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俱舍論頌疏論本 2

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2.1

From here, third, analysis by various categories: there are twenty-two categories in all that differentiate the eighteen elements. Here there are three categories. The śāstra states: "Among the eighteen elements expounded before, how many are visible (sanidarśana) and invisible (anidarśana)? How many are with impact (sapratigha) and without impact (apratigha)? How many are wholesome (kuśala), how many unwholesome (akuśala), and how many indeterminate (avyākṛta)?" The verse states:

2.2

"One is visible, namely form;
ten having form are with impact;
excluding form and sound, eight of these
are indeterminate; the remainder are of three kinds."

2.3

Commentary: 'One is visible, namely form' means that among the eighteen elements, one element is visible, namely the element of visible form (rūpa-dhātu). Because colors and shapes have different distinctions here and there, they can consequently manifest expressions pointing to 'this' and 'that'; expression is called 'seeing' (darśana). Because there is that expression, it is called 'visible'. Another explanation: 'seeing' refers to the eye faculty observing visible form; because form possesses being seen by the eye, it is called 'visible'.

2.4

Regarding "ten are material and have resistance": the five faculties and the five objects are called ten. Because their intrinsic nature is material (rūpa), they are called "material". These ten material dhātus are composed of subtle particles (paramāṇu) and mutually obstruct each other; hence they are called "having resistance" (sapratigha). The treatise says: "Like hand obstructing hand, like stone obstructing stone, or both obstructing each other (hand and stone are called both)." One should know that, in general, there are three kinds of resistance: first, resistance through physical obstruction (āvaraṇa-pratighāta); second, resistance through sphere of activity (viṣaya-pratighāta); third, resistance through cognitive object (ālambana-pratighāta). Resistance means obstruction. There are two kinds of obstruction: first, obstruction by physical impediment; second, obstruction by confinement. Obstruction by physical impediment refers to resistance through physical obstruction; its intrinsic nature is the ten material dhātus; obstruction itself is resistance, which is a karmadhāraya compound. Obstruction by confinement refers to the two kinds of resistance: through sphere of activity and through cognitive object. As for the intrinsic nature of resistance through sphere of activity, the treatise says: "It refers to the twelve dhātus (the six faculties and six consciousnesses), a portion of the dharmadhātu (within the dharmadhātu, taking only the mental factors, hence called 'a portion'), and all phenomena possessing a sphere of activity, with respect to objects such as visible forms (the preceding twelve dhātus and a portion of the dharmadhātu, because they can grasp objects, are called 'all phenomena possessing a sphere of activity'. 'With respect to objects such as visible forms' refers to the objects grasped)." These twelve dhātus are confined by their spheres of activity and are therefore called "having resistance". Resistance of a sphere of activity is a tatpuruṣa compound. As for the intrinsic nature of resistance through cognitive object: it refers to all seven mind-dhātus (the six consciousnesses and the mind-dhātu) and a portion of the dharmadhātu (mental factors). The term "cognitive object" (ālambana) refers to the six objects: visible forms and the rest. The term "having resistance" refers to the seven mind-dhātus and a portion of the dharmadhātu. That these seven mind-dhātus and the dharmadhātu are called "having resistance through cognitive object" means that they are confined and obstructed by their cognitive objects, and are therefore called "having resistance". Resistance of a cognitive object is a tatpuruṣa compound. The treatise cites the Prajñaptipāda-śāstra to prove resistance through sphere of activity, because it makes a fourfold alternative (catuṣkoṭi). The Prajñaptipāda-śāstra speaks thus: "Herein, there is obstruction in water and not on land, such as the eyes of fish and the like. There is obstruction on land and not in water, speaking from the majority, such as the eyes of humans and the like. There is obstruction in both, such as the piśācas (in Chinese: ghosts that eat flesh and blood), the śiśumāra, and the eyes of fishermen, frogs, and the like (these piśācas and others can see forms both in water and on land; therefore they are capable of obstruction in both). There is non-obstruction in both, namely, excluding the previous characteristics." The treatise says: "Between sphere of activity (viṣaya) and cognitive object (ālambana), what further difference is there?" (A question). "If this has functioning with respect to that phenomenon, then that is said to be the sphere of activity of this phenomenon. The mind and mental factors arise by grasping that; that is called a cognitive object with respect to mind and the rest." The explanation says (answering): "That phenomenon" refers to the six objects: visible forms and the rest. "This has functioning" means that these six faculties and six consciousnesses have functions such as seeing and hearing with respect to those forms and the rest. According to this text of the treatise, that upon which functioning relies is called the "sphere of activity". For example, the eye can see form and the consciousness can discern form; one calls form a "sphere of activity" because the eye and consciousness have a function regarding form. Mind and mental factors are by nature weak and feeble, and arise only by grasping an object, just as a frail person cannot stand up without a staff; hence objects such as visible forms are clung to by consciousness and are called "cognitive objects" (ālambana) (the above is the commentary). According to this text of the treatise, the two meanings of sphere of activity and cognitive object are completely distinct. Take for instance a single visible form: being seen by the eye, it is called a "sphere of activity", because the eye has a function regarding the form. This same visible form can induce consciousness to arise and is called a "cognitive object", because it provides power to consciousness. By this principle, in terms of the sense of obstruction in grasping a sphere, it is called resistance through sphere of activity. Therefore, resistance through sphere of activity extends to the six faculties and six consciousnesses, because faculties and consciousnesses can grasp spheres of activity. In terms of the sense of obstruction in taking an object as condition, it is called resistance through cognitive object; therefore, resistance through cognitive object belongs only to mind and mental factors, because mind and mental factors arise relying upon objects. Master Guang also said: "In terms of the sense of obstructing the substance, it is called resistance through cognitive object. In terms of the sense of obstructing the function, it is called resistance through sphere of activity." There are many more interpretations, which would be tedious and are not narrated here. The treatise also says: "How is it that the eye and the rest, when proceeding with respect to their own sphere of activity and their own cognitive object, are said to have obstruction?" (Asking the meaning of obstruction. How is it that the eye faculty, visual consciousness, and the rest, when proceeding with respect to their own sphere of activity, are said to have obstruction? Asking about resistance through sphere of activity. How is it that visual consciousness and the rest, when proceeding with respect to their own cognitive object, are said to have obstruction? Asking about resistance through cognitive object. The word "own" excludes others, as the eye sees forms and the ear hears sounds.) "Because, going beyond that and relying on another, these do not proceed." (The explanation says: This is the answer. Going beyond that form and the like, toward other sounds and the like, this eye and the rest do not proceed; hence it is called obstruction.) "Or again, obstruction has the meaning of conjunction (saṃnipāta); that is to say, phenomena such as the eye proceed in conjunction with their own sphere of activity and their own cognitive object." (The explanation says: This explains obstruction in terms of conjunction.)

2.5

Question: "If a phenomenon has resistance through sphere of activity, does it also have resistance through physical obstruction?" Answer: "A fourfold alternative should be made: The seven mind-dhātus, a portion of the dharmadhātu, and all associated phenomena (the forty-six mental factors are called 'all associated phenomena') constitute the first alternative. Because they can grasp an object, they are called having resistance through sphere of activity; not being composed of subtle particles, they do not have resistance through physical obstruction. The five objects—visible forms and the rest—constitute the second alternative. Being composed of subtle particles, they are called having resistance through physical obstruction; being unable to grasp an object, they do not have resistance through sphere of activity. The five faculties—the eye and the rest—constitute the third alternative. Being composed of subtle particles, they are called having resistance through physical obstruction; because they can grasp an object, they are also called having resistance through sphere of activity. A portion of the dharmadhātu, namely unassociated phenomena, constitutes the fourth alternative (within the dharmadhātu, excluding mental factors, the remaining possession, non-possession, and so forth are called unassociated phenomena). Not being composed of subtle particles, they do not have resistance through physical obstruction; being unable to grasp an object, they do not have resistance through sphere of activity."

2.6

Question: "If a phenomenon has resistance through sphere of activity, does it also have resistance through cognitive object?" Answer: "One should follow the subsequent alternative: that which has resistance through cognitive object is necessarily having resistance through sphere of activity, because when mind and mental factors arise taking an object as condition, they necessarily grasp a sphere of activity. There are those that have resistance through sphere of activity but not resistance through cognitive object, namely the five faculties: the eye and the rest. Because faculties such as the eye can grasp a sphere of activity, they are called having resistance through sphere of activity; because they do not take an object as cognitive condition, they do not have resistance through cognitive object." Relying on the Sautrāntika school, the venerable Kumāralāta said this (Kumāralāta is translated here as 'youth of noble birth'): "Where the mind wishes to arise, and another obstructs it so that it does not arise, one should know that it has resistance; the absence of resistance is the opposite of this." The meaning of this verse is: for instance, where visible form is present, when the mind wishes to arise and is obstructed by another sound, the mind then does not arise. At the time when the mind does not arise, it is called 'having resistance'; when the mind is actually arising, it is called 'without resistance'. This differs from the Sarvāstivāda, which speaks of it as having resistance at the state where the mind arises. The author of the treatise in his intention aligns with Kumāralāta's explanation; hence the treatise says: 'This is accepted.'"

2.7

Regarding "excluding visible form and sound, eight are indeterminate; the remaining are of three kinds": this is the section classifying the three moral natures. Among these ten material dhātus, excluding visible form and sound, the remaining eight are of indeterminate (avyākṛta) nature. The two words "indeterminate" grammatically belong to the upper line. "The remaining" refers to visible form and sound, which encompass all three natures. The three natures are: first, wholesome; second, unwholesome; third, indeterminate. If a phenomenon is praiseworthy and placed within the white category, it is called wholesome by nature; if a phenomenon is blameworthy and placed within the black category, it is called unwholesome by nature; that which is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy is called indeterminate. Another explanation is: because it cannot be recorded as a maturation result (vipāka-phala), it is called indeterminate. The eight kinds, such as the eye, cannot be recorded as wholesome or unwholesome in nature; they are subsumed under the indeterminate. If visible form and sound are co-arisen through the power of a wholesome mind and are subsumed under bodily or vocal intimation, they are called wholesome by nature; if they are co-arisen through the power of an unwholesome mind and are subsumed under bodily or vocal intimation, they are called unwholesome; if co-arisen from an indeterminate mind and subsumed under bodily or vocal intimation, they are called indeterminate. And those not co-arisen from mind are collectively called indeterminate. The mention of "visible form and sound" refers to: bodily intimation is visible form, and vocal intimation is sound. "Co-arisen" means that the mental sovereign and mental factors can give rise to them together. Because visible form and sound are not intrinsically wholesome or unwholesome, they are judged to be wholesome or unwholesome based on the mind that produces them. If the mind is wholesome, the body and speech it produces are also called wholesome; if the mind is unwholesome, the body and speech it produces are also called unwholesome. Therefore bodily and vocal [actions] are called co-arisen wholesomeness.

2.8

From here is the fourth section: classification according to the three realms. The treatise says: "Having explained the wholesome and so forth, among the eighteen dhātus, how many are bound to the desire realm? How many are bound to the form realm? How many are bound to the formless realm?" The verse says:

2.9

"Bound to the desire realm are eighteen; bound to the form realm are fourteen, / Excluding smell, taste, and their two consciousnesses; bound to the formless are the last three."

2.10

Explanation: Those bound to the desire realm are fully eighteen. Those bound to the form realm are only fourteen, excluding the objects of smell and taste, and the consciousnesses of nose and tongue. Smell and taste are excluded because their nature is material food (kavaḍīkārāhāra); in the form realm there is no material food, and therefore no smell or taste. Nose and tongue consciousnesses are excluded because they lack cognitive objects: nose consciousness takes smell as object and tongue consciousness takes taste as object; since smell and taste are absent, nose and tongue consciousnesses are absent.

2.11

Those bound to the formless realm are only the last three, namely the mind-dhātu, mental consciousness dhātu, and dharmadhātu. The five faculties such as the eye, and the five objects such as visible form—these ten are material. The formless realm is free from matter, and therefore lacks these ten. Because it lacks these ten, the five consciousnesses are also absent. Hence the treatise says: "Because their supports and conditions are absent, the five consciousnesses are also absent (the five faculties are the supports, and the five objects are the conditions)." Therefore only the last three are bound to the formless realm.

2.12

From here is the fifth section: classification into with-outflows and without-outflows. The treatise says: "Having explained the realm bindings, among the eighteen dhātus, how many are with outflows (sāsrava)? How many are without outflows (anāsrava)?" The verse says:

2.13

"Mind, dharma, and mental consciousness apply to both; / The rest are only with outflows."

2.14

Explanation: "Mind, dharma, and mental consciousness apply to both" means that they extend to both with-outflows and without-outflows. Mind and mental consciousness subsumed under the truth of the path are called without-outflows; the rest are called with-outflows. If the dharmadhātu is the truth of the path or unconditioned, it is called without-outflows; the rest are called with-outflows (the dharmadhātu contains mental factors without outflows, which are called the truth of the path). The remaining fifteen dhātus are strictly with-outflows, because they are not subsumed under the truth of the path or the unconditioned.

2.15

From here is the sixth section: with investigation and with analysis. In this there are two parts: first, the direct classification; second, resolving objections.

2.16

First, as for the direct classification, the treatise says: "Among the eighteen dhātus, how many have investigation and have analysis? How many are without investigation and only with analysis? How many are without investigation and without analysis?" The verse says:

2.17

"The five consciousnesses have only investigation and analysis; / The last three have three; the rest have neither."

2.18

Explanation: The five consciousnesses, such as the eye, have investigation and have analysis because they are always associated with investigation (vitarka) and analysis (vicāra). That is to say, the five consciousnesses, such as the eye, have two causes for always being associated with investigation and analysis: first, their mode of activity is coarse; second, they operate through external gates. Due to these two causes, the consciousnesses of the eye and the rest are accompanied by investigation and analysis; this principle is fixed, and therefore the verse says 'only'.

2.19

Regarding "the last three are threefold; the rest are without [either]": "The last three" refers to the mind, phenomena, and mind-consciousness, because each is the last among the faculties, objects, and consciousnesses. Repeating "threefold" clarifies that these three dhātus all encompass three categories; the three categories are called "threefold". As for the three categories: first, the category with vitarka and with vicāra; second, the category without vitarka and with vicāra only; third, the category without vitarka and without vicāra. Therefore the śāstra says: "These last three dhātus all encompass the three categories: the mind-dhātu, the mind-consciousness-dhātu, and the associated mental phenomena of the dharmadhātu, excluding vitarka and vicāra. (Within the dharmadhātu there are forty-six mental factors, which are termed the associated dharmadhātu. From among these forty-six mental factors, excluding vitarka and vicāra, one takes the remaining forty-four mental factors; since the two, vitarka and vicāra, do not encompass all three categories, they are excluded. Here the text intends to clarify what encompasses the three categories.) If they are in the desire realm and the first dhyāna, they are with vitarka and with vicāra. If they are in the intermediate dhyāna, they are without vitarka and with vicāra only. In the stages from the second dhyāna upward, up to the peak of existence, they are without vitarka and without vicāra. (This clarifies that the mind-dhātu, the mind-consciousness-dhātu, and the forty-four associated factors of the dharmadhātu encompass the three categories across the stages.)" The śāstra also says: "The unassociated phenomena included in the dharmadhātu, and vicāra in the intermediate dhyāna, are likewise." (Within the dharmadhātu there are fourteen unassociated [formations] and three unconditioned [phenomena], together with avijñapti-rūpa, which are termed unassociated phenomena. These unassociated phenomena and the vicāra of the intermediate dhyāna are the same as the previously mentioned third category, without vitarka and without vicāra; therefore it says 'are likewise'. That is to say, because unassociated phenomena are not associated with vitarka or vicāra, they are termed without vitarka and without vicāra. In the intermediate dhyāna stage, vicāra is without vitarka; because it is not associated with vitarka, it is termed without vitarka. Vicāra lacks a second vicāra to be associated with together; therefore it is termed without vicāra.) The śāstra also says: "Vitarka is at all times without vitarka and with vicāra only, because there is no second vitarka, and because it is associated with vicāra only." (Vitarka is the same as the previously mentioned second category, termed without vitarka and with vicāra only. Because two vitarkas do not arise at the same time, there is no second vitarka. Since vitarka lacks a second vitarka, and vitarka is not associated with vitarka, vitarka is termed without vitarka. Vitarka is associated with vicāra; thus vitarka is termed with vicāra only. Please read this attentively.) The śāstra also says: "When vicāra is in the desire realm and the first dhyāna, it is not subsumed under the three categories; what should it be called?" (The intention of this question is: vicāra is not subsumed under the three categories because vicāra is not associated with vicāra, so it cannot be said to belong to the category with vitarka and with vicāra. Vicāra can be associated with vitarka, so it cannot be said to belong to the second category of without vitarka and with vicāra only, nor to the third category of without vitarka and without vicāra. Since it is not among the three categories, what should it be called?) This should be called without vicāra and with vitarka only, because there is no second vicāra, and because it is associated with vitarka only. (This sentence answers the previous question. Because vicāra has no second vicāra to be associated with together, it is termed without vicāra. Because it is associated with vitarka, it is termed with vitarka only.) For this reason, it is said that the stage with vitarka and with vicāra contains four categories of phenomena (For this reason means due to the existence of this fourth category of without vicāra and with vitarka only. The stage with vitarka and with vicāra is the desire realm and the first dhyāna): 1. with vitarka and with vicāra, referring to the remaining associated phenomena other than vitarka and vicāra (the remaining associated phenomena are the other forty-four mental factors); 2. without vitarka and with vicāra only, which is vitarka itself; 3. without vitarka and without vicāra, which is all unassociated phenomena (unassociated phenomena refers to the fourteen unassociated formations, the three unconditioned phenomena, and avijñapti-rūpa within the dharmadhātu); 4. without vicāra and with vitarka only, which is vicāra itself. Regarding "the rest are without [either]": the remaining ten rūpa-dhātus are without vitarka and without vicāra, because they are constantly unassociated with vitarka and vicāra.

2.20

From here, the second [section] resolves an objection. The śāstra raises the question: "If the five consciousness-bodies are with vitarka and with vicāra, how can they be said to be without conceptualization (nirvikalpa)?" The verse says:

2.21

"The five are said to lack conceptualization
Because [they lack] deliberative and recollective [conceptualization];
Their essential nature consists of distracted wisdom of the mental stage
And the various memories of the mind."

2.22

Commentary: The first two lines resolve the objection; the latter two lines identify the essential nature. Tradition states that conceptualization is broadly of three kinds: 1. conceptualization of intrinsic nature (svabhāva-vikalpa), 2. deliberative conceptualization (abhinirūpaṇā-vikalpa), and 3. recollective conceptualization (anusmaraṇa-vikalpa). Because the five consciousness-bodies, although possessing intrinsic nature [conceptualization], lack the other two, the śāstra says: "Just as a one-legged horse is called legless, so the sūtras say that they are without conceptualization." As for conceptualization of intrinsic nature, its essential nature is vitarka alone, which will be explained below among the mental factors.

2.23

"Consists of distracted wisdom of the mental stage" identifies the essential nature of deliberative conceptualization. "Distracted" means not in absorption (samādhi), excluding wisdom within absorption. "Associated with the mind-consciousness" excludes the consciousnesses of the five senses. Therefore, the distracted wisdom associated with the sixth consciousness is termed deliberative conceptualization.

2.24

"And the various memories of the mind" identifies the essential nature of recollective conceptualization. Whether in absorption or in distraction, the various memories associated with the mind-consciousness are called recollective conceptualization (memory encompasses both absorption and distraction, which is why it is called "various").

2.25

Hereunder, seventh is the category of having an intentional object (sālambana) and lacking an intentional object (anālambana); eighth is the category of being appropriated (supātta) and unappropriated (anupātta). The śāstra raises the question: "Among the eighteen dhātus, how many have an intentional object? How many lack an intentional object? How many are appropriated? How many are unappropriated?" The verse says:

2.26

"The seven mental [dhātus] and half of the dharmadhātu
Have an intentional object; the rest do not.
The first eight dhātus and sound
Are unappropriated; the rest are both."

2.27

Commentary: The first two lines answer the seventh question; the latter two lines answer the eighth question. "The seven mental [dhātus]" are the six consciousnesses and the mind-dhātu. "Half of the dharmadhātu": within the dharmadhātu there are four categories of phenomena, but here only the mental factors are taken, which is not the whole, so it is called "half". These seven mental dhātus and half of the dharmadhātu have an intentional object. "To grasp" (ālambana) means to seize upon an object. Mind and mental factors are called that which grasps (ālambaka); the object is called the intentional object (ālambana). Having that intentional object is termed "having an intentional object" (sālambana). Regarding "the rest do not": "the rest" refers to the ten rūpa-dhātus and the unassociated phenomena included in the dharmadhātu; because they cannot grasp an object, they are termed lacking an intentional object (anālambana).

2.28

Regarding "the first eight dhātus and sound are unappropriated": "the first" means taking the previous seven mental dhātus and the entirety of the dharmadhātu; these eight and sound make nine dhātus in total, which are termed unappropriated (anupātta). Regarding "the rest are both": "the rest" refers to the remainder, namely the five sense faculties—eye and so forth—and visible form, odor, taste, and tangible objects. These nine dhātus each encompass two meanings: 1. appropriated, and 2. unappropriated. When the five faculties of the eye and so forth abide in the present period, they are termed appropriated; in the past and future, they are termed unappropriated. When visible form, odor, taste, and tangible objects abide in the present period and are inseparable from the five faculties, they are termed appropriated. If in the present they are not combined with the faculties, or are external to the body, as well as being past or future phenomena, they are termed unappropriated. (Explanation: visible form, odor, taste, and tangible objects comprise three classes that are termed unappropriated: 1. those not combined with the faculties, such as hair and bodily hair; 2. those external to the body, such as earth, water, etc. among insentient things; 3. those of the past and future.) The śāstra says: "'Appropriated' means held together by the mind and mental factors, gathered as their basis, hence termed appropriated, because benefit and harm mutually follow one another." (Because the five faculties of the eye and so forth are gathered by that mind and mental factors as their basis, and the four objects supporting the faculties are gathered as their basis, the nine dhātus of the eye and so forth are appropriated by the mind and mental factors; possessing that appropriation, they are termed appropriated. Because of appropriation, benefit and harm to the eye and so forth follow the mind: when the mind has joy and pleasure, the body is also benefited; when the mind has suffering and distress, the body is also harmed.)

2.29

From here, ninth is the category of being primary elements (mahābhūta) and derived matter (upādāyarūpa); tenth is the category of being an accumulation (saṃcita) and non-accumulation (asaṃcita). The śāstra raises the question: "Among the eighteen dhātus, how many are of the nature of primary elements? How many are of the nature of derived matter? How many are of the nature of an accumulation? How many are of the nature of non-accumulation?" The verse says:

2.30

"Within the tangible-dhātu there are two kinds;
The other nine rūpas are derived matter;
A part of dharma is also like this;
The ten rūpas are accumulations."

2.31

Commentary: The upper three lines answer the ninth question; the bottom line answers the tenth question. Regarding "within the tangible-dhātu there are two kinds": "tangibles" refers to the tangibles sensed by the body, which encompass two kinds: 1. the primary elements: earth, water, fire, and wind; 2. derived matter: the seven including smoothness, roughness, etc.

2.32

Regarding "the other nine rūpas are derived matter": "the other" refers to the remaining five faculties of the eye and so forth, and the four objects of visible form and so forth, excluding only tangibles; these nine rūpa-dhātus are exclusively of the nature of derived matter. Regarding "a part of dharma is also like this": avijñapti-karma-rūpa, which is one part of the dharmadhātu, is the same as the previous nine dhātus in being exclusively derived matter; hence it says "is also like this". In the dharmadhātu there are four parts of phenomena: 1. associated phenomena, 2. unassociated phenomena, 3. avijñapti-rūpa, and 4. unconditioned phenomena. Here, taking only avijñapti, it says "one part".

2.33

Regarding "the ten rūpas are accumulations": the five faculties and five objects are called the ten rūpas; being formed of atoms (paramāṇu), they are called accumulations. By implication, the remaining eight are non-accumulations, because they are not [composed of] atoms.

2.34

From here below, eleventh is the category of that which cleaves and that which is cleaved; twelfth is the category of that which burns and that which is burned; thirteenth is the category of that which weighs and that which is weighed. The śāstra raises the question: "Among the eighteen dhātus, how many can cleave? How many are cleaved? How many can burn? How many are burned? How many can weigh? How many are weighed?" The verse says:

2.35

"It is said that only the four external dhātus
Can cleave and are cleaved;
They are also that which is burned and that which weighs;
That which burns and that which is weighed are disputed."

2.36

Commentary: Regarding the upper two lines: visible form, odor, taste, and tangibles are called the four external dhātus; these are termed that which cleaves and that which is cleaved. When the four dusts form an axe, they are termed that which cleaves. When the four dusts form firewood and the like, they are termed that which is cleaved. Question: "What phenomenon is called cleaving?" Answer: "When an aggregate of matter such as firewood arises in contiguous succession, and an axe or the like divides it so that they arise in separate successions, this phenomenon is called cleaving."

2.37

Regarding "they are also that which is burned and that which weighs": just as the four external dusts are called that which cleaves and that which is cleaved, their essential nature as that which is burned and that which weighs is also like this.

2.38

Regarding "that which burns and that which is weighed are disputed": "disputed" means controversy; that which burns and that which is weighed have two different interpretations, hence termed disputed. That is, some say: the essential nature of that which burns and that which is weighed is also as before, only the four external dhātus. Or again, others say: only the fire-dhātu can be called that which burns, and that which is weighed is only heaviness; heaviness is derived matter, the heavy tangible among tangibles.

2.39

From here, fourteenth is the category of the fivefold classification. The śāstra raises the question: "Among the eighteen dhātus, how many are born of fruition (vipākaja)? How many are accumulated through nourishment (aupacayika)? How many are of an outflow nature (niṣyanda)? How many possess real entities (dravyasat)? How many are momentary (kṣaṇika)?" The verse says:

2.40

"The internal five have fruition and nourishment;
Sound is not born of fruition;
The eight unimpeded are outflows
And also of the nature born of fruition;
The remaining three are real; only dharma,
And only the last three, are momentary."

2.41

Explanation: 'The internal five have [the nature of being] maturational and nourished': the five sense faculties, the eye and the rest, belong to only two classes: they are born of maturation and they are nourished. That which is produced by karma is called born of maturation. In the present life, that which causes what is small to grow large, and nourishes what is lean to make it stout, due to food, drink, and the like, is called nourished. The substance of the five faculties, the eye and the rest, is not unconditioned, so they are not called 'having actual reality'; nor are they the initial moment of the patience with regard to suffering, so they are not called 'a single moment'. Question: 'The five faculties, the eye and the rest, arise from causes of similar species and have the nature of an outflow; why then is it not said that they admit of outflow?' Answer: 'The five categories clarify their meanings such that their entities are distinct from one another, not including each other. If the five faculties, the eye and the rest, were not exhaustively subsumed by being born of maturation, only then would the subsumption under

2.42

Regarding the meaning of 'born of maturation', the treatise gives four explanations. The first says: That which is born of a cause of maturation is called 'born of maturation' (vipākaja), just as an ox-drawn cart is called an 'ox cart', omitting the middle word; therefore it is spoken of in this way. In this explanation, 'maturation' pertains either to the cause or to the result. If it pertains to the cause, maturation is itself the cause and is called the cause of maturation—this is a karmadhāraya compound. If it pertains to the result, the cause of maturation is called the cause of maturation—this is a tatpuruṣa compound. If one speaks of 'born of maturation', it is exclusively a tatpuruṣa compound; that is, being born of a cause of maturation is called 'born of maturation', dropping the two characters for 'cause' and 'of', saying merely 'born of maturation', just as saying 'ox cart' drops the two characters for 'drawn by'. The second explanation says: Alternatively, the karma that has been performed transforms and is capable of maturing when the time of obtaining the result arrives; hence it is called 'maturation'. The result arises from it, so it is called 'born of maturation'. That is, the karma that has been performed gives rise to the function of seizing the result before the time of obtaining it arrives; when the time of obtaining the result arrives, it gives rise to the function of delivering the result. Because this function of delivering the result is different from the former function of seizing the result, it is called 'transformation'. Transformation is difference; because it is capable of maturing, it is called 'maturation' (vipāka). The difference is itself the maturation; therefore it is called 'maturation'—this is a karmadhāraya compound. The result arises from it, so it is called 'born of maturation'. The arising of maturation is a tatpuruṣa compound. The intention of this explanation is that 'maturation' resides in the cause, while 'born' pertains to the result. The third explanation says: The result obtained by it belongs to a different class from the cause, and yet it is what is matured; therefore it is called 'maturation'. The intention of this explanation is that the result is neutral, whereas the cause is wholesome or unwholesome; therefore it is said to belong to a different class from the cause, which is called 'different'. Furthermore, it is what is matured; maturation is itself what is born—this is a karmadhāraya compound. The fourth explanation says: Alternatively, the designation of the result is provisionally applied to the cause. (The intention of this explanation is that the result is called maturation, which is the same as the second explanation. The cause is not maturation, yet the cause is now called maturation because the designation of the result is established upon the cause. The cause is called maturation because it possesses maturation; this is a bahuvrīhi compound. The result arises from the cause of maturation, so it is called 'born of maturation'. The arising of maturation is a tatpuruṣa compound.)

2.43

Regarding 'nourished' (aupacayika): the nourishing factors are of four kinds: first, food and drink; second, supportive care, such as anointing and bathing; third, sleep; fourth, meditative stabilization (samādhi). These four superior conditions support and benefit the five faculties, making the small grow large and nourishing the lean to become stout; hence they are called 'nourished'. The nourishers admit of all three moral natures; that which is nourished is exclusively neutral. Here, in the section on the five categories, what is taken is that which is nourished.

2.44

'Sound is without what is born of maturation': sound has two classes: first, outflow; second, nourished. As for being without what is born of maturation: matter born of maturation arises spontaneously, whereas sound operates according to intention and has interruption; therefore, it is not born of maturation.

2.45

'Eight unhindered are outflow and also of the nature of being born of maturation': the seven mental [elements] and the mental-object element (dharmadhātu), having no accumulation, are called the 'eight unhindered'. These have the nature of outflow and of being born of maturation. If they arise from causes of similar species and universal causes, they are called the nature of outflow; if they are brought forth from causes of maturation, they are called born of maturation. Because they are not accumulations, they are not nourished.

2.46

'The remaining three': 'the remaining' refers to the remaining four: visible form, odor, taste, and tangible object. These four, being outside the aforesaid five faculties (the eye and the rest) and the eight unhindered, are called 'the remaining'. These remaining four admit of three classes: they have causes of maturation, they are nourished, and they have the nature of outflow. 'Actual reality is only the dharma [element]': the unconditioned is called 'actual reality' because it is not shifted by the four characteristics and its entity is solid and real. This is subsumed under the dharma element; therefore, only the dharma element is exclusively called 'having actual reality'.

2.47

'Momentary are only the last three': mind, dharmas, and mental consciousness are called 'the last three'. Only these three elements have a single moment: namely, at the first moment of the path of vision, in the category of the patience with the dharma of suffering, there is only this one single moment of mind that ultimately does not arise from a cause of similar species; because it is not an outflow, it is called 'a single moment'. Other conditioned dharmas are all outflows. The mind associated with the patience with suffering is called the mind element and the mental consciousness element: looking toward the subsequent, it is called 'mind'; looking toward the antecedent, it is called 'mental consciousness'. The dharmas arising together with feeling and the rest are called the 'dharma element'.

2.48

From here below is the fifteenth, the section on acquisition and possession. According to the Sarvāstivāda school, if acquisition reaches the characteristic of arising, it is called 'acquisition' (prāpti); if acquisition reaches the present, it is called 'possession' (samanvāgama). At the time of possession, it is not called acquisition; at the time of acquisition, it is not called possession. As for 'the characteristic of arising', it is in the future. The treatise says: 'Thus has been explained being born of maturation and the rest. Now one should deliberate: if one does not possess the eye element previously and now acquires possession of it, does one also [acquire possession of] the eye-consciousness element? If one does not possess the eye-consciousness element previously and now acquires possession of it, does one also [acquire possession of] the eye element? Questions such as these should now be briefly answered.' The verse says:

2.49

'The eye and the eye-consciousness elements / Are acquired singly, together, neither, and so forth.'

2.50

Explanation: Eye and eye-consciousness are differentiated by four alternatives. In 'singly, together, acquired, neither, and so forth', 'singly' refers to the two simple alternatives; 'acquired together' refers to the alternative of both; 'neither' refers to the alternative of neither; 'and so forth' clarifies the four alternatives of possessing and not possessing. First, the first simple alternative within 'singly' means acquiring the eye but not acquiring consciousness: that is, being born in the desire realm and gradually acquiring the eye faculty. The words 'gradually acquiring the eye' are intended to indicate the womb-born, egg-born, and moisture-born; for if one is apparitionally born, the faculties are acquired simultaneously. Generally speaking, the eye faculty is a neutral result of maturation, acquired exclusively simultaneously with dharmas; therefore, in terms of gradual acquisition, it is merely called acquiring the eye. Eye-consciousness admits of the three moral natures, and there is acquisition both before and after, as well as together. Previously, in the intermediate state, eye-consciousness had already arisen. Now, this gradual acquisition of the eye faculty is after taking rebirth. Because consciousness was possessed previously, it is not called 'acquisition'. And when one dies in the formless realm and is born in the second, third, or fourth dhyānas (when born in the second, third, or fourth dhyānas, the intermediate state at its initial arising has only the eye faculty and no eye-consciousness; because eye-consciousness has not yet arisen, it is not called 'acquisition'). The second simple alternative is acquiring consciousness but not acquiring the eye: that is, having already been born in the stages of the second, third, or fourth dhyānas, eye-consciousness presently arises. ('Presently' means right now; 'arises' means is born. Consciousness at the characteristic of arising is called 'presently arising'. This consciousness that arises is at the phase of the characteristic of arising, right in the future; at that time it is called 'acquisition'. Its eye faculty is in the present, which is called 'possession' and not 'acquisition'.) The third alternative, 'both', means acquiring both the faculty and consciousness: that is, when one dies in the formless realm and is born into the desire realm or the Brahmā world. At the initial moment of the intermediate state in the desire realm and the Brahmā world, both faculty and consciousness exist; at that time it is called 'acquisition'. The fourth alternative, 'neither', refers to states other than the aforesaid.

2.51

The verse says 'and so forth' to include the four alternatives of possession. The first alternative is possessing the eye faculty but not possessing eye-consciousness: that is, being born in the stages of the second, third, or fourth dhyānas when eye-consciousness does not arise. The second alternative is possessing eye-consciousness but not possessing the eye faculty: that is, being born in the desire realm not having yet acquired the eye faculty, or having acquired it and then lost it. That is, being born in the desire realm, one necessarily possesses consciousness, because the dharmas of that stage are possessed. 'Not having yet acquired the faculty' refers to the time of initial conception in the womb; 'having acquired it and then lost it' refers to a person who is blind after birth. Since they have no eye faculty, they do not possess it. The third alternative means being born in the desire realm, having acquired the eye without losing it, and being born in the Brahmā world; or if born in the second, third, or fourth dhyāna, when directly seeing visible form, both faculty and consciousness are possessed. The fourth alternative refers to states other than the aforesaid.

2.52

From here is the sixteenth, the section on internal and external. The treatise says: 'Among the eighteen elements, how many are internal? How many are external?' The verse says:

2.53

'Twelve are internal: the eye and the rest; / The six, visible form and the rest, are external.'

2.54

Explanation: Twelve are internal: the six faculties and the six consciousnesses. Because these twelve elements are the bases of mind, and the bases are close and intimate, they are said to be 'internal'. The six objects—visible form and the rest—are the objective supports of mind; and because the objective supports are distant and mediated, they are said to be 'external'.

2.55

From here is the seventeenth, the section on sharing the same function and not sharing the same function. The treatise says: 'Among the eighteen elements, how many share the same function? How many do not share the same function?' The verse says:

2.56

'Dharmas share the same function; the remaining are both, / Operating or not operating in their own activity.'

2.57

Explanation: 'Dharmas share the same function': 'dharmas' refers to the dharma element (dharmadhātu). In this dharma element, there is only sharing the same function (sabhāga); there is no not sharing the same function (tat-sabhāga). Speaking generally of the six objects being called 'sharing the same function': they definitely serve as the objective support for the consciousness capable of apprehending them. 'Definitely' has two meanings. First: like the five objects, visible form and the rest, they definitely serve as objective supports for consciousness, which is called 'definitely'; that is, the five consciousnesses are called 'definite' because they apprehend objects without confusion. Now, these five objects obtain the name 'definite' because they definitely serve as objective supports for the five consciousnesses; when the five consciousnesses apprehend them, they are said to 'share the same function'. Although they are apprehended by mental consciousness, because it is not definite, they are not 'sharing the same function'. Second: the object of dharmas is called 'definite' because its very substance is definite, being apprehended exclusively by mental consciousness, which is determinate. Because it is definitely apprehended by mental consciousness, it is called 'sharing the same function' in relation to mental consciousness. The treatise says: 'There is no single dharma element among them for which boundless mental consciousness has not already arisen, is not presently arising, or will not arise.' Therefore, this dharma element is constantly called 'sharing the same function'. (Boundless mental consciousness is the contemplation of non-self, because the objects it apprehends are boundless. 'Has already arisen, is presently arising, or will arise' means already arisen in the past, presently arising in the present, and to arise in the future.) 'The remaining are both': that is, the remaining seventeen elements all have both sharing the same function and not sharing the same function. If they perform their own activity, they are called 'sharing the same function'; if they do not perform their own activity, they are called 'not sharing the same function'. Regarding 'performing their own activity': 'activity' means active function. As with the six faculties and six consciousnesses, they are called 'performing their own active function' in terms of being capable of grasping their objects; if they are incapable of grasping their objects, they are called 'not performing their own activity'. The five objects, visible form and the rest, are called 'performing their own activity' in terms of serving as objects; not serving as objects is called 'not performing their own activity'. Here, the eye faculty, in relation to visible form that can be seen, has seen, is presently seeing, or will see, is called an eye that shares the same function. To explain extensively in this manner, down to the mind faculty, each should be spoken of as its own active function in relation to the object of its own activity. An eye that does not share the same function is of only four kinds: namely, not seeing visible form, having already ceased, presently ceasing, to cease in the future, and dharmas that will not arise. Just as the eye has four kinds, down to the body element there are also four kinds; this should be understood by analogy with the eye. The mind that does not share the same function is of only one kind: namely, dharmas that will not arise; since a mind that arises necessarily shares the same function, only that which does not arise is called 'not sharing the same function'. The form element that has been seen, is presently seen, or will be seen by the eye is called visible form that shares the same function. Visible form that does not share the same function is of only four kinds: namely, not seen by the eye, having already ceased, presently ceasing, to cease in the future, and dharmas that will not arise. Just as it is for visible form, down to the tangible object it should be known to be likewise: sharing the same function is of three kinds, and not sharing the same function is of four kinds. The six consciousnesses, the eye[-consciousness] and the rest, have three kinds of sharing the same function: already arisen, presently arising, and to arise. Therefore, their not sharing the same function is of one kind, being exclusively dharmas that will not arise, just as explained for the mind element.

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