俱舍論頌疏論本 13
English (machine translation) 13
- Language
- English
13.1
Action means karma; this chapter explains it extensively, and so it is called the 'Analysis [of Karma]'. In explaining the verses of this chapter, there are three overall headings: first, explaining the essential nature of karma; second, explaining the names of the various karmas; third, miscellaneous explanations of the various karmas.
13.2
Under explaining the essential nature of karma: first, directly explaining the essence of karma; second, distinctions through various categories; third, extensively explaining vijñapti and avijñapti.
13.3
Under directly explaining the essence of karma: first, explaining karma that is produced; second, explaining the primary elements that produce it.
13.4
Under explaining karma that is produced: first, explaining the two and three karmas; second, explaining the five kinds of karma.
13.5
Hereunder is the first, explaining the two and three karmas, taking up the preceding to raise the question. The treatise states: 'As explained before, the world of sentient beings and the physical world have manifold distinctions; through what are such distinctions produced?' The verse says:
13.6
"The varieties of the world are born of karma:
Volition and that which is done by volition.
Volition is mental karma,
And what is done refers to body and speech."
13.7
The commentary explains: The first line gives the general answer, the next line explains the two karmas, and the lower two lines explain the three karmas. 'The varieties of the world are born of karma': the distinctions of the world are produced by karma; it is not that Īśvara and Mahābrahmā act as a single primary cause, serving as the cause of antecedent consciousness to produce the worlds. Tīrthikas postulate that a deva first generates a desire to perceive, wishing to enjoy objects, which is called the cause of antecedent consciousness that can produce the world; this is a false imputation. Karma is good or bad, and its fruits are divided into pure and impure. Among humans, good karma is mingled and corrupted by evil karma; because of mixed karma, they bring about an impure body, but bring about external requisites such as saffron and sandalwood that are most delightful. The good karma of devas cannot be mingled with evil; it is called pure karma. Because their karma is purely good, the internal and external results brought about are both wonderful.
13.8
Question: "What is the intrinsic nature of this karma by which [the world is produced]?" Answer: "'Volition and what is done by volition'—this clarifies the two karmas. In the sūtras it is said that there are two karmas: first, karma of volition; second, karma having willed. 'Karma having willed' means what is done by volition. 'Volition is mental karma, and what is done is bodily and vocal'—this clarifies the three karmas, namely the unfolding of the former two karmas into three kinds. Volition is mental karma; what is done by volition is bodily and vocal karma, and because it arises caused by volition, it is called 'what is done by volition.' With regard to 'mental karma,' it is designated in terms of origination: karma is volition, which is associated with the mind; as mind originates it equally, it is called mental karma. With regard to 'bodily karma,' it is designated in terms of its support: the body refers to the physical body; karma arises supported by the body, so it is called bodily karma. With regard to 'vocal karma,' it is designated in terms of its intrinsic nature, because the intrinsic nature of speech is itself karma." Moreover, the treatise says: "Yet that which the mind wills is itself mental karma; the karma done by volition is called the two karmas of body and speech, because they are co-originated by volition (Explanation: Volition is called 'equal origination'; volition together with the mind can originate bodily and vocal karma)."
13.9
From here [proceeds] the second [section], clarifying the five karmas: first, clarifying informative and uninformative [karma]; second, clarifying bodily and vocal informative [karma]; third, proving the existence of uninformative [karma].
13.10
First, as for the informative and uninformative [karma], the treatise says: "Now, what is the intrinsic nature of the two karmas of body and speech?" The verse says:
13.11
"These two karmas of body and speech
are both of the nature of informative and uninformative."
13.12
Explanation: Because body and speech each have informative and uninformative [aspects], the two karmas of body and speech are both of the nature of informative and uninformative.
13.13
From here [proceeds] the second [section], specifically clarifying bodily and vocal informative [karma]. The treatise first asks: "Now, what is the character of bodily and vocal informative [karma]?" The verse says:
13.14
"Bodily informative [karma] is accepted as a particular shape;
it does not have motion as its substance,
because all conditioned phenomena
end in a single moment,
because there would be no causeless [destruction],
and because a cause of arising would have to be able to destroy.
Shape is also not substantially existent,
because it would have to be grasped by two sense faculties,
and because there are no distinct subtle atoms [of shape].
Vocal informative [karma] is accepted as the sound of speech."
13.15
Explanation: The first nine lines clarify bodily karma, and the last line clarifies vocal karma. In the first line, the author of the treatise sets forth the Sarvāstivāda view that shape is bodily informative [karma]. In the next five lines, the author of the treatise refutes the Sāṃmitīya view that motion is called bodily karma. In the subsequent three lines, the author of the treatise turns back to refute the Sarvāstivāda view that physical shape is substantially existent.
13.16
'Bodily informative [karma] is accepted as a particular shape': the Sarvāstivāda school accepts that bodily informative karma has physical shape as its substance; through the power of volition, such and such particular bodily shapes are separately arisen, which is called bodily informative karma. 'Shape' refers to physical shape, like the shapes of joining palms, killing, binding, and so forth. Shape is itself informative, because it informs of good and evil. Informative is itself karma, because it involves action. Since this physical shape arises dependent on the body, it is called bodily informative karma.
13.17
'It does not have motion as its substance': the Sāṃmitīya school says that motion is called bodily informative [karma]; to refute this, it is said that it is not motion. The Sāṃmitīya school posits that among conditioned phenomena, mind, mental factors, sound, radiance, and the like are accepted to perish in a moment and definitely have no motion. But the matter of bodily informative karma is accepted to possess motion, and hence does not perish in a moment. Just as when bowing to the Buddha or the like, as the body moves and turns, if the action is not yet finished, this matter in motion does not perish in a moment. Since this body when moving informs of good and evil, bodily informative karma therefore has motion as its substance.
13.18
'Because all conditioned phenomena end in a single moment': [this] establishes the reasoning to formally refute [them]. Because all conditioned phenomena are momentary, they definitely have no motion. How is it known that they are all momentary? Because they have an end. Since there is an end later, one knows that there was cessation before; therefore one knows that conditioned phenomena all perish momentarily. Thus, the two words 'end, because' in the verse explain 'momentary, because' above. The word 'because' is spoken twice in the verse: 'because they have moments' and 'because of ending.' Here a syllogism should be established: Subject: the matter of bodily informative karma; Thesis property: definitely has no motion; Reason: because it is momentary; Similar example: like mental factors, etc. Correspondingly: mental factors and the like are momentary, and mental factors and the like have no motion; bodily informative [karma] is momentary, and bodily informative [karma] has no motion. Therefore the treatise says: 'If it arises at this place, it perishes right at this place; there is no possibility of it moving from here to another place, and so it cannot be said that motion is called bodily informative karma.' That school rescues [its thesis] by saying: 'We accept that bodily informative [karma] does not perish momentarily, and therefore motion exists.' This points out that the author of the treatise's reason of being momentary has the fallacy of being unestablished. To refute this rescue, a syllogism should be established: [Subject:] the matter of bodily informative karma definitely has moments, [Reason:] because it has an end, [Similar example:] like mental factors, etc. Correspondingly: mental factors have an end later, and mental factors have moments; bodily informative [karma] has an end later, and bodily informative [karma] has moments. Therefore, by the two words 'because of ending,' it is established that conditioned phenomena are all momentary, and the reasoning is extremely well established. Thus the treatise says: 'All conditioned phenomena are momentary, and the reasoning is extremely well established, because they must end later. That is to say, the cessation of conditioned phenomena does not depend on a cause. Why is this? That which depends on a cause is an effect; non-existence as cessation is not an effect, so it does not depend on a cause (Explanation: An effect-phenomenon depends on a cause; cessation is a non-existent phenomenon, and a non-existent phenomenon is not an effect, so it does not depend on a cause. A syllogism should be established: Cessation does not depend on a cause, because it is non-existence, just like a hare's horn. Since the cessation of conditioned phenomena does not depend on a cause, it is clearly known that conditioned phenomena are all momentarily destroyed).'
13.19
'Because there would be no causeless [destruction]' refutes their subsequent rescue. They accept that the cessation of a phenomenon depends on a cause to cease, and so the treatise says: 'Is it not that in the world it is perceptually observed that firewood and the like are brought to non-existence through cessation because of contact with fire? There is definitely no other means of valid cognition superior to direct perception; therefore it is not the case that the cessation of phenomena is entirely independent of causes (firewood depends on fire to cease, which is dependence on a cause; firewood and the like are directly seen, proven by direct perception).' To refute this rescue, it is said 'because there would be no causeless [destruction].' If you accept that firewood and the like depend on a cause to cease, then no cessation whatsoever should fail to depend on a cause, just as arising depends on a cause and there is none without a cause. Correspondingly: an arising phenomenon depends on a cause to arise, and there is no arising without a cause; a ceasing phenomenon depends on a cause to cease, and there is no cessation without a cause. Yet one directly observes that consciousness, flames, and the like cease without depending on a cause; clearly one knows that the cessation of firewood and the like also does not depend on a cause to cease. A syllogism should be established: Furthermore, the cessation of firewood and the like definitely does not depend on a cause, because it is subsumed under the conditioned, like consciousness, flames, and the like. Consciousness and flames are conditioned and cease without depending on a cause; firewood and the like are conditioned and likewise cease without depending on a cause. Mind and mental factors are collectively called 'consciousness' because they can be conscious of objects. 'Flame' is the flame of a lamp. 'A cause of arising would have to be able to destroy': [this] further pursues it with reason. Moreover, if contact with fire is the cause for firewood and the like, transformation by heat arises, differing as low, medium, and high: low heat is first yellow, medium heat is next black, and high heat is blackest. Yet when medium heat arises, low heat immediately ceases; if high heat arises, medium heat also ceases. Then the cause that produces medium and high heat would itself in essence be the cause that destroys low and medium heat; arising and ceasing are mutually contradictory—how could a cause of arising possibly be capable of destroying? Therefore, by this reasoning it is demonstrated that they are mistaken. The treatise says: 'Therefore there is no cause that makes phenomena cease; phenomena cease spontaneously because they are of a destructible nature. Because they cease spontaneously, as soon as they arise they cease. Because as soon as they arise they cease, the meaning of momentariness is established. Because there are moments, motion definitely does not exist. That bodily informative [karma] is shape is logically established.'
13.20
'Shape is also not substantially existent': the Sautrāntika school marks its refutation of the Sarvāstivāda view that physical shape is substantially existent. Therefore the treatise says: 'However, according to the Sautrāntika masters, shape is not substantially existent; that is to say, when a collection of color-matter arises predominantly on one side, long shape is designated nominally. In relation to this long shape, where another collection of color-matter arises sparsely on one side, short shape is designated nominally; where it arises extensively on all four sides, square shape is designated nominally; where it arises completely filling all places, circular shape is designated nominally. The remaining shapes should be understood accordingly (the remaining shapes refer to high, low, etc., which are all nominally designated). Just as seeing a firebrand moved swiftly and continuously in one direction leads one to call it long, and seeing it whirled around leads one to call it a circular shape, so shape has no distinct, substantial category of physical entity.'
13.21
'Because it would have to be grasped by two sense faculties': the Sautrāntika masters formally establish reasoning to refute [them]. If you, Sarvāstivādin, assert that there is a substantially existent, distinct category of physical shape, then there would be the fault that a single [kind of] matter is grasped by two sense faculties: just as with matter such as length, first it is seen by the eye faculty, and second it is touched by the body faculty, because when touching with the body one knows length and shortness; hence, there would follow the fault of being grasped by two sense faculties. Within the twelve sense bases, there is logically no form base that is grasped by two sense faculties; hence one knows that physical shape originally has no substantial entity. The treatise says: 'However, just as one apprehends the characteristic of length and so forth dependent on touch, so too dependent on color one can apprehend shape (Explanation: This passage presents the correct position established by the Sautrāntikas. Saying "dependent on touch" means that because shape is nominal, when the body faculty touches, mental consciousness therein apprehends nominal length and so forth dependent on the body faculty's touch; hence it is said "dependent on touch," which means mental consciousness apprehends length and so forth dependent on the body faculty's touch).'
13.22
'Because there are no distinct subtle atoms': this states the reason why shape is nominal. That is to say, apart from color-matter, there are no distinct subtle atoms called 'long' and so forth; it is merely through such arrangement of color-matter that within distinctive characteristics one nominally designates 'long' and so forth (the characteristics of square, circular, etc., are called distinctive). However, in the Sautrāntika school, shape is bodily informative [karma], but it is nominal, not substantial. Although shape is informative, it is not karma. As for 'bodily karma,' it takes volition as its substance; that is, the volition that moves the body in various ways operates through the door of the body and is therefore called bodily karma; because it is the karma of the body, it is called bodily karma. As for 'vocal karma,' it also takes volition as its substance; that is, the volition that issues speech operates through the door of speech and is therefore called vocal karma; because it is the karma of speech, it is called vocal karma. As for 'mental karma,' deliberative volition and determinative volition are the substance of mental karma. Therefore, these three karmas all have volition as their substance; following the difference of their doors, distinctive names are established: operating through the door of mind is called mental karma; operating through the door of body is called bodily karma; operating through the door of speech is called vocal karma. In all there are four volitions: first, deliberative volition; second, determinative volition; third, body-moving volition; fourth, speech-issuing volition. The first two are mental karma; the third is bodily karma; the fourth is vocal karma. Because in the Sautrāntika school the material nature of the two informative [karmas] of body and speech is dull, it is solely of indeterminate nature, unlike in the Sarvāstivāda school where the two karmas of body and speech take matter as their substance, bodily karma being physical shape and vocal karma being sound, both being subsumed under matter. Therefore the treatise says: 'The preceding preparatory arousal of thoughtful volition—"I should do such and such an action that ought to be done"—is called karma of volition. Having already thought, a volition to perform the action arises; that is, performing the action to be done according to what was thought, which can issue body and speech, is called karma having willed (Explanation: The Sautrāntikas explain the two karmas of the sūtra, wishing to clarify that both karmas have volition as their substance. "Thoughtful" refers to deliberative volition and determinative volition).'
13.23
'Vocal informative [karma] is accepted as the sound of speech': this clarifies vocal karma, stating that the sound of speech is vocal informative karma. These [two] karmas of body and speech both have uninformative [aspects], as was already differentiated previously in the "Chapter on the Elements."
13.24
From here [comes] the third [section], establishing the existence of avijñapti. As mentioned before in the "Chapter on the Dhātus", because the Sautrāntika school does not accept that avijñapti is substantially real, they say that avijñapti is merely the seed of intention (cetanā)—namely, the four active intentions of deliberation, decision, moving [the body], and issuing [speech], which perfume and form seeds upon form (rūpa) and mind (citta). Upon these intention-seeds, [functions of] guarding against wrong and preventing transgression are nominally designated as avijñapti; simply not doing evil is called avijñapti, without having any real substance. Therefore the śāstra states: "The Sautrāntikas also say that this is not substantially real, because it is merely non-action due to a prior vow, and because it is posited based on past great elements (mahābhūta). However, past great elements lack real substance, and furthermore, forms of avijñapti have no material characteristics (rūpa-lakṣaṇa). (Explanation: First, because of non-action, it is called avijñapti. Second, avijñapti relies on past great elements; if the great elements do not even exist, how could avijñapti exist? Third, it also has no material characteristics. Due to these three reasons, avijñapti has no real substance)." Therefore, below this, the Sarvāstivāda school proves with eight arguments that avijñapti is substantially real. The verse says:
13.25
"Because of the statements of three [kinds of] forms and untainted forms, / [Merit] increasing, non-action [becoming karma], and so forth."
13.26
Explanation: In this verse there are eight proofs: 1. the proof from the statement of three forms; 2. the proof from the statement of untainted (anāsrava) forms; 3. the proof from the statement of the increase of merit; 4. the proof from the statement of non-action constituting karma; 5. the proof from forms in the sphere of mental objects (dharmāyatana); 6. the proof from the eight factors of the path; 7. the proof from prātimokṣa morality; 8. the proof from morality acting as an embankment.
13.27
"Because of the statements of three [kinds of] forms and untainted forms": this raises two proofs: first, the proof from the statement of three forms; second, the proof from the statement of untainted forms. "[Merit] increasing, non-action, and so forth": "increasing" refers to the third proof, the increase of merit; "non-action" is the fourth proof, non-action constituting karma; the remaining four proofs are gathered by the word "and so forth". First, as for the proof from the statement of three forms: it is because a sūtra states that forms are of three kinds, and these three serve as āyatanas that subsume all forms: first, form that is visible and offers resistance (namely, the rūpāyatana); second, form that is invisible and offers resistance (the five sense-faculties such as the eye, and sound, smell, taste, and tangibles); third, form that is invisible and offers no resistance (avijñapti-rūpa). Since this sūtra speaks of form that is invisible and offers no resistance, one clearly knows that avijñapti is substantially real.
13.28
Second, as for the proof from untainted forms: as a sūtra states, "What are untainted phenomena? Namely, when neither craving nor anger arises toward any forms of the past, future, or present, and so forth up to consciousness as well; these are called untainted phenomena." Since this sūtra speaks of untainted forms, one clearly knows that the substance of avijñapti must be real. Aside from avijñapti, there are no other forms that are called untainted.
13.29
Third, as for the proof from the increase of merit: as a sūtra states, "Any faithful good son or good daughter who accomplishes the seven bases of meritorious action having support (sopadhi-puṇyakriyāvastu)—whether walking or standing, sleeping or waking—the meritorious karma continually arises in constant succession. It is also like this for those without support." Since this sūtra speaks of the increase of meritorious karma, and the increase of meritorious karma is none other than avijñapti: namely, after that donor performs giving, whether an evil mind or an avyākṛta mind arises, or during a mindless state, if there were no avijñapti, based on what phenomenon could the increase of meritorious karma be spoken of? Therefore, one knows that avijñapti has real substance. The seven meritorious [actions] with support are: 1. giving to travelers; 2. giving to wayfarers; 3. giving to the sick; 4. giving to caretakers of the sick; 5. giving parks and groves; 6. giving constant food-alms; 7. giving at proper times. These seven kinds, being wholesome, are called merit; being deeds, are called karma; karma relies on these seven, hence they are called "bases" (vastu). The meritorious [actions] without support: having no material things to give, one merely gives rise to deep minds of sympathetic joy and reverence, which also produce superior merit.
13.30
Fourth, as for the proof from non-action constituting karma: furthermore, when oneself does not act but dispatches another to kill and so forth, if there were no avijñapti, it would not constitute a karmapatha. Why is that? Namely, issuing speech to give orders dispatching another to kill and so forth—this issuance of speech-intimation (vijñapti) is not subsumed under the karmapatha, because the agent has not yet carried out the act of killing and so forth; when that agent has finished carrying out the killing and so forth, that earlier speech-intimation has no different nature, so how could the commander accomplish the karmapatha of killing and so forth? One clearly knows that there is an additional avijñapti of killing and so forth that comes into [the commander's] body, whereby the commanding person accomplishes the karmapatha; therefore, this karmapatha is subsumed under avijñapti.
13.31
Fifth, as for the proof from forms in the dharmāyatana: furthermore, a sūtra states, "Bhikṣus, you should know: dharmas are the external āyatana, phenomena not subsumed by the eleven āyatanas, invisible and offering no resistance." This sūtra does not say there is no form within the dharmāyatana; therefore, one knows that within the dharmāyatana there is truly avijñapti-rūpa. If there were no avijñapti-rūpa, this sūtra would have an omission and become useless—namely, because the sūtra would omit the words "non-form". Since it does not say "non-form", one clearly knows that avijñapti is real.
13.32
Sixth, as for the proof from the eight factors of the path: if there were no avijñapti, there should be no eight factors of the path. For among the eight factors of the path, right speech, right action, and right livelihood—these three are avijñapti. Therefore the śāstra states: "Because when in meditative absorption (samādhi) there is no speech and so forth (Explanation: when in samādhi one cannot speak, so there is no [manifest] right speech; the body does not move to bow to the Buddha and so forth, so there is no right action; one does not beg for food and so forth, so there is no right livelihood. Since the three such as right speech are spoken of within samādhi, it is because within samādhi there are the three avijñapti forms of right speech and so forth. After emerging from samādhi, one is able to give rise to the three right ones and not give rise to the three wrong ones; hence right speech and so forth are spoken of within samādhi. This is naming the cause after the result: the cause is the avijñapti-rūpa, and the result is right speech and so forth)."
13.33
Seventh, as for the proof from prātimokṣa morality: if there were no avijñapti, there should also be no prātimokṣa morality. Because after receiving the precepts, although evil or avyākṛta minds directed toward different conditions arise, one is still called a bhikṣu; one clearly knows that there is separately an avijñapti precept-form called prātimokṣa morality, which continues to function within evil and avyākṛta states, whereby one is called a bhikṣu and so forth.
13.34
Eighth, as for the proof from morality acting as an embankment: furthermore, a sūtra states, "The morality of abstaining from killing and so forth is called embankment-morality, because it is capable of lasting continuous succession, damming and obstructing the faults of precept-violation." Since this sūtra speaks of morality as an embankment, one clearly knows that there is separately an avijñapti precept-form. The Sarvāstivāda school cites the above eight proofs to prove the reality of avijñapti.
13.35
From here, the Sautrāntikas reconcile and explain the previous statements. First, as for the three forms, [the third] is the form that is the object of samādhi, not avijñapti-rūpa. The Yogācāras (here translated as "corresponding", meaning the correspondence of mind and object) say: "When cultivating dhyāna, the form of the objective sphere of samādhi produced by the power of samādhi is not seen by the eye-faculty, hence it is called invisible. It does not obstruct space, hence it is called offering no resistance."
13.36
Second, untainted form is also form that is the object of samādhi: form produced based on an untainted samādhi is called untainted form.
13.37
Third, as for the increase of merit, it is merely the seeds perfumed by the active wholesome intention of giving, nominally designated as avijñapti, which is called the increase of merit. Therefore the śāstra states: "The perfuming by the intention directed at the previous giving continues subtly, gradually transforms, and arises with distinction. Because of this, it can induce many fruits in the future; hence it is stated with intentional meaning that in constant succession, meritorious karma gradually increases and meritorious karma continually arises. (Explanation: 1. perfuming, 2. subtly, 3. succession, 4. transformation, 5. distinction—these five are all alternative names for seeds)."
13.38
Fourth, the proof from non-action constituting karma: its substance is also the seeds of intention.
13.39
Fifth, form subsumed under the dharmāyatana: this is the aforementioned form of the objective sphere of samādhi.
13.40
Sixth, as for the eight factors of the noble path, the śāstra states: "Although there is no avijñapti, when on the path one obtains such an inclination and support, so that after emerging from contemplation, by the former momentum one is able to give rise to the three right ones and not give rise to the three wrong ones; because the result is designated in the cause, the eight factors of the noble path can be fully posited. (Explanation: According to the Sautrāntika school, the intention concurrent with the path is called 'inclination' (āśaya), and serves as the support for the three right ones after emerging from samādhi, hence it is called 'support' (āśraya). This intention concurrent with the path is nominally designated as avijñapti, called 'avijñapti concurrent with the path'; avijñapti has no substance, and right speech and so forth are posited upon this intention. The rest of the text can be understood)."
13.41
Seventh, as for prātimokṣa morality: its substance is also the seeds of intention. Upon these intention-seeds, there is the function of guarding against wrong and stopping transgression, nominally designated as avijñapti. Therefore the śāstra states: "Namely, by the power of intention and aspiration, having previously made a resolve, one is able definitely to check and ward off evil bodily and vocal karma; through this, prātimokṣa restraint is established (end of śāstra passage)." Eighth, as for morality being an embankment, the śāstra states: "Namely, having previously made a resolve definitely not to do evil, later, repeatedly recollecting it, with shame and modesty manifest, one can restrain oneself, causing one not to violate the precepts; therefore, the meaning of embankment is held and maintained by the mind." To briefly explain the Sautrāntika doctrine of intention-seeds: for example, when receiving precepts, one vows to eliminate the seven wrongs, perfuming and forming the seven preliminary intention-seeds at the preparatory stage. Later, when arriving at the third karmavācanā of receiving the precepts and encountering superior conditions, based on these preliminary intention-seeds, root intention-seeds are further perfumed; together with the prior preliminary intention-seeds, they concurrently produce the seeds of the seven factors in the first thought-moment, two sets of seven-factor seeds in the second thought-moment, three sets of seven-factor seeds in the third thought-moment, and so forth, as long as one has not encountered the conditions for relinquishing, the seven factors increase from thought-moment to thought-moment; if one encounters the conditions for relinquishing, they do not increase. Immoral precepts are also like this. Another explanation: upon a single intention-seed, moment by moment the function of the seven factors increases; the Mahāyāna is also like this. However, according to the Mahāyāna school, it perfumes the eighth consciousness. If according to the Sautrāntika school, it perfumes form and mind; that is, form and mind hold the seeds, and upon form and mind there is the function of producing fruits, nominally designated as seeds, having no separate substance apart from form and mind.
13.42
From here [comes] the second [section], explaining the producing great elements, in which there are three [parts]: 1. explaining the difference in great elements between vijñapti and avijñapti; 2. explaining the identity and difference in the time of production; 3. explaining the difference in the planes on which the great elements rely.
13.43
First, as for the difference in great elements between vijñapti and avijñapti, the śāstra states: "It was previously said that avijñapti is produced by the great elements. Is it produced by the great elements of vijñapti? Or is there a difference?" The verse says:
13.44
"These producing great elements / Are different from the support of intimation."
13.45
Explanation: "These" refers to this avijñapti. Avijñapti and vijñapti are born from different great elements. This avijñapti-rūpa is subtle, whereas vijñapti-rūpa is coarse; a single set of four great elements cannot produce two fruits, coarse and subtle, hence they must be different.
13.46
From here [comes] the second [part], explaining the identity and difference in the time of production. The śāstra states: "While vijñapti and its great elements must arise at the same time, avijñapti and its great elements differ slightly in time." The verse says:
13.47
"The subsequent moments of avijñapti in the desire [realm] / Arise relying on past great elements."
13.48
The explanation says: The word "desire" excludes the avijñapti that accompanies concentration in the form realm. The avijñapti accompanying concentration is necessarily simultaneous with the primary elements that produce it. Only for what is bound to the desire realm, after the initial moment, does all avijñapti arise from past primary elements. That is, the avijñapti of the initial moment is simultaneous with the primary elements; at this time, the primary elements suspendedly produce many future avijñaptis. Therefore, all avijñapti of the second moment arises relying on the past primary elements. The past primary elements are able to produce avijñapti with the five causes such as origination, and are called the basis (āśraya). With these as its basis, avijñapti is able to arise. When avijñapti arises, it relies on present primary elements. The primary elements of the present body merely serve as a support (āśrita), not the basis. The treatise says: "Serving as the cause of setting in motion and the cause of subsequent rolling, just as a wheel rolls on the ground relying on the hand and the ground (Explanation: The past primary elements are called the cause of setting in motion; 'setting in motion' means arising, because avijñapti arises. The primary elements of the present body are called the cause of subsequent rolling, because avijñapti rolls along following the primary elements. 'Cause of subsequent rolling' is a tatpuruṣa compound. When a hand throws a wheel, the wheel rolls relying on the ground; the wheel is a metaphor for avijñapti, the hand is a metaphor for the past primary elements, and the ground is a metaphor for the primary elements of the present body)." Question: "Do the primary elements that produce the avijñapti of subsequent moments at the initial moment produce it using those very primary elements that produced the avijñapti of the initial moment? Or do distinct primary elements arise to produce the avijñapti of subsequent moments?" Answer: "According to the Vibhāṣā, there are three explanations for this: The first explanation says: The very primary elements that produced the avijñapti of the initial moment are used to produce the avijñapti of subsequent moments. The second explanation says: A separate set of primary elements arises, which suspendedly produces many future avijñaptis. The third explanation says: At the initial moment, many sets of primary elements arise, which suspendedly produce many future avijñaptis, with the four primary elements producing them distinctly moment by moment."
13.49
From here, the third section explains the distinct arising according to the level of the producer. The treatise says: "Of which level are bodily and vocal karma? Produced by the primary elements of which level?" The verse says:
13.50
"The defiled relies on its own level;
The undefiled follows the place of rebirth."
13.51
The explanation says: "The defiled relies on its own level" explains the primary elements upon which defiled morality relies. The prātimokṣa of desire and that which accompanies concentration in the form realm—these two disciplines are called defiled morality; each is produced by the primary elements of its own corresponding level, because defiled phenomena are fixedly bound to their level. Therefore the treatise says: "Bodily and vocal karma bound to the desire realm are produced only by primary elements bound to the desire realm; and so on up to bodily and vocal karma of the fourth dhyāna, which are produced only by the primary elements of that level (the quotation from the treatise ends here)."
13.52
"The undefiled follows the place of rebirth" explains the primary elements upon which undefiled morality relies. The avijñapti that accompanies the path is called undefiled morality. This undefiled morality is produced by the primary elements of the place where the body is reborn. That is, if one is born in the desire realm and the undefiled becomes present, it is produced by the primary elements of the desire realm. Although this undefiled of desire arises relying on the six levels of the form realm, it is not produced relying on the primary elements of those levels, because undefiled phenomena do not fall within any realm. Moreover, because no primary elements are undefiled, nor can one speak of unconditioned primary elements, and because the undefiled arises based on the physical body, it is produced by the primary elements following the place of rebirth. And so on up to: if the body is born in the fourth dhyāna and the undefiled becomes present, it is produced only by the primary elements of that level; because it follows the place of rebirth, the meaning is analogous to what was stated before.
13.53
Below this is the second part, analysis through various gates, within which: first, explaining in terms of category; second, distinguishing in terms of nature, realm, and level.
13.54
Below this is the first, explaining in terms of category. The treatise says: "To what categories do this vijñapti and avijñapti belong? And produced by primary elements of what categories are they?" The verse says:
13.55
"Avijñapti is unappropriated,
Also of uniform outflow, and included among sentient beings;
The uncollected relies on the nature of uniform outflow,
Arising from appropriated, distinct primary elements;
What is born of concentration relies on the nourished,
Being unappropriated, without distinct primary elements.
Vijñapti is solely of the nature of uniform outflow,
Pertaining to the body, it is appropriated."
13.56
The explanation says: The first six lines explain the category of avijñapti and its supporting primary elements; the last two lines explain the category of vijñapti and its supporting primary elements. "Avijñapti is unappropriated": whether in concentration or uncollected, all avijñapti is called unappropriated because it has no obstructive resistance.
13.57
"Also of uniform outflow, and included among sentient beings": that is, avijñapti-rūpa arises from homogeneous causes and is of the nature of uniform outflow. The word "also" indicates that some of it is momentary; namely, the path-accompanying avijñapti that is simultaneous with the endurance of suffering is not a uniform outflow, hence it is called having [the nature of] the momentary. The phrase "included among sentient beings" means that this avijñapti arises relying on the internal body and is subsumed under the category of sentient beings.
13.58
"The uncollected relies on the nature of uniform outflow, arising from appropriated, distinct primary elements" explains the primary elements upon which avijñapti relies. "The uncollected" refers to the prātimokṣa avijñapti of the desire realm. "Relies" refers to the primary elements on which avijñapti relies. These uncollected primary elements arise from homogeneous causes and are solely of the nature of uniform outflow. Moreover, because these primary elements are the fruit of an uncollected mind, they are called appropriated; there is necessarily an attached mind that appropriates them as its own substance, hence they are appropriated. The phrase "arising from distinct primary elements" indicates that the seven branches of the three of the body and four of speech are each produced by distinct sets of the four primary elements, because the uncollected seven branches are mutually not a single fruit; hence these seven branches are produced by separate primary elements.
13.59
"What is born of concentration relies on the nourished, being unappropriated, without distinct primary elements" explains the primary elements upon which the avijñapti of concentration relies. The avijñapti born of concentration is twofold: the dhyāna discipline and the undefiled discipline. The primary elements upon which these two avijñaptis rely are solely of a nourished nature, because while in concentration one is necessarily able to nourish the four primary elements; hence the primary elements born of concentration are solely of a nourished nature. Moreover, the primary elements of concentration are unappropriated, because in the state of concentration there is definitely no attached mind that appropriates these primary elements as an internal self-entity, hence they are unappropriated. "Without distinct primary elements" indicates that the seven branches of the avijñapti of concentration are produced by a single set of four primary elements, because these primary elements are simultaneous with the concentrated mind; since the concentrated mind is one, this set of primary elements is also solely one set. Furthermore, because these seven branches mutually constitute a single fruit, they are produced without distinct primary elements.
13.60
"Vijñapti is solely of the nature of uniform outflow": bodily and vocal vijñapti-rūpa arise from homogeneous causes and are solely of the nature of uniform outflow.
13.61
"Pertaining to the body, it is appropriated": among them, bodily vijñapti is called appropriated because it pertains to the body. Vocal vijñapti does not pertain to the body, so it is unappropriated. However, newly arisen primary elements of uniform outflow dwell throughout the parts of the body to produce vijñapti karma without destroying the original body, nor is the body enlarged, because karmic retribution is porous and has interstices, so they can accommodate each other.
13.62
From here, the second part explains nature, realm, and level: first, explaining nature, realm, and level; second, explaining the three moral natures. The treatise says: "The divisions into two, three, and five gates of karma have already been distinguished; what are the differences in their moral nature, realm, and level?" The verse says:
13.63
"Avijñapti is declared; the remaining three [exist in all];
Unwholesome is only in desire;
Avijñapti pervades desire and form;
Vijñapti is only in the two with investigation;
Desire lacks obscured vijñapti,
Because there is no origination [for it]."
13.64
The explanation says: "Avijñapti is declared; the remaining three [exist in all]" is the differentiation of the three moral natures. That is, avijñapti-rūpa does not extend to the indeterminate; it is only wholesome or unwholesome in nature, hence it is said to be "declared" (vyākṛta). "The remaining" refers to vijñapti karma and mental volition, which both extend to all three moral natures. Question: "Why does avijñapti not extend to the indeterminate?" Answer: "Because the strength of an indeterminate mind is weak and feeble, it cannot initiate strong avijñapti karma such that when the cause has ceased, the fruit still continues to arise; therefore avijñapti karma is not indeterminate."
13.65
"Unwholesome is only in desire": among avijñapti, vijñapti, and volition, the unwholesome exists only in the desire realm; the wholesome and indeterminate exist in all levels.
13.66
"Avijñapti pervades desire and form" explains that avijñapti does not extend to the formless realm, because in the formless realm there are no primary elements; since there are no primary elements, how could avijñapti exist? Moreover, only where there are body and speech can there be discipline; in the formless realm body and speech do not operate, hence there is no discipline. Furthermore, the masters of the Vibhāṣā say: 'Morality (śīla) is generated to counteract bad discipline; bad discipline exists only in the desire realm, and the formless realm is fourfold distant from desire: first, distance of basis; second, distance of mental mode; third, distance of cognitive object; fourth, distance of antidote. Therefore in the formless realm there is no avijñapti-rūpa.'"
13.67
"Vijñapti is only in the two with investigation": the desire realm and the first dhyāna are called the two with investigation. Vijñapti-rūpa exists only in the levels with investigation, for there must be coarse examination (vitarka) and subtle investigation (vicāra) to give expression to vijñapti. From the second dhyāna upward there is neither coarse examination nor subtle investigation, hence there is no vijñapti karma.
13.68
"Desire lacks obscured vijñapti, because there is no origination [for it]" explains that obscured vijñapti exists only in the first dhyāna. In discussing vijñapti karma, wholesome and unwholesome are judged according to the originating mind; 'originating' means the mind that is able to produce [it]. Since in the desire realm there is no obscured mind able to manifest vijñapti karma, obscured vijñapti does not exist in the desire realm. Although in the desire realm there are the two views of selfhood and extremes, which are obscured minds, they are abandoned by seeing and cannot initiate karma; that which initiates karma is abandoned only by cultivation. Question: "What is meant by obscured vijñapti karma in the first dhyāna?" Answer: "Like the Great Brahmā King giving rise to a deceptive mind toward Aśvajit and producing bodily and vocal karma, this is called obscured vijñapti. The treatise says: 'For what reason is there no vijñapti karma at all from the second concentration upward? The desire realm has no obscured-indeterminate vijñapti karma, because there is no originating mind that produces karma. Only a mind with coarse examination and subtle investigation can produce karma, and from the second concentration upward there is no such mind at all. Furthermore, the mind that manifests vijñapti is abandoned only by cultivation, whereas afflictions abandoned by seeing operate inwardly; and in the desire realm there is definitely no obscured-indeterminate affliction abandoned by cultivation. Therefore, vijñapti karma is absent in all three higher levels, and the desire realm has no obscured-indeterminate vijñapti karma (the quotation from the treatise ends here; it can be understood through contemplation).'"
13.69
From here, the second part explains the reasons for the three moral natures. Within this, there are two: first, explaining the reasons for the three moral natures; second, explaining the two kinds of origination.
13.70
First, to explain the three moral natures: the treatise explains that four causes establish the three moral natures: first, by ultimate truth; second, by intrinsic nature; third, by association; fourth, by origination. Here one should distinguish: what phenomenon is of what nature? And by what cause is it established? The verse says:
13.71
"In the ultimate sense, wholesome is liberation;
By intrinsic nature, shame, modesty, and the roots;
By association, what is associated with them;
By origination, material karma and the like.
Contrary to this are called unwholesome;
Ultimate and indeterminate are the two permanent [phenomena]."
13.72
The explanation says: "In the ultimate sense, wholesome is liberation": nirvāṇa is called liberation, because in nirvāṇa there is the supreme tranquility and all sufferings are completely pacified, just like being free from illness; it is wholesome and it is permanent, hence it is called 'ultimate'. Because it has real substantial existence, it is further called 'truth/reality'. Therefore, this nirvāṇa is called wholesome in the ultimate sense.
13.73
"By intrinsic nature, shame, modesty, and the roots": 'roots' refers to the three wholesome roots such as non-greed, as well as shame (hrī) and modesty (apatrāpya). The intrinsic nature of these five dharmas is wholesome, just like good medicine; they are called wholesome by intrinsic nature.
13.74
"By association, what is associated with them": the first 'association' is the designation, and the second 'association' is the explanation. That is, other minds and mental factors besides those previous five such as non-greed are not wholesome by intrinsic nature; but because they are associated with them, they obtain the designation of wholesome. They are called wholesome by association, like water mixed with medicine.
13.75
"By origination, material karma and the like": 'material karma' refers to bodily and vocal vijñapti and avijñapti karma. 'And the like' includes the four characteristics among the unassociated formations, as well as acquisition (prāpti) and the two mindless absorptions. These various phenomena are called wholesome by origination, because they are originated by what is wholesome by intrinsic nature and by association, and thereby obtain the designation of wholesome, like milk produced from the juice of good medicine.
13.76
"Contrary to this are called unwholesome": reversing these four wholesome ones, four unwholesome ones are established. Unwholesome in the ultimate sense refers to the phenomena of saṃsāra, because the phenomena of saṃsāra have suffering as their intrinsic nature and are extremely untranquil, like a chronic disease. Unwholesome by intrinsic nature refers to shamelessness (āhrīkya), lack of modesty (anapatrāpya), and the three unwholesome roots such as greed and hatred; their nature is unwholesome, like poison. Unwholesome by association: excluding shamelessness, lack of modesty, and so on, other minds and mental factors must be associated with shamelessness, lack of modesty, and so forth, before being called unwholesome, like water mixed with poison. Unwholesome by origination refers to bodily and vocal karma, and the four characteristics and acquisition among the unassociated formations; because they are originated by what is unwholesome by intrinsic nature and by association, they are like milk produced from the juice of poisonous medicine.
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- 俱舍論頌疏論本 — Classical Chinese