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Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c8: Chapter V: Other Non-Buddhistic Doctrines

Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c8

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Chapter V: Other Non-Buddhistic Doctrines

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Besides the six teachers dealt with above there was a number of other teachers who offered, according to their own lights, solutions of the ultimate problems relating to the soul, the world and the *summum bonum* of the man's life, basing them not so much on reasoning as on intuition or inner experiences acquired through meditation. The use of logic was not much in evidence, and if there was any, it was due to the endeavour of the disciples to establish on a firm basis the theories already propounded by their respective teachers. Along with the various expositions of the highest Truth, the pre-Buddhistic religious and philosophical literatures contain a large body of cosmological and metaphysical speculations together with analyses of the elements composing the living beings of this world as also of the various spheres of existences as conceived in their cosmology. The analyses also have as their basis the intuition or meditational experiences, or the traditional beliefs handed down from the hoary past. Though ostensibly Buddhism wanted to offer a rational solution of the ultimate problems, it did not quite succeed to keep itself free from the intuitional and traditional exposition of the metaphysical themes. It inherited a mass of beliefs relating, for instance, to the origin and form of the universe (*tridhātu*), classification of the worlds and beings (*viññāṇaṭṭhitis*) and so forth. The gradual evolution of the world (vide *Aggaññasuttanta*),¹ the existence of heavenly beings (vide *Mahāsamayasuttanta*),¹ the six mystical powers (*chaḷa-abhiññā*), the *mahāpuruṣa-lakṣaṇas*,² the eight causes of earthquake, the seven treasures (vide e.g. *Mahāparinibbānasuttanta*),³ the causes leading to the origin of castes are a few among the various beliefs that were inherited by the early Buddhists. The Buddhist texts, on the other hand, rendered a service to the cause of Indian philosophy by laying bare the irrationality of many of the religious and philosophical views current in Northern India before and after the rise of Buddhism. It has been shown in some of the texts that the views were nothing but inner experiences of persons who had made some progress on the path of spiritual advancement but were far beneath the stage at which the highest truth could be realised. In the Pāli texts these views are summarily dismissed away as untenable without a detailed logical examination of them.⁴

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¹ *Dīgha*, II, no. 27.

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¹ *Digha*, II, no. 20.

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² *Ibid.*, III, no. 30.

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³ *Ibid.*, II, no. 16.

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⁴ A notion has been made widely current by some of the modern scholars that the ostensible object of the *Brahmajālasutta* is to give a bird's-eye view of the non-Buddhistic opinions. This notion is wholly wrong, for the *Brahmajālasutta* has no presumption of that kind. (Cf. *Samantapāsādikā*, pp. 60-61; *Majjhima*, I, p. 40: *attavāda* and *lokavāda*; II, pp. 233-8; *Visuddhimagga*, pp. 443, 587; *Mahābodhi*, 1933, pp. 166 ff.; E. J. Thomas, *Life of Buddha*, p. 19). The doctrine of the six *titthiyas*, (see chap. IV) not to speak of the *Upaniṣadic* thoughts, are beyond the purview of the *Sutta*. Its main object is to draw up a list of the possible theories about the world and the soul that might haunt the minds of the monks who, by meditating according to the Buddhist path of meditation, acquired certain powers but did not reach the highest state. The so-called sixty-two views are really a systematic exposition of the experiences of a Buddhist monk and have very little to do with the then existing non-Buddhistic opinions. There may be a few agreements between some of the sixty-two views and the philo-

The Avyākatas

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There are a few problems said to have been left unanswered (avyākata) by Buddha, the reason assigned for doing so being either that they relate to topics or notions which have sophical tenets embodied in the Upaniṣads and other Brāhmanic philosophical works, but that does not go to establish that the Brahmajālasutta was composed with any reference to them, the cases of agreement being only accidental. The Sutta, however, has served two important purposes, viz., disabusing our minds of many deep-rooted current notions about the world, the soul and their ultimate condition, and cautioning us against interpreting the doctrine of Buddha in the light of our preconceived notions. By way of illustration, I may point out that the notion of Ātman as a permanent, immaculate entity existing within our body unaffected by karma (actions) is likely to distort the true import of the Attā or Puggala of the Buddhist texts, and in the same way the notion of Nihilism (Ucchedavāda = Natthatta) may influence the interpretation of Anattā or Suññatā doctrine of the Buddhists. A typical instance is given in the Majjhima Nikāya (I, pp. 136-137): A Sassatavādin hears Buddha's teaching about the attainment of Nibbāna by the destruction of passion, desire, wrong views etc. and concludes therefrom that Buddha is an Ucchedavādin. Childers writes in his article on Nibbāna (Pali Dictionary, p. 267): "There is probably no doctrine more distinctive of Sākyamuni's original teaching than that of the annihilation of being" (p. 274): Burnouf "is decidedly in favour of the opinion that the goal of Buddhism is annihilation."

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The best purpose that has been served by the Sutta is that it shows us the way to distinguish Buddha's doctrines from those that were not his. In the fifth century B.C. or a little later, it was almost impossible for any teacher to give out any fresh line of thought without the chance of its being confused with one or other of the current opinions, and this confusion could best be avoided by pointing out the pitfalls, in which the later interpreters were likely to fall. This has been done in this Sutta to a certain extent. Then again, Buddha, like the other great teachers, had at times recourse to enigmatical language, baffling nothing to do with the highest Truth, or that they divert our attention from the real goal of our life.¹ These problems are mentioned almost in the identical language throughout the Piṭaka thus:

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1. *Sassato loko* (the world is eternal)
2. *Asassato loko* (the world is not eternal);

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the attempts of many an erudite commentator to find out the exact sense. The Buddhist texts abound in such enigmatic expressions. This Sutta, in marking out what Buddhism is not, serves, therefore, as an excellent guide for the comprehension of the sense of such expressions. Inspite of this Sutta, the terse saying did give rise to so many Buddhist schools of thought within a century or two after Buddha's death, not to speak of the divergent explanations offered by the present day scholars of Buddha's conception of Soul and Nibbāna. Though the Sutta contains many statements of doubtful value, an exposition of it as a whole may serve to remove many of our misconceptions.

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1 The usual English synonym chosen for *avyākata* is 'indetermined.' It is equated to *avyākṛta*, which, literally, means 'not-explained' or 'not-determined.' *Avyākṛta* is a Buddhist-Sanskrit form derived from the word *Avyākata*. The Pāli word *avyākata* may well be taken as corresponding in sense to Sanskrit *avyakta*, meaning 'inexpressible' or 'unanswerable' because the question does not arise, and all answers are inadmissible. It, however, does not bear the philosophical sense of *avyakta* which is commonly in use in Vedānta and Sāṅkhya, but it is quite plausible to hold that Buddha meant by *avyākata*, inexplainable in worldly language, i.e., the nature of Nibbāna is as unfit for answer as is the question of the existence of the sky-flower. See Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, I, p. 228.

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It is this *avyākata* attitude of Buddha to the ultimate problems that has led the present day scholars to dub Buddha as agnostic. Prof. Kieth goes further and remarks (in his *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 45) that Buddha's "agnosticism in these matters is not based on any reasoned conviction of the limits of knowledge; it rests on the two-fold ground that the Buddha has not himself a clear conclusion of the truth on these issues, etc."

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3. *Antavā loko* (the world is finite);
4. *Anantavā loko* (the world is not finite);
5. *Tam jīvam tam sarīram* (the soul is identical with the body);
6. *Aññam jīvam aññam sarīram* (the soul is different from the body);
7. *Hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā* (Tathāgata exists after death);
8. *Na hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā* (Tathāgata does not exist after death);
9. *Hoti ca na ca hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā* (Tathāgata both exists and not exists after death);
10. *N'eva hoti na na hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā* (Tathāgata does neither exist nor not exist after death).¹

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¹ See, e.g., Aggi-Vacchagotta-sutta in the *Majjhima*, I, pp. 157, 426, 483-489, Avyākata-saṃyutta in *Saṃyutta*, IV, pp. 376 ff., also III, pp. 214 ff.; Poṭṭhapāda-sutta in *Dīgha*, I, p. 191; see also *Mādhyamika Vṛtti*, p. 446 (mentioning 14 problems), 536; and ch. XXII; *Mahāvyutpatti*, 206.

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Of the problems mentioned in the list, the first six are exhaustively dealt with in the *Brahmajāla Sutta*. Though the treatment is not quite philosophical, it gives us a clear idea of what the early Buddhists had in their minds as to the implication of these problems. The heads of subjects as arranged in the *Brahmajāla Sutta* are as follows:—
1. Four kinds of Sassatavādā;
2. Four kinds of Ekaccasassatavādā;
3. Four kinds of Antānantikā;
4. Four kinds of Amarāvikkhepikā;
5. Two kinds of Adhiccasamuppannikā;
6. Sixteen kinds of Saññivādā;

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7. Eight kinds of Asaññivādā;
8. Eight kinds of N’evasaññīnāsaññivādā;
9. Seven kinds of Ucchedavādā; and
10. Five kinds of Diṭṭhadhammanibbānavādā.

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The correspondences between the two lists may be indicated thus:—

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| *Indeterminable problems* | *Problems in the Brahmajāla Sutta* |
| 1. Sassato loko | { 1. Sassatavādā |
| | 2. Ekaccasassatavādā |
| 2. Asassato loko¹ | 9. Ucchedavādā |
| 3. Antavā loko | } 3. Antānantikā |
| 4. Anantavā loko² | |
| 5. Taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ | } 6. Saññivādā |
| 6. Aññaṃ jīvaṃ aññaṃ sarīraṃ | 7. Asaññivādā |
| | 8. N’evasaññīnāsaññivādā |
| 7. Hoti Tathāgato paraṃmaraṇā | |
| 8. Na hoti Tathāgato | |
| paraṃmaraṇā | |
| 9. Hoti ca na hoti | } 4. Amarāvikkhepikā |
| Tathāgato paraṃmaraṇā | |
| 10. N’eva hoti na’ na hoti | |
| Tathāgato paraṃmaraṇā³ | |
| Nil | { 5. Adhiccasamuppannikā |
| | 10. Diṭṭhadhammanibbānavādā |

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The above comparative table reveals the fact that the problems, which are generally treated in the Pāli text as indeterminable and their exposition as not conducive to the spiritual welfare of persons, are explained in as much detail as possible in the *Brahmajāla Sutta*, and therefore the charge of

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1 The first and second are sometimes put as Sassato loko; Asassato 2 The third and fourth are usually put thus: Antavā loko; loko; Sassatāsassato loko; N’eva sassato nāsassato loko. Anantavā loko, Anatavānantavā loko; N’eva antavā nānantavā loko. 3 The items 7th to 10th are dealt with here in chapter VI.

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agnosticism sometimes laid against the founder of the religion by the present day writers is unwarranted. The explanations, however, have been given more or less in the light of the inner experiences of the Buddhist monks as stated above and are without any reference to the existing non-Buddhist opinions, or any attempt to refute or reconcile them.

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Nāgārjuna, in his *Madhyamaka-kārikās*, has shown as logically as possible what the indeterminable problems signify and how they are untenable. From the arguments put forward by him, it seems that he is true to the letter and spirit of the discourse as given in the Pāli texts, and that he penetrates right into the innermost core of the problems and brings out what the Teacher had in his mind.

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All of these views have been described in the Buddhist texts, whether Hinayānic or Mahāyānic, as wrong (*micchādiṭṭhi*) and are attributed to people’s natural inclination of adhering to the heresy of individuality (*sakkāyadiṭṭhi*), consisting in regarding the body or any particular element of it as soul.¹

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¹ See *Samyutta*, IV, p. 286; also E. J. Thomas, *Life of Buddha*, p. 202. *M.Vr.*, pp. 340, 361: *Satkāyadṛṣṭyupaśamāt sarvadṛṣṭyupaśamati*; *Samyutta*, IV, p. 287: *imā diṭṭhiyo sakkāyadiṭṭhiyā sati honti*. See also *Paṭis.*, I, pp. 149-150.

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Speaking about the object of the introduction of this indeterminable problems into the Buddhist texts, Buddhaghosa² almost echoed what the Mahāyāna teachers had said, namely, that they were necessary for the exposition of *Suññatā*, by which Buddhaghosa, of course, meant only *Puggala-suññatā* while the Mahāyānists meant both *Pudgalaśūnyatā* and *Dharmaśūnyatā*.

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² *Sum. Vil.*, I, p. 102. *Tasmā sabbaññuta-ñāṇassa mahantabhāvadassanattham desanāya ca suññatā-pakāsana-bhāvattham*. . . .

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In our exposition of the problems we shall follow the arrangement of the *Brahmajāla Sutta* adding, where available, the arguments of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti as presented in the *Madhyamakavṛtti*.

Sassatavāda

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I. Four kinds of Sassatavāda (Eternalists), i.e. those who hold that the soul and the world exist eternally.¹

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¹ Cf. *Saṃyutta*, IV, p. 40: atthatta.

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The reason assigned by the *Brahmajāla Sutta* as the basis of this view is that some people on account of their spiritual advancement develop the power (*abhiññā*) of remembering their former births (*pubbenivāsānussati*) up to a certain number. They may be divided into three classes in accordance with the number of births that can be remembered by them. The fourth class refers to those persons who arrive at the conclusion that the world and the soul are eternal by means of logic and reasoning only. In short, the memories of the past and future existences, according to the Sutta, make a person a Sassatavādin, for he thinks that the world has been rolling on from eternity and will be rolling on for ever and that he will be born again and again.² Times out of number Buddha was confronted with the question whether he was a Sassatavādin or not, and every time he had to say that he was neither a Sassatavādin nor an Asassatavādin because the question of Sassata or Asassata does not arise in reference to the highest truth.³ It should, however, be remembered that *Sassata* in the Pāli Nikāyas does not bear the metaphysical sense in which it is used in the Upaniṣads while speaking of the great Ātman. The Sassatavādins, according to the Nikāyas,¹ are those who take *attā* or self as one of the five khandhas or something apart from them, and hold that it continues for ever and without any change. It is stated in the *Majjhima Nikāya*² that the self (*attā*), according to the Sassatavādins, is the speaker, feeler, and enjoyer of the fruits of good and evil actions (*kamma*), is permanent (*nicca*), fixed (*dhuva*), eternal (*sassata*), unchangeable (*avipariṇāmadhamma*), and is steadfast like the so-called eternal objects, viz., the Sun, Moon, ocean, earth and mountain. The Buddhists, because of their *kṣaṇikavāda* and the denial of a permanent entity, are not prepared to admit that the identical being feels the consequences of his action, which as the *Nidāna-Saṃyutta* asserts, would make them Sassatavādins.³

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² *Dīgha*, III, p. 109-110: Atītaṃ kho ahaṃ addhānaṃ jānāmi, saṃvaṭṭi pi loko, anāgataṃ ca kho ahaṃ addhānaṃ jānāmi saṃvaṭṭissati vā ti.

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³ The Truth or Nibbāna, according to Buddha, is uncaused and unconditioned (*ahetu-appaccaya*) and hence is non-relative, absolute, and

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¹ *Majjhima*, I, pp. 98; 182, IV, p. 400.

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² *Majjhima*, I, p. 8; *Papañcasūdanī*, I, p. 71. *See Infra*, ch. VIII.

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³ *Saṃyutta*, II, p. 20: So karoti so paṭisaṃvediyatīti kho Kassapa ādito sato sayaṃkataṃ dukkhan ti iti vadaṃ sassatam etaṃ pareti. Cf *M Vr*, p. 344, *see infra*. Also Franke, *Dīgha* (transl.), p. 23

Sassatavāda and Sāṃkhya

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The only Brāhmaṇic school of philosophy to which the Sassatavāda bears resemblance is the Sāṃkhya. According to this school, there are two distinct eternals, the *Puruṣa* and the *Prakṛti*, the former corresponding to *Attā* and the latter to *Loka*,

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is only realisable within one’s ownself (*paccattaṃ veditabbo viññūhi*). It cannot be described by any of the empirical terms, and hence the question of eternality or non-eternality does not arise.

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with this difference that, according to the Sassatavādins, the soul is an active agent while the Puruṣa (= eternal attā) of the Sāṅkhya is an inactive onlooker, the active agent being Ahaṅkāra, the principle of individuation, which however, issues out of the Prakṛti or matter in its primeval form. The eternal Loka of the Sassatavādins is the evolved world in its variety.

Four kinds of Ekaccasassatavāda

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II. Ekaccasassatavāda (Partial Eternalists), i.e., those who hold that one of the three classes of the higher gods exists eternally while the rest do not do so; or those who contend that the body or the organs of sense are impermanent while the mind or consciousness (citta = mano = viññāṇa = attā) is permanent.

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The three classes of the higher gods referred to above are (A) Ābhassarā, (B) Khiḍḍāpadosikā, and (C) Manopadosikā.¹

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¹ Dīgha, I, pp. 17 ff.; III, pp. 28 ff. Cf. Majjhima, I, pp. 326 ff.

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(A) Ābhassarā. According to the cosmogonic speculations of the Buddhists, as also of some of the Upaniṣadic teachers,² there were in the beginning no beings and the first to appear were the Ābhassarā gods, capable of taking shape at will,³ feeding themselves only with joy (pīti), self-luminous (sayampabhā), moving about in the sky and getting all that they desired.⁴

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² Sum. Vil, I, p. 110: pakatiyā nibbatta-sattānam natthitāya suññam. Taitt. Up. (II. 7): asad vā idam agra āsīt. Tato vai sad ajāyata. See Bṛhad. Up. I, 1-2. Cf. the Egg-legend in Chā. Up. 19, 1-3. See also RV, X, 129. To this conception, it seems the Chā. Up (VI, 2, 1) refers in the following words: Taddhaika āhur asad evedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam. Tasmād asataḥ saj jāyata iti.

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³ Sum Vil, I, p. 110: jhānamattena nibbattattā manomayā.

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⁴ Dīgha, III, pp. 84-5.

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After existing for aeons, there appeared a palace of Brahmā (Brahma-vimāna). One of the Ābhassarā gods came to be reborn in the Brahmavimāna or the Brahma-world at the exhaustion of his merits or the span of his life.¹ But he felt very lonely and wished for companions. Like him other Ābhassarā gods also made their appearances in the Brahma-world.² The first Ābhassarā god, however, regarded himself as Brahmā or Mahābrahmā thinking that as it was by means of his reflection that other beings appeared in the Brahma-world, he must be their creator. The other beings were also under the impression that the first Ābhassarā god, Mahā-brahmā, having been in existence before them, must have been their lord and originator (issaro kattā nimmātā).³

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¹ Digha, I, p. 17, āyukkhayā va puññakkhayā. Cf. Gītā, ix, 21. Te tam bhuktvā svargalokaṃ viśālam/ kṣiṇe puṇye martyalokaṃ viśanti//

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² Brahmakāyikā bhūmi, see Sum. Vil., I, p. 110.

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³ Mahābrahmā is described in the Pali texts as: abhibhū anabhibhūto aññadatthu-daso vasavatti issaro kattā nimmātā seṭṭho sañjitā vasi pitā bhūtabhavyānam (the supreme, the unsurpassed, the all-seeing, the mighty, the lord, the creator, the maker, the chief the best, the ruler, and the father of all present and future beings).

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The text says further that in course of time, some of these beings happened to be reborn in the mortal world and through meditation and such other practices could visualize their former existences up to their birth in the Brahma world and gave out the view that Mahābrahmā, who had been existing when they were first born, is the creator of all beings and is eternal (sassata), whereas the beings who were born after Mahābrahmā were created by him and hence impermanent (asassata).

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This doctrine naturally reminds us of the Upaniṣadic speculations about the creation of the world by Brahmā the Prajāpati, the Primeval Being, who by reflection produced fire, which in its turn produced water, which again produced earth (food or matter). Through these three elements the Primeval Being produced the whole universe. According to the Chāndogya Upaniṣad the created things and beings are mere appearances hence evanescent, while the real, i.e. the eternal things are the Primeval Being and the three above-mentioned elements.¹

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¹ See Ranade, *Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy*, pp. 85-87.

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(B) Khiḍḍāpadosikā.² This class of partial eternalists holds that the Nimmāṇarati, Paranimmita-vasavatti and such other gods,³ who are not given to excessive pleasure and enjoyment (khiḍḍā), exist eternally, while others do not. The reason assigned is similar to the previous one, viz., that some of these gods were reborn in the mortal world, where through meditation and other practices they remembered their former births up to the Khiḍḍāpadosika-deva stage and not further. This led them to hold the belief as above.

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² *Digha*, I, p. 19; III, p. 31.

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³ *Sum. Vil*, I, p. 114.

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(C) Manopadosikā.⁴ This class of partial eternalists believe that the Cātummahārājikā gods,⁵ who do not bear ill-will towards one another, exist eternally, while those, who are not so, fall from that state and are impermanent. The reason assigned is similar to the previous one with this difference that in this case they remembered up to their existence as Cātummahārājikā gods.

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⁴ *Digha*, I, p. 21; III, pp. 32-3.

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⁵ *Sum. Vil*, I, p. 114.

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(D) The Takki Ekaccasassatikas: These, constituting the fourth class, were the logicians who arrive at the conclusion that the soul (= citta = mano = viññāṇa) is permanent, unchangeable, steadfast, and so forth, while the body is not so. This naturally reminds us of the Maitrī Upaniṣad (II. 3-4) where the soul is described as pure (śuddha), tranquil (śānta), eternal (śāśvata), great by itself (sve mahimni), and making the body living (anenedam śarīram cetanavat pratiṣṭhāpitam). A similar conception is found in the Kauṣitakī and other Upaniṣads.¹

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¹ See Oldenberg, Die Lehre der Upaniṣads, p. 295, Ranade, Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy, p. 134.

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Six of the eight forms of the so-called Sassatavādas and Ekaccasassatavādas, if critically examined, will be found to be based on one of the six abhiññās (higher powers) attained by the Arhats, viz., the Pubbenivāsañāṇa (knowledge of former births). It is regarded as one of the various but not essential attainments of an Arhat. This power may be obtained by a person by practising concentration of mind but without fully developing insight into the truth, which is an essential condition of Arhathood. These meditators, who have not yet attained the Arhat stage, but have acquired the power of recalling some of their former births, think that they have known what is to be known and give an interpretation of the truth, i.e. of the ultimate beginning and end of existence, according to their own experiences.

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The remaining two classes of speculators, the logicians, one holding the soul and the world to be eternal, and the other holding the soul to be eternal but not the body, have been passed over in the Bhabmajāla Sutta with the remarks that opinions are sometimes formed by the logicians who depend purely on reasoning and not on meditation.

Nāgārjuna assails the Śāśatavādin

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As no attempt has been made in the *Brahmajāla Sutta* to refute the above-mentioned views, it will be worth while to turn to *Nāgārjuna's Madhyamakārikās*, in the last chapter of which, he takes up for refutation the various doctrines, two of which are the *Śāśvata*- and *Aśāśvata-vādas*.

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Refuting *Śāśvatavāda*, *Nāgārjuna* says¹ that if a person of the past could be shown to be the same as that of the present, then only *Śāśvatavāda* could stand, but this is not possible as it would give rise to the contingency of permanency (*nityatva*) of a being as also to the possibility of a being, having a particular form of existence, to assume different bodies (lit. different forms of existence).² A permanent being should not be said to transmigrate nor a human being who was formerly an animal but became a human being through good karma should say that he was an animal, for, *Śāśvatavāda* should insist that a man must remain a man, an animal an animal, and that is absurd.³

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¹ *M. Vr.*, pp. 574-5.

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² *Ibid.*, *Ekagatisthasyāpi nānāgatisamgrhitatvaprasangāt*. That is, it would lead to the absurdity of an animal, for instance, (if it is *nitya*) to become a man or a god without passing through death.

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³ To comprehend the arguments of *Nāgārjuna*, it should be remembered that *Nāgārjuna* uses the undermentioned synonyms of the Real and the Unreal in the absolute sense.

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The Real: *Nitya* = *Śāśvata* = *Svabhāva* = *Ātmā*, meaning that which is permanent, remains eternally the same without origin and destruction and never undergoes the slightest change, something like the so-called eternal Himālaya mountains, the Sun, the Moon.

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The Unreal: *Anitya* = *Aśāśvata* = *Niḥsvabhāva* = *Anātmā*, meaning that which is impermanent and undergoes change is really non-existing like the two Moons seen by a person with diseased eyes.

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One may however question, “Well, how could Śākyamuni say, ‘At that time I was the Cakravarti king Māndhatā’, if Śākyamuni was not the same as Māndhatā.” The object of such a statement, says Nāgārjuna, is (i) to negative the notion of complete separateness (*anyatvapratiṣedhakam*) and (ii) to establish the non-identity (*naikatva-pratipādakam*) of the two existences of a transmigrating being. Admitting that Śākyamuni was not totally different from Māndhatā, what harm is there in holding that he was identical with Māndhatā. Nāgārjuna’s reply is that, besides the objection of *nityatva* (permanency), it would land us in the absurd position that *upādāna* is responsible for the distinction between the two existences and not *ātmā*. The absurdity is shown thus: Let us assume that *ātmā* and *upādāna* are indistinguishable, and that *ātmā* of the previous existence is the same as the one in the present, from this it would follow that *upādāna* (having *pañcaskandhalakṣaṇa*) of the previous existence is the same as that of the present. But this is absurd as no change in *upādāna* in two existences is admissible. Then again, if *ātmā* and *upādāna* be distinguished as the agent and its object, then also it is not proper to say that object (*upādāna*) has changed but not its agent (*ātmā*, i.e., holder, *upādātṛ*).¹

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¹ For details see *infra*, Ch. VII.

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Nāgārjuna then points out that *ātmā* is inseparable from *upādānas*, because it cannot exist apart from the *upādānas*. If it is *upādāna* which comes into existence and undergoes change on account of ignorance, *karma*, etc., and not *ātmā*, then one has to say that the existence of *ātmā* is without any cause (*ahetukatvaprasaṅgāt*) and that is impossible according to Nāgārjuna. Hence *ātmā* and *upādāna* are not separable.

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Nāgārjuna then attacks the position of the *Aśāśvatavādins*.¹ He says that if ‘men’ and the ‘men reborn as gods’ be regarded as different, like the Neem and Mango trees, then only the Aśāśvatavādins can maintain that the soul of the man has been destroyed and a different soul has come into existence; but to maintain such a distinction in characteristics as between the Neem and Mango trees goes against the theory of the characteristic continuity (*saṃtānānuvṛtti*) of beings which is admitted to exist between ‘men’ and ‘the men reborn as gods’ and so the position of the Aśāśvatavādins becomes untenable.

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¹ Though it should have been dealt with along with the doctrines of *Ucchedavāda* (see *infra*) we cannot help treating it here in order to bring out the force of Nāgārjuna’s arguments.

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Nāgārjuna, explaining the position of the *Śāśvatāśāśvatavādins* (Pāli. *Ekaccassattikas* = Partial Eternalists), says that according to this class of thinkers, a man when reborn as a god should partially give up his human attributes and take the divine in their place; so by the destruction of one part of his being he is *aśāśvata*, and by the retention of the other, he is *śāśvata*. To hold that one part of a being is divine and the other human is not proper; hence the position of the Śāśvatāśāśvatavādins is untenable.²

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² Nāgārjuna, it seems, is evading the issue here. The contention of the Śāśvatāśāśvatavādins is that the soul is divine and immortal while the body is not so. Nāgārjuna here is not distinguishing the soul from the body. He is refuting those only who hold that the soul is one of the constituents of the body, or is at least not distinguishable from the body. This, however, is never accepted by the Brāhmanic *Śāśvatavādins*.

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After refuting the three positions mentioned above it becomes easy for Nāgārjuna to disprove the contention of the *Naivaśāśvatanāśāśvatavādins*. He says that one may use the expression na śāśvata or na aśāśvata only when he has shown that there was something śāśvata which later on became aśāśvata. But it has been already shown that the śāśvata and aśāśvata nature of beings cannot be established; hence there can be no such being as naivaśāśvatanaśāśvata.¹

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¹ M. Vr., p 585.

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He now rounds up this refutation by examining whether there is, in fact, any padārtha (thing) going about in this beginningless world, the existence of which (thing) we have supposed on the basis of the continuous succession of birth and death without any beginning. If it could be proved that the saṃskāras,² or, the self is leaving one gati (lit. state of existence) to go to another, from this again, it is going elsewhere, then the saṃsāra (stream of existence) could be proved to be without a beginning. But this is not possible, because a thing which is permanent (nitya) or impermanent (anitya) cannot be said to be coming and going. That being so, is it right to say that the stream of existences (saṃsāra) has a beginning only because of the remoteness and non-perception of the beginning of the chain of births and death (janmaparamparayā atīdirghatvenādyanupalambhāt)? Then again, when no entity can be shown as transmigrating (saṃsartur abhāvāt), how can the stream of existences (saṃsāra) be said to have a beginning or not? So it is quite wrong to hold that there is something (kaścit padārthaḥ) which has been going about in this beginningless world and which can be perceived. There is, in fact, nothing eternal (śāśvata) and so it is meaningless to think of anything as non eternal (aśāśvata), or both, or neither of the two.³

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² M. Vr., p. 586; cf. Ibid., p. 529.

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³ For Nāgārjuna's position see M. Vr., pp 537, 591.

Antānantikā

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III. Four kinds of *Antānantikā* (limitists and unlimitists). The *Antānantikā* are those who hold that

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(a) the world is limited in extent and circular in shape;

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(b) the world is unlimited in extent and is without any end;

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(c) the world is limited upwards and downwards but unlimited breadthwise;

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(d) the world is neither limited nor unlimited (in any direction whatsoever).¹

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¹ In the usual enumeration of *diṭṭhis*, only the first and second are mentioned. See e.g., *Paṭis.*, I, p. 153.

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The reasons assigned for these conclusions are as follows: Some meditators who take the finite and circular world as their object of meditation and do not extend it to all the world systems (*Cakkavāḷas*),² arrive at the first conclusion. Those who take all the *Cakkavāḷas* as their object of meditation, arrive at the second,³ while those who take the *Cakkavāḷas* limited upwards and downwards but unlimited breadthwise as their object of meditation, arrive at the third.⁴

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² A *Cakravāḷa* has a Sun and a Moon as also a multitude of stars moving around the *Mahāmeru*.

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³ See also *Paṭis.*, I, p. 152-3.

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⁴ As an approach to this view we may point to the theory of the origin of the world in the *Aitareyopaniṣad*, where the heaven and the earth are conceived as "encompassed on the upper and nether sides by regions of water." Ranade, *op. cit.*, p. 95. In the Buddhist cosmology a chiliocosm consisting of 1,000 or more worlds is encompassed by a gigantic wall. See McGovern, *Manual of Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 48; Hardy, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 89.

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These three classes of speculators are, in fact, not concerned about the ultimate end of the world. They speak about the finiteness and infiniteness of the shape of the world or the universe. In popular Buddhism, the universe is believed to be composed of an infinite number of world systems, of which one thousand or one million or one thousand millions form a chiliocosm. The first three conclusions are, according to the *Sutta*, nothing but the three kinds of experiences obtained gradually through meditation. The author of the *Sutta* wants to show that those who have one of these experiences but have not yet obtained the highest conception of *Suññatā*,¹ give out one’s own individual experience as the true conception of the universe.

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¹ Cf *Sum Vil*, p 123. Imasmim pi Brahmajāle hetthā ditthi-vasena desanā utthitā, upari suññatāpakāsanam āgatam.

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As regards those who reach the fourth conclusion, the text says they are logicians who depend on pure arguments. The Buddhist logicians are evidently responsible for the fourth theory. Their characteristic method of exposition of all metaphysical topics is by the fourfold process (*catuṣkoṭika*).² It is, as a rule, not applied to empirical things. By this fourfold process it is contended that the world is non-existent as the Śūnyatāvādins hold, or is only a creation of the mind as the Vijñānavādins assert, and hence the question of the attributes of *anta* and *ananta* with reference to the world does not arise.

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² Viz, *hoti; na hoti, hoti ca na hoti ca, n’eva hoti na na hoti*.

Nāgārjuna’s Comment

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The exposition of the four *Antānantādi* views given above relates to cosmogony and appears to be a little laboured due, perhaps, to the expositor’s desire to bring them into a line with the previously mentioned *Sassatādi* views and to attribute three of the four views to ecstatic experiences. The exposition of these views elsewhere is of quite a different nature and sounds reasonable. Nāgārjuna has taken up these problems in his *Madhyamaka-kārikā* and has shown how these are untenable. He first states their four positions thus:

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(a) Those, who cannot foresee the future appearance of the self or the world (*ātmano lokasya vā*), regard the world as limited (*antavān*);

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(b) Those, who can foresee the future appearance of the self or the world, regard the world as unlimited (*na antavān*);

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(c) Those, who can foresee the future appearance of the self or the world partially and not fully, regard the world as both limited and unlimited;

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(d) Those, who cannot foresee the future appearance of the self or the world either partially or fully, regard the world as neither limited nor unlimited.

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Refuting the above four propositions, Nāgārjuna says:

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(a) The existence of *paraloka* (after-life or after-world) is admitted by the Buddhists, hence those who admit it should not say that the self or the world has an end because in that case there could not be an after-life or after-world.

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(b) Similarly if the existence of *paraloka* is admitted, one should not say that the self or the world has no end (*ananta*) because in that case also there cannot be a *paraloka*.

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(c) The third view that the world is both limited and unlimited is not tenable for the following reasons:

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(i) Take for instance, the case of a man reborn as a god; if it be held that the *skandhas* of the man had been destroyed at his death (i.e. *antavān*), then it cannot be said that they have given rise to a god. They would be like the extinguished lamp with oil but lacking a wick. As it is admitted that a being reappears after death, it should not be said that the self or the world is limited.

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¹ *M. Vr.*, pp. 536, 573, 587-591.

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(ii) Applying similar reason, it can be shown that the self or the world cannot be said to be unlimited. In the case when a man is reborn as a god, if it be said that the *skandhas* of the man had not been destroyed at his death, they could not have given rise to a god. The self or the world would be endless and indestructible (*ananto 'vināśī*) on account of not giving up its own form. It is only when the previous *skandhas* cease to exist, and that another set of *skandhas* comes into existence, as a result of the same, hence it is not proper to say that the self or the world is unlimited (*ananta*) as the previous *skandhas* do not exist any further.

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In Buddhism, the repeated existences of a being is nothing but the continuous flow of *skandhas* (*skandhasantāna*), the *skandhas*, however, are being destroyed every moment and have fresh existence like the flame of a lamp. In other words, the previous set of *skandhas* is destroyed every moment but at the same time it becomes a cause for the appearance of the next. It happens uninterruptedly and so it is said to be continuous, though it is not strictly so. The flame of a lamp appears to be continuous and even identical, but, in fact, it is not so because the drop of oil which once fed the flame is exhausted and another drop of oil takes its place to feed the flame, which therefore cannot be the previous one. On account of this apparent uninterruptedness, it is believed to be continuous and even identical. Hence to a Buddhist philosopher, the self or the world cannot be both limited and unlimited, it is ever flowing like a stream undergoing change every moment (until it reaches Nirvāṇa).

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Nāgārjuna then takes up for refutation the third view of both limitedness and unlimitedness. He says that the adherents of this view may say that one part of the man (i.e. body) is destroyed, hence antavān; while the other part (i.e. soul) remains undestroyed, hence anantavān. Nāgārjuna in reply says that it is absurd to hold that one part of a being is destroyed and the other is not. He, however, as a Buddhist philosopher, is not prepared to admit the existence of soul and body as two separate entities. He says that, according to his opponents then, a man, if reborn as a god, should be partly human and partly divine, but this is not possible, hence the opponents cannot uphold the view of the self or the world being both limited and unlimited.

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He then proceeds to show that this partial identity and partial change cannot be attributed either to the soul (upādātā) or to the elements of the body (upādāna) because it has been established elsewhere¹ that the soul has no existence of its own apart from the skandhas, hence to speak of a non-existing entity as partially the same and partially different is absurd on the face of it.

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¹ See infra, Ch VII.

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(d) When the third position is not tenable, i.e. when it cannot be said that the self or the world is both limited and unlimited, Nāgārjuna says that no argument need be adduced to refute the fourth view that the self or the world is neither limited nor unlimited.

Amarāvikkhepika

IV. Four kinds of Amarāvikkhepikas (evasive disputants)

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There are some thinkers who do not want to draw a line of demarcation between good and evil actions; so when they are confronted with inquiries about good and evil, they do not give a categorical answer, for they believe that they may be wrong in their answer and be opposed by others and that will produce in their mind either conceit and pride, or ill-will and hatred,¹ both of which will be a hindrance to their spiritual progress. If the opinion of an Amarāvikkhepika be contradicted, he would bear ill-will or hatred and this fact proves that he was wrong and guilty of speaking a falsehood, and hence would create a hindrance to his spiritual progress. Should he, however, obstinately adhere to his own view and not accept the view as corrected by his opponents, he would have *upādāna* (cause for rebirth) and that would also be a hindrance to his further spiritual progress.

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¹ See *Sum. Vil.*, I, p. 116. Chando=dubbalarāgo; rāgo=balavarāgo; doso=dubbala-kodho; patigho=balava-kodho.

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The third and fourth classes of Amarāvikkhepikas are those who are afraid of facing a well-trained logician with any positive opinion about good and evil, lest they be vanquished in the dispute and thus be led to bear an ill-will towards their opponents. This ill-will would cause hindrance to their spiritual progress.²

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² See B. M. Barua, *Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, p. 329.

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These disputants have thus their own good reason for the line of action followed by them in view of the fact good (*kuśala*) and evil (*akuśala*) are relative terms, and no hard and fast line can be drawn between them. To a Mahāyānist or a Vedāntist there is ultimately nothing as good or evil, and hence no positive statement can be made about them, the best course therefore would be either to remain silent or evade a positive answer, and the latter course has been preferred by the Amarāvikkhepikas. Whatever may have been the justification for the disputants becoming Amarāvikkhepikas, they were, in the eyes of the Buddhists, men of weak intellect and deluded, and supposed to have been generally incapable of being *brahmacārins*. Hence they were not regarded as capable of attaining the highest truth.¹

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¹ *Majjhima*, I, p. 521. ² See chap. IV, p. 39-40. ³ In the *Saṃyutta*, II, p. 20 it is said that Kassapa once asked Buddha whether misery is uncaused and not due to one's own and others' actions (*asayaṃkāraṃ aparaṃkāraṃ adhiccasamuppannaṃ dukkhan ti*). See also *Dīgha*, III, p. 139; *ante*, chap. IV, p. 35-6. ⁴ See *Vis. M*, p. 172, Hardy's *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 10.

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Sañjaya, one of the six heretical teachers, has been classed as an Amarāvikkhepika.² The advocates of Navya Nyāya love to indulge in evasions of issues. It is not improbable that these Amarāvikkhepikas were the fore-runners of the Naiyāyikas who very often indulged in slippery arguments (*vitaṇḍā*).

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*Adhiccasamuppannika*

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V. Two classes of *Adhiccasamuppannikas* (Fortuitous Originists). There are some thinkers who hold that the soul and the world originate accidentally without any cause (*adhiccasamuppannika*).³

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(a) The texts speak of one class of such thinkers thus: There are some meditators who take up *Vāyo-kasina*⁴ for meditation and then reaching the fourth *jhāna* discover that mind is the source of all troubles, and so they induce a state in which mind does not function. Should they die while thus meditating, they are reborn as ‘*Asaññasattā*’ gods. Some of these again fall from that state by developing *saññā* and are reborn in the mortal world where some of them practise meditation and develop the power of remembering former births. Their memory does not go beyond the *Saññuppāda* state, i.e., the time of their fall from their position as ‘*Asañña-sattā*’ gods, and so they declare that the soul and the world originate fortuitously.

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(b) The second class of *Adhiccasamuppannikas* comprises those who arrive at the above-mentioned conclusion through reasoning. As a parallel to this doctrine, we may refer to the *Lokāyatikas* or *Bārhaspatyas* who hold that the happiness and misery of persons are brought about by the laws of nature, and that there is no other cause. It was by an accidental combination of elements that the living beings such as a peacock of variegated colours or a human being is born. The conceptions of heaven and hell, merit and demerit, and so forth, according to them, are creations of designing minds. The doctrine of Ajita Kesakambalin is similar to what has been stated above. According to him, there is no preceding cause or condition for the affliction or purification of a person and hence there is no need for exertion. It is a mistake to think, he says, that one can change the course of his life by the observance of precepts or performance of rituals or practice of asceticism.*

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¹ *Digha*, I, p. 53-54; *Samyutta*, III, p. 211. Cf. *ante*, ch. IV, p. 37-38.

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∗ NOTE: In the *Digha Nikāya* (I, p. 30) the five classes of thinkers including the Antānantikas dealt with before are called Pubbanta-kappikas (i.e. those who speculate about the beginning of the universe) In the *Mādhyamika-vṛtti* (pp. 536, 572), however, the Śāśvatavādins are only called Pūrvāntikas, while the Antānantikas are called Aparāntikas (i.e. those who speculate about the future of the universe) (See also *Majjhima*, II, pp. 228 ff.; *Paṭis.*, I, p. 155). Buddhaghosa remarks in a general way that some of those who have developed the power of remembering former births (*pubbenivāsānussati*) become Pubbantaka-

Uddhamāghātanika

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VI. Sixteen kinds of *Uddhamāghātanika-saññivādins*¹ (those who believe in the existence of a conscious soul after death).² The sixteen conceptions are as follows:—

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¹ The Aparāntakappikas, according to the *Dīgha Nikāya*, number forty-four from the *Uddhamāghātanikas* to the *Diṭṭha-dhamma-nibbānavādins*.

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² *Dīgha*, I, p. 31; *Majjhima*, II, p. 229.

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(a) Soul is material (*rūpī*)³ and remains healthy and conscious after death (*aroga param maraṇā saññī*). This view, says Buddhaghosa, is due to the meditator developing the notion that the soul is identical with the object of his meditation. He further says that such beliefs are held by the Ājīvikas. From the information collected by Dr. Barua, it is apparent that the Ājīvikas conceived of soul as an entity absolutely pure in its nature, but there is nothing to show that the soul, according to the Ājīvikas, is material.

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³ *Rūpī attā*. 'Rūpa' is usually translated as 'form'. On the basis of the connotation of 'rūpa' in *nāmarūpa*, I think it should be translated by the word 'matter.' In the Buddhist cosmological speculations, 'rūpadhātu' means not 'the world of forms,' but the 'material world.' Likewise 'Arūpadhātu' means not 'the world of the formless' but the 'non-material world.'

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ppikas, while some who have developed higher vision (*dibbacakkhu*) become Aparāntakappikas (*Sumangala Vilāsinī*, I, p. 119).

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In the *M. Vṛ.*, it is clearly stated that 'nāma' is a collective name of the four *arūpiṇaḥ skandhā* (i.e. immaterial skandhas) while *rūpa* is that which takes form and offers obstruction (*rūpyata iti rūpam bādhyata ityarthaḥ*). The Tibetan rendering of *rūpyate* is *gshig tu. run bus* = because it is susceptible of examination and that of *bādhyate* is *gnod. par. bya. bar. nun* = it is susceptible of being struck (see *M. Vṛ.*, p. 544 fn.). Cf. Another conception of soul similar to this (b) Soul is non-material (*arūpi*) but remains healthy and conscious after death. Buddhaghosa thinks that this view is due to the meditator reaching the Arūpasamāpatti stage and confusing the *nimitta* (object of meditation) of Arūpasamāpatti with *attā* (soul). He attributes to Mahāvīra a doctrine similar to this. Buddhaghosa seems to be correct in his suggestion, for the Jainas also describe their soul (*jīva*) as non-material (*arūpa*) and formless (*amūrta*).¹

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¹ See *Pre-Buddhistc Indian Philosophy*, p. 309 See also Guerinot, *La Religion Djaina* (Paris, 1826), ch. VI. *L’âme le djiva, est le principe de la vie, la force vitale. Elle possède une série de qualités: elle est immatérielle, amourta, sans forme, aroupa.........*

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The next six views are more or less stereotyped combinations of *rūpi* and *arūpi*, *anta* and *ananta*. These are as follows:— The soul after death is
(c) both material (*rūpi*) and non-material (*arūpi*)
(d) neither *rūpi* nor *arūpi*
(e) finite (*anta*)

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in the Mahānidāna Sutta (*Dīgha*, II, p. 64): *Rūpi me paritto attā ti* and *Rūpi me ananto attā ti*.

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It may be observed that if *Rūpi* means ‘form’ it cannot be *ananta* (infinite) hence *rūpi* should mean ‘material’.

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The only point to which I want to draw attention is that the word ‘aroupa’ (*arūpa*) should have been rendered into French by the word ‘immatérielle’ and ‘amourta’ (*amūrta*) by ‘sans forme.’ Mr. Jaini also in his *Outlines of Jainism* (Cambridge, 1916), p. 83, translates *amūrta* by the word ‘immaterial.’ In the *Dravyasamgraha* (edited by Sarat Chandra Ghosal, 1917, The Sacred Books of the Jainas Series), pp. 4, 5, 22, *amūrta* is translated by the word ‘formless.’

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Mons. Guerinot, however, does not mention the source from which he traced the word ‘arūpa.’ From the *Dravya-samgraha* (p. 22) it is apparent that soul, according to the Jainas, in its pure state, is invisible and it takes matter (*pudgala*) when it is afflicted by passions.

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(f) infinite (*ananta*)
(g) both *antavān* and *anantavān*
(h) neither *antavān* nor *anantavān* The soul after death is conscious of
(i) only one object (*ekatta*)¹
(j) many objects (*nānatta*)²
(k) limited space or object (*paritta*)³
(l) unlimited space or object (*appamāṇa*)⁴

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¹ Similar to the Brahmakāyikā and Subhakiṇṇā gods = 2nd and 4th Viññāṇaṭṭhitis (*Dīgha*, II, p. 69).

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² Similar to Ābhassarā gods = 3rd Viññāṇaṭṭhiti (*Dīgha*, II, p. 69).

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³ Cf. *Majjhima*, II, p. 13. *Sabbaso rūpasaññānaṃ samatikkamo, paṭighasaññānaṃ atthaṅgamo, nānattasaññānaṃ amanasikāro ananto ākāso ti ākāsānañcāyatanam upasampajja viharati ayaṃ catuttho vimokkho.*

v1.c8.s6.18

⁴ Cf. *Majjhima*, II, p. 229: *Etaṃ va pan’ ekesam upātivattataṃ viññāṇakasinam eke abhivadanti appamāṇam āneñjam*; for further elucidation see *Majjhima*, II, p. 13.

v1.c8.s6.19

These four views are attributed by Buddhaghosa to the various experiences acquired by ecstatic meditation. He says that the first (i) view is held by those who have attained the fourth *samāpatti*, while the second (j) by those who have not attained any one of the *samāpattis*. The third (k) and fourth (l) are held by those meditators who have for meditation an object or space or *viññāṇa*, limited (*paritta*) or unlimited (*appamāṇa*). The soul after death has
(m) unmixed happiness (*ekanta-sukhī*), e.g., when a being is in the third or fourth *jhānabhūmi*;
(n) unmixed misery (*ekanta-dukkhī*), e.g., when a being is in hell;

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(o) mixture of happiness and misery, e.g., when a human being is in the mortal world;
(p) neither happiness nor misery, e.g., when a being is in the Vehapphala heaven.

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Buddhaghosa attributes these four views to those who form their conception of soul on the basis of the four different kinds of future existences as indicated above.

Uddhamāghātanika-asaññivāda

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VII. Eight kinds of *Uddhamāghātanika-asaññivādins* (upholders of the existence of unconscious soul after death).

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Among those who are of opinion that the soul remains unconscious but healthy after death, the following eight conceptions of the soul are current:

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The soul is
(a) material (*rūpī*)
(b) non-material (*arūpī*) (c-h) both *rūpī* and *arūpī* and so forth as stated above in connection with the conscious soul (c-h)¹

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