俱舍論疏 4

English (machine translation) 4

Language: English

4.2

Chapter 2: Analysis of Faculties, Part 2

On the statement: 'The Śāstra says: now we should investigate up to definitely co-arise,' this is the second major section of this chapter, consisting of twenty-seven stanzas explaining co-arising phenomena. Within the text there are two parts: first, a question; second, an answer. This is the question. Question: Why is this treatise composed? The *Nyāyānusāra* says: For what reason does one investigate the co-arising of all phenomena? In order to refute perverse doctrines and reveal the correct principle. That is, some maintain that conditioned forces arise spontaneously without a cause; others maintain that conditioned forces are born from a single cause; still others maintain that conditioned forces arise from unequal causes such as primordial nature (prakṛti) and so forth. To counter these assertions, this treatise is composed. The intention of the question in this treatise means: all conditioned phenomena, in accordance with their substantive marks, differ in various ways as matter, mind, and so forth; when these phenomena arise, do they also arise separately, or are there phenomena that definitely co-arise?

4.4

On the Śāstra's statement: 'There are those that definitely co-arise,' this is the reply. Within the reply there are three parts: first, a brief reply; second, opening the section headings; third, explaining them individually according to the headings. This is the brief reply.

4.5

On the Śāstra's statement: 'Namely, among all phenomena up to are not mentioned here,' this is the second part, opening the section headings. Although five classes of phenomena are listed, only four sections are explained; unconditioned phenomena do not arise, and so are not mentioned here.

4.6

On the Śāstra's statement: 'Now we first distinguish the definite co-arising of matter,' from here below is the third part, explaining individually according to the headings. This single stanza is the first, explaining the definite co-arising of matter.

4.7

On the statement: 'The Śāstra says: up to more subtle than this,' this explains 'atomic cluster' in the verse. A paramāṇu is not an aggregation; a subtle atom (aṇu) consists of seven paramāṇus, and among aggregated matter, the atomic cluster is the most subtle. This passage also shows that paramāṇus of form and so on gather with their own kind to form an atomic cluster. Another explanation: it agrees with the *Nyāyānusāra*. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: 'Because the absolute minimum of matter has no further divisions, it is designated "absolute minimum." Just as a single kṣaṇa is called the minimum of time and cannot be further split into half a kṣaṇa, so the mutual aggregation of many subtle atoms that are definitely inseparable is called an atomic cluster.' According to this treatise text, 'subtle' refers to the paramāṇu, and 'cluster' refers to the eight or nine paramāṇus and so forth. Of the two interpretations, the latter is superior.

4.8

On the Śāstra's statement: 'This, in the desire realm up to visible matter, odor, taste, and tangible matter,' this explains being without sound and without faculties in the desire realm.

4.9

On the Śāstra's statement: 'Without sound and possessing faculties up to the body is the ninth,' this explains being without sound and possessing the body faculty.

4.10

On the Śāstra's statement: 'Clusters with the remaining faculties up to because their bases are distinct,' this explains that the remaining faculties have distinct bases.

4.11

The treatise says: 'In the preceding aggregates... arisen due to the cause of the great elements', which explains that which has sound. The Vibhāṣā, fascicle ninety, states: 'Regarding the body, visible, sound, and tangible dhātus being definitely possessed in the desire and form realms, but not possessed in the formless realm: Question: The body, visible, and tangible dhātus may be so, but how can the sound dhātu be constantly possessed? Some make this explanation: The separation and joining of the great elements inevitably produce the sound dhātu. If a sentient being is in the desire or form realm, because the great elements are constantly present, they always generate sound. Evaluation: One should not make this statement. If the four great elements inevitably and constantly produced sound, by which great elements would this produced sound be created? If it were created by these very [elements], then multiple visible forms with resistance would arise from a single [set of] four great elements. If it is said to be created by other [great elements], those other four great elements would again inevitably produce sound, and so on in succession, entailing the fault of infinite regress. One should make this statement: In the bodies of sentient beings born in the desire and form realms, many sets of four great elements exist within a single body; when they strike against one another, they then produce sound, but when they do not strike, no sound arises. Although within a single body sound inevitably arises, it is not that all parts of the body produce sound. Furthermore, this treatise and others speak of eight [elements] without sound, and so forth.' Based on such passages: That [a being] definitely possesses sound is stated on the basis of a single sentient being definitely possessing sound within a single body, not that it is definitely omnipresent. Nine [elements] with sound and so forth are stated on the basis of proximity. The intentions of the two texts are distinct, and they do not contradict each other. Examining the intent of the various treatises: where there are the eye and other faculties, there is definitely the body faculty and the remaining eight [entities]; where there is the body faculty, there are also definitely eight. Although the faculty and the four sense-objects are definitely not separated and definitely arise together, among the four internal sense-objects there are also those that definitely arise together and those that are indefinite. The definite ones are such that, for example, if one has karmic retribution of the eye, one definitely has retribution of the body, and so on; some merely are not separated from the faculty without arising and ceasing together, such as unmanifest form and sound, as well as the great elements that create manifest and unmanifest [forms], transformed forms, and the like. Although the presence or absence of these relative to the faculty is indefinite, speaking in terms of the general locus, they are said to be definitely not separated. Although sound is indefinite, when sound arises, it must strike the great elements of visible form and the like before it is produced; visible form and fragrance and the like definitely arise together; hence, where there is sound, there are definitely eight entities. Where the other eight entities exist, sound does not definitely exist. Where the sense-objects of fragrance and taste exist, visible form and tangibility definitely exist; where visible form and tangibility of the desire realm exist, fragrance and taste do not definitely exist. One master says: 'When one whose body is in the form realm creates emanations of the desire realm, they do not emanate fragrance and taste.' This is not the correct view; [external objects] are rather the external sense-objects that definitely have eight. Although the four great elements creating the path and dhyāna saṃvara depend on the body and the like, they do not indefinitely arise together. If one takes them to necessarily exist in mutual dependence, then there are no four great elements arising without visible form and the like, allowing for the absence of sound. The old Vibhāṣā has the explanations of two masters. The first master says: 'All four great elements are definitely not separated from visible form and sound; all visible form of the desire realm is definitely not separated from fragrance and taste.' The second master says: 'All four great elements do not necessarily have visible form and sound; all desire-realm visible form does not necessarily have fragrance and taste.' Dharma Master Nian says: 'Neither master holds the correct view; only by taking a part from each can it be correct. One should say that all four great elements are definitely not separated from visible form, but do not necessarily have sound; all desire-realm visible form is definitely not separated from fragrance and taste. Hence the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya says: "The subtle atom in the four faculties / should be understood as ten kinds; / in the body faculty there are nine, in the others eight: / this refers to the realm that has fragrance."' Dharma Master Tai says: 'Dharma Master Nian's intention, because the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya does not mention the presence of sound, is to understand clearly that this sound is not constantly possessed.' Dharma Master Tai says: 'If Dharma Master Nian makes this interpretation, it is a great error. The Jñānaprasthāna says: "Who possesses the dhātu of sound? The answer is: the desire and form realms." Furthermore, the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya says: "Sentient beings without ideation enter into the nature of the ten āyatanas." Since sound is constantly possessed, we know that the first master of the Vibhāṣā—stating that all four great elements are definitely not separated from visible form and sound, and all desire-realm visible form is definitely not separated from fragrance and taste—is the correct view. However, that the verses of the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya and Kośa do not mention sound is because sound is produced due to the striking together of the great elements, and unlike fragrance and the like it is not constantly present. Its sound is separately added in this treatise, while the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya abridged it and did not mention it.' Dharma Master Tai's intent was to say that since sound is constantly possessed, one clearly knows that all four great elements are not separated from sound.

4.12

Now, examining Dharma Master Nian's explanation, it deeply grasps the treatise's intention. That all four great elements do not necessarily have sound is identical with the view of the evaluator in the Vibhāṣā. That all in the desire and form realms definitely possess sound is spoken based on a single body. That all desire-realm visible form is definitely not separated from fragrance and taste is identical with the evaluator of the Vibhāṣā, fascicle one hundred and forty-five, [which says that] when one whose body is in the form realm creates emanations of the desire realm, they also emanate fragrance and taste without possessing them. Dharma Master Tai's explanation: if he says that sound is definitely possessed, this statement is correct; if he says that all four great elements are definitely not separated from visible form and sound, this is incorrect. One can only say that they are not separated from visible form; how could one say they are definitely not separated from sound? Based on the view of the evaluator in the Vibhāṣā, there are four great elements that are not separated from sound, and there are four great elements that are separated from sound; how can one say that all four great elements are definitely not separated from sound? If one says that all great elements produce sound everywhere, this falls back into what was refuted by the evaluator of the Vibhāṣā, and therefore it is also irrational. Furthermore, stating that all desire-realm visible form is definitely not separated from fragrance and taste is also the same as Dharma Master Nian. According to Dharma Master Nian's [view] that all four great elements are definitely not separated from visible form and do not necessarily have sound, this agrees with what was stated by the evaluator in the Vibhāṣā: only when the four great elements are struck and excited is it termed 'having sound'; the remaining four great elements themselves are not termed 'having sound'. It is not that within a single body sound is not necessarily present and thus called indefinite. If one speaks of [the elements] being together in a single body, then sound must inevitably be present, and it should definitely be nine, ten, and so forth. Now, examining the two explanations in the Vibhāṣā: the former master's [view] that the desire realm is definitely not separated from fragrance and taste means that in the form realm, fragrance and taste are also emanated like ornamental requisites, without being possessed. The latter master's [view] that all desire-realm visible form does not necessarily have fragrance and taste means that when the body is in the form realm, it emanates only the two sense-objects of desire-realm visible form and tangibility. Dharma Master Tai and Dharma Master Guang falsely explained Dharma Master Nian's intention, saying that because the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya does not mention the presence of sound, one clearly knows that this sound is not constantly possessed. This is an erroneous interpretation of the Dharma Master's intention. Since Dharma Master Nian lectured on Kātyāyanī[putra], how could he not know that the Jñānaprasthāna says: 'Who possesses the dhātu of sound? The answer is: the desire and form realms'? Moreover, how could he not know the ten āyatanas of the non-ideational [gods]? Because not all four great elements constantly have sound, Dharma Master Nian [held that] sound is not necessary, not that a single body completely lacks sound. Just as this treatise and others say 'without sound: eight, nine, ten; with sound: nine, ten, eleven', and so forth, this agrees with the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya. When this says 'without sound', how could it mean that one does not possess sound? Since the Dharma Master adopted this text, his intention was likewise so.

4.13

Furthermore, that Dharma Master Tai cited the Jñānaprasthāna and other treatises to refute Dharma Master Nian was a great error. Moreover, his own explanation that 'hence we know that the first master of the Vibhāṣā—that all four great elements are definitely not separated from visible form and sound, and all desire-realm visible form is definitely not separated from fragrance and taste—is the correct view' is an even greater error. It directly contradicts the Vibhāṣā's statement that there are four great elements without sound, and the eight [elements] without sound and so forth of this treatise and the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya. Since Dharma Master Nian's position conforms to the text of the treatise, the two masters, Tai and Guang, merely refuted him erroneously.

4.14

The treatise says: 'If the four great elements... can be apprehended, and not the others', which clarifies the increase and decrease in substance and function of the four great elements. This is a question.

4.15

The treatise says: 'In that aggregate... combined taste with roasted flour', which answers by way of an increase in function. The Vibhāṣā, fascicle one hundred and thirty-one, has two explanations: one says an increase in substance, and the other says an increase in function. This treatise adopts the latter master, while the Nyāyānusāra adopts the former master. The Nyāyānusāra rescues the former master, stating: 'Do we not also observe an increase in function in material phenomena? As when vinegar is mixed with water, good medicine is mixed with poison, salt is mixed with water, and so forth. Although the quantities of both are equal, their functions differ; how can it be said that for material phenomena, increase is spoken of in terms of substance? There is no contradiction here. Because although the tangible atoms of vinegar and water are equal, their tastes differ: the taste atoms of vinegar are more, and the taste atoms of water are fewer; hence, that the taste of vinegar is predominant is still an increase in substance. In various aggregates, because entities such as taste are substantively increased and strong, it is said to be an increase in function. Because the conditioned arising and principles of good medicine, poison, and so forth have distinctions, their substantive categories are like this. Due to this, although small in quantity they can overcome the large, and it is not that a different function arises distinct from the substantive category. Therefore, grasping at an increase in function is a wrong view. Or, just as categories are distinct, grades are also like this; hence only for the mind and the like is increase spoken of in terms of function, while for material phenomena increase is spoken of in terms of substance, just as it is established by depending on many or depending on one.' Explication: Mind and matter being dependent on one or dependent on many are different; increase in function and increase in substance are also not of a single pattern. Examining the two explanations, both are texts of the Vibhāṣā; the Nyāyānusāra master, in this context, should not censure the treatise master as being wrong. However, when we examine increase in substance and increase in function, they do not yet exhaust the principle. For example, if a quantity of water possesses all six tastes, and six people consume this water together, their initial perceptions differ: which one is an increase in substance? Which one is an increase in function? Therefore, we know that the nature of dharmas is indeterminate in accordance with conditions; it is not substance or function.

4.16

The treatise says: 'How is it known that the others also exist there?', which is a question.

4.17

The treatise says: 'Because they have the functions of cohesion, ripening, distention, and supporting', which is the answer. Within this there are two: this is the first answer. Because the functions exist, one knows that the substances exist.

4.18

On the Śāstra's statement, "Some say that upon meeting conditions... their functions have predominance and inferiority": this is the second answer. By the marks existing subsequently, one knows that the substance existed prior. When meeting conditions such as fire, substances like ghee, wax, and iron then flow. Just as in winter water, due to extreme cold, there are marks of warmth and so forth; and because of having previously touched extremely cold water, subsequently touching somewhat cold water, one perceives warmth within it. Although the substances of the four great elements are not separated from one another, because [one] function predominates, only one mark is manifested; just as when multiple sensory objects are mixed together, the predominant one is experienced first, and when multiple sounds are made together, only the predominant one is heard. Volume 141 of the Vibhāṣā says: "Question: How is it known that these four great elements are never separated from one another? Answer: Because their intrinsic characteristics and operations are all to be found in every aggregate. That is to say, within an aggregate of solidity, because the intrinsic characteristic of the earth element is presently perceptible, its existence is thoroughly established. Within this aggregate, if there were no water element, gold, silver, tin, and the like could not be melted. Furthermore, if there were no water, they would disperse. If there were no fire element, when stones and the like strike against one another, fire would not be produced. Furthermore, if there were no fire, nothing could ripen [them], and they would decay. If there were no wind element, there would be no motion. Furthermore, if there were no wind, there would be no growth. Within an aggregate of moisture, because the intrinsic characteristic of the water element is presently perceptible, its existence is thoroughly established. Within this aggregate, if there were no earth element, when reaching the state of severe cold it would not solidify into ice. Furthermore, if there were no earth, boats and the like would sink. If there were no fire element, there would be no warm season. Furthermore, if there were no fire, it would decay. If there were no wind element, it would not move. Furthermore, if there were no wind, there would be no growth. Within an aggregate of warmth, because the intrinsic characteristic of the fire element is presently perceptible, its existence is thoroughly established. Within this aggregate, if there were no earth element, the flames of lamps and candles could not turn back. Furthermore, if there were no earth, they could not hold objects. If there were no water element, it would not generate flow. Furthermore, if there were no water, flames would not gather together. If there were no wind element, they would not flicker. Furthermore, if there were no wind, they would not increase. Within an aggregate of motion, because the intrinsic characteristic of the wind element is presently perceptible, its existence is thoroughly established. Within this aggregate, if there were no earth element, upon striking walls and other obstacles it would not deflect and turn back. Furthermore, if there were no earth, it could not support objects. If there were no water element, there would be no cold wind. Furthermore, if there were no water, it would disperse. If there were no fire element, there would be no warm wind. Furthermore, if there were no fire, it would decay."

4.19

On the Śāstra's statement, "Other masters say... 'elements' means seeds": this refers to the Sautrāntikas. There are only seeds; there is no substantial characteristic. The Mahāyāna does not speak of seeds [here], yet it allows that there may be one great element up to four great elements, and allows one derived matter up to five sense objects, which nevertheless are inseparable in the same locus and not blended into a mixture. The general idea of the Sautrāntikas is also the same.

4.20

On the Śāstra's statement, "How is it known that there is visible matter in wind?": this is a question. If one says that external objects definitely consist of eight subtle atoms, as in the case of external wind free of dust, where shape matter such as long [and short] is universally agreed to be definitively absent, how is it known that there is visible matter in wind? If there is no visible matter, then there is only tangible matter; where would the eight subtle atoms be?

4.21

On the Śāstra's statement, "This matter is to be believed... because they are not separated": this is the answer. The visible matter in wind can only be believed to exist on the basis of the scriptural teaching; it cannot be known by inference. Or, because the odor associated with it is presently apprehensible: although it cannot be seen, its odor can be smelled; and since odor and visible matter necessarily occur together, visible matter definitely exists.

4.22

On the Śāstra's statement, "What was said previously concerning the form realm... therefore it is not stated separately": this explains the form realm by analogy, which is clear.

4.23

On the Śāstra's statement, "When speaking of 'things' here... is it stated in terms of the bases?": from here onward are questions and answers of analysis. This is the question.

4.24

On the Śāstra's statement, "If so, what fault is there?": this is a counter-question.

4.25

On the Śāstra's statement, "Both have faults... there is the fault of being too few": this criticizes [the view] based on substances as having the fault of being too few.

4.26

On the Śāstra's statement, "If it is stated in terms of bases... there is the flaw of being too many": this explains the flaw of being too many when based on bases.

4.27

On the Śāstra's statement, "Neither has any fault... the derived matter that depends on them": this answers the two objections.

4.28

On the Śāstra's statement, "If so, the great elements... because there are four great elements": this raises an objection with respect to the different types of great elements.

4.29

On the Śāstra's statement, "It should be understood here that... because there is no difference in type": this answers by combining them because of sameness of type. However, the Nyāyānusāra has two further explanations; thus that treatise says: "Alternatively, there is also no fault if based solely on substance, because it is stated here that they necessarily arise together. The substances of shape matter and the like do not definitely exist, since they are absent in light, luminescence, and so forth. Alternatively, it is based solely on bases, yet in order to refute numerous false views, the great elements are stated separately. As for the 'numerous false views': some falsely claim that the great elements and derived matter have no distinct intrinsic nature (meaning the Dārṣṭāntikas, Bhadanta Buddhadeva, and others); or again, others falsely claim that there is no separate substance of derived matter within the tangible-object base (Śrīlāta's view accepts other matter); or again, others falsely claim that not all aggregates are equipped with all [elements]. Among the Sautrāntika masters, some maintain that there are no four great elements at all, or again falsely claim that their number is not fixed. By stating the great elements separately, all these false views are eliminated. (The Sautrāntika masters agree with the Mahāyāna view, or say that great elements definitely exist but do not necessarily comprise all four.)"

4.30

On the Śāstra's statement, "What is the use of analyzing... the meaning should be investigated": here the author of the treatise puts an end to dispute.

4.31

On the Śāstra's statement, "Having explained this above... it will now be stated in turn": the following half-verse explains the other co-arising [factors].

4.32

On "The Śāstra says... otherwise they do not arise": this explains that mind and mental factors are necessarily concurrent. There is never a time when the primary mind arises without being accompanied by mental factors, nor when mental factors arise without being accompanied by the primary mind; hence it says they are necessarily concurrent. It does not mean that the primary mind is concurrent with all types of mental factors.

4.33

On the Śāstra's statement, "Conditioned phenomena are precisely... arise together with the four characteristics": regarding the words "the characteristics of conditioned phenomena", this means that all conditioned [phenomena] necessarily arise together with the four kinds of characteristics. The two words "necessarily concurrent" from the preceding line carry over to the subsequent line: conditioned phenomena and their characteristics are necessarily concurrent.

4.34

On the Śāstra's statement, "The word 'or' in 'or acquisition'... therefore it says 'or'": this explains the two words "or acquisition" in the verse. Among conditioned phenomena, some arise together with acquisition, namely phenomena pertaining to sentient beings; and some do not arise together with acquisition, namely phenomena pertaining to non-sentient things; therefore it says "or".

4.35

On the Śāstra's statement, "It was mentioned earlier: 'mental factors'—what are they?": from here onward, taking the opportunity, mental factors are explained in detail. What are called "mental factors" are that which belongs to the mind. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Among the four conditioned [classes], matter and mind were analyzed in detail as stated in the previous chapter." Factors such as mental factors have not yet been analyzed in detail; below, there are eleven and a half verses explaining mental factors in detail. Within the text there are four parts: first, stating their names and substances; second, stating their co-arising; third, differentiating ambiguities; fourth, stating their various designations. Within stating their names and substances, it is again divided into two: first, opening the section and listing the names; second, taking up the section and explaining them individually. The following half-verse opens the section and lists the names.

4.36

On "The Śāstra says... fifth, factors of the ground of minor afflictions": it lists the names of the five grounds, which is clear. According to volume 42 of the Vibhāṣā, outside of the factors of the five grounds, there is additionally the ground of great obscured-unspecified [factors], meaning obscured-unspecified mind and mental factors; and the ground of great unobscured-unspecified factors, meaning all unobscured-unspecified [factors]. The factors of these two grounds have no separate mental factors, so they are not mentioned here.

4.37

On the Śāstra's statement, "A 'ground' means an operational domain... serves as the ground for those factors": this explains the name of the five grounds in general.

4.38

On the Śāstra's statement, "Because it is the ground for great factors, it is called a great ground": this explains "great ground" in particular. That is to say, the ground is the primary mind, and the great factors are the mental factors.

4.39

On the Śāstra's statement, "Here, whatever factors... are called factors of the great ground": this explains the factors of the great ground in particular, meaning the mental factors. This is a double genitive compound (tatpuruṣa) explanation.

4.40

On the Śāstra's statement, "meaning factors that constantly exist in all minds": this shows the substance of the factors of the great ground.

4.41

On the Śāstra's statement, "What are those factors?": this is a further question. Below, the five great ground factors are explained individually, in five sections. Below, the first section of one verse explains the factors of the great ground individually. Preparing to explain their names and substances, the general name is first explained, as stated earlier. The Nyāyānusāra says: "The ground is precisely the mind; because it is the ground of great factors, it is called the great ground. Here, whatever factors belong to the great ground are called factors of the great ground. That is, factors that co-arise universally with all categories and all minds; because of this, the mind is not a factor of the great ground, since it does not co-arise with the mind." Based on the treatise text above, the ten factors such as sensation are called "great" because they pervade all minds. Because the primary mind is the support for what is great, it is called the "great ground". The ten factors such as sensation arise together with the mind, so they are called "factors of the great ground". Because the mind does not co-arise with the primary mind, it is not a factor of the great ground. Volume 16 of the Vibhāṣā states: "Question: What is the meaning of factors of the great ground? Answer: 'Great' refers to the mind. These ten factors are the place where the mind arises; being the ground of the great, it is called the great ground. The great ground itself is the factors, so they are called factors of the great ground. Some say: Mind is called 'great' because its substance and function are predominant. Precisely this great is the ground, hence it is called the great ground, because it is the locus of support for the various mental factors. Because the ten factors such as sensation are universally obtainable in all great grounds, they are called factors of the great ground. Some say: The ten factors such as sensation pervade all categories of mind, hence they are called 'great'; mind is their ground, hence it is called the 'great ground'. Sensation and the like are precisely what belongs to the great ground, hence they are called factors of the great ground." The first two explanations differ from the two treatises [Abhidharmakośa and Nyāyānusāra], while the last explanation agrees with the two treatises. Since ancient times, various masters have used either three meanings or five meanings to differentiate the distinctions among the five grounds; fearing prolixity, they are not recounted. Now this author of the treatise uses only one meaning to differentiate the distinction of the ground factors, which is superior to differentiating by three or five meanings. That is, he differentiates them by their pervading all minds, for all other mental factors are unable to pervade all minds.

4.42

On "The Śāstra says... in combination they are universally present": first, it explains in general their universal presence. Since it is said to be the teaching of the masters of the Vibhāṣā, it says "tradition says".

4.43

On the Śāstra's statement, "Here, sensation means... because of their distinction": this is interpreted in accordance with the aggregate of sensation. Speaking of experiencing subsequent to contact, and because the Nyāyānusāra does not refute this here, we know that this statement refers to experiencing contact that conforms to pain, pleasure, and so forth, not to experiencing sensory objects that conform to pain, pleasure, and so forth. Some insist that it is experiencing the preceding object, which is not definitive. Thus the Nyāyānusāra says: "That which benefits, harms, or is contrary to both with respect to the body of support, experiencing pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral contact, is called sensation." In accordance with this text, it experiences simultaneous contact.

4.44

On the Śāstra's statement, "Conception means grasping distinctive marks in an object": that is grasping distinctive marks such as male and female. The Nyāyānusāra says: "The cause of positing and grasping the distinctive marks of objects such as male and female is called conception." Commentary: It means serving as the cause that enables the mind and mental factors to posit and grasp marks such as male and female.

4.45

On the Śāstra's statement, "Volition means causing the mind to engage in activity": the Nyāyānusāra says: "Causing the mind to engage in activity that is wholesome, unwholesome, or unspecified, bringing about an excellent, inferior, or middling nature, is called volition. Because volition exists, it causes the mind to have active functioning toward objects, just as the power of a lodestone is able to make iron move."

4.46

On the Śāstra's statement, "Contact means sense faculty, object... being able to make contact": the Nyāyānusāra says: "Born from the coming together of sense faculty, object, and consciousness, able to serve as the cause of sensation and having contact [with the object], it is called contact."

4.47

On the Śāstra's statement, "Desire means longing for tasks to be done": the Nyāyānusāra says: "Longing to take hold of an object is called desire."

4.48

On the Śāstra's statement, "Wisdom means being able to discern phenomena": the Nyāyānusāra says: "Discerning marks such as wrongful and correct regarding what is cognized is called wisdom. When discernment is not yet determined, it may also occur together with doubt."

4.49

On the Śāstra's statement, "Mindfulness means clearly remembering an object without forgetting": the Nyāyānusāra says: "The cause of clearly remembering an object without forgetting it is called mindfulness." Commentary: By the power of mindfulness, one clearly and distinctly remembers an objective field, serving as the cause of not forgetting at a later time; it does not mean taking only past objects as its objective field.

4.50

[The root text of the] Treatise states: "Attention (manaskāra) means that which is able to alert the mind." The Nyāyānusāra states: "That which directs the mind and mental factors, causing them to be alerted toward an intentional object, is called attention. In worldly convention, this is called 'keeping in mind.'" The Commentary explains: When the minds and mental factors are submerged and not active, they are alerted and aroused by the power of attention, which urges them to act and enables them to adhere to their intentional object; this is what is called in worldly convention 'keeping one's mind on this.'

4.51

The Treatise states: "Resolve (adhimokṣa) means being able to confirm the object." The Nyāyānusāra states: "Confirmation toward an object is called resolve. Other masters say: 'Adhi' means superior, and 'mokṣa' means liberation. This enables the mind to turn unimpededly and autonomously toward the object, like superior discipline (śīla) and so forth." The Commentary explains: Clearly confirming an object, ascertaining that a thing is thus and not otherwise—such a distinct understanding is called resolve. Question: If so, when conjoined with doubt, how can resolve be present? Answer: Whether questioning 'is it there?' or 'is it not?', in either state of mind it can individually confirm and apprehend the mark; thus resolve is present. 'Other masters' refers to the masters of the Miśrakābhidharmahṛdaya and so forth. They say that causing the mind to be autonomous toward the object is 'superior', because the object cannot obstruct it. Obtaining modification is called 'mokṣa', mokṣa meaning liberation. Therefore the older translation of the Miśrakābhidharmahṛdaya called it liberation (jie-tuo). 'Superior discipline and so forth' includes superior concentration and superior wisdom. As it is said: due to contact the mind adheres to the object, and due to resolve the mind is freed from the object. That is its meaning.

4.52

The Treatise states: "Samādhi means one-pointedness of mind." The Nyāyānusāra states: "The cause that makes the mind undistracted, grasping the intentional object without scattering, is called samādhi." The Commentary explains: Due to the power of concentration, in that very instant, the mind and mental factors are caused to adhere together to a single intentional object, reaching this and not another. 'Samādhi' is rendered here as 'equipoise' (dengchi), which is holding the mind evenly so that it abides on one intentional object. Where the above explanations of the mental factors refer to 'the mind', this also encompasses mental factors. Concerning factors with contrary characteristics arising together, consider this properly; for fear of verbosity, it is not explained here. The two treatises are briefly cited to distinguish their intrinsic natures and characteristics; wishing to cite many texts, for fear of complexity it is not set forth.

4.53

The Treatise states: "All minds and mental factors [...] can only be apprehended by awakening wisdom (buddhi)." This highlights that the dharmas of mind and mental factors are subtle and difficult to know. In the Sarvāstivāda school, ten dharmas are omnipresent (sarvatraga), whereas in the Mahāyāna only five are omnipresent. The Nyāyānusāra states: "That Sthavira says: There are only three kinds, namely sensation (vedanā), ideation (saṃjñā), and volition (cetanā). Thus only three are called omnipresent. There are also those who do not posit mental factors, stating that the distinctions of mind alone are termed sensation and so forth." This should be recorded.

4.54

The Treatise states: "Having thus explained [...] what are those dharmas?" The second section below uses one verse to explain the great wholesome ground-dharmas (kuśalamahābhūmika-dharma). First it explains the great wholesome ground. That 'ground-dharmas of the wholesome' has a twofold genitive relation, as should be understood from before.

4.55

"The Treatise states: [...] are only omnipresent in wholesome minds." This explains the name 'great wholesome dharmas'. Among mental factors, there are those that are exclusively wholesome but not omnipresent in wholesome minds, namely delight and disgust. There are those that are omnipresent in wholesome minds but not exclusively wholesome, namely the great ground-dharmas. There are those that are exclusively wholesome and also omnipresent in wholesome minds, namely the ten beginning with faith. There are those that are not omnipresent in wholesome minds and not exclusively wholesome, namely the two of investigation and analysis, sleep, and regret. Defiled mental factors alone are not wholesome by nature; hence the word 'wholesome' has already excluded them.

4.56

The Treatise states: "Among these, faith [...] is therefore called faith." The Nyāyānusāra states: "Contrary to turbidity of the mind, it is manifest endorsement and acceptance. Cause and effect, being without error, pertain individually to their own results; serving as the basis for desire and capable of nourishing resolve, it is called faith." The Abhidharmāvatāra states: "It is a dharma capable of dispelling turbidity and defilement from the mind. Just as a water-clearing gem placed in a pond causes turbid and defiled water to instantly become clear and pure, so when the gem of faith is within the pond of the mind, all turbid defilements of the mind are completely dispelled."

4.57

The Treatise states: "Heedfulness means [...] is called heedfulness." The Nyāyānusāra states: "Devoting oneself to one's own welfare, guarding body, speech, and mind. Being the contrary of heedlessness, it is called heedfulness." The Commentary explains: 'One's own welfare' refers to the nirvāṇa of the three vehicles and beloved worldly fruits. Being that to which one is devoted, it indicates the basis. 'Guarding body, speech, and mind' indicates the function. 'Being the contrary of heedlessness' clarifies what it counteracts.

4.58

The Treatise states: "Pliancy (praśrabdhi) means the serviceability of the mind." The Nyāyānusāra states: "When correct attention operates, it is the cause of lightness, agility, peace, and comfort of body and mind. The serviceability of the mind is called pliancy." The Commentary explains: 'When correct attention operates' clarifies the state of its basis, which is the time when wise attention is directly occurring. 'Being the cause of lightness, agility, peace, and comfort of body and mind' indicates its function. 'The serviceability of the mind' points to its intrinsic nature.

4.59

The Treatise states: "Does not a sūtra also speak of pliancy of the body?" This is a question by the Sautrāntika. Since a sūtra states that there is pliancy of the body, how can it be exclusively the serviceability of the mind?

4.60

The Treatise states: "Although it is not that it does not speak of it [...] should be understood to be likewise." This is the Sarvāstivādin's explanation. This is like bodily sensation, which is not the material body, but is the sensation conjoined with the five consciousnesses. Pliancy is also like this.

4.61

The Treatise states: "How could this be posited as a limb of awakening?" This is the Sautrāntika's objection. If pliancy conjoined with the five consciousnesses existed, how could it be said to be a limb of awakening? This objection is absolute. Now, examining this objection, it is not pertinent: pliancy of mind itself would not all be limbs of awakening, so how could pliancy of the five consciousnesses be made a limb of awakening?

4.62

The Treatise states: "It should be understood that here [...] serviceability of the body." In this passage, the Sautrāntika interprets the sūtra differently from the Sarvāstivāda. When the sūtra speaks of bodily pliancy, it means that the material body has serviceability, which is light tangible object within the body.

4.63

The Treatise states: "Furthermore, how can this be called a limb of awakening?" This is the Sarvāstivādin's objection. A limb of awakening is a mental factor, while pliancy [of the body] is a material dharma; how could this be called a limb of awakening?

4.64

The Treatise states: "Because it accords with a limb of awakening [...] pliancy of mind." This is the Sautrāntika's resolution. Because when entering concentration the bodily pliancy accords with the pliancy of mind within concentration, it is called a limb of awakening.

4.65

The Treatise states: "Is such a statement seen elsewhere as well?" This is the Sarvāstivādin's question. Elsewhere too, is designation established by following along with another in this manner?

4.66

The Treatise states: "There is, as a sūtra states: [...] gaining the name without error." A sūtra is cited as a parallel explanation. It is also seen elsewhere that hatred and the causes and conditions of hatred are named the hindrance of ill-will, and views, reflection, and effort are named the aggregate of wisdom. Although that cause of hatred, reflection, and effort are not hatred and not wisdom, because they accord with them they also receive their names. Here too it should be likewise. The Sautrāntika also acknowledges mental pliancy, but it lacks a separate entity, being merely a distinction of volition. It exists only in a concentrated mind, does not exist in distraction, and in principle does not exist conjoined with the five consciousnesses. Bodily pliancy is light tangible object, the cause of bodily lightness and agility. The Nyāyānusāra states: "Some make this statement: Since bodily pliancy is spoken of here, it is not solely a mental factor that is called pliancy. This statement is unreasonable, because sensation and so forth would also have to follow this explanation. Rather, sensations conjoined with the five consciousness-bodies are called bodily sensations. Some make this statement: Even if there is pliancy, its entity is not a mental factor. Yet because mental factors are spoken of here, that should not be spoken of; it is because it can accord with the limb of awakening that its entity is also called a limb of awakening. That is to say, bodily pliancy can induce the mental pliancy that is a limb of awakening. It is also seen elsewhere that hatred and the cause of hatred are named the hindrance of ill-will, and views, reflection, and effort are named the aggregate of wisdom. Although that cause of hatred, reflection, and effort are not hatred and not wisdom, because they accord with them they also receive their names. Here too it should be likewise." Now, examining this: since the Nyāyānusāra says 'Some make this statement', presenting the positions of two masters, the explanation given by a certain person seems not to have grasped the point. From 'It is also seen elsewhere' onward, it seems to give a general account of their position, not that it intends to state that pliancy of the five consciousnesses is called a limb of awakening. For throughout the Vibhāṣā, nowhere is it stated that bodily pliancy is called a limb of awakening. If there were such a statement, it would be citing evidence for their own school, meaning that there is a separate sūtra stating that bodily pliancy is called a limb of awakening.

4.67

The Treatise states: "Equanimity of mind [...] is called equanimity (upekṣā)." The Nyāyānusāra states: "Equanimity of mind is called upekṣā. Being contrary to restlessness (auddhatya), and induced by proper manner, it causes the mind not to overstep; this is the meaning of equanimity." The Commentary explains: 'Equanimity of mind' points to its intrinsic nature. Counteracting the non-equanimity of depression and restlessness, it is therefore called equanimity. 'Being contrary to restlessness' presents what it counteracts. Restlessness has coarse and active conduct, strongly opposing the meaning of equanimity, which is why it is specifically mentioned. 'Induced by proper manner' and so forth explains the meaning of equanimity: equanimity is wholesome by nature, induced and produced by a mind acting in proper manner, capable of subduing the mind so that it does not exceed what is to be done. In this treatise, 'having no alerting nature' means having no restlessness.

4.68

The Treatise states: "How can it be said [...] the two arise conjoined?" This is an objection. Among the general mental factors, attention has an alerting quality, while among the wholesome, equanimity has no alerting quality; how could the two arise conjoined in a single instant?

4.69

The Treatise states: "Was it not said before [...] are difficult to comprehend?" The author of the Treatise answers.

4.70

The Treatise states: "Although some are difficult to comprehend [...] they are not mutually contradictory." The opponent objects again.

4.71

The Treatise states: "This one has alertness [...] what contradiction is there?" The answer is given: Attention has alertness, while equanimity has no alertness. Since the two entities are distinct, what contradiction is there?

4.72

The Treatise states: "If so, they should not [...] would all be conjoined with each other." The opponent objects again: One has alertness and one lacks alertness; since the two are distinct, how can they grasp the same intentional object together? Furthermore, if having alertness and lacking alertness can be conjoined, then all greed, non-greed, and so forth should also be conjoined with each other.

4.73

The Treatise states: "Categories of this kind [...] should be understood to be likewise." The answer is given: The other dharmas belonging to categories of this kind, with distinct entities and differing functions, should all be cited here as parallels. Just as those with differing functions arise in the same mind, so here equanimity and attention arise in the same mind, and should be understood to be likewise.

4.74

The Treatise states: "The two kinds, shame (hrī) and embarrassment (apatrāpya), will be explained later." This refers to the explanation below.

4.75

The Treatise states: "The two roots mean [...] great wholesome ground-dharmas." The Nyāyānusāra states: "Being contrary to attachment and craving toward obtained and unobtained sensory realms, a mind without affectionate defilement is named non-greed (alobha); an intention free of malice and harm toward sentient and non-sentient beings, being the seed of compassion, is called non-hatred (adveṣa)."

4.76

The Treatise states: "Non-harming means absence of injuring or tormenting." The Nyāyānusāra states: "Being contrary to injuring and tormenting sentient beings and giving them joy, the benign and good nature of the mind is called non-harming (ahiṃsā)."

4.77

The treatise says: "'Vigor' refers to having bravery/zeal of the mind as its nature." The Nyāyānusāra says: "Safeguarding or abandoning virtues and faults that have already arisen; causing to arise or not arise virtues and faults that have not yet arisen—the mind's lack of indolence is called 'vigor'. Because of this, the mind advances firmly and tirelessly in undertakings appropriately performed." Relying on the Nyāyānusāra, delight and disgust are additionally established among wholesome dharmas, yet they do not pervade all wholesome minds. Therefore, that treatise says: "The mention of the two words 'and' also encompasses delight and disgust. 'Disgust' refers to a wholesome mind carefully observing the infinite faults of phenomena; that aversion of the mind which conforms to non-greed arisen through this dominant force is called disgust, and the mental application associated with this is called the mental application of disgust. 'Delight' refers to a wholesome mind aspiring to the counteragents that lead away from faults; that enthusiasm of the mind which conforms to their realization and cultivation arisen through this dominant force is called delight. This also operates in [stages] such as the unapproached stage that is free from joy; hence it is not the feeling of joy, and the mental application associated with this is called the mental application of delight. The modes of these two mutually conflict; therefore, they cannot arise together in a single mind. For this reason, they are not explicitly expounded here, because their status as great wholesome ground dharmas cannot be established. There is also the case where the faculty of joy and the mode of disgust operate together, but there is definitely never a case where the modes of delight and disgust operate together. To indicate that these two definitely do not operate together, the two words 'and' are used, because their modes conflict." Furthermore, the Abhidharma treatise says: "'Delight' refers to joyful admiration. Having seen the virtues in the category of cessation, it causes the mind to joyfully admire and comply with cultivating the good. Because the mind has this, it delights in nirvāṇa; the mental application associated with this is called the mental application of delight. 'Disgust' refers to revulsion. Having seen the faults in the category of saṃsāra, it causes the mind to turn away in revulsion and comply with dispassion. Because the mind has this, it detests birth-and-death; the mental application associated with this is called the mental application of disgust." Furthermore, the Vibhāṣā, fascicle twenty-eight, says: "Evaluation: There is a distinct dharma named disgust, which is neither wisdom nor non-greed; it is a mental factor and is associated with the mind." This is said to be among the remaining mental factors of such a class that are associated with the mind. However, regarding what the Jñānaprasthāna says about the tolerances and knowledges of suffering and origination being capable of disgust: because those tolerances and knowledges are associated with disgust, they are said to be capable of disgust; they are not the intrinsic nature of disgust. Furthermore, in the Vibhāṣā, fascicle one hundred and ninety-six, the evaluating master separately states that disgust has an intrinsic nature, which is the same as the previous text. This disgust is exclusively wholesome, common to the tainted and untainted. Furthermore, the Vibhāṣā, fascicle one hundred and forty-three, also separately establishes delight and disgust. However, that the minor treatises mostly do not mention them is because they do not arise constantly and do not pervade wholesome minds, so they are not spoken of as great wholesome ground dharmas. Mental factors that arise in association and do not arise through their own power are twenty-eight: among the universal ones, excluding wisdom; the ten of the great wholesome ground; the defiled ground excluding ignorance, which leaves one; the two of the unwholesome ground; and among the indeterminate, two are taken, namely investigation and analysis. Those that arise through their own power and do not arise in association are sixteen dharmas: namely, the ten minor defilements, and six among the indeterminate, namely greed, anger, pride, regret, sleep, and doubt. The reason why sleep arises through its own power is that during the state of sleep, greed, anger, etc., as well as wholesome minds arise. These are greed, etc., and wholesome [minds] arising in accordance with sleep, not sleep arising in accordance with greed and the like. Hence the Vibhāṣā, fascicle fifty, says: "Although sleep and regret also stand independently, they are not separate from the two, so they are not established among the fetters." Question: "If so, greed and the like should both arise through their own power and arise through following along." Answer: "In sleep, whether arising through their own power or through other power, perhaps they all accord with sleep, so their characteristics have no distinction; hence this is not mentioned. Furthermore, although they arise in accordance with sleep, their natures do not accord with it to become unwholesome and so forth, so they are not separately explained. Those that both arise in association and arise through their own power are two dharmas: namely, ignorance among the great defilements and wisdom among the universal. If it acts as the five views, it arises through its own power; the rest arises in association. If it is accompanied by the nine anuśayas, the ten minor defilements, and regret, it is associated; unshared ignorance arises through its own power. That which neither arises in association nor arises through its own power is one dharma, namely the king of mind."

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