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Early Monastic Buddhism v2.c34: Chapter VIII (B)

Early Monastic Buddhism v2.c34

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Contents

Chapter VIII (B)

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The Śaila Schools, Prajñaptivādins, Bahuśrutīyas and Vetulyakas

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In discussing the doctrines of the Śaila and other schools, Vasumitra has mixed them up with the Mahāsanghikas, probably with that section of the Mahāsanghikas who are distinguished in the *Kathāvatthu-aṭṭhakathā* as ekacce Mahāsanghikā. It is on the basis of the *Kathāvatthu* that we have distinguished the doctrine of the later Mahāsanghikas, whose opinion may be taken as identical with those of the Śaila and other schools and put them together in the following pages.

1. Is Buddha human?

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In Vasumitra’s treatise the Buddhas are described as *lokottara* (supramundane), and as such he is made of *anāsrava dharmas*¹ (pure qualities, without sleep or dream which are concomitants of *sāsrava dharmas*). Buddhas have unlimited *rūpa-kāyas* (material bodies), powers (*balas*), length of life (*āyu*), etc.

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¹ Masuda renders it as “no sāsrava dharmas.” The rendering, I would prefer, is “anāsrava dharmas,” i.e. Buddhas are embodiment of anāsrava dharmas, viz., silaskandha, samādhisk., prajñāsk., vimuktisk. and vimuktijñānadarśanask. not of rūpa, vedanā, saññā, saṅkhārā and viññāṇa which are sāsrava dharmas. See my *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna* (henceforth indicated as *Aspects*), p. 108.

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In the *Kathāvatthu* (XVII. 1 & 2) the above doctrines are attributed to the Vetulyakas, according to whom the Buddha does not live in the world of men neither should he be located anywhere and it is his created form (*abhinimmito jino*) that delivered the religious discourses. The Theravādins account for this heresy by saying that it is due to the literal but wrong interpretation of the passage: *Bhagavā loke jāto loke sambuddho lokam abhibhuyya viharati anupalitto lokenā ti* (Buddha, born and enlightened in this world, overcame this world and remained untouched by the things of the world—*Sam. Nik.*, iii. 140). This is supplemented by further discussions in the *Kvu.*, (XVIII. 1, 2 & XXI. 6) relating to the heresies also attributed to the Vetulyakas, viz., *Na vattabbam*, “*Buddho Bhagavā manussaloke aṭṭhāsī*” ti (It should not be said that Buddha lived in the world of men—XVIII. 1); *Sabbā disā Buddhā tiṭṭhantī ti*¹ (Buddhas exist in all corners of the world—XXI. 6) and *Abhinimmitena desito ti* (the discourses are delivered by created forms—XVIII. 2). These show that according to the opponents of the Theravādins the Buddha is omnipresent and as such is beyond the possibility of location in any particular direction or sphere and that all the preaching of Buddhism has been done by the apparitional images of Buddha.

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¹ This is the opinion of the Mahāsanghikas only according to the *Kvu.*

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Buddhaghosa with his usual naïvety understood the Vetulyakas as holding the opinion that Buddha remained always in the Tusita heaven, where he was before he came to this world. The discussions in the *Kathāvatthu* as also the terse statements of Vasumitra leave no doubt about the fact that the Mahāsanghikas (specially their offshoots,—the Vetulyakas and the Lokottaravādins) regarded Buddha as transcendental. Masuda suggests that the *sambhogakāya* of Buddha is referred to in the heresies, but the time of emergence of the conception of *sambhogakāya* is still a matter of controversy.¹ From the discussion in the *Kathāvatthu* (XXI. 5) concerning "atthi Buddhānaṃ Buddhehi hinātirekatā ti (whether Buddhas mutually differ?) it seems that the Andhakas (another offshoot of the Mahāsaṅghikas) were still concerned with the *Sambhogakāya* and had not yet arrived at the conception of the *Dharmakāya*. Buddhaghosa says that the Andhakas hold that Buddhas differ from one another in some qualities other than attainments like *satipaṭṭhāna*, *sammāppadhāna*, etc., the orthodox school holding that Buddhas may differ in respect of *sarīra* (body), *āyu* (length of life) and *pabhāva* (radiance) but not in regard to the attainments mentioned above. The discussion in the *Kvu.* (XVIII. 3) shows that the Uttarāpathakas held the views that Buddhas can have no *karuṇā* (compassion), and that Buddha's body is made of *anāsrava dharmas*. In the *Mahāvastu* (I, p. 167-8) the conception of *lokottara* Buddha appears thus:—Transcendental are the practices of Bhagavān, and so are his *kuśalamūlas*, his eating, drinking and such other daily actions. He follows the ways of the world just as much as he follows the transcendental ways.² He makes a show of standing, walking and other *iriyāpathas*, but he never gets tired. He washes his feet or body though there is no dirt to wash; he cleanses his teeth though his mouth smells like a lotus;¹ he eats though he has no hunger, and so forth. These are all due to his being an embodiment of the effects of good actions.² There is nothing in common between Him and the beings of the world. Everything of the great ṛṣi is transcendental including his advent into the world.³

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¹ Masuda's opinion, however, can be supported by the fact that in the *Mahāvastu* (I, p. 169) Buddha's *kāya* is equated to *niṣyandakāya* rendered into Chinese by *pao sheng* which is also the rendering of *sambhogakāya*, see my *Aspects*, pp. 117, 120.

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² *Mahāvastu*, I, p. 168: लोकानुवर्तनां बुद्धा अनुवर्तन्ति लौकिकौ । प्रज्ञप्रिमनुवर्तन्ति यथा लोकोत्तरामापि ॥

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¹ Cf. Kvu. XVIII. 4: Buddhassa Bhagavato uccārapassāvo ativiya aññe gandhajāte adhigaṇhātīti—opinion of some Andhakas and Uttarāpathakas.

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² Mtu., I, p. 169: बुद्धानां शुभनिष्यन्दानां एषा लोकानुवर्तना। Cf. Laṅkā. pp. 28, 34: निष्यन्दबुद्धा।

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³ Mtu., I, p. 159.

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If the transcendence of Buddha be admitted, then it follows as a matter of course that his length of life would be unlimited and that he could not be subject to sleep or dream, as he could have no fatigue, and one who is without sleep and ever awake has nothing to do with dream. It is worth noting here that even in the Pāli suttas like the Mahāparinibbānasutta⁴ there are hints to the effect that a Buddha, if he wishes, can extend his life-limit up to a Kalpa or the end of a Kalpa thus revealing that the transcendental conception has taken roots in the minds of the Buddhists at a very early date.

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⁴ Dīgha, II, p. 103. yassa kassaci cattāro iddhipādā bhāvitā—so ākaṅkhamāno kappam vā tiṭṭheyya kappāvasesam vā.

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In the Kathāvatthu⁵ the discussion resting with the topic: Buddhassa Bhagavato vohāro lokuttaro ti reveals that the Andhakas, to whom the above opinion is ascribed, held that Buddha’s actions (vohāro) are lokuttara and that they are treated as lokiya (mundane) and lokuttara (supramundane) according as the object of the action is lokiya or lokuttara. Mr. Shwe Zan Aung prefers to confine the sense of the word “vohāro”⁶ to “speech”, and we think there is good reason for it.¹ In Vasumitra’s treatise an opinion of this nature is attributed to the Mahāsanghikas in contrast to the Sarvāstivādins, viz., the sūtras (or discourses) preached by the Buddha are all perfect in themselves (nītārtha). Buddhas speak of nothing but dharma (doctrines), as such their teaching is concerned only with paramārtha-satya (paramatthasacca), i.e., not with saṃvṛtisatya (sammuti-sacca).² The paramārthasatya cannot be normally expressed by words. It can be explained only by silence or at the most by an exclamation—which idea, I think, is expressed in Vasumitra’s treatise thus: “The Buddha can expound all the doctrines with a single utterance and that there is nothing which is not in conformity with the truth in what has been preached by the World-honoured one.”³ In the Upāyakauśalyaparivarta of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka it has been shown that for training up deluded beings in his doctrines, Buddha did take recourse to various expedients which were false, i.e., unreal (saṃvṛti or sammuti), and that through such teachings he led the deluded beings to the truth—paramārtha. So it follows that all his teachings collected in the Piṭakas are merely saṃvṛti or sammuti (unreal) and hence they are not his real teachings.⁴

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⁵ Kvu., II, 10.

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⁶ Sans. Vyavahāra

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¹ Cf. M.Vṛ., p. 494. व्यवहारमनाश्रित्य परमार्थो न देश्यते ।

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² Paramārtha-satya means the highest truth while saṃvṛti-satya means the so-called truths as used in every day usage by the people in general. For detailed treatment see my Aspects, pp. 216 ff.

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³ Asia Major, II, p. 19.

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⁴ Aspects, p. 198.

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According to the Mahāsanghikas, Vasumitra says, Buddhas have both kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna⁵ always present in their mind, the Sarvāstivāda holding that all Arhats may have kṣaya-jñāna but a few only have anutpādajñāna; the Theravādins, however, do not make such a distinction.

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⁵ Masuda, pp. 21, 42.
(a) Kṣayajñāna means cognizance of the fact that all the āsavas are destroyed;

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Among the other attributes of this lokottara Buddha, Vasumitra’s treatise speaks of his powers (balas)¹ as unlimited while the Mahāvastu of his five eyes (cakṣus)² as uncommon

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(b) Anutpādajñāna means cognizance of the fact that one will not be reborn again. Cf. Kośa, VI, 67; Aṭṭhasālinī, p. 54. Cf. Aspects, p. 106 fn. 1.

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1 The ten balas are,— (Mahāvastu, pp. 159-160). (Kathāvatthu and Majjhima Nikāya).

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1. स्थानास्थानं वेत्ति 1. Ṭhānāṭhānaṃ jānāti.
2. सर्व्वगामिनीं च प्रतिपदं वेत्ति 2. Sabbatthagāminīpaṭipadaṃ jānāti
3. नानाधातुकं लोकं विदन्ति 3. Anekadhātuṃ nānādhātuṃ lokaṃ jānāti.
4. अधिमुक्तिनानात्वं वेत्ति 4. Sattānaṃ nānādhimuttikataṃ jānāti.
5. परपुरुषचरितकुशलानि वेत्ति 5. Parasattānaṃ parapuggalānaṃ indriya-paropariyattaṃ yathābhūtaṃ jānāti.
6. कर्मबलं प्रतिजानन्ति शुभाशुभम् 6. Atītānāgatapaccuppannānaṃ hetuso vipākaṃ jānāti.
7. क्लेशव्यवधानं वेत्ति 7. Jhānavimokkhasamādhisamāpattinaṃ saṅkilesaṃ vodānaṃ voṭṭhānaṃ yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti.
8. पूर्व्वनिवासं वेत्ति 8. Anekavihitaṃ pubbenivāsaṃ anussarati.
9. परिशुद्धदिव्यनयना भवन्ति 9. dibbena cakkhunā satte passati cavamāne upapajjamāne etc.
10. सर्व्वक्लेशविनाशं प्राप्नोन्ति 10. āsavānaṃ khayā anāsavaṃ ceto-vimuttiṃ paññāvimuttiṃ diṭṭhe va dhamme sayaṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā upasampajja viharati.

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2 By eyes, the text means all the five, viz., māṃsacakṣu, divyac., prajñāc., dharmac., and buddhac.

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(asādhāraṇa) and excelling those of Pratyekabuddhas, Arhats and others. This particular topic—tathāgatabalaṃ sāvakasādhāraṇaṃ ti has been taken up for discussion in the Kathāvatthu (III. 1), but strangely enough the position taken by the compiler of the Kathāvatthu is not that of a Theravādin but of a Lokottaravādin Mahāsanghika as against the Andhakas, i.e., the Śaila schools. In Vasumitra’s treatise this topic appears in a slightly different form.

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The Theravādins do not regard Buddha as lokottara but attribute to him almost all the powers and qualities of a lokottara Buddha and this discussion reveals one of such instances. The ten special balas (powers) of a Tathāgata appear not only in the Mahāvastu (I, pp. 159-160) but also in old Pāli works like the Majjhima Nikāya (i, pp. 69 ff.). The contention of the Andhakas is that there is a certain degree of difference between the Buddhas and the Arhats regarding the acquisition of the ten balas, and as such, Buddhas and Arahats are not on the same level (asādhāraṇaṃ). In the Mahāvastu and the Pāli works this view is accepted with this reservation that Buddhas are sarvākārājña, i.e., they possess a complete and detailed knowledge of everything, while an Arhat can at the utmost have sectional knowledge.¹ The Pāli school, i.e., the Theravādins hold that as far vimutti is concerned there is no difference between a Buddha and an Arhat, and that Buddhas are superior to the Arhats only on account of the fact that the former are promulgators of a new law while the Arhats are only followers of the same.¹

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¹ Cf. Kvu. Cy., p. 62: Ṭhānāṭhānādini hi sāvakā padesena jānanti. Tathāgatā nippadesena iti. Tāni uddesato sādhāraṇāni; niddesato asādhāraṇāni—niddesato sabbākāravisayataṃ saṃdhāya paṭikkhipati. Cf. Mtu, I, p. 158: बोधिसूलमुपगम्य चापाज्ञायां सर्वाकारज्ञतायां पंचचत्तः समन्वागता भवन्ति। Cf. Aspects, p. 106 fn. 1.

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¹ This argument is adduced in the *Kvu*. See also *Sam Nik*, III, p. 66.

II. Are Bodhisattvas average beings?

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If, according to the Mahāsaṅghikas, Buddhas are *lokottara*, and if the Buddhas, we *puthujjanas* know of, are only created forms of the real Buddha, the Bodhisattvas also cannot be average human beings—they must also be supramundane. In Vasumitra's treatise the following account of the Bodhisattvas is given: The Bodhisattvas do not pass through the embryonic stages. They assume the form of white elephants when they enter their mothers' wombs and come out of the same by the right side. The above opinion is the natural outcome of the legendary belief that came to be woven around the person of the great man about a century after his actual existence. In the *Lalitavistara*,² the Bodhisattva is placed not only in a crystal casket put within the womb but while in that state he is said to be preaching his dharma to the heavenly beings that flocked around him. The stories of the white elephant seen by Māyā in a dream at the time of her conception and the birth of the Bodhisattva by bursting through the right side of the mother's womb are too well-known to need any comment. The incorporation of these legends in the doctrines of the Mahāsaṅghikas shows that the Bodhisattva conception of the Mahāyānists was yet in the course of development.

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² *Lalitavistara*, ch. VI, p 73 (of A.S B. edition)

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The only doctrine that can be described as Mahāyānic is that Bodhisattvas take birth out of their own free will in any form of existence for imparting Buddhist dharmas to the sentient beings of that particular form of existence¹ an idea well illustrated in the Jātakas, and developed in the later Mahāyāna works like the Śikṣāsamuccaya and the Bodhicaryāvatāra. This topic has been taken up for discussion in the Kathāvatthu (XXIII. 3): Bodhisatto issariyakāmakārikahetu vinipātaṃ gacchati ti—but the arguments put forward completely ignore the standpoint of the Mahāsaṅghikas and attempt to show the untenability of the opponent's proposition by treating the Bodhisattva as nothing but an average human adept toiling along the path towards the attainment of bodhi.

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¹ Masuda, p. 21.

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In the niyāmokkantikathā² (Kvu., IV. 8, XII. 5, 6 XIII. 4) the same attitude is taken by the Theravādins. By niyāma, the Theravādins understand sammattaniyāma and micchattaniyāma, the former being the practice of brahmacariya (purity in conduct) and ariyamagga (path of sanctification) including, for the Bodhisattvas, the fulfilment of pāramis, leading to nibbāna (i.e. samyaktva or sammatta), and the latter the commission of heinous crimes (anantariyakamma) leading to hell (i.e., mithyātva or micchatta), all other practices being looked upon as aniyata (un-predestined).³ In the sense as expressed above any Śrāvaka can be a sammattaniyāma and he need not be a bodhisattva. The Theravādins do not recognise the bodhisattvas as superior in attainments to the Śrāvakas, and in the matter of brahmacariya and practice of ariyamagga they do not want to make any distinction between a Śrāvaka and a Bodhisattva.

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² Stepping into the path destined to reach Nibbāna.

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³ Kvu., pp. 78, 143: Ime dve niyāme thapetvā añño niyāmo nāma natthi.

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In the Laṅkāvatāra and Asaṅga's Sūtrālaṅkāra and such other Mahāyāna works however it is repeatedly stated that a person by the development of *bodhicitta* becomes a *niyata* Bodhisattva, i.e., through the fulfilment of *pāramīs* and practice of the various forms of asceticism he is to become ultimately a Buddha. Siddhārtha Gautama, in one of his previous births as Jotipāla-māṇava, did, as a matter of fact, develop *bodhicitta* at the time of Kassapa Buddha and then through several births, he fulfilled the *pāramīs* and took recourse to all possible *sādhanās*, whether Buddhistic or non-Buddhistic and ultimately attained perfection. He even became disciples of Āḷāra Kālāma and Rudraka Rāmaputta whose doctrines are treated as heresies in the *Brahmajāla* and other *suttas*. In the Mahāyāna texts emphasis is laid more on *bodhicitta* than on *brahmacariya* and *ariyamagga*. In the *Kathāvatthu* discussion, the Mahāyānic sense of *niyata* is ignored and the Theravāda sense of *sammattaniyāma* is kept in view. In the *Kathāvatthu* (XIII. 4) it is argued that to speak of a *niyata śrāvaka* or *bodhisattva* to have become a *sammatta*¹ is illogical. The difference of opinion really rests on the interpretation given to the word *niyata* in Mahāyāna texts as against that given by the *Kathāvatthu* writer and commentator. Inspite of the above interpretation of *niyāma* and attitude of the Theravādins they contend that Gautama Buddha in his bodhisattva existence did not become a disciple (*śrāvaka*) of Kassapa Buddha. In support of their contention they cited the passage: *na me ācariyo atthi, sadiso me na vijjati* etc. The Andhakas, strangely enough, took the opposite view and asserted that he did become a *śrāvaka* of Kassapa Buddha and cited the passage from the *Majjhima Nikāya* (ii, p. 54): *Kassapo, ahaṃ Ānanda bhagavati brahmacariyaṃ acariṃ sambodhāyā ti* etc.²

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¹ *Na niyatassa niyāmokkamanam tasmā asādhakan ti* Kvu. A., p. 143.

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² *Kvu.*, p. 288.

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According to the Theravādins, the Bodhisattvas as a class of beings as envisaged in the *Sūtrālaṅkāra* and *Laṅkāvatāra* do not exist. The individual, who happens to become the Buddha, is called a bodhisattva in his previous existence just to distinguish him as a being superior to an average one; by calling him a bodhisattva the Theravādins do not attribute to him any special virtues unattainable by a śrāvaka. The Mahāsaṅghikas or the Andhakas do not subscribe to the above view. According to them an individual from the moment he develops *bodhicitta* becomes a bodhisatta and is destined (*niyata*) to become a Buddha and follows a career which is quite different from that of a śrāvaka. The career of the former is marked more by love and compassion for the suffering beings than by path-culture while that of the latter has more of path-culture and *sādhanā* than exercise of *mettā* and *karuṇā*.

III. Are Arhats fully emancipated?

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According to Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva, the secession of the Mahāsaṅghikas from the Theravādins happened on account of the five points of Mahādeva. Four of these points relate to the qualities attainable by an Arhat. According to the Theravādins only one who is fully emancipated is called an Arhat,—he is *anupatto sadattho vītarāgo vītadoso vītamoho khīṇāsavo ohitabhāro katakaraṇīyo nāparam itthattāyā ti* (in possession of the excellent goal, free from attachment, hatred and delusion, in short, all impurities, relieved of burden of khandhas, accomplished in all that is to be done and devoid of any further existence). He has further acquired the clear vision about the origin and destruction of things, got rid of all doubts (*kaṅkhā*) about the Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha, non-existence of soul and the theory of causation, seen things for himself without the help of others (*na paravitāraṇā*)¹ and attained *bodhi* which however is *catumaggaññāṇa*² and not *sabbaññutañāṇa*—the *bodhi* of the Buddhas.³ The Theravādins do not admit the failings⁴ which are attributed to the Arhats by the Bahuśrutīyas, the Śaila schools and the Haimavatas. The failings are thus enumerated in Vasumitra's treatise:

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¹ See *infra*, p. 87

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² The *catumaggas* are sotāpatti, sakadāgāmi, anāgāmi and arhatta

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³ See *Kvu.*, A., p. 76.

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⁴ For the discussion "Parīhāyati arahā arahattā ti" see *infra*, p. 90.

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(1) Arhats can be tempted by others;
(2) They have still ignorance;
(3) They have still doubt;
(4) They gain knowledge through others' (help).⁵

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⁵ Masuda, pp. 24, 36, 38, 53, cf. *JRAS.*, 1910, pp 413-423. For the 5th point see *infra*, p. 87.

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In the *Kathāvatthu* (II, 1-5) all the above statements are taken up for discussion and appear thus:

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(i) *Atthi arahato rāgo?* (II. 1).⁶
(ii) *Atthi arahato aññāṇan*⁷ *ti?* (II. 2).
(iii) *Atthi arahato kaṅkhā ti?* (II. 3).
(iv) *Atthi arahato paravitāraṇā ti?* (II. 4).

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⁶ In the text the wording is "atthi arahato asucisukkavisaṭṭhi?" It perhaps refers to an instance of the Māra gods having removed *asucisukka* of an arhat. The commentator remarks that the impostors passing as arhats may have *asucisukkavisaṭṭhi* and upon that the contention of the Śaila schools is based. The Theravādins take their stand upon the fact an arhat cannot have *rāga* and hence they cannot commit *asucisukkavisaṭṭhi*.

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⁷ *Aññāṇam* is not the same as *avijjā*.

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The Theravādins emphatically deny that an Arhat who is free from attachment (*vītarāga*) can be subject to temptation. The opponents, as shown in the *Kvu.*, draw a subtle distinction between a *Sa-(=Sans. Sva-)dhammakusala-arhat* and a *Para-dhammakusala-arhat*, the former, according to the commentator, is a *Paññāvimutta* and the latter an *Ubhatobhāgavimutta*, that is, the knowledge of the former is confined to his own personal attainments while that of the latter is extended to other’s attainments besides his own. In the Pāli texts the *Ubhatobhāgavimutta* is not regarded as superior to the *Paññāvimutta* the only distinction made between the two is that the former has *samathābhinivesa*¹ and realisation of eight *vimokkhas*² while the latter has *vippassanābhinivesa*³ and realisation of only four *jhānas*,⁴ but as far as the question of *rāga* or *āsavas* is concerned both the classes of Arhats must be regarded as completely free from them, hence the subtle distinction drawn by the opponents is of no avail according to the Theravādins.

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¹ Samatha leads to concentration of thoughts and eradication of attachment (*rāga*). Cf. *Aṅguttara*, I, p. 61: *rāgavirāgā cetovimutti*.

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² For the eight *Vimokkhas*, see Appendix.

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³ Vipassanā leads to knowledge and removal of ignorance. Cf. *Aṅguttara*, I, p. 61: *avijjāvirāgā paññāvimutti*.

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⁴ Cf. *Aspects*, pp. 250, 276. See *Majjhima*, I, p. 477 and *Manorathapūraṇī*, III, p. 188; *Puggala-paññatti*, 14, 72.

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The next two points, that an arhat may have ignorance (i.e. *aññāṇa* and not *avijjā*) and doubt (*kaṅkhā* or *vimati*) are also vehemently opposed by the Theravādins on the ground that one cannot be an arhat unless he gets rid of *avijjā* and *vicikicchā* and develops perfect vision free from impurities (*virajam vītamalam dhammacakkhum*) after having dispersed all his doubts (*kaṅkhā vapayanti sabbā*).

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The opponents, as presented in the *Kvu.*, in this case also draw a distinction between a *Sadhammakusala-arhat* and a *Paradhamma-kusala-arhat, saying that both the classes of arhats may not have avijjā in regard to the truths, the theory of causation, etc. or vicikicchā about Buddha, Dharma and Saṅgha or absence of soul, but the former may have aññāṇa and kaṅkhā, say, as regards the name and family of an unknown man or woman or of a tree. It should be noted here the opponents do not mean sabbaññutañāṇa (omniscience) but just paradhammañāṇa—an intellectual power attained by the Ubhatobhāgavimutta-arhats, by which they can know many things outside himself. Arguing in this way the opponents maintain that a section of the arhats, i.e., the Paññāvimuttas or Sa-dhammakusala-arhats have ignorance (aññāṇa) relating to things or qualities other than those belonging to himself.

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The same arguments and counter-arguments are applied in the next discussion relating to atthi arahato paravitāraṇa? The word paravitāraṇa perplexed our translator Mr. Shwe Zan Aung.¹ The discussion in the Kvu. reveals that the word means that an arhat develops faith in the Triratna or acquires knowledge of the truths, etc. not by himself but through the instruction of his preceptor¹ in whom he had firm faith. The Theravādins oppose the contention of the opponents, saying that an arhat is vītamoha and is possessed of dhammacakkhu and so he does not require paravitāraṇa. The opponents as before contend that a sa-dhammakusala-arhat requires paravitāraṇa, while a para-dhammakusala-arhat does not.

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¹ "Excelled by others." See Points of the Controversy, p. 119. Buddhaghosa writes: yasmā yesaṃ tāni vatthuni pare vitaranti pakāsenti ācikkhanti tasmā tesaṃ atthi paravitāraṇa ti. Cf. Masuda, p. 24: "gain spiritual perception by the help of others (lit. enlightenment through others)."

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Another statement of Vasumitra relating to the Arhats, namely, "one who is kṛtakṛtyaḥ (= Pāli: katakaraṇīyo) does not take any dharma to himself i.e. has no attachment for worldly things" is echoed, I think, in the *Kvu.* (XVII, 1 & XXII. 2) in these terms: *atthi arahato puññopacayo ti?* and *arahā kusalacitto parinibbāyati ti*. The Theravādins agreeing with the Mahāsanghikas contend that the citta of Arhats goes beyond *pāpa* and *puṇya*, *kusala* and *akusala*, *kriyā* and *vipāka*, hence, to speak of them as acquiring merits or demerits is absurd. The opponents, the Andhakas, however, contend that the Arhats perform many good deeds, e.g., making gifts, worshipping caityas and so forth, and remain always self-possessed (*sato sampajāno*) even at the time of his parinibbāna, and so he does collect merits and passes away with *kusalacitta*.

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Neither the above discussions in the *Kathāvatthu* nor the terse statements of Vasumitra help us much in finding out the real difference between the Andhakas and the Theravādins about the position of an Arhat. The Mahāyāna works point out the distinction thus: Arhats, who are perfect Śrāvakas, get rid of only *kleśāvaraṇa*, i.e., the veil of impurities consisting of *rāga*, *dosa*, *moha*, *sīlabbataparāmāsa*, and *vicikicchā* but not of *jñeyāvaraṇa*, i.e., the veil which conceals the truth—the veil which can only be removed by realising the Dharma-śūnyatā or Tathatā.¹ It is the Buddha alone who is perfectly emancipated having both *kleśāvaraṇa* and *jñeyāvaraṇa* removed. That the Mahāsanghikas appear to be groping to get at this clear distinction will be evident from two other topics discussed in the *Kvu.* but not referred to in Vasumitra's treatise. The topics are,—*atthi kiñci saññojanam appahāya parinibbānan ti?* (XXII. 1) or *arahattappattīti?* (XXI. 3). To these the Mahāsanghikas replied in the affirmative, saying that an arhat is *nikkileso* (free from impurities) and does attain *parinibbāna* or *arhatta* but as he is not cognizant of all that is *Buddhavisaya* (domain of Buddha's knowledge), it must be admitted that some *saññojanas* are left in him. This opinion may be taken as a hint that the arhats do not remove the *jñeyāvaraṇa*.²

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¹ For details, see *Aspects*, pp. 35 ff.

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² There are a few subsidiary discussions in the *Kathāvatthu* relating to Arhats. These are given here briefly:—

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IV. 1. Householders cannot become Arhats—*Theravādins*. But householders like Yasa, Uttiya, Setu became Arhats—*Uttarāpathakas*.

v2.c34.s3.26

IV. 2. No one is born as Arhats—*Therav*. But there are Upahacca-(uppajja)-parinibbāyī Arhats—*Uttarāp*.

v2.c34.s3.27

IV. 3. All dharmas of Arhats are not anāsava, e.g. their physical body etc.—*Therav*. But Arhats are anāsavā (free from āsavas)—*Uttarāp*.

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IV. 4. In the Arhat stage, only arhattaphala is acquired—*Therav*. But all the phalas are possessed by the Arhats—*Uttarāp*.

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IV. 5. An Arhat is chaḷupekkho (see App.)—*Therav*. Rather Arahā chahi upekkhāhi samannāgato—*Uttarāp*

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IV. 10. All saññojanas are gradually destroyed and not by Arhattamagga alone—*Therav*. But by the destruction of all saññojanas one becomes an Arhat—*Andhakas*.

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XVII. 2. Arhats may have untimely death as arahatghātaka is mentioned in the Buddhavacanas—*Therav*. But as one cannot become an Arhat before the karmaic effects are exhausted, an Arhat cannot have untimely death—*Rājagirikas* and *Siddhatthikas*.

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XVII. 3. Arhats do not die when in imperturbable meditation and devoid of kriyācitta—*Therav*. But did not Gautama Buddha pass away immediately after arising from the 4th jhāna—*Uttarāp*.

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IV. Can there be retrogression of Arhats, Srotaāpannas and other Phalasthas?

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The following views regarding the possibility of retrogression of Arhats, Srotaāpannas and other phalasthas are attributed in Vasumitra's treatise¹ to a section of the Mahāsanghikas and some of their sub-sects:

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¹ Masuda, p. 22.

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(i) From the gotrabhūmidharma there is in all stages the possibility of retrogression.

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(ii) A Srotaāpanna has a chance of retrogression while an Arhat has not.

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The above two views are discussed in the *Kathāvatthu* under the topic: *Parihāyati arahā arahattā ti?* (I. 2).

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It will be observed that the *Kvu.* does not attribute to the Mahāsanghikas the above views about the retrogression of Arhats and Srotaāpannas. According to the Mahāsanghikas, the *Kvu.* says, an Arhat has retrogression while a Srotaāpanna has not, while Vasumitra takes a contrary view, as above (ii). Vasumitra says that the former opinion is held by the Sarvāstivādins and other schools. Buddhaghosa points out that this opinion is held by one section of the Mahāsanghikas and not all, and so Vasumitra may have in view the views "of that section, according to whom the Arhats may retrogress but the Srotaāpannas do not."²

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² *Kvu. A.*, p. 35: Sammitiyā Vajjiputtiyā Sabbatthivādino ekacce ca Mahāsanghikā arahato parihānim icchati.

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All the schools advocating the view that arhats retrogress hold, as stated in the *Kvu.*, that the Sotāpannas have no retrogression. This, however, contradicts the statement of Vasumitra.³ All these schools accept that a sotāpanno is *niyato* *sambodhiparāyaṇo* and hence is not subject to retrogression, but a sakadāgāmī or an anāgāmī may retrogress but not further than the sotāpanna stage, for some of the adepts in these stages may have *anusaya* which may develop into *pariyuṭṭhāna*¹ and thus bring about the fall—an argument which will be discussed next in connection with the Aṭṭhamakas. In regard to these two stages the *Kvu.* corroborates Vasumitra’s statement (no. ii).

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³ See Masuda, II, p. 27.

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¹ *Anuśaya* means that which lies in the mind in a latent state with the possibility of its coming into appearance if it receives an effective impulse, while *pariyuṭṭhāna* means its actual appearance in the mind without however a corresponding response in the outer world. For further details, see p. 94f.

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Regarding the srotaāpannas, Vasumitra further states that:
(1) they are capable of knowing their own nature (*svabhāva*) through their *citta* and *caitasika dharmas*;
(2) they can also attain the *dhyāna*;
(3) they are liable to commit all sorts of offences except the five *anantarīyas* (i.e. matricide, patricide etc.)

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In the *Kvu.* we do not come across any controversy relating to the first two topics. This silence may be interpreted as that the Theravādins accepted the two views. As regards the third topic, we may take into consideration the controversy: *Diṭṭhisampanno puggalo sañcicca pāṇaṃ jīvitā voropeyyā ti?* (see infra). A sotāpanna is a person with right view (*diṭṭhisampanno*), hence, according to the Theravādins, he cannot commit killing (*pāṇātipāta*) or such other offences, not to speak of the five extreme offences like matricide or patricide. Vasumitra perhaps speaks of the opinion of that section of the Mahāsaṅghikas i.e., the Andhakas, who contemplate the retrogression of the Sotāpannas while the *Kvu.* very likely speaks of the other section, according to whom the Sotāpannas do not retrogress.

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There are in Vasumitra's treatise two other statements, which also relate to the Srotāpannas. They are,—
(i) When one enters into the *samyakatva-nyāma*,¹ one may be said to destroy all *saṃyojanas*.²
(ii) None of the *dharmāyatanas*³ can be known or understood: they can be attained (only by those Aryan *pudgalas* above the *darśanamārga*).

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¹ See above, p. 82.

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² The three *saṃyojanas* are *sīlabbataparāmāsa*, *vicikicchā*, *micchādiṭṭhi*.

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³ The Dharmāyatanas are *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *saṃskārā*. Cf. *Abhi. Kośa*, p. 46.

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The *Kvu.* contributes no discussion on the above two points. The Theravādins also cannot but subscribe to these views.

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V (a). Do the *Aṭṭhamakas*⁴ have *anusaya*⁵ and *pariyuṭṭhāna*?

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⁴ The *aṭṭhamakas* are those who have just stepped into the Sotāpanna-hood, which is the eighth or the lowest stage in the fruits of sanctification.

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⁵ For the meaning of the term and its distinction from *pariyuṭṭhāna*, see p. 91, fn. 1.

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Relating to the Aṭṭhamakas, Vasumitra says that according to the Mahāsaṅghikas—
(i) In the eighth stage (*aṣṭamaka-bhūmi*) one can remain for a long time.

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In the *Kvu.* (III. 5) the identical problem is discussed in these words:
(i) *Aṭṭhamakassa puggalassa diṭṭhipariyuṭṭhānaṃ pahīnan ti?*

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Masuda's comment on the first view seems to be wide of the mark, though he quotes 'Shu-chi as his authority. The discussion in the *Kathāvatthu* clears up the view thus:

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According to the *Andhakas*, an adept who is in the eighth stage i.e., *sotāpatti-maggaṭṭha* and not yet *sotāpanna* gets rid of *diṭṭhipariyuṭṭhāna*, *sīlabbata-p.* and *vicikicchā-p.* but not *diṭṭhi-anusaya*, *sīlabbata-a.*, and *vicikiccha-a.*, i.e., the *anusayas* may become active (*uppajissati*) if they receive an impulse. The Andhakas by drawing this distinction between *pariyuṭṭhāna* and *anusaya* hold that an *aṭṭhamaka* may not get rid of the three *anusayas* and consequently remain away from the *sotāpanna* stage for a long time.¹

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¹ *Aṭṭhamaka* puggalas have *saddhā* but not *saddhindriya*—Andhaka.

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The *Kathāvatthu* also discusses the following two allied views attributed to the *Pubbaseliyas* and the *Uttarāpathakas*:

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(i) *Diṭṭhisampanno puggalo sañcicca pāṇaṃ jīvitā voropeyyā ti?* XII. 7 (Pubbaseliyas)

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(ii) *Diṭṭhisampannassa puggalassa pahīnā duggatī ti?* XII. 8 (Uttarāpathakas).

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By the first view the Pubbaseliyas mean that a person by having *sammādiṭṭhi* does not get rid of *dosa* (hatred), hence he can commit the sin of killing—a view wholly rejected by the Theravādins. By the second view the Uttarāpathakas assert that a person with *sammādiṭṭhi* cannot be reborn in a lower form of existence; the Theravādins point out that it may be so, but he may have *taṇhā* (desire) for objects and beings belonging to the lower forms of existences.

V (b). Are anusaya and paryavasthāna associated with mind or not?

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There are in Vasumitra two statements relating to *anusaya* and *paryavasthāna*, which will clear up the above problem further.—

v2.c34.s4.2

(i) *Anuśayas* (dormant passions or latent bias) are neither *citta* nor *caitasika* dharmas: and again they never become the object of thought (*anālambana*).

v2.c34.s4.3

(ii) *Anuśaya* is different from *paryavasthāna* (pervading passion) and *paryavasthāna* is different from *anuśaya*. It must be said that the *anuśaya* does not combine (*samprayuj*) with the *citta* whereas the *paryavasthāna* does.

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Relating to the above topics, the *Kvu.* has,

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(i) *Anusayā anārammaṇā ti?* (IX. 4) and *cittavippayuttā*
(ii) *Anusayā avyākatā ti* (XI. 1)
(iii) *Añño kāmarāgānusayo aññaṃ kāmarāgapariyuṭṭhānan ti?* (XIV. 5)
(iv) *Pariyuṭṭhānan cittavippayuttan ti?* (XIV. 6)

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Masuda offers the following interpretation from the *Shu-chi*: The *anuśayas* are really *bījas* (germs inborn in the mind) of *rāga* and other passions. They remain dormant unless excited by the corresponding impulse. They remain always in the mind, even in *kusalacitta*, so they are dissociated from the mind and do not require any object (*ālambana*) for support. When the *anuśaya* is excited by a suitable impulse, it becomes *paryavasthāna* (*pariyuṭṭhāna*) and as such becomes a mental function (*caitasika*), and then only it becomes an impurity and clogs the way to spiritual progress. The interpretation given above is corroborated by the *Kvu.*¹ The Theravādins however do not distinguish between *kāmarāgānusaya* and *kāmarāgapariyuṭṭhāna* and maintain that as the *anusayas* are included in the *Saṃkhārakkhandha*, they are all *sārammaṇa*. But according to the Andhakas some saṃkhāras are sārammaṇa (with basis) and some are anārammaṇa (without basis),¹ but not so are the remaining four khandhas. The Andhakas further maintain that as a puthujjana having kusalāvyākata-citta is sometimes described as “sānusayo ti” when their anusayas are without any ārammaṇa, it must be admitted that anusayas may be anārammaṇā.

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¹ *Kvu. A.* p. 117: *Tattha yesāṃ anusayā nāma cittavippayuttā ahetukā avyākatā ten' eva anārammaṇā 'ti laddhi seyyathā pi Andhakānañ c' eva ekaccānañ ca Uttarāpathakānaṃ.*

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¹ Kvu., p. 407: Saṃkhārakkhandho ekadeso sārammaṇo, ekadeso anārammaṇo.

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From the above discussion it is apparent that the anusayas, according to the Andhakas, are avyākata² i.e. neither good nor bad, and consequently they are citta-vippayutta, and also causeless (ahetuka). The Andhakas in the third discussion assert that anusayas are different from pariyuṭṭhānas, but in the fourth the Kvu. makes the Andhakas contend that pariyuṭṭhānas are also cittavippayuttas, which, however, apppear to be contradictory. Vasumitra says that the pariyuṭṭhānas according to these schools are cittasampayuttas, so we must dismiss the statement of the Kvu. as unwarranted.

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² The Andhakas, it seems, looked upon the anusayas as vipākacitta and treated the same as avyākata. Cf. Dhammasaṅgaṇi

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“The world in its variety originates out of actions (karma) which accumulate on account of anusayas. In the absence of anusayas, karma is not capable of producing a new existence (punarbhava). Consequently the root of bhava or rebirth is karma, in other words, anusaya.” With these words Vasubandhu opens the fifth book of Kośa. (See Kośa, V, p. 1).

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The Sarvāstivādins like the Theravādins regard anusaya, paryavasthāna and kleśa as same, the only distinction being that anusaya is the subtle, while paryavasthāna the manifest, state of rāga, dosa, moha, etc.

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The *Kośa* too deals with the problem under discussion, viz., whether or not *anuśaya* (e.g. *kāmarāgānusaya*) is a dharma by itself dissociated from mind, the *prāpti* of *kāmarāga*, etc.? The answer of the Sarvāstivādins is in the negative as that of the Theravādins. The former quote as their authority the *Jñānaprasthāna-sūtra*, in which *anuśaya* is shown to be associated with mind (*cittasamprayukta*). They assert that *anuśayas* are *kleśas*, and hence they cannot but be *citta-samprayuktas*.

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In this connection the *Kośa* refers to the opinion of the Sautrāntikas, who hold that *anuśaya* is different from *kleśa* inasmuch as it is neither associated with, nor dissociated from, mind because it is not a *dravya* apart; it is a *śakti* left in certain individuals by the previously existing *kleśas* and has the power of reproducing further *kleśas*. According to the Sautrāntikas, *kleśa* when non-manifest is *anuśaya* and when manifest, an act, it is *paryavasthāna* (*Kośa*, V, p. 7).¹

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¹ For exhaustive treatment of *Anuśayas*, see La Vallée Poussin's *Abhidharmakośa*, V.

VI. Can the Atthamakas have Saddhindriya?

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Vasumitra does not mention this view among the doctrines of the Mahāsanghikas but it is stated in the *Kvu.* that according to the Andhakas, *atthamakassa puggalassa natthi saddhindriyan ti* (III. 6), i.e., the *atthamakas* may develop *saddhā*, *viriya*, etc. but do not acquire *saddhindriya*, *viriyindriya* etc., a distinction which the Theravādins are not prepared to admit. The Andhakas mean that *saddhindriya* or *viriyindriya*, etc. is a faculty forming a part of the mind while *saddhā* or *viriya* etc. is only a passing phase of the mind.

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VII. *Are there worldly samyagdr̥ṣṭi and samyak-śraddhendriya?*

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Along with the above we may discuss the allied topic worded thus in Vasumitra’s treatise,—

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(1) There is neither laukikasamyagdr̥ṣṭi (worldly right view) nor laukikaśraddhendriya (worldly faculty of faith).

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The corresponding passages of the *Kvu.* are,—

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(1) *Natthi puthujjanassa ñāṇan ti?* (XX, 2);¹ and

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¹ Attributed to the Hetuvādas only.

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(ii) *Natthi lokiyaṃ saddhindriyan ti?* (XIX, 8).²

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² Attributed in the Cy. to the Hetuvādas and Mahīśāsakas and they mean all the five indriyas, saddhā, viriya, sati, samādhi and paññā.

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The argument of the Theravādins is that a layman may have *paññā* and *saddhā* of a kind which may be different from those of an adept, but *paññā* and *saddhā* that he possesses do develop into *paññindriya* and *saddhindriya*. It may be that the layman’s *paññā* or *ñāṇam* is confined to *dāna*, *sīla*, *cāga*, etc., i.e. *lokiya* affairs and does not extend to the comprehension of *lokuttara* subjects like truths, *maggas* and *phalas*, hence according to the Theravādins there may be *lokiya paññindriya* and *saddhindriya*.

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VIII. *Is utterance of dukkha possible in meditation; and Does it help perception of the truths?*

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The two statements of Vasumitra (i) “The path is realized by utterances” and (ii) “Even in the state of *samāhita* one can utter words” to which corresponds “*samāpannassa atthi vacībhedo ti*” of the *Kathāvatthu* are explained by Buddhaghosa thus: According to the Śaila schools an adept while in the first *jhāna* (meditation) and on the point of attainment of the Sotāpattimagga in some cases gives out an exclamation like “aho dukkhan ti.”¹ This, the adherents of the Śaila schools account for by saying that in the first jhāna, there is *vitakkavicāra*, and because of *vitakkavicāra* there is *vacīsaṃkhāra*² i.e., discursive and discriminating thoughts cause vocal activity, hence there is the possibility of a meditator in the first jhāna uttering the word ‘dukkha’. The Theravādins contend that as all physical activities of a meditator are set at complete rest, his giving out of an exclamation is an impossibility.³

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¹ Cf. *Vinaya*, I, p. 15, in Yasapabbajjā, Upaddutaṃ vata bho upassatthaṃ vata bho.

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² Cf. *Kvu.*, IX, 9: Opinion of the Pubbaseliyas: Sabbaso vitakkayato vicārayato vitakkavipphāro saddo ti? The Cy. on it is: Yasmā vitakkavicārā vacīsaṃkhārā ’ti vuttā tasmā sabbaso vitakkayato vicārayato antamaso manodhātuppavattikale pi vitakkavipphāro saddo yevā ti. Cf. *Majjhima*, I, p. 301.

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³ Cf. *Kvu.*, XVIII, 8: Samāpanno saddaṃ suṇāti ti. As it has been said by Buddha that sound is a hindrance to the first jhāna and that one rises from the first jhāna by an external sound, the Pubbaseliyas inferred therefrom that one in meditation hears sound.

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Along with the above we should take into consideration the other three doctrines of the Mahāsaṅghikas presented thus in Vasumitra’s treatise,—

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(i) The words of suffering can help (the process of realization of the path);

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(ii) Suffering leads a man to the path;

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(iii) Suffering also is (a kind of) food (*āhāra*); and

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(iv) Through *prajñā* suffering is destroyed and final beatitude is obtained.

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The corresponding expressions in the *Kathāvatthu* are as follows:—

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(i) “*Idaṃ dukkhan ti*” *vācaṃ bhāsato* “*idaṃ dukkhan ti*” *ñāṇaṃ pavattatī ti*? (XI. 4).

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(ii) *Dukkhāhāro maggaṅgaṃ maggapariyāpannan ti?* (II. 6).

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Both these statements repeat in a slightly different form what has been stated by Vasumitra. The Andhakas and the Sailas hold that when a meditator realises within his innermost heart that the world is full of suffering and is not worth living, an exclamation like “aho vata dukkham”¹ spurts out of his mouth and then and there his insight (ñāṇa) penetrates into the first truth “idaṃ dukkhan ti” and as a result, he attains (pariyāpuṇāti) the Sotāpattimagga. So “dukkha” may be called an “āhāra” in respect of the realisation of the path as also an “aṅga” (limb) of the Sotāpattimagga.

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¹ See fn. 1 above.

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The fourth doctrine mentioned above is, as Masuda explains, that *dukkha* can be removed not by means of the observance of moral precepts (śīlas) and practice of meditation (samādhi) but by the knowledge of the truth, causal law, and *anatta* of the things of the world. It is the basic teaching of Theravāda, hence no reference is made to it in the *Kvu*.

IX. How Vijñānas function?

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The following opinions are attributed by Vasumitra to the Mahāsaṅghikas:

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(i) Beings of the Rūpa and Arūpadhātu possess all the six sense-perceptions (ṣaḍvijñānas)²

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² Or ṣaḍvijñānakāya or the group of six sense-perceptions.

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(ii) The five vijñānas conduce both to attachment (sarāga) and freedom from attachment (virāga); and

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(iii) The rūpendriyas (organs of sense) are nothing but lumps of flesh: the eyes do not see colours, the ears do not hear sounds, the nose does not smell odours, the tongue does not taste flavour, and the body does not feel touch.

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The *Kvu.* deals with these topics thus:

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(i) *Saḷāyataniko attabhāvo rūpadhātuyā ti?* (VIII. 7) and (ii) *Pañc’ evāyatanā kāmā ti?* (VIII. 4).

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(iii) *Cakkhunā rūpaṃ passati ti?* ...pe...*kayena phoṭṭhabbaṃ phusati ti?* (XVIII. 9).

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In the discussion relating to the six āyatanas (spheres of the organs of sense), the *Kvu.* shows that the Andhakas took literally the expression: *rūpī manomayo sabbaṅgapaccaṅgī ahinindriyo ti* and assert that there are in the rūpadhātu all the six indriyas and āyatanas with this difference from the Kāmadhātu, that out of the six āyatanas three, viz., ghāna, rasa and phoṭṭhabba do not exist but their *nimittas*, i.e., the subtlest forms exist.¹ In the Abhidhamma texts it is stated that the denizens of the Rūpadhātu have five khandhas and six (and not twelve) āyatanas, while those in the Arūpadhātu have four khandhas and two āyatanas (manāyatana and dhammāyatana only).²

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¹ *Vibhaṅga*, p. 405: In Kāmadhātu there are cakkhāyatana and rūpāyatana, sotāyatana and saddāyatana, etc., in all, twelve āyatanas.

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² *Vibhaṅga*, pp. 405-7.

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Relating to the third point the *Kvu.* contradicts Vasumitra and says that it is the Mahāsanghikas who held the opposite view, viz., the eyes see colours, ears hear sounds etc. by conceiving a *pasādacakkhu*, a subtle eye, which has not got the power of *āvajjana* (reflection) like *cakkhuviññāṇa* but possesses just the power of knowing (*paṭijānāti*) objects. In this case also, shall we account for the contradictions by saying that the opinion of ‘ekacce mahāsanghikā’ is represented by Vasumitra while the opinion of the ‘aññe mahāsanghikā’ is noticed in the *Kathā-* vatthu.¹ The Theravādins and a section of the Mahāsanghikas hold that the eyes, ears etc. are mere material conveyers of perception, the cakkhuviññāṇa, sotaviññāṇa, etc. being the actual percipients, in other words, eyes, ears etc. belong to the rūpa-khandha which is material, while cakkhuviññāṇa, etc. belong to the viññāṇa-khandha, which makes a being aware of the things around him.

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¹ See infra.

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X. How many avyākatas are there?

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The opinion of the Andhakas that "there is nothing which is indeterminate" (avyākṛta) has been explained by Masuda as that the Andhakas admitted only two natures of things, good or bad and not a third, neither good nor bad. This interpretation does not appear to be sound as in the Buddhist texts the three natures of things are accepted generally. The avyākatas also refer to those problems which Buddha left unanswered as any answer to them whether in the affirmative or in the negative would mislead the enquirer, or treated the question as absurd and unanswerable. These avyākata problems are always mentioned in a stereotyped form in all Buddhist texts whether Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna.² Nāgārjuna has utilised these problems in his Mādhyamika-kārikā to establish the Mahāyānic conception of Śūnyatā. If we accept Vasumitra's statement as correct, we shall have to say that the Śūnyatā conception was known to the Mahāsanghikas, and so to them the so-called avyākata problems were not avyākata (inexplicable), but this way of looking at the statement of Vasumitra seems to me to be too far-fetched and so, I think, Vasumitra’s statement is not complete. Perhaps it refers to the problem discussed in the *Kvu.*: *diṭṭhigataṃ avyākata ti?* (XIV. 8),—whether a person holding one of the unanswered views can be regarded as avyākata i.e. neither good nor bad. The answer of the Theravādins is that the holder of any one of the views is wrong, hence akusala and cannot be avyākata as supposed by the Andhakas and Uttarāpathakas.

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² Sassato loko, asassato loko; antavā loko, anantavā loko; tam jīvam tam sarīram, aññam jīvam aññam sarīram; hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā, na hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā, hoti ca na hoti caTathāgato param maraṇā, n'eva hoti na na hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā.

XI. How many Asaṃskṛtadharmas are there?

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In the Pāli texts, as also in the *Abhidharmakośa* (of the Sarvāstivādins) the three asaṃskṛtas are, (i) Pratisamkhyā-nirodha, (ii) Apratisamkhyā-nirodha and (iii) Ākāśa. The Andhakas increase them to nine by adding the four āruppas¹ and ārya-mārgāṅikatva.² Excepting the nirodha of two kinds, all other asaṃskṛtas of the Mahāsaṅghikas are not recognised as such by the Theravādins, whose argument is whether each of these asaṃskṛtas is of the same nature as Nibbāna, if not, they are saṃskṛtas. Strangely enough the *Kvu.* goes so far as to say that ākāśa is not asaṃkhata. The attitude taken in the *Kvu.* (VI. 2, 4, 6; XIX. 3, 4) is that Nibbāna is *tāṇaṃ lenaṃ accutaṃ amataṃ*, (escape, refuge, infallible and immortal) so each of the seven of asaṃkhatas, even every member of the formulæ of the Paṭiccasamuppāda, each of the four phalas must be *tāṇaṃ* lenaṃ accutaṃ amataṃ, otherwise they are saṃkhatas (constituted). The Mahāsaṅghikas interpret, as presented in the Kvu., that the asaṃkhata is that which is unchangeable (aneñja) but not tānaṃ lenaṃ, etc. In regard to the causal law, they rely on Buddha's statement: avijjā paccayā bhikkhave saṃkharā, uppādā va Tathāgatānaṃ anuppādā va Tathāgatānaṃ thitā va sā dhātu dhammaṭṭhitatā dhammaniyāmatā idappaccayatā etc., and point out that by asaṃkhata they do not mean the links separately but the unchangeable law (a) of the origin a thing through a cause, and (b) of the unchangeable nature of dhammas, undisturbed by appearance (uppāda) or non-appearance (anuppāda) or continuity (ṭhiti). As for the āryamārgāṅikatva, the Kvu. explains that Pubbaseliyas regard as asaṃkhata the fact of attainment (patti) of a magga or phala by the removal of certain mental impurities (kilesapahānaṃ) and not the maggas or phalas by themselves. This, Vasumitra corroborates by using the term mārgāṅikatva i.e. prāpti of a mārga and not simply mārga.¹ In the Kvu. there are a few other discussions relating to the asaṃkhatas to which we shall revert when dealing with the Mahīśāsakas.

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¹ The four āruppas are—
(i) Ākāsānañtāyatana.
(ii) Viññāṇānañtāyatana;
(iii) Ākiñcaññāyatana; and
(iv) Naivasamjñā-nāsamjñāyatana.

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² Cf *Kośa*, iii, p. 77.

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¹ In the Majjhima Nikāya (I, p. 301) it is distinctly stated that aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo is saṅkhato.

XII. Other doctrines

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The remaining three opinions of this group of schools, viz.,
(i) There is no intermediate state of existence (antarābhava),
(ii) Phenomena exist neither in the past nor in the future, and
(iii) The nature of mind is pure in its origin: it becomes impure when it is stained by āgantukarajas and upakleśas, are in accord with those of the Theravādins.¹ Both these schools do not admit that between death and rebirth there is any intervening period in which the subtle khandhas wait for the selection of the parents or the states of existences. The Kvu. says that the opinion of the opponents is formed through the miscomprehension of the meaning of the word ‘antarāparinibbāyī.’ We shall revert to this topic while dealing with the Sammitīyas, with whom, the commentator says, the Pubbaseliyas agreed.

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