瑜伽論記 14

English (machine translation) 14

Language: English

Among the ten sections, the seventh explains the meaning of karma, which resolves the visible forms that manifest within the objective domain of the eye consciousness, the sounds within the objective domain of the ear consciousness, and intention (cetanā) among the associates of the mental consciousness; it may also be understood as resolving the mental factor of intention associated as a companion to all six consciousnesses, because intention is the nature of karma in all cases. In this there are two parts: first, clarifying the three natures and the three karmas; second, clarifying the three karmas of non-restraint and so forth. In the former, it first distinguishes the characteristics of karma, and then clarifies whether they are nominal or real.

14.4

Regarding 'Furthermore, what is expressive karma (vijñapti-karma)? It is briefly of three kinds', etc.: Jing supplements what was missing, saying: Among these three expressive karmas, bodily and vocal karma—if their essences are identified according to the objective aspect (nimittabhāga)—means that visible form and sound produced by intention of the three natures are the essences of bodily and vocal karma; as for mental karma, taking the fundamental intention simultaneous with body and speech is the essence of mental karma. If one sets aside the objective aspect and identifies the essence in terms of the subjective aspect (darśanabhāga), then taking the fundamental intention that relies on the portals of body and speech is called bodily and vocal expressive karma, while the preliminary preparatory intention is called mental expressive karma. As for non-expressive karma (avijñapti-karma): in the desire realm, whether wholesome or unwholesome karma, when identifying the essence of the three karmas either according to the objective aspect or according to the subjective aspect, the seeds perfumed by that karma continuously hold back [their opposites]—as good holds back evil, or evil holds back good—and are nominally designated as manifest activity. As long as the initial undertaking is not yet expired, such karma-seeds progressively increase at every moment, and this is called 'possessing karma'. If the limit of their momentum has passed or the aspiration has ceased, and the karma-seeds no longer increase, this is called 'relinquishing karma'. As for the discipline of the path and absorption (anāsrava- and dhyāna-saṃvara), seven branches of non-expressive [action] are nominally established solely in terms of the associated intention and mind arising in a single thought-moment, because a single thought-moment can depart from the faults of the seven branches. For both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna teachings state that the discipline of the path and absorption arises and perishes in accordance with the mind and is not permanently continuous; if one were to establish the discipline of the path and absorption in terms of seeds, there would be the fault of permanent continuity, and one could not say that it arises and perishes in accordance with the mind. As for the pure discipline of a bodhisattva, bodily, vocal, and mental expressive actions have their essence identified either in terms of the objective aspect or the subjective aspect as described above; while non-expressive karma is based on the karma-seeds, which, in accordance with the original vow, once received, progressively increase all the way to bodhi.

14.5

Next, explaining their names: Bodily and vocal actions as the objective aspect have visible form and sound as their essence; when arising from action, they express the intention's joy, anger, and such matters—thus using the objective aspect to express the subjective aspect, which is also called using the characteristic to express the essence. Hence the Śataśāstra says: 'Like a fish swimming submerged, which stirs the waves and thereby expresses itself.' Mental expressive karma cannot express itself to others; it only expresses and clearly cognizes its own object-domain. Now, bodily and vocal expressive karmas are named after their ability to express through body and speech, whereas mental expressive karma takes associated cognition of the object as its cause. As for non-expressive karma, it has two meanings: First, in terms of manifest body and speech, according to their wholesomeness or unwholesomeness, they express by their characteristics, and their self-nature expresses itself, so it is called expressive karma; but with respect to a different nature, they cannot express each other, so it is also called non-expressive—just as the good does not express the evil, and the evil does not express the good. Second, karma-nature is nominally established in terms of the bodily and vocal karma-seeds; because they cannot express good, evil, and such matters, they are called non-expressive. The discipline of the path and absorption arises and perishes based on the mind; because it cannot express anything according to matters, it is called non-expressive karma. Here, only expressive karma is discussed, while non-expressive is omitted; yet in principle it must exist, because seeds exist. As for mental expressive karma: with respect to expressing and cognizing its own domain, it is called expressive karma, taking its function as its name; because good and evil natures are different, good does not express on behalf of evil and evil does not express on behalf of good, so it is also called non-expressive. If mental non-expressive karma is established in terms of seeds: although manifest activity is nominally established in terms of seeds, it cannot clearly express any object-domain, and is therefore called mental non-expressive [karma]. Ji says: Following this fascicle below, after explaining the two unconditioned dharmas such as space, it concludes: 'Such twenty-four non-associated formations and so forth are all conventionally existent.' Looking at the flow of the text, it concurrently summarizes everything from the fifty-second fascicle onward. The seeds at the end of the previous fascicle and this karma are all implicit objections, meaning that the preceding non-associated formations were proven to be nominally existent. Previously it was asked whether seeds are nominal or real; having clarified the nominality or reality of seeds, karma is established and clarified upon seeds. Even if seeds are provisionally established, the preceding non-associated formations are not yet exhausted, and therefore the non-conceptual absorption and so forth are established upon seeds. Hence below karma, it clarifies the three non-associated formations such as the non-conceptual absorption, and then resolves the meaning of karmapath from the eighth fascicle of the root treatise. That belonged to the stage with investigation and reflection, whereas this is the mental stage, so it is not a direct resolution.

14.6

Regarding the passage stating: "If it is in terms of the ten unwholesome paths of action of body, speech, and mind...", Jing says: The first seven are both actions and paths, whereas the latter three—covetousness, malice, and wrong view—are paths but not actions. Why then does it state here that the three actions of body, speech, and mind are called the ten unwholesome paths of action?

14.7

The explanation is: Here it speaks based on the mental action being simultaneously conjoined with covetousness, malice, and wrong view; therefore it says, "the ten unwholesome paths of action of body, speech, and mind." In terms of principle, mental volition is not the latter three paths, because volitional action is action and not path. Regarding "not separated from": this means one is accompanied by and not separated from the karmic seeds. Regarding "due to the predominant force of active manifestation, etc.": because of the predominant force of these seeds toward that active manifestation, all defiled manifest actions of body and speech are brought into being.

14.8

Bei says: Because one has not become separated from what is countered by the noble path, it says "not separated from." The current explanation is slightly different: because below, in explaining wholesome action, it states "vowing to undertake detachment from them," one knows that "not separated from active manifestation" here means not being detached from the ten unwholesome [paths].

14.9

Regarding the passage from "If one precisely in relation to them..." up to "is called wholesome manifest action": Jing says: Since it says that one vows to undertake detachment from manifest actions of body and speech, that means one has not yet initiated body or speech and only has volitional aspiration; how then does it get the name "manifest action of body and speech"?

14.10

The explanation is: If it is considered in terms of active wholesome practice, then at that time there are no actions of body and speech. If it is considered in terms of restraining wholesome practice, then at that time they do exist. Because at the time of vowing and undertaking, within a single volitional thought there is the sense of detachment from the seven faults of body and speech, this volitional thought is named wholesome action of body and speech; therefore there is no fault.

14.11

Regarding the passage from "If all tracks of deportment..." up to "is called indeterminate manifest action": Ji and others say: This conforms to the Sarvāstivāda doctrine. Saying "one part" means: among the four sensory data of deportment and the five sensory data of arts and crafts, only body and speech are taken; hence it says "one part." Now in the Mahāyāna, this applies to the three natures; here indeterminate is taken, excluding wholesome and unwholesome, hence it says "one part." These are all arisen from preparation, unlike mind born of karmic maturation which cannot initiate action. If so, minds of magical transformation can also initiate action, so why are they not discussed? Now in Mahāyāna: if it is for benefit and joy, one should know it is wholesome and thus belongs to the category of the wholesome; if it is for amusement, one should know it is indeterminate and thus belongs to the category of deportment and the like, so it is omitted and not discussed.

14.12

Regarding the passage from "If there is one who does not wish to manifest to others..." up to "is called mental manifestation": Jing says: This generally explains the mental actions of the three natures. When one does not wish to show it to others, but merely within one's own internal mind a mind of the three natures arises and manifests cognitive clarity toward the preceding phenomena, it is called mental manifest action.

14.13

Tai says: A subsequent volition manifests the preceding volition; therefore it is called mental manifest action. Ji says: While the two kinds—body and speech—manifest to others, the mind manifests only to oneself. For example, when initiating actions of body and speech, there must be a mental manifestation that knows "I am doing such an act," and so forth; thus the mind that manifests cognition prior to subsequently doing this act is both manifest action; it is called mental manifest action.

14.14

Ce says: What is done by the cognitive aspect is known by self-awareness; what is done by self-awareness is known by self-awareness of self-awareness; and so on, up to what is done by self-awareness of self-awareness is known by self-awareness. Because it is known solely within, internal volitional deliberation is called mental manifest action.

14.15

From here below, it next clarifies the nominal and the real. Jing says: This refutes the Hinayāna clinging that within a single instant bodily action has movement, which is its real action. Here, action of the body is nominally designated in terms of the continuum where this ceases and that arises; because there is no movement in a single thought-moment, there is no real action. This is stated in terms of the sense-faculty form of the image aspect of the fundamental consciousness ceasing here and arising there, in order to refute the external attachments. The mental consciousness's reflection follows the basic matter as indeterminate. Ji says: Because the masters of the Saṃmatīya school hold that the continuum of material dharmas throughout one period of the four characteristics has distinct moving form which is called bodily manifestation, it is now refuted: Moments perish and arise in succession, ceasing in this place and arising in another place; it is not that within a single real dharma without arising and ceasing it does not perish here and can go there. The expansion, contraction, and so forth among the quality category of the Vaiśeṣikas are also held to have real substance; they are now refuted together. If it is the Sarvāstivāda: although they lack moving form, they hold there is a separate action-form; for instance, when expanding and contracting, a separate action-form arises. Here it is not so: there is only the karmically matured, indeterminate physical body transformed and arisen in this place through the power of volition, and not a separate action-form; therefore it says that there is only the body ceasing in another place, and so forth.

14.16

Regarding "there are only spoken sounds, which are called vocal manifest action": this excludes the Sarvāstivāda position that sound itself is vocal action. Here it says there are only spoken sounds; initiated by volitional action, they are called vocal manifest action, whose substance is purely indeterminate, unlike the Hinayāna where the substance of the action extends to the three natures. Regarding "there is only initiating mind and formative volition, which are called mental manifest action": this states that volition is taken as mental action; mental action also initiates body and speech, taking volition as action; action is form but is nominally designated, not that there is a separate form called action, etc.

14.17

Regarding the passage from "Why is that?..." up to "is not reasonable": this refutes the Saṃmatīya and others. One should first establish that momentariness exists; only then can one refute the absence of movement. One should first set up a syllogism: All material sensory data and the like must perish momentarily, because they are subsumed under the form aggregate, just like the flame of a lamp or the sound of a bell. The flame of a lamp and the sound of a bell are mutually accepted by others. Only then does one set up the syllogism: There is no form reaching this place that travels to another place, because it perishes momentarily, like the flame of a lamp, etc. This reason of "momentary perishing" is then fully established.

14.18

Regarding "Furthermore, apart from the mere arising of conditioned formations, any other real activity is unapprehendable by eye, ear, or mind": this also refutes the Saṃmatīya's real activity of movement, and also refutes the Sarvāstivāda's real activity of the atomic nature of action-form. It also refutes the real nature of the action category of the Vaiśeṣikas. Now it is negated generally, saying: there is no distinct real activity, just as the three actions apprehended by eye, ear, and mind are all unapprehendable. Although their movement and action-form are apprehended by the eye and so on, it incurs the fallacy of being unestablished for one party, because here the eye consciousness and the like are not admitted to apprehend them. The syllogism is: The movement, action-form, and so forth that you assert to exist apart from conditioned formations are definitely unapprehendable by eye, ear, and mind, because they are not known by either of the two means of valid cognition—perception and inference—like a rabbit's horns. Although mental action extends to the three natures, it takes the meaning of volitional formative activity as manifesting cognitive clarity, and so forth.

14.19

Below, the three actions of non-restraint and the like are clarified, and the text is divided into four: first, clarifying the actions of evil restraint; second, clarifying the actions of wholesome restraint; third, clarifying intermediate actions; fourth, re-examining them through questions and answers. In the first there are two: first, setting forth the causes and conditions; later, distinguishing the essential nature.

14.20

In the first: Question: Why is wholesome restraint immediately a path of action, whereas unwholesome restraint is called a path of action only when it subsequently arises as intermediate? The Tripiṭaka Master says: Because wholesome restraint is restraining the wholesome, it immediately constitutes a path of action. Jing says: The essential nature of evil restraint is precisely using the ten unwholesome paths and evil volitional aspirations, being constantly conjoined with lack of faith, indolence, forgetfulness, distraction, and faulty awareness, taking these as its essence.

14.21

Explaining its name: The substance of action capable of inducing painful fruition is called evil; the precepts of evil are called evil restraint.

14.22

Explaining according to the text: Saying "possessing discrimination" excludes deranged persons. This speaks of being born into a family of non-restraint and obtaining non-restraint through vowing to undertake the task; it differs from the Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya where being born into a family of non-restraint, merely killing one living being entails obtaining non-restraint without necessarily requiring the vow to undertake the task; if born into another family, one must undertake the task.

14.23

Regarding the passage "Moreover, toward this livelihood task, repeatedly giving rise to a mind of desire, delight, and approval, etc.": only when having initially undertaken the task one repeatedly approves it does it constitute non-restraint.

14.24

Below, explaining the meaning of repeated approval and acceptance, "Because it is subsumed under non-restraint, etc.": as the Tripiṭaka Master says, when initially undertaking the task, one only accomplishes the six [afflictions] such as lack of faith on the mental stage, as well as all seeds of the preliminary steps of the seven branches such as killing; being able to generate the fundamental paths of action later, they are called unwholesome roots—it is not that covetousness and the like are called unwholesome roots; later, when confronting conditions and practicing killing, stealing, and the like, one gradually accomplishes intermediate killing and so on. It can also be further explained: initially taking wrong volition and the six such as lack of faith as conditions to undertake the task initiates and increases the fundamental karmic seeds of killing and so forth in the ālayavijñāna. At that time, it is called accomplishing the fundamental non-restraint actions of killing and so forth. Regarding "Like one born in a family of non-restraint, so it is with anyone whatsoever, etc.": by analogy, if one born in another family accepts the vow and performs the acts, all are called one who abides in [non-]restraint. Regarding the text below from "this person, up to...": this means that until one obtains the counteraction, it grows thought-moment by thought-moment; that is, from the seeds of the ten unwholesome paths of action, in the next moment they increase to twenty, in the third moment they increase to thirty, and so on up to infinity. Ji says: If born in a family of non-restraint, possessing discrimination, one generates a vowed aspiration oneself, saying "I will use this livelihood task, etc.": this corresponds to the "originating restraint" among the eight restraints, and the rest below are matched one by one. Now in Mahāyāna, even if born in a family of non-restraint, from the point of possessing discrimination onward, it is accomplished only when one generates a vowed aspiration oneself. If one does not vow, contravening the previous intention of one's parents, thinking "I will not do this task," then it is not non-restraint. Restraint means rule, hence it is called non-restraint; it is not that an evil rule is called non-restraint, but that this is its essential name, similar to evil śīla. Now, according to the drift of this text, merely initially giving rise to the mind and vowing to act is not subsumed under non-restraint; it must be repeatedly generated before it is accomplished.

14.25

The current explanation: The prior state constitutes the path of preparation, which is accomplished but not yet determined and still light; thereafter, repeatedly generating the mind is of middling grade, which is the uninterrupted path; later, if one actually performs this task, it becomes superior grade, separately acting to initiate non-manifest [action].

14.26

However, according to the treatise: although non-manifest [action] of body and speech is accomplished, it is only subsumed under the three unwholesome roots of the mind, because through the mind the seven non-manifest branches of body and speech are accomplished. The treatise says: one only accomplishes vast unwholesome roots; later, if one performs the deed, it immediately initiates manifest and non-manifest [action]; the non-manifest initiated by this mind does not belong to body and speech. But because the treatise does not say that unwholesome roots are accomplished, once the deed is performed later, it is then subsumed under body and speech. Furthermore, merely accomplishing the mental unwholesome roots is named non-restraint, not accomplishing the seven paths of action consisting of form; the seven paths of action consisting of form are accomplished when the act is performed again, and are also not called non-restraint, unlike the Sarvāstivāda which calls them intermediate paths of action.

14.27

Regarding "One should know that demerit increases continuously": this also means that moment by moment the seven branches double; therefore it is said to increase continuously.

14.28

Next, distinguishing the essential nature: Jing says: Here, when the six dharmas such as wrong vow are directly present, they are taken as the undertaking; being able to receive the karmic seeds of the paths of action in the fundamental consciousness, they are called capable of initiating those actions. In the Abhidharma, there are four conditions for relinquishing; now in Mahāyāna, throughout the texts one only sees conditions for relinquishing wholesome precepts, and has not seen a text for relinquishing evil restraint; in terms of principle there are three conditions, excluding the arising of both sexual characteristics. Bei says: The ten unwholesome paths of action, the three unwholesome roots, and the six such as lack of faith are the essence of evil precepts; the text is brief and does not differentiate them. He also says: In intermediate action there are two: first, undertaking manifest and non-manifest, which is undertaking action and initiating action; second, accompanying manifest and non-manifest, which is active manifestation arisen from seeds. Ji says: Strictly defining the essential nature, it is merely nominally established upon the seeds of evil volition. Here, taking what is contrary to the five faculties as predominant, it speaks of lack of faith and the like; in reality, ten dharmas always operate together, up to wrong desire, wrong resolve, etc. This volition is precisely the volition capable of initiating action, like the second, originating restraint, among the eight restraints below. The above concerns non-restraint. A single period of mental commitment constitutes its time of completion: meaning that until it is relinquished, the seven branches continuously increase. The time of relinquishment refers to four occasions: receiving precepts, end of life, obtaining concentration, and the arising of both sexual characteristics. Now in Mahāyāna, even without receiving precepts, the ritual of vowing to relinquish is also called relinquishment; hence there are five occasions. Therefore the treatise says: "Up to the point where this volition is not relinquished, it is called non-restraint," which makes it clear that relinquishing the mental action of volition also relinquishes non-restraint.

14.29

Regarding the expression “bad moral discipline” (duḥśīla): śīla means cool and refreshing. Because one who performs evil detests what is cool and refreshing, it is called “bad moral discipline”; it is not that the evil essence itself is śīla. An earlier objection stated: “If one explains the precepts as guarding against wrongs, there are precepts that do not guard against wrongs, etc.” This [objection] does not understand the designation; if one explains it as we do now, there is no fault, just as with the name “non-restraint” (asaṃvara). Another objection stated: “The evil essence is not śīla, but because one who performs evil detests śīla, it is called bad śīla; by the same token, the essence of view would not be bad, but because one who performs evil detests that view, it would be called bad view.” The explanation is: “view” means discernment, and both good and bad discernments are called views; śīla means cool and refreshing, and the evil essence is not cool and refreshing, so it cannot be made parallel to “view.”

14.30

Next, clarifying good restraint (saṃvara). The text has five divisions: first, explaining the good by contrast with the bad; second, distinguishing differences; third, clarifying the essential nature; fourth, clarifying the enumerated categories; fifth, distinguishing by question and answer.

14.31

“Contrariwise, it follows and proceeds in corresponding fashion”: this is the first [division]. Ji says: The essential nature of restraint is also conjoined with good volition, and also takes five mental factors; strictly speaking, its essence is nominally established solely on the seeds of volition. Now, according to the text of the Great Vehicle, it also takes the ten paths of good action and the five aggregates of volition as its essence.

14.32

Next, the section distinguishing differences has two parts: first, clarifying differences; later, distinguishing by question and answer.

14.33

“One who is capable of receiving it can then receive it”: first, having the [proper] physical basis; second, having aspiration and revulsion in the mind regarding worldly transcendence. In bad restraint, it is not like this, hence there is a difference. “Or restraint is received from others or by oneself, or again there are some who receive it purely spontaneously, except for the bhikṣu restraint, etc.”: Jing says: “By oneself or from others” is a general statement, commonly clarifying the seven assemblies and the day-and-night precepts. “Or received purely by oneself, except for the bhikṣu restraint” generally subsumes what is received by the seven assemblies and the day-and-night precepts into three kinds: the five renunciant assemblies are collectively called the bhikṣu restraint, while among the householders there are the upāsakas and the upavāsas. Now it is clarified that upāsakas and upavāsas may have the principle of receiving by oneself, whereas the five renunciant assemblies must receive from others. “Because not all are capable of receiving it”: because it cannot be received by paṇḍakas and the like. Under “If the bhikṣu...”, it inversely challenges the opponent regarding the timing of the arising of the precepts: namely, among the five renunciant assemblies, the two assemblies [of bhikṣus and bhikṣuṇīs] obtain the precepts upon the conclusion of the third karmavācanā. The śrāmaṇeras, śrāmaṇerīs, and the two householder assemblies obtain the precepts upon receiving the three refuges. The two renunciant assemblies must receive from others because they are subsumed under bhikṣus; the two householder assemblies may receive spontaneously, and they likewise obtain the precepts upon receiving the three refuges. The bodhisattva precepts admit of being received spontaneously across the board, subsuming all precepts entirely; if one later goes forth from the household, one must receive from others. Here, the precepts of the two vehicles are being clarified, so they are received from others. Ce says: “From others or by oneself” distinguishes obtaining from others; “purely received spontaneously” distinguishes purifying one’s own mind, receiving without relying on a preceptor.

14.34

Next, distinguishing by question and answer. As for “the two kinds of factors of accompanying protection, namely shame (hrī) and remorse (apatrāpya)”: Ji says: Shame is able to receive by oneself, while remorse refers to [receiving] from others. However, both operate together; yet based on what is predominant, at one time there may be one or lack the second, but that does not mean one is completely absent. If one receives the precepts from others, seven factors are generated by body, such as going to the teacher’s dwelling, or seven factors are generated by speech, such as uttering words to request the teacher. If received spontaneously, there is only mental informative action (vijñapti); here, body and speech do not serve as the preliminary means, but solely mind serves as the preliminary means to receive and obtain the seven uninformative [actions] (avijñapti) of body and speech. Question: In that case, is there an uninformative [action] that does not arise from an informative [action], because there is no body and speech, and the mind itself accomplishes the informative [action]? If so, when receiving by oneself, how could bowing to the Buddha and speaking words not be informative actions? The present explanation is: uninformative [action] is said to lack body and speech because it does not make it known to others, not that there are no bodily and vocal actions of one's own. Therefore, it also arises from informative [actions], just as sending another to execute a task, or speech and the like, serves as an informative manifestation of the body and so forth; thus body and speech can mutually inform each other. Furthermore, these are based on general liturgical procedures: just as one who is gravely ill cannot move the body or utter speech, yet though receiving from another, there is also an uninformative [action] not arisen from an informative [action]; or generating an aspiration by oneself consists solely of uninformative [action]; hence this analysis is made.

14.35

Ce says: The two dharmas of the factors of accompanying protection, shame and remorse, may be complete or incomplete, hence one receives from others. If one has shame, one necessarily has remorse, and thus receives by oneself; if one has remorse, one does not necessarily have shame, and therefore such a person cannot receive by oneself, but must rely on others to arouse remorse and obtain the precepts; for such a person, it is prescribed to receive from others. As for “equal without difference”: although the two modes of reception differ, they both equally possess the five factors.

14.36

From “If the volition of renunciation...” onwards is the third [division], clarifying the essential nature. First, it clarifies the six dharmas as the essence of restraint. Ce says: On the volition of renunciation, informative action is nominally designated; informative action and the faculties operate simultaneously, which is called restraint.

14.37

Next, it clarifies that taking these six dharmas as causes and co-arising factors generates the ten paths of good action, which constitute good restraint. Jing says: The three types—small portion, large portion, and full portion—of renouncing the ten bad actions make thirty goods. Among higher, middling, and lower bad actions, renouncing only the lower grade is called a small portion; if one renounces both lower and middling grades, it is called a large portion; if one fully renounces all three grades, it is called a full portion.

14.38

Next, the thirty practices are distinguished according to time; the last four are practicing oneself, exhorting others, praising the essence of that practice, and rejoicing in the practitioner. “The measure of merit generated should be known to be likewise”: from the preceding one hundred practices, one hundred merits are generated. Ji says: Regarding “one portion, etc.”, this is the same as the Sautrāntikas, where upon receiving one or two precepts, the precepts are also generated. Bad restraint and the like are also like this: vowing to receive for one time is also called bad restraint; if one directly practices killing without a vow, it is merely called intermediate. Receiving distinctively at distinct times is collectively called having ten. Here one asks: What is the difference between full renunciation, etc., and a short time, etc., such that it is said there are one hundred precepts up to the ten for one's whole life? And how does receiving oneself differ from instructing others? Explanation: Because the objects and aspirations of the mind differ. However, herein are three positions: the first three positions concern the matter, the next three positions concern time, and the last four positions concern the person; but regarding the third in the last group, one's own speech is divided into two.

14.39

In the fourth [division], clarifying the enumerated categories of precepts, first it directly clarifies that there are eight restraints, and later subsumes the eight into three.

14.40

In the former, it first cites the number and lists the names, and later distinguishes them in sequence.

14.41

Jing says: 1. That which is able to initiate refers to the preliminary means of receiving the precepts; 2. that which subsumes and receives refers to the actual reception of the precepts—these two clarify reception. 3. That which guards and protects refers to diligent dedication without violation; 4. that which brings back refers to being able to repent after violating—these two clarify upholding. The lower, middling, and higher three apply commonly to both reception and upholding. The single purity applies commonly to dhyāna and the path: concentration is the first, and the path is the second; hence it says below, “drawn by the power of the first and second purities.” That the arhat is superior not on account of the superiority of what is counteracted is because there is nothing left to sever. Ji says: Regarding “śīla without remorse, etc.”, as the seventh chapter of the Prakaraṇāryavācā says: Because śīla is accomplished, there is no remorse; because of no remorse, delight arises; because delight arises, the mind is joyful; because the mind is joyful, the body is at ease; because the body is at ease, one experiences bliss; because one experiences bliss, the mind becomes concentrated; because the mind is concentrated, one contemplates according to reality; because one contemplates according to reality, revulsion arises; because revulsion arises, one is freed from desire; because one is freed from desire, one is liberated. Because one is liberated, one knows oneself: “I have realized liberation, my rebirths are exhausted, etc.” [This refers to] the meditative restraint (dhyānasaṃvara).

14.42

Here there are only the four fundamental [dhyānas]; as the eighth fascicle of the Abhidharma[samuccaya] briefly states, material restraint precepts are not established in the formless realm. Texts such as the Prakaraṇāryavācā state that the formless also has precepts concurrent with concentration. However, whether cultivating within the desire realm or generating the path of seeing, all serve as distal counteragents; here, in accordance with the logical approach, the formless is not spoken of, and in the unarrived dhyāna there is also an uninterrupted path, which is omitted without discussion. If it is uncontaminated: for one who previously attained dhyāna, relying on the five stages to enter seeing and attain the fruit of non-returner, obtaining the precepts of the path of seeing, the uninterrupted path serves as the counteragent to the bad paths of action and the like, while the subsequent path of liberation up to the non-learner, viewed in relation to the bad precepts of the path of seeing, is called a distal counteragent. In the case of the path of cultivation, the subtle faults in the body of an ārya, according to whatever stage they rely on, in the nine grades of the uninterrupted path, viewed in relation to what is to be severed, are called the path of counteraction, and the path of liberation is also called a distal counteragent. However, the Great Vehicle nowadays further compresses the nine stages of the three realms, severing them in nine grades from the first fruit directly to the non-learner; in that severance of afflictions, depending on whatever stage one relies on, one takes the nine grades of the uninterrupted path as the path of counteraction, and the remaining stages are called distal counteragents, with the sole exception of the peak of existence and intermediate dhyāna. This is based on a learner who initially attains the third fruit, where, having severed the defilements, they are superior because of the severance of what is to be severed. If one gradually severs from the third fruit onwards, it is likewise; it is only due to the superiority of the counteragent that one attains the counteragent of the non-learner. If one severed the nine grades of the three realms abruptly, until one has attained the uninterrupted path of the non-learner, it is always superior because of the severance of what is to be severed; only the non-learner is superior because of the superiority of the counteragent. As for entering the path of seeing: here, based on the four fundamental [dhyānas], the method for a leaping practitioner is formulated, while in the unarrived dhyāna, the method for a person of the first fruit is formulated; in fact, the unarrived dhyāna also attains the fruit of leaping, obtaining the seven mental orientations, and relying on the unarrived one attains the fruit of non-returner. The seventh mental orientation of the culmination of preliminary practice necessarily enters the fundamental [dhyāna]; here the discussion is based on the fulfillment of the fruit. This treatise discusses leaping; just as with a sequential person, in the formless stage one can also sever the seeds of precept violation of the desire realm.

14.43

The Tripiṭaka Master says: To say that the path of seeing relies on the six stages and universally includes the intermediate [dhyāna] is incorrect. Only among the six clear observations do three rely on five, generated excluding the intermediate dhyāna. Although texts elsewhere say there is uncontaminated [dharma], yet because the dwelling of the Brahmā king is largely distracted, just as with the peak of existence, although there is uncontaminated [dharma], it does not accomplish the severance of afflictions, as is widely distinguished elsewhere. However, regarding these precepts concurrent with concentration and the path, the Tripiṭaka Master says: They are established upon the active volition concurrent with the path of seeing, because they are called form that conforms to the mind.

14.44

Question: How can active volition be the essence of the precept concurrent with concentration? Someone says: Established upon its seeds, it should be established upon the seeds of volition in the preceding path of preliminary practice, just as the volition generating the prātimokṣa precept takes the volition of the preceding preliminary practice to determine the karma. This does not constitute an explanation: since the preliminary practices prior to concentration and the path are neither the precepts of concentration nor of the path, but are scattered minds or bound to other stages and realms, how could the essence of the precept be determined according to the preliminary practice?

14.45

It should only be established according to the volition concurrent with concentration and the path. Ce says: In the restraint of guarding and protecting, there are two explanations. One explanation: Good volition together with the five faculties is called guarding and protecting; because it can protect restraint, it is called restraint, though its essence is not restraint. Another explanation: Because it is guarded and protected by the essence of the precept, it is called guarding and protecting.

14.46

Subsuming the eight into three. As for “reception and upholding”: the two precepts of receiving and following have informative and uninformative aspects, as detailed in the Vinaya school.

14.47

Below, the fifth part, distinguishing by question and answer, has six topics: first, subsuming the seven assemblies and the day-and-night precepts into three kinds; second, clarifying how many factors the three precepts possess; third, clarifying how many precepts are prescribed for the two assemblies of men and women; fourth, clarifying that novices must abandon gold and silver; fifth, clarifying the differences in expanding and combining the eight and ten precepts regarding renouncing singing, dancing, perfumes, and flower garlands; sixth, clarifying the disallowance of ṣaṇḍhas and the like from receiving the renunciant precepts.

14.48

In the first [topic], regarding “renouncing evil conduct and sensual conduct”: Jing says: Renouncing drinking alcohol, eating past noon, singing, dancing, perfumes, flower garlands, and high, large beds is called renouncing conduct involving sensual dusts. Renouncing the afflictive paths of action such as killing and stealing is called renouncing evil conduct. Renouncing unchaste conduct applies commonly to renouncing both kinds of upavāsa.

14.49

Regarding “One should merely exhort and encourage, subsuming the two causes, etc.”: By upholding the causes of the two conducts of renouncing evil and renouncing desire for a short time and with little exertion, one is gradually enabled to emerge from the heavy burden of birth and death. The former three factors, renouncing evil conduct, are renouncing killing, stealing, and false speech. The subsequent four factors, renouncing sensual conduct, are not eating past noon, not drinking alcohol, not singing, dancing, or performing music, not applying perfume to the body, not wearing flower garlands, and not mounting high and wide beds; these four are all sensual dusts of conduct involving desire.

14.50

Tai says: The first three branches abandon transgressions by nature and are therefore called 'abandoning evil conduct'; the latter four branches do not abandon transgressions by nature, but merely abandon those arising from ornaments and objects of the five desires, and are therefore called 'abandoning conduct of sensual desire'. Unchaste conduct is an evil conduct that is a transgression by nature. Furthermore, conduct of sexual desire and abandoning it is called 'conduct of mutual abandonment'. Because in the third [state of life] one cannot cultivate the conduct of mutual abandonment conclusively for one's whole life, one should only diligently take up mutual abandonment for a day and night as the cause for mutual abandonment for the rest of one's life. Do not say of oneself that, being suppressed by the heavy burden of household life, one cannot undertake the proximate fruition-abiding that serves as the cause for the conduct of mutual abandonment and the lifelong precepts of mutual abandonment; hence it is called 'proximate abiding'.

14.51

Ji says: 'The first three, abandoning evil conduct, etc.' is discussed here according to the majority.

14.52

Under the second, explaining the number of complete branches, 'four branches of a monk' is like the six branches of śīla explained in the Śrāvakabhūmi. Here in this text, the six are subsumed into four. First, 'attaining completeness' is abiding in pure śīla. Second, 'undertaking the trainings concordant with the Dharma' is properly guarding the prātimokṣa precepts. Third, 'concordantly guarding the minds of others' consists of the third [branch], having complete proper conduct, which is the precepts of deportment, and the fourth, having complete range of activity, which is not frequenting slaughterhouses and the like. Fourth, 'concordantly guarding the trainings as undertaken' consists of the fifth, seeing great terror in minor faults, and the sixth, undertaking to train in the trainings.

14.53

The Abhidharma[-samuccaya] and the Prakaraṇāryavācā take the text on the six branches in the Yogācārabhūmi and subsume them into five: they merely combine having complete proper conduct and having complete range of activity into one, while leaving the remaining four as before; thus they only make five.

14.54

Regarding the statement, 'If performing the motion with the fourth karmavācanā and summarily undertaking the subsequent coarse trainings': this means that after receiving the precepts, the four grave offenses and the four reliances are summarily spoken—that is, begging for food and so forth are called coarse trainings. With one motion and three karmavācanās, the third karmavācanā is called the fourth. From this point on, having undertaken to practice the subsequent precepts, it is called the 'branch of undertaking trainings concordant with the Dharma'. Upā- means 'proximate', -ka means 'serving', -sa is the masculine inflection, and -sī is the feminine inflection; adding the inflections -sa and -sī to 'proximate-serving', men and women are thereby distinguished.

14.55

Regarding the statement, 'Second, the branch of repeatedly cultivating after violating what was undertaken': if one has already transgressed the first three, and the master or saṃgha discovers it, one reveals and repents through non-lying speech, thereby repeatedly cultivating the first three.

14.56

Regarding 'anointing with scents and crowning with garlands': in the Western countries, they anoint their bodies with scents and use garlands as crowns; since these are occasions for heedlessness, they are prohibited. 'Those properly training' refers to śikṣamāṇās, who undertake the six rules and train in the precepts for two years.

14.57

Under the third, explaining the number of precepts instituted for the two communities of men and women: 'Mātṛgrāma' should correctly be translated as 'mother-village'. In the Western countries, women are called 'mothers', as people of the same village. Novice monks have ten precepts, hence it says 'a lesser portion'. Śikṣamāṇās have sixteen, hence 'a greater portion'.

14.58

Under the fourth, explaining the novice's abandoning gold and silver: dancing, singing, and instrumental music are called 'practices of occasion'; eating at improper times is called 'that which is undertaken'.

14.59

The fifth, questions and answers on inclusion and distinction, is as in the text.

14.60

The sixth explains not permitting ṣaṇḍhas and others to receive the ordination of leaving home. A ṣaṇḍha is entirely devoid of faculties, either naturally born without faculties or mutilated by others; these are collectively named ṣaṇḍha. A paṇḍaka is translated here as 'of much defilement', encompassing both having faculties and lacking faculties. The lower text says: naturally born without faculties is a ṣaṇḍha and also a portion of paṇḍaka; a paṇḍaka's virility may arise or not arise. One who is only a paṇḍaka having faculties mutilated by others: if not subjected to wrongdoing upon oneself by others, is solely a ṣaṇḍha; if defiled by others, then it encompasses both kinds, thus forming two propositions: 1. Solely a ṣaṇḍha and not a paṇḍaka: one mutilated without faculties who delights in being active and not receptive; 2. Solely a paṇḍaka and not a ṣaṇḍha: one having faculties whose virility may arise or not arise, etc.; 3. Both a ṣaṇḍha and a paṇḍaka: those naturally born without faculties or mutilated without faculties who delight in being both active and receptive are such. How is it known that one naturally born without faculties encompasses delighting in both active and receptive? By analogy with those mutilated without faculties, where it says not being defiled by others is solely named a ṣaṇḍha, while if defiled by others it is named both; thus we know that those naturally born without faculties encompass delighting in both active and receptive, and are designated both persons. However, regarding the differences in merit and so forth in their undertaking and guarding all trainings: this resolves an external objection. The thrust of the objection is that because the karmic retribution of a ṣaṇḍha and the like is inferior, the moral code they undertake does not contravene men or women. The thrust of the resolution says: if one undertakes the five precepts with an equal mind, there is no difference in merit.

14.61

From here below, the third explains intermediate karma. Although bodily, verbal, and mental karma may be wholesome, they are not moral restraint, because they do not arise from a pledge seeking nirvāṇa. Although many evils may arise, because they do not pledge a lifelong livelihood, they are not subsumed under bad moral restraint.

14.62

Question: Does this intermediate karma have only informative [matter], or does it also have uninformative [matter]?

14.63

There are two explanations for this. One says: It has only informative [matter], which takes as its entity the capacity situated upon the active volition following the twofold wholesome and unwholesome. Another says: It also has uninformative [matter], which takes the capacity of seeds as its entity.

14.64

Question: Are the bodhisattva's three clusters of precepts all moral restraint, or are they also intermediate?

14.65

There are two explanations for this. One says: Because the precept of moral restraint is preeminent in abandoning evil, it obtains the name 'moral restraint', while the other two are intermediate. Another says: They are all called 'moral restraint'; since gathering wholesome qualities and benefiting sentient beings can both serve as standards and uphold, they are called 'moral restraint'.

14.66

Question: Can there be intermediate [karma] in the body of a Buddha?

14.67

Answer: There are two explanations. One says: There also is, identical to the Hīnayāna treatises. Another explanation says: There is none; because every single merit of the Buddhas is preeminent, all are called moral restraint.

14.68

From here below, the fourth section re-examines questions and answers. Therein, it first determines that whether undertaken by oneself or from another, if undertaken and maintained with an equal mind, there is no difference in merit; next, it clarifies obstacles to the precepts; finally, it clarifies conditions for renouncing the precepts.

First 68 of 424 passages. Read on

Linked texts (1)

瑜伽論記 — Classical Chinese