俱舍論疏 30

English (machine translation) 30

Language: English

30.2

Chapter Nine: Refutation of the Clinging to a Self, Part Two.

On the Śāstra's statement: "If it is merely the five aggregates of clinging [...] the bearer of the heavy burden": The Vātsīputrīya cites a sūtra to raise an objection. If it is precisely the five aggregates of clinging that are called the self, why did the World-Honoured One state: "There are taking up and casting off the heavy burden, and the bearer of the heavy burden"?

30.4

On the Śāstra's statement: "For what reason should the Buddha not speak thus of this?": The author of the Śāstra inquires. For what reason is the Buddha not permitted to speak in this way regarding this nominal self?

30.5

On the Śāstra's statement: "The heavy burden should not itself be called the bearer": That school replies. If the five aggregates of clinging themselves are called the self and are also the heavy burden, then the bearer would be the very burden borne. According to our tenet, which says that the bearer is the self and the burden borne is the aggregates of clinging, there is no such fault.

30.6

On the Śāstra's statement: "Why is that?": The author of the Śāstra inquires: Why should the Buddha not speak thus?

30.7

On the Śāstra's statement: "Because it has never been seen": The Vātsīputrīya replies: Because it has never been seen that the bearer is said to be the very burden borne.

30.8

On the Śāstra's statement: "The inexpressible thing should likewise not be spoken of": The author of the Śāstra refutes by analogy. You establish a fifth inexpressible treasury of dharmas as the self; this inexpressible thing should likewise not be spoken of.

30.9

On the Śāstra's statement: "Why is that?": The Vātsīputrīya inquires.

30.10

On the Śāstra's statement: "Because it also has never been seen": The author of the Śāstra replies: It has never been seen that an inexpressible thing is spoken of. If it is spoken of, it is expressible, not inexpressible.

30.11

On the Śāstra's statement: "Moreover, taking up the heavy burden [...] because it has never been seen": The author of the Śāstra counters with an objection. Taking the 'taking up of the heavy burden' as an analogy: that which takes up the heavy burden refers to craving and so forth; the heavy burden taken up is the five aggregates of clinging. Since craving and so forth are included within the five aggregates of clinging, how can the grasper be that which is grasped? Because it has never been seen.

30.12

On the Śāstra's statement: "Yet the sūtra states that craving [...] the bearer should be likewise": The author of the Śāstra adduces that the taker of the burden is subsumed within the aggregates, so by analogy the bearer is also subsumed within the aggregates.

30.13

On the Śāstra's statement: "It is precisely with reference to the aggregates [...] and so on in detail": The author of the Śāstra clarifies the meaning. It is precisely with reference to the aggregates that the 'person undergoing repeated rebirth' is designated. Fearing that people would grasp at a truly existent separate self as permanent and substantially real, the Buddha Himself states in the text below: 'It is merely in accordance with worldly convention that this venerable one is said to have such a name.'

30.14

On the Śāstra's statement: "As cited above [...] the pudgala": The author of the Śāstra explains the intention of the sūtra. In order to make it understood that taking the aggregates as the self can be described as impermanent and not a substantially existent entity: precisely the mutual torment of the five aggregates of clinging receives the name 'heavy burden'; and because preceding moments give rise to subsequent moments, they are called the 'bearer'; it is not that a substantially existent separate self is called the 'bearer.'

30.15

On the Śāstra's statement: "A pudgala [...] because it is subsumed under wrong view": That school again cites a text to prove a real self. If there were no real self, there would be no spontaneously born beings, and denying their existence is called wrong view.

30.16

On the Śāstra's statement: "Who says there is none? [...] because in principle they are substantially real": The author of the Śāstra clarifies. I do not say there are no spontaneously born beings; as the Buddha stated: 'I say they exist.' What the Buddha said refers to the continuity of aggregates capable of going to future lives without depending on womb, egg, or moisture, which is called a spontaneously born being. Because the spontaneously born aggregates are in principle substantially real, denying their existence is subsumed under wrong view; it does not refer to a real self.

30.17

On the Śāstra's statement: "Furthermore, if you accept this wrong view [...] because it should not be abandoned by cultivation": The author of the Śāstra counters with an objection. There is no wrong view that denies the self. You say that denying a spontaneously born self is called wrong view, but your school says the self is not subsumed under the four truths; thus this view should not be abandoned by seeing the four truths. Furthermore, because it is confused about principle, it is not abandoned by the path of cultivation; hence we know there is no wrong view that denies the self.

30.18

On the Śāstra's statement: "If it is said that the sūtra states [...] one term for one heap": The author of the Śāstra rejects their reckless citation of the text. They say: 'The statement that "one self is born into the world" makes it clear that it is not the aggregates, because the aggregates are not one.' That is also illogical, because this is a nominal designation of 'one' with respect to the aggregate-heap as a whole. Just as in the world one says: 'one heap of hemp,' 'one heap of rice,' and so forth; although there are many items composed of eight atoms, they are collectively called 'one.'

30.19

On the Śāstra's statement: "Or else the pudgala [...] because it is born into the world": The author of the Śāstra counters with an objection. Because the sūtra says 'one,' you claim it is not the aggregates but a separate, single self. Since the sūtra speaks of 'birth,' the self would have to be conditioned, which contradicts your school's tenet.

30.20

On the Śāstra's statement: "The word 'birth' here does not mean arising anew like the aggregates": That school clarifies that the self's birth is not an arising anew like that of the aggregates.

30.21

On the Śāstra's statement: "In what sense is it said to be born into the world?": The author of the Śāstra inquires. If the self's birth into the world is not an arising like that of the aggregates, in what sense is it said to be born into the world?

30.22

On the Śāstra's statement: "Based on its now [...] taking on a different state": That school clarifies. Calling the self 'born' does not mean it arises anew like the aggregates; rather, it is because the self takes on new aggregates that it is called 'born.' Just as in the world one speaks of 'the sacrificer being born' or 'the grammarian being born': this sacrificer is not in fact born anew; because he initially acquires the Vedas, he is called 'born.' Or just as in the world one speaks of 'an old person being born,' 'a sick person being born,' and so forth: this old or sick person is not in fact born anew; because they take on a different state, they are called 'born.' The self is likewise: it does not in fact arise anew separately like the aggregates; because it takes on different aggregates, it is called 'born.'

30.23

On the Śāstra's statement: "Because the Buddha has already refuted it [...] therefore the Buddha has already refuted it": The author of the Śāstra cites a sūtra to refute them. The Buddha said that when casting off these aggregates and continuing with other aggregates, except for the nominal designation based on the dharmas of the five aggregates, no continuity of aggregates is accepted; thus a separate self has already been refuted. When you claim a real self casts off and takes on aggregates, how could that not be refuted?

30.24

On the Śāstra's statement: "The Phalguna Sūtra [...] taking on and casting off the aggregates": The author of the Śāstra again cites a sūtra to prove there is no self that takes on and casts off the aggregates.

30.25

On the Śāstra's statement: "Furthermore, the examples you cite [...] fail to serve as analogies": The author of the Śāstra refutes the previously cited analogies on two fronts. If they are said to be the self, that is not established, for I do not accept it. If they are the mind and so forth, they perish moment by moment, arising ever anew; thus taking on and casting off are not established, and the body is like the mind and so forth. Furthermore, just as the Vedas and so forth are different from the body, the aggregates should also be different from the pudgala. The aged and diseased bodies are distinct before and after; in neither is there taking on or casting off. If you agree with the Sāṃkhya in saying there is transformation, that has already been refuted above.

30.26

On the Śāstra's statement: "Moreover, if you accept that the aggregates are born [...] this would be different from the aggregates and permanent": If, according to their school, the aggregates are born while the self is not born, then it must be accepted that the self is different from the aggregates and that the self is permanent. This contradicts their school's tenet that the pudgala is neither permanent nor impermanent, and neither identical to nor different from the aggregates.

30.27

On the Śāstra's statement: "Furthermore, this [self] is only one, while the aggregates [...] is different from the aggregates": The author of the Śāstra restates their assertion. The self is one, and the aggregates are five; thus the self is different from the aggregates.

30.28

On the Śāstra's statement: "The primary elements are four [...] not different from the primary elements": The Vātsīputrīya counters the author of the Śāstra with an objection. The primary elements are four, and derived matter is one, yet it is said that the primary elements are not different from derived matter. Although the aggregates are five and the self is only one, why do you not allow that it is not different from the five aggregates?

30.29

On the Śāstra's statement: "That is the fault of their school": The author of the Śāstra resolves it.

30.30

On the Śāstra's statement: "What is meant by 'their school'?": The Vātsīputrīya asks.

30.31

On the Śāstra's statement: "Those treatises that assert derived matter is identical to the primary elements": That school asserts that the primary elements are identical to derived matter; that is the fault of their school.

30.32

On the Śāstra's statement: "Even if it were as in their view [...] pudgala": Refuting by granting their premise. If the Vātsīputrīya holds that the self and the aggregates are like Buddhadeva's view that derived matter is identical to the primary elements, then it should likewise follow that the primary elements are identical to derived matter, and the aggregates are identical to the self.

30.33

On the Śāstra's statement: "If the pudgala [...] the soul is identical to the body": The Vātsīputrīya objects. If it is not as our school says, that there is a separate self, but rather that the five aggregates themselves are called the 'soul' and so forth, why did the World-Honoured One, in answering the non-Buddhist's question, not declare that the soul is identical to the body?

30.34

On the Śāstra's statement: "Observing the questioner [...] whether tortoise hair is hard or soft": The author of the Śāstra replies. Our school says that the aggregates are nominally called the self. While the aggregates are the self, the non-Buddhists falsely cling to a separate, real self that is identical to or different from the aggregates. Since the self does not exist, identity and difference cannot be established, and therefore the Buddha did not declare it. It is just as one would not answer whether tortoise hair is hard or soft; answering it would be an irrelevance, failing to address the premise of the question.

30.35

On the Śāstra's statement: "Ancient masters [...] identical to or different from the body": The author of the Śāstra cites an ancient answer to resolve the doubt of the Vātsīputrīya. It can be understood from the text.

30.36

On the Śāstra's statement: "Why did the Buddha not say that the soul does not exist at all?": The outsider asks.

30.37

On the Śāstra's statement: "Also observing the questioner [...] He did not teach nominal existence for them": The author of the Śāstra replies. If one says that the aggregates are called the soul, saying there is no soul would deny the aggregates; following wrong view, they were not a suitable vessel for the Dharma, so He did not teach nominal existence for them.

30.38

On the Śāstra's statement: "In principle it must be so [...] as explained extensively in the sūtra": Further citing the sūtra to show that because they were not suitable vessels for the Dharma, He did not teach them. If He had answered that it exists, He feared they would cling to a permanent self; if He had answered that it does not exist, He feared they would give rise to annihilationism; therefore the Buddha did not answer.

30.39

On the Śāstra's statement: "Based on this meaning [...] it harms the cub of good karma": Based on the meaning of the preceding prose, this verse is spoken. It is like a tigress holding her cub in her mouth, neither too tightly nor too loosely. If she is too tight in saying there is a soul, they will cling to a real self as existing, and be injured by the fangs of the view of self; if she is too loose in saying there is no soul, they will deny the conventional self as non-existent, and thus harm the cub of good karma; therefore He did not answer.

30.40

On the Śāstra's statement: "It is further said in verse [...] the Buddha did not answer existence or non-existence": Re-emphasising the previous meaning; it can be understood from the text.

30.41

On the Śāstra's statement: "For what reason was it not declared whether the world is eternal and so forth?": Generating further discussion from the treatise, inquiring about the remaining undeclared points.

30.42

On the Śāstra's statement: "Also observing the intention (āśaya) of the questioner": The reply. Because the questioners' intentions differed.

30.43

On the Śāstra's statement: "If the questioner clings [...] all four are illogical": Explaining that with either intention, it cannot be declared. If one clings to the self as the world, because the substance of the self is completely non-existent, one cannot answer that it is eternal, non-eternal, both eternal and non-eternal, or neither eternal nor non-eternal.

30.44

On the Śāstra's statement: "If one clings to saṃsāra [...] all are likewise illogical": If one clings to saṃsāra as the world, answering eternal, non-eternal, and so forth is likewise completely illogical.

30.45

On the Śāstra's statement: "Namely, if it were eternal [...] all are improper": Explaining that if one takes saṃsāra to be the world, all four answers entail faults. It can be understood from the text.

30.46

On the Śāstra's statement: "Like the Nirgrantha [...] did not declare definitively": Citing an analogy to explain.

30.47

On the Śāstra's statement: "The four [points regarding] finite and so forth [...] because all entail faults": Explaining by analogy the four points regarding finite and so forth.

30.48

On the Śāstra's statement: "How is it known that these four have the same meaning as eternal and so forth?": The outsider asks.

30.49

On the Śāstra's statement: "Because there was a non-Buddhist [...] the meaning is identical to the former": Replying by citing an event; it can be understood from the text. 'Uttika' here means 'one who can speak.'

30.50

On the Śāstra's statement: "For what reason again [...] the four [propositions] of existing and so forth?": The outsider asks.

30.51

On the Śāstra's statement: "Also observing the questioner [...] and so asked the question": The reply. Because they considered the liberated self to be the Tathāgata, the Buddha did not answer, as it shares the same faults as before.

30.52

On the Śāstra's statement: "Now one should cross-examine [...] also exists after death": Questioning the Vātsīputrīya.

30.53

On the Śāstra's statement: "They say it is for fear of falling into the fault of permanence": The Vātsīputrīya replies. Because their school holds that the self is neither permanent nor impermanent.

30.54

On the Śāstra's statement: "If so, for what reason [...] the fault of falling into permanence": Raising an objection by analogy. If you say it is for fear of falling into permanence that He did not answer that the self exists after death, why, out of fear of falling into permanence, when the body breaks up, and so forth...

30.55

On the Śāstra's statement: "If the Buddha previously saw [...] because the substance of the self is completely non-existent": The author of the Śāstra refutes them on two fronts. If you say that the Buddha previously saw the unliberated self and therefore declared it, but once it attained nirvāṇa He no longer saw it, and because He did not know it existed the Buddha did not declare it to exist, that would deny that the Great Master possesses omniscience, as it would exist without Him knowing it. If you accept that the World-Honoured One possesses omniscience and yet did not declare it, one should accept that He did not declare it because the substance of the self is completely non-existent.

30.56

On the Śāstra's statement: "If it is said that the World-Honoured One [...] and the fault of permanence": Another objection. If you say that He saw the self after liberation but did not speak of it, this entails the fault of being separate from the aggregates, since the self remains when the aggregates perish; and it entails the fault of falling into eternalism, because of clinging to the self as permanent.

30.57

On the Śāstra's: "If both seeing and non-seeing [are inexpressible] ... not omniscient": Another objection. If both seeing and non-seeing are inexpressible, then one would gradually have to say that it is inexpressible whether the Buddha is omniscient or not omniscient, which would contradict the sūtra stating that the Buddha is omniscient.

30.58

On the Śāstra's: "If it is said that [the self] really exists ... because of falling into the place of wrong views": This again recounts their position. Because the sūtra states: "As real, as abiding... those who resolutely cling to non-self fall into the place of wrong views." Thus they know that a self exists, because clinging to non-self causes one to fall into wrong views.

30.59

On the Śāstra's: "This does not constitute proof ... because of falling into the place of wrong views": The author of the Śāstra refutes it. If the sūtra stating that those who resolutely cling to non-self fall into wrong views were to prove that there is a self, then since that sūtra also states that those who resolutely cling to a self fall into wrong views, it would equally prove non-self. Therefore one should know that this sūtra leads one away from annihilationism and eternalism, and does not prove that a self exists.

30.60

On the Śāstra's: "In the Abhidharma ... it is clearly stated": The author of the Śāstra cites the Abhidharma as proof. Stating that the self exists or does not exist is subsumed under eternalist and annihilationist views, which is profoundly reasonable. Clinging to the existence or non-existence of a self belongs to the extremes of eternalism and annihilationism, because this is clearly stated in the Vatsagotra-sūtra cited earlier.

30.61

On the Śāstra's: "If there is definitely no pudgala ... there is definitely a pudgala": An objection by the Vātsīputrīyas. If there is no self, who can be said to transmigrate through birth-and-death? For birth-and-death itself ought not to transmigrate. Since the sūtra speaks of rushing through birth-and-death, one knows there is definitely a pudgala. If the continuum of skandhas perishes on the spot, how could there be transmigration?

30.62

On the Śāstra's: "How does this again transmigrate through birth-and-death?": The author of the Śāstra asks. Since the self is not impermanent, how can it be said to transmigrate through birth-and-death?

30.63

On the Śāstra's: "Because of abandoning previous skandhas and taking up subsequent skandhas": The opponent explains. The self is not impermanent, but because the skandhas taken up and abandoned are impermanent, it is termed "transmigration."

30.64

On the Śāstra's: "Such a thesis has already been examined and dismissed earlier": The author of the Śāstra refers to what preceded, refuting the thesis that the self depends on the skandhas, and so forth.

30.65

On the Śāstra's: "Just as a fire consuming a plain ... transmigrates through birth-and-death": Having finished refuting the opponent's clingings, the author of the Śāstra sets forth his own explanation of the transmigration of the nominal self. First the simile, then the application to the phenomenon. It can be understood according to the text.

30.66

On the Śāstra's: "If there are only skandhas ... was named Sunetra": The opponent cites scripture to object. If the earlier skandhas have already perished and subsequent skandhas have arisen anew, how can it be said that "I at present was the Teacher of the World in the past"?

30.67

On the Śāstra's: "What flaw is there in this statement?": The author of the Śāstra asks in return.

30.68

On the Śāstra's: "Because the skandhas are distinct": The opponent replies. If the five skandhas are nominally designated as a self, since the substances of the past skandhas and present skandhas are distinct, how could the present "I" be the past "I"?

30.69

On the Śāstra's: "If so, what thing is it?": The author of the Śāstra asks in return.

30.70

On the Śāstra's: "It refers to the pudgala": The opponent replies.

30.71

On the Śāstra's: "If the past 'I' is the present, its substance should be permanent": The author of the Śāstra objects. Your school posits that the self is neither permanent nor impermanent. If the past "I" is identical with the present "I", it would have to be permanent, which contradicts your own school.

30.72

On the Śāstra's: "Therefore, to say that the present 'I' ... previously burned that matter": The author of the Śāstra sets forth the correct view. Just as a person takes a single torch, first burning grass with it and later burning wood with it—although it perishes from moment to moment, it is a single continuum, and one can say that this fire burning the wood had previously burned the grass, not that the substance of the earlier and later fires are not distinct. The meaning of the World-Honoured One's "I at present was the Teacher in the past" is also shown in accordance with this: the past and the present are a single continuum, not that the former did not perish.

30.73

On the Śāstra's: "If it is said that there is definitely ... far removed from liberation": The author of the Śāstra objects. If it is said that there definitely exists a real self, this self would be subtle, and when the Buddha's wisdom, which is supreme, contemplates this self, it would see it most clearly. Having seen the self, a view of self would then arise, leading up to being bound by attachment to the self; this would slander the Buddha and be far removed from liberation. In the text, he first points out the fault, next cites scripture, and finally concludes.

30.74

On the Śāstra's: "If it is said ... this statement is meaningless": The author of the Śāstra takes up the thesis to refute it. If it is said that imagining a self in what is not self gives rise to attachment to self, whereas seeing a self in what is a self does not give rise to attachment to self, this statement is meaningless.

30.75

On the Śāstra's: "Why is that?": The opponent inquires into the reason why it is meaningless.

30.76

On the Śāstra's: "In what is not self ... there is no reason to substantiate it": Answering the reason why it is meaningless. Clinging to a self in what is self and clinging to a self in what is not self—holding to one's own as distinct from another—has no difference, and there is no reason to substantiate that one does not love a real self while one loves a false self.

30.77

On the Śāstra's: "Therefore, regarding the Buddha ... produce the boils and sores of views": Concluding the fault of the Vātsīputrīyas.

30.78

On the Śāstra's: "Thus, one group ... the fault of lacking liberation": Stating that within the Buddha's Dharma there are the Vātsīputrīyas, as well as those who deny that the substances of all dharmas exist. The non-Buddhists cling to the existence of a distinct true self-nature. All alike cannot escape the fault of lacking liberation.

30.79

On the Śāstra's: "If in all respects ... how can it remember and recognise?": Those who cling to a self raise this common objection: if in all respects the substance of a self does not exist at all, how could a momentarily perishing mind remember and recognise an object previously experienced or a similar object?

30.80

On the Śāstra's: "Such remembering and recognising ... arises from a specific modification of the mind": The author of the Śāstra adopts the Sautrāntika view to answer. "From within the continuum" means within one's own body. "The category of ideation that remembered the object" is the mind of an earlier time; remembering an object and grasping marks is of different categories, and the arising of a specific modification in the mental seed is another name for seed. Grasping marks is the active function of ideation.

30.81

On the Śāstra's: "Now, as for the initial memory ... arises immediately thereafter": The opponent asks. The previous explanation of the arising of a subsequent memory from a specific modification of the preceding mind of memory: from what specific modification of mind does that preceding memory arise?

30.82

On the Śāstra's: "Arises from a specific modification of the mind having an associated ideation ... directed towards that": The reply. This initial memory arises from a specific modification of mind with an associated ideation of mental application directed towards that similar dharma. "Not being a difference in basis" means difference in body. Conditions such as grief and distraction impair the capacity of the seeds; relying on conditions of the former sort, the capacity of the seeds is not impaired by these conditions, and thus the initial memory arises, which is the arising of the initial memory. It arises from mental application directed towards this object and other conditions, as well as those seeds.

30.83

On the Śāstra's: "Although there are such ... having efficacy": The author of the Śāstra explains. The arising of memory necessarily requires both causes and conditions before it can arise, and apart from these two, no efficacy of a self is seen.

30.84

On the Śāstra's: "How can a different mind ... have the principle of memory?": That school objects. The earlier mind and the later mind are distinct, yet the later mind remembers the object of the earlier mind. The two minds of Devadatta and Yajñadatta are distinct; could Yajñadatta remember the mental object of Devadatta?

30.85

On the Śāstra's: "This objection is unreasonable ... because of having the nature of cause and effect": The author of the Śāstra resolves it. The earlier mind and the later mind belong to one continuum and have the sense of cause and effect; therefore, the later mind remembers the object of the earlier mind. Devadatta and Yajñadatta are different continua, and lacking cause and effect, they do not remember each other's [objects].

30.86

On the Śāstra's: "We do not say ... there arises subsequent recognition": The author of the Śāstra explains further. It is not that when a different mind sees an object, another mind can remember it, because the continuum is one. Rather, from the seed of the specific capacity of the past mind that took that object as its cognitive condition, the consciousness of the present time capable of memory is induced. That is to say, as explained earlier, due to the power of transformation and distinction in the continuum, memory arises—what fault is there? By the power of this memory, subsequent recognition arises.

30.87

On the Śāstra's: "Since the substance of a self does not exist, who is the one capable of remembering?": That master asks.

30.88

On the Śāstra's: "What is the meaning of 'capable of remembering'?": The author of the Śāstra asks that master.

30.89

On the Śāstra's: "Through mindfulness, it can grasp an object": That master replies.

30.90

On the Śāstra's: "Is this grasping of an object distinct from mindfulness?": The author of the Śāstra interrogates. Since an object is grasped through mindfulness, could there be a grasping of an object distinct from mindfulness?

30.91

On the Śāstra's: "Although not distinct from mindfulness, it is simply due to an agent": That master replies. Although there is no grasping of an object distinct from mindfulness, nevertheless, when mindfulness grasps an object, it is due to there being an agent.

30.92

On the Śāstra's: "The agent is nothing other than ... a specific modification of that kind of mind": The author of the Śāstra replies. You say that the agent is a distinct self; I say that the agent is simply the cause of memory.

30.93

On the Śāstra's: "However, as for what is said in worldly convention ... it is said that he is capable of remembering": The author of the Śāstra explains further. When the world says that Caitra is capable of remembering, this is the designation of the name Caitra upon the continuum of skandhas, not upon a real self. Because a subsequent memory arises from an earlier mind that saw, it is said that he can remember. Caitra is the name of a asterism in the first month; when someone is born in the first month, they take their name from this asterism.

30.94

On the Śāstra's: "If the substance of a self does not exist ... the sixth case is used": That master objects.

30.95

On the Śāstra's: "This sixth case relies on the meaning of ownership": The author of the Śāstra replies.

30.96

On the Śāstra's: "What kind of thing belongs to what kind of owner?": That master asks.

30.97

On the Śāstra's: "This is like an ox or the like belonging to Caitra": The author of the Śāstra replies.

30.98

On the Śāstra's: "How is he the owner of the ox?": That master investigates.

30.99

On the Śāstra's: "It means that depending on various ... he attains mastery over it": The author of the Śāstra replies.

30.100

On the Śāstra's: "Regarding what ... do you seek the master of mindfulness?": The author of the Śāstra reproaches.

30.101

On the Śāstra's: "To drive mindfulness toward the remembered object": That master replies.

30.102

On the Śāstra's: "To what end do you drive mindfulness?": The author of the Śāstra asks.

30.103

On the Śāstra's: "In order to make mindfulness arise": That master replies.

30.104

On the Śāstra's: "How wondrous is this mastery ... yet you drive this?": The author of the Śāstra reproaches. How could one drive this very thing in order to make it arise? That would entail the fault of what generates being what is generated.

30.105

On the Śāstra's: "Furthermore, regarding mindfulness, does the self ... or does it make mindfulness move?": The author of the Śāstra presents a two-pronged question.

30.106

On the Śāstra's: "Because mindfulness does not move, it should only make it arise": That master replies. Mindfulness is a mental phenomenon and cannot be made to move; therefore, the self should make this mindfulness arise.

30.107

On the Śāstra's: "Then a cause is called an owner ... the owner of mindfulness?": The author of the Śāstra explains the owner of mindfulness for that master.

30.108

On the Śāstra's: "The aggregation of conditioned forces ... does not depart from causes": The author of the Śāstra explains for that master that both the owner of the ox and the ox lack real substantiality. Both are a single type of continuum of conditioned forces. Yet the cause capable of making it undergo variation and arise in a different location is called the owner of the ox, which is the one capable of driving the ox.

30.109

On the Śāstra's: "Since memory is like this ... should also be explained by analogy": Following the case of memory, recognition is explained by analogy. Following memory and recognition, who is capable of cognising, whose consciousness is it, and so forth, should also be explained by analogy. Although broadly the same, they are not without minor differences.

30.110

On the Śāstra's: "Now, the causes and conditions of consciousness ... should be understood accordingly": Explaining the minor differences. The explanation of the meaning of cause is the same, but with slight differences regarding conditions.

30.111

On the Śāstra's: "There are some who say ... the one capable of cognising, and so forth": The third main section also refutes the Sāṃkhyas. They establish this mindfulness and mind as the one capable of cognising and so forth, which is their self.

30.112

On the Śāstra's: "Now we should question them ... consciousness cognising is also like this": The author of the Śāstra first refutes their simile, and by analogy with the simile refutes the doctrine. A two-pronged interrogation: What is Devadatta? If he is a real self, this was refuted earlier. If he is a nominal person, his substance is not a single thing, because the name Devadatta is nominally designated upon the continuum of conditioned forces of Devadatta. This refutes the simile. Just as Devadatta can walk, consciousness cognising is also like this: this refutes the doctrine by analogy.

30.113

Regarding: "Based on what principle is it said that Devadatta can walk?": The opponent asks.

30.114

On the Śāstra's: "It means that at each moment ... a flame or sound can travel": The author of the Śāstra replies. That is, although the nominal continuum perishes from moment to moment, when it arises in a different location from here to there, this is called "walking"; the cause is called the "walker", not that a real self goes from here to there. Just as a flame or a sound, although perishing moment by moment, is conventionally said to travel because of arising in different locations.

30.115

On the Śāstra's: "So too with Devadatta ... also speak in this way": By analogy with walking, he explains cognising. Because the noble ones conform to worldly convention, they also speak in this way.

30.116

On the Śāstra's: "The sūtras say that consciousnesses ... what function does it perform?": An inquiry.

30.117

On the Śāstra's statement: "[Consciousness] performs nothing at all [...] it is said to 'cognise an object'": This is the author of the treatise's answer. This is identical to what the Sandhinirmocana-sūtra calls the dhāraṇī not shared with the non-Buddhists: "Whether it be defiled or pure phenomena, I declare that all are devoid of agency, and there is also no person (pudgala) whatsoever, because all phenomena are free from an agent."

30.118

On the Śāstra's statement: "How does it resemble an object?": This is a question.

30.119

On the Śāstra's statement: "It means bearing its aspect [...] it is called 'cognising an object'": This is the explanation. When consciousness arises, having the aspect of the object is called "cognising the object"; because it lacks the aspect of the sense faculty, it is not called "cognising the faculty."

30.120

On the Śāstra's statement: "Or [just as] with respect to an object, consciousness [...] bells and drums are said to be able to sound": This further explains the ability of consciousness to cognise. Just as because of a bell or drum there is a sound, and one says "the bell or drum can sound," so because the preceding consciousness serves as the cause for the subsequent consciousness which is able to cognise the object, one says "consciousness can cognise." It is spoken of in terms of its cause.

30.121

On the Śāstra's statement: "Or just as a lamp can go, consciousness can cognise in the same way": This is the third explanation.

30.122

On the Śāstra's statement: "Based on what principle is it said that a lamp can go?": This is a question.

30.123

On the Śāstra's statement: "Within the continuum of the flames [...] it is said to 'be able to cognise'": This is the explanation. When a lamp arises continuously in different locations, it is called the lamp's "going"; when consciousness [arises] with respect to different objects, it is said that consciousness is "able to cognise"; thus its very essence is its capacity.

30.124

On the Śāstra's statement: "Or just as with the arising of form, the abiding of form [...] the principle must also be like this": This uses a simile to show that there is no cogniser. Just as with the arising of form and so forth there is no distinct producer, so when consciousness cognises an object, there is also no cogniser.

30.125

On the Śāstra's statement: "If the subsequent consciousness arises [...] like a sprout, stem, leaf, and so forth": This is the opponent's question.

30.126

On the Śāstra's statement: "Conditioned phenomena all have abiding-[and-decay] [...] the subsequent must differ from the prior": This is the author of the treatise's explanation. Because conditioned phenomena possess the characteristic of alteration (decay), the subsequent consciousness cannot be invariably similar to the prior.

30.127

On the Śāstra's statement: "If it were otherwise [...] one would naturally emerge from meditative absorption": This is the author of the treatise's counter-objection explaining the point. If the subsequent were always similar to the prior, there would be no emergence from meditative absorption.

30.128

On the Śāstra's statement: "The continuums of various thoughts [...] because of differences in lineage": This explains why thoughts have a fixed sequence.

30.129

On the Śāstra's statement: "Just as immediately after a woman's thought [...] owing to differences in lineage": This points to a concrete instance to explain.

30.130

On the Śāstra's statement: "Immediately after a woman's thought [...] differences in external conditions": This explains that although various kinds of subsequent thoughts could possibly arise after a woman's thought, nevertheless, that which was previously repeatedly activated, that which is clear, or that which was recently activated arises first, because such a thought possesses strong cultivation power. But at the moment it is about to arise, if differences in external conditions of the body occur, it is not fixed—as when one constantly brings up thoughts of a husband, but sometimes encounters a child and so gives rise to thoughts of the child; or when the body is touched by pain, one immediately gives rise to a different thought.

30.131

On the Śāstra's statement: "For all that have the power of cultivation [...] produce its own effect": This is the opponent's objection. If it is by the power of cultivation that this thought repeatedly arises, why would not whichever has the strongest cultivation power perpetually produce its own effect?

30.132

On the Śāstra's statement: "Because this thought has [...] because it is most conducive": This is the explanation. It means that owing to the characteristic of abiding-decay (alteration), it does not perpetually produce its own effect, because this characteristic of abiding-decay conforms to producing a different thought.

30.133

On the Śāstra's statement: "The categories of various thoughts [...] only the Omniscient One knows": This clarifies that the sequence of thoughts is subtle and fine, attributing knowledge of it to the Buddha alone, and citing a verse as proof. The cause of the distinct categories of colors in the feathers of a peacock can only be known by the Buddha.

30.134

On the Śāstra's statement: "The cause for the differentiation of form [...] could be easily cognised": This adduces the easy to illuminate the difficult. The cause for the differentiation of form as an objective support must be known only to the Buddha, how much more so that which is not of the nature of form.

30.135

On the Śāstra's statement: "A certain class of non-Buddhists [...] all come from the self": This is the second part of the third major section refuting non-Buddhists, refuting the Vaiśeṣikas. They state that when the various thoughts arise, they all proceed from the self, because they are qualities (guṇa) of the self.

30.136

On the Śāstra's statement: "The preceding two objections [...] like a sprout, leaf, and so forth": The author of the treatise cites the preceding two objections to refute the Vaiśeṣikas. Since the self is unitary, on what basis does the subsequent consciousness not perpetually resemble the prior, and why is there a fixed sequence?

30.137

On the Śāstra's statement: "If it is said that it is due to depending on [...] because it is not universally established": This refutes their shifted position. Their position says: the reason that consciousness does not perpetually resemble the preceding consciousness is that it depends on the contact of the self with the substance category (dravya-padārtha) of form and the mind, and due to these various differences, a distinct consciousness arises. This principle is definitely not so. The essence of the self is unitary; its contact with another mind is not universally established. This is not mutually accepted by both traditions, so it does not establish their thesis.

30.138

On the Śāstra's statement: "Furthermore, the contact of two things [...] would both have destruction": The author of the treatise refutes the contact of the mind with the self. The contact of two things has spatial boundaries; they cannot contact universally. The self is omnipresent, whereas the mind has spatial boundaries. Moreover, that non-Buddhist school itself explains the characteristic of contact by saying: non-reaching prior, reaching later is called "contact." If the self contacts the mind, and the mind has spatial boundaries, the self should also have spatial boundaries; because the mind moves, the self should move; because the mind is destroyed, the self should be destroyed. If it is not so, how can it be called "contact"?

30.139

On the Śāstra's statement: "If one part contacts [...] because there are no distinct parts": This refutes partial contact, because the self has no distinct parts. The above refutes the contact of consciousness (or mind) with the self.

30.140

On the Śāstra's statement: "Even granting there is contact [...] how could contact have any difference?": This grants contact for the sake of argument, but refutes difference in contact. Since the essence of the self is permanent and the mind is without distinction, how could their contact have any difference, such that it produces a consciousness different from the prior?

30.141

On the Śāstra's statement: "If it depends on a different cognition [...] can there be differentiation": This refutes their shifted position. If they claim that because it depends on a different cognition (buddhi), the arising of consciousness differs, then the distinct cause producing cognition incurs the same objection as that regarding the arising of consciousness.

30.142

On the Śāstra's statement: "If it depends on different dispositions (saṃskāra) [...] what is the use of the self?": This refutes their shifted position. If, depending on differences in dispositions, the contact between self and mind produces differentiation in consciousness, then the mind should simply depend on differences in dispositions to be able to produce mental consciousness; what is the use of the self?

30.143

On the Śāstra's statement: "With respect to the arising of consciousness, the self [...] the word 'svāhā'": This is a refutation. Consciousness arises with differences based on differences in dispositions; the self has no function in the arising of consciousness, yet they claim the arising of consciousness is due to the self, just like when medicine cures an illness and the matter is already accomplished, a deceitful physician falsely claims: "It was due to my incantation." "Svāhā" (pu-sha-he) here means "auspiciousness."

30.144

On the Śāstra's statement: "If it is claimed that these two [...] there is no principle to prove it": This refutes their shifted position that mind and dispositions exist due to the self. Although there is this statement, there is no principle to establish it.

30.145

On the Śāstra's statement: "If it is said that these two [...] the meaning of being a basis": The author of the treatise questions the nature of this basis.

30.146

On the Śāstra's statement: "It is not that mind and dispositions [...] the self is their basis": The opponent answers. Mind and dispositions rely on the self not as a painting relies on a wall or fruit relies on a vessel. If it were like these two, there would be two faults: first, the fault of mutual obstruction; second, the fault of sometimes existing separately.

30.147

On the Śāstra's statement: "If so, how is it?": The author of the treatise presses the opponent. The self serves as the basis for cognition and dispositions not as a vessel holds fruit or a wall holds a painting; how then do you say cognition and dispositions rely on the self?

30.148

On the Śāstra's statement: "This is just like the earth [...] the basis of the four things": The opponent answers. Just as the four things—color-form, odor, taste, and tangibility—rely on the earth.

30.149

On the Śāstra's statement: "Such a statement of theirs [...] is merely a conventional designation of the name 'self'": The author of the treatise refutes it, saying: If, as you say, the self is the basis of the two, just as earth is the basis for odor and so forth, then since odor and so forth rely on earth, there is no earth apart from the four; and since mind and dispositions rely on the self, there is no self apart from the two.

30.150

On the Śāstra's statement: "If apart from odor and so forth [...] the earth has odor and so forth": The opponent objects. Since one says "the earth has odor and so forth," it is clear that the possessor is different from what is possessed; hence we know that apart from the four there is a distinct earth.

30.151

On the Śāstra's statement: "In order to show the essence of earth [...] a wooden statue's body, and so forth": The author of the treatise explains. It is to show differences in the substance of earth, because the substance of earth has differences such as odor. Just as in worldly speech, in order to show differences in the substance of a statue, one speaks of "a wooden statue's body" and so forth; although the wood is itself the statue, it still excludes other statues, such as iron ones.

30.152

On the Śāstra's statement: "Furthermore, if there were a self [...] produce all cognitions": The author of the treatise further refutes it. If the self, depending on differences in dispositions, were able to produce cognition, then since dispositions are numerous, why does it not simultaneously produce all cognitions?

30.153

On the Śāstra's statement: "If at that time this disposition [...] the effect would not arise perpetually": He further refutes their defense. If they defend by saying: the reason one does not simultaneously produce all cognitions is that a disposition with strong functional power obstructs the other weaker dispositions from producing their effects, so that one cannot simultaneously produce all cognitions; then why, from that strong disposition, does the effect not arise perpetually?

30.154

On the Śāstra's statement: "The answer to this is as before [...] because it gradually undergoes alteration": The opponent defends: our school accepts that it is impermanent and gradually undergoes alteration. Just as the earlier objection asked: why does that which has the strongest cultivation power not perpetually produce its own effect? To which the answer was: because this thought has the characteristic of abiding-decay (alteration). My answer to this objection is also identical to that: because the substance of the disposition gradually undergoes alteration.

30.155

On the Śāstra's statement: "If so, positing a self [...] because its essence has no distinction": This refutes the idea that transformation is due to dispositions. If the arising or non-arising of consciousness depends on dispositions, then positing a self is pointless, because it is the power of dispositions that causes the mind to arise with distinctions. That school's positing of dispositions is identical to our Buddhist school's explanation of thoughts arising with distinctions through cultivation. Since it is by the power of cultivation, what does it have to do with a self?

30.156

On the Śāstra's statement: "One must certainly believe [...] because the principle is not established": This uses that which relies to prove the self that is relied upon. That school posits the self as a substance (dravya) and mindfulness and so forth as the category of qualities (guṇa-padārtha). Qualities rely on the category of substance and do not rely on anything else. Therefore one knows that the essence of the self also exists and cannot be said to be non-existent.

30.157

On the Śāstra's statement: "This proof is illogical [...] there are only empty words": The author of the treatise refutes the opponent's proof. The opponents maintain that mindfulness and so forth are subsumed under the category of qualities, that their essence is entirely non-substantial, and that they rely on other substantial phenomena. Our school does not accept this, nor is it universally established. Our school accepts that mindfulness and so forth possess distinct substantial natures, and all are called substantial. For our school's sūtra states that six substantial entities are called the fruits of asceticism (śrāmaṇyaphala); the six substantial entities are the five uncontaminated aggregates along with analytical cessation (pratisaṃkhyānirodha).

30.158

On the Śāstra's statement: "That they rely on a substantial self [...] there are only empty words": This is the second refutation of relying on a self. It points to the same refutations as before, and so is not repeated.

30.159

On the Śāstra's statement: "If the self is truly non-existent [...] what is the essence of the self?": The non-Buddhist counter-objects. It is for the sake of the self, which will experience the fruits of suffering and pleasure, that one performs good and evil karma. If the essence of the self is non-existent, for whose sake does one perform karma? If one performs karma for the sake of the self, what is the essence of the self?

Linked texts (1)

俱舍論疏 — Classical Chinese