Shringaraprakasha 2
English (machine translation) 2
- Language
- English
Contents
- 2.p1 — 83 parts
2.p1.1
Second Illumination: The Illumination of the Nominal Stem and So Forth. / 2.1 The nominal stem is threefold: having distinct constituents, having indistinct constituents, and an imitation. / Among these, that having distinct constituents is threefold: primary-derivative in form, secondary-derivative in form, and compound in form. / Among them, the affixes to verbal roots that express state or syntactic role are the primary affixes. / There, the meaning of a verbal root that is not organized into a temporal sequence is a state (bhāva); as it is said: / 'That form of verbal meaning which tracks time is an action; / that which is delimited as a discrete entity on all sides is called a state.' (2.2) / Here, that [state] exists in six ways: accomplished, to be accomplished, accomplished but incomplete, to be accomplished and incomplete, accomplished yet to be accomplished, and to be accomplished yet accomplished. / Among these, because the primary affix is the prominent element, there is no emergence of action, so having become an entity, it takes on gender, number, and so on; it is the cause for a relation-case-ending under the rule 'Of the agent and object in a primary-affix construction' (Pāṇini 2.3.65), and is the accomplished [state]; / as in: 'This is a wonder: the cooking of the rice and the appearance of the Brahmins'; 'Devadatta's split of the firewood'; 'Yajñadatta's desire to make a mat.' / Here, in the case of the restriction that 'only for the object when both apply', because the explanation is 'in that primary derivative wherein both are applicable', and because this restriction is prohibited in the case of [-aka] and [-in] affixes, the genitive ending applies even to the agent, thereby indicating the accomplished nature of the state. / When the verbal root element is prominent, due to the emergence of action, it does not become an entity, does not take on gender, number, and so on, and is the cause only for a syntactic-role case ending of the agent and object; this is the [state] to be accomplished; / as in: 'He goes to eat rice'; 'Having studied his sacred recitation, he bathes'; 'He sits drinking milk repeatedly.' / For this very reason, the genitive ending is prohibited by the rule 'Not with [the affixes] la, u, ka...' (Pāṇini 2.3.69). / Connected with a secondary suffix while still being accomplished is the accomplished-incomplete [state]; / as in: 'mutual screaming' (vyāvakrośī), 'assembled' (sāṅkūṭinam), 'artificial' (kṛtrimam).
2.p1.2
Here, just as in forms like ābhijityaḥ ('descendant of Abhijit') and kauñjāyanyaḥ ('descendant of Kuñjāyana'), the sense of offspring, even though expressed by aṇ and other [suffixes], and in tauttirīyāḥ ('followers of Tittiri') and chāgaleyinaḥ ('followers of Chagalā'), the sense of being proclaimed [by him], even though expressed by chaṇ and other [suffixes], is not fully realized without the origination of a taddhita suffix having the scope of pleonastic study or knowledge, so too an action, even when accomplished [and] expressed by ṇaj or iṇuñ conditioned by reciprocity or comprehensive inclusion, or purely expressed by a kṛt affix, is not fully realized without the origination of a taddhita suffix serving a pleonastic purpose or indicating avoidance; thus it is an accomplished [action] that is unrealized. / What is yet to be accomplished and is linked to a secondary verbal employment is an unaccomplished [action] that is unrealized; as in: cakāsāñcakāra ('shone'), vidāṅkurvantu ('let them know'), raipoṣaṃ puṣyati ('nourishes with increase of wealth'). / Here, just as a word ending in cvi and the like in contexts such as transformation into what it previously was not—e.g., śuklībhavati ('becomes white'), paṭapaṭākaroti ('makes a crackling noise')—and a word ending in soṭ in contexts of repetition of an action and the like—e.g., lunīhi lunīhīty evāyaṃ lunāti ('he mows as if crying, "Mow! Mow!"'), rāṣṭram aṭa aṭam aṭa dūram aṭety evāyam aṭati ('he wanders as if crying, "Roam the realm! Roam! Roam far!"')—being incomplete because its word-meaning is not fully manifested, requires the secondary employment of kṛ, bhū, and the like, or a secondary employment according to the specific grammatical rule, in order to manifest its own meaning; so too a word ending in ām and a word ending in ṇamul, being incomplete because their word-meaning is not fully manifested, having the very nature of something to be accomplished, require the secondary employment of kṛ, bhū, and the like, or a secondary employment according to the specific grammatical rule, in order to manifest their own meaning; therefore, the action denoted by this is an unaccomplished [action] that is unrealized. / Thus it is said: 'Because ṇamul, just like ām, has an incomplete meaning, the secondary verbal employment is indeed established like [that of] cvi; but the rule for the sense of the rule-governed [action] is the secondary verbal employment prescribed according to the rule in cases such as kaṣ ('to scrape').' / Therefore, by cakāsāñcakāra and the like, this meaning is conveyed: 'he shone' (cakāsti sma), 'let them know' (vidantu), 'nourishing with wealth, he nourishes this' (rāyaḥ puṣyann amuṃ puṣyati). / For this very reason, some do not begin a separate chapter on ṇamul, thinking, 'It is established solely as an adverb.' / Objection: Adverbs take the accusative case and the neuter gender; and how can the root puṣ ('to nourish') itself be the object of puṣ? For the self cannot be pervaded by the self itself; indeed, even a well-trained lad cannot mount his own shoulders. / [Reply:] That is not so;
2.p1.3
in cases like 'he should lead a refined life' (nāgarakaṃ vṛttaṃ varteta) or 'he should sacrifice with the Viśvajit sacrifice' (viśvajitā yajeta), because pervasion and delimitation are observed through the non-identity of the general and the particular, the particular action of puṣ is indeed the object of the general root puṣ. / Nor is there any invariant rule that adverbs can only be objects; for an action, just as it is an object because of being brought into accomplishment, is also an agent because of being brought into existence; and hence adverbs are construed in both ways: 'having produced nourishment of wealth, he nourishes' (raipoṣaṃ kṛtvā puṣyati), or 'he nourishes in such a way that there is nourishment of wealth' (raipoṣaṃ yathā bhavaty evaṃ puṣyati). / An accomplished [action] that is joined with the characteristics of what is to be accomplished is 'accomplished-to-be-accomplished'; as in: 'marvelous is the milking of the cows by an untrained non-cowherd' (āścaryo gavāṃ doho'śikṣitenāgopālena), 'truly excellent is the drinking of milk by Yajñadatta' (sādhu khalu payasaḥ pānaṃ yajñadattena), 'wonderful indeed is the composition of the sūtra by Pāṇini' (vicitrā hi sūtrasya kṛtiḥ pāṇininā). / Here, since the instrumental case is taught for the agent because of the rule that 'when both [agent and object] are applicable, the genitive is used only for the object,' it is understood that this action, although accomplished, also becomes something to be accomplished by virtue of speaker's intention. / Others, however, describe the accomplished-to-be-accomplished differently: 'he sits after the manner of a camel' (uṣṭrāsikām āste), 'he eats five times' (pañca vārān bhuṅkte), 'he cooks five turns' (pañca prayogān pacati). / Here, because the camel-sitting, turns, and performances have no separate existence as they consist of a particular action, repetition, or execution, and because the accusative is observed for things to be designated by the verbal action, it is understood through the speaker's intention of non-difference that even accomplished things have the status of something to be accomplished, just like the action itself. / Thus it is said: / 'Because it is a particular condition of that [action], the camel-sitting is not distinct [and] not to be pervaded; / but in its state of being accomplished, on account of identity with the sitting, it is called an object in terms of its result. // Because of the relation "this is that" when quality and qualified are non-different, / the state of being accomplished belonging to turns and the like, just like that of an action, is not flawed.' (2.3) / Therefore, the meaning of uṣṭrāsikām āste and the like is: 'he sits like a camel' (uṣṭravad āste), 'he performs the action of eating five times' (pañcāvṛttiṃ bhujikriyāṃ karoti), 'he executes five cookings' (pañca pākān nirvartayati). / What is to be accomplished and is joined with the characteristics of the accomplished is 'to-be-accomplished-accomplished'; as in: 'it is to be done by you' (kartavyaṃ bhavataḥ), 'two things are to be done' (kārye bhavataḥ).
2.p1.4
Here, by the rule “Not after la, u, uka, alu, ayan, a niṣṭhā affix, an affix having the sense of khal, or tṛn” (Pāṇini 2.3.69), because affixes beginning with *l* express an accomplishable meaning, the genitive is prohibited for the agent and the direct object. However, because the genitive is re-prescribed by rules such as “Optionally in the case of the agent with kṛtya affixes” (Pāṇini 2.3.71), “And after kta in the present tense” (Pāṇini 2.3.67), and “A supplementary addition in the case of the neuter expressing action (bhāva),” it is understood that in one alternative, depending on the speaker's intention (vivakṣā), it denotes an accomplished meaning; thus action expressed by this is both accomplishable and accomplished (sādhyasiddha). And it cannot be said that no prohibition of kṛtya affixes is heard here, because in *khasarthatṛnām*, by *khalartha* the kṛtya, kta, and khalartha affixes, as well as śatṛ, śānac, and cānaś, are included, whereas by *tṛn* only the tṛn affix is meant. For this very reason, just as for action expressed by a niṣṭhā affix, so too for action expressed by a kṛtya affix, the genitive does not occur even for the object, as in: / “Just as the sun has set, just as the moon has risen, / so must slackness of resolve be entered into by the fawn-eyed maiden.” (2.4) / How, then, can there be an affix denoting bhāva from a transitive verb? For that must occur from an intransitive verb, as he says: “Affixes beginning with *l* occur in the sense of the direct object and action (bhāva) from intransitive verbs” (Pāṇini 3.4.69); “Only in those two meanings do kṛtya, kta, and khalartha affixes occur” (Pāṇini 3.4.70). For one never says *kṛtaṃ kaṭaṃ devadattena* [“the mat was made by Devadatta” with the action-noun governing an accusative object]. It is answered: this is not an internal substance-object (dravyakarma); rather, according to the rule “Time, distance, action, and the destination of motion are designated as objects of intransitive verbs,” among external objects such as time, it is an object of a verb of motion characterized as a destination. And that this is external is known from the renewed mention of the accusative in “In continuous connection of time and distance” (Pāṇini 2.3.5); otherwise, since the accusative in the sense of a direct object would already be established, he would only have said “and the dative for an object of a verb of motion.” And it is precisely due to the absence of an internal substance-object that a verb is intransitive, while in the presence of that very [substance-object] it becomes transitive; therefore, an object such as time, even when present, does not impair its designation as intransitive. Others, however, describe the accomplishable-accomplished differently: *uṣṭrāsikā āsyante* (“they sit the sittings of camels”), *hataśāyikāḥ śayyante* (“they lie the lyings of the slain”), *yavāgvāḥ pākāya vrajati* (“he goes for the cooking of barley-gruel”).
2.p1.5
Here, because sitting (āsikā) and lying (śāyikā) consist of the action expressed by the finite verb, and because cooking (pāka) is to be accomplished by the action of going, even though there is accomplishability (sādhyatva), yet, due to connection with case-endings expressive of gender and number, establishedness (siddhatva) is also understood according to the speaker's intention; thus this is called 'accomplishable-established' (sādhyasiddha). Even so, by the expressions 'camels' sittings are sat' (uṣṭrāsikā āsyante) and 'the slain's layings are lain' (hataśāyikāḥ śayyante), it is the nature of the verbal action itself that is conveyed, metaphorically treated in terms of generic and specific forms: it is expressed by the finite verbs in a generic form, and by the words ending in ṇvul in a specific form. The plural number, however, is for the purpose of intense censure: for indeed, the many censured sittings of a camel, possessing numerous forms, and the numerous excessive layings of the slain which are recognized as being of that same kind—with these functioning as particulars, this sitting and this lying, due to apprehending identity-in-difference produced by the relation of standard of comparison (upamāna) and object compared (upameya), are conveyed by the verbal ending (lakāra) as well, in terms of the generic-specific relation, precisely through plurality for the purpose of intense censure; for without plurality, the generic-specific relation is untenable. Therefore, the sentence-meaning is: 'sittings like a camel's sittings are done or take place', or 'layings like the layings of the slain are done or take place'.
[Objection:] Well then, in this way, for words like uṣṭrāsikā as well as repetitions of turns (vāraprayoga), etc., just as there is accusative-case-like objecthood, neuter gender also should apply, as in: 'he cooks mildly' (mṛdu pacati), 'he cooks excellently' (praśastaṃ pacatīti).
[Reply:] It is replied: an action-qualifier (kriyāviśeṣaṇa) is indeed threefold—external (bāhya), internal (ābhyantara), and external-internal (bāhyābhyantara). Among these, the external consists of a circumstance/attribute (dharma), such as a turn (vāra), etc.; the internal consists of a specific variety, such as a camel's sitting (uṣṭrāsikā), etc.; and the external-internal consists of a quality (guṇa), such as mildness (mṛdu), etc. Among them, how could the external, qualifying the principal without shifting its own nature through metaphorical non-difference based on the connection 'this is that', abandon its own gender? And the internal, because it encompasses a specific portion and has an inherent gender and number, how could it take on another gender? But the external-internal, being a quality, lacks an inherent gender of its own, and according to the rule, 'words expressive of qualities take their gender and number from their substrate' (Mahābhāṣya 1.2.64), takes precisely the gender of what is qualified;
2.p1.6
In that case, since action by its very nature is solely to be accomplished and is devoid of gender and number, when qualifying an action, the neuter gender alone is proper for words like mṛdu. But for words like uṣṭrāsikā and vāra, because they permanently possess inherent gender and embrace a specific aspect, even when they are action-qualifiers, there is no neuter gender. Now, in 'he goes for cooking' (pākāya vrajati), 'he goes for firewood' (edhebhyo vrajati), why is not the action ending in the dative expressing 'for the sake of that' (tādarthya) understood as simply established (siddha), like 'the pot is for cooking' (randhanāya sthālī)? It is not so: for the affix is introduced solely in the sense of 'for the sake of that' by the rule 'and [the affixes are introduced] denoting the verbal action' (Pāṇini 3.3.11), and the dative is prescribed in its own sense by 'and [the dative is prescribed] after an action-denoting word having the sense of the infinitive' (Pāṇini 2.3.15). For what purpose, then, is this said? For ghañ and other suffixes are already established in the sense of verbal action (bhāva), and the dative in the sense of tādarthya. [Reply:] Let not the suffix tumun, occurring with a word denoting an action as a subordinate member (kriyārthopapada), supersede ghañ and others in this domain; and the non-uniform rule regarding similar affixes (vā-asarūpa-vidhi) does not operate here, because of the specific mention of ṇvul in 'tumun and ṇvul' (Pāṇini 3.3.10). Now, just as in 'he goes to fetch firewood' (edhān āhartuṃ vrajati) [we have] 'he goes for firewood' (edhebhyo vrajati) with the dative by the rule 'and [the dative is used] in the sense of the object of a verb whose subordinate action is implied' (Pāṇini 2.3.14), if it were similarly 'he goes to do cooking' (pākaṃ kartuṃ vrajati) -> 'he goes for cooking' (pākāya vrajati), what fault would there be? None at all. But this I ask: is that cooking established (siddha) or to be accomplished (sādhya)? If it is established, why does he go to do it? If it is to be accomplished, then in the presence of words denoting action as a subordinate member, ghañ and other suffixes are superseded by tumun. If, however, by virtue of having the sense of tumun they express what is to be accomplished, and by ending in the dative case they have a meaning that is not a concrete substance (asattvabhūta), how do ghañ and other suffixes in pākāya, etc., become the cause for the genitive case marking relation in 'of barley-gruel' (yavāgvāḥ)? Such is the power of words: only a certain word has a connection with a certain word, and with a certain word alone does a certain word connect. That is to say: even when the meaning is identical, in 'he who stays awake into the later part of the night' (prajāgaritā apararātrān) the suffix tṛn arises from the connection with an external object and a prepositional object, but not for one who is expressed by jāgarūka ('habitually watchful'); in 'he accepts cooking, etc.' (ūrīkaroti pākādikam), the words like ūrī connect with the action of doing (kṛ) which resides in one or multiple particulars, but not with roots like pac (to cook) whose domain is that meaning;
2.p1.7
In 'the king's wives who do not see even the sun' (asūryaṃpaśyā rājadārāḥ), the negative particle nañ negates the action of seeing which has the sun as its object, even though it is separated, and not the state of being the sun; similarly, 'verses which are not sung again' (apunargeyāḥ ślokāḥ), and 'the brāhmaṇa who does not eat at a funeral feast' (aśrāddhabhojī brāhmaṇaḥ). Likewise, in 'the mendicant who does not eat salt' (alavaṇabhojī bhikṣuḥ), a negative compound is seen even in the absence of semantic compatibility (asāmarthya), just as in asūryaṃpaśyā, etc.; but not in 'doing nothing' (akiṃcitkurvāṇaḥ); likewise, 'stealing a māṣa bean' (māṣaṃ haramāṇaḥ), 'crawled out from the unfathomable depth' (agādhād utsṛptaḥ). Moreover, in 'drinking milk again and again' (payaḥ pāyaṃ pāyaṃ, payaḥ pītvā pītvā) and 'entering the house again and again' (geham anupraveśam anupraveśam, geham anupraviśyānupraviśya), suffixes like ṇamul cause the reduplication of words in the sense of repetition (ābhīkṣṇya) and pervading frequency (vīpsā), but the suffixes yaṅ, śas, etc., do not do so, as in 'he cooks excessively' (pāpacyate), 'give two by two' (dviśo dehi); the intensive word ending in yaṅ conveys the intensity of the action even without reduplication, as in lolūyate ('he cuts intensely'), whereas the imperative form does not, as in 'reap, reap' (lunīhi lunīhi) -> lolūyate; words ending in niṣṭhā, etc., having lost the power to express the object by virtue of the complex formation (vṛtti), do not prevent the accusative case of the object, as in 'having previously made the mat' (kṛtapūrvī kaṭam), 'having studied grammar' (adhītī vyākaraṇam); suffixes like tumun, even when the desire has ceased, govern only the accusative in the object, as in 'intending to go to the village' (grāmaṃ gantumano), 'desiring to make a mat' (kaṭaṃ kartukāmaḥ); even when there is the restrictive rule that when both [agent and object] are applicable, [the genitive occurs] only in the object, suffixes like ktin take the relational case (genitive) even for the agent for the sake of compounding, as in 'the wondrous composition of the sūtra by Pāṇini' (vicitrā sūtrasya kṛtiḥ pāṇineḥ), 'the grammatical instruction of words by the teacher' (śabdānām anuśāsanam ācāryasya); even though ghañ and other suffixes express what is to be accomplished and signify meanings that are not concrete substances, they connect precisely with the relational case (genitive) in the object, as in 'for the cooking of the barley-gruel' (yavāgvāḥ pākāya); thus the action expressed by them becomes 'accomplishable-established' (sādhyasiddha).
2.5 A kāraka (syntactic role) is the cause of an action; that too is of six kinds: agent (kartā), object (karma), instrument (karaṇa), recipient (saṃpradāna), point of departure (apādāna), and locus (adhikaraṇa). Among these, the agent is threefold: independent (svatantra), instigator (hetu), and middle agent (karmakartā);
2.p1.8
Among them, that which employs the instrument and other [factors] in an action by its own will and is not employed by them is the independent agent (kartṛ); as for example: ‘the shower of sons and grandsons’ (putrapautrasya darśakaḥ), ‘the destroyer of cities’ (purāṃ bhettā). That which impels that very [agent] engaged in action is the prompter (hetu); as for example: ‘having caused the king to fight’ (rājānaṃ yodhitavān), ‘the bowman who causes the king to fight’ (rājayudhvā dhanuṣmān), ‘bows causing the nails to loosen’ (nakhāni mocayanti nakhamucāni dhanūṃṣi). The direct object itself, when intended to be spoken of as independent, is the object-agent (karmakartṛ); as for example: ‘the cooking beans cook by themselves’ (svayameva pacyante pacelimā māṣāḥ), ‘fragile woods break by themselves’ (svayameva bhajyante bhaṅgurāṇi kāṣṭhāni). The direct object (karma) is of three kinds: to be brought into being (nirvartya), to be modified (vikārya), and to be reached (prāpya). Among them, that which is produced when nonexistent, or manifested when existent, is that to be brought into being; as for example: ‘a mat to be made’ (kartavyaḥ kaṭaḥ), ‘a sound to be articulated’ (uccāryaḥ śabdaḥ). That whose original material is destroyed or in which another quality is produced is that to be modified; as for example: ‘the boiled rice has been eaten’ (bhukta odanaḥ), ‘the field being reaped’ (lūyamānaḥ kedāraḥ). When no particular change effected by the action is perceived, that which is reached—whether desired or not desired by the agent through the action—is that to be reached; as for example: ‘a master difficult to behold’ (durdarśaḥ prabhuḥ), ‘a path easily traversed’ (suyāno mārgaḥ). The instrument (karaṇa) is external, internal, and both external and internal. Among them, that which is perceived outside the body of the agent is external; as for example: ‘boiled rice causing satiation’ (āśitaṃbhavaṃ bhaktam), ‘a pitcher containing water’ (dhṛtodakaḥ karakaḥ). The opposite of that is internal; as for example: ‘a pleasant disposition’ (priyaṃkaraṇaṃ śīlam), ‘subjugating affection’ (vaśīkaraṇaṃ prema). That possessing the qualities of both is external and internal; as for example: ‘a brāhmaṇa worthy to be given to’ (dīyate'smai dānīyo brāhmaṇaḥ), ‘a child to whom the gods should give’ (devā deyāsurasmai devadāyo ḍimbhaḥ). The domain of the technical definition ‘that which one intends by the direct object is the indirect object’ (Pāṇini 1.4.32) is that which is reached through the direct object alone; as for example: ‘one to whom what is to be given will be given’—a fisherman (dāśaḥ kaivartaḥ); ‘he comes for whom a cow is slaughtered’—a guest (gaughnaḥ atithiḥ). Because the word ‘karma’ also includes action, that which is reached by an action is that reached by action; as for example: ‘people praise him’—a praiseworthy king (ślāghyo rājā); ‘people desire for him’—desirable wealth (spṛhaṇīyo vibhavaḥ).
2.p1.9
The point of ablation (apādāna) has a specified domain or an implied domain; as for example: ‘a mountain from which one falls’ (prapatano giriḥ), ‘a hill from which one flows’ (prasravaṇaḥ śailaḥ). That which is stated through connection with a past event or the like has an implied domain; as for example: ‘the boundary mountain’ (avadhiḥ parvataḥ), ‘the ocean as limit’ (maryādā samudraḥ). The locus (adhikaraṇa) is topical (vaiṣayika), contiguous (aupaśleṣika), and causal (naimittika). Among them, that which binds variously in manifold ways through categories, qualities, actions, substances, and the like is a domain (viṣaya), such as space, time, and so forth; the topical is that which rests on a domain itself; as for example: ‘cows and others drink here’—a watering trough, a reservoir (nipānaṃ jalāśayaḥ); ‘kings are sustained in it’—a capital city (rājadhānī nagaram). Contiguity (upaśleṣa) is physical contact; that which brings it about is contiguous; as for example: ‘arrows are held in it’—a quiver (iṣudhiḥ upāsaṅgaḥ); ‘they sleep on this’—a couch, a bed (śayyā prayaṅkaḥ). That which is merely the cause is causal; as for example: ‘spectators’ minds are delighted here’—the stage, a spectacle (raṅgaḥ prekṣā); ‘eyes and minds are pleased in it’—a palace, a mansion (prāsādaḥ saudham). This twofold [set of categories] expands in six ways: pure, mixed, conditioned by adjuncts, conventional, having fixed relation, and having incidental relation. Among these, non-contact with other meanings is purity. For verbal actions (bhāva), as for example: ‘the cooking of boiled rice’ (odanasya pākaḥ), ‘having done enough’ (alaṃ kṛtvā), ‘surely having remained’ (khalu sthitvā); for syntactic roles (kāraka), as for example: ‘the creator of the waters’ (apāṃ sraṣṭā), ‘the filler of a hundred years’ (varṣaśatasya pūrakaḥ), ‘soma flowing’ (somaṃ pavamānaḥ). Blending is mixture; for verbal actions, as for example: ‘it is time to eat’ (kālo bhoktum), ‘enough of eating’ (alaṃ bhoktum), ‘he walks eating again and again’ (bhojaṃ bhojaṃ vrajati); for syntactic roles, as for example: ‘a woman fit to be approached’ (gamanamarhati gamyā yoṣit), ‘an enemy capable of being conquered’ (jetuṃ śakyate jayyaḥ śatruḥ), ‘he goes to cook’ (paktuṃ vrajati), ‘the cook goes’ (pācako vrajati). A qualifier mentioned in the grammatical treatise, whether external, internal, or both, is an adjunct (upādhi); for verbal actions, as for example: ‘your manner of lying down’ (bhavataḥ śāyikā), ‘the mating of cows’ (upasaro gavām), ‘a flock of animals’ (samajaḥ paśūnām); for syntactic roles, as for example: ‘a lazy person who rubs his belly’ (tundaparimṛjo 'lasaḥ), ‘an elephant that sports in clumps of grass’ (stamberamo hastī), ‘an animal that robs a leather-bag’ (dṛtihariḥ paśuḥ). Conventional usage (rūḍhi) is the signification of a substance where there is signification of a quality; for verbal actions, as for example: ‘hunting’ (mṛgayā), ‘latent impression’ (vāsanā), ‘wandering mendicancy’ (parivrajyā);
2.p1.10
for syntactic roles, as for example: ‘a potter’ (kumbhakāraḥ), ‘a lotus’ (paṅkajam), ‘the new moon day’ (amāvāsyā). An invariable connection requiring a correlate is fixed relation (samabandha); for verbal actions, as for example: ‘having eaten, he goes’ (bhuktvā vrajati), ‘he desires to eat’ (bhoktumicchati), ‘the mountain is not reaching the river’ (aprāpya nadīṃ parvataḥ); for syntactic roles, as for example: ‘he studies while pacing about’ (caṅkramyamāṇo'dhīte), ‘he resides while studying’ (adhīyāno vasati), ‘giving cattle, he goes’ (godāyo vrajati). A connection requiring an incidental attachment is incidental relation (anubandha); for verbal actions, as for example: ‘clamor occurs’ (sāṃrāviṇaṃ vartate), ‘he nourishes abundant wealth’ (raipoṣaṃ puṣyati), ‘it shone’ (cakāsāñcakāra); for syntactic roles, as for example: ‘one who has sacrificed with the Agniṣṭoma’ (agniṣṭomayājī), ‘one who gives a hundred camels and she-camels’ (uṣṭrakośaśataṃ dāyī). Now, in expressing these, the primary verbal suffixes (kṛt) are of three kinds: expressing action (bhāvavacana), expressing syntactic roles (kārakavacana), and expressing both action and syntactic roles (bhāvakārakavacana). Among them, suffixes such as athuc, ṇvul, ṇac, tumun, se, and ṇamul express action; suffixes such as ṇvul, aṇ, uṇ, kki, śatṛ, and tṛn express syntactic roles; and suffixes such as tavya, tavai, kta, khal, sugh, and ghañ express both action and syntactic roles. Among those expressing action, when unconditioned by adjuncts and in the sense of accomplished action, suffixes such as athuc are used; as for example: ‘joy’ (nandathuḥ), ‘sacrifice’ (yajñaḥ), ‘sleep’ (svapnaḥ), ‘action’ (kriyā), ‘itching’ (kaṇḍūyā), ‘fanning’ (vyajyā). In this very category, when possessing an adjunct such as disease, suffixes such as ṇvul are used; as for example: ‘anorexia afflicts’ (arocako bādhate), ‘diarrhea causes’ (pravāhikā karoti), ‘your sitting’ (bhavata āsikā), ‘you owe me a feeding of sugarcane’ (ikṣubhakṣikāṃ me dhārayasi), ‘what deed did you perform?’ (kāṃ tvaṃ kārikāmakārṣīḥ), ‘your non-action, O outcaste’ (akaraṇiste vṛṣala). In the sense of unaccomplished action, suffixes such as ṇac are used; as for example: ‘mutual shouting continues’ (vyāvakrośī vartate), ‘they engage in mutual laughter’ (vyāvahāsīṃ kurvanti), ‘made artificially by an instrument’ (karaṇena nirvṛttaṃ kṛtrimam), ‘having eaten, he goes’ (bhuktvā vrajati), ‘having borrowed, he sacrifices’ (apamitya yajate), ‘he eats making it tasty’ (svāduṅkāraṃ bhuṅkte), ‘he reviles shouting “thief!”’ (coraṅkāramākrośati). In the Vedic domain, in the sense of the infinitive (tumun) itself, suffixes such as se are used; as for example: ‘so that I may speak of your riches’ (vakṣe rāyastvā), ‘for everyone to see the sun’ (dṛśe viśvāya sūryam), ‘the gods could not divide the fire’ (agniṃ devā vibhājaṃ nāśaknuvan), ‘able to practice witchcraft’ (īśvaro'bhicaritoḥ), ‘able to scratch’ (īśvaro vilikhaḥ). When the study of one's own branch is unaccomplished, suffixes such as ṇamul are used; as for example: ‘agent’ (kārakaḥ), ‘creator’ (sraṣṭā), ‘delighter’ (nandanaḥ), ‘dear’ (priyaḥ), ‘sacrificer’ (yajvā), ‘aging’ (jaran).
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Affixes such as an occurring with an accompanying word denote the agent and other [syntactic roles]; for example: kandalavah ('one who cuts stems'), padaharakah ('one who takes away feet'), subhamkaranam ('making auspicious'), goghnaḥ ('slayer of a cow'), sambhuh ('born from bliss'), and gosthah ('standing among cows'). Primary affixes belonging to the unadi class, occurring without an accompanying word, have conventional meaning; for example: karuh ('artisan'), datram ('sickle'), dhatri ('nurse'), dasah ('servant'), and bhismah ('terrible'). Both types, when possessing elision, are affixes such as kvin; for example: ghrtasprk ('touching clarified butter'), saddak ('sitting well'), arthabhak ('partaking in wealth'), subhamyuh ('prosperous'), pran ('forward-facing'), and yun ('yoked'). Affixes such as satr denote solely the agent when the portion of action is prominent; for example: yavagum pacan ('cooking barley-gruel'), somam pavamanah ('purifying soma'), asitam dasvan ('having given food'), vedamanucanah ('having recited the Veda'), bhuktavan odanam ('having eaten boiled rice'), and gramam gami ('about to go to the village'). The very same are affixes such as trn when accompanied by limiting conditions like disposition; for example: jagaritapararatrah ('one who remains awake in the latter part of the night'), mundayitārah sravisthayanah ('the Sravisthayanas are habitual shavers'), vadhumudham ('one who carries the bride'), alamkarisnuh ('disposed to adorn'), katiha kavacam udvahamanah ('how many here bear armor?'), satam dayi ('habitual giver of a hundred'), and edhan aharako vrajati ('he goes as a fetcher of firewood'). Affixes such as tavya, denoting either the state or the syntactic roles, have their portion of action prominent or non-prominent; for example: kartavyam bhavata ('it should be done by you'), karaniyam bhavata ('it is to be done by you'), karyah kato bhavatah ('a mat is to be made by you'), krtyah kato bhavatah ('a mat is to be made by you'), vastavyo bhavan ('you ought to dwell'), and brahmabhuyam bhavatah ('the becoming of brahman belongs to you'). The very same, belonging to the Vedic domain, are affixes such as tavai; for example: paridhatavai ('to dress around'), paristaritavai ('to strew around'), avacakse ('to look down'), avagahe ('to plunge into'), diddaksenyah ('worthy of being seen'), and kartum havih ('to prepare the oblation'). Affixes such as kta have their portion of action prominent; for example: bhuktam bhavata ('it was eaten by you'), bhujyamanam bhavata ('it is being eaten by you'), bhoksymanam bhavata ('it will be eaten by you'), bhuktam odanam ('boiled rice was eaten'), bhakta odano bhavata ('the boiled rice was eaten by you'), and likewise bhoksymanah ('one who will eat'). The very same, possessing distinct grammatical tenses, are affixes such as khal; for example: svadhyambhavam bhavata ('it is easy for you to become wealthy'), sutthanam bhavata ('it is easy for you to stand up'), prasitambhavam bhavata ('it is easy for you to partake'), duradhyambhavam bhavata ('it is hard for you to become wealthy'), isatpanah somo bhavata ('soma is easy to be drunk by you'), and atimbhavam bhaktam ('boiled rice is easily possessed'). Affixes such as lyut, whose portion of action is non-prominent, mostly denote qualities; for example: vyasasya vacanam ('Vyasa's speech'), paniner uktih ('Panini's utterance'), dhatrasya hasitam ('the laugh of the actor'), idhmanam vrascanam ('cutting of fuel sticks'), jananam bhaktih ('devotion of the people'), and rajnam matam ('opinion of kings'). The very same, mostly denoting substances, are affixes such as ghan;
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for example: paryayah kriyanam ('succession of actions'), viparyayah kalasya ('reversal of time'), samgrahah sastrānam ('compilation of treatises'), adhitas svadhyayāh ('the Vedic study has been studied'), adhigata upayah ('the means has been grasped'), and sreyan upadhyayāh ('the preceptor is superior'). 2.6. Affixes denoting their own sense as related to state or syntactic roles, not attached to verbal roots, are secondary affixes (taddhita). There, state is twofold: internal and external. Of these two, the internal is the occasion for the word's application to its referent, as [the author of the Mahabhasya] said: 'That quality through whose presence a word is applied to a substance is its state; in denoting that, -tva and -tal are used.' For its comprehensive grasp, the author of the Samgraha recites: 'In a word [they convey] that universal; in the universal of things [they convey] the word itself; in words like "white" [they convey] the universal; in a word for a substance [they convey] that quality; in primary affixes they convey that connection, and in a possessive [derivative they convey] the undifferentiated form: [such are] the expressible meanings that -tva and others bring to awareness within expressible objects.' 2.7. Therefore it is divided into six kinds: universal, quality, inherent nature, relation, aggregate, and undifferentiated form. Among these, the universal is, for example: gotvam ('cowness'), suklatvam ('whiteness'), manusyakam ('humanity'), strainam ('femininity'), paumsnam ('masculinity'), and brahmanyam ('brahminhood'). Quality is, for example: suklatvam ('whiteness'), sighratvam ('swiftness'), suryatvam ('sun-ness'), diktvam ('directional nature'), and tadatvam ('temporality'). Relation is, for example: pacakatvam ('cook-ness'), kandalavatvam ('stem-cutter-ness'), danditvam ('staff-bearer-ness'), aupagavatvam ('descendant-of-Upagu-ness'), rajapurusatvam ('king's-servant-ness'), nilotpalatvam ('blue-lotus-ness'), and gaurakhadiratvam ('fair-Khadira-ness'). Undifferentiated form is, for example: sattvam ('existence'), vidyamanatvam ('being-present-ness'), gargatvam ('Garga-ness'), pancalatvam ('Pancala-ness'), padarthatvam ('word-meaning-ness'), and pankajatvam ('mud-born-ness'). Now, an objection: A traditional rule states: 'From universal and quality, [the state is] universal and quality; of things like Dhava and Khadira, it is the aggregate of their own kind; in Dittha and others it is inherent nature, but in primary affixes it is relation; 2.8. [such are the domains of] -tva and other affixes.' How then does it also occur with undifferentiated form and the like? It is answered: 'In primary affixes, secondary affixes, and compounds, the expression of relation is invariable, except in cases of conventional usage, undifferentiated form, and unfailing connection.' Hence it was said: 'In primary affixes they convey that connection, and in a possessive derivative the undifferentiated form.' 2.9. The boundary point also is accepted by the wise as what is to be expressed by -tva and other affixes: for from cowness arises the cognition 'cow' as well as its linguistic designation. 2.9.
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For they say as follows: "In 'tasya bhavas tvatalau' (the state of that takes -tva and -tal), 'state' means that from which this linguistic designation and cognition arise." That is incorrect; for cowness does not generate the cognition 'cow' by functioning as the source of origin under [the rules] 'the material cause of the agent of coming into being' or 'the place of emergence of the verb "to become"'; as in: 'an arrow is produced from a horn' or 'the Ganges flows from the Himalayas.' Cognition, rather, arises solely from the self and originates solely from the mind; as has been said: 'The non-production of cognitions simultaneously, even though the self is all-pervading, is the inferential mark of the mind; [as reflected in:] "I did not see, I did not hear, I did not know; my mind was elsewhere."' However, instrumentality in producing the cognition 'cow' is indeed accepted for cowness and the like, just as it is for the word. In that case, just as from the whiteness belonging to an inhering locus arises the cognition of whiteness with respect to the white object, so from the cowness belonging to an inhering locus arises the cognition of cowness with respect to the cow; these two stand in a mutual cause-and-effect relationship. Linguistic designation, however, is linguistic sound; and that is what, when uttered, makes the meaning known. For that too, cowness does not serve as the boundary point. For linguistic sound is produced solely from space and emerges solely from the mouth, not from cowness and the like. As they say: 'Indeed, we perceive the linguistic sound in the mouth, and the meaning in the world.' Even when the view is held that linguistic sound is eternal, even then cowness and the like are the denotata, the qualificands of the linguistic sound; yet with respect to being that which is made known, by the logic to be stated regarding the positions of modification and transformation, the boundary point belongs conversely to linguistic sound itself. Superimposition, on the other hand, occurs through similarity, through an adjunct, or through both adjunct and similarity; as in the case of silver upon mother-of-pearl, redness upon crystal, or a face upon a reflected image. In that case, that which is superimposed upon something, or that which superimposes upon something, becomes its locus or its object, but never its boundary point; taking cowness as its occasion, the word 'cow' is superimposed upon the cow, or superimposes itself in the cow. It is accepted indeed that: 'That quality through whose presence a word is applied to a substance is denoted when -tva and -tal are added.' 2.10. That which has the nature of the meaning of a verbal root and is expressed by primary affixes is the external [state];
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That too is sixfold: having the form of an action (bhāvarūpa), having the form of a syntactic role (kārakarūpa), having the form of a related entity (saṃbandhirūpa), qualified by an action (bhāvaviśiṣṭa), and qualified by a related entity (saṃbandhiviśiṣṭa). Among these, that which is identical to the occasion of application (pravṛttinimitta) has the form of an action, as in: the duty (karma) of a brāhmaṇa is *brāhmaṇya* (brahmanhood); the duty of a family priest is *paurohitya* (priesthood); of a thief, *steya* (theft); of a friend, *sakhya* (friendship); of an envoy, *dūtya* (embassy); of a merchant, *vāṇijya* (commerce). That which stands on equal footing with syntactic roles (kāraka) has the form of a syntactic role, as in: conduct that befits a king is *rājavat* (kingly conduct); activity lasting up to the required time is *ākālikī* (prompt/temporary); an action in which a swoop like that of a hawk occurs is *śyenaṃpātā* (a hawk-fall action); a game in which a stick is the weapon is *dāṇḍā* (a stick-fight); an assembly in which there is greatness is *mahiminī* (a grand gathering); an expedition in which fried-pulse cakes are the staple provision is *vaṭakamayī yātrā* (a cake-centered journey). That which has become a concrete entity through conventional usage (rūḍhi) has the form of a related entity, as in: a flock of blue jays is *cāṣam*; a traditional corpus of theatrical works is *nāṭyam*; a marriage among the Bhṛgus and Aṅgirases is *bhṛgvaṅgirasikā*; enmity between crows and owls is *kākolūkikā*; a flock of sheep is *avikaṭaḥ*; an expansive flock of those very sheep is *avipaṭaḥ*. That which resembles an unexpected windfall, a marvel, or the like, is qualified by an action, as in: the arrival of a crow is accidental, and the falling of a palm fruit [is accidental], and by that falling palm fruit occurs the death of the crow; in just this way, the arrival of Devadatta [is accidental] and the sudden raid of bandits [is accidental], and by them occurs his death. In this case, the confluence of Devadatta and the bandits is like the confluence of the crow and the palm fruit—that is one aspect of the simile; and the slaying of Devadatta is like the slaying of the crow—that is the second aspect of the simile. There, the first is the meaning of the compound, *kākatālam* (“crow-and-palm”); the second is the meaning of the affix, *kākatālīyam* (“fortuitous as the crow and the palm”). And this compound is established solely from this very inferential indicator (jñāpaka); as it is said: “And a compound takes the affix *cha* in the sense of ‘accidental’ when applied to such an object.” For in the phrase “applied to such an object” (tadviṣayāt), the word *tat* refers to the sense of *iva* (“as/like”) according to the rule “Like a likeness” (Pāṇini 5.3.96). Similarly: *ajākṛpāṇīyam* (“like the goat and the sword”), *andhakavartakīyam* (“like the blind man and the quail”), *ghuṇākṣarīyam* (“like letters bored by a woodworm”), *ardhajaratīyam* (“half-old woman”), and *gomayapāyasīyam* (“cow-dung pudding”).
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That which is delimited by a related entity is qualified by a related entity, as in: *halyaḥ kāṣaḥ* (a furrow made by a plow), *saudhaḥ samakocaḥ* (a narrowing made of plaster), *pauruṣeyo vadhaḥ* (a human slaying), *ātharvaṇa āmnāyaḥ* (the Atharvan tradition), *vaido ghoṣaḥ* (a settlement of Bidians), *chāndosagyo dharmaḥ* (the duty pertaining to prosody). Even a limiting condition (upādhi) can be a related entity, as in: he boasts in the manner of the Gārgyas (*gārgikayā vikatthate*), he insults in the manner of the Kaṭhas (*kāṭhikayā'dhikṣipati*), he followed the manner of the Gārgyas (*gārgikāmanvavetaḥ*), he understood the manner of the Gārgyas (*gārgikāmavagatavān*), he understood the manner of the Kaṭhas (*kāṭhikāmavagatavān*). The meaning of a verbal root is also an action (bhāva); for an action too, when enclosed and defined by an object of comparison, becomes an accomplishable-accomplished action. It is threefold: [as] an action-syntactic role, “he acts like a king” (*rājavat*); the functioning like an idiot applies to actions such as study situated in brāhmaṇas and the like by association, because similarity between an action and either a universal or a substance is impossible. As he says: “When an action is compared to that, [the affix occurs] if there is a verb” (Pāṇini 5.1.115); the affix *vati* occurs in the meaning of “equal” after a word ending in the third [instrumental] case capable [of syntactic relation] with “that” (*tena*). That which is qualified by a syntactic role is as follows: “he transacted as if by a king” (*rājavat*); “I see you as if a god” (*devavat*); “he cuts with a sickle as if with a sword” (*asivat*); “when he gives to Devadatta as if to a brāhmaṇa” (*brāhmaṇavat*); “he descends from a seat as if from a mountain” (*parvatavat*); “he acts toward a teacher as toward a father” (*pitṛvat*). Here, this very sutra is interpreted differently: “in such a way that it is equal to that specific syntactic role.” If an action is of this kind, when an affix prescribed in the sense of action (bhāva) is added, sometimes the adverbial modifier of the action is expressed through the affix, and sometimes through the morphological base (prakṛti), as in: *tīvraḥ pākaḥ* (“intense cooking”) and *tīvraṃ pākaḥ* (“he cooks intensely”). That which is qualified by a related entity is as follows: “his study is like that of a brāhmaṇa” (*brāhmaṇavat*); “his furious conduct is like that of a king” (*rājavat*); “his speech is like that of a dullard” (*jaḍavat*); “his brilliance is like that of the sun” (*sūryavat*); “his protection is like that of a father” (*pitṛvat*); “his instruction is equal to that of a teacher” (*guruvat*). Here, however, *vati* is introduced by the rule “In that place or like that [person’s]” (Pāṇini 5.1.116).
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Now, since this is already established by the rule, "equal to that" [Pāṇini 5.1.115], for what purpose is the rule, "in that, like that" [Pāṇini 5.1.116] introduced? [The reply is:] An affix would not be obtained when a substance and a quality are equal; as in, "palaces in Pāṭaliputra like [those] in Mathurā: madhurāvat"; "the teeth of a kṣatriya are white like [those] of a brāhmaṇa: brāhmaṇavat." If it is suggested: "The mention of 'action' will not be made in the prior rule, and by association, nominal stems will apply to substance and quality just as to action; and then, by analyzing the expressions as 'Caitra's cows are equal to Maitreya's' or 'the teeth of a kṣatriya are equal to a brāhmaṇa's,' the affix -vati will be established by the prior rule alone." That is incorrect. For in that case, the affix would also improperly apply in: "an ox is equal to a gayal." But when the affix in the sense of iva ('like') is prescribed only after words ending in the locative and genitive cases, there would be no contingency of the affix in: "an ox is like a gayal." For the usage of the word iva occurs with reference to an external relatum for words ending in the locative and genitive cases, and not merely with reference to the sense of iva itself; for the word iva indicates a relation characterized by being the standard of comparison and the object of comparison, but it does not express the nature of the relata. Therefore, in order that there should be no application [of the affix] in: "an ox is equal to a gayal," the mention of action is made in the prior rule. And when that is done, the affix would not occur when a substance and a quality are equal; thus, the affix -vati is prescribed in the sense of iva after words ending in the locative and genitive cases by the rule: "in that, like that" (Pā. 5.1.116). Now, for what purpose is the rule: "it deserves that" (Pā. 5.1.117)? The affix -vati is also desired where there is an agent whose action is deserving; where there is no intention to express a standard of comparison, its prescription is not obtained. // 2.11 The condition of standard and object of comparison may belong to one entity with another, or even to a single entity with itself through a distinction of states. // Among these, with another, as in: "Even though he is not a grammarian, he acts like a grammarian; even though she is a woman, she speaks like a man." With oneself through a distinction of states, as in: "Even though he is a grammarian, out of contempt he sometimes speaks like a non-grammarian;"
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or a woman is addressed: "Speak like a woman!" Even a grammarian, out of contempt, sometimes speaks like a non-grammarian; for it is heard: There were seers named Yarvāṇa and Tarvāṇa who had directly perceived dharma. Thinking, "Only within the sacrificial altar must one not speak barbarously; outside it, out of contempt [it does not matter]," when "yad vā naḥ tad vā naḥ" should have been said, they spoke "yarvāṇas tarvāṇaḥ." A woman also sometimes speaks like a man owing to a lack of boldness that has been adopted, as it is said: // "Victorious is that Karṇāṭa queen Vijayāṅkā, like Sarasvatī herself, / who is the abode of Vaidarbha speech second only to Kālidāsa." // When neither of these two kinds of comparison is intended to be expressed, how can the affix -vati belong to the meaning of iva? Considering this, it is stated: // 2.12 In that regard, in the case of rājavadvṛttam ("conduct like that of a king"), when the speaker's intention is of such a meaning: "the conduct by this king is equal to [that of] a king such as Pṛthu: rājavadvṛttaṃ rājñā," then the affix is established by the very first rule. When, however, the intention is such: "his conduct is like that of King Pṛthu: rājavadvṛttaṃ rājñaḥ," then it is by the second rule. But when the usage rājavadvṛttam is made in the absence of a standard and object of comparison, meaning: "this conduct befits only a king and none other," then the affix -vati is prescribed by "it deserves that" (Pā. 5.1.117); hence the introduction of the rule is not meaningless. // 2.13 Others, however, [hold that] in the rule "equal to that, if it is an action, -vati" (Pā. 5.1.115), under the view of an accusative object, an action cannot be a qualifier of an action; hence they connect the view of an emotion qualified by a syntactic role by means of "it deserves that" (Pā. 5.1.117): the dealing that befits a king, the appearance that befits a deity, the cutting that befits a sword, the gift that befits a brāhmaṇa, the descent that befits a mountain, the subservience that befits a father—these are stated as: rājavat, devavat, asivat, brāhmaṇavat, parvatavat. Its meaning has been illustrated by expressions such as: "dealt with like a king."
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