俱舍論疏 22

English (machine translation) 22

Language: English

22.2

Chapter Six: Analysis of the Āryas and Pudgalas, Part One

Regarding "āryas and worthy ones": The Shuowen says, "Having much talent and conduct is called worthy." The Guiyuan zhucong says, "Lacking nothing that is not penetrated is called sage." According to the Renwang jing, those before the bhūmis are worthy ones, and those on the bhūmis are named āryas, for the sūtra speaks of "the three worthy and ten ārya [stages]." According to this treatise: "'Ārya' refers to the arising of the anāsrava path already attained; being far removed from all bad dharmas, they are therefore named 'ārya,' because they have attained the acquisition of ultimate disjunction." Based on the above sūtras and treatises, the stages of the seven preparatory applications are named "worthy," and those from the kṣānti of suffering onward are named "ārya." Because this chapter explains them extensively, it is titled "Analysis of the Āryas and Pudgalas." Why is it explained after the "Chapter on Anuśayas"? The previous chapter explained abandonment, which corresponds to the truth of cessation. The path is the substance of the ārya, and the ārya is indeed the truth of the path; the path is the cause of cessation, so it is explained afterward.

22.4

On the Śāstra's text, "Having thus explained... what are their characteristics?": It sums up what precedes and introduces what follows. It sums up the fruit of abandonment explained before, and introduces the cause of cessation explained after. This chapter has three major sections: first, explaining the essential nature of the path; second, explaining the objects contemplated by the path; third, differentiating persons in relation to the path. The following single verse explains the essential nature of the path.

22.5

On "The Śāstra says: ... are they also sāsrava?": Summing up the preceding [explanation] that [this is achieved] through the paths of seeing and cultivation, it now asks whether the two paths are sāsrava or anāsrava.

22.6

On the Śāstra's text, "It should be known that the path of seeing... the path of cultivation applies to both": This is the answer. The path of seeing is exclusively anāsrava, while the path of cultivation applies to both sāsrava and anāsrava.

22.7

On the Śāstra's text, "Why is that?": It inquires into the preceding to explain the reason.

22.8

On the Śāstra's text, "Because the path of seeing can swiftly... therefore it applies to both kinds": This is the answer. The path of seeing being able to swiftly counteract the three realms is the first cause. Its abandoning in a single sudden stroke the nine grades abandoned by seeing is the second cause. By these two causes, it is exclusively anāsrava, for worldly paths do not have this capability; therefore, it is exclusively anāsrava: this is the conclusion. The path of cultivation does not swiftly abandon the afflictions of the three realms, nor does it abandon the nine grades in a single sudden stroke; it is different from the path of seeing, and therefore applies to the sāsrava. The Nyāyānusāra criticizes this, saying: "The stated reason why the path of seeing is exclusively anāsrava is that it abandons the nine grades in a single kṣaṇa. This reason does not prove it, for sāsrava [paths] are also able to abandon five categories in a single kṣaṇa; could being able to abandon in a single sudden stroke necessarily make it subsumed under anāsrava?" Now, examining this, the Nyāyānusāra's criticism is not fitting. Regarding the abandonment of afflictions, abandoning the nine grades in a single sudden stroke is difficult, necessarily requiring an anāsrava path. Abandoning the five categories combined is easy; the ordinary stage only abandons them combined. Abandoning the nine grades in a single sudden stroke is difficult, and the path of seeing abandons the nine in a single sudden stroke, which is why it is exclusively anāsrava. When I use abandoning the nine grades in a single sudden stroke as the reason, why does it bring up abandoning the five categories combined as an objection?

22.9

On the Śāstra's text, "As just spoken of, because of seeing the truths... what are their characteristics?": Below is the second [major section], explaining the objects contemplated by the path. Below, explaining the domain of the path, the text contains two parts: first, explaining the four truths; second, explaining the two truths. This single verse explains the four truths.

22.10

On "The Śāstra says: ... explains the truths of suffering and origin": Within the text there are two parts: first, explaining the names and substances of the four truths; second, explaining the sequence of the four truths. This passage refers back to the earlier explanation of their names and substances, which can be understood from the text.

22.11

On the Śāstra's text, "Is the sequence of the four truths as spoken of there?": This asks: Is the sequence of the four truths as in the "Chapter on Dhātus," where it first spoke of the truth of the path, next spoke of the truth of cessation, and afterward spoke of suffering and origin—is it in such a sequence?

22.12

On the Śāstra's text, "Not so": This is the answer.

22.13

On "How so?": This is the inquiry.

22.14

On the Śāstra's text, "As now enumerated... third, cessation; fourth, the path": This answers with the present sequence.

22.15

On the Śāstra's text, "Are the intrinsic natures of the four truths also different?": This asks about the substance of the four truths: Is their substance also different from before, just as the sequence is?

22.16

On the Śāstra's text, "Not so": This is the answer. "How so?": This is the inquiry.

22.17

On the Śāstra's text, "As distinguished before... the word 'likewise' is stated": This is the answer. The verse's stating "likewise" shows that their substance is the same as explained before.

22.18

On the Śāstra's text, "For what reason are the four truths in such a sequence?": This asks about the reason for the sequence of suffering first and the path last.

22.19

On the Śāstra's text, "In accordance with the stages of abhisamaya... only afterward is the fruit stated": This is the answer. It first answers in direct order and afterward explains by the reverse, which can be understood from the text.

22.20

On the Śāstra's text, "However, there may be some dharmas... the sequence of prior and posterior": Taking the opportunity of explaining the four truths, it differentiates three kinds of sequence. Like the four smṛtyupasthānas—body, sensation, mind, and dharmas—they follow the sequence of their arising. Like the four samyakprahāṇas, they merely follow convenience of expression, their arising not being definitively so. Here, these four truths follow the sequence of prior and posterior in the stages of abhisamaya.

22.21

On the Śāstra's text, "For what reason is the sequence of abhisamaya necessarily so?": This asks about abhisamaya.

22.22

On the Śāstra's text, "Because in the stage of prayoga they are contemplated in this way": This is the answer.

22.23

On the Śāstra's text, "For what reason does prayoga necessarily contemplate them in this way?": This asks about prayoga.

22.24

On the Śāstra's text, "Namely, if there is a dharma... suffering is the truth of suffering": This answers the reason for contemplating suffering first.

22.25

On the Śāstra's text, "Next, one again contemplates the suffering... the cause is the truth of origin": This answers the reason for contemplating origin after suffering.

22.26

On the Śāstra's text, "Next, one again contemplates the suffering... the path is the truth of the path": This answers the sequence of contemplating cessation and the path after suffering and origin.

22.27

On the Śāstra's text, "Just as having seen the illness... afterward one seeks good medicine": This adduces an analogy to clarify it.

22.28

On the Śāstra's text, "The sūtra also says... suffering, origin, cessation, and the path": This cites a sūtra as proof, which can be understood from the text.

22.29

The treatise says: "Therefore, in the stage of preparation, up to giving free rein to the galloping horse"—this applies the simile. Vibhāṣā 77 says: "Question: How are these four noble truths established? Are they established based on real entities? Are they based on cause and effect? Or are they based on direct realization (abhisamaya)? If based on real entities, there should be three truths, because suffering and origin are a single thing. If based on cause and effect, there should be five truths, because the path has cause and effect. If based on direct realization, there should be eight truths, because of the eight higher and lower truths. Answer: It should be said that the four truths are established based on cause and effect, because the nature of cause and the nature of effect in the path are combined to establish one truth. That is to say, the uncontaminated combines the nature of cause and the nature of effect, both being practices that lead to the ultimate cessation of birth, old age, sickness, and death in the world of suffering existence; therefore, they are combined and established as one. Question: If so, the nature of cause and the nature of effect of the contaminated are both practices of transmigration and origination that lead to birth, old age, sickness, and death in the world of suffering existence, so they too should be combined and established [as one], and there should only be three truths. Answer: Even so, the mental modes (ākāra) are distinct and collective; therefore, only four noble truths are established. That is, there are four mental modes regarding the effect-nature of the contaminated, four mental modes regarding the cause-nature of the contaminated, and collectively four mental modes regarding the cause-nature and effect-nature of the uncontaminated path. There are some who say: The four truths are established by virtue of three conditions: first, by virtue of real entities; second, by virtue of cause and effect; third, by virtue of denial and faith. 'By virtue of real entities' means that the real entities of these four truths are two: first, contaminated; second, uncontaminated. 'By virtue of cause and effect' means that contaminated entities possess the nature of cause and effect, divided into two: suffering and origin; uncontaminated [entities] are of two kinds: first, possessing both cause-nature and effect-nature; second, possessing effect-nature but no cause-nature. That which possesses both cause-nature and effect-nature is established as the truth of the path; that which possesses effect-nature without cause-nature is established as the truth of cessation. Question: Why are the cause-nature and effect-nature of contaminated entities each established as an individual truth, whereas in the uncontaminated path the cause-nature and effect-nature are combined to establish a single truth? Answer: Because the denial and faith that take them as objects are distinct and collective. That is to say, regarding the cause-nature and effect-nature of the contaminated, denial arises separately: one denies regarding the effect-nature that it is truly suffering, and two, one denies regarding the cause-nature that it is truly origin; the arising of faith is also distinct. Regarding the cause-nature and effect-nature of the uncontaminated path, one collective denial arises, namely denying that it is the path, and one collective faith arises, namely having faith that it is the path. Therefore, the four truths are established by three conditions. Furthermore, there are those who say: The four truths are established based on direct realization. Although there are eight higher and lower [truths], those with identical mental modes are combined and established as one."

22.30

The treatise says: "What meaning does this name 'direct realization' designate?"—this asks about what the name designates.

22.31

The treatise says: "It should be known that this designates the meaning of direct complete awakening"—this is the answer. As for "direct realization" (abhisamaya): "direct" means manifest presence; "realization" means complete awakening; that is, the object of correct awakening.

22.32

The treatise says: "For what reason is this said to be exclusively uncontaminated?"—this is the question.

22.33

The treatise says: "Facing toward nirvāṇa, up to therefore it obtains the designation 'correct'"—this is the answer. "Facing toward nirvāṇa" means facing toward the fruit. That is, it is the object correctly awakened to by the true path; hence it says "the meaning of direct contemplation." "This awakening is truly pure and therefore obtains the designation 'correct'" clarifies that only uncontaminated awakening is entitled to be called "correct."

22.34

The treatise says: "It should be known that here, up to they are not different as entities"—this identifies the intrinsic nature of the truths of suffering and origin. The intrinsic nature of suffering and origin is simply all five clinging-aggregates: within each one of them there is the meaning of cause and the meaning of effect; the effect is called suffering, and the cause is called origin.

22.35

The treatise says: "The two truths of cessation and the path also differ in their entities"—this identifies the intrinsic nature of the truths of cessation and the path. Cessation is the unconditioned of cessation through deliberation (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha), and the path is the conditioned uncontaminated; therefore, they differ in entity.

22.36

The treatise says: "In what sense are they spoken of in the sūtras as 'noble truths'?"—this asks about the name. Since the four truths are real, they should be the same for both ordinary beings and noble ones; in what sense are they spoken of in the sūtras as noble truths?

22.37

The treatise says: "Because they are truths of the noble ones, they obtain the designation 'noble'"—this is the answer. Because the noble ones take them as true, they are called noble truths.

22.38

The treatise says: "For those who are not noble, could these possibly become false?"—this is an objection. For non-noble ones, could these four truths not be real suffering and so forth up to real path, but rather false? How is it that these four are exclusively called noble truths?

22.39

The treatise says: "They are truths for all, up to because of inverted views"—this is the answer. Suffering is truly suffering, origin is truly cause, and up to the path to the cessation of suffering is called the true path. For both the noble and the ordinary, the principle is constantly like this. However, only the noble see suffering as truly suffering, and so forth up to seeing the path as truly the path; therefore they are called noble truths. Ordinary beings falsely reckon suffering to be pleasure and the path to be non-path; because of their inverted views, they are not called ordinary truths.

22.40

The treatise says: "As a verse says, up to the non-noble speak of it as pleasure"—this cites scriptural authority as proof. The Nyāyānusāra says: "However, the principle of the four truths has no distinction; whether in the noble or in the ordinary, they are all true as they are. It is based on those who are capable of seeing them that the designation 'noble' is specifically established. Or, the meaning intended is: only the noble contemplate the principle of the four truths with noble practice; at all times their mental modes are without distinction, and the noble practice and the truth-principle thoroughly correspond to each other; thus, according to the practice that follows the truths, the name 'noble truths' is established. It is not like the six worldly non-noble practices, which first contemplate this stage as the three [modes of] calm and so forth, and later contemplate it as the three modes of grossness and so forth; because they do not correspond, [the truths] do not take their name. Or, the meaning intended is: only the noble contemplate the principle of the four truths with noble wisdom; once they attain correct determination, there is no principle of returning to uncertainty; thus the truths follow wisdom to obtain the name 'noble truths.' Precisely by this principle, when noble wisdom contemplates the truths, it obtains the names of the wisdoms of suffering, origin, cessation, and path. Although ordinary wisdom can see the principle of the four truths and attain determination, because it may still become uncertain, the truths do not follow it to obtain the name 'ordinary truths'; therefore, it should only be called conventional wisdom." Question: Why are space and cessation not through deliberation not subsumed under the truths? Vibhāṣā 77 says: "If a dharma is suffering (the truth of suffering), is the cause of suffering (the truth of origin), is the end of suffering (the truth of cessation), or is the antidote to suffering (the truth of the path), the World-Honoured One establishes it as a truth. Space and cessation not through deliberation are not suffering, not the cause of suffering, not the end of suffering, and not the antidote to suffering; therefore the World-Honoured One does not establish them as truths." There are many more explanations, but none equal this explanation.

22.41

The treatise says: "Other masters say, up to noble and non-noble truths"—this recounts a divergent opinion. Masters such as the Sautrāntikas hold that the truths of cessation and the path are exclusively noble truths because they are realized only by noble ones, whereas the two truths of suffering and origin pertain to both ordinary and noble beings because both possess them. Vibhāṣā 77: "Question: There are four mental modes that contemplate the effect of transmigration; why is this effect only called the truth of suffering and not the truth of impermanence and so forth? Answer: Furthermore, the aspect of suffering is unshared: only contaminated dharmas are suffering and not others; therefore it is called the truth of suffering. The other three, such as impermanence, are shared aspects with others; that is, the aspect of impermanence is present in three truths. The aspects of emptiness and non-self pervade all dharmas; therefore this is not called the truth of impermanence and so forth. Question: There are four mental modes that contemplate the cause of transmigration; why is this cause only called the truth of origin? Answer: Furthermore, the aspect of origin applies only to contaminated dharmas, as they draw together and produce transmigration, unlike the uncontaminated. The aspects of cause, production, and condition are also present in the uncontaminated, because the noble path also has cause, production, and condition. Because origin is unshared, it is established as the name of the truth. Question: There are four mental modes that contemplate nirvāṇa; why is nirvāṇa exclusively called the truth of cessation, and not the three kinds of truths such as calm? Answer: Furthermore, because the name 'cessation' is unshared, it is established as the name of the truth, for the name 'cessation' exclusively reveals ultimate cessation. The name 'calm' is ambiguous with concentration (samādhi), and 'sublime' and 'escape' are ambiguous with the path; therefore it is not called the truth of calm, sublime, and escape. Question: There are four mental modes that contemplate the noble path; why is the noble path only called the truth of the path, and not the three kinds of truths such as suitable? Answer: Furthermore, the name 'path' exclusively reveals the road leading to nirvāṇa; therefore it is established as the name of the truth. 'Suitable' is ambiguous with correct principle, 'practice' extends to the contaminated, and 'emancipation' extends to nirvāṇa; therefore this is not called the truth of suitable, practice, and emancipation."

22.42

The treatise says: "Only one part of feeling is the intrinsic nature of suffering"—from here down, one line of verse specifically explains the truth of suffering.

22.43

The treatise says: "From the prose, up to there is also no error"—this is the prose explanation. First it explains collectively, and later it explains individually. There are three kinds of suffering-nature; all contaminated dharmas, because of their conjunction with these three kinds of suffering, are collectively called the truth of suffering.

22.44

The treatise says: "Here, agreeable, up to therefore called suffering"—this explains individually. Here, agreeable contaminated conditioned formations, in conjunction with pleasant feeling, are called the suffering of deterioration (vipariṇāma-duḥkhatā). Disagreeable conditioned formations, in conjunction with unpleasant feeling, are called the suffering of suffering (duḥkha-duḥkhatā). Aside from the conjunction with these two feelings, the remaining contaminated conditioned formations, because of their conjunction with neutral feeling, are called the suffering of conditioned formations (saṃskāra-duḥkhatā).

22.45

The treatise says: "What are meant by agreeable, disagreeable, and the rest?"—this is the question. It was previously stated that agreeable formations and so forth are conjoined with the suffering of deterioration and so forth; what are meant by agreeable formations and the rest?

22.46

The treatise says: "They mean the three feelings of pleasure and so forth, up to obtain the designations agreeable and so forth"—this is the answer. Formations that conform to pleasant feeling through the force of pleasant feeling are called agreeable. Up to, formations that conform to neutral feeling in conjunction with the force of neutral feeling are called the remaining formations that are neither agreeable nor disagreeable.

22.47

The treatise says: "Why is that?"—this investigates the reason why pleasant feeling and so forth are called the nature of the suffering of deterioration and so forth.

22.48

The treatise says: "If pleasant feelings, up to what is impermanent is suffering"—this is the answer. First it answers the reason why the three feelings constitute suffering, and afterwards it answers the reason why conforming [formations] are suffering. This text is the first. Pleasant feeling constitutes suffering because it is suffering when it deteriorates. As the sūtra says: "Pleasant feelings are pleasant when arising and pleasant when persisting, but suffering when deteriorating." Before deteriorating, their arising and persisting are both pleasant; only when they deteriorate are they called suffering; thus we know that pleasure constitutes suffering through deterioration. If unpleasant feelings constitute the nature of suffering through their intrinsic entity, as the sūtra says: "Unpleasant feelings are suffering when arising and suffering when persisting." Since both arising and persisting are suffering, we know they constitute the nature of suffering through their intrinsic entity. If neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant feelings constitute the nature of suffering through conditioned formations, they are called conditioned formations because they are constructed by manifold conditions. As the sūtra says: "What is impermanent is suffering." Since it says that what is impermanent is suffering, we know that neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant feeling, not being the former two, constitutes suffering precisely through conditioned formations. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Of contaminated impermanent things, none is not suffering."

22.49

The treatise says: "As with feeling, the conditioned formations conforming to feeling are likewise so"—this second part explains that the conditioned formations conforming to feeling share the same meaning as feelings. The Nyāyānusāra says: "However, that which the Bhagavān stated in the sūtra, that 'unpleasant feeling is suffering when arising and when persisting,' is because that unpleasant feeling is suffering by its nature. As for 'pleasure when deteriorating,' when unpleasant feeling deteriorates, even if there is no pleasant feeling, because of the cessation of unpleasant feeling it appears like pleasure; therefore it is also called pleasure. Because the designation 'deterioration' is established for the phase of the cessation of the continuum, when unpleasant feeling ceases it is called the deterioration of unpleasant feeling (not momentary destruction). And so forth, pleasant feeling is pleasant when arising and when persisting because that pleasant feeling is pleasant by its nature. As for 'suffering when deteriorating,' ordinary beings, when not yet detached from defilement, constantly seek pleasure in their minds; at the phase of the deterioration of pleasure, sorrow and the like arise, and therefore pleasant feeling is spoken of as the nature of the suffering of deterioration. When pleasant feeling deteriorates, even if there is no unpleasant feeling, it appears like suffering and also constitutes suffering. Neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant feeling is neither suffering nor pleasure when arising and when persisting, because its nature is that [neutrality]. When it deteriorates, as either suffering or pleasure is capable of becoming manifest, it can be said to have both suffering and pleasure; at the time of deterioration it is impossible to have both; therefore the Buddha made a different explanation regarding this, saying that it is suffering without wisdom, and the arising of wisdom is pleasure. Because without wisdom it expands, this feeling is accompanied and increased by ignorance. Because of the lack of wisdom, within the bad destinies and the like, limitless suffering of conditioned formations completely arises; because it is extremely subtle, it is very difficult to perceive, and only noble ones are capable of perceiving it. Therefore there is a verse." The verse cited is identical to that in this treatise.

22.50

The treatise says: "Other masters explain, up to is called the nature of the suffering of conditioned formations"—this recounts a divergent explanation. This master's intention is to say: the three sufferings are all karmadhāraya compounds, unlike the Sarvāstivādin [view] that what gives rise to suffering after deteriorating is called deterioration, and so forth.

22.51

On the Śāstra's statement, "One should know that here... because of suffering through conditioned forces, it is suffering": This explains an implicit objection. The implicit objection means: If all contaminated phenomena, because they are conditioned by multiple causes and are impermanent by nature, are entirely suffering through conditioned forces, then agreeable and disagreeable phenomena should also be suffering through conditioned forces; why are they spoken of as the suffering of change and the suffering of suffering? The explanation says: Agreeable phenomena have two sufferings, change and conditioned forces; the suffering of change is distinct, while the suffering through conditioned forces is common. Disagreeable phenomena have two meanings: the suffering of suffering and suffering through conditioned forces. The suffering of suffering is distinct, while the suffering through conditioned forces is common. Based on the principle of the distinct, the suffering of change and the suffering of suffering are spoken of; in actual truth, everything is suffering through conditioned forces.

22.52

On the Śāstra's statement, "Only the noble ones... generate extreme revulsion and dread toward the object": This cites a verse as proof.

22.53

On the Śāstra's statement, "Because all fools... up to the skandhas of the Peak of Existence": This explains that the ordinary person's revulsion toward the superior-grade suffering of suffering falls short of the noble person's revulsion toward the inferior-grade suffering through conditioned forces.

22.54

On the Śāstra's statement, "The Truth of the Path should also... because it is of conditioned nature": This is an objection. The previous explanation stated: Neither-painful-nor-pleasant sensation is made suffering by conditioned forces because it is conditioned by multiple causes. As the sūtra states: "Whatever is impermanent is suffering. Just as with sensation, so it is with phenomena conforming to sensation." Following this, the Truth of the Path is also conditioned; because it is conditioned by multiple causes, because its nature is impermanent, and because of its conditioned nature, it should be subsumed under suffering through conditioned forces.

22.55

On the Śāstra's statement, "The Truth of the Path is not suffering... because of bringing all suffering to an end": The author of the Śāstra cites the explanation of other masters. Although the noble path is impermanent, because it can bring all suffering to an end, it does not conflict with the noble mind and is not called suffering. The reason we know this is the explanation of other masters is that the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Other masters say: The noble path is not suffering, because being in conflict is the characteristic of suffering. It is not that the arising of the noble path conflicts with the noble mind, because it can bring all suffering to an end."

22.56

On the Śāstra's statement, "If when observing all conditioned phenomena... only illuminates the contaminated": This cites a parallel example as an explanation. The Truth of the Path is conditioned and anāsrava, while analytical cessation is unconditioned, nirvāṇa, and peaceful. Suffering is conditioned and contaminated; having its analytical cessation is called nirvāṇa and peaceful. When the sūtra speaks of observing all conditioned phenomena as nirvāṇa and peaceful, it is also because, having previously seen that this conditioned phenomenon is contaminated suffering, one subsequently observes the cessation of suffering as peaceful. Therefore, one knows that when the sūtra says "because it is conditioned, it is suffering," this word "conditioned" only illuminates the contaminated.

22.57

On the Śāstra's statement, "If among all dharmas... suffering is the Noble Truth": This is a question.

22.58

On the Śāstra's statement, "One group explains... conceptualizes an ulcer as pleasure": This relates the explanation of a different master of the Vaibhāṣikas. The meaning of this explanation is: Pleasure is little and suffering is much; it is named suffering after the majority.

22.59

On the Śāstra's statement, "Others in this regard... speak of pleasure also as suffering": This is Kumāralāta's explanation. The essence of pleasant sensation is not suffering; it is called suffering due to three causes: first, because it can serve as a cause of suffering; second, because it can accumulate all sufferings; third, because having suffering, one hopes for pleasure. Due to these three causes, pleasure is spoken of as suffering.

22.60

On the Śāstra's statement, "In actual truth, it should be said... is the Truth, not pleasure": This states the orthodox explanation of the Vaibhāṣikas. That the noble ones observe the three realms of existence, pleasant sensations, and so forth, as all suffering, is because they share in common the suffering through conditioned forces; hence it is collectively named the Truth of Suffering.

22.61

On the Śāstra's statement, "How is pleasant sensation also observed as suffering?": This is a question.

22.62

On the Śāstra's statement, "Because its nature is impermanent... exactly as with painful sensation": This is the reply. Pleasant sensation, together with other contaminated phenomena, is equally impermanent; observing that pleasant sensation conflicts with the noble mind, it is called suffering, without taking the pleasurable characteristic of pleasant sensation. Just as when observing form and so forth through the observation of suffering, one takes the other conflicting characteristics upon form and so forth and designates them as suffering, it is not that their characteristic of suffering is exactly as with painful sensation.

22.63

On the Śāstra's statement, "Contaminated pleasant sensation... this explanation is unreasonable": The author of the Śāstra refutes Kumāralāta's explanation, first generally denying it and then separately refuting it.

22.64

On the Śāstra's statement, "Being able to serve as a cause of suffering... how does it pertain to suffering?": This refutes the claim that the cause is not the aspect of suffering.

22.65

On the Śāstra's statement, "Moreover, all noble ones... as the cause of painful sensation": This refutes [the claim that] the skandhas are not the cause of suffering.

22.66

On the Śāstra's statement, "Furthermore, the sūtra again speaks of suffering through conditioned forces; what is its use?": This refutes that suffering through conditioned forces would be purposeless.

22.67

On the Śāstra's statement, "If it is suffering because of impermanence... what is the difference between the mental aspects?": This is an external objection. If it is suffering because of impermanence, then the mental aspect of impermanence should also be the mental aspect of suffering; what difference is there between the two mental aspects?

22.68

On the Śāstra's statement, "Because they are dharmas of arising and ceasing... can induce the mental aspect of suffering": This is the reply. Because they are dharmas of arising and ceasing, this is the mental aspect of impermanence. Because they conflict with the noble mind, this is the mental aspect of suffering. Merely seeing impermanence, one knows that they conflict with the noble mind; this is the mental aspect of impermanence inducing the mental aspect of suffering, and it is not that the two are identical.

22.69

On the Śāstra's statement, "Masters of other schools... sensation is only suffering": This states the doctrine of the Mahāsāṃghikas and different masters of the Sautrāntikas.

22.70

On the Śāstra's statement, "How is this known to be so?": The Vaibhāṣikas interrogate.

22.71

On the Śāstra's statement, "Due to scripture and reasoning": The Mahāsāṃghikas reply.

22.72

On the Śāstra's statement, "How is it due to scripture?": The Vaibhāṣikas ask.

22.73

On the Śāstra's statement, "As the World-Honoured One said... is called perversion": They reply by citing three sūtras.

22.74

On the Śāstra's statement, "How is it due to reasoning?": This asks about the reasoning.

22.75

On the Śāstra's statement, "Because all causes of pleasure... reasoning should also be thus": They reply with the reasoning. They take these causes of pleasure being unfixed as the reasoning. Since this cause of pleasure later produces suffering, one therefore knows that fundamentally it is also a cause of suffering. That at first, being subtle, it is not perceived, is the first reasoning.

22.76

On the Śāstra's statement, "Moreover, when remedying suffering... there is definitely no real pleasure": It is only because of remedying suffering that the awareness of pleasure arises; therefore, when departing from heavy suffering, one considers light suffering to be pleasure, while in reality there is no pleasant sensation. This is the second reasoning.

22.77

On the Śāstra's statement, "The masters of the Abhidharma... this statement is reasonable": The author of the Śāstra evaluates and accepts the Vaibhāṣika tenet.

22.78

On the Śāstra's statement, "How is this known to be so?": The Mahāsāṃghikas ask.

22.79

On the Śāstra's statement, "For now, one should cross-examine... pleasure would be established as existent": Three pairs of cross-examinations.

22.80

On the Śāstra's statement, "If it is said that what is agreeable... because it is not agreeable": The author of the Śāstra presents their attempted defense. Since it was previously agreeable and later not agreeable, one therefore knows that what is agreeable is also not real; this would then establish the reasoning that pleasant sensation lacks reality.

22.81

On the Śāstra's statement, "Not so; agreeable... is a disagreeable phenomenon": The author of the Śāstra resolves the objection. The intrinsic characteristic of pleasure is genuinely agreeable; the noble person, because this sensation is an occasion of heedlessness, must be accomplished through vast effort, and is subject to alteration and impermanent, considers it not agreeable; it is not that its intrinsic characteristic is not agreeable.

22.82

On the Śāstra's statement, "If its own entity... real pleasant sensation exists": The author of the Śāstra uses a double counter-objection to establish the Vaibhāṣika tenet. Since the intrinsic characteristic of sensation can generate agreeableness, and by a figurative method one observes sensation as suffering, one therefore knows that the intrinsic characteristic of pleasant sensation is agreeable, and its entity is not suffering.

22.83

On the Śāstra's statement, "However, when the World-Honoured One said... he made such a statement": This cites a sūtra as proof. The Buddha's statement that everything is suffering was made based on the two approaches of suffering through conditioned forces and the suffering of change. Painful sensation has two aspects, namely the suffering of suffering and suffering through conditioned forces. Pleasant sensation has two meanings, conditioned forces and change; neutral sensation has only the meaning of conditioned forces. If based on the approach of suffering through conditioned forces, one observes all three sensations as suffering; based on the approach of the suffering of change, pleasant sensation is also suffering. Observing the intrinsic characteristic of sensations, painful sensation is suffering, while the other two are not suffering. The Buddha himself explained: "Relying on all conditioned forces being impermanent, and all conditioned phenomena being subject to alteration, I said with hidden intent: 'Whatever sensation there is, none is other than suffering.'" Therefore, one knows that it was said with hidden intent via the approach of suffering through conditioned forces; this sūtra was not spoken based on the suffering of suffering.

22.84

On the Śāstra's statement, "If by intrinsic characteristic... three sensations really exist": Here the author of the Śāstra cites a sūtra to challenge the Mahāsāṃghikas. Since Ānanda said, "Other sūtras say there are three sensations, without speaking of a hidden intent," one therefore knows that the sūtras speaking of three sensations are not of hidden intent. Since Ānanda said, "Relying on what hidden intent does this sūtra again say that whatever sensation there is, none is other than suffering?", one therefore knows that the sūtras speaking of all sensations as suffering are of hidden intent.

22.85

On the Śāstra's statement, "Since the World-Honoured One said... is not truly of definitive meaning": First he adduces the question as proof, and then he adduces the answer as proof. Saying that all sensations are suffering is not of definitive meaning.

22.86

On the Śāstra's statement, "Moreover, the sūtra says... because it is a phenomenon subject to alteration": This resolves the second sūtra. When the sūtra says to observe pleasant sensation as suffering, pleasant sensation has two aspects: first, the approach of intrinsic characteristic, which because it is agreeable is of the nature of pleasure; second, relying on a figurative approach, impermanence and alteration are of the nature of suffering. Because the Buddha instructed that it be observed as suffering through the figurative approach, it is not that it is observed as suffering through the approach of intrinsic characteristic.

22.87

On the Śāstra's statement, "However, when observing pleasure... observes pleasure as suffering": This explains an implicit objection. If its intrinsic characteristic is pleasure and the figurative approach is suffering, why did the World-Honoured One teach observing the figurative approach and not observing the intrinsic characteristic? The reply says: Because observing the intrinsic characteristic increases greed and so forth, whereas when observing the figurative approach one is able to attain liberation; therefore, he instructed the observation of suffering and did not instruct the observation of pleasure.

22.88

On the Śāstra's statement, "How is it known that its intrinsic characteristic is pleasure?": The Mahāsāṃghikas ask.

22.89

On the Śāstra's statement, "As a verse states... therefore all sensations are said to be suffering": Citing a verse that speaks of pleasure as suffering via the figurative approach, he adduces the verse in reply.

22.90

On the Śāstra's statement, "Moreover, the sūtra says... this was spoken with a specific intention": This resolves the third sūtra.

22.91

On the Śāstra's statement, "Because in all worldly realms... the reasoning of lacking reality is established": This explains the reason why it was spoken with a specific intention. Because in all worldly realms pleasure is little and suffering is much, yet they consider it entirely pleasure, it is therefore called perversion. It is not that when there is entirely no pleasure, considering it pleasure constitutes perversion. The realms of existence also, because pleasure is little and suffering is much, exclusively consider them pleasure, which is called perversion.

22.92

On the Śāstra's statement, "If the intrinsic characteristic of sensation... what benefit would there be?": The author of the Śāstra turns the objection against the Mahāsāṃghika masters. When the intrinsic characteristic of all sensations is pleasure, speaking of them as all suffering is in order to eradicate greed. If the intrinsic characteristic of all sensations is suffering, and the Buddha spoke of them as pleasure, what benefit would there be?

22.93

On the Śāstra's statement, "If it is said that the World-Honoured One... and so on at length": The author of the Śāstra presents their attempted defense and refutes it. When the World-Honoured One said that sensations are all suffering, he stated that it was his hidden intent. When observing the five sensations, he spoke words of true reality; therefore, one knows that "all suffering" is figurative, while the five sensations are the intrinsic nature, not conventional speech. He cites two sūtras as proof, which can be understood from the text.

22.94

On the Śāstra's statement, "Furthermore, how could the Buddha... distinguish and speak of three?": This is a counter-question. Painful sensation is one; how could phenomena of identical cause be distinguished and spoken of as three?

22.95

On the Śāstra's statement, "If it is said that the world... superior awareness of pleasure": The author of the Śāstra grants their hypothesis to refute it. If it is said that the world gives rise to the awareness of pleasure toward inferior suffering, considers superior suffering to be pain, and considers middling suffering to be neutrality, and [the Buddha] spoke in accordance with them, then pleasure also has three different grades; one should give rise to a superior awareness of pleasure toward inferior suffering, a middling pleasure toward middling suffering, and an inferior awareness of pleasure toward superior suffering.

22.96

On the Śāstra's statement, "Moreover, when experiencing an exquisite... the interrogation is likewise": This is the second fallacy, that suffering is not established. When experiencing an exquisite object, what inferior suffering is there within it toward which pleasure arises? If there were inferior suffering when experiencing an exquisite object, then experiencing an object would already have ceased and not arisen. Since at that time there is no inferior suffering, then the awareness of pleasure should become even more intense and superior, because at that time superior-grade sufferings are entirely absent.

22.97

On the Śāstra's statement, "Moreover, an inferior-grade sensation... how could it be reasonable?": This is the third fallacy, perversion. Among the three sensations, those that are distinct and vivid are only the two, pain and pleasure; neutral sensation is dull and obscure. If when an inferior-grade painful sensation is present, it is admitted to be a pleasant sensation, then it is distinct; when a middling painful sensation is present, it is admitted to be a neutral sensation, then it is dull and obscure. That the inferior sensation is distinct while the middling sensation is dull and obscure inverts the meaning, and therefore constitutes a fallacy. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Holding that the inferior is distinct while the middling is conversely dull and obscure—who that has wisdom could tolerate this thesis?"

22.98

On the Śāstra's statement, "Moreover, in the lower three absorptions... three sensations such as pleasure": This is the fourth fallacy, violating cause and effect. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Moreover, as the absorptions become progressively superior, the attachment to suffering would progressively increase; among unreasonable doctrines, who could surpass this?"

22.99

On the Śāstra's statement, "Therefore, one should not rely on... three sensations such as pleasure": This generally concludes that it is incorrect.

22.100

On the Śāstra's statement, "Moreover, the sūtra speaks of... a small fraction of real pleasure": This is the fifth fallacy, contradiction with scripture. It can be understood from the text.

22.101

On the Śāstra's statement, "Thus, for now, we have distinguished... is not established as proof": This concludes the refutation showing that the adduced scriptures do not establish proof.

22.102

On the Śāstra's statement, "The statements of reasoning established also do not constitute proof": Next, he refutes the reasoning.

22.103

On the Śāstra's 'First, because causes of pleasure [...] are not indeterminate': This refutes [the view that] causes of pleasure are indeterminate. It means that depending on the difference in the states of the support—the body—an external object only then becomes a cause of pleasure. Or it may be only a cause of suffering; it is not determined by the external object alone. For instance, when the bodily support suffers from cold, warmth is a cause of pleasure; when the bodily support suffers from heat, cold is a cause of pleasure. The reverse applies to causes of suffering. The causes of suffering and pleasure are not solely external objects; they also depend on the body to be causes of suffering or pleasure. Since the state is determinate, the cause is also determinate.

22.104

On the Śāstra's 'Just as fire in the world [...] the principle of determination is established': This presents a simile for illustration. It can be understood according to the text.

22.105

On the Śāstra's 'Moreover, in the three dhyānas [...] can generate suffering': This refutes [the view that] causes of suffering are indeterminate. Alternatively, in the lower three absorptions there is only pleasant sensation and no painful sensation; within the three absorptions, how could the cause that produces pleasure not be determinate?

22.106

On the Śāstra's 'Furthermore, what they say [...] the awareness of pleasure arises': This refutes [the view that] remedying suffering produces pleasure. When experiencing superior objects, suffering is not being remedied; thus, there would have to be no awareness of pleasure.

22.107

On the Śāstra's 'Even granting that at that time [...] generates the awareness of extreme pleasure': This is a hypothetical refutation.

22.108

On the Śāstra's 'Moreover, the pleasure of the dhyānas [...] should be stated by analogy with the preceding': This refutes [the view] that the higher stages have suffering to be remedied.

22.109

On the Śāstra's 'Furthermore, what they say [...] should be understood likewise': This refutes [the view that] shifting [a burden] is the cause of producing pleasure. At the state of initial shifting to the shoulder, real pleasure is produced; if it were otherwise, after the initial shift pleasure should gradually increase, because the previous heavy suffering would gradually lessen afterward. That shifting deportment produces pleasure is also explained by analogy with this.

22.110

On the Śāstra's 'If previously there was no suffering [...] generates the awareness of suffering': An objection by the Mahāsāṃghika. If there was no suffering at the time of the initial shifting to the shoulder, why would an awareness of suffering suddenly arise later?

22.111

On the Śāstra's 'Due to the change of the body [...] the principle of real existence is established': This is the reply. Just as wine produces sweet or sour flavors according to the passage of time, could it be that the sweetness or sourness of the wine existed previously?

22.112

On the Śāstra's 'From this it is definitely known [...] appropriately called suffering': The above summarizes the real nature of the noble truth of suffering.

22.113

On the Śāstra's 'The very essence of suffering conditioned phenomena is also called the noble truth of origination': This presents the essence of the noble truth of origination according to the Sarvāstivādin school. From here onward, the noble truth of origination is explained separately.

22.114

On the Śāstra's 'This statement is definitely [...] because craving is origination': The Sautrāntika master quotes a sūtra to raise an objection.

22.115

On the Śāstra's 'Because the sūtra speaks in terms of the preeminent [...] is also the noble truth of origination': The Sarvāstivādin explains the sūtra.

22.116

On the Śāstra's 'By what [evidence] is such an approach of reasoning proved?': The Sautrāntika inquires.

22.117

On the Śāstra's 'In another sūtra [...] is called a person (pudgala)': The Sarvāstivādin quotes a sūtra as proof. Because it is not craving alone that is taken as the truth of origination, but action (karman) and ignorance (avidyā) are also taken as the truth of origination, therefore we know that speaking of craving is stated in terms of what is preeminent.

22.118

On the Śāstra's 'Furthermore, a sūtra states [...] consciousness with grasping is spoken of': Explaining the five seeds. There are two explanations. The first explanation states: first, roots; second, stems; third, branches; fourth, joints; fifth, seeds. These are similes for consciousness with grasping. The second explanation states: the 'five seeds' means that the seeds of the five destinies are called consciousness with grasping; 'grasping' is affliction, and consciousness accompanied by affliction is the cause of the five destinies, hence called consciousness with grasping. Since the sūtra does not state this metaphorically, the latter explanation is correct. This proves that the sūtra does not speak of craving alone.

22.119

On the Śāstra's 'Furthermore, that sūtra states [...] states the four stations of consciousness': That is, that sūtra speaks of placing them in the earth element; this is another designation for the four stations of consciousness. Those five seeds being placed in the earth element is a metaphor for the fivefold consciousness with grasping and the four stations of consciousness. This means that afflictions and consciousness take the four aggregates as their cause, not merely craving.

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俱舍論疏 — Classical Chinese