Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

A History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, so far as it illustrates the Primitive Religion of the Brahmans c8: Chapter I. The Sûtra Period

A History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, so far as it illustrates the Primitive Religion of the Brahmans c8

Language
English

Contents

Chapter I. The Sûtra Period

c8.2

The *Sûtra* period, with which we have to begin, is of peculiar importance to the history of Indian literature, inasmuch as it forms the connecting link between the Vedic and the later Sanskrit. While on the one hand we must place several works written in *Sûtras* under the head of the post-Vedic or modern Sanskrit, we shall also find others which, although written in continuous *Anushtubh-ślokas*, or, more frequently, intermixed with *Trishtubh* and other verses (as, for instance, some of the *Prâtiśâkhyas* and *Anukramanîs*, and the still more modern *Pariśishtas*), must be considered as the last productions of the Vedic age, trespassing in a certain degree upon the frontier of the later Sanskrit.

c8.3

It is difficult to explain the peculiarities of the style of the *Sûtra* literature to any one who has not worked his way through the *Sûtras* themselves. It is impossible to give anything like a literal translation of these works, written as they are in the most artificial, elaborate, and enigmatical form. *Sûtra* means string; and all the works written in this style, on subjects the most various, are nothing but one uninterrupted string of short sentences, twisted together into the most concise form. Shortness is the great object of this style of composition, and it is a proverbial saying (taken from the *Mahâbhâshya*)

c8.4

amongst the Pandits¹, that "an author rejoiceth in the economising of half a short vowel as much as in the birth of a son." Every doctrine thus propounded, whether grammar, metre, law, or philosophy, is reduced to a mere skeleton. All the important points and joints of a system are laid open with the greatest precision and clearness, but there is nothing in these works like connection or development of ideas. "Even the apparent simplicity of the design vanishes," as Colebrooke remarks, "in the perplexity of the structure. The endless pursuit of exceptions and limitations so disjoins the general precepts, that the reader cannot keep in view their intended connection and mutual relation. He wanders in an intricate maze, and the clew of the labyrinth is continually slipping from his hands." There is no life and no spirit in these Sûtras, except what either a teacher or a running commentary, by which these works are usually accompanied, may impart to them.

c8.5

¹ Benares Magazine, Oct. 1849.

c8.6

Many of these works go even further: they not only express their fundamental doctrines in this concise form of language, but they coin a new kind of language, if language it can be called, by which they succeed in reducing the whole system of their tenets to mere algebraic formulas. To understand these is quite impossible without finding first what each algebraic *x*, *y*, and *z*, is meant to represent, and without having the key to the whole system. This key is generally given in separate Sûtras, called *Paribhâshâ*, which a pupil must know by heart, or always have present before his eyes, if he is to advance one step in the reading of such works. But even then it would be impossible to arrive at any real understanding of the subject, without being also in possession of the laws of the so-called Anuvritti and Nirvritti. To explain the meaning of these technical words, we must remember that the Sûtras generally begin by putting forward one proposition (Adhikâra), which is afterwards never repeated, but always to be understood, till a new subject of the same kind is introduced. After the statement of a subject, the author goes on by giving a first rule, which may extend its influence over the next following rules, whether these be restrictions or amplifications of it. These restrictive rules exercise again their influence to a certain extent over other rules, so that the whole becomes one continuous chain, each link held and modified by the others, and itself holding to and modifying the rest. The influence of one rule over the others is called Anuvritti, its cessation, Nirvritti. Without knowing the working of these two laws, which can only be learnt from commentaries, the Sûtras become very much confused. This is particularly the case in those works where the so-called Mîmânsâ method of Pûrva-paksha (reasons contrà), Uttara-paksha (reasons pro), and Siddhânta (conclusion), is adopted. Here the concatenation of pros and cons is often so complicated, and the reasons on both sides defended by the same author with such seriousness, that we sometimes remain doubtful to which side the author himself leans, till we arrive at the end of the whole chapter. It is indeed one of the most curious kinds of literary composition that the human mind ever conceived; and though altogether worthless in an artistic point of view, it is wonderful that the Indians should have invented and mastered this difficult form, so as to have made it the vehicle of expression for every kind of learning. To introduce and to maintain such a species of literature was only possible with the Indian system of education, which consisted in little else except implanting these Sûtras and other works into the tender memory of children, and afterwards explaining them by commentaries and glosses. An Indian pupil learns these Sûtras of grammar, philosophy, or theology by the same mechanical method which fixes in our minds the alphabet and the multiplication-table; and those who enter into a learned career spend half their life in acquiring and practising them, until their memory is strengthened to such an unnatural degree, that they know by heart not only these Sûtras, but also their commentaries, and commentaries upon commentaries. Instances of this are found among the learned in India up to the present day.

c8.7

These numerous Sûtra works which we still possess, contain the quintessence of all the knowledge which the Brahmans had accumulated during many centuries of study and meditation. Though they are the work of individuals, they owe to their authors little more than their form; and even that form was, most likely, the result of a long-continued system of traditional teaching, and not the invention of a few individuals.

c8.8

There is a great difference, according to the notions of the Hindus themselves, between a work composed previous to the Sûtra period, and a Sûtra composition. The difference of style between a Brâhmaṇa and a Sûtra work (with the exception of some Kalpa-Sûtras, to be mentioned hereafter) would strike every body at first sight, although, as regards the grammatical forms, Vedic irregularities are, according to Sanskrit grammarians, allowed in Sûtras also.¹ But there is another, and more important difference. Literary works, belonging to the preceding periods, the Brâhmaṇas as well as the Mantras, are considered by Indian theologians as forming the Śruti, or divine revelation, in contra-distinction to the Sûtras and all the rest of their literature. In the dogmatical language of orthodox Hindus, the works, which contain the Śruti, have not been composed, but have only been seen or perceived by men, *i.e.*, they have been revealed to men. The Sûtras, on the contrary, although based upon the Śruti, and therefore in some instances also called Śrauta Sûtras, are yet avowedly composed by human authors. Whenever they appear to be in contradiction with the Śruti, their authority is at once overruled, and only in cases where anterior evidence is wanting from the Śruti, can they have any claim to independent authority.

c8.9

¹ Vedic forms occur in the Prâtiśâkhya-Sûtras, and are pointed out as such by the commentators. For instance, I. Prâtiśâkhya, iv. 33. ता वशंगमानि instead of तानि वशंगमानि। The Commentator says, तानिश्शब्दलोपो द्रष्टव्यः। छंदोवत्सूत्राणि भवंति। The same applies also to the Sâmayâchârika-Sûtras, for instance, those of Âpastamba, i. 53., where we read अधा-सनशायी। The Commentator explains this irregular form by अधःशब्दस्य सवर्णदीर्घश्छंदसो ऽपपाठो वा। Again, i. 93. we find अग्लास्तु explained by the Commentary as तच्चानुस्वार-पाठश्छंदसः। अपपाठो वा। Gautama-Sûtras, p. 40. l. 20. we read सकारांतपाठ आर्षः सुमेधसो दुर्मधस इत्यादिषु दर्शनात्॥

c8.10

Now, even if we had no other means of proving that the Sûtras could have been composed only after the composition of the Brâhmaṇas, there would be no reason to consider this distinction, drawn by the Indians themselves between their sacred and profane literature, as altogether artificial and devoid of historical meaning, particularly if it can be shown how great an influence that very distinction has exercised on the religious struggles of India.

c8.11

It is clear that this distinction has ever been the stronghold of the hierarchical pretensions of the Brahmans. We can understand how a nation might be led to ascribe a superhuman origin to their ancient national poetry, particularly if that poetry consisted chiefly of prayers and hymns addressed to their gods. But it is different with the prose compositions of the Brâhmaṇas. The reason why the Brâhmaṇas, which are evidently so much more modern than the Mantras, were allowed to participate in the name of Śruti, could only have been because it was from these theological compositions, and not from the simple old poetry of the hymns, that a supposed divine authority could be derived for the greater number of the ambitious claims of the Brahmans. But, although we need not ascribe any weight to the arguments by which the Brahmans endeavoured to establish the contemporaneous origin of the Mantras and Brâhmaṇas, there seems to be no reason why we should reject as equally worthless the general opinion with regard to the more ancient date of both the Brâhmaṇas and Mantras, if contrasted with the Sûtras and the profane literature of India. It may easily happen, where there is a canon of sacred books, that later compositions become incorporated together with more ancient works, as was the case with the Brâhmaṇas. But we can hardly imagine that old and genuine parts should ever have been excluded from a body of sacred writings, and a more modern date ascribed to them, unless it be in the interest of a party to deny the authority of certain doctrines contained in these rejected documents. There is nothing in the later literature of the Sûtras to warrant a supposition of this kind. We can find no reason why the Sûtras should not have been ranked as Śruti, except the lateness of their date, if compared with the Brâhmaṇas, and still more with the Mantras. Whether the Brahmans themselves were aware that ages must have elapsed between the period during which most of the poems of their Rishis were composed, and the times which gave rise to the Brâhmaṇas, is a question which we need hardly hesitate to answer in the affirmative. But the recklessness with which Indian theologians claim for these Brâhmaṇas the same title and the same age as for the Mantras, shows that the reasons must have been peculiarly strong which deterred them from claiming the same divine authority for the Sûtras.

c8.12

To ascribe to literary compositions such as the Mantras and Brâhmaṇas a divine origin, and to claim for them a divine and absolute authority, is a step which can hardly pass unnoticed in the intellectual history of a nation, whether for the circumstances which led to it, or for the results which it produced. Now, in India the results of that fatal step are palpable. It may have been intended as a check on religious reforms, but it led to a religious revolution.

c8.13

Buddhism would be unintelligible, unless as the overthrow of a system which had tried to maintain its position by an appeal to a divine revelation; and we may be certain that the distinction between Śruti and Smṛiti, between revealed and profane literature, was established by the Brahmans, previous to the schism of Buddha.

c8.14

If the belief was once established, that not only the simple effusions of the Ṛishis, but the pointed doctrines of the Brâhmaṇas also, emanated from a divine source, and could not therefore be attacked by human reasoning, it is clear that every opposition to the privileges which the Brahmans claimed for themselves, on the sacred authority of the Veda, became heresy; and where the doctrines of the Brahmans were the religion of the people, or rather of the king, such opposition was amenable to the hierarchical laws of the state. The Brahmans themselves cared much more to see the divine authority of the Śruti as such implicitly acknowledged, than to maintain the doctrines of the Ṛishis in their original simplicity and purity. In philosophical discussions, they allowed the greatest possible freedom; and, although at first three philosophical systems only were admitted as orthodox (the two Mîmânsâs and the Nyâya), their number was soon raised to six, so as to include the Vaiśeshika, Sânkhya, and Yoga-schools.¹ The most conflicting views on points of vital importance were tolerated as long as their advocates succeeded, no matter by what means, in bringing their doctrines into harmony with passages of the Veda, strained and twisted in every possible sense. If it was only admitted that, besides the perception of the senses and the induction of reason, revelation also, as contained in the Veda, furnished a true basis for human knowledge, all other points seemed to be of minor importance. Philosophical minds were allowed to exhaust all possible views on the relation between the real and transcendental world, the Creator and the created, the divine and the human nature. It was not from such lucubrations that danger was likely to accrue to the caste of the Brahmans. Nor was the heresy of Buddha Śâkya Muni found so much in his philosophical doctrines, many of which may be traced in the orthodox atheism of Kapila. His real crime lay in his opposition to the exclusive privileges and abuses of the Brâhmans. These abuses were sanctioned by the divine authority of the Veda¹, and particularly of the Brâhmaṇas. In attacking the abuses, Buddha attacked the divine authority on which they were founded, and the argument was short: he is a heretic; anathema esto.

c8.15

¹ Kumârila quotes Sânkhya and Yoga, together with other heretical systems. सांख्ययोगपांचरात्रपाशुपतशाक्यनिर्ग्रन्थ-परिगृहीतधर्माधर्मनिबंधनानि॥ As to the Vaiśeshikas, see page 84.

c8.16

¹ The Buddhists say that the three Vedas were propounded originally by Maha Brahma, at which time they were perfect truth; but they have since been corrupted by the Brahmans and now contain many errors. Cf. R. Spence Hardy, Eastern Monachism, p. 185.

c8.17

Buddha was a Kshatriya.² He was of princely

c8.18

² Kumârila always speaks of Buddha as a Kshatriya who tried to become a Brahman. For instance,

c8.19

स्वधर्मातिरेकेण च क्षत्रियेण सता प्रवृत्तप्रतिग्रहौ प्रतिपन्नौ। And again, बुद्धादेः पुनरयमेवातिक्रमो ऽलंकारबुद्धौ स्थितः। origin, and belonged to the nobility of the land. He was not the first of his caste who opposed the ambition of the Brahmans. Several centuries before Buddha, Viśvâmitra, who, like Buddha, was a member of the royal caste, had to struggle against the exclusiveness of the priests. At that early time, however, the position of the Brahmans was not yet impregnable; and Viśvâmitra, although a Kshatriya, succeeded in gaining for himself and his family the rights for which he struggled, and which the Brahmans had previously withheld from all but their own caste. King Janaka of Videha again, whose story is given in the Brâhmaṇas, refused to submit to the hierarchical pretensions of the Brahmans, and asserted his right of performing sacrifices without the intercession of priests. However great the difference may have been between the personal character of these two men and of Buddha,

c8.20

येनैवमाह कलिकलुषकृतानि यानि लोके मयि निपतंतु विमुच्यतां तु लोक इति स किल लोकहितार्थं क्षत्रियधर्ममतिक्रम्य ब्राह्मणवृत्तिं प्रवृत्तं प्रतिपद्य प्रतिषेधातिक्रमसमथैर्ब्राह्मणैरननुशिष्टं धर्मं बाह्यजनानुशास्तिं धर्मपीडामप्यात्मनो ऽङ्गीकृत्य परानुग्रहं कृतवानित्येवंविधैरेव गुणैः स्तूयते॥

c8.21

“And this very transgression of Buddha and his followers is represented as if it did him honour. For he is praised because he said, ‘Let all the sins that have been committed in this world fall on me, that the world may be delivered.’ It is said that if he thus transgressed the duty of a Kshatriya, and entered the life of a Brahman and preached, it was merely for the good of mankind; and that in adopting for the instruction of excluded people a law which had not been taught by the Brahmans, he took the sin upon himself and was benefiting others.”

c8.22

the first principle of their opposition was the same. All three were equally struggling against the overweening pretensions of a selfish priesthood.

c8.23

But while Viśvâmitra contented himself with maintaining the rights of his tribe or family, and became reconciled as soon as he was allowed to share in the profits of the priestly power, — while King Janaka expressed himself satisfied with the homage paid to him by Yâjnavalkya and other Brahmans, — while, in short, successive reformers as they appeared were either defeated or gained over to the cause of the Brahmans, — the seeds of discontent were growing up in the minds of the people. There is a dark chapter in the history of India, the reported destruction of all the Kshatriyas by Paraśu-râma. It marks the beginning of the hierarchical supremacy of the Brahmans. Though the Brahmans seem never to have aspired to the royal power, their caste, as far as we know the history and traditions of India, has always been in reality the ruling caste. Their ministry was courted as the only means of winning divine favour, their doctrines were admitted as infallible, their gods were worshipped as the only true gods, and their voice was powerful enough to stamp the simple strains of the Rishis, and the absurd lucubrations of the authors of the Brâhmaṇas, with a divine authority. After this last step, however, the triumph of Brahmanism was preparing its fall. In India, less than in any other country, would people submit to a monopoly of truth; and the same millions who were patiently bearing the yoke of a political despotism threw off the fetters of an intellectual tyranny. In order to overthrow one of the oldest religions of the world, it was sufficient that one man should challenge the authority of the Brahmans, the gods of the earth, (bhûdeva), and preach among the scorned and degraded creatures of God the simple truth that salvation was possible without the mediation of priests, and without a belief in books to which these very priests had given the title of revelation. This man was Buddha Śâkya Muni.

c8.24

Now if we inquire how Buddha’s doctrines were met by the Brahmans, it is true that here and there in their philosophical works they have endeavoured to overthrow some of his metaphysical axioms by an appeal to reason. An attempt of this kind we have, for instance, in Vâchaspati Miśra’s commentary on the Vedânta Sûtras. In commenting on the tenet of Buddha, that “ideas like those of being, and not-being, &c., do not admit of discussion,”¹ Vâchaspati observes that the very fact of speaking of these ideas, includes the possibility of their conception; nay, that to affirm they do not admit of reasoning involves an actual reasoning on them, and proves that the mind can conceive the idea of being as different from that of not-being.

c8.25

¹ सदादीनामप्यविचारं न सहते॥

c8.26

Such, however, were not the usual weapons with which Brahmanism fought against Buddhism. The principal objection has always been, that Buddha’s teaching could not be true, because it did not derive its sanction from Śruti or revelation. The Brahmans, as a caste, would readily have allowed being and not-being, and the whole of Buddha’s philosophy, as they did the Sânkhya philosophy, which on the most important points is in open opposition to the Vedânta. But while Kapila, the founder of the Sânkhya school, conformed to the Brahmanic test by openly proclaiming the authority of revelation as paramount to reasoning and experience, Buddha would not submit to this, either for his philosophical (abhidharma), or for his much more important moral and religious doctrines (vinaya). No doubt it would have been easy for him to show how some of his doctrines harmonised with passages of the Veda, as in the Veda all possible shades of the human mind have found their natural reflection. If he had done so only for some of his precepts, such, for instance, as, "Thou shalt not murder,"¹ "Thou shalt not drink,"² "Thou shalt eat standing,"³ the Brahmans would readily have passed over other doctrines, even such as came into practice after Buddha's death, like "Who longs for heaven, shall worship the holy sepulchre,"⁴ "He shall pull out his hair,"⁵ &c. As he refused to do so, the line of argument taken by the Brahmans was simply confined to an appeal to revelation, in disproof of the possibility of the truth of Buddha's doctrines.

c8.27

¹ न हन्यात्।

c8.28

² न पिबेत्। i. e. "thou shalt not drink intoxicating liquors."

c8.29

³ तिष्ठन्भुञ्जीत।

c8.30

⁴ चैत्यं वंदेत स्वर्गकामः।

c8.31

⁵ केशान् लुञ्चेत।

c8.32

There must be something very tempting in this line of argument, for we see that in later times the Buddhists also endeavoured to claim the same divine character for their sacred writings which the Brahmans had established for the Veda. A curious instance of this is given in the following discussion, from Kumârila's Tantra-vârttika. Here the opponent (pûrva-paksha) observes, that the same arguments which prove that the Veda is not the work of human authors, apply with equal force to Śâkya's teaching. His authority, he says, cannot be questioned, because his precepts are clear and intelligible; and as Śâkya is not the inventor, but only the teacher of these precepts, and no name of an author is given for Śâkya's doctrines, the frailties inherent in human authors affect them as little as the Veda.¹ Everything, in fact, he concludes, which has been brought forward by the Mîmânsakas to prove the authority of the Veda, proves in the same way the authority of Buddha's doctrine. Upon this, the orthodox Kumârila grows very wroth, and says: "These Śâkyas, Vaiśeshikas, and other heretics, who have been frightened out of their wits by the faithful Mîmânsakas, prattle away with our own words as if trying to lay hold of a shadow. They say that their sacred works are eternal; but they are of empty minds, and only out of hatred they wish to deny that the Veda is the most ancient book.

c8.33

¹ अकर्तृकतया नापि कर्तृदोषेण दुष्यति। वेदवद्बुद्धवाक्यादि कर्तृस्मरणवर्जनात्॥ बुद्धवाक्यसमाख्यापि प्रवृत्तनिबन्धना। तद्दृष्टत्वनिमित्ता वा काठकांगिरसादिवत्॥ यावदेवोदितं किंचिदेदप्रामाण्यसिद्धये। तत्सर्वं बुद्धवाक्यानामतिदेशेन गम्यते॥

c8.34

And these would-be logicians declare even that some of their precepts (which they have stolen from us), like that of universal benevolence, are not derived from the Veda, because most of Buddha’s other sayings are altogether against the Veda. Wishing, therefore, to keep true on this point also, and seeing that no merely human precept could have any authority on moral and supernatural subjects, they try to veil their difficulty by aping our own arguments for the eternal existence of the Veda. They know that the Mîmânsakas have proved that no sayings of men can have any authority on supernatural subjects; they know also that the authority of the Veda cannot be controverted, because they can bring forward nothing against the proofs adduced for its divine origin, by which all supposition of a human source has been removed. Therefore, their hearts being gnawed by their own words, which are like the smattering of children, and having themselves nothing to answer, because the deception of their illogical arguments has been destroyed, they begin to speak like a foolish suitor who came to ask for a bride, saying, ‘My family is as good as your family.’ In the same manner they now maintain the eternal existence of their books, aping the speeches of others. And if they are challenged and told that this is *our* argument, they brawl, and say that we, the Mîmânsakas, have heard and stolen it from them. For a man who has lost all shame, who can talk away without any sense, and tries to cheat his opponent, will never get tired, and will never be put down!” Towards the end of this harangue, Kumârila adds, what is more to the point, that the Bauddhas, who ascribe to everything a merely temporary existence, have no business to talk of an eternal revelation.

c8.35

Now, it ought not to be overlooked, that in all these discussions the distinction between Śruti (Mantras and Brâhmaṇas) and Smṛiti (Sûtras) is always taken for granted. If, at the time of the first controversies between Bauddhas and Mîmânsakas, the authors of the Mantras or Brâhmaṇas, and particularly the founders of the so-called ancient Brâhmaṇas, had still been alive, or their names generally known, even a Brahman could not have ventured to stand up for the divine and eternal origin of this part of the Śruti. On the other hand, nothing could have prevented the Brahmans from ascribing the same supernatural origin to the Sûtras, if at the time of the rising power of Buddhism their authors also had been lost in oblivion. The distinction, therefore, between Śruti (revelation) and Smṛiti (tradition) which is a point of such vital importance for the whole Brahmanic system, will also be found significant in an historical point of view.

c8.36

It must be observed, however, before we proceed farther, that what is called Smṛiti includes not only Sûtras, but also Śloka works, such as the laws of Manu, Yâjnavalkya, and Parâśara (the Mânava, Yâjnavalkya, and Parâśara-dharma-śâstras), which sometimes are called the Smṛitis, in the plural. Most of these, if not all, are founded on Sûtras; but the texts of the Sûtras have mostly been superseded by these later metrical paraphrases.

c8.37

How then did the Brahmans, after they had established the distinction between Śruti and Smṛiti, defend the authority of the Smṛiti, including Sûtras and the later Śloka works?

c8.38

That the Smriti has no claim to an independent authority, but derives its sanction from its intimate connection with the Śruti, is implied by its very name, which means recollection. For, as Kumârila remarks (in the pûrva-paksha), “Recollection is knowledge, the object of which is some previous knowledge; and if Manu and other authors of Smritis had not originally been in possession of an authoritative knowledge, it would be impossible to appeal to their recollection as an authority.¹ It would be as if a man, omitting his son or daughter, was to appeal to the son of a barren daughter. For the original knowledge of Manu might be compared to his son, but his recollection would only be like a grandson. Now as people, if they have reason to doubt the existence of a daughter, would disbelieve every mention of the son of a daughter, thus the recollection (smriti) of Manu would be futile, if he himself had not possessed some means of authoritative knowledge.”

c8.39

¹ पूर्वविज्ञानविषयं विज्ञानं स्मृतिरुच्यते। पूर्वज्ञानादिना तस्याः प्रामाण्यं नावधार्यते॥ And again, मन्वादीनामपि यदि प्रथमं किंचित्प्रमाणं संभाव्यते ततः स्मरणं भवेन्नान्यथा। कस्मात्पुनः पुत्रं दुहितरं चाधिक्रम्य बन्ध्यादौहित्रोदाहरणं कृतं। स्थानतुल्यत्वात्पुत्रस्थानीयं हि मन्वादेः पूर्वविज्ञानं। दौहित्रस्थानीयं स्मरणं। अतश्च यथा दुहितुरभावं परामृश्य दौहित्रस्मृतिं भ्रांतिं मन्यते तथा मन्वादिभिः प्रत्यक्षाद्यसंभवपरामर्शादृष्टकादिस्मरणं मिथ्येति मंतव्यं॥

c8.40

The following extract from Sâyaṇa’s Commentary on Parâśara’s Code² will show the use which the Brahmans made of this argument, in order to substantiate the authority of their legal text-books.

c8.41

² MS. Bodl. 172, 173.

c8.42

"Does it not seem after all," he says, "as if this Smriti (containing as it does the laws of men) hardly deserved a commentary of its own, inasmuch as it is difficult to make out on what grounds it claims any authority? For if we appeal to a Sûtra of Jaimini's (the founder of the Pûrva-mîmânsâ) where he has proved that the Veda possesses an authority irrespective of anything else, these arguments can hardly apply to books which are evidently the work of men, and entirely dependent on the authority of their sources. These sources again, if they be considered as the life and strength of that authority, are often very indistinct. First, they could never fall under the cognizance of the senses, because the very nature of duty or law is transcendental. Nor can this ultimate reason or source be found in induction, inasmuch as induction is only possible after observation. Neither can it be looked for in the sayings of other men, because man is exposed to error, and cannot even express things as he has really perceived them. But even if man was free from error, there would always be room for doubt and opposition. And as to finding the authority for these laws in direct precepts of the Śruti (Mantras and Brâhmaṇas) this is out of the question, because such precepts are not to be found there. We have never seen a passage in the Veda where precepts like those of the Smriti, to keep the body clean, &c., are given. To admit the right of induction for laws of this kind would be most dangerous, for it would apply with equal force to the precepts of Buddha, to worship the holy sepulchre, &c.

c8.43

"However, there is an answer to all these doubts.

c8.44

A great difference exists between the Smritis of Manu and the Smritis of Buddha, because Manu's authority is asserted by the undeniable Veda itself. It is said in the Veda, ‘Whatever Manu said, was medicine;’ but there is no passage there in any way favourable to the Smriti of Buddha, and therefore the right of applying induction cannot be considered dangerous, because it never could be extended to Buddha's doctrines.

c8.45

“Quod non,” says the opponent. “This passage of the Veda, ‘Whatever Manu said, was medicine,’ is only an Arthavâda (an explanatory remark), and has no evidence by itself. It only serves to illustrate or recommend another precept, viz., that two verses of Manu's are to be used at a certain sacrifice.¹ Therefore, there is no passage in the Veda to warrant the authority of the Smriti; and if Sâkya's, *i. e.* Buddha's, Smriti be exceptionable, the same applies to the Smriti of Manu. Thus it is said, ‘As men speak often untruth and are exposed to error, as no divine precept is given, faith only can be authority.’ But

c8.46

¹ As dhayyâs at the Somâraudra Charu, in the middle of the Sâmidhênî, or fire-kindling hymns. The same argument occurs in Kumârila's Tantra-vârttika, i. 3.,

c8.47

तथा च मनोर्ऋचः सामिधेन्यो भवतीत्यस्य विधेर्वाक्यशेषे श्रूयते मनर्वे यत्किंचिदेव वदेत्तद्भेषजं भेषजताया इति॥

c8.48

Mahâdeva, in his Commentary on the Hiranyakeśi-sûtras, says that the Śruti bears witness to the authority of the Smritis by declaring that whatever Manu said was medicine.

c8.49

श्रुतिरपि स्मृतीनां वेदमूलत्वमाह यद्य किंच मनुरवदत्तद्भेषजमिति भेषजं यथा हितमेवं मनुवचनमपि प्रमाणत्वेन हितमित्यर्थः॥ further, even admitting that there was a shadow of authority for Manu, what could be said in favour of Parâśara’s Smṛiti, which is now to be explained? For, although the Veda may praise Manu, it never does the same for Parâśara, and thus Parâśara’s authority at least can hardly be defended.

c8.50

“Against all this our answer is: the Smṛitis are an authority, because that they should have authority is understood by itself; and there is no reason why they should not be considered as having authority. Three reasons are given why Manu and the rest could not claim any authority, viz. ‘that men speak untruth, that they are exposed to error, and that no divine precept is given.’ These objections, however, are entirely out of order, because nobody would ever think that Manu and Parâśara, who have been perfect from their very birth, could have spoken untruth, and could have erred. So much for the first two objections. And who ever denied that these sages were perfect from their very birth, as Mantras, Arthavâdas, Itihâsas, and Purâṇas, prove distinctly not only the existence of Parâśara and others, but also their perfection? Nay, even if we had not the testimony of the Mantras, how could the perfection of Parâśara and others be denied, which is involved in their very existence? A difference of opinion is quite impossible. And has it not been proved in the chapter on the gods¹ in the Uttara-mîmânsâ, that the Mantras do not require any further proof for what they say? It is true that in the chapter on the Arthavâdas it has been admitted that what the Arthavâdas contain is not always to be believed. But this is only on account of some impossible things which are occasionally mentioned therein. Therefore an Arthavâda like this, ‘Whatever Manu says is medicine,’ although it only serves to recommend another rule, must yet be considered as true in itself. With regard to Śâkya, nothing similar can be brought forward; and thus it is well said elsewhere, ‘May a man scorn all the erroneous doctrines of Arhat, Chârvâka, and Buddha.’ As regards Parâśara in particular, it is wrong to say that his fame is not equally founded on the Veda, for it is said in the Śruti, ‘Thus spoke Vyâsa, the son of Parâśara.’ If, therefore, the famous Veda-Vyâsa is praised as the son of Parâśara, how much more famous must not Parâśara, his father, have been! In the genealogical Brâhmaṇa of the Vâjasanêyi-śâkhâ, the son also and the grandson of Parâśara are mentioned in the succession of pupils and teachers who handed down the Veda¹, ‘Ghṛitakauśika received from Pârâśaryâyaṇa, Pârâśaryâyaṇa from Pârâśarya, Pârâśarya from Jâtukarṇya, &c.’ Therefore Parâśara stands quite on a level with Manu; and the same applies to all the other Rishis, like Vasiṣṭha and Yâjnavalkya, who are authors of Smṛitis, and are mentioned in the Śruti. Thus we read, ‘The Rishis did not see Indra clearly, but Vasiṣṭha saw him clearly.’² ‘Atri gave his children to Aurva, who longed for a son.’¹ ‘Yâjnavalkya had two wives.’² Therefore one must not think of attacking the Smritis of Manu and others by any means.

c8.51

¹ If this refers to the Sankarshaṇakâṇḍa, which is ascribed to Jaimini, and forms an appendix to the Karmamîmânsâ-sûtras (cf. Prasthânabheda), we ought to read Pûrva-mîmânsâ instead of Uttara-mîmânsâ.

c8.52

¹ Bṛihadâraṇyaka, 5. 6. 3.

c8.53

² Taittirîya-Saṃhitâ, 3. 5. 2. ऋषयो वा इंद्रं प्रत्यक्षं नापश्यन् तं वसिष्ठः प्रत्यक्षम्पश्यत्

c8.54

¹ Taittirîya-Saṃhitâ, 7. 1. 8.

c8.55

² Śatapatha-brâhmaṇa, xvii. 4. 5.

c8.56

“The third reason also which was brought forward against the authority of the Smriti, viz. that the

c8.57

सो ऽब्रवीत् ब्राह्मणं ते वक्ष्यामि यथा त्वत्पुरोहिताः प्रजाः प्रजनिष्यन्ते ऽथ मेतरेभ्य ऋषिभ्यो मा प्रवोच इति। तस्मा एतान् स्तोमभागानब्रवीत् ततो वसिष्ठपुरोहिताः प्रजाः प्राजायंत तस्माद्वसिष्ठो ब्रह्मा कार्यः॥

c8.58

“The Rishis did not see Indra clearly, but Vasishtha saw him clearly. Indra said, ‘I shall tell you a Brâhmaṇa, so that all men that are born will have thee for Purohita; but do not tell of me to the other Rishis.’ Thus he told him these parts of the hymns; and ever since, men were born having Vasishtha for their Purohita. Therefore a Vasishtha is to be chosen as Brahman.”

c8.59

Cf. Tâṇḍya Brâhmaṇa, xv. 5., where it is said of the Bharatas that they will always have a Vasishtha as Purohita. The Commentator there observes, that Bharata may either mean the kings of that name, or men in general.

c8.60

अचिरददादौर्वाय प्रजां पुत्रकामाय स रिरिचानो ऽमन्यत निर्वीर्यः शिथिलो यातयामा स एतं चतुरात्रमपश्यत्तमाहरत्तेनायजत ततो वै तस्य चत्वारो वीरा अजायंत सुहोता सूद्गाता स्वध्वर्युः सुब्रह्मः॥

c8.61

“Atri gave his children to the son of Urva, who longed for a son. Then he felt lonely, and saw that he was without power, weak, and decrepit. He saw this Chatûrâtra; he took it and sacrificed with it. Four sons were born to him from it,—a good Hotṛi, a good Udgâtṛi, a good Adhvaryu, and a good Brahman.”

c8.62

precepts given there are not based upon passages of the Śruti, does not hold good, because passages are met with which are the source of all the laws given in the Smṛiti. Thus we read, ‘These five great sacrifices are every day commenced and every day performed: the Devayajna (to the gods), the Pitṛiyajna (to the fathers, the manes), the Bhûtayajna (to all beings), the Manushyayajna (to men), the Brahmayajna (to Brahman, the divine Self).’¹ And although there is no distinct precept in the Veda for ablutions, &c., yet all this is implied. Thus the Bhaṭṭâchâryâs say, ‘It is right to respect the Smṛitis, because they are delivered by Vedic authors, because their origin is well established, and because they derive their authority from the Veda, if but rightly understood.’ The Munis see the Śruti, and they deliver the Smṛiti; therefore the authority of both is proved on earth by full evidence. A man who despises these two, and adopts fallacious doctrines, is to be avoided by good men as a heretic and Veda-blasphemer.

c8.63

¹ Taittirîya-âranyaka, ii. 10.

c8.64

“But one might object that if these precepts can be learnt from the Śruti, the Smṛiti would be unnecessary, because that only which cannot be learnt from other sources forms a fit object for a new work. Here then we say that these precepts, though they can be learnt from the Veda, are nevertheless put together in the Smṛitis for the purpose of making the order of their performance more easy, by leaving out the Arthavâdas, and by taking from some Śâkhâs of the Veda particular facts omitted in others. Now it might again be objected that this is done in the *Kalpa-sûtras*, and that therefore there was no necessity for the Smritis. But this is wrong, because there are two different kinds of duties to be performed, called *Śrauta* (based on Śruti) and *Smârta* (based on Smṛiti). The *Śrauta* ceremonies consist in sacrifices like the Darśa-pūrṇamāsa, &c., which can only be performed after the sacred fire has been placed in the house, and they are clearly based upon the Veda, as we read it. The *Smârta* sacraments and traditional customs, on the contrary, consist in ablutions, rinsing the mouth, &c., and they are to be considered as based upon a Śâkhâ of the Veda which is hidden, but the existence of which must be inferred. Although, therefore, those precepts which regard the placing of the sacred fire, &c., are put together in the *Kalpa-sûtras*, yet as other duties, such as ablutions, rinsing, &c., are not included in them, the Smṛitis have still their legitimate object.”

c8.65

This discussion has been given here at full length because it is a genuine specimen of Indian orthodox dialectics. Whatever may be thought of this style of argument, we see at all events how great an importance has always been attached by the Brahmans to the distinction between Śruti and Smṛiti.

c8.66

It may also have been observed in this extract, that it is not quite in accordance with the language of Sâyaṇa to speak of Sûtra works as Smṛitis in the plural. He applies this term to metrical codes only, like Manu, Yâjnavalkya, and Parâśara, but not to Sûtras or Vedângas.¹ This, however, does not affect our present question, because even Sâyaṇa, though he does not call the Sûtras by the name of Smṛitis, places them notwithstanding in the same category with the codes of law, and separates them from the Śruti, upon which they are founded, but with which they are not to be confounded. The Kalpa-sûtras are called by him śrauta, *i. e.* based on revelation, but not Śruti (revelation), because although they treat of the same subjects as the Śruti, they are themselves extracts only from the sacred writings. They are arranged by authors whose names are given, while, according to Indian notions, Mantras and Brâhmaṇas were only seen by the Ṛishis, but neither composed nor arranged by them.¹

c8.67

¹ Kumârila remarks that, although the six Vedângas are not called by the name of Smṛiti, they are Smṛiti in the same sense

c8.68

¹ “When we spoke of this (the authorship of Madhuchhandas) to a learned Hindu friend, he exhibited very marked dissatisfaction and distress, begging us to write and tell Professor Wilson that the hymn had *no* author; that it had existed from everlasting; and that Madhuchhandas was only the fortunate seer to whom, on the last occasion of its revelation, it had been revealed.”—*Benares Magazine for June 1851*, “On Müller’s Edition and Wilson’s Version of the Rig-Veda.”

c8.69

That Sûtras, even where they contain Vedânga-doctrines, are distinctly excluded from the Śruti, may be seen from the following passage. In the Tantra-vârttika (1. 3.), Kumârila says, “There is a great as the Dharma-sûtras, i. 3. 9. स्मृतिवं लंगानां धर्मसूत्राणां चाविशिष्टं॥ यद्यपि स्मृतिशब्देन नांगानानामभिधेयता। तथाप्येषां न शास्त्रत्वप्रमाणलनिराक्रिया॥ Mahâdeva, in his Commentary on the Hiraṇyakeśi-sûtras, says distinctly, सूत्रेषु स्मृतिवं स्मृत्यधिकरणे स्थितं। तत्सूत्रकारेणैवोकं न्यायवित्समय इति मीमांसासिद्धान्तस्वीकारदर्शनेन॥ difference between the Kalpa-sûtras, which teach the performance of sacrifices enjoined by the Vedas, such as we now possess them, and the Smritis, which derive their authority from parts of the Veda that have either disappeared or are dispersed, or the existence of which can be proved by induction only. It is easier, therefore, to establish the authority of the Kalpa-sûtras than that of the Smritis. The objections which have been raised against the authority of the Smritis, and which had to be removed by us before, cannot be thought of with regard to the Kalpa-sûtras, not even if it were only for argument's sake.¹ The question, therefore, is only this, whether the Kalpa-sûtras have the same authority as the Veda, or whether they merely derive their authority from it. As the Veda is called 'shaḍanga,' 'having six members,' these six members, and amongst them the Kalpa-sûtras, might seem to be implied by the common name of Veda. This, however, would be wrong²; for the Kalpa-sûtras, as is well-known, are composed by human authors like Maśaka, &c. They do not take their names, like the Kâthaka and other Śâkhâs of the Veda, from those by whom they were proclaimed, but from their real authors. It is true, no doubt, that the authors of the Kalpa-sûtras have the name of Rishis, and it might be said that as Śiśu Ângirasa was not the author of the Śaiśava hymns in the Sâmaveda, the Kalpa-sûtras too were not composed, but only proclaimed, by those whose names they bear, particularly as there are even Brâhmaṇas, for instance those of the Aruṇa and Parâśara-śâkhâ, which have nearly the same form as the Kalpa-sûtras. Nevertheless, nothing can be more mistaken than the opinion of those who would put the Kalpa-sûtras on the same footing as the Veda, because people who teach and learn the Kalpa-sûtras know that there was a time when these works did not exist, and that they were composed by certain authors like Maśaka, Baudhâyana, Âpastamba, Âśvalâyana, Kâtyâyana, and others.”¹ They are drawn, as he

c8.70

¹ अप्रमाणं स्मृतीनां च यदशब्दतयोदितं। वपच्च न तदक्तुं कल्पसूत्रेपु शक्यते॥ प्रत्यक्षवेदशब्दात्तदुक्ता नापशब्दता। न ह्यत्यन्तानृतं वक्तुं शक्यते पूर्वपक्षिणा॥

c8.71

² वेदत्वं कल्पसूत्राणां नो वक्तव्यं मनागपि।

c8.72

¹ Kumârila expressly observes that these names signify certain individuals, and not Charaṇas (sects), like those of Kaṭha, by which certain Śâkhâs of the Veda were promulgated.

c8.73

यथा च कठादिचरणैरनादिभिः प्रोच्यमानानामनादिवेदशाखानामानादिसमाख्यासंभवो नैवं नित्यावस्थितमशकादिगोत्रचरणप्रवचननिमित्तसमाख्योपपत्तिः। मशकबौधायनापस्तंबादिशब्दा ह्यादिमेकद्रव्योपदेशिन इति न तेभ्यः प्रकृतिभूतेभ्यो ऽनादिग्रंथविषयसमाख्याव्युत्पादनसंभवः॥

c8.74

“The branches of the Veda which were proclaimed by the sects of Kaṭha and others from all eternity, have a fair claim to be called eternal. But this does not apply to works handed down by the sects or families of Maśaka and others, however long they may have been established. For names like Maśaka, Baudhâyana, and Âpastamba, imply an individual being which had a beginning, and therefore it is impossible that a title derived from these names should ever belong to an eternal work.”

c8.75

And again:

c8.76

यथैव हि कल्पसूत्रग्रंथानितरांगस्मृतिनिबंधनानि चाध्येच- observes in another place, partly from the Veda, but partly also from other sources; and the same applies, according to him, to all the Vedângas and Smṛitis; nay, even to later works, such as the epic and paurâṇic poems.¹

c8.77

¹ तत्र यावद्धर्ममोक्षसंबंधि तदेदप्रभवं। यच्चर्थसुखविषयं तल्लोकव्यवहारपूर्वकमिति विवेक्तव्यं। एषैवेतिहासपुराणयोरप्युपदेशवाक्यानां गतिः॥

c8.78

व्यापयितारः स्मरंति तथाश्वलायनबौधायनापस्तंबकात्यायनप्रभृतीन् ग्रंथकारत्वेन॥

c8.79

“For teachers and pupils do not only know by heart the Kalpasûtra books, and the other Vedânga and Smṛiti compositions, but they also remember Âśvalâyana, Baudhâyana, Âpastamba, Kâtyâyana, and others, as the authors of these books.”

c8.80

“All that has reference to virtue and final beatitude is taken from the Veda, while other matters, the purpose of which consists in pleasure and gain, are according to the customs of men. This distinction applies not only to the Vedângas, but also to authoritative passages in the Purâṇas and Itihâsas.”

c8.81

Uvaṭa, in his commentary on the Śâkala prâtiśâkya, takes the same view. He says, “that as the Veda was too difficult to be used by itself, learned men have extracted from it different doctrines on the ceremonial, the metre, and grammar, and brought them into a more intelligible form in the Sûtras.”

c8.82

यस्मात्केवलर्वेदवाक्यैर्न शक्यते ऽनुष्ठातुं विचित्रत्वाद्ेदवाक्यानां गूढार्थत्वाच्च अतः कविभिराचार्यैर्वेदार्थकुशलैर्वेदार्थेभ्यो निष्कृष्य कर्मार्थं सुखावबोधनानीमानि विद्यास्थानानि प्रवर्तितानि। शिक्षा कल्पो व्याकरणं निरुक्तं छंदो ज्योतिषमिति धर्मशास्त्रं पुराणं न्यायविस्तरो मीमांसादीनि।

c8.83

And again:

c8.84

अत आचार्यो भगवान् शौनको वेदार्थवित् सुहृद्‌वा

c8.85

It might therefore be best to distinguish between Smṛiti or tradition in general, and the Smṛitis or law-books in particular. We might then speak of śrauta- and smârta-sûtras, comprehending by the former name all Sûtras, the source of which can be traced in the Śruti; by the latter those of which no such source exists, or at least, is known to exist.¹ The title of Smṛitis in the plural (or Smṛiti-prabandhâs) might be left, for convenience sake, to such works as Sâyaṇa is speaking of, which are composed not in Sûtras but in Ślokas. It ought to be remembered, however, that the same subjects which are treated in the metrical Smṛitis of Manu and others, had similarly been treated in Sûtras (śrauta, gṛihya, and sâmayâchârika), and that the principal difference between the two lies, not in their matter, but in their age, and their style.

c8.86

¹ Thus, smârtam karma is well defined by Shaḍguruśishya in the Sarvânukramaṇîbhâshya, as ‘nishekâdi śmaśânântam smṛiti-gṛihyavihitam karma.’ In the Commentary on Âśvalâyana’s Śrauta-sûtras, it is said, that, if observances, like rinsing the mouth, &c., are prescribed in the Śrauta-sûtras (as they are for instance Âśval. i. 1. 3.), this is only done in order to show that such observances are acknowledged and presupposed by the Śrauta-sûtras, though they belong to the province of the Gṛihya ceremonies.

c8.87

ब्राह्मणेभ्यो ऽर्थवादानुत्सृज्य विधिं समाहृत्य पुरुषहितार्थ-
मृग्वेदस्य शिक्षाशास्त्रं कृतवानिति॥

c8.88

स्मार्तानां स्नानाचमनयज्ञोपवीतादीनां श्रौतकर्माविरुद्धाना-
मस्मिन् शास्त्रे प्राप्तिप्रदर्शनार्थमिदमाचमनं कर्मांगं विधीयते।
शौचार्थस्य गृहप्रवेशात्मागेव कृतत्वात्। तदुक्तं। मनःप्रसा-
दात्योक्त्या तपसा स्नानकर्मणा। आचांत्या चात्मनः
शुद्धिं कृत्वा कर्म समारभेदिति॥

c8.89

An objection against this division and terminology, not unknown to the Brahmans themselves, is that it is difficult to say whether certain Smârta-sûtras may not be based upon some lost Sâkhâ of the Veda. The Śrauta portions of the Kalpa-sûtras, there can be no doubt, are founded on Śruti, if by this name we understand not only the hymns, but also the Brâhmaṇas of the Veda. But there are only few allusions, even in the Brâhmaṇas, to the ceremonies described in the Gṛihya-sûtras; and the few passages which are quoted from the Śruti in their support, are chiefly taken from the Âraṇyakas and Upanishads, the latest branches of Vedic literature. As to the Âchâras, or the established rules of conduct with regard to particular temporal duties, even Indian writers admit that there are only very vague allusions to them in the Śruti, and they try to prove that these laws are based on parts of the Veda which no longer exist. This is a view which is taken for instance by Haradatta in his Commentary on Âpastamba’s Sâmayâchârika-sûtras, and it deserves to be examined more closely. On the first Sûtra¹, “Therefore let us now explain the Sâmayâchârika duties,” he makes the following observations.

c8.90

¹ अथातः सामयाचारिकान्धर्मान् व्याख्यास्यामः॥१॥

c8.91

“The word ‘therefore’ implies a reason, which is that as the śrauta (sacrificial) and gârhya (domestic) ceremonies have been explained, and as these ceremonies presuppose other observances, these other observances must now be explained too. For when it was said before (in the Śrauta and Gṛihya-sûtras), that such and such an act was to be performed by a man after he had rinsed his mouth, by a man who is clean, who holds a pavitra in his hand, who is invested with the sacred thread, &c., an acquaintance with all these things, such as rinsing, &c., is presupposed. The twilight prayers, too, are referred to in the preceding Sûtras, when it is said, that a man who does not perform his twilight prayers is impure, and unworthy of every sacrifice. Several other instances occur; and it is therefore necessary to explain now immediately those other precepts called sâmayâchârika (temporal). Sâmayâchârika is derived from samaya (agreement) and âchâra (custom). Samaya, a human agreement, is of three kinds: vidhi, injunction; niyama, restriction; pratishedha, prohibition. Rules founded upon samaya are called samayâchâras, from which the adjective sâmayâchârika. Dharma (virtue) is the quality of the individual self, which arises from action, leads to happiness and final beatitude, and is called apûrva, supernatural. But, in our Sûtra, dharma means law, and has for its object dharma as well as adharma: things to be done and things to be avoided.

c8.92

"It might be said, however," continues the Commentator Haradatta, alluding to the same controversy which we saw before treated of by Sâyaṇa, "that if samaya (human agreement) be the authority for the law, it would be difficult to deny the same authority to the Bauddhas and their laws, to worship the holy sepulchre, &c.; and therefore Âpastamba has added the next Sûtra:¹ ‘Those agreements are of authority which were made by men who knew the law.’

First 91 of 871 passages. Read on

Linked texts (58)