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History of Aurangzib, Based on Original Sources v5: Volume 5

History of Aurangzib, Based on Original Sources v5

Language
English

Contents

Volume 5

Front matter

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THE BOOK WAS DRENCHED the *Gesta Romanorum*, the *Legenda Aurea* of Jacobus de Voragine, and the *Speculum Historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais. These were the books that fed the imagination of the Middle Ages, and they were the books that the Church, in its wisdom, provided for the instruction and edification of the faithful.

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But the Church did not merely provide books; it also provided the means of their dissemination. The monastic scriptoria, where monks labored in silence to copy the sacred texts, were the precursors of the printing press. And when the press finally arrived, it was the Church that first harnessed its power, using it to spread the word of God to the corners of the earth. The Gutenberg Bible, the first major book printed in Europe, was a testament to the Church's commitment to the written word.

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Yet, even as the Church championed the spread of knowledge, it also sought to control it. The *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*, or List of Prohibited Books, was a tool used by the Church to suppress ideas it deemed dangerous or heretical. This tension between the desire to educate and the need to control would define the Church's relationship with literature for centuries to come.

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It is a complex history, one that is marked by both enlightenment and suppression. But it is a history that cannot be ignored, for it is the history of the very foundation of Western civilization. The Church, in its role as the guardian of knowledge, has shaped the way we think, the way we write, and the way we understand the world around us.

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the *Gesta Romanorum*, the *Legenda Aurea* of Jacobus de Voragine, and the *Speculum Historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais. These were the books that fed the imagination of the Middle Ages, and they were the books that the Church, in its wisdom, provided for the instruction and edification of the faithful.

v5.c71.6

But the Church did not merely provide books; it also provided the means of their dissemination. The monastic scriptoria, where monks labored in silence to copy the sacred texts, were the precursors of the printing press. And when the press finally arrived, it was the Church that first harnessed its power, using it to spread the word of God to the corners of the earth. The Gutenberg Bible, the first major book printed in Europe, was a testament to the Church's commitment to the written word.

v5.c71.7

Yet, even as the Church championed the spread of knowledge, it also sought to control it. The *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*, or List of Prohibited Books, was a tool used by the Church to suppress ideas it deemed dangerous or heretical. This tension between the desire to educate and the need to control would define the Church's relationship with literature for centuries to come.

v5.c71.8

It is a complex history, one that is marked by both enlightenment and suppression. But it is a history that cannot be ignored, for it is the history of the very foundation of Western civilization. The Church, in its role as the guardian of knowledge, has shaped the way we think, the way we write, and the way we understand the world around us.

v5.c71.9

the *Gesta Romanorum*, the *Legenda Aurea* of Jacobus de Voragine, and the *Speculum Historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais. These were the books that fed the imagination of the Middle Ages, and they were the books that the Church, in its wisdom, provided for the instruction and edification of the faithful.

v5.c71.10

But the Church did not merely provide books; it also provided the means of their dissemination. The monastic scriptoria, where monks labored in silence to copy the sacred texts, were the precursors of the printing press. And when the press finally arrived, it was the Church that first harnessed its power, using it to spread the word of God to the corners of the earth. The Gutenberg Bible, the first major book printed in Europe, was a testament to the Church's commitment to the written word.

v5.c71.11

Yet, even as the Church championed the spread of knowledge, it also sought to control it. The *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*, or List of Prohibited Books, was a tool used by the Church to suppress ideas it deemed dangerous or heretical. This tension between the desire to educate and the need to control would define the Church's relationship with literature for centuries to come.

v5.c71.12

It is a complex history, one that is marked by both enlightenment and suppression. But it is a history that cannot be ignored, for it is the history of the very foundation of Western civilization. The Church, in its role as the guardian of knowledge, has shaped the way we think, the way we write, and the way we understand the world around us.

v5.c71.13

the *Gesta Romanorum*, the *Legenda Aurea* of Jacobus de Voragine, and the *Speculum Historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais. These were the books that fed the imagination of the Middle Ages, and they were the books that the Church, in its wisdom, provided for the instruction and edification of the faithful.

v5.c71.14

But the Church did not merely provide books; it also provided the means of their dissemination. The monastic scriptoria, where monks labored in silence to copy the sacred texts, were the precursors of the printing press. And when the press finally arrived, it was the Church that first harnessed its power, using it to spread the word of God to the corners of the earth. The Gutenberg Bible, the first major book printed in Europe, was a testament to the Church's commitment to the written word.

v5.c71.15

Yet, even as the Church championed the spread of knowledge, it also sought to control it. The *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*, or List of Prohibited Books, was a tool used by the Church to suppress ideas it deemed dangerous or heretical. This tension between the desire to educate and the need to control would define the Church's relationship with literature for centuries to come.

v5.c71.16

It is a complex history, one that is marked by both enlightenment and suppression. But it is a history that cannot be ignored, for it is the history of the very foundation of Western civilization. The Church, in its role as the guardian of knowledge, has shaped the way we think, the way we write, and the way we understand the world around us.

v5.c71.17

the *Gesta Romanorum*, the *Legenda Aurea* of Jacobus de Voragine, and the *Speculum Historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais. These were the books that fed the imagination of the Middle Ages, and they were the books that the Church, in its wisdom, provided for the instruction and edification of the faithful.

v5.c71.18

But the Church did not merely provide books; it also provided the means of their dissemination. The monastic scriptoria, where monks labored in silence to copy the sacred texts, were the precursors of the printing press. And when the press finally arrived, it was the Church that first harnessed its power, using it to spread the word of God to the corners of the earth. The Gutenberg Bible, the first major book printed in Europe, was a testament to the Church's commitment to the written word.

v5.c71.19

Yet, even as the Church championed the spread of knowledge, it also sought to control it. The *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*, or List of Prohibited Books, was a tool used by the Church to suppress ideas it deemed dangerous or heretical. This tension between the desire to educate and the need to control would define the Church's relationship with literature for centuries to come.

v5.c71.20

It is a complex history, one that is marked by both enlightenment and suppression. But it is a history that cannot be ignored, for it is the history of the very foundation of Western civilization. The Church, in its role as the guardian of knowledge, has shaped the way we think, the way we write, and the way we understand the world around us.

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BASED ON ORIGINAL SOURCES

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JADUNATH SARKAR, M.A., *Indian Educational Service, (Bihar.)*

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VOL. V The Closing Years, 1689-1707

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1924 M. C. SARKAR & SONS CALCUTTA

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Rs. 4

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BY THE SAME AUTHOR

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1. *History of Aurangzib*, 5 vols., sold separately. Vol. I. Reign of Shah Jahan. ,, II. War of Succession, 1657-58. ,, III. Northern India, 1658-1681, 2nd ed. ,, IV. Southern India, 1644-89, Rs. 3-8 each. ,, V. The Last Phase, 1689-1707, Rs. 4.

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2. *Shivaji and His Times*, 2nd ed., enlarged, with a portrait, Rs. 4.

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3. *Studies in Mughal India*, Rs. 2. (22 Historical essays and biographies.)

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4. *Chaitanya*, 2nd ed., greatly enlarged, with a portrait, Rs. 2. (The greatest saint of Bengal, 1485-1533 A.D.).

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5. *Anecdotes of Aurangzib*, Re. 1-8. (Persian text of Ahkam-i-Alamgiri with English translation and notes).

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6. *Economics of British India*, Rs. 3. (4th ed., revised and enlarged.)

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7. *Mughal Administration*, 2nd ed. (272 pp.) Rs. 3.

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8. *Later Mughals*, 1707-1739, by W. Irvine, edited and continued by J. Sarkar, 2 large vols. with portrait, Rs. 8 each.

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Publishers—M. C. SARKAR & SONS, 90/2A, HARRISON ROAD, CALCUTTA.

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Printed by S. C. Majumdar, SRI GOURANGA PRESS, 71/1, Mirzapur Street, Calcutta. Published by S. C. Sarkar of M. C. SARKAR & SONS.

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CHAPTER XLIX.—A Survey of the Last Eighteen Years ... ... 1—19 The tragedy of Aurangzib's life, 1—his movements during his last 20 years, 4—Maratha recovery after 1689, 7—war during 1692—93, 8—Aurangzib at Islampuri, 11—his sieges, 13—miserable condition of the country, 16—sad end of Aurangzib, 18.

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CHAPTER L.—Operations in Western Deccan during 1688—1695 ... 20—49 Maratha ministers and generals in 1689, 20—Rajaram's accession, 22—his flight to Madras Karnatak, 23—Aurangzib takes many forts, 26—Marathas capture Rustam Kh., 29—Panhala besieged by Muizz-ud-din, 33—Lutfullah's campaigns, 38—fighting in 1691-92, 41—Santa and Dhana active, 43—Kari fort, 47—Santa's movements, 47.

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CHAPTER LI.—Conquest of the Madras Karnatak ... ... 50—109 Karnatak : its divisions, 50—Harji Mahadik, Maratha viceroy, 53—Mughals enter Karnatak, 56—confusion and disorder, 59—Rajaram's Court at Jinji, 63—his dealings with the French and the English, 64—Zulfiqar arrives, 69—Jinji fortifications described, 70—Zulfiqar begins siege, 72—Santa and Dhana raise siege of Jinji, 78—Kam Bakhsh intrigues, 81, is arrested, 85—Mughal retreat to Wandiwash, 89—

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operations during 1693, 94—Zulfiqar against Tanjore, 97—operations in 1696, 103—fall of Jinji, 107.

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CHAPTER LII.—Struggle with the Marathas during 1695—1700 ... 110—137

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Qasim Kh. against Santa, 110—driven into Dodderi, 113—hardships of Mughals, 116—they capitulate, 117—Himmat Kh. killed by Santa, 120—Basavapatan relieved, 121—civil war between Dhana and Santa, 124—death of Santa, 127—character, 128—Rajaram in Maharashtra, 130—his last expedition, 132—death of Rajaram, 135—Tara Bai as regent, 136.

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CHAPTER LIII.—Mughal-Maratha Struggle in Konkan ... 138—158

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Divisions of Konkan, 138—its strategic importance, 139—Konkan under Shivaji, 141—Mughal invasion, 142—Matabar Kh.'s conquests in Nasik district, 146—and in Thana district, 150—Matabar's buildings in Kalian, 151—he renews war, 153—attacks Portuguese in Bassein, 155—last years of Matabar, 157.

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CHAPTER LIV.—Aurangzib besieges Maratha Forts ... 159—192

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Islampuri base, 159—Satara besieged, 161—falls, 166—Parli captured, 167—hardships of retreat, 168—flood in Khawaspur camp, 170—Panhala besieged, 173—Md. Murad's deeds, 174—Maratha activities, 177—Khelna (Vishalgarh) besieged, 180—Fathullah's heroism, 184—sufferings during return, 187—siege of Kondana (Singh-garh), 189—of Rajgarh & Torna, 191.

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CHAPTER LV.—Internal History of the Marathas ... ... 193—213 Ramchandra, regent in the West, 193—Rajaram's doings in Jinji, 194—Maratha system of guerilla warfare, 196—factions among Maratha ministers, 197—Tara Bai's character, 199—internal dissensions, 201—Shahu's captivity, 203—Maratha allies of Mughals, 207—Rai-bhan, 211.

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CHAPTER LVI.—Capture of Wagingera, 1705 ... ... 214—234 Berad race, character, 214—their Nayak family, 215—Pidia Nayak's career, 218—Wagingera described, 221—siege of Wagingera, 223—fight with Marathas, 225—peace negotiations, 227—Nusrat Jang's victories, 229—Wagingera taken, 233.

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CHAPTER LVII.—The Last Phase ... 235—267 Desolation of the country, 235—plunder and disorder, 237—famine, 239—Maratha system of spoliation described, 241—changes in Maratha tactics, 242—Aurangzib ill at Devapur, 244—marches to Ahmadnagar, 247—despair, 248—Maratha predominance, 250—Azam Shah plots against Kam Bakhsh, 254—last illness of Aurangzib, 256—death, 257. Appendix: Aurangzib's last letters to Azam, 259, and to Kam Bakhsh, 260—his last will, 262.

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CHAPTER LVIII.—War in Rajputana, 1681—1707 ... ... 268—292 War with Rathors for 30 years, 268—three stages of the war, 270—how Shujaet Khan controlled Marwar, 272—Durgadas and Durjan Sal Hada's raids, 277—Akbar's daughter restored to Aurangzib, 281—also his son Buland Akhtar, 284—second revolt of Durgadas and Ajit, 287—they submit, 289—Ajit's final triumph, 292.

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CHAPTER LIX.—Disorders in Northern India ... ... 293—311

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Causes of brigandage, 293—Jat risings near Agra, 295—Rajaram Jat's doings, 297—killed, 299—Jat forts taken, 300—Churaman, 302—Pahar Singh Gaur rebels, 303—his sons, 305—Gangaram Nagar's rebellion in Bihar, 308—Gopal Singh Chandawat in Malwa, 310.

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CHAPTER LX.—English Traders in India, 312—358

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Early English trade with Bengal, 312—friction with Mughal officials, 315—grievances of English traders examined, 317—Mughal Government's position explained, 321—English sack Hughli in 1686, 325—seize Hijli, 328—plunder and burn Balasore, 330—Emperor pardons English traders, 333—Sir Josiah Child orders war upon the Mughals, 336—English factors at Surat imprisoned, 337—European piracy in Indian seas, 340—Ganj-i-sawai looted, 343—Surat factors imprisoned, 346—Aurangzib's policy towards European traders, 349—Capt. Kidd plunders the Queda Merchant, 352—European traders forced to supply convoys, 354—Sir W. Norris's embassy, 355—confinement of Sir J. Gayer, 356—Dutch reprisals, 357.

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CHAPTER LXI.—Some Provinces ... 359—435

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*Bengal*: its natural wealth, 359—peace secured by Mughal conquest, 362—popular sufferings in 1660, 364—Shaista Kh.'s good deeds, 366—Shova Singh and Rahim Kh.'s rebellion, 370—Bengal under Murshid Quli Kh., 376—*Malwa*: its wealth, strategic importance, and composite population, 379—first Maratha incursion, 1699, 382—Nima Sindhia's raid in 1703, 383—Bidar Bakht in Malwa, 387—examples of disorder, 389—*Bundelkhand*: Chhatra Sal's early career, 390—rebellion, 395—later career, 397—*Gondwana*: its old kingdoms, 400—Deogarh history, 401—Chanda, 406—Bakht Buland's career, 408—and success, 410—*Kashmir*: Emperors' visits, 412—ignorance and poverty of people, 414—superstition, 416—flood, earthquake, and fire at Srinagar, 417—Mughal viceroys and their doings, 418—Shia-Sunni fight, 421—Prophet's foot-prints adored, 423—popular credulity, 424—*Gujrat*: the gate of India, 426—lawless tribes, 428—Maratha incursions, 428—Dhana's invasion in 1706, battle of Ratanpur, 431—persecution of Bohras, 432—and of Khojas, 434.

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CHAPTER LXII.—Condition of the People, 436—472

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Decline of the Mughal empire, 436—peace how very necessary, 438—economic exhaustion caused by Aurangzib's wars, 439—natural calamities, 441—trade and manufacture ruined, 443—peasants robbed, 445—Government turns bankrupt, 447—unpaid officials starve, 449—disorder and mal-administration in N. India, 451—subahdars too poor and weak to govern, 453—condition of Rajputs, 454—decay of Indian civilisation under Aurangzib, 455—official inefficiency, 457—ill education and depravity of nobles, 458—prevalent vices, 461—superstition, 461—contempt for foreign science, 464—slavery, 464—official bribery, 465—clerks, their life and character, 468—purity and joys of life of the masses, 469—popular religions, 470.

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CHAPTER LXIII.—Aurangzib and Indian Nationality ... ... 473—495

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Character of Aurangzib, 473—his over-centralisation and its effects, 477—real nature of Mughal Government, 480—an autocracy, 481—Hindu and Muslim outlook upon life how different, 482—political suppression of the Hindus, 485—decline of Indian Muhammadans, its causes, 486—the Indo-Muslim was an exotic, with intellectual vacuity due to language, 487—weakness of Hindu society, 489—religious amity and strife, 491—unprogressive spirit of old India, 493—significance of Aurangzib's reign in history, 494.

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Author's thanks ... ... ... 496

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[A general Index to all the five volumes with a full bibliography will be issued separately.]

Chapter XLIX. A Survey of the Last Eighteen Years.

§ 1. The tragedy of Aurangzib's life, how developed.

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The life of Aurangzib was one long tragedy,—a story of man battling in vain against an invisible but inexorable Fate, a tale of how the strongest human endeavour was baffled by the forces of the age. A strenuous reign of fifty years ends in colossal failure. And yet this king was one of the greatest rulers of Asia in intelligence, character, and enterprise. He was, in an extraordinary degree, hardworking, active, moral, and inspired by the sense of duty. He denied himself pleasure and repose, steeled his heart against the seductions of the senses and the appeals of pity and human weakness, and governed his people according to the best ideals of his age and creed. And yet the result of fifty years of strong and good administration by this Puritan in the purple was the hopeless breaking up of his empire. This tragedy in history was developed with all the regularity of a perfect drama.

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The first forty years of his life were spent in steady and arduous self-training and preparation for the supreme office in the realm. This seed-time was followed by a year of sharp contest for the throne, which put all his powers to the test and rewarded his energy, courage and sagacity with the golden crown of Delhi. Then came twenty-three years of peaceful and prosperous reign and settled residence in the great capitals of Northern India. With every enemy removed from his path, the whole empire of India obeying his command, and wealth and culture increasing from the peace and order that his firm and vigilant rule had ensured to the country,—Aurangzib seemed now to have attained to the summit of human happiness and glory. This was the third Act of his life, and after it began his decline. A pitiless Nemesis, like that of the Greek tragedy, raised against him an enemy in the very bosom of his family. The rebel son of Shah Jahan cannot long enjoy his triumph because he is confronted by the rebellion of his own son Muhammad Akbar (1681.)

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The flight of the defeated rebel to the Maratha king drew Aurangzib to Southern India, where he was destined to spend the last 26 years of his life in tents and wear out the empire's revenue, army, and organised administration as well as his own health in an unending and fruitless struggle. But the irony of Fate at first veiled from him and his contemporaries the futility of his efforts and the tragic close of his career. In the fourth Act of his life, which is comprehended in the fourth volume of this History, all seemed to go well with him;— Bijapur and Golkonda were annexed, the Berad chieftain of Sagar was forced to submit, and the troublesome Maratha king was brought to the block and his capital and entire family captured (1689). In this result nothing seemed to be wanting to complete the triumph of Aurangzib. But a few thoughtful observers could already discern ominous signs of the coming doom, peeping out here and there, while others were still blinded as to the future by the brilliancy of the empire. The seeds that had been sown in the third stage of his life, unnoticed and in ignorance of their fruits, began to sprout up in the fourth and he had to gather their baneful harvest in the fifth and closing period of his life.

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Therefore, the tragedy of Aurangzib is concentrated in the last eighteen years of his life (1689-1707), which form the theme of the present volume. Not that any one could at its outset forecast the exact course of the future, nor that events moved steadily in one direction only. Slowly but pitilessly his Fate works itself out, finally defeating all his efforts, though the invisible cause of his failure lay in his character and past deeds. Slowly but with increasing clearness does the tragic plot unfold itself, till Aurangzib realises the true nature of the forces arrayed against him and the real trend of affairs. But he does not abandon the struggle; even when the hopelessness of the contest forces itself on him and his Court, his endeavour is as strenuous as before. He tries new remedies; he changes his tactics with changes in the political situation and in the distribution of the enemy forces. At first he sends out his generals, while himself occupying a central position for their control and guidance. His generals fail to achieve a decision; very well, then this old man of eighty-two must go out to conduct the war in person for six years (1699-1705); and he retires to Ahmadnagar only when the first summons of death reaches him. Then, and then only does he mournfully recognise Ahmadnagar as destined to be his "journey's end" (khatam-us-safar.)*

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In this chapter I propose to take a general survey of Aurangzib's movements and policy during these last eighteen years,—how the situation developed at different times and in different theatres,—what steps he took to meet each of these new developments and with what results,—what leading actors arose at different stages of the contest and how they influenced the scene,—and how slowly but surely the moral decline of the empire passed into the actual dissolution of government and of social order at his death.

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§2. Aurangzib's movements during his last 20 years.

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When Golkonda fell to him (on 21st September 1687), a year after the conquest of Bijapur, Aurangzib's work in the Deccan seemed to have been completed. The long dream of the Mughal Emperors ever since the days of Akbar seemed at last to have been fully realised. No rival Muslim Power was left in the Deccan, and all India now bowed beneath the sceptre of Delhi. True, there was a Hindu king still unsubdued; but he was an upstart of limited means and his soldiers no better than brigands; their suppression, so it seemed, was only a question of time, now that the Mughal army was set free and the Marathas had no ally left to them anywhere in India.

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∗ Hamid-ud-din's Ahkam, § 56. K. K. (540) has Ikhtitam-i-safar.

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After the capture of Golkonda, Aurangzib lay encamped near that fort till 25th January 1688, in order to settle the administration of the conquered country, and then he returned to Bijapur (on 15th March) by way of Bidar and Kulbarga. At Bijapur he lived for the next nine months, till driven out (on 14th December) by a terrible outbreak of the plague. By way of Akluj and Bahadur-garh (on the Bhima) he reached Koregaon in the Puna district, where he encamped from 3rd March to 18th December 1689, and then returned to Bijapur (on 11th Jan. 1690), this being his third visit to the Adil Shahi capital. But he soon left it, and after spending February, March and April at different places south of that city, near the bank of the Krishna, he finally encamped at Galgala, on the southern side of that river and 34 miles south-west of Bijapur, about 21st May 1690. The rest of this year and the first two months of the next year were passed by him here; and then he went back to the environs of Bijapur for fourteen months (March 1691—May 1692). Thereafter, Galgala was again his residence, for nearly three years (May 1692—March 1695). Here the Venetian doctor Gemelli Careri visited him (21st March 1695) and has left a graphic account of his Court and personal habits.

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Finally, after a fifth and last visit to Bijapur for five weeks (April-May 1695), he settled at Brahmapuri on the southern bank of the Bhima, (some 20 miles south-east of Pandharpur), which his pious zeal renamed Islampuri. Here he lived for four years and a half (21 May 1695—19 Oct. 1699), travelling to Sholapur every year in Ramzan in order to spend the holy month there in prayer, fasting and meditation. At Islampuri his encampment was walled round, and here he left his family in charge of his wazir when he set out on 19th October, 1699, on that endless campaign against the Maratha forts which was to wear out the last years of his life, and from which he returned to Ahmadnagar (20 Jan. 1706), only to die a year later (20 Feb. 1707).

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Such briefly were Aurangzib's movements during the last twenty years of his reign. We shall now survey the changes in the military situation during this time.

§3. The Maratha recovery, 1690-91.

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The years 1688 and 1689 were a period of unbroken triumph to the Emperor. His armies marched east and south to take possession of the forts and provinces of the annexed kingdoms of Bijapur and Golkonda. Thus, Sagar (the Berad capital), Raichur and Adoni (in the east), Sera and Bangalore (in Mysore), Wandiwash and Conjeveram (in the Madras Karnatak), Bankapur and Belgaon (in the extreme south-west), were occupied; and to crown all, Shambhuji was captured and his capital with his entire family seized. As the Maratha chronicle says of 1689, "This year the Mughals took all the forts." In Northern India, too, signal success attended his arms: the Jat rising under Rajaram was put down and that leader was slain (on 4th July, 1688).

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But at the end of 1689 the new Maratha king Rajaram was known to have reached the fort of Jinji in safety, and the Emperor's forces had henceforth to be directed south-eastwards into the Mysore plateau and the Madras Karnatak if he was to preserve his rightful gains from Bijapur and Golkonda in those quarters and to check Maratha activity there. Thus, the brilliant success of Mughal arms since 1687 received a sharp set-back in 1690. Jinji became a centre of Maratha enterprise in the East Coast, while their ministers left at home organised resistance to the Mughals in the west. The difficulties of Aurangzib were only multiplied by the disappearance of a common head and a central Government among the Marathas, as every Maratha captain with his own retainers fought and raided in a different quarter and on his own account. It now became a people's war, and Aurangzib could not end it, because there was no Maratha Government or State-army for him to attack and destroy. The imperial forces could not be present everywhere in full strength; hence, they suffered reverses here and there. The enemy forts which the Mughals had captured or bought during the first panic following Shambhuji's downfall, now began to be recovered by the Marathas. The tide first turned against Aurangzib in May 1690, when his general Rustam Khan was captured and his whole camp looted by the Marathas.

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Throughout 1690 and 1691 the Emperor's chief concern still was to take possession of the almost boundless expanse of fertile territory in the south and the east, which had legally fallen to him as the heir-at-law of Adil Shah and Qutb Shah. At this stage, he evidently underrated the Maratha danger, as he hoped that with their capital and royal family in his hands and their new king invested in Jinji by the same general who had captured Sahu and Raigarh, the State of the Marathas had been practically annihilated. He had yet to take a proper measure of the Maratha people.

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§4. The fighting during 1692 and 1693.

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In the autumn of 1691 the Mughal position before Jinji became so dangerous that the Emperor had to divert large forces to that quarter. In 1692 nothing was achieved by the imperialists in the western theatre, while in the east coast the year ended with crushing disasters to their arms,—the capture of two high Mughal generals, the abandonment of the siege lines before Jinji, and the arrest of Prince Kam Bakhsh by his colleagues (Dec. 1692—Jan. 1693). So, the first thing to be done in 1693 was to save the situation by pouring reinforcements and supplies into the Eastern Karnatak. In the western theatre, Prince Muizz-ud-din, who had laid siege to Panhala in October 1692, toiled unsuccessfully throughout the next year, and was finally expelled by the Marathas in March 1694. In addition to this, there were the incessant raids of the Maratha partisan leaders,—Santa Ghorparé, Dhana Jadav, Nima Sindhia, Hanumant Rao and others,—diversified by occasional successes of the Mughal pursuing columns which had not the least decisive effect, but merely lightened the Maratha rovers of a part of their booty and some mares and arms, and sometimes cost them the lives of their rear-guard.

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Meantime, nearer the imperial head-quarters, over the broad and strategically important tract from Bidar to Bijapur and from Raichur to Malkhed, the activities of the hardy aboriginal tribe of Berads led by the genius of their chief Pidia Nayak, had become so serious that a large army under a first-rate general had to be posted at Sagar (72 miles east of Bijapur) from June 1691 to December 1692.

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Then the Berad chieftain made his submission, but he renewed his hostility three years later, when another large army had to be sent against him (1696).

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During 1694 the war in Western Deccan continued to be of the same indecisive and straggling character. Only in the Madras Karnatak the reinforced Mughal general made many conquests and levied contribution from Tanjore, but without thereby hastening the capture of the new Maratha capital at Jinji.

§5. Aurangzib realises his hopeless position, 1695.

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At last, by April 1695 Aurangzib came to realise that he had really gained nothing by the conquest of the Adil Shahi and Qutb Shahi capitals and the extinction of their royal lines. He had formally annexed their dominions and his officers had taken legal possession of their chief forts and administrative centres; but these gains had not been secured, they had not been made into "settled" provinces like the old subas of the empire. For Aurangzib, then, there was no going back to Delhi; his work in the Deccan was still unfinished; indeed, it was only just beginning.

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He now perceived that the Maratha problem was no longer what it had been in Shivaji's time, or even in Shambhuji's. They were no longer a tribe of banditti or local rebels, but the one dominating factor of Deccan politics, the only enemy left to the empire, and yet an enemy all-pervasive from Bombay to Madras across the Indian Peninsula, elusive as the wind, without any headman or stronghold whose capture would naturally result in the extinction of their power. They had now assumed the alarming character of being the ally and rallying point of all the enemies of the empire and all disturbers of public peace and regular administration throughout the Deccan and even in Malwa, the Central Provinces and Bundelkhand. A nation was now up in arms, or more correctly all the various tribes residing in Southern and Central India were up in arms with Maratha aid and concert, against the officers of the Emperor and the cause of law and order in general. Aurangzib realised that he was a frail man buffeting a raging ocean with his bare arms.

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His hope of returning to Delhi and ruling peacefully from that centre of the empire had at last to be given up as an empty dream. He must stay on the spot till death, if necessary.

§ 6. The Emperor's stay at Islampuri, 1695-1699.

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Therefore, in May 1695 he sent his eldest son to govern the north-western portion of the empire (the Panjab, Sindh, and afterwards Afghanistan) and to guard the western gateway of India, while he himself settled at Islampuri in as much permanence of residence as the military situation and his age (now verging on eighty) allowed. This place was his last abode, because though he actually lived here for the next 4½ years only, it remained ever after as his home and stronghold, the base (*bungah*) at the back of his campaigns.

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During the Islampuri period (1695-1699), the Maratha danger came nearer home and drove the Mughals into the defensive in the Marathi and Kanarese districts of the present Bombay Presidency. The movements of the roving bands under Santa Ghorpare, Dhana Jadav and their imitators were bewilderingly rapid and unexpected. The Mughals could not defend every place; their pursuing columns panted helplessly behind the "robbers" and wore themselves out in vain. Local representatives of the Emperor, who had learnt by bitter experience that aid could not be expected from their master in time,—and sometimes ever at all,—made unauthorised terms with the Marathas by promising them an annual blackmail of one-fourth of the revenue (*chauth.*) They were still more urged to do it by the fact that if the Marathas looted a district the Emperor ordered his local governor to make the loss good to the victims! If a Mughal officer resisted the Marathas and was defeated and captured by them, he had to provide his own ransom, and the Emperor would often dismiss such unfortunate sufferers on the suspicion of cowardice. Hence, it was safer for a Mughal commander to bribe the Marathas than to fight them; certainly, it was cheaper. Worse than these, many imperialists made a concert with the enemy and enriched themselves by robbing the Emperor's own subjects a innocent traders, as these officers had been starving at getting no rent from their devastated fiefs. The Mughal administration had really dissolved, and only the presence of the Emperor with all his troops in the country held it together, but it was now a delusive phantom. Santa and Dhana were the heroes of this period; the initiative lay entirely with them, and they upset every plan and calculation formed by the imperialists.

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The chief incidents of this Islampuri period were Santa's destruction of two great Mughal generals, Qasim Khan (Nov. 1695) and Himmat Khan (Jan. 1696), the murder of Santa in a domestic feud (June 1697), the Mughal capture of Jinji (7 Jan. 1698), and the return of Rajaram to Maharashtra.

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§ 7. Aurangzib's last campaigns, 1699-1705.

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This last event forced a change on Aurangzib's policy. Safe in the undisputed possession of the east coast, he could now concentrate all his resources in the western theatre of war. Such a change of objective had become necessary too, as the head and centre of the Maratha power had once more shifted to the west and he could destroy it only by seizing their king's forts and family in Maharashtra and thus repeating once again, but in a more decisive and final form, the success that had followed his capture of Shambhuji and his capital in 1689.

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Now, therefore, began the last stage of Aurangzib's career,—the sieges of successive Maratha forts by the Emperor in person. The rest of his life (1699-1707) is a repetition of the same sickening tale : a hill-fort captured by him after a vast expenditure of time men and money, the fort recovered by the Marathas from the weak Mughal garrison after a few months, and its siege begun again by the Mughals a year or two later! His soldiers and camp-followers suffered unspeakable hardships in marching over flooded rivers, muddy roads, and broken hilly tracks ; porters disappeared ; transport beasts died of hunger and overwork ; scarcity of grain was ever present in his camp. His officers wearied of this labour of Sisyphus ; but Aurangzib would burst into wrath at any suggestion of return to Northern India and taunt the unlucky counsellor with cowardice and love of ease [Ahkam §46.] One by one the old able and independent officers and courtiers of his earlier years had passed away, and he was now surrounded only by timid sycophants and upstart nobles of his own creation, who could never venture to contradict him in his errors, nor give him honest counsel. The mutual jealousies of his generals—Nusrat Jang against Firuz Jang, Shujaet Khan against Muhammad Murad, Tarbiyat Khan against Fathullah Khan,—ruined his affairs as completely as the French cause in the Peninsular War was ruined by the jealousies of Napoleon's marshals. Therefore, the Emperor must conduct every operation in person, or nothing would be done.

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A bare list of his sieges is given below :— Basant-garh (siege, 22nd—25th Nov. 1699). Satara (siege, 8 Dec. 1699—21 April 1700). Parli-garh (siege, 30 April—9 June). Halt at Khawaspur for the rainy season of 1700 (from 30 Aug.) Panhala (siege, 9 March—28 May, 1701). Pavan-garh (do.) Halt at Khatau for the rainy season of 1701 (29 May—7 Nov.) Capture of Wardhan-garh (6 June) Nandgir, Chandan and Wandan (6 Oct.) by Fathullah Khan. Khelna (siege, 26 Dec. 1701—4 June 1702). Halt at Bahadur-garh for the rainy season of 1702. Kondana (siege, 27 Dec. 1702—8 April 1703). Halt at Puna for the rainy season of 1703 (1 May—10 Nov.) Rajgarh (siege, 2 Dec. 1703—16 Feb. 1704). Torna (siege, 23 Feb.—10 March). Halt at Khed for the rainy season of 1704 (17 April—22 Oct.) Wagingera (siege, 8 Feb.—27 April 1705). Halt at Devapur for the rainy season of 1705 (May—23 Oct.)

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This was the last campaign of the old campaigner of eighty-eight, for here he received a warning of what was to come. At Devapur a severe illness seized him, which was aggravated by his insistence on transacting business as usual. The whole camp was thrown into despair and confusion. At length Aurangzib yielded to their entreaty and the warning of approaching death, and retreated to Ahmadnagar (20 January 1706), to die there a year afterwards.

§ 8. Sorrow and misery of his last years.

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The last few years of his life were inexpressibly sad. On its public side there was the consciousness that his long reign of half a century had been a colossal failure. The endless war in the Deccan exhausted his treasury; the Government turned bankrupt; the soldiers starving from arrears of pay (usually three years overdue) mutinied; and during the closing years of his reign the revenue of Bengal, regularly sent by the honest and able *diwan* Murshid Quli Khan, was the sole support of the Emperor's household and army, and its arrival was eagerly looked forward to. While in the Deccan the Marathas remained supreme to the end, lawlessness reigned in many places of Northern and Central India also. The old Emperor in the far South lost control over his officers in Hindustan, and the administration grew slack and corrupt; chiefs and zamindars defied the local authorities and asserted themselves, filling the country with tumult, and the great anarchy began in the empire of Delhi even before Aurangzib had closed his eyes.

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In the Deccan, the Maratha captains, each acting on his own account, incessantly raided Mughal territory and did the greatest possible injury to the imperialists by their guerilla warfare. They seemed to be ubiquitous and elusive like the wind. The movable columns frequently sent out from the imperial head-quarters to "chastise the robbers", only marched and counter-marched, without being able to crush the enemy. When the Mughal forces had gone back, the scattered Marathas, like water parted by the oar, closed again and resumed their attack as before. There was an exultant and menacing Maratha army always hanging three or four miles behind the Emperor's camp wherever it marched or halted.

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The wastage of the Deccan war, which raged intensely for nearly 20 years, was one hundred thousand soldiers and followers and three times that number of horses, elephants, camels and oxen on the Mughal side every year (*Storia*, iv. 96). In the imperial camp pestilence was always present and the daily mortality was heavy from the immense numbers of men crowded together, the accumulation of filth and flies, and the unbearable stench. (*Ibid*, 116.) The economic exhaustion of the Deccan was complete; "the fields were left devoid of trees and bare of crops, their places being taken by the bones of men and beasts. The country was so entirely desolated and depopulated that neither fire nor light could be found in the course of a three or four days' journey." (*Ibid*, 252.) Trade and revenue collection had long ceased, and incessant brigandage by both sides had at last left nothing to be looted.

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§ 9. The end of Aurangzib.

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In addition to the failure of his rule, Aurangzib's domestic life was loveless and dreary, and wanting in the benign peace and cheerfulness and the kindred warmth which throw a halo round old age. He was ever haunted by the fear that his sons would treat him as he had treated Shah Jahan. Lastly, there was the certainty of a deluge of blood when he would close his eyes and his three surviving sons, each supported by a provincial army and treasury, would fight for the throne to the bitter end. Death was busy at work within his family circle for some years before his own end. In the midst of the darkness closing around him, he used to hum the pathetic verses :—

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By the time you have reached your 80th or 90th year,
You will have received many a hard blow from the
hand of Time ;
And when from that point you reach the stage of a
hundred years,
Death will put on the form of your life.

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His last illness overtook him at Ahmadnagar, late in January 1707; then he rallied for five or six days, sent away his two sons Azam and Kam Bakhsh from his camp to their provincial governments, and resumed his daily prayers and official work. But that worn-out frame of 90 years had now been taxed beyond human endurance. A severe fever set in, and in the morning of Friday, 20th February, 1707, he sank into eternal rest.

Chapter L.

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OPERATIONS IN WESTERN DECCAN DURING 1688-1695.

§ 1. The leading Maratha ministers and generals at the accession of Rajaram.

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When the great Shivaji's successor Shambhuji was killed by Aurangzib (March 1689) and his family was closely besieged in Raigarh, it seemed very likely that the newly created Maratha kingdom and independent nationality would be destroyed very soon. The prospect became still more gloomy at the end of the year, when Shambhuji's sons were captured and his successor Rajaram driven into hopeless flight by the Mughals. In this terrible national crisis the genius of the Maratha people saved them and secured their liberty. It is, therefore, necessary to study the leaders of this almost kingless State during the period.

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At the time of the downfall of Shambhuji and the hurried crowning of Rajaram (Feb. 1689), the leading persons in the Maratha State who had survived the havoc of Shambhuji's reign were three: Nilkantha Moreshwar Pinglé the Peshwa, Ramchandra Nilkantha Bavdékar the Amatya, and Shankaraji Malhar the Sachiv.* In addition to them there was an officer possessed of the highest cleverness and experience, namely, Prahlad, the son of the late Chief Justice and shrewd diplomatist, Niraji Ravji. This Prahlad had been Maratha ambassador at Golkonda, and had, in that capacity, done signal services to Shivaji and Shambhuji, and the influence and knowledge that he had thus acquired were so great that he became all in all in the council of Rajaram at Jinji.

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∗ This distribution of offices is tentative, being based upon Chitnis, ii. 39-40. In the *Modern Review*, May 1924, p. 588, a writer gives reasons for doubting its correctness.

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Three other men, who had hitherto filled only subordinate posts, now forced their way by their genius and enterprise to the first rank of State servants and popular leaders in this crisis of Maratha history. They were Dhana Singh Jadav and Santaji Ghorparé (the two rivals for the office of Senapati), and Parashuram Trimbak, who finally rose to the post of Regent in 1701.*

§ 2. Rajaram's position and policy on his accession, 1689.

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In the last year of Shambhuji's reign (1688), the splendid State created by the genius and valour of Shivaji seemed about to break to pieces. Many vassal chiefs, notably the Savants of Vadi, had been in rebellion for some time past and could not be conquered. In November 1688, the Shirké family had risen in arms with the sympathy of the discontented ministers jealous of the foreign favourite Kavikalas and the good wishes of all who despaired of the safety of Shivaji's heritage in the hands of the drunken profligate Shambhu; but they had been defeated and driven out of the country, and the king had taken swift vengeance by throwing into prison Prahlad Niraji, the chief *karkuns* and many other prominent officers (December)—which had the effect of paralysing the administration [Z. S.]

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∗ Chit. ii. 71; Bharatvarsha, year 1, No. 3, pp. 31—40; Kaifiyats, p. 146.

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Less than two months after this *coup* had come the crushing blow of the capture of Shambhu by the Mughals (about 3rd February, 1689). To many of the Marathas this disaster probably appeared as a blessing in disguise: the hateful North Indian favourite who had bewitched the king and the insolent and capricious Rajah himself, whom no patriot and no honourable man could serve, were both removed by one stroke of fate.

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Immediately after hearing of Shambhuji's capture, Changoji Katkar, the qiladar of Raigarh, with the support of Yesaji Kank, the old Mavlé captain and comrade of Shivaji's youth, took Rajaram out of prison and seated him on the throne (8th February). The State officers confined by the late king,—some in 1684 and others only two months ago—were all released. Shambhuji's heir Shahu was a boy of six only, and therefore the dowager queen, Yesu Bai, very wisely supported Rajaram instead of urging the claims of her own son. It was not a time for woman's rule or infant's rule. Even before the capture of Shambhuji, a Mughal army had been detached in December 1688 under the able general Zulfiqar Khan, against his capital, and now (February 1689) the fort was invested in right earnest. [M. A. 331, 327.] As the besiegers strengthened their posts, Rajaram wisely decided not to risk his all by shutting himself up in that fort, but to go out of it in time, raise forces from the country at large, and with them try to drive away the besiegers of Raigarh.

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So, he slipped out of the fort in the garb of a Hindu religious beggar (yogi) on 5th April, and by way of Pratapgarh, Satara and Parli went to Panhala, where with the help of Ramchandra he began to levy fresh troops. But the Mughals were after him, and he found no real safety anywhere in the home country. True, all these forts were still in his possession; but how long would they withstand the captor of Bijapur and Golkonda? Moreover, it would be a wise strategy to divide the enemy's forces by transferring a part of the Maratha activities to the far-off East Coast, while the Mughals were kept in play on the western side of the Peninsula by his other officers. So he decided to retire to the Madras Karnatak and there make a stand with the help of his first cousin Shahji II of Tanjore (the successor of Vyankoji).

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The plan of operations for the future was thus arranged: Rajaram was to be escorted to Jinji by Prahlad Niraji (as his chief counsellor) with a number of generals like Dhana Jadav, Santa Ghorparé and some others. The supreme control of affairs in the homeland was vested in Ramchandra N. Bavdékar, the *Amatya*, with his head-quarters first in Vishalgarh and latterly in Parli, assisted by Shankaraji Malhar (the *Sachiv*) and certain other officers. All officials and captains in the homeland were to take their orders from Ramchandra and obey him like the king himself. The commands of this dictator of the West were not to be upset even by the king on appeal. The supreme authority thus conferred on Ramchandra was designated by his new title of *Hakumat-panah*. Ramchandra had an inborn genius for command and organisation. He gathered round himself the ablest lieutenants, men like Parashuram Trimbak and Shankaraji Narayan, and managed to make the mutually jealous and contentious Maratha guerilla leaders act in concert, though his orders lacked the prestige and authority which the king's presence in Maharashtra could have given to them and though he was confronted by a tireless clever and powerful enemy like Aurangzib. Ramchandra's masterly insight and consummate tact were proved by his exact adaptation of his policy and plan of operations to the genius of his countrymen and the actual situation in the midst of which he had to work.

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Finding the Mughal pursuit dangerously close and persistent, Rajaram left Panhala about 30th June 1689,* passed through many perilous adventures and a period of concealment in Bednur territory, and then by rapid marches reached Vellore on 28th October, and some four days later entered Jinji "in humble guise" like a poor private person. There he took over the government from the unwilling hands of Harji Mahadik's widow and son, formed a full Court and began to reign like a king, though in extreme poverty. The Peshwa Nilkantha M. Pinglé accompanied his master to Jinji, but there fell completely into the second place. He merely stamped his seal on the royal letters, while the king's leading counsellor and the supreme authority in the State was Prahlad Niraji, on whom the high title of Regent (Pratinidhi) was conferred and who thus stood outside and above the cabinet of eight ministers (Ashta-Pradhan).

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∗ Z. S. says that Rajaram fled from Raigarh to Pratapgarh on 10 Chaitra Badi (=5 Apr. 1689), issued from Panhala on 8 Ashwin Badi (=26 Sep.) and reached Vellore on 11 Kartik Badi (=28 Oct.) The initial and final dates are correct, but in the middle one I suggest Asharh for Ashwin (thus getting 30 June for the departure from Panhala), because it is hardly possible for a man to cover the 500 miles from Panhala, via Bednur to Vellore in the 32 days (26 Sep.—28 Oct.) that Z. S. gives to this journey. Moreover, we know from the contemporary imperial history Masir-i-Alamgiri (328) that Rajaram went through many adventures after leaving Panhala; he was overtaken by the Mughals on an island in the Tungabhadra on the frontier of Bednur, escaped from the ring of his enemies, and was concealed by the Rani of Bednur and subsequently allowed to go away. A week or two of time must be allowed for these causes of delay, but Z. S.'s dates leave no room for them in the last part of Rajaram's journey. Chitnis's itinerary of Rajaram [ii. 26—31] seems to me to be imaginary and of no value.

§ 3. Aurangzib's successes and policy during 1689.

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When Rajaram fled from Maharashtra (1689), Aurangzib had already won many of the Maratha forts and was rapidly winning others by money or force, as the enemy were paralysed by Shambhuji's misgovernment and subsequent downfall. In the extreme north, Salhir (21 Feb. 1687) and Trimbak (8 Jan. 1689) had been captured, and in the centre Singhgarh (Nov. 1684) and Rajgarh (May 1689), while in North Konkan his able agent Matabar Khan was on the high tide of success, taking fort after fort, as will be described in Chapter LIII. Only the capital Raigarh and the three very important fortresses of Vishalgarh, Satara and Panhala still remained in Maratha possession. Of these Raigarh and Panhala were to fall before the year was over.

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