四明尊者教行錄 3
English (machine translation) 3
- Language
- English
3.1
Compiled by the Śramaṇa Zongxiao of Shizhi, Siming
3.2
Twenty Questions on the Separate Principle Following Conditions
3.3
Verses of Questions and Answers on the Section of Intrinsic Substance in the Guangming xuan
3.4
Thirty Sections of Questions and Answers behind the Crimson Curtain
3.5
Forty-Two Sections of Examination Questions upon Opening the Curtain
3.6
Seven Sections of Miscellaneous Questions and Answers on the Teachings
3.7
Questions and Answers on the Four Types of Four Noble Truths
3.8
Twenty-Two Questions on the Separate Principle Following Conditions (with Preface)
3.9
A scholar of our school asked me, saying: 'Benevolent Sir, in your Zhiyao chao, do you establish that suchness in the separate teaching has the meaning of following conditions?' I replied: 'Indeed.' The guest said: 'Now, Master Fazang composed a commentary explaining the Awakening of Faith, exclusively establishing that suchness possesses the two meanings of unchanging and following conditions, stating: "Unchanging is none other than following conditions; following conditions is none other than unchanging." Furthermore, within his five teachings, it belongs to the final teaching and also partakes of the sudden teaching. In contrast, it refutes the Consciousness-Only school's discussion of the principle of suchness, which only addresses unchanging and does not speak of following conditions. Upon close examination, Consciousness-Only is precisely our school's separate teaching. The unchanging and following conditions clarified in those final and sudden teachings is the principle of our school's perfect teaching; how can you, Benevolent Sir, speak of the separate principle following conditions?' I said to him: 'According to what principle did Master Fazang judge that the suchness discussed in Consciousness-Only does not follow conditions?' The guest said: 'The Awakening of Faith Commentary says: The Consciousness-Only school only takes the karmic mark as the origin of the arising of all dharmas; its suchness is devoid of awareness and cognition, statically unchanging, and does not allow for following conditions. It only speaks of the arising and perishing of the eight consciousnesses, which, even when transformed into the four wisdoms, are solely conditioned and cannot be identical to principle; hence the scope of the dharmas it interprets reaches only as far as the karmic consciousness.' I said: 'Indeed. If one says that the nature of suchness possesses awareness and cognition, it can be perfumed and transform, and thus one speaks of following conditions. Since it is solely inert and dull, it does not receive perfuming. Since it does not receive perfuming, how could it follow conditions to transform and create all dharmas?' Thereupon I interrogated him: 'Does the suchness of the separate teaching lack awareness and cognition? If it lacks awareness and cognition, why is it titled buddha-nature? Therefore, the Fuxing says: "The Middle Way clarified in our school's teachings has only two meanings: first, free from annihilationism and eternalism, which belongs to the previous two teachings; second, buddha-nature, which belongs to the latter two teachings." Since the Middle Way of the separate teaching is called buddha-nature, does not "buddha" have the meaning of "awakened"? If the middle principle were inert and dull, fundamentally devoid of awareness and cognition, how could it be the nature of the great awakened fruitional person? Moreover, "nature" has the meaning of being unalterable; if the causal state lacks the meaning of awareness and only arrives at it in the fruitional state, this would be alteration and transformation—how could it be called "nature"? Furthermore, the Miaole says: "Whenever the buddha-fruit is established in the separate teaching, there are three meanings: first, taking the nature of principle as the buddha-realm; second, taking the culmination of fruition as the buddha-realm; third, partially calling it the buddha-realm from the first bhūmi upward." Since the separate teaching establishes a buddha-realm, how could there be an inert and dull buddha? Fazang's commentary already states that because suchness lacks awareness and cognition it is static, and because it is static it does not follow conditions. Since the separate principle possesses awareness and cognition, this proves it is not static. Since it is not static, why would it not follow conditions?' The guest, meeting with this interrogation, was struck dumb and at a loss. I then said to him: 'Since you do not understand the reason, how can you recklessly refute and establish? Having pitied your ignorance, I therefore formulate several dozen questions, interrogating your erroneous refutations and establishments, so that you may somewhat understand that the separate principle has the meaning of following conditions.' The guest said: 'I wish to hear them.'
3.10
Question 1: Fazang's commentary already says: 'The Consciousness-Only school reaches only as far as the karmic mark as the origin of the arising of all dharmas; therefore its suchness does not speak of following conditions.' Since Jingxi established that suchness in the separate teaching can produce the nine realms when in delusion, it takes suchness as the origin for producing dharmas, which is eternally distinct from taking the karmic mark as the origin for producing dharmas—how can you say the separate principle does not follow conditions?
3.11
Question 2: Fazang's commentary also says: 'The Consciousness-Only school has not yet clarified that the karmic marks and suchness share the one mind as their single source; therefore it says that suchness lacks awareness and cognition, is statically unchanging, and does not allow for following conditions.' Since Jingxi explained that in the separate teaching a single thought of sense-bases and sense-objects is the source of delusion and awakening, and said that the Tathāgata as nature of principle is the root of good and evil, is it not the case that the karmic marks and suchness share the one mind as the source of producing dharmas? This being so, how can you say the separate principle does not follow conditions?
3.12
Question 3: Fazang's commentary already says: 'The Consciousness-Only school only speaks of the arising and perishing of the eight consciousnesses, which, even when transformed into the four wisdoms, are solely conditioned and cannot be identical to principle.' Since Jingxi established that the separate principle is called buddha-nature, is it merely transforming the eight consciousnesses into the four wisdoms? Since the separate principle is buddha-nature, it follows pure conditions to become the fruitional buddha. How can you say it does not follow conditions?
3.13
Question 4: Since none of the five teachings in Fazang's commentary establish the theoretical possession of the three thousand, but merely establish the three teachings of final, sudden, and perfect in terms of unchanging and following conditions, I ask you to set forth in detail the characteristics of following conditions in the principles of these three teachings. If there are no distinct characteristics, how are the three teachings established? If there are distinct characteristics, please explain them in detail.
3.14
Question 5: Since the perfect teaching in Fazang's commentary does not speak of the nature of principle inherently possessing all dharmas, can it be completely equal to our school's perfect teaching? When his perfect teaching is compared to our present perfect teaching, they are already as different as heaven and earth; how can you equate the principle of his final teaching with our present perfect teaching?
3.15
Question 6: In Fazang's commentary not speaking of the theoretical possession of all dharmas, was it because he knew it but did not speak of it, or because he did not know it? If he knew it but did not speak of it, he would have the fault of concealing profound meanings. If he fundamentally did not know it, then he was not adept at discussing the perfect teaching; how could it be the same as our present perfect teaching? If his perfect teaching is not yet the same as our present perfect teaching, how much less so his final teaching?
3.16
Question 7: Since Fazang's commentary does not speak of the theoretical possession of all dharmas, this means that a single principle follows conditions to transform and create all dharmas, which is not unconditioned/non-contrived. If it does not constitute non-contrivance, how can it be identical to our present perfect teaching?
3.17
Question 8: The perfect teaching in Fazang's commentary speaks of the non-obstruction of phenomena and phenomena, and the manifold host and companion, resembling our teachings that form and fragrance are the Middle Way and all dharmas tend toward form. Granting this for the sake of argument, it resembles our present perfect teaching; but can the unchanging and following conditions of his final teaching be spoken of in this way? If it speaks of the non-obstruction of phenomena and phenomena, that is his perfect teaching, not his final teaching. If it has not yet reached that, it still falls short of his own perfect teaching; how could it equal our present perfect teaching?
3.18
The ninth query: Is the 'unchanging yet according with conditions' of their final teaching the same as or different from the 'unchanging yet according with conditions' explained in the Jinbi? If it is different, then it is not our perfect [teaching]. If it is the same: the Jinbi explains that true thusness is the myriad dharmas because it accords with conditions; the myriad dharmas are true thusness because it is unchanging. Relying on these two meanings, it establishes that insentient beings have Buddha-nature. Although the final teaching establishes according with conditions yet unchanging, it asserts that in sentient beings it receives the name 'Buddha-nature', whereas in insentient beings it is only called 'dharmatā' and not called 'Buddha-nature'. Having thus divided it into two branches, its speaking of 'unchanging' is in vain; it is precisely 'changing'. Since it contradicts the Jinbi, how could it be called the perfect principle? One must know that the provisional teaching has the name without the reality, because its words stating that there is Buddha-nature are spoken merely in terms of understanding and principle. When spoken merely in terms of understanding and principle, it is not yet said to be pervasive; if this is not provisional, what is it?
3.19
The tenth query: The Jinbi says: 'A guest asked: Why does the provisional teaching not say that the two causes of conditioned [requisites] and illumination are pervasive? I answered: Sentient beings have from beginningless time grasped at self and what belongs to self; pointing from what they grasp, it should not yet be said to be pervasive. In the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, bringing along the provisional to explain the real, space is used to illustrate the direct [cause], but not yet used to illustrate the conditioned and illumination. If a teaching is exclusively provisional, then all three causes are limited, just as in the separate [teaching] the beginner hearing of the direct [cause] is also limited; the womb nature and nature of principle are all like this. Therefore, ordinary mortals hearing that insentient beings lack it—relying on delusion to point to delusion—say that what can create is [Buddha-nature], and adhering to the provisional to establish nature, say that what is created is not.' (The above is entirely from the Jinbi, without changing a single character.) When the two causes are not pervasive, it is still called 'bringing along the provisional'; if the direct [cause] is confined to sentient beings, it distinctly belongs to the separate [teaching]. Since the final teaching is like this, how can one cling to it as being perfect?
3.20
The eleventh query: Fazang's commentary clearly determines that ālayavijñāna is the root of arising dharmas, hence calling it the differentiated teaching, whereas revealing that true thusness is the root of arising dharmas is called the final teaching. If you now already believe that the principle of the separate [teaching] is non-abiding and able to create the myriad dharmas, if it does not accord with conditions, how could it create dharmas?
3.21
The twelfth query: Other traditions do not speak of 'non-abiding'; you now distort the dharmatā upon which they rely, claiming it can be covered over, so as to make it 'non-abiding'. Even if you make this distortion, take just how in the final teaching the real turns following delusion to create the myriad dharmas—is this what can be covered over or not? If it cannot be covered over, can the created dharmas be said to be the mutual interpenetration of the one and the many and the unimpededness between phenomenon and phenomenon, or not? If so, how would it differ from their perfect [teaching]? If not, if it is not 'covered over', what is it? Could it be that the principle of true thusness is not sovereign? One must know that the final teaching is merely principle; because it is non-abiding, it cannot maintain the nature of the Buddha-realm. Being seized and bound by delusion, it is pressed into becoming the nine realms—this precisely corresponds to the meaning of 'can be covered over'. Those who receive this teaching, although they believe that true thusness changes and creates the myriad dharmas, do not know that phenomenon and phenomenon are right there perfectly interfused, because this teaching does not explain that the principle suddenly inherently possesses all dharmas. If one receives our perfect [teaching], since one knows that inherent virtues inherently possess all dharmas, although changing and creating in accordance with ignorance, it is acting yet non-acting, because they are inherently possessed. Since phenomena are identical with principle, each and every dharma is completely and constantly all-encompassing of all dharmas, being nothing other than the dharmadhātu. Since what the final teaching explains is not like this, how could it equal our perfect teaching?
3.22
The thirteenth query: The final teaching says that true thusness is original enlightenment; the separate teaching says that true thusness is Buddha-nature. Is nature not original? Is Buddha not enlightenment? Since name and meaning are equal, how could they not be the same?
3.23
The fourteenth query: The Vijñaptimātra school says that because true thusness lacks awareness, it cannot be deluded. The final teaching explains that because true thusness has awareness, it can be deluded; because it can be deluded, it can be enlightened, and therefore it establishes 'according with conditions'. Since the principle of the separate [teaching] has awareness, how could it not be like this? If it can, why would it not accord with conditions?
3.24
The fifteenth query: You say that the non-abiding principle of the separate teaching being able to create the myriad dharmas is merely that principle can create phenomena, which is a one-sided meaning—is that not having only the meaning of according with conditions, without the meaning of unchanging? You fundamentally do not know that unchanging is expounded in common by both the final and the differentiated teachings, whereas according with conditions belongs exclusively to the final teaching. Therefore it is explained that unchanging does not necessarily accord with conditions, but if one speaks of according with conditions, there must be unchanging, because it is the nature of true thusness that accords with conditions. If it altered when according with conditions, it would not be called 'nature'.
3.25
The sixteenth query: You say that the separate teaching says 'not identical' while the final teaching says 'identical', making them different. This is because you are confused by names and do not investigate principle at all. Because it does not speak of the nine realms being inherently possessed in the nature, it is merely principle according with conditions to make the nine; if ignorance is severed, the nine realms must be destroyed. If the nine realms are identical with the principle of true thusness (both the Great Purport and the Zhiguan explain with this meaning, such as saying the initial mind is the subsequent mind, and so on), why would it be necessary to eliminate the nine? Is it not that the nine realms can definitely obstruct principle? If one claims this is not so, does the final teaching also say that the nine realms are all the dharmadhātu, each and every one all-encompassing, or not? If it does, what distinction is there between it and their perfect [teaching]? If it does not, how can it be called 'identical'? Furthermore, since their perfect [teaching] does not speak of the nature inherently possessing the three thousand, although it speaks of each and every one being all-encompassing, it does not yet have the reason for all-encompassing; if compared to our perfect [teaching], it does not achieve the meaning of 'identical', how much less the final teaching?
3.26
The seventeenth query: You say that the nine realms inherently possessed in the nature cannot be called 'differentiated'; this is because you do not yet know that within principle there is intrinsically the meaning of establishing all dharmas. Therefore Miaole says: 'Principle means inherent virtues, conditioned and illuminating [causes], and so forth.' Moreover, if the dharmas inherently possessed in the nature are not called differentiated, why does the Commentary on the Wonderful Sūtra say: 'If one knows that the earth inherently possesses peaches and plums, one recognizes that there is the provisional within the real, and understands that non-differentiation is precisely differentiation. If one knows the upright appearance of peaches and plums, one recognizes that there is the real within the provisional, and understands that differentiation is precisely non-differentiation.' Since it takes the earth inherently possessing peaches and plums as the provisional, and this provisional is called differentiation, does this not mean that the nine realms inherently possessed in the nature can be termed differentiation?
3.27
The eighteenth query: In the Zhiguan, the one-thought mind of the separate teaching is the root of delusion and understanding, citing the Laṅkāvatāra's principle of the tathāgatagarbha being the cause of good and non-good. Your idea is that if this line proves the final teaching, it has the meaning of according with conditions, but if it proves the separate teaching, it does not have the meaning of according with conditions. But here the citation of the text is abridged; that sūtra fully states: 'The seven consciousnesses do not transmigrate, nor do they act as the cause of suffering and pleasure' (the substance of ignorance is empty). 'The tathāgatagarbha is the cause of good and non-good; whether arising or ceasing, experiencing suffering and pleasure, it is together with the cause' (true thusness accomplishes phenomena). Since it can act as the cause and is also immediate to arising and ceasing, how can this text be interpreted as not according with conditions? If you say that not citing the text on arising and ceasing means it does not accord with conditions, could the Vijñaptimātra school say that true thusness is the cause of good and evil? Moreover, the subsequent text illustrates this with the pool water in the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa—how can this be explained away? It says: 'Like the water of a great pool: when an elephant enters, it becomes turbid; when a jewel enters, it becomes clear.' One should know that the pool water is the root of clarity and turbidity, while the jewel and elephant are conditions devoid of clarity and turbidity. Now I ask: does the pool water accord with these two conditions to become clear or turbid, or not? If it accords, how could it be interpreted as not according with conditions?
3.28
The nineteenth query: The Fuxing explains the arousal of the mind in the separate teaching, saying: 'Within afflictions there is the tathāgatagarbha. Ordinary mortals, born blind, are always together with the womb but do not know or see it; therefore they transmigrate in birth and death and are instead harmed by the womb.' Furthermore, since the bodhisattva of the separate teaching arouses the mind because of seeing sentient beings like this, how can it be said that true thusness does not accord with conditions?
3.29
The twentieth query: You say that the Zhiyao posed a question to refute Master Anguo, and therefore specially established that the principle of the separate [teaching] accords with conditions. This is because you do not understand the intention of Anguo's query, resulting in this erroneous talk. As his query says: 'The true thusness of the separate teaching does not accord with conditions, while the true thusness of the Awakening of Faith can accord with conditions; I wonder whether the Awakening of Faith is separate or perfect? If it is separate, the texts conflict. If it is perfect, it violates Fazang's commentary.' Now, the initial mention of 'according with conditions or not according with conditions' was merely because broad learners falsely thought that the separate teaching does not speak of according with conditions while the Awakening of Faith does speak of according with conditions, so he followed common sentiment to set up the inquiry. Since it was commonly known that the Awakening of Faith speaks of true thusness according with conditions, he determined it by asking: I wonder whether this meaning of according with conditions is separate or perfect? Broad learners did not know that true thusness according with conditions applies to both teachings, so he posed this double determination. Then, when he raised the actual difficulty, he said: If one says that the Awakening of Faith is separate, it contradicts the treatise text, because the treatise text states that the one mind subsumes mundane and supramundane dharmas, and in the greatness of attributes clarifies that it possesses immeasurable virtues of the nature, which means originally possessing the thousand thusnesses; furthermore, the ten abodes and eight manifestations are the partial reality of the perfect teaching, effortlessly extending responses being the stages of the perfect teaching. If one definitely determines it as belonging to the separate [teaching], it contradicts these passages of the treatise. If one definitely determines it as belonging to the perfect [teaching], it violates Fazang's commentary, because the commentary does not explain the subsumption of mundane and supramundane dharmas in terms of the mind possessing the hundred realms, nor does it interpret the immeasurable virtues of the nature in terms of inherent good and inherent evil. Furthermore, it does not explain the ten abodes and eight manifestations in terms of partial reality, but says that they are performed by subduing view and thought [afflictions] through the power of vows and supernormal powers. If one determines it as belonging to the perfect [teaching], it contradicts such passages in the commentary. If you now cling to Anguo having definitely determined the final teaching to be our perfect [teaching], why did he state in his actual difficulty: 'If it is perfect, it violates Fazang's commentary'? Fazang's commentary precisely uses the final teaching to explain the Awakening of Faith. If the final teaching were the perfect [teaching], explaining it as perfect would precisely accord with Fazang's commentary; why would he say: 'If it is perfect, it violates Fazang's commentary'?
3.30
Verses of Inquiry and Response on the Chapter on the Intrinsic Substance of the Profound Meaning of the Suvarṇaprabhāsa
3.31
Inquiry by the Repentance Master Ciyun; Response by Dharma Master Siming
3.32
Zunshi bows his head to the Dharma Lord of Yanqing. I have heard privately that in recent days you have unreservedly deployed your eloquence to propagate the exceedingly profound Dharma-gate of the Suvarṇaprabhāsa. Thinking of myself tied down like a gourd, having no affinity to join your assembly, and seeing that the profound meaning of this sūtra demonstrates the fifth, 'derived from its intrinsic substance', this meaning is so profound that I once spent whole nights pondering it without understanding. I have respectfully composed verses to present for your consultation. Beyond your preaching and instructing, I pray you will resolve this once for all. I eagerly await the arrival of your reply.
3.33
What is the dharmatā? / Is its self-substance golden light? / Should it be established based on its meaning, / or is it also formed as physical matter? / Dharmatā is fundamentally not physical matter; / from what does the golden color arise? / If established from its meaning, / it is still merely a provisional designation. / The whole gold is the dharmadhātu; / every single particle of dust is completely equal. / What does repentance eliminate? / What does praise glorify? / Since transgression and blessing are not two, / leading by emptiness is an empty sound. / The empty treasury fully manifests emptiness; / the earth treasury is hard to overturn. / How are these the same and different? / I pray you will resolve my doubts. / The lotus flower and rice weeds— / how are they judged in terms of intrinsic substance? / By analogy with all dharmas, / may the lion's strings resound!
3.34
Zhili bows to the Repentance Master of Gṛdhrakūṭa. Ever since awkwardly attempting to confine my steps to following the curriculum of lectures, although my practice of the Way is not deep, standard maxims remain. Now receiving your formidable inquiry, which arises from great compassion, to make me investigate and cause others to awaken: through press of circumstances and affairs, I have long delayed my reply; now I casually offer this response, hoping you will peruse it closely.
3.35
Dharmatā possesses all physical forms, / named wonderful forms; / dharmatā possesses all meanings, / named the primary meaning. / Can this meaning and this form / ever be divided into two? / The nature of fire is precisely true emptiness— / the Śūraṅgama reveals its significance; / the nature of form is precisely the nature of wisdom— / the Awakening of Faith displays its import. / The thousand thusnesses, appearances and non-appearances, / can only be lodged in a single kṣaṇa; / the one principle, empty and non-empty, / is where Vairocana completely pervades. / Exhausting form to the utmost neighboring atom / is precisely the original ground; / scrutinizing mind down to a single kṣaṇa / is precisely the wisdom of true thusness. / The nose smells the fragrance of merit; / the tongue tastes the flavor of the wondrous Dharma. / That the appearances of the world are permanent / is truly because they abide in the Dharma-position; / that the Dharma-body streams into the five paths / is truly because it possesses provisional wisdom. / When the mind is frantic, gold and stone are obscured; / when form is diseased, thoughts and perceptions are intoxicated. / Principle of mind and form are not different; / how could physical matter and meaning ever diverge? / Sentient beings are deluded about the original source, / rigidly separating the sentient and insentient realms. / Practicing repentance and praise relying on emptiness, / the substance of the dharmadhātu is fully complete. / Bright light illuminates the world; / true gold is the most precious of all dharmas. / The ultimate true substance / is directly invoked, not taken from an analogy. / In striking and evoking this profound subtlety, / I know you are equipped with both adornments; / with this deliberation of mine, / I further invite you to refine its essence.
3.36
Zunshi again submits an inquiry in verse to his Dharma brother of Yanqing, hoping he may perused it once and awaiting his reply:
3.37
The Nirvāṇa [Sūtra speaks of] four kinds of ineffability, yet sets down words on account of causes and conditions;
It also speaks of the ultimate truth, which has words and has real meaning.
Between existence and non-existence, the ultimate and the conventional, how are identity and difference to be distinguished?
All phenomena are identical to True Suchness, having neither name nor character;
True Suchness is identical to all phenomena, varying according to conditions.
If their arising necessarily entails the nature's three thousand, why deny them name and meaning?
The nature of water and fire is true emptiness; in emptiness, who can distinguish unity from difference?
Manifesting according to karma, they arrive at different ends only from the branch-traces;
Establishment entirely depends on the conventional; why deny them name and meaning?
The nature of form is identical to the nature of wisdom, truly because their substance is non-dual;
In non-duality there is neither right nor wrong; non-wrongness is the original ground.
Yet waiting until the utmost adjacent void is exhausted—how does that manifest wisdom?
Originally there is one pure clarity, divided into six functions;
Expedients have many doors, but returning to the source, the nature is non-dual.
Non-duality is precisely suchness; how can there be fragrance or taste?
Medicine and illness correspond in nature; mind and form are treated by expedients;
Water and fire respectively rise and sink, suddenly becoming discordant and discarded.
If dependent arising derives solely from nature, how does it reveal non-duality?
All phenomena are like a great illusion; the one and the many lodge within each other;
Realizing that illusion is itself truth, what need is there to distance oneself from them together?
Exhausting dust and forgetting the instant—how can the intention of presence and absence remain?
At first one could not bear contemplating the mind; why now tolerate this view?
Though choosing and discarding depend on oneself, what about continuing to hesitate?
O Great Guide of humans and gods, why lack decisive wisdom?
Contemplating mind is also contemplating form; one exclusively contemplates the mind-ground;
Form is not called contemplating mind, yet mind lacks nothing of embracing meaning;
Identity and difference, and mutual inclusion: how is their meaning to be grasped?
Contemplating mind is just a single thought; a single thought is endowed with the three thousand;
The three thousand contain body and land; why single out the omission of the sense of contemplating form?
The three thousand up to external objects: how can they be brought to the same level?
3.38
Zhili respectfully presents his humble thoughts, replying again to the inquiry from the Repentance Master of Gṛdhrakūṭa, hoping he will deign to examine it:
3.39
In the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra], the one real truth does not differ in its negative and positive expressions;
What relies on words and what is free from words are all the meaning of True Suchness.
This conventional and this ultimate truth are not from conceptual passion but accord with wisdom;
Both truths are termed "true," and this truth has names and characters.
If one understands the nature's three thousand, this is the meaning of the fully perfected nature;
Each and every phenomenon is completely true and eternal; both name and reality are noble and revered.
Relying on this imaginary construct, how could it be placed in the same class?
Its substance is like flowers in the sky; what reality could correspond to its names?
Mind and form are non-dual in substance, yet within emotional attachments their difference is rigidly held;
Wishing to break through rigid attachments, one must push through to the utmost limit.
If one knows that they rely on the storehouse of principle, not a single phenomenon is discarded;
Lodging in this to reveal the perfect and eternal, when did one ever seek to distance oneself from it?
Though it is one pure clarity, its substance is endowed with the three thousand meanings;
Circumstantial and direct retributions are contained within principle, and the sense faculties and objects are complete within the nature.
Exclusive mind is just exclusive form; it is also exclusive fragrance and exclusive taste;
It is exclusive touch and exclusive sound; this principle is well worth pondering.
The forces of water and fire oppose each other; light and darkness can alternate in remedying;
Right within this mutual contradiction, one sees all the more the sense of mutual accord.
Mutual contradiction displays complete virtues; mutual accord expresses non-duality.
A wise person contemplates this well: how have root and branch ever differed?
The principle of contemplating mind is profound; at first glance it seems a contradictory meaning;
Arising from the āvarta-dhāraṇī, who would not hesitate?
Having presumed to act as a propagator of the teaching, I reflect on what rank I occupy;
A single word cannot settle the case; only upon rethinking can it be accomplished.
The nine realms are spoken of in terms of cultivating mind; the three paths of defilement are remedied through mind;
This contemplates from external objects: only when the external is broken does the internal become manifest.
In terms of principle they are unified, but on the basis of delusion they are provisionally divided into two;
Knowing the ultimate reason, how would one dare to rely on emotional effort?
All three phenomena are called subtle, yet mind alone is the most profound and secret;
Within the mind one sees the Dharma realm; sentient beings and Buddhas are brought to equal unity.
Confusing oneself and chasing other things, one rigidly sets up sentient beings and the insentient vessel-world;
Seeing form, one immediately sees mind; clearly it all arises from the nature.
3.40
Thirty Sections of Questions and Answers behind the Crimson Curtain
3.41
Inquiries by Dharma Master Siming; Responses by Dharma Master Jingjue.
3.42
On the fourth day of the second month in the spring of the first year of the Tianxi reign era, the Abbot of Yanqing brought forth thirty articles on the doctrinal teachings of the mountain school, and raising the crimson curtain, questioned his disciples. His words were concise and his purport extremely subtle, intended to inspire those without delusion to exert themselves in disseminating the teaching, and to rouse those lacking cleverness to strive diligently in study. The disciple Renyue gave spontaneous responses, which came together into an elegant composition. This was not to seek single-character praise from the state of Lu, but rather to request the admonition of the four choices of Wujin. Since it has already been transcribed, this preface is now written.
3.43
Question 1: In the Tripiṭaka [teaching], the true illumination of the patient cognition of suffering belongs to the first fruit; why then is it said that cessation is not the true truth? All four are called truths; are they true with respect to the ultimate, or true with respect to the conventional?
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Answer: Originally, in the Tripiṭaka [teaching], principle is uniquely one truth, while contemplation has four truths. Principle is revealed through contemplation, which is why it says, "the true illumination of the patient cognition of suffering." When principle is revealed, contemplation is forgotten, which is why it says, "cessation is not the true truth." Why so? Because it relies on the ultimate truth of cessation into non-existence and the conventional truth of departing from illusion. Although knowing suffering, abandoning the accumulation of karma, cultivating the cause, and realizing the fruit are all active practices of arising and ceasing, they are not the empty and still substance of principle. In examining the dharmatā thoroughly, what delusion or awakening could there be? Thus the Great Master said: "In the Tripiṭaka [teaching], the dharmatā is naturally so from heaven; accumulation cannot defile it, suffering cannot afflict it, the path cannot penetrate it, and cessation cannot purify it." However, only through the patient cognition of suffering is True Suchness illuminated, and only where form is analyzed to the end is emptiness seen. Although that which can analyze and that which is analyzed are both not emptiness, the perception of emptiness arises on account of the analysis of form. Hence we know that the true illumination of the patient cognition of suffering and the statement that cessation is not the true truth do not contradict each other in meaning. Furthermore, illumination above necessarily entails manifestation below: if conventional truth is true, then ultimate truth is true. How could there be a difference between before and after?
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Question 2: What is the difference between calming the mind through [contemplating] conditions and the correct contemplation of a pratyekabuddha?
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Answer: Calming the mind through conditions is meant for beginners who have much delusion and ignorance in their minds and give rise to views of annihilationism and eternalism; therefore, they are instructed to contemplate the conditions of the three periods of time to counteract and remedy them. Thus Jingxi said: "Because the three periods of time are continuous, there is no annihilation; because the three periods of time alternate and pass away, there is no eternalism," and so forth. This only briefly understands the aspect of the arising of conditions, and does not yet know the aspect of the cessation of conditions. The correct contemplation of a pratyekabuddha, however, does not merely contemplate the three periods of time alone, but can even contemplate hundreds, thousands, and myriads of lifetimes; furthermore, it knows both arising and cessation, and takes both conventional truth and ultimate truth as true. The two contemplations are slightly different and must not be conflated.
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Question 3: Various texts all state that pratyekabuddhas contemplate causes and conditions to sever afflictions. What does this contemplation look like?
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Answer: Different texts present diverse explanations; I shall now attempt a rough presentation. As explained in the Āgama, the medium vehicle's contemplation of the characteristics of causes and conditions has both a reverse and a direct order. From ignorance to old age and death is called direct; from old age and death to ignorance is reverse; both arising and cessation are like this. This is a general statement. If we follow the Si nianchu, it thoroughly analyzes, investigates, and contemplates the characteristics of deconstruction: either taking the branch of craving as primary, or taking the branch of grasping as primary, also having direct and reverse orders. Take, for instance, craving as primary: one investigates from what cause greedy craving arises, and knows that this greed arises on account of craving, and so on up to formative action caused by ignorance, and ignorance caused by all past defilements. Again, directly tracing forward, this craving can give rise to grasping, grasping gives rise to becoming, and becoming gives rise to the future twenty-five states of existence and birth-and-death. If contemplating to deconstruct them: one contemplates craving as the contemplation of the nature of the present defiled five aggregates, and so on up to contemplating ignorance as the contemplation of the nature of the past defiled five aggregates. Furthermore, if contemplating becoming, it is the contemplation of the nature of the wholesome and unwholesome five aggregates, and so on up to contemplating future birth-and-death as the contemplation of the nature of indeterminate karmic fruition of birth-and-death. This is called investigating in reverse and direct orders to deconstruct the four inversions. When inversions cease, then ignorance ceases, and so on up to the cessation of old age and death. (The above briefly gathers the doctrinal meaning of the Si nianchu text.) Taking the branch of grasping as primary pertains to individuals with view delusions; the direct and reverse investigation and deconstruction follow the example of the craving branch. Furthermore, the Zhiguan explains that within the sphere of dhyāna, one relies on practice to discern manifestation, taking the branch of becoming as primary. Also, the Shiqian explains that the four teachings' contemplations of causes and conditions all arise from craving. That these various explanations differ is truly because capacities and natures are distinct, so their cultivation and entry are not equal. Now, in accordance with the Fuxing, the contemplation of causes and conditions is determined to be of two kinds: first, inferring the cause by examining the fruit; second, inferring the fruit by examining the cause. The Nianchu and the Zhiguan infer the fruit by examining the cause, whereas the Shiqian infers the cause by examining the fruit. However, between the meanings of these two kinds, the Nianchu should be taken as the standard, because it correctly accords with the meaning of causes and conditions. Since causes and conditions take ignorance as primary, now contemplating craving and grasping is just [contemplating] ignorance. Therefore, the Great Master extensively revealed the characteristics of practice, which truly lie right here.
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Question 4: Since the Āgama only expounds the Tripiṭaka [teaching], why did eighty thousand gods directly arouse the aspiration for the Great Path?
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Answer: Truly it is because the gradual and sudden Dharma gates are fundamentally non-dual in substance, and the capacities of the small and the great are originally without difference in principle. It is just that encountering different perfumings results in different liberations. Now that the various gods awaken to the great, how could that be isolated? Upon examination, they must have cultivated the great vehicle's contemplative wisdom in past lives by means of the small vehicle's truth-realms, and now, hearing their original realm, their past seeds are triggered. It is like placing poison beforehand into curd and consuming it; consuming curd again later will then be able to kill a person. Yet because the Tathāgata knows capacities and knows the time, liberating beings in accordance with their maturation, he merely uses the four truths of arising and ceasing to respond to the two conditions of small and great; this is precisely the manifest indeterminate teaching. Objection: In the Deer Park, it was only said that the gods attained the purity of the Dharma eye. Only upon reaching the Prajñā assembly was it indicated that they attained the patient cognition of non-arising. If so, the śrāvakas and others did not know that the gods directly aroused the aspiration for the Great Path; based on this, does it not become the meaning of the secret teaching? Answer: Recently I have seen many scholars advocate this view, but when questioned about their rationale, their words have no source. Moreover, the secret teaching refers to fully expounding both gradual and sudden teachings, addressing both small and great capacities respectively, where each does not hear the other—only then is it called secret. It does not mean that those receiving small benefit being unaware of those receiving great benefit constitutes secret. If we speak of the characteristics of the secret teaching in the Deer Park, as the Dazhidulun says, what the bodhisattvas saw was that immeasurable asaṃkhyeyas of people attained the two vehicles, and immeasurable asaṃkhyeyas of people attained the patient cognition of non-arising, and so forth. In the present case, for the eighty thousand gods only the small was expounded, and they saw and heard identically with the śrāvakas; what secrecy could there be? Furthermore, the Great Master explicitly designated this as the manifest indeterminate teaching; how could one not believe it?
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Question 5: After beings of the shared teaching are received and grafted, they ought to cultivate and realize according to the stages of the latter two teachings. Why does the text of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sūtra only take the tenth stage as the fruit?
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Answer: This is because the ten stages in the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā contain the meanings of the three teachings of the Mahāyāna. For instance, the first stage bodhisattva is called patient suppression; the second and third stages are called compliant patience; from the fourth stage onward is called the patient cognition of non-arising, up to sporting with spiritual penetrations and purifying the Buddha land—all of these apply to the three teachings. Therefore, the Fuxing, in interpreting the tenth stage as "like a Buddha," says that if a practitioner who is received and grafted arrives here, having broken one grade of ignorance, they can also [manifest] the eight phases, hence they are called "like a Buddha." Is this not proof that the name and meaning of the ten stages apply across the three teachings? If so, why does the Fuxing, in explaining being received and grafted, say: "It means using the former teaching having a beginning but no end; having used the seventh and eighth stages, one does not reach the ninth and tenth. Then one uses the latter teaching having an end but no beginning, merely using the stages of direction and bhūmi without needing the abodes and practices; being joined and grafted in the middle, it gets the name of being grafted"? Does this not mean that after being received and grafted, one relies on the stages of the latter teaching? Answer: If judged by the scripture's text, there are no separate stages. But the Great Master grasped the profound import of the sūtra, and took the ten stages as applying across the three teachings; therefore, Jingxi elaborated upon it fully in terms of the stages of the two teachings, intending to differentiate the meaning of being received and grafted. To expand upon the text to resolve what was concise was indeed the author's intention.
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Question six: In what sense do bodhisattvas of the shared teaching retain residual traces to moisten rebirth?
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Answer: 'Retain' means intentionally retain, not that their contemplative power is insufficient to proceed with cutting them off. Why is this? Because bodhisattvas of this teaching have already subdued defilements and conformed to principle at the stage of the nature and the stage of the eight persons, and they practice the six perfections everywhere on behalf of all sentient beings, bringing both merit and wisdom to ultimate completion in all activities. It is like a bodhisattva of the Tripiṭaka [teaching] who, within middle forbearance, practices for three incalculable eons and arrives at the stage of doing what is to be done; he naturally accords with the ultimate truth, and it is certain that the manifestations of both main [defilements] and residual traces are removed—just as with the thirty-four minds, what impediment could there be? It is merely because their resolve to save sentient beings is vast and the time needed to purify the land is long that they support themselves with vows and compassion, retaining them in order to moisten rebirth and transform beings. The reason they must retain residual traces is that, lacking the true substance of the wondrous response, they use these as the basis for receiving a body. Therefore, the Miaoxuan says: 'The shared teaching also admits of having a response body, but it is merely an intentional supernatural power; with the body turned to ashes and consciousness extinguished, there is no permanently abiding basis—on what basis could a response arise?' This serves as reliable proof.
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Question seven: The Abhidharmakośa takes dust-and-sand [ignorance] as residual traces; how can one retain them to moisten rebirth?
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Answer: The Great Master explains that in the shared teaching there are two kinds of residual traces: the residual traces of the affliction obstacle and those of the phenomena obstacle. The phenomena obstacle is precisely the dust-and-sand within the realms. If one speaks of retaining residual traces to moisten rebirth, this refers precisely to the residual traces of afflictions. This is because afflictions are defiled unknowing, taking fundamental ignorance as their essence, and they can produce birth and death. Dust-and-sand is undefiled unknowing, taking inferior wisdom as its essence, and does not produce birth and death. One should say: in order to moisten rebirth, a bodhisattva must retain the residual traces of affliction; in order to transform beings, he must break through the residual traces of dust-and-sand. Thus one knows that the essences of these two residual traces are somewhat different.
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Question eight: Since the Vaipulya contains the four teachings, does every single passage require four interpretations? Or does each have its own textual exposition?
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Answer: In some cases, every [passage] requires four interpretations; in other cases, each has its own textual exposition. The ways of responding to capacities are manifold and cannot be reduced to a single rule. For example, when the Great Master interprets the Sūtra of Invoking Avalokiteśvara, from the symptoms of illness up through fixing the thought, counting breaths, and hearing the dhāraṇī to gain benefit, he explains them throughout with reference to ten kinds of practitioners—meaning that every [passage] requires four interpretations. But when he interprets the Visualization Sūtra, it is directed specifically at capacities suited for the sudden, not admitting of gradual entry—meaning each has its own textual exposition. Or, a single sūtra may fully clarify the four teachings, each having its own textual exposition, as in the case of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa. The reason four interpretations are required is that both collection and teaching carry [the four] (the Sūtra of Invoking Avalokiteśvara); that each has its own textual exposition is because the collection carries them while the teaching does not (the Visualization Sūtra). Therefore one knows that the doctrinal characteristics of the Vaipulya are difficult to clarify and cannot be treated uniformly.
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Question nine: Since Prajñā contains only the three teachings of the Mahāyāna gate, why does the Renwang jing teach four verses on impermanence?
First 59 of 174 passages. Read on
Linked texts (1)
- 四明尊者教行錄 — Classical Chinese