the middle of the fourth century A.D. (*History of India Logic*,

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ship of the N.S., a view which is supported by Vācaspati and Jayanta. According to *Padma Purāṇa* (Uttarakhaṇḍa, 263) and *Skanda Purāṇa* (Kālikā Khaṇḍa, xvii), Gautama is the author of the N.S., and Viśvanātha is of this opinion. Hindu tradition identifies the two and holds that Gautama is called Akṣapāda, or one who has eyes in his feet. The story runs that when Gautama was absorbed in meditation and fell into a well, God in his mercy bestowed on his feet the power of vision to prevent further mishaps. Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇ goes against a well-established tradition when he observes that "Gautama and Akṣapāda seem both to have contributed to the production of the work. The *Nyāya Sūtra* treats mainly of five subjects, viz. (1) pramāṇa, the means of right knowledge; (2) prameya, the object of right knowledge; (3) vāda, debate or discussion; (4) avayava, the members of the syllogism; and (5) anyamataparīkṣā, an examination of contemporary philosophical doctrines. The second and the third subjects, and possibly also the first subject in its crude form, ample references to which are met with in the old Brāhmanic, Buddhistic and Jaina books, were in all probability handled by Gautama, whose Ānvīkṣīvidyā was constituted by them. The fourth and the fifth subjects, and possibly also the first subject in its systematic form, were introduced by Akṣapāda into the Ānvīkṣī-vidyā, which in its final form was styled the N.S. Akṣapāda was therefore the real author of the N.S., which derived a considerable part of its materials from the Ānvīkṣī-vidyā of Gautama" (*History of Indian Logic*, pp. 49-50). This view is but a conjecture which it is impossible either to defend or refute. Not only is Gautama identified with the author of the *Dharma Sūtra*, but is also regarded as the same as the sage of that name mentioned in Vālmīki’s *Rāmāyaṇa* in connection with the episode of Ahalyā. According to the M.B. (Śāntiparva, 265. 45), Medhātithi is another name for Gautama. Bhāsa, in his *Pratimānāṭaka*, refers to Medhātithi as the founder of the Nyāya system: "Mānavīyaṃ dharmaśāstram, māheśvaraṃ yogaśāstram, bārhaspatyam arthaśāstram, medhātither nyāyaśāstram" (Act V). See also *History of Indian Logic*, p. 766.

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Dignāga’s works, which are preserved in Tibetan translations, are Pramāṇasamuccaya, with a commentary by the author himself, Nyāyapraveśa, Hetucakrahamaru, Ālambanaparīkṣā and Pramāṇaśāstrapraveśa, and they are said to be popular in Japan.¹ Dignāga belongs to the fifth century A.D.² Many of the important changes introduced in logical doctrine by Praśastapāda are traced to Dignāga, whose originality will suffer a good deal, if Praśastapāda is found to be his predecessor.

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¹ Some idea of their contents may be gathered from Vidyābhūṣaṇ’s History of Indian Logic, pp. 276–299, and Uddyotakara’s references to Dignāga’s views in his N.V.

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² Tāranātha’s History of Buddhism says that Dignāga was the son of a Brāhmin of Conjeevaram, who soon became proficient in the teachings of the Hīnayāna, though he later acquired from Vasubandhu Mahāyāna teachings. According to the evidence of Yuan Chwang, Vasubandhu, before he became a Buddhist, was well versed not only in the eighteen schools of Buddhism, but also in the six systems of the Hindus. Vasubandhu is now assigned to the first half of the fourth century A.D., and Dignāga may have flourished some time before A.D. 400. Kālidāsa’s suggested reference to Dignāga in his Meghadūta confirms this view, since Kālidāsa belongs to the same period (see Keith: Classical Sanskrit Literature, pp. 31–32, and I.P., p. 624 n.).

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Uddyotakara’s Nyāyavārttika (sixth century A.D.)³ is a defence of Vātsyāyana against the attacks of Dignāga. Dharmakīrti’s Nyāyabindu is a defence of Dignāga against the criticisms of Uddyotakara. If we assume that the Vādavidhi referred to by Uddyotakara⁴ is another name for Dharmakīrti’s Vādanyāya, and that the śāstra referred to by Dharmakīrti in his Nyāyabindu⁵ is the Vārttika of Uddyotakara, then these two writers may be supposed to belong to the same period. The latest date, however, for Dharmakīrti is the beginning of the seventh century.⁶ In the ninth century Dharmottara followed on the lines of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, in his Nyāyabinduṭīkā.

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³ Subandhu’s Vāsavadattā refers to Uddyotakara as the rescuer of the Nyāya (see Hall’s edition, p. 235). Bāṇa’s Harṣacarita, written during the time of King Harṣa, who reigned in Thanesvar, at any rate during the years from A.D. 629–644, when the Chinese pilgrim Yuan Chwang travelled through India, mentions Vāsavadattā (i), which refers to Uddyotakara. It is therefore safe to assume that he belonged to the sixth century A.D. Uddyotakara is a Bhāradvāja by gotra and a Pāśupata by sect.

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⁴ N.V., i. 33.

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⁵ Nyāyabindu, iii, Peterson’s edition, pp. 110–111.

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⁶ I-tsing refers to him. See Takakusu: I-tsing, p. lviii.

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Towards the first half of the ninth century, Vācaspati re-established

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pp. 42, 116–117; A., 1915, Art. on Vātsyāyana). While Keith (I.L.A., p. 28) and Bodas (Introduction to Tarkasaṃgraha) agree with this view, Jacobi and Suali are inclined to place him about the beginning of the sixth century A.D., or a little earlier. Haraprasād Śāstri makes Vātsyāyana a successor of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, since he is familiar with the Mahāyānist doctrines of momentariness, śūnyavāda, individuality, etc. See J.A.S. of Bengal, 1905, pp. 178–179.

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the orthodox view of the Nyāya in his *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*. He also wrote smaller works on the Nyāya called *Nyāyasūcinibandha* and *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*.¹ He is a versatile genius, and has written authoritative works on other systems of thought, as the *Bhāmatī* on the Advaita Vedānta and the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* on the Sāṃkhya. He is therefore styled Sarvatantrasvatantra or Ṣaḍdarśanīvallabha. Udayana's (A.D. 984) *Tātparyapariśuddhi* is a valuable commentary on Vācaspati's work. His *Ātmatattvaviveka* is a defence of the permanent soul and a criticism of the Buddhist thinkers Āryakīrti and others. His *Kusumāñjali* is the first systematic account of the theism of the Nyāya.² His other works are *Kiraṇāvali* and *Nyāya-pariśiṣṭa*. Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* is an independent commentary on the *Nyāya Sūtra*. Jayanta, who quotes Vācaspati, and is quoted by Ratnaprabhā and Devasūri, belongs to the tenth century.³ Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāyasāra* is, as its name implies, a survey of the Nyāya philosophy. He admits the three proofs of perception, inference and verbal testimony, and rejects comparison as an independent means of proof. He is a Śaivite, perhaps of the Kashmir sect, and belongs to the tenth century A.D. Vardhamāna's *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa* (A.D. 1225) is a commentary on Udayana's *Nyāyatātparyapariśuddhi*, though it incorporates the views of Gaṅgeśa, the father of Vardhamāna and the founder of the modern school. Rucidatta's *Makaranda* (A.D. 1275) develops Vardhamāna's views.

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¹ It is sometimes suggested that the author of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* is different from the writer here referred to, and lived in the fifteenth century A.D. Vācaspati says that his *Nyāyasūci* was composed in the year 898, which most probably refers to the Vikrama era and corresponds to our A.D. 841. There is no doubt that he preceded Ratnakīrti, the Buddhist logician (A.D. 1000).

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² When he felt that God did not show any mercy towards him in consideration of his services for theism, he is reported to have addressed the Supreme in the words, " Proud of thy prowess thou despisest me upon whom thy existence depended when the Buddhists reigned supreme."

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³ See *History of Indian Logic*, p. 147, and I.L.A., p. 33.

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The later works on the Nyāya openly accept the Vaiśeṣika categories, which they bring under prameya or objects of knowledge, or under artha, which is one of the twelve kinds of prameya. Varadarāja's *Tārkikarakṣā* (twelfth century A.D.) is an important treatise of the syncretist school. He brings under prameya the twelve objects of the Nyāya as well as the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika. Keśava Miśra's *Tarkabhāṣā* (end of the thirteenth century) combines the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika views.⁴ .

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⁴ It is translated by Dr. Jhā in *Indian Thought*, vol. ii.

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The important Jaina logical works are Bhadrabāhu's *Daśavaikālikaniryukti* (357 B.C. circa), Siddhasena Divākara's *Nyāyāvatāra* (sixth

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Aiśvaryamadamatto 'śi mām avajñāya vartase
Parākrānteṣu bauddheṣu madadhinā tava sthitiḥ.

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century A.D.), Māṇikyanandi’s *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra* (A.D. 800), Devasūri’s *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṃkāra* (twelfth century A.D.) and Prabhācandra’s *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa*. The Jaina thinkers and the Buddhist logicians differentiated logical inquiries from those of religion and metaphysics, with which they were mixed up in the discussions of the Hindu writers. The Nyāya works of the latter treat of atoms and their properties, souls and rebirth, God and the world, as well as logical problems of the nature and limits of knowledge. The Buddhist and the Jaina thinkers showed no interest in the metaphysical implications of the ancient Nyāya, but laid great stress on the purely logical aspects, and thus prepared the way for the modern Nyāya, which is pure logic and dialectic.

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Gaṅgeśa’s *Tattvacintāmaṇi* is the standard text of the modern school.¹ Vardhamāna, the son of Gaṅgeśa, continued the tradition in his works. Jayadeva wrote a commentary on *Tattvacintāmaṇi* called the *Āloka* (thirteenth century). Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma’s *Tattvacintāmaṇivyākhyā* may be regarded as the first great work of the Navadvīpa (Nuddea) school, and it belongs to the end of the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century. He was fortunate in his disciples, the chief of them being Caitanya, the famous Vaiṣṇava reformer, Raghunātha, the renowned logician and the author of *Dīdhiti* and *Padārthakhaṇḍana*,² Raghunandana, the famous jurist, and Kṛṣṇānanda, the great authority on Tāntrik rites. Though Gaṅgeśa wrote only on the four pramāṇas, and did not concern himself directly with the metaphysical implications, Raghunātha, like some other writers of this school, showed much interest in metaphysics also. Jagadīśa (end of the sixteenth century) and Gadādhara (seventeenth century) are well-known logicians of this school. Annaṃ Bhaṭṭa³ (seventeenth century), a Brahmin of Andhra, tried to evolve a consistent system from out of the ancient and the modern Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, though his views leaned towards the ancient Nyāya. His *Tarkasaṃgraha* and *Dīpikā* are popular manuals of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. Vallabha’s *Nyāyatitavatī*, Viśvanātha’s *Nyāyasūtravṛtti* (seventeenth century) are other works of some importance.⁴

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¹ A summary of this work is given in Vidyābhūṣan’s *History of Indian Logic*, pp. 407-453. Gaṅgeśa lived at Mithilā in the last quarter of the twelfth century, as is evident from his familiarity with Udayana’s works and quotations from Śivāditya and Harṣa. In *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (ii. p. 233) Śrī Harṣa’s views are criticised.

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² This criticism of the Vaiśeṣika system is published in the *Pandit* (xxiv and xxv) under the title “Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa.”

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³ *History of Indian Logic*, p. 388.

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⁴ For the history of Hindu logic in China and Japan, see Suguira : *Hindu Logic as Preserved in China and Japan*.

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It is possible to distinguish different stages in the development of logical studies in India. We have first of all Ānvīkṣikī, which is given a separate place along with the Nyāya in the Mahābhārata. It soon becomes blended with the Nyāya, and in the classical texts of the ancient school we have in addition to logical theory a metaphysical view of the universe as a whole. As Vātsyāyana says, “ The highest good is attained only when one has rightly understood the real nature of (1) that which is fit to be discarded (i.e. suffering along with its causes in the shape of avidyā and its effects), (2) that which puts an end to suffering, in other words, jñāna (knowledge), (3) the means by which the destruction of suffering is accomplished, i.e. philosophical treatises, and (4) the goal to be attained or the highest good.”¹ Ancient Nyāya discussed logical questions, though not for their own sake. The contributions of the Jaina and the Buddhist thinkers bring about a change in the outlook. The modern Nyāya, with its exclusive interest in the theory of knowledge, forgets the intimate relation between logic and life. The ancient Naiyāyika had a more adequate idea of the relation of logic and metaphysics. Logic can ascertain the normative forms of thought only in relation to the content of thought. The modern Naiyāyika devotes great attention to pramāṇa or the means of knowledge and the theory of definition,² and discards altogether the question of prameyas or the objects known. The scholastic subtleties, the logical legerdemain, the fine hair-splitting in which the works of the successors of Gaṅgeśa indulge, terrify many, and even those who have grappled with them cannot be sure that they have comprehended their ideas. Many of those who have waded through these works are impressed by their brilliant dialectical feats, but find them often more confusing than enlightening. Plain issues are obscured by over-subtlety. The fondness of the logical mind for drawing distinctions often degenerates into a love of formulas, and leaves on the mind the impression of a formalism rather poor in content. Elaboration of terminology takes the place of inquiry into subject-matter. Terms which ought to define distinctions are sometimes employed to circumvent difficulties. Of some at least of these works it may be said that they merely succeed in showing how learned one can be about one knows not what. Even those who believe that the mill of their intellect grinds exceeding small cannot help admitting that it is not always fed with a sufficiency of grain.¹ The value of Navya Nyāya as a training-ground for the intellect can hardly be overestimated.

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¹ N.B., i. 1. 1.

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² Lakṣaṇapramāṇābhyāṃ vastusiddhiḥ.

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¹ Cp. Bodas: *Tarkasaṃgraha*, p. 1; Keith: I.L.A., p. 35. Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇ divides the history of the Nyāya philosophy into three periods: Ancient (650 B.C. to A.D. 100), Mediæval (up to A.D. 1200), and Modern (from A.D. 900). See his *History of Indian Logic*, p. xiii. For an idea of the character of Modern Nyāya, see Dr. Śaileśvar Sen's *A Study of Mathurānātha's Tattva-cintāmaṇi-rahasya*, 1924.

The Scope of the Nyāya

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The term Nyāya means literally that by means of which the mind is led to a conclusion.² "Nyāya" becomes equivalent to an argument, and the system which treats of arguments more thoroughly than others comes to be known as the Nyāya system. Arguments are either valid or invalid. The term "nyāya" means in popular usage right or just, and so the Nyāya becomes the science of right reasoning. "Nyāya" in the narrow sense stands for syllogistic reasoning,³ while in the wider sense it signifies the examination of objects by evidences. It thus becomes a science of demonstration or of correct knowledge, pramāṇaśāstra. All knowledge implies four conditions: (1) The subject or the pramātṛ, the cogniser or the substantive ground of the cognitions; (2) the object, or the prameya to which the process of cognition is directed; (3) the resulting state of cognition, or the pramiti; and (4) the means of knowledge, or the pramāṇa.⁴ Every cognitive act, valid or invalid, has the three factors of a cognising subject, a content or a what of which the subject is aware, and a relation of knowledge between the two, which are distinguishable though not separable. The nature of knowledge, as valid or invalid, depends upon the fourth factor of pramāṇa. It is the operative cause of valid knowledge in normal circumstances.¹

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² Niyate anena iti nyāyaḥ.

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³ N.B., i. 1. 1. Vātsyāyana uses the expression paramanyāya for the conclusion or nigamana which combines in itself the five parts of a syllogism. Dignāga calls the members of a syllogism nyāyāvayava. See also N.V., iv. 1. 14. In Vācaspati's *Nyāyasūci* the section on the syllogism (i. 1. 32-39) is spoken of as the Nyāyaprakaraṇa. Viśvanātha means by Nyāyasvarūpa the essential structure of the syllogism. See his *Nyāyasūtravṛtti*, i. 1 25; i. 1. 31; i. 1. 38; i. 1. 40. Mādhava (S.D.S., xi) uses the word nyāya in the sense of inference for the sake of others.

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⁴ Pramākaranam pramāṇam. See also *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, i.

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¹ N.V., i. 1. 1.

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While Vātsyāyana defines pramāṇa as an instrument of knowledge or "that by which the knowing subject knows the object,"² Uddyotakara calls it the cause of knowledge (upalabdhihetu).³ He admits that this definition is rather wide, since the cogniser and the object cognised are also causes of cognition, but justifies it on the ground that "The cogniser and the cognised have their function fulfilled elsewhere, i.e. the function of the cognising subject and the cognised object lies in, and is only fulfilled by the inciting of the pramāṇa into activity; pramāṇa, on the other hand, does not have its function fulfilled (except by the bringing about of the cognition); so it is the pramāṇa that is to be regarded as the real cause of the cognition." Wherever the pramāṇa is present, cognition arises; wherever it is absent, whatever else may be present, cognition does not arise. Pramāṇa is thus the most efficient cause of cognition and the last to appear before the cognition arises.⁴ Śivāditya brings out the logical implication when he defines pramāṇa as that which produces pramā or knowledge in accord with reality.⁵ Jayanta makes pramāṇa the cause which produces non-erroneous, certain knowledge of objects.⁶

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² N B., i. 1. 1.

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³ See also N.V.T.T., i. 1. 1.

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⁴ N.V., i. 1. 1. Another objection, viz., that if the pramāṇa is brought into existence by the cognising subject and the cognised object, then these two must exist prior to the pramāṇa, though as a matter of fact, until the pramāṇa is there, we cannot recognise subject or object, which have a meaning only in relation to the thought activity called the pramāṇa, is considered. Uddyotakara admits all this, but says: "These words are not dependent on their relation to present action only." A cook is a cook whether he is actually cooking or not. "The reason for such usage lies in the (expressive) potency of the word itself; and this potency is present at all times; in the same manner, there need be no incongruity in the assertion that the pramāṇa is brought into existence by the cognising subject and the cognised object."

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⁵ Saptapadārthī, sec. 144. See also S.D.S., xi.

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⁶ Avyabhicāriṇīm asaṃdigdhām arthopalabdhim. Nyāyamañjarī, p. 12.

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The specific form of knowledge depends on the pramāṇa. The other factors of subject and object may be the same in perception or inference. Similarly, the contact of the manas with the soul is the common mediate cause of all forms of knowledge. This contact takes different forms in the different kinds of knowledge. Though the Nyāya deals with knowledge, it deals more especially with the supreme condition of knowledge called the pramāṇa, and so it is called pramāṇaśāstra.¹ Before we investigate the nature of objects, we must know the capacity of the instruments of knowledge; for "knowledge of the thing to be measured depends on the knowledge of the measure."² Pramāṇaśāstra not only helps us to a right apprehension of objects, but also enables us to test the validity of knowledge.³ It is both formal and material, and is interested in consistency as well as in truth. The Nyāya starts with the assumption that the account of the world which our minds afford us is in the main a trustworthy account. All knowledge is revelatory of reality (arthaprakāśa). We are so constituted as to perceive objects, notice their resemblances and draw inferences. These operations are performed by all thinking men, though with different degrees of care and exactness. Whenever we have mental activity, controlled by the purpose of acquiring a knowledge of reality, we have a topic for logical inquiry. Truth-seeking is already present in human action. Logical theory does not create it. It only tries to interpret this element and express its nature in general principles. Its problem is not much different from that of any positive science. Just as a physiologist investigates the processes by which life is sustained in the individual, the logician states the laws governing the process of knowledge. He is no more responsible for it than the physiologist is for the working of the bodily mechanism.

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¹ The importance attached by the Hindu thinkers to the investigation of pramāṇas is evident from Viśvanātha's reference that pramāṇa is one of the names of Viṣṇu.

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² Mānādhīnā meyasiddhiḥ.

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³ Cp. W. E. Johnson's definition of logic as ' the analysis and criticism of thought " (Logic, vol. i, p. xiii).

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The Nyāya system does not assume that value and fact are wholly disparate and require altogether different methods of treatment. Values attach to facts and can be studied only in relation to them. We do not start with empty minds; we possess information about the nature of the world through experience and tradition. A complex system of knowledge is handed down through the scriptures. Adopting the inductive method of science, the Nyāya classifies the different ways in which our knowledge is acquired. The four pramāṇas through which correct knowledge is acquired are pratyakṣa or intuition,¹ anumāna or inference,² upamāna or comparison and śabda or verbal testimony.³ Western treatises on logic do not generally treat of perception,⁴ but the Nyāya regards it as one of the important sources of knowledge. Inference is a central topic of the Nyāya system, which is sometimes called Hetuvidyā, or the science of reason on which the validity of an inferential argument depends.⁵ According to this view logic is the theory of inference or anumānavāda. Intuitive or immediate knowledge is beyond the scope of logic as thus understood. The Nyāya does not justify this narrow usage. The inclusion of verbal testimony, which is a problem of Revealed Theology, shows the religious interest of the system. The Nyāya gives us a psychological account of these four sources of knowledge. It affirms that logical inquiry cannot be carried on without regard to the psychological processes by which knowledge as mental content is gained. It treats at length the ways by which the mind is carried forward and impelled to produce fresh results. In doing so, it also points out the pitfalls which are incidental to the employment of these means. The problem of logic is not a purely inductive one. The mere generalisation, that all our knowledge is gained through one or other of the four sources of knowledge, does not explain the problem of knowledge. Generalisation is not explanation.

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¹ Sense-perception is only a variety of intuition or direct apprehension.

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² Anumāna means literally the knowledge of one thing after, or through that, of another.

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³ N.S., i. 1. 3. Caraka gives āptopadeśa or reliable assertion, pratyakṣa, anumāna and yukti or continuous reasoning. See also Sthānāṅga Sūtra.

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⁴ Cp., however, J. S. Mill: "Truth is known to us in two ways, intuition and inference" (System of Logic, Introduction, p. 4).

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⁵ The term "hetuvidyā" occurs in Milinda (S.B.E., vol. xxxv, pp. 6-7), Lalitavistara (xii). Though "hetu" means only reason or ground, the Jaina thinkers use it in a wider sense. See also Manu, ii. 11; M.B., Ādiparva, 1-67; Śāntiparva, 210. 22; Aśvamedhaparva, 85. 27. The earlier grammarians, Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali accept this view. See also N.V., iv 1. 14; I.L.A., p. 11.

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The Nyāya not only inquires into the ways and means by which the human mind assimilates and develops knowledge, it also interprets the logical facts and expresses them in logical formulas which assume the form of standards or norms in all cases of the divergence of thought from its normal course of truth-seeking. Pramāṇas thus become the measures or canons of knowledge by means of which we can check and evaluate the knowledge already existing in us. Logic is thus the science of proof or the estimation of evidence. It discusses the validity of knowledge by showing its dependence on given grounds or compatibility with reality. The problem of truth has important bearings on metaphysical theory. The Nyāya is a metaphysics of reality (tattvaśāstra),¹ as well as a theory of knowledge. Thus it is not merely formal logic but a full epistemology, combining discussions of psychology and logic, metaphysics and theology.

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