Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma" c19: Appendix I. Vasubandhu on the Fundamental Principle of the Sarvāstivāda School

The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma" c19

Language
English

Contents

Appendix I. Vasubandhu on the Fundamental Principle of the Sarvāstivāda School

c19.2

The fifth chapter (*koça-sthāna*) of the *Abhidharma-koça* (v, 24 6) contains a detailed exposition of the argument between the Sarvāstivādins or Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas upon the question of the reality of future and past elements (*dharmas*), written according to the method of later dialectics. It is divided in two parts, *pūrvapakṣa* and *uttarapakṣa*. In the first the Vaibhāṣika makes a statement of his case, and he is attacked by the Sautrāntika; he answers the questions and triumphs over the opponent. In the second the parts are reversed: the Vaibhāṣika puts the questions and the Sautrāntika answers them and secures the final victory. As a conclusion the Vaibhāṣika gives voice to his despair at the impossibility of conceiving the transcendentally deep essence of the elements of existence. The translation is made from the Tibetan text of the Peking edition of the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo. vol. 64, fol. 279, b. 5–285, a. 2. Some explanations have been introduced from Yaçomitra’s Commentary, and the Tibetan commentary of Mchims-pa, which is the standard work for *abhidharma* throughout Mongolia and Tibet.

c19.3

AN EPISODICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE POSSIBILITY OF PAST AND FUTURE EFFICIENCY

c19.4

(*Abhidharma-koça*, *Kārikās* V, 24–6)

c19.5

(The author establishes that some passions exist only at the time when the corresponding objects are present, such are love or disgust towards sense-objects. But there are other passions of a general scope, such as preconceived dogmatical ideas, delusion, a doubting turn of mind, etc.; these have a bearing towards all objects whether past, present, or future. The following question is then raised.)

c19.6

But are this past and this future really existent or not? If they are, it would follow that the elementary forces (*saṃskāra*) (which are active in the process of life) must be permanent (i.e. immovable), since they exist through all time. If they are not, how is it to be explained that a man is attracted to (objects past and future) by such (passion as he experienced formerly, or will be subject to in future)?

c19.7

The Vaibhāṣikas do not admit those elements (which combine in the process of life) to be permanent, since they are subject to the action of four energies which are) the characteristic appurtenance of such elements (viz. the forces of origination, decay, existence, and destruction). But, on the other hand, they emphatically declare that “the times” (i.e. everyone of the three times) are existent in reality.

c19.8

The Sautrāntika asks, for what reason?

Part I.—The case for Everlasting Elements

c19.s1.1

The Vaibhāṣika answers: The times are always existent Kārikā, v, 2 (1) because this has been declared in Scripture, (2) because of the double (cause of perception), (3) because of the existence of the perception’s object, (4) because of the production of a result (by previous deeds). Since we maintain that all this exists, we profess the theory that everything exists (Sarvāstivāda).

c19.s1.2

(1) Because this has been declared in Scripture.—Our Sublime Lord has declared: (“the elements of matter, O Brethren, the past and the future ones, are impermanent, not to speak of the present ones. This is perceived by the perfect saint, endowed, as he is, with wisdom. Therefore, he is regardless of past sense-objects, he does not rejoice at future enjoyments, he entertains disgust and aversion in regard to the present ones, he is engaged in keeping them off). O Brethren! if some kind of past matter did not exist, the perfect saint endowed with wisdom could not be regardless of past sense-objects, but, since they are existent, he (enjoys the privilege of) disregarding them. If some kind of future matter were not existent, the wise and perfect saint could not be free from rejoicing at future enjoyments (since his independence would have no object). But future sense-objects do exist, etc.”

c19.s1.3

(2) Because of the double (cause of perception).—It is declared in Scripture: “consciousness, when operating, is conditioned by (elements) of a double kind.” What are they? The sense of vision and colour (for a visual consciousness), and so on (an organ of perception and its respective object for each of the six kinds of consciousness, the last being) the intellect itself and its non-sensuous objects ¹ (for consciousness purely mental).

c19.s1.4

¹ *Manaḥ* and *dharmaḥ*.

c19.s1.5

Thus these first two reasons for admitting the existence of the past and the future are taken from Scripture, but there are others, too, which are founded on argument.

c19.s1.6

(3) *Because of the existence of an object.*—If there is an object, its cognition can arise; if there is none, neither can its cognition be produced. If the past and the future were not existent, the objects (of the corresponding cognition) would be non-existent, and, as non-existent, they could not be cognized.

c19.s1.7

(4) *Because of the production of a result (by former deeds).*—If the past did not exist, how could a deed, good or bad, attain, after some lapse of time, its fruition, since, at the time when the latter appears, the cause which has produced retribution is gone. (A former deed, good or bad, does exist in reality, because, when it becomes ripe, it produces fruition, just as a present one does.)

c19.s1.8

For these reasons we *Vaibhāṣikas* maintain that the past and the future necessarily exist. This leads to the theory that everything is existent, and our school is known by emphatically adhering to the principle of such universal existence (*Sarvāstivāda*). Accordingly (it is said above in the mnemonic verse): "since we maintain that all this exists, we profess the theory that everything exists." Those who maintain that everything, past, and present, exists are advocates of universal existence (*Sarvāstivādins*). On the other hand, those who make a distinction, partly admitting and partly denying this theory, are termed the Distinguishing School (*Vibhajyavādins*). They maintain that the present elements, and those among the past that have not yet produced their fruitions, are existent, but they deny the existence of the future ones and of those among the past that have already produced fruition.²

c19.s1.9

² Cf. above, p. 43, n. 3.

c19.s1.10

*Sautrāntika*.—And how many branches are there among these advocates of universal existence?

c19.s1.11

*Vaibhāṣika*.—There are four branches, inasmuch as they maintain (1) a change of existence (*bhāva-pariṇāma*), (2) a change of aspect (*lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma*), (3) a change of condition (*avasthā-pariṇāma*), or (4) contingency (*apekṣā-pariṇāma*). The third is all right. The difference in time reposes on a difference of condition (i.e. function of the elements).

c19.s1.12

(1) It was the venerable Dharmatrāta who maintained the view that existence (*bhāva*) changes in the course of time, not substance (*dravya*). He is known to have been arguing thus: when an element enters different times, its existence changes, but not its essence, just as when a golden vessel is broken, its form changes, but not its colour. And when milk is turned into curds, its taste, consistency, and digestive value are gone, but not its colour.¹ In the same manner, when an element, after having been future, enters into a present time, it gets rid of its future existence, but not of the existence of its essence, and when from present it becomes past, it casts away its present existence, but not the existence of its substance.

c19.s1.13

¹ Or, if *rūpa* stands for *svarūpa*, "its essence."

c19.s1.14

(2) It was the venerable Ghoṣa who assumed a change in the aspect of the elements (*lakṣaṇa*). He is known to have professed the theory that, when an element appears at different times, the past one retains its past aspect, without being severed from its future and present aspects, the future has its future aspect, without being altogether deprived of its past and present aspects, the present likewise retains its present aspect, without completely losing its past and future aspects. Just as, when a man falls into passionate love with a female, he is not altogether deprived of his capacity of love towards other females (but this capacity is not prominent).

c19.s1.15

(3) A change of condition (*avasthā*) is advocated by the venerable Vasumitra. He is known to have maintained that, when one element manifests itself at different times, it changes in condition, and receives different designations according to the condition which it has reached, without changing in substance. (When an element is in a condition in which it does not yet produce its function, it is called future; when it produces it, it is called present; when, having produced it, it ceases to work, it is past, its substance remaining the same.) Just as in an abacus the same ball receives different significations according to the place it is thrown in. If it is thrown in the place for units it means one, if in the place for hundreds it means a hundred, if in the place for thousands it means one thousand.

c19.s1.16

(1) An advocate of contingency (*apekṣā*) is the venerable Buddhadeva. He is known to have maintained the principle that an element in the course of time receives this or that denomination on account of its relation to the former and the next moment. (An element is future with respect to the former one, be it past or present, it is present with respect to a former, i.e. past one or with respect to the next one, i.e. future one, it is past with respect to the next one, be it present or future.) Just as the same female may be called a mother (with respect to her children) and a daughter (with respect to her own mother).

c19.s1.17

Thus it is that all these four (lines of thought) are so many varieties of the theory which maintains Universal Existence. As regards the first of them, it is nothing else than the doctrine of the changing manifestations (of one eternal matter). Therefore it must be included in the Sānkhya system (which has already been rejected). As to the second, it is a confusion of all times, since it implies co-existence of all the aspects (of an element) at the same time. The passion of a man may be prominent towards one female, and merely existent (imperceptibly) towards another one; but what has this fact to do with the theory it is supposed to illustrate? According to the fourth explanation, it would follow that all the three times are found together, included in one of them. Thus in the scope of the past time we can distinguish a former and a following moment. They will represent a past and a future time. Between them the intermediate moment will correspond to a present time. Thus it is that among all proposed explanations the (remaining one alone), the third in number, is right, that which maintains a change of condition (or function). According thereto the difference in time reposes on the difference in function: at the time when an element does not yet actually perform its function it is future; when performing it, it becomes present; when, after having performed it, it stops, it becomes past.

c19.s1.18

*Sautrāntika*.—Although I perfectly understand all this, I do not see my way to admit that it implies a real existence of the past and the future. For, if the past is really existent and the future likewise, what induces us (to make a distinction between them and) to call them past and future?

c19.s1.19

*Vaibhāṣika.*—But have we not already explained it: the time of an element is settled in accordance with the time of its function.

c19.s1.20

*Sautrāntika.*—If this be the case, an eye which does not look at the present moment will not be present, because it does not perform its function?

c19.s1.21

*Vaibhāṣika.*—It is present (because it performs its other functions) : it is the immediate cause (of the next moment of its existence and the remote cause) determining (its future character).

c19.s1.22

(Although an eye that does not look is not performing its function, it, nevertheless, is efficient in immediately producing and forecasting the homogeneousness of its future with its past and in producing its, so-called, co-operative result.¹ In that sense it is present.)

c19.s1.23

¹ The Sarvāstivādins establish several kinds of causal relations between the elements. If e.g. a moment of the sense of vision produces in the next moment a visual sensation, it is termed *kāraṇa-hetu* and its result *adhipati-phala*. This relation will be absent in the case of an inefficient condition of the organ of vision. But there are other relations between the moments of this organ. When the next moment is just the same as the foregoing one, thus evoking in the observer the idea of duration, this relation is termed *sabhāga-hetu* as to *niṣyanda-phala*. If this moment appears in a stream (*santāna*) which is defiled by the presence of passions (*kleça*), this defiling character is inherited by the next moments, if no stopping of it is produced. Such a relation is called *sarvatraga-hetu* as to *niṣyanda-phala*. Finally every moment in a stream is under the influence of former deeds (*karma*) and may, in its turn, have an influence on future events. This relation is termed *vipāka-hetu* as to *vipāka-phala*. The simultaneity of the inseparable elements of matter will produce a co-operative result (*puruṣakāra-phala*). These last three relations must be existent even in the case of a non-operative moment of the sense of vision. Cf. *Ab. K.*, ii, 50 ff.; O. Rosenberg, *Problems*, chap. xv.

c19.s1.24

*Sautrāntika.*—In that case the past will be the same as the present, since the past likewise produces such results—the past viewed as a cause of homogeneousness in consecutive moments,² as a general moral cause,³ and as a cause requiring retribution⁴—all these causes would be present since they may perform their actual functions at the present moment.

c19.s1.25

² *Sabhāga-hetu*. ³ *Sarvatraga-hetu*. ⁴ *Vipāka-hetu*.

c19.s1.26

*Vaibhāṣika.*—I call present a cause which exhibits at the present moment a double function—that of giving an immediate result and that of determining the character of its remote future. A past cause, although it may produce a result at the present moment, does not, at present, determine its general character (which has been previously determined). Therefore the past is not the same as the present.

c19.s1.27

*Sautrāntika.*—If the time is settled according to efficiency, an element may be past inasmuch as its power of determining the general character of a remote result belongs to the past, and it may be present nevertheless, since it produces the result of the present moment. Thus a confusion of the characteristic signs of all the three times will arise, and I maintain that you are guilty of such confusion. Your standpoint leads to the absurdity of assuming actual or semi-actual past causes (i.e. semi-present elements), since the cause of homogeneousness and other past causes may produce a (present) result. A confusion of the essential natures of the three times is the consequence.

Part II.—The case against Everlasting Elements

c19.s2.1

*Sautrāntika.*—To this we must make the following reply :—What is it that keeps (an element from exhibiting its action) ? And how is (the time of this action to be determined) ? If it, the time of an element's existence, does not differ from the essence of the element itself, there will altogether be no time. If the element in the future and in the past exists just in the same sense as in the present, why is it future and past ? The essence of the elements of existence (*dharmatā*) is deep !

c19.s2.2

If the essence alone of the elements of existence persists throughout all the three times, but not their function, what is it that constitutes an impediment to this function ? What is it that sometimes induces them to perform and sometimes keeps them back from performing their function ?

c19.s2.3

*Vaibhāṣika.*—The function is performed when all the necessary conditions are present.

c19.s2.4

*Sautrāntika.*—This won't do ! because (according to your theory) these conditions are always present. Again, as to the functions themselves, they likewise may be past, future, and present. They then require an explanation in their turn.

c19.s2.5

Will you admit the existence of a second function (which will determine the time of the first)? or will you suppose that it neither is past, nor future, nor present, but that it, nevertheless, does exist? In this case this function will not be subject to the elementary forces of life (*saṃskṛta*) and will represent an immovable eternal entity (*asaṃskṛta*). For this reason you cannot maintain that, as long as an element does not yet perform its function, it is future.

c19.s2.6

*Vaibhāṣika*.—If the function of an element were something different from the element itself, your objections would be right. But since it is not different, they do not hold good.

c19.s2.7

*Sautrāntika*.—Then there is no time at all! If the function is the same as the substance, the elements will always remain identical. For what reason are they sometimes called past, sometimes future, and sometimes present?

c19.s2.8

*Vaibhāṣika*.—An element that has not yet appeared is future, one which has appeared and not yet disappeared is present, one which has disappeared is past. What is it you find unfounded in this explanation?

c19.s2.9

*Sautrāntika*.—The following point needs here to be established:-- if the past and the future exist in the same sense as the present, as realities, why is it, then, that, being existent in the same sense, they are future and past? If the substance of the same element is alone (permanently) existent, what is the reason that it is spoken of as "having not yet appeared" or "gone"? What is it that does not appear later on and whose absence makes us call it "past"?

c19.s2.10

Thus it is that the notion of three times will altogether have no real foundation, as long as you don't accept the view that the elements appear into life out of non-existence and return again into non-existence after having been existing. (Your theory implies eternal existence of the elements.)

c19.s2.11

*Vaibhāṣika*.—It is absurd to maintain that it implies eternal existence! There are the four forces (of origination, decay, maintenance, and destruction) to which every element is subject, and the combination (of the permanent essence of an element with these forces produces its impermanent manifestations in life).

c19.s2.12

*Sautrāntika*.—Mere words! They cannot explain the origination and decay (which are going on in the process of life). An element, according to this view, is permanent and impermanent at the same time. This, indeed, is something quite new! It has been said on this occasion :—

c19.s2.13

Maintained eternal essence;
Denied eternal being!
And yet no difference between
This essence and this being.
'Tis clearly a caprice
Of the Almighty!
'Tis spoken by His order!

c19.s2.14

(*Vaibhāṣika*.—But Buddha has said that there "is" a past and there "is" a future.)

c19.s2.15

*Sautrāntika*.—We, likewise, maintain that there "is" a past and there "is" a future. But this means that what has been formerly "is" past, and what, in the (presence of its causes), will happen "is" future. They exist in this sense only, not in reality.

c19.s2.16

*Vaibhāṣika*.—Who has ever maintained that they exist just in the same sense in which the present exists?

c19.s2.17

*Sautrāntika*.—How can one exist otherwise?

c19.s2.18

*Vaibhāṣika*.—The essence of the past and of the future is (always) existent.

c19.s2.19

*Sautrāntika*.—If they are always existent, how is the (remarkable result) brought about that they are called past or future? Therefore the words of our Sublime Lord, "there is a past, there is a future," must be understood in another sense. He proffered them when discussing with the Ājīvikas (who denied moral responsibility for past deeds). He strongly opposed their doctrine, which denied the connexion between a past cause and a future result. In order to make it known that a former cause and a future result are something which happened formerly and will happen in future, he categorically declared: "There is a past, there is a future." For the word "is" acts as a particle (which may refer to something existent and to non-existence as well). As e.g. people will say: "there is absence of light" (before it has been kindled), "there is absence of light after (it has been put out)," or the "light is put out, but I did not put it out". When Buddha declared that there "is" a past and there "is" a future, he used the word "is" in that sense.

c19.s2.20

Had it been otherwise, it would be absolutely impossible to account for (the notions of) a past and a future.

c19.s2.21

*Vaibhāṣika.*—But, then, how are we to understand the words of our Sublime Lord when addressing the Lāguḍacikhīyaka wandering ascetics (the bearers of a tress on the head and a stick in the hand)? Why did he declare: “a deed (which requires immediate retribution) is past, is accomplished, is finished, is gone, has disappeared, but, nevertheless, it does exist.” What did these ascetics really deny? Not that the accomplished deed was past, (but that it could have some actual existence, i.e. some efficiency. Hence the words of Buddha imply an actual existence of the past).

c19.s2.22

*Sautrāntika.*—(No!) He meant that a force to produce retribution is driven by a past deed into the run (of combined elements which constitute an individual). Were it existent in reality, it would not be past. This is the only way in which this passage needs be understood, because on another occasion, in the sermon about “Non-substantiality as the Ultimate Truth”,¹ the Sublime Lord has spoken thus: “when the organ of vision appears into life, there is absolutely nothing from which it proceeds, and when it vanishes, nought there is to which it retires. Therefore, O Brethren, this organ of vision has no former existence. Then it appears, and after having been existent it vanishes again.” If a future organ of vision were existent, Buddha would never have declared that it appeared out of non-existence (out of nothing).

c19.s2.23

¹ Paramārtha-śūnyatā-sūtra, Saṃyuktāgama, xiii, 22 (McGovern).

c19.s2.24

*Vaibhāṣika.*—(This passage means that), as far as the present time is concerned, it did not exist, and then appeared (in the scope of this time).

c19.s2.25

*Sautrāntika.*—Impossible! Time is not something different from the object (existing in it).

c19.s2.26

*Vaibhāṣika.*—But may not its essence have not been present and then have appeared?

c19.s2.27

*Sautrāntika.*—This would only prove that it had no (real) future existence.

c19.s2.28

(The second argument of the Sarvāstivādins refuted)

c19.s2.29

*Sautrāntika.*—Now your second argument is drawn from the circumstance that cognition, when arising, reposes on two factors:

c19.s2.30

a perceptive faculty and a corresponding object. Here we must at first (consider the instance) of mental cognition reposing on the operation of the intellect and on a mental (not sensuous) object.¹ Is this object a real cause in the same sense as the intellect? or is it a mere (passive) object realized by the intellect? If it were a real active cause, how could events which must happen after the lapse of a thousand æons, or those which never will happen, possibly constitute an active cause of the corresponding cognition? And the Final Deliverance, which is synonymous with the total cessation of every operation of all the elements of existence, how can it constitute a really active cause of its own conception? But if, on the other hand, such objects are mere passive objects of the operating mind, then I maintain that they may be future and may be past.

c19.s2.31

¹ *dharmaḥ*, i.e. 64 dharmas, *āyatana* No. 12.

c19.s2.32

Vaibhāṣika.—If they altogether do not exist, how can they possibly be objects?

c19.s2.33

Sautrāntika.—Their existence I admit, (understanding by existence) that very form in which they are conceived by us at the present moment in the present place.

c19.s2.34

Vaibhāṣika.—And how are they conceived?

c19.s2.35

Sautrāntika.—As past and as future. If somebody remembers a past object or a former feeling, he has never been observed to say "it exists", but only "it did exist".

c19.s2.36

(The third argument of the Sarvāstivādins examined)

c19.s2.37

Sautrāntika.—As (to the cognition of past and future) sense objects, the past ones are remembered in that very form in which they were experienced when they were present, and the future ones are known to Buddhas just in that form in which they will appear at the time when they will be present.

c19.s2.38

Vaibhāṣika.—And if it be just the same existence (as the present one)?

c19.s2.39

Sautrāntika.—Then it is present.

c19.s2.40

Vaibhāṣika.—If not?

c19.s2.41

Sautrāntika.—(It is absent: and thus) it is proved that absence can be cognized just as well (as presence).

c19.s2.42

Vaibhāṣika.—But (will you not admit that the past and the future) are fragments of the present itself?

c19.s2.43

*Sautrāntika.*—No, because we are not conscious of apprehending fragments.

c19.s2.44

*Vaibhāṣika.*—But, then, it may represent the same stuff, with the mere (difference that in the past and the future) its atoms may be disjoined?

c19.s2.45

*Sautrāntika.*—In that case, atoms will be eternally existent, and (all the process of life) will consist in their either combining or disjoining. There will altogether be no new origination, no real extinction, and thus you will become guilty of adhering to the (heretical) doctrine of the Ājīvikas.

c19.s2.46

Moreover, you will be contradicted by the scriptural passage 283, b. 4. (referred to above): “when the organ of vision is produced, it does not come from some other place; when it disappears, it is not going to be stored up in another place, etc.”

c19.s2.47

On the other hand, it is impossible that feelings and other (mental phenomena), which have no atomic structure, should be divided into fragments. If remembered, they likewise are remembered in that very form in which they did appear and were experienced. And, if you suppose that they continue to exist in the same form, they must be eternal. If they do not, it will be proved that (a non-existent feeling) may be apprehended (by memory) just as well (as an existent one is apprehended by self-perception).

c19.s2.48

*Vaibhāṣika.*—If non-existence is capable of being apprehended, 283, b. 6. you must add to (the list of all things cognizable, i.e.) to the twelve bases of cognition (*āyatana*), a new category, the thirteenth, non-existence.

c19.s2.49

*Sautrāntika.*—Supposing I think about the absence of a thirteenth category, what will be then the object corresponding to my thought?

c19.s2.50

*Vaibhāṣika.*—It will be this very (category, i.e. its) name.

c19.s2.51

*Sautrāntika.*—And what is it (generally speaking) that we apprehend, when we are expecting to hear a word which as yet is not pronounced?

c19.s2.52

*Vaibhāṣika.*—It is nothing else than this very word.

c19.s2.53

*Sautrāntika.*—Then a person who desires not to hear this word, will be obliged to pronounce it!

c19.s2.54

*Vaibhāṣika.*—It may be the future condition of this word?

c19.s2.55

*Sautrāntika.*—If it is something existent, why does it produce an idea of absence?

c19.s2.56

*Vaibhāṣika.*—Then it may be its present absence?

c19.s2.57

*Sautrāntika.*—No! it is the same. (If this present absence is something existent, why does it produce an idea of non-existence?)

c19.s2.58

*Vaibhāṣika.*—Then it may be the characteristic sign of a future; (this sign is absent at present, and gives rise to the idea of non-existence).

c19.s2.59

*Sautrāntika.*—This sign consists (in the fact that the future) will appear into existence out of a previous non-existence. Thus it is that both existence and non-existence may be objects of cognition.

c19.s2.60

*Vaibhāṣika.*—And how do you explain the words of the future Buddha, who has spoken thus: "that these persons know or perceive things which do not exist in the world—this is impossible!"?

c19.s2.61

*Sautrāntika.*—These words (do not mean that non-existence cannot be an object of cognition, but they) have the following meaning:—"there are other, manifestly deluded, persons (who have not yet attained the divine power of vision: they) perceive things that never did exist. I perceive only existing (remote) things." If, on the contrary, every possible thought had only existing things for its object, what reason could there have been for doubting (the accuracy of the assertion of such people about what they were perceiving by their power of divine vision)? or what would have been the difference (between the *bodhisattva*'s real power of vision and the incomplete power of these men)?

c19.s2.62

It is inevitable that we should understand the passage in this sense, because it is confirmed by another scriptural passage, which begins with the words: "come unto me, ye monks, my pupils!" and goes on until the following words are spoken: "what I am telling him in the morning becomes clearer at night; what I am conversing about at night becomes clearer to him next morning. He will cognize the existence of what does exist, the non-existence of what does not exist. Where something still higher exists, he will know that there is something still higher; and where nothing higher exists, he will know that (it is the Final Deliverance, that) there is nothing higher than that!" Therefore the argument (in favour of a real existence of the past, that you have drawn from the supposed fact that) our intellect can have only existent things for its object—this argument is wrong.

c19.s2.63

(The fourth argument of the Sarvāstivādins examined)

c19.s2.64

*Sautrāntika*.—As to your next argument (in favour of the real 284, a. 7. existence of the past, viz. because it has a real) result—we must observe that we, the Sautrāntikas, never did maintain that a result can be produced from a past deed (directly).

c19.s2.65

*Vaibhāṣika*.—How is it produced, then?

c19.s2.66

*Sautrāntika*.—(This deed) is the beginning of a peculiar chain of events (in the course of which the result appears sooner or later). A more detailed explanation of this point will be given later on, when we will refute the theory (of the Vātsiputrīyas, who) maintain the existence of an individual.¹ (As to your view, it is manifestly inconsistent) What result can a past deed produce according to this view? If the past and the future are actually existent, the result will necessarily be pre-existent from all eternity.

c19.s2.67

¹ *Ab. K.*, ix; translated in my *Soul Theory*.

c19.s2.68

*Vaibhāṣika*.—(But we assume the existence of the force of generation?)

c19.s2.69

*Sautrāntika*.—Well, then, it will be established that this force 284, b. 1. itself appears after having previously been non-existent! In fact, if everything without any exception is pre-existent, there can be nothing that could have a force to produce anything! In the end it comes to the same as the theory of the followers of Varṣagaṇya. According to them there is neither production of something new nor extinction of something existent: what exists is always existent, what does not exist will never become existent.

c19.s2.70

*Vaibhāṣika*.—But the force (of a past deed) may consist in “making present” (some already existing element)?

c19.s2.71

*Sautrāntika*.—How is this “making present” to be understood? 284, b. 3.

c19.s2.72

*Vaibhāṣika*.—It consists in removing (the result from one) place to another.

c19.s2.73

*Sautrāntika*.—Then the result would be eternally pre-existent. And, as to non-existent elements, how can they (be made to change place)? Moreover, such “removing” means production (of a motion, i.e. of something) which previously did not exist.

c19.s2.74

*Vaibhāṣika*.—It may consist in a “specification” of the (everlasting) essence of an element?

c19.s2.75

*Sautrāntika*.—This, again, would prove that there is production of what previously did not exist. To conclude: the principle of Universal Existence, as far as exegetical literature is concerned, where it implies an actual existence of the past and the future, does not hold good. On the contrary, it is all right if we strictly conform to the words of Scripture, where it is declared that “everything exists”.

c19.s2.76

*Vaibhāṣika*.—And in what sense has it been declared in Scripture that “everything exists”?

c19.s2.77

*Sautrāntika*.—O Brahmins! it has been declared, “everything exists”: that means no more than “the elements included in the twelve categories (*āyatana*) are existent”.

c19.s2.78

*Vaibhāṣika*.—And the three times (are they not included among these elements)?

c19.s2.79

*Sautrāntika*.—(No, they are not!). How their existence is to be understood we have already explained.

c19.s2.80

*(The Sarvāstivādin reverts to his first argument)*

c19.s2.81

*Vaibhāṣika*.—If the past and the future did not exist, how could it be possible that a man should be attracted by (a past and future passion) to a (past or future object of enjoyment)?

c19.s2.82

*Sautrāntika*.—This becomes possible because past passions leave residues (or produce seeds), which are the causes of new passions; these seeds are existent (and the saint has the capacity of keeping them down, of being independent of them). Therefore, a man can be bound by (past accesses of) passion. And it is in this sense that he can be allured by (future or past) objects, because the seeds of these passions, which are directed towards (past and future enjoyments), are always present in him.

Conclusion

c19.s3.1

*Vaibhāṣika* (does not feel discountenanced by this series of arguments, and says :) We Vaibhāṣikas, nevertheless, maintain that the past and the future certainly do exist. But (regarding the everlasting essence of the elements of existence, we confess) that this is something we do not succeed in explaining, their essence is deep (it is transcendental), since its existence cannot be established by rational methods.¹ (And as to the use we make of the notion of time in common life, it is contradictory. We use) the expression: "what appears vanishes" (implying that the same element appears and disappears, e.g.) "some matter appears and disappears". But we, likewise, say "one thing appears, another disappears", implying that one element, the future one, enters into life, and another one (the present one), stops. We also speak of the appearing of time (itself "the time is come"), because the element which enters into life is included in the notion of time. And we speak about being born "from time", since the future includes many moments (and only one of them actually enters into life).

c19.s3.2

¹ The Peking and Narthang Bstan-ḥgyur read here *dran-bar mi nus-so*. This may mean that the remark of the Vaibhāṣika applies to the elements of mind alone, i.e. the elements that cannot be carried from one place to another. But Saṅghabhadra’s text points to a reading *hcad-par mi nus-so*, which undoubtedly is the correct one, since it is supported by the translation of Hiuen-Tsang. The corruption must be very old, since the block-print of the Aga monastery, which is founded on old sources coming from Derge, repeats it and it is retained by Mchims-pa.

c19.s3.3

*End of the Episodical Investigation* the *Goths*, the *Vandals*, the *Suevi*, the *Burgundians*, the *Alani*, the *Huns*, the *Franks*, the *Saxons*, the *Thuringians*, the *Rugians*, and the *Heruli*. The names of these tribes are familiar to the reader, but their origin, their migrations, and their settlements are involved in the deepest obscurity. The most probable opinion is that they were all of German or Scythian extraction, and that they had been driven from their native seats by the pressure of the Huns, a formidable nation of Tartars, who had crossed the Volga and the Tanais, and were advancing with rapid strides towards the frontiers of the Roman empire.

c19.s3.4

The first of these nations that crossed the Danube was the *Goths*. They were divided into two great branches, the *Visigoths* or Western Goths, and the *Ostrogoths* or Eastern Goths. The Visigoths, under the conduct of Fritigern, implored the protection of the emperor Valens, and were permitted to settle in the province of Thrace. But the perfidy of the Roman governors, and the insolence of the Roman soldiers, soon provoked them to rebellion. They defeated the imperial armies, and Valens himself perished in the battle of Hadrianople.

c19.s3.5

The death of Valens was followed by the accession of Theodosius, who, by his wisdom and valour, restored the discipline of the Roman legions, and compelled the Goths to accept a peace, which was rather a truce than a permanent settlement. The Goths, however, remained in the heart of the empire, and their presence was a constant source of danger and alarm. They were no longer the rude barbarians who had first crossed the Danube; they had learned the arts of war and the policy of the Romans, and they were ready to take advantage of any opportunity to assert their independence.

c19.s3.6

The reign of Theodosius was the last period of the glory of the Roman empire. After his death, the empire was divided between his two sons, Arcadius and Honorius. Arcadius reigned in the East, and Honorius in the West. The division was fatal to the interests of the state. The two brothers were weak and indolent, and they were governed by their ministers and favourites. The Goths, under the command of Alaric, took advantage of the weakness of the government, and invaded Italy. They besieged and took Rome, and the eternal city, which had for so many centuries been the mistress of the world, was plundered by the barbarians.

c19.s3.7

The fall of Rome was a shock to the whole civilized world. It was the end of an era, and the beginning of a new and darker age. The Goths, after the death of Alaric, retired from Italy, and settled in Gaul and Spain, where they founded kingdoms which were destined to last for several centuries. The Vandals, under the command of Genseric, crossed into Africa, and established a powerful kingdom, which for a time threatened the security of the Mediterranean. The Franks, under the command of Clovis, conquered Gaul, and laid the foundations of the French monarchy. The Saxons, under the command of Hengist and Horsa, invaded Britain, and established the kingdoms of the Heptarchy.

Linked texts (3)