大般涅槃經義記 8

English (machine translation) 8

Language: English

8.1

Composed by Śramaṇa Shi Huiyuan of Jingying Monastery under the Sui.

From here below is the second part, clarifying that greed arises from conditions and is not originally existent, expounding it comprehensively with liberation. Therein are three parts: first, briefly clarifying that greed and liberation are gathered and arise from conditions and are not originally existent; second, broadly distinguishing the characteristics of greed arising from conditions and the mind being liberated from greed from conditions; third, from "for this reason, buddhas and bodhisattvas do not definitively say" downward, generally concluding it.

8.3

In the former part, first two gates are set out: "never definitively saying that the mind has a pure nature" is one gate; "and an impure nature" is another gate. Next, it generally explains them: because "the pure and impure natures have no abiding place," no definitive statement is made. Below, it specifically explains them: "arising greed from conditions, hence it is said not to be non-existent" clarifies that it lacks a pure nature; "originally without a greedy nature, hence it is said not to be existent" clarifies that it lacks a defiled nature.

8.4

In the broad explanation, first two gates are set out: "arising greed from conditions" is one gate, clarifying that it lacks a pure nature; "the mind being liberated from conditions" is another gate, clarifying that it lacks a defiled nature. Next, two conditions are listed, first designated and then listed: "conforming to saṃsāra" is the defiled condition; "conforming to Mahāparinirvāṇa" is the pure condition. Below, it clarifies liberation in relation to greed based on the two conditions, distinguishing it through four gates, first listing and then explaining them.

8.5

In the first gate, first there is a question and then an explanation. This gate specifically speaks in terms of ordinary persons: if an ordinary person has not severed the cultivation of a greedy mind, such a person arises and ceases together with greed—this is spoken in terms of one who arouses it; the manifest arising of greed is called cultivation. From "all arisen" downward, it is spoken in terms of one who possesses it. Therein, first is the doctrine, next the simile, and afterward the application; below, it explains it again.

8.6

In the doctrine, "all who have not severed greed arise and cease together with the mind" means: although some people attain concentration and suppress greed, they have not severed and eliminated it; because the nature of the latent proclivity remains in the mind, they arise and cease together.

8.7

Next, it is illustrated with a simile: "sentient beings of the desire realm all possess the relish of the first ground" refers to the first dhyāna as the first ground. Dhyānas are of three kinds: first, pure dhyāna, which refers to the pure mind with outflows of the higher realms; second, undefiled dhyāna, the stillness of the principle of the truths; third, relish dhyāna, which has three distinctions: first, discussing it generally, all afflictions within the ground of the first dhyāna are generally named relish dhyāna—because one relishes and clings to the sphere of objects, it is called relish; because it is a dharma of the dhyāna ground, it is called dhyāna; second, speaking specifically of craving, the mind of craving clinging to objects resembles concentration, so it is spoken of as relish dhyāna; third, correctly discussing its entity, the factor of concentration associated with the afflicted mind in the higher realms is the entity of relish dhyāna; hence the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* says: "Relish is associated with craving; relish dhyāna is like this." Sentient beings of the desire realm all fully possess this relish dhyāna, for as long as relish of all defiled dharmas has not yet been severed, while below, one necessarily possesses what is above.

8.8

Question: Why speak specifically of relish dhyāna? Pure and undefiled [dhyānas] exist only through cultivation; unlike relish concentration where, while one's body is in the lower ground, one constantly possesses its nature in that part of the higher ground that has not yet been severed, and hence it is taken as a simile. Question: Since relish dhyāna below all possesses what is above, for what reason does it speak specifically of the first ground? It provisionally adduces the first ground, and the rest can be known by analogy, so it is omitted from discussion. Another question: Why speak specifically of sentient beings of the desire realm all possessing it? In sentient beings of the desire realm, in relation to the relish of the first ground, it exists before it has arisen, resembling that greed which exists before it has arisen; hence it is specifically adduced. For one in the first dhyāna, it is said to exist when manifestly arisen, the principle being easily known, so why does it require discussion? From the second dhyāna upward, one does not possess the lower relish; for this reason it is not spoken of. "Whether cultivated or uncultivated, constantly possessing it" reveals the preceding "all possessing"; "attaining it when encountering conditions" reveals the preceding "possessing"; and from "causes and conditions" downward reveals the characteristics of the preceding conditions. Next is the application, and afterward the explanation; the text in all cases can be understood.

8.9

Next, it explains the second, first questioning and then explaining. This gate is explained in relation to three kinds of persons: first, explained in terms of the external ordinary persons among śrāvakas, when conditions arise, greed is generated, and contemplating the skeleton counteracts it—this is called not ceasing together; this is viewed with respect to arising delusion, but if viewed with respect to the nature of the latent proclivity, contemplating the skeleton does not eliminate it, so it still ceases together with greed; second, explained in terms of the higher internal ordinary persons among śrāvakas, from the stage of heat upward where the four fruits have not yet been realized, when conditions arise, greed is generated, and upon realizing the fruits it ceases; within the path of practice it also ceases, but it is spoken of in terms of the fruits for clarity; third, explained in terms of the immovable bodhisattva: upon attaining the immovable stage, the mind arises together with greed but does not cease together with greed. Entering the eighth ground from the preceding seven grounds is called attaining the immovable; within the preceding seven grounds, having a mind that loves the Buddha is called arising together with greed, and relinquishing it at the eighth ground is called not ceasing together; hence the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* says: "The mind of the Buddha, the bodhicitta, the mind of nirvāṇa, and so forth do not operate at all, how much less worldly minds!"

8.10

Next, it explains the third, first questioning and then explaining. This gate is explained solely in terms of bodhisattvas: being personally devoid of greedy love is called "not arising together"; manifesting it in accordance with others is called "ceasing together with greed."

8.11

Next, it explains the fourth, first questioning and then explaining. This gate is explained in relation to four kinds of persons: first, in terms of arhats; second, in terms of pratyekabuddhas; third, in terms of Tathāgatas; fourth, in terms of the remaining bodhisattvas, excluding the immovable. Why is that? Bodhisattvas of the ten grounds are divided into three levels: from the first to the seventh grounds is the stage of effort, combined as one level, where evil greed is the fault and wholesome greed is the antidote, not yet spoken of as an affliction; in this stage, unwholesome greed does not operate at all, so it does not arise together and also does not cease together; because wholesome greed is not an affliction, it is not spoken of. Bodhisattvas of the eighth ground form a single level by themselves, where wholesome greed is the affliction and non-greed is the antidote; in this stage, initially turning away from wholesome greed without yet being able to abandon it is called arising together with greed, and ultimately being able to eliminate it completely is called not ceasing together; it is not entirely non-co-arising and non-co-ceasing, so it is now excluded. From the ninth ground upward is combined into one level, where in relation to that wholesome greed there is entirely none whatsoever, and therefore it is spoken of as not arising and ceasing together. Because of this meaning, excluding the immovable, all other bodhisattvas are called not arising and ceasing together.

8.12

The former was brief and the next was broad; from "for this reason" downward is the third part, the general conclusion: "For this reason, one does not definitively say that the mind has a pure nature or an impure nature."

8.13

From here below is the second part, against the previous grasping at original non-existence by Guṇarāja, clarifying that it is not originally non-existent. The mind of true consciousness is originally covered by delusion; it is not that there was previously no defilement, yet it does not combine with those fetters of greed and the like; it is not that there was originally no purity, yet because there was originally defilement, it can therefore be liberated. In the text there are two parts: first, clarifying that at the time of an ordinary person, the mind's characteristics are defiled while its essential nature is pure; second, from "buddhas and bodhisattvas eternally destroy greed" downward, clarifying based on the preceding meaning that there is liberation.

8.14

In the former [part], first is the dharma, next is the simile, and finally is the application. Checked against the simile, the text in the dharma part is brief and deficient; if complete, it ought to say: "Although this mind is covered by greed, anger, and delusion, it does not combine with those fetters of greed and the like." In the text, it merely explains that it does not combine and stops there, leaving being covered undiscussed. In the simile, the initial statement that "it is covered by smoke and the like, and hence is not seen" compares to what was omitted earlier: "sun and moon" compare to the essence of the true mind; "smoke" and the like compare to the various fetters of greed and so forth. Although the sun and moon are bright, they are covered by smoke, clouds, dust, fog, and the like. The true mind is like this: although its nature is pure, it is covered by delusions. The section from "although it is not seen" downward compares to the aforementioned non-combination with the fetters of greed and the like; "smoke, clouds, dust, fog, and the asura's hand" are its five obscurations. Below, the application reveals the dharma: "The mind is also like this; due to causes and conditions, it produces the fetters of greed" corresponds to the sun and moon above being covered by smoke and the like; the section from "although sentient beings" downward corresponds to the sun and moon above not combining with the obscurations. Within this, it first directly clarifies non-combination. The section from "if it is" downward explains: "greed is the nature of greed" clarifies that delusion is distinct from truth; "non-greed is the nature of non-greed" clarifies that truth is distinct from delusion. The mind of non-greed cannot become greed—the true does not become the delusional; the mind of the fetter of greed cannot become non-greed—the delusional does not become the true. The section from "for this reason" downward concludes. This meaning is still that of "the inherently pure mind is unstained yet stained, stained yet unstained" in the Śrīmālādevī Sūtra. This concludes the first section.

8.15

"The buddhas and bodhisattvas permanently destroy greed" and so forth explains, in accordance with the preceding meaning, that there is liberation.

8.16

From here on, the third [section] refutes the aforementioned objection of non-definitiveness by [Bodhisattva] Guṇarāja, clarifying that it is not indefinite: following from evil causes and conditions, the mind is definitely bound; following from wholesome causes and conditions, the mind is definitely liberated; therefore, it is not indefinite. Within this, it first opens and sets forth two approaches: "all sentient beings produce greed from conditions" is the approach of definite bondage; "the mind is liberated from conditions" is the approach of definite liberation. Below, it explains them extensively. First it explains the first approach: initially the specific parts, and subsequently the conclusion. Within the specific parts there are six: first, bondage by Māra; second, bondage by the five desires; third, bondage by inverted views; fourth, bondage by the view of existence; fifth, bondage by the view of self; sixth, bondage by evil actions.

8.17

In the first [bondage], there is first a simile. Within the simile there are four: first, the simile of the differences in dharma positions. "Snow Mountains" broadly illustrates the path of transcending the three realms; "man" illustrates the māras; "monkey" illustrates ordinary beings. "The precipitous and steep places where neither man nor monkey can go" illustrates that neither māras nor other ordinary beings can walk the supramundane path. "Or again, there are places where monkeys can go but man cannot" illustrates that other ordinary beings can reach the upper two realms, but māras cannot arrive there. "Or again, there are places where both can go" illustrates that in the realm of desire, both māras and other ordinary beings are able to go. These are adduced to capture [...] the dwelling place, and in accordance with it, reveal that māras are able to delude ordinary beings.

8.18

Second, the simile of the māras deluding ordinary beings. "The places where both man and monkey can go" repeats the third [item] from before. "The hunter places pitch upon the block" means placing the pitch of the five desires upon the block of humans and devas. "To catch monkeys" means using it to delude ordinary beings. Question: The five desires are the karmic fruits of sentient beings; what do they have to do with the affairs of Māra? It says that Māra places desires upon the block of humans and devas—this is not all-inclusive; here it merely adduces what Māra performs, such as when Māra brought [his] daughters to seduce Dharaṇīṃdhara and others.

8.19

Third, the simile of ordinary beings being deluded. "Because of folly, the monkey goes and touches it with its hand": among the five sense faculties, one mostly looks at its form with the eye first. "Having touched it, it is stuck": seeing it, love arises. Speaking of "wishing to be freed": the five faculties grasping objects and alternating with one another is called "wishing to be freed"; it is not wishing for liberation. Touching objects, all are greed—this is called sticking. "Thus in all five places it cannot be freed": attachment arises in all five faculties.

8.20

Fourth, the simile of being captured and held by Māra. "The hunter pierces it with a staff and carries it back home": the staff of heterodox teachings entering the mind is called "piercing"; gathering them as subjects of Māra is called "carrying it back home."

8.21

Next, it applies [the similes]; the text specifically has five parts: First, the word "perilous" illustrates the correct path attained by buddhas and bodhisattvas, corresponding to the precipitous and steep places in the first section. Second, the section from "the monkey illustrates ordinary beings" downward corresponds to the second section; previously it was said: "In the places where both man and monkey can go, the hunter places sticky pitch upon the block"; hence it is now applied. The monkey illustrates ordinary beings, the hunter illustrates Māra, and the sticky pitch illustrates the sensory realm of greed and desire. Because the text is brief, it only says it illustrates greed. Third, the section from "places where neither man nor monkey can go" downward re-applies the first section. Fourth, the section from "ordinary people are bound by the five desires" downward corresponds to the third section, where every touch is stuck and none can be freed. Fifth, the section from "causing Māra Pāpīyān to lead them away at will" downward corresponds to the fourth section, where it is pierced with a staff and carried back; first it applies and then glosses it.

8.22

The above was bondage by Māra. The section from "just as a king" downward is the second, revealing the characteristics of gain and loss in being bound by the five desires: first the simile, next the application, and finally re-differentiating them.

8.23

The section from "what is called being bound to Māra" downward is the third, bondage by inverted views: first a question, next a differentiation, and finally a general conclusion.

8.24

Furthermore, the section from "if one sees all dharmas as real" downward is the fourth, bondage by the view of existence. The view of existence is still the mind of self-attachment to dharmas: first a differentiation and then a conclusion.

8.25

Furthermore, the section from "if one sees that the self is form" downward is the fifth, bondage by the view of self. This proclaims the twenty views of the body as the view of self: first a differentiation and then a conclusion.

8.26

The section from "my śrāvakas" downward is the sixth, bondage by evil actions: first a differentiation and then a conclusion. Within the differentiation, the opening statement, "leaving the twelve divisions [of scriptures] and cultivating non-Buddhist texts," clarifies the lack of correct understanding; "not understanding the actions of the tranquility and cessation of leaving household life" and so forth clarifies the lack of correct practice.

8.27

The above six gates extensively clarify being bound. The section "due to these causes and conditions, the mind together with greed" and so forth draws a general conclusion revealing the faults. Next, it expands on the above: "Being liberated from conditions is also not impure; therefore I say that the mind attains liberation" generally marks and introduces it, and next explains it specifically. Among the former six bondages, it merely overturns the latter gate: "if one does not receive" and so forth clarifies that one's practice is correct; "for the sake of nirvāṇa" and so forth reveals that one's understanding is correct; the section from "you should know that this" downward concludes with praise in general; "this is called the eighth" draws a general conclusion.

8.28

In the ninth virtue, there is first a question, next a differentiation, and finally a general conclusion. Within the differentiation, it fully takes five virtues as its essence. First it raises them in general, next enumerates them, and later explains them, below praising their capabilities. "When a bodhisattva cultivates the sūtras, they initially bring forth five things" is the general raising. Among the ten virtues, the latter four are progressive advancements. Among the superior, the first is cultivating the antidotes; the next clarifies the fulfillment of their antidotes; the next clarifies that their cultivation of the correct path is the fulfillment of the correct path. This virtue is the cultivation of the correct path; looking toward the later fulfillment of the path, it is spoken of as initial, and therefore called the "initial bringing forth of five things." Next, it enumerates the five names: first querying and then enumerating. Faith is the expedient means that gathers practice; because it is definitive regarding dharmas, it is called "faith." The latter four are correct practice: the first two gather merit—doing good without deviousness is called an "upright mind," and guarding against faults without committing them is called "precepts"; the latter two gather wisdom—drawing close to a teacher to seek the Dharma is called "associating with good friends," and listening to the Dharma and accepting it broadly is called "much learning."

8.29

Below, it explains them extensively. Within faith, first is a question, next an explanation, and finally a conclusion. Within the differentiation there are three: first, differentiating faith in contrast to objects; second, the section from "if a śramaṇa" downward praises it to reveal its supremacy; third, the section from "although there is" downward clarifies that faith is free from marks. In the first part, it first differentiates and then concludes generally.

8.30

Within the differentiation there are eight, as explained in the Bodhisattvabhūmi: faith in the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha constitutes three; faith in the power of the supernormal abilities of buddhas and bodhisattvas, combined with the former, makes four; faith in causes and fruits, combined with the former, makes five; faith in the real meaning, combined with the former, makes seven—meaning faith that bodhi has great beneficial meaning; faith in obtaining expedient means, combined with the former, makes eight—meaning faith in the path cultivated and studied by bodhisattvas. What is explained here is broadly the same as that Bodhisattvabhūmi with minor differences: "faith in the Three Jewels" is its first three; "giving has karmic reward" is its fifth; "faith in cause, faith in fruit, faith in the two truths" is its sixth; "faith in the real meaning"—faith that the path of the One Vehicle is divided into three for the sake of sentient beings—is omitted there; it could also be that these words are precisely the faith in the power of the supernormal abilities of buddhas and bodhisattvas there, as dividing the one into three is mastery in preaching, which is also called supernormal power; "faith in the ultimate truth" is its seventh, faith in obtaining meaning—the supreme bodhi is the utmost among beneficial meanings and is called the ultimate truth, not the meaning of principle, as the meaning of principle is subsumed under the aforementioned two truths; "faith in wholesome expedient means" is its eighth, obtaining expedient means.

8.31

From here on, the second [part] praises it to reveal its supremacy: "such that śramaṇas and the like cannot destroy it" praises the firmness of its faith; "attaining the nature of a noble one" praises what faith accomplishes—one who has this faith is fit to be a seed of buddhahood, called the nature of a noble one; "cultivating giving and the like, one is able to draw close to nirvāṇa and not fall into birth and death" praises the benefit of faith—being able to leave birth and death and draw close to great nirvāṇa. First it is discussed with regard to giving, and later extended to precepts and so forth. The section from "this is called" downward concludes.

8.32

From here on, the third [part] clarifies that faith is free from marks, being fulfilled through realizing the real: "therefore, although there is faith, yet one also does not see" that I have this faith; "this is the first thing" concludes it generally. Next, it explains the upright mind; the text specifically has two parts: first, clarifying the upright mind in terms of converting others externally; second, the section from "furthermore, what is the upright mind" downward clarifies the upright mind in terms of practice for one's own benefit. In the former, first is a question, next a differentiation, and finally a conclusion. Within the differentiation, first it discusses it, and from "Guṇarāja said" downward, question and answer reveal it again. In the former direct discussion, the text specifically has two parts: first, clarifying that the bodhisattva is upright and not crooked; second, the section from "although seeing" downward clarifies that although the mind is upright, it is skillful, adapting to differences among beings, unlike worldly people who are foolishly blunt and vex others. In the former: "acting uprightly toward sentient beings" clarifies cultivating the upright mind; the section from "all sentient beings" downward clarifies leaving behind the crooked mind. "All sentient beings produce crookedness upon meeting conditions" adduces the ordinary to reveal the noble; the section from "the bodhisattva is not" downward differentiates the noble as distinct from the ordinary. "The bodhisattva is not like this" directly clarifies distinction from the ordinary; the section from "why" downward explains: "skillfully understanding that all dharmas are causes and conditions" means understanding and knowing that devious crookedness is the condition for birth and death. In skillfully adapting to beings: first, it clarifies that the bodhisattva sees evil and does not speak of it, and the section from "why" downward explains it; later, it clarifies that the bodhisattva sees good and praises it, and the section from "what is" downward explains it, first bringing forth the essence of goodness and later revealing the intention of praise—to cause sentient beings to hear of the nature and bring forth the aspiration [for awakening].

8.33

Below, it re-reveals the aforementioned meaning of praising the nature to cause people to bring forth the aspiration. Guṇarāja objects first. What is the intention of the objection? He explains that since one possesses buddha-nature, one naturally attains buddhahood, so what need is there for praising? In the text, the opening words, "As the Buddha said, 'a bodhisattva praises the nature to cause beings to bring forth the aspiration'—this meaning is not so," repeat [the thesis] to directly negate it; the section from "why" downward extensively explains and reveals the negation, first querying the intention of the negation, and below debating against it. Within the debate, it first repeats the aforementioned three sick persons. From "if they meet" onward, within what is repeated, it extends the upper to the lower, clarifying that all attain it naturally on their own and do not rely on praising the nature.

8.34

Regarding citing the prior passage, there are both the metaphor and its application. Here it first cites the metaphor: 'When the Tathāgata first opened the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, he stated that there are three kinds,' which sets it forth as a general topic. Since the Tathāgata previously stated in the 'Chapter on Manifesting Illness' that there are three types of persons, this refers to that as the time of the initial opening, and among the practices and training taught, that was the beginning. Below, it cites them individually. 'All sentient beings are also like this' and so forth cites the prior passage applying the metaphor: 'Sentient beings are like this' is the general application; the rest are individual applications, first applying it to the intermediate person, next to the inferior person, and lastly to the superior person. Why is the order different from that previously stated? Placing the superior at the end was done in order to construct an objection based on it; hence it is not the same as before.

8.35

Next, it constructs the objection. First, it says: 'Whether they encounter [the conditions] or do not encounter them, all generate [the resolve]; why does the Tathāgata say that praising the nature causes them to generate the resolve?' This constructs an objection based on the superior person cited earlier. From 'If, whether they encounter or do not encounter [the conditions], they all do not generate [the resolve]' and so on, it constructs an objection based on the inferior person cited earlier. Clinging to the superior to subsume the inferior, he argues that all attain it naturally and do not depend on praising the nature. In this, the phrasing of the objections has six iterations, which are grouped into four.

8.36

The six objections are: First, explaining that the icchantika possesses the nature and attains buddhahood, which objects to and refutes the Buddha's teaching that [the icchantika] does not become a buddha. Second, from 'As stated: What is termed an icchantika?' and so forth, explaining that the icchantika's innate good is not severed, which objects to and refutes the Buddha's teaching on the severing of the roots of good. Third, from 'As the Buddha previously taught in the twelve divisions of scripture' and so forth, explaining that the icchantika's innate good is constantly present, which objects to and refutes the Buddha's teaching on falling into hell. Fourth, from 'The buddha-nature is unsevered and not an icchantika' and so forth, explaining that the nature is unsevered, which objects to and refutes [the teaching that] severing the good makes one an icchantika. Fifth, from 'If on the basis of the buddha-nature one generates bodhi' and so forth, explaining that possessing the buddha-nature naturally directs one toward buddhahood, which objects to and criticizes the Tathāgata's teaching of the Dharma. Sixth, from 'The Buddha stated that in the cause the nature of the fruit' and so forth, explaining that within the cause there definitely exists the nature of the fruit that is capable of attaining bodhi, which objects to and refutes the Buddha's teaching that within the cause there is no fruit. As for the grouping into four: the fourth objection is the same as the second, and the fifth objection is the same as the first; therefore, below there is no separate answer [for them], which should be noted carefully.

8.37

Within the first objection, 'Whether they are termed encountering or not encountering [the conditions], all are incapable of generating [the resolve]—this meaning is not so' cites [the statement] to directly negate it. 'Why is this?' and so forth explains it. 'Such a person will attain bodhi' briefly explains and exposes the error.

8.38

In the second objection, it first cites the Tathāgata's words about severing the good and directly negates them as incorrect. 'Why is this?' and so forth explains it. 'Does not sever the buddha-nature' briefly explains and exposes the error. 'The principle of the nature is unsevered; how can you say it is severed?' re-explains and exposes the error.

8.39

In the third objection, it first cites the previously discussed two kinds of good mentioned in the first virtue, listing their names as constant. Below, it constructs an objection: 'The impermanent can be severed and can fall into hell; the constant good is unsevered, so why does it not avert [hell]?'

8.40

In the fourth objection, 'The buddha-nature is unsevered, [so one is] not an icchantika' establishes its own principle. 'Why did the Tathāgata say that one is an icchantika?' negates and refutes the Buddha's words.

8.41

In the fifth objection, 'If on the basis of the buddha-nature one generates bodhi' directly puts forward the principle. 'Why preach the twelve divisions of scripture for their sake?' criticizes the Buddha for teaching. From 'For example' onward, it elaborates that possessing the nature naturally leads to attaining buddhahood, establishing that preaching is inappropriate. There are two iterations. In the first, there is first the metaphor, and afterward the application reveals the Dharma. 'The mind of bodhi is also like this' explains that when sentient beings merely generate the resolve once, by the power of the buddha-nature they naturally attain buddhahood, just as rivers flow to the ocean, not needing the Tathāgata to teach for their sake before attaining it. In the second, there is first the metaphor, and the application below can be understood.

8.42

In the sixth objection, it first cites and directly negates: 'As the Buddha stated, that within the cause the nature of the fruit is neither existent nor non-existent—this meaning is not so.' 'Why is this?' and so forth explains it, first asking and then debating. First, based on metaphors, it explains that the cause contains the fruit, establishing that the Buddha['s statement] is not so. 'For this reason' and so forth concludes.

8.43

Below, the Buddha answers, first praising and then explaining. In the praise, the opening words 'Excellent!' provide a general praise; from 'There are two' downward is the specific [praise]. First, in praising the rarity of the benefit of the question, he generally adduces six kinds of pairs of people to show that all are rare, in order to single out the sixth by categorizing the others alongside it. Among the benefits: 'turning the Dharma' is the benefit of revealing the correct; 'drying up the twelve [links]' and so forth is the benefit of destroying saṃsāra; from 'being able to [defeat] Māra' downward is the benefit of crushing the heterodox.

8.44

Below, he explains the phrasing of the objections. What is the purport of the explanation? Just as an intermediate person can generate the resolve if they encounter a friend and hear the Dharma, but cannot generate it if they do not encounter [a friend] and do not hear [the Dharma], it is for this person that I speak of praising the buddha-nature to cause them to generate the resolve, not for the superior or inferior. In the text there are four parts: first, explaining and resolving the three metaphors; second, revealing the Dharma based on [them]; third, from 'The icchantika also attains' downward, resolving the phrasing of the objections; fourth, concluding his own necessity to praise.

8.45

The first section can be understood.

8.46

In the second section, the Dharma is revealed based on the metaphor. The objection based on the superior person is immediately dispelled: It is for the intermediate person that I speak of praising the buddha-nature to cause them to generate the resolve; how can one base an objection on the superior to claim that I have no need [to praise it]? The text is clear and can be understood.

8.47

In the third section, he resolves the previous objections raised regarding the inferior person. The objections are six in number, but the Buddha resolves only four; because the fourth objection is the same as the second and the fifth objection is the same as the first, there is no separate explanation [for them]. In explaining the first objection, he clarifies that regarding the icchantika person, there are meanings of both attaining and not attaining buddhahood: if they abandon the icchantika mind, they immediately attain buddhahood; if they do not abandon it, they do not attain it; one cannot say that they definitely attain it unequivocally. Here, he first explains that the icchantika also attains it; 'Why is this?' and so forth explains, 'Because generating the mind of bodhi is not [being] an icchantika.' Below, he explains that they do not attain it; 'For what reason is it said that the icchantika attains it?' questions King of Virtue's earlier assertion of attainment; 'In truth, they do not attain it' directly explains non-attainment; from 'Like the exhaustion of life' downward, metaphors illustrate non-attainment.

8.48

From 'Icchā is termed faith' downward, he resolves the second objection. In this, the text divides into eight iterations, though the meaning debated is only two: first, explaining the reason why the buddha-nature is not severed, which is because it does not enter into the roots of good that are severed; second, explaining the meaning of severing the good as becoming an icchantika, which is because severing the other kinds of good is termed being an icchantika. Among the eight iterations, the first six can be understood. In the seventh round, it first explains that an icchantika severs impermanent good and is termed an icchantika; afterward, it explains that the buddha-nature is not like what is severed: the buddha-nature is permanent and unlike the impermanent, and therefore is not severed; being neither good nor non-good, it is unlike the previous good, and therefore is not severed. In this, it first explains neither good nor non-good. 'Why is this?' and so forth explains, first clarifying neither good, and afterward clarifying nor non-good.

8.49

In the eighth round, 'Furthermore, good dharmas are obtained upon birth' explains that the phenomenal mark is different from the nature; 'The nature is not obtained upon birth' clarifies that the nature is different from the phenomenal mark; 'Because of severing what is obtained upon birth, one is termed an icchantika' discusses severing in terms of phenomenal marks. What is this good obtained upon birth? When the five faculties of faith and so forth have been cultivated in past habituation to completion, being obtained immediately upon birth is called good obtained upon birth. For what reason is it specifically the severing of this good that is termed being an icchantika? Because expedient good has already been discussed previously: when severing the roots of good, one first gives rise to an expedient mind of improper contemplation, and later gives rise to the nine grades of heavy evil wrong views, which definitively sever the roots of good. The earlier expedient mind severs the expedient good, and the later ninefold heavy wrong views sever the good obtained upon birth. The earlier second line, speaking in terms of the beginning, discussed severing the expedient [good]; this [passage], speaking in terms of the end, discusses severing the [good] obtained upon birth.

8.50

Next, he explains the objection in the third line: 'As you have said, if the icchantika possesses the nature, why does it not avert the sins of hell?' cites the words of his objection. Below, he explains it in response, clarifying that within the icchantika there is no buddha-nature [as fruition], and therefore it cannot avert the suffering of the three wretched realms. What does this mean? The nature as fruition is able to avert the suffering of the three wretched realms, but the nature as cause is unable to do so. The icchantika has the cause but does not yet have the nature as fruition; therefore it does not avert [them]. In the text, he first explains that the icchantika lacks the nature; from 'Since the icchantika lacks the nature, how could it avert...' downward, he shows that it does not avert [them].

8.51

In the former part, 'The icchantika has no buddha-nature' is a doctrinal explanation of absence. From 'Like a king' downward is the metaphor, which has eight clauses: First, the metaphor of sentient beings' nature hearing the nature: the 'king' represents sentient beings; the 'lute' represents the body; the 'sound' represents the buddha-nature. The purity of the nature is praised as 'wondrous'; that all who hear it delight in it is called 'the mind is deeply attached, with no thought of abandoning it.' Second, from 'He immediately told...' downward is the metaphor of investigating in accordance with what was heard: the 'minister' represents the Tathāgata, and [the king's action represents] sentient beings' nature. Asking about the origin of the buddha-nature is called 'told the wise minister: Where does the sound come from?' Third, from 'The great minister answered...' downward is the metaphor of the noble one providing instruction: explaining that the nature manifests from within the five aggregates is called 'comes from the lute.' Fourth, from 'The king spoke again...' downward is the metaphor of requesting the noble one to seek to see it: seeking to see the essence of the nature is called 'bring the sound here.' Fifth, from 'The minister immediately replied...' downward is the metaphor of identifying the fruit in terms of the cause: explaining the aggregates as the nature to instruct the general mind is called 'brought the lute and placed it before the king'; identifying the fruit in terms of the cause, he therefore says it is the sound. Sixth, from 'The king said to the lute: Produce sound' downward is the metaphor of seeking the nature within phenomenal marks, also called the metaphor of seeking the nature without finding it: 'lute, produce sound' is seeking the nature in general marks; failing to find it, so that the nature is not manifested, is called 'the sound does not come forth'; from 'he immediately cut the strings' downward is seeking the nature in distinct marks: breaking apart and dissecting each individual aggregate and failing to find the nature is called 'cut the strings and so forth, yet the sound still did not come forth.' Seventh, from 'The king was then enraged' downward is the metaphor of failing to understand and slandering the noble one. Eighth, from 'The minister said to the king...' downward is the metaphor of the noble one providing an explanation: 'As for obtaining the sound, the principle is not like this' rebukes emotional, deluded grasping; from 'Through various conditions' downward demonstrates the manner of realization: only when all practices are complete is it seen, which is called skillful cultivation through various conditions bringing about awakening, termed 'only through skillful expedients does the sound come forth.'

8.52

Below, the application reveals the Dharma: 'The buddha-nature is like this' corresponds to the sound of the lute in the first clause; 'there is none' refers to the cause; 'the dwelling place of the bodhisattva' corresponds to the sixth clause, seeking the sound without finding it; 'it can be seen through expedients' corresponds to the eighth clause, the sound coming forth through expedients; 'because it can be seen, one attains bodhi' means that seeing it results in becoming a buddha.

8.53

Above, it has extensively clarified that the icchantika lacks the nature; below, it clarifies that because the icchantika does not see it, it does not avert [retribution]. 'How could it avert?' directly clarifies that it does not avert [it]; from 'If an icchantika possessed faith' downward inversely illustrates that it does not avert [it]; from 'Because of lack of faith' downward directly illustrates that it does not avert [it].

8.54

From 'As you have said, that milk lacks curd' downward, he resolves the sixth objection. He first cites the words of the objection, and below shows in response that it is incorrect. In this, there is first the doctrine, next the metaphor, and afterward the application. In the doctrine, 'Foolish people make such statements' rebukes the heterodox for deviating from the correct; 'the wise never say' distinguishes the correct from the heterodox. 'Why is this?' and so forth explains: 'Because there is no nature [as curd in the milk],' the wise do not speak of it as existing. In the metaphor there are three clauses: First, from 'Without conditions' downward proves that curd is fundamentally absent; second, from 'Like water and milk' downward proves that under different conditions it does not come forth, proving that curd is fundamentally absent; third, from 'Seeking everywhere' downward proves that only upon obtaining conditions does it come forth, proving that curd is fundamentally absent. Below, the application reveals the Dharma: 'The buddha-nature is like this' corresponds to the nature of milk and curd being visible dependent on conditions; 'attainable dependent on conditions' corresponds to immediately becoming curd upon obtaining the conditions sought; 'being completed only after depending on conditions is precisely being without nature' corresponds to: if it existed fundamentally, why would it depend on conditions?

8.55

Having extensively answered above, 'For this reason, constantly praising the good in others is termed a straightforward mind' concludes the answer to the question above. Previously it was in terms of transforming others; below, it explains the straightforward mind in terms of one's own practice, first asking, next explaining, afterward praising, and finally concluding. In the explanation, 'The bodhisattva constantly does not commit evils' is the straightforwardness of mind that is free from fault; from 'If there should be a fault' downward is the straightforwardness of mind that repents faults.

8.56

First, he explains repenting faults; from 'If someone asks' downward, he reveals straightforwardness by framing questions. There are five questions and answers, and the text in each case can be understood. From 'Because of the straightforward mind' downward, he praises it to reveal its benefits: 'faith in the existence of the buddha-nature' is the benefit of according with principle; 'not termed an icchantika' is the benefit of departing from the heterodox; 'termed a disciple of the Buddha' is the benefit of taking refuge in the correct; 'if receiving robes' and so forth is the benefit of properly receiving offerings. 'This is termed' downward concludes.

8.57

Next, upholding the precepts is explained: first a question, next the explanation, and then the overall conclusion. Within the explanation, it first abandons the faults of ordinary people, next abandons [those of] the Hīnayāna, and finally cultivates the Mahāyāna. Within abandoning the faults of ordinary people, there are three distinct clauses: first, abandoning the fault of ordinary people's divergent seeking—upholding the restrictive precepts "not for the sake of birth in the heavens, nor out of fear"; second, abandoning the fault of non-Buddhist mistaken precepts—"not receiving the dog precept, the cock precept, the ox precept," and so forth; third, abandoning the fault of ordinary people transgressing and violating—not violating the four grave offenses is called "not breaking the precepts," avoiding the preliminary stages of grave offenses is called "not breaching the precepts," not committing minor faults is called "not blemishing the precepts," and avoiding the preliminary stages of minor offenses is called "not corrupting the precepts"; these abandon the faults of ordinary people. Not seeking the lesser fruit is termed "not practicing the precepts of the śrāvaka"; this clause clarifies abandoning the faults of the Hīnayāna. Below, the cultivation of the great is explained: "receiving the śīla precepts" is the expedient means of training in the precepts; "attaining completion without arrogance" means that when the precepts are perfected, one is free from marks.

8.58

Next, associating with friends is explained: first a question, next the explanation, and then the overall conclusion. Within the explanation, it first explains the bodhisattva as a good friend, and next explains the Buddha as a friend. "My own person is itself [such a friend]" refers generally to himself; "therefore able to cut off pudgalas..." and below adduces their nature, using twelve past matters to demonstrate that he himself is a true friend. "By this principle..." and below generally praises the benefit of friends, leading people to draw close to them. Why did Ānanda say that half the brahma-faring does not know the causal nature? Because it arises from a limb. The Buddha knows that present goodness and past causes all arise from friends; hence he speaks of complete practice. "This is called..." and below is the conclusion.

8.59

Next, extensive learning is explained: first a question, next the explanation. Six stages select the essentials, leading people to measure their capacity and hear and receive them. "This is called..." and below is the conclusion.

8.60

The above has extensively explained [the practices]; from here below is the fourth [section], praising the capacity of their practice. Therein, it first explains that relying on the preceding five kinds, one can generate benefit for oneself; "like a father and mother..." and below explains that one can benefit others. Within the former, self-benefit, it first opens three gates: "doing what is difficult to do" is the practice of vigor; "enduring what is difficult to endure" is the practice of patience; "giving what is difficult to give" is the practice of generosity (dāna). Next it explains their marks, and finally clarifies freedom from attachment: "though able to do it, not thinking 'I do it'" is freedom from attachment regarding the first; "patience and giving are likewise" analogizes the latter two gates.

8.61

Below, within benefiting others, it first generates the practice of loving-kindness; "if a child encounters..." and below explains generating the practice of compassion; "toward all sentient beings neither angry nor delighted..." and below explains the practice of sympathetic joy and equanimity. In loving-kindness, first an analogy, and then the correspondence, which can be understood.

8.62

In compassion, first an analogy: within the analogy, it first explains treating an existing illness, and then not counting on gratitude. Below, it corresponds to reveal the Dharma: first it corresponds to treating [illness]; "never thinking..." and below corresponds to not counting on gratitude. Therein, first, one does not think of oneself as eliminating afflictions for sentient beings, first in the direct sense and then in the reverse; "only thinking..." and below means having no thought of sentient beings to whom one might preach the Dharma to cause them to sever afflictions.

8.63

Below, sympathetic joy and equanimity are explained: "toward all sentient beings not being angry" is sympathetic joy; "not being delighted" is equanimity. First it explains directly; "King of Virtuous Qualities said..." and below clarifies this again through questions and answers. Within the former direct explanation, it first speaks in terms of the Dharma: "A bodhisattva toward sentient beings is neither angry nor delighted" briefly adduces sympathetic joy and equanimity. "Why?" and below explains: because of "well cultivating and gathering the samādhi of emptiness," anger and delight do not arise. Next it is revealed through an analogy: the "forest" is an analogy for the bodhisattva; the "fire" and so forth are an analogy for those who can afflict; "yet this forest..." and below is an analogy for having neither anger nor delight. The correspondence below can be understood.

8.64

Below, it clarifies this again, clarifying the meaning of the preceding well-cultivated samādhi of emptiness: the King of Virtuous Qualities first asks, and the Tathāgata next answers; since the answer is not exhaustive, it is clarified again below. In the first question, he first sets up two premises: "the nature of dharmas is inherently empty" is the first premise; "empty because empty of emptiness" is the second premise. The substance of dharmas is not empty, but by the contemplation of emptiness one forcibly breaks it down to make it empty; this is called "empty because empty of emptiness." Below, he poses challenges: "If the nature is inherently empty, one should not need to cultivate emptiness and only then see emptiness" poses a challenge to the first; "Why does the Tathāgata say that by cultivation one sees emptiness?" concludes by challenging the holy words. "If the nature is not empty, though one cultivates emptiness one cannot make it empty" poses a challenge to the latter: "If the substance of dharmas is not empty, what contemplation could make it empty?"

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大般涅槃經義記 — Classical Chinese