成唯識論述記 9

English (machine translation) 9

Language: English

9.2

Treatise: If there is consciousness-only... [why do sūtras speak of three natures?]

The Commentary states: Although there are seven verses resolving external objections, they are divided into two: the first two verses answer the objection that "if there is only consciousness, it then contradicts reason"; the subsequent five verses answer the objection that "if there is only consciousness, it then contradicts the sūtras." Within the latter there are two: the first three verses explain the objection that "if there are no objects, the three own-natures are not established"; the subsequent two verses explain the objection that "if there is consciousness, the three non-natures are not established." Within this first part there are four: first, the general question; second, the brief answer; third, the interrogation; fourth, the explanation. This is the first. The meaning of the present objection says: If external phenomena do not exist apart from internal consciousness, there would only be one nature, and three should not be spoken of; since the sūtras do speak of three, it is therefore not vijñapti-mātra.

9.4

Treatise: It should be known that the three natures are also not separate from consciousness.

9.5

The Commentary states: This is the brief answer. It is not that because natures are spoken of as three, there is then no vijñapti-mātra, for the three are spoken of precisely as not separate from consciousness.

9.6

Treatise: Why is this?

9.7

The Commentary states: The opponent questions. What is the reason why the three are not separate from consciousness?

9.8

Treatise: The verse states: ... [not without seeing this [one can see] that].

9.9

The Commentary states: Below is the detailed answer. Within the verses there are three: the first two verses distinguish the three natures; in the subsequent one verse, the first three lines explain the identity and difference of the natures, and the fourth line explains the sequence of witnessing and seeing the consummate (pariniṣpanna) and the dependent (paratantra) at the time of internal realization. Within the first two verses, the first verse explains the first nature; the subsequent half-verse explains the dependent; the subsequent half-verse explains the consummate; the rest of the text is intelligible. In the commentary below, the text is divided into two: first, explaining the verse text; second, explaining through various approaches. In explaining the root verses, the text is again divided into two: first, explaining the verse text separately; second, from "The meaning spoken of here" below, generally explaining the intention of the verse and concluding the answer to what was asked. In separately explaining the verses, the text is again divided into three: first, distinguishing the three natures; next, distinguishing the meaning of non-difference and unity; finally, distinguishing the sequence of realization and seeing. Separately explaining the three natures is divided into three, or into two: first, explaining the first verse on the nature of pervasive conceptualization (parikalpita-svabhāva), and explaining the subsequent half-verse on the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva)—because they are elucidated in contrast to each other, they are combined as one; and second, explaining the remaining half-verse on the consummate nature (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva). Within the first, it is divided into two: first, only explaining the parikalpita; and second, explaining it together in contrast to the paratantra.

9.10

Treatise: Pervasively conceiving and estimating, it is therefore called pervasive conceptualizer (parikalpa).

9.11

The Commentary states: In explaining the parikalpita, there are two explanations; this is the explanation of Nanda and others mentioned earlier, explaining the two characters "pervasive conceptualization" (parikalpa) in the first line of the verse: explaining "pervasive" by the meaning of everywhere, and explaining "conceptualization" by the meaning of estimating. Only the sixth consciousness is capable of pervasively conceiving and estimating. Because the seventh consciousness and the like are of this category, they are also called pervasive conceptualization; yet they can only be called conceptualization and not pervasive. Now, according to the correct doctrine, one should therefore make a fourfold distinction based on this: there is that which is pervasive but not conceptualizing, namely the anāsrava consciousnesses, sāsrava wholesome consciousnesses, and so forth, which can pervasively and broadly take objects as conditions without conceptualizing or grasping; there is that which is conceptualizing but not pervasive, namely the seventh sāsrava consciousness; there is that which is both pervasive and conceptualizing, namely the sāsrava defiled sixth consciousness with self-grasping and dharma-grasping, and so forth; there is that which is neither pervasive nor conceptualizing, namely the sāsrava five consciousnesses, the eighth consciousness, and so forth. Question: Why is this pervasive conceptualization called "such and such"?

9.12

Treatise: Because the categories are numerous... [it is false discrimination].

9.13

The Commentary states: Because this conceptualizing mind has numerous categories, either two, three, and so forth, as will be known below, it is spoken of as "such and such." What is its substance? It refers to the false discrimination that is the pervasive conceptualizer, namely all minds of dependent nature capable of giving rise to pervasive conceptualization. About to explain the second line, it turns back to explain the previous line, as well as explaining the word "by" (由, yóu).

9.14

Treatise: That is, by such and such... [the things pervasively conceptualized].

9.15

The Commentary states: Because of false discrimination, it pervasively conceptualizes various things that are pervasively conceptualized. "Thing" (vastu) means substance, namely what is grasped as arisen by the conceptualizing mind. What is its substance?

9.16

Treatise: It refers to what is falsely grasped... [own-nature and distinctions].

9.17

The Commentary states: This nature is precisely all meanings and principles of the aggregates, bases, realms, and so forth falsely grasped, whether dharma or self; within these two kinds, their own-nature and differentiated meanings are precisely phenomena that do not exist outside the mind; that is, it is because there is the substance of the conceptualizing mind that things are conceptualized as existent. The word "parikalpa" in the upper line reveals the substance of the conceptualizing mind and the like, showing the substance of that phenomenon through the ākāra of pervasive conceptualization; the word "parikalpa" in the second line is precisely the ākāra of the mind that is the pervasive conceptualizer. The former uses the ākāra to present that substance of phenomena; the latter uses the ākāra to clarify the fault of giving rise to conceptualization. Question: Since the own-nature of these conceptualized phenomena does not exist, why are they called "things" and called "various"? Answer: In accord with the conceptualizing mind, they are spoken of as things; because the mind has many categories, they are spoken of as various; their substances are not various. Furthermore, the non-existent phenomena that are conceptualized may also be called things, because both existent and non-existent phenomena are called things. As for saying "various," in accord with the falsely discriminating mind that is the pervasive conceptualizer conceiving these non-existent things, before the mind there are also various marks.

9.18

Treatise: This falsely grasped... [the own-nature of pervasive conceptualization].

9.19

The Commentary states: Explaining the third line. The dharma, self, own-nature, and distinctions outside the mind falsely grasped in this second line have no substantial nature, like the hair of a tortoise, etc.; because their substance is definitely non-existent, they are collectively named the own-nature of pervasive conceptualization (parikalpita-svabhāva).

9.20

Treatise: Such an own-nature... [because it cannot be apprehended].

9.21

The Commentary states: Next is the fourth line. Such own-nature of pervasive conceptualization in the third line is utterly non-existent; because it does not exist even in the slightest, it is called "utterly non-existent." Phenomena of dependent nature exist in some slight measure. How is it known to be non-existent? Because when thoroughly investigated through the two dharmas of reason and teaching, it cannot be apprehended, as in the reason and teachings cited previously in fascicle seven and elsewhere. This is one round, merely explaining the first nature.

9.22

Below is the explanation of the second master. First it is brief, merely explaining the first verse; later it is broad, contrasting with the dependent and additionally explaining the subsequent half-verse.

9.23

Treatise: Or the first line reveals the consciousness that is the pervasive conceptualizer.

9.24

The Commentary states: The meaning is the same as the previous [master].

9.25

Treatise: The second line indicates the object that is pervasively conceptualized.

9.26

The Commentary states: The locus upon which grasping relies is different from the previous master. In terms of principle, this extends to both the dependent and consummate natures, as will be known below. However, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and others only speak of the dependent, because it is the base, because it is rather close, because it is the domain of ordinary beings, and because it is easily known; yet in principle it extends to the consummate.

9.27

Treatise: The latter half [of the verse] then expresses... [because it cannot be apprehended].

9.28

The Commentary states: The latter half of the verse, namely the lower two lines, only then expounds that the pervasive-imaginative constructed nature is non-existent, because its non-existence has already been broadly demonstrated in the preceding seventh fascicle. However, as the fourth and fifth fascicles of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha state that the 'pervasive imaginator' is this first line, the 'pervasively imagined' is this second line, and the 'pervasive-imaginative constructed own-nature is thus established' is the latter half of the verse here. Above, it merely re-explained what is grasped in the first verse; from here below, it broadly explains the first verse as well as the dependent-arising nature. Below, it broadly explains the three natures in three parts; however, in the third line, it explains it together with the dependent nature. Since it states that the first line is the pervasive imaginator, the treatise next asks:

9.29

Treatise: What is the own-nature of the initial pervasive imaginator?

9.30

The Commentary states: These are words of inquiry. Below, it first elaborates on 'pervasive imagination', and later elaborates on 'various and sundry'.

9.31

Treatise: There is an opinion [held by Sthiramati and others] that all eight consciousnesses [...] are all capable of pervasive imagination.

9.32

The Commentary states: This is [the view of] Sthiramati and others, that grasping pertains to all three natures, and among defiled minds, there are none that do not grasp. The five consciousnesses and the eighth consciousness have only dharmagrāha; the seventh has only ātmagrāha; the sixth consciousness pertains to both kinds.

9.33

Treatise: Because false discrimination is their own-nature.

9.34

The Commentary states: If a defiled mind could, like the undefiled, not give rise to grasping, then it should not be called 'false discrimination'; if a non-grasping mind were called 'false discrimination', then the undefiled mind should also be called a 'mind of false discrimination'. Thus, by this principle, it is clarified that all defiled minds are capable of pervasive imagination. Passages in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, the Madhyāntavibhāga, and elsewhere all state that the eight consciousnesses are false discrimination.

9.35

Treatise: Because they all manifest resembling what is grasped and that which grasps.

9.36

The Commentary states: In the sacred teachings it is said that the two graspings are called 'grasping'. Since all defiled minds manifest resembling the marks of that which grasps and what is grasped, they all possess grasping. For it is not the case that a mind possessing grasping is not called grasping, nor is it the case that a mind devoid of grasping resembles the two graspings. All sūtras and treatises contain this statement. It is stated thus in both the fourth fascicle of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and the Madhyāntavibhāga.

9.37

Treatise: Because it is said that the ālayavijñāna [...] takes [false grasping] as its cognitive object.

9.38

The Commentary states: The vāsanā of the false grasping of the constructed own-nature is the seed of the grasping mind and so on. Fascicle fifty-one of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and the Prakaraṇāryavācā, etc., state that the ālayavijñāna takes the seeds of the false grasping of the pervasive-imaginative constructed own-nature as its cognitive object. If there were defiled minds that do not grasp, there would be defiled seeds that the eighth consciousness does not take as cognitive objects; why then does the treatise say that the eighth consciousness takes false seeds as cognitive objects? Fascicle seventy-six of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra state that the eighth consciousness takes marks, names, discriminations, and vāsanā as cognitive objects, and fascicle fifty-one states that it takes pervasive-imaginative seeds as cognitive objects. Therefore, pervasive-imaginative seeds extend to all defiled minds; that is, even within wholesome minds and so forth, dharmagrāha is admitted to exist. This is the doctrine of Master Sthiramati and others.

9.39

Below is the second [position, held by] Master Dharmapāla and others.

9.40

Treatise: There is an opinion that only the sixth [and seventh consciousnesses] [...] are capable of pervasive imagination.

9.41

The Commentary states: The following text has three parts: first, stating the thesis; second, establishing the proofs; third, reconciling contradictions. This is the first. It is not at all the five or the eighth consciousness, nor is it all minds; only those that grasp self and phenomena are capable of imagining. Why is that?

9.42

Treatise: Because it is said only that the mental consciousness is capable of pervasive imagination.

9.43

The Commentary states: Below there are ten proofs, marked by the word 'because' occurring ten times. If the mind capable of imagining extended to all eight consciousnesses, why does the fourth fascicle of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha mention only the mind? Question: As the seventh consciousness is also capable of pervasive imagination, yet that treatise mentions only the mental consciousness and does not mention the seventh, could it be that the seventh cannot? Since the seventh consciousness is capable yet not mentioned, it clarifies that the five and eighth consciousnesses are also capable yet not mentioned.

9.44

Treatise: Because manas and mental consciousness are together called 'mental consciousness'.

9.45

The Commentary states: The seventh is called manas, and together with the sixth consciousness, they are collectively called 'mental consciousness'. That is, it has already been mentioned; who says it was not mentioned? As in the Hīnayāna, with karma and karmapatha: cetanā is only karma and not path; the three phenomena of covetousness and so forth are paths and not karma; bodily and vocal [actions] are both karma and path, but collectively spoken of they are merely called karmapatha. The seventh is named manas and the sixth is named mental consciousness; spoken of collectively they are named mental consciousness, so there is no preceding objection. Sthiramati and others say: Why not allow that only the sixth consciousness is capable of pervasive deliberation, while the remaining seven consciousnesses, though also capable of imagining, cannot pervasively imagine, so the Mahāyānasaṃgraha does not mention them, not that the others do not imagine? Both the root treatise and commentary of the fourth fascicle of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha make this explanation, saying: The sixth consciousness is capable of all-pervasive deliberation, its substance conforming to that name, while the others are not so, hence that treatise does not mention them. Furthermore, if you speak of them collectively like karma and karmapatha, I do so as well: the seventh is called manas; the five and eighth are called vijñāna; the sixth is called manas-vijñāna. That treatise speaks of them collectively as mental consciousness—what fault is there in that either? Therefore we know that all eight consciousnesses are capable of pervasive imagination.

9.46

Treatise: Because deliberative discrimination is capable of pervasive imagination.

9.47

The Commentary states: Since the five and eighth lack deliberation, it is clear that they lack discrimination and do not give rise to grasping. The root text of the fourth fascicle of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states: 'It should be known that the mental consciousness is capable of pervasive imagination because it possesses discrimination,' up to: 'Therefore, the mental consciousness operates with boundless ākāras and discriminates and deliberates universally with regard to all things, hence it is called pervasive imagination,' whereas the five and eighth consciousnesses cannot universally deliberate. If so, then since the seventh cannot universally deliberate, it should not be included here. This is not so; among the three kinds of discrimination, deliberative discrimination can function within the seventh as discrimination with marks, up to being non-defiled, whereas the five and eighth consciousnesses do not possess this capacity. Since the seventh consciousness possesses deliberation, it may indeed be included here; the five and eighth are not so. Asvabhāva says: that the mental consciousness has discrimination is because it is capable of manifesting an intermingling with recollective discrimination. 'Manifesting' means deliberation, not the own-nature [discrimination], since the others also possess it. This is the correct interpretation. The former master says: deliberative discrimination has coarse and prominent marks of imagination, which the five and eighth lack, but they possess subtle discriminations such as own-nature, spontaneous, and marked discrimination; why would it violate reason to say the five and eighth possess them? Although the Mahāyānasaṃgraha speaks in terms of coarse deliberative discrimination and does not mention the five and eighth, the five and eighth consciousnesses are in fact capable of pervasive imagination; furthermore, all eight consciousnesses are set apart from the undefiled mind, hence it says that mental consciousness can have discrimination, not that it refers solely to the sixth and seventh consciousnesses. Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha only says that by this category it is capable of pervasive deliberation, without setting apart which ones; Asvabhāva specifically explained the root treatise and therefore set them apart with words like 'manifesting'; what obstacle is there in this? He objects to this later, saying:

9.48

Treatise: Because that which grasps self and phenomena is necessarily prajñā.

9.49

The Commentary states: The five and eighth consciousnesses are not constantly associated with prajñā; how could grasping possibly exist [in them]? The former master says: If deliberative prajñā is coarse, the five and eighth lack it, yet subtle ones also exist. If so, why is the mental factor of prajñā not universally present (sarvatraga)?

9.50

Treatise: Because the two graspings are necessarily associated with avidyā.

9.51

The Commentary states: The two graspings of self and phenomena are necessarily associated with avidyā. It is not that avidyā exists within a wholesome mind, because its nature is contrary to the wholesome root of non-delusion (amoha). The former master says: What fault is there in this? I am like your Hīnayāna vitarka and vicāra arising together: vitarka and vicāra have conforming natures and may be admitted to arise together, but a wholesome mind and avidyā have contrary natures.

9.52

Treatise: Because it is not said that avidyā has a wholesome nature.

9.53

The Commentary states: Because treatises such as the Yogācārabhūmi do not state this. Below, under the two hindrances, that text will be cited. How could avidyā be spoken of as existing within a wholesome mind? If he should say that all defiled states are called unwholesome, and are called wholesome merely because their ākāras are slight—

9.54

Treatise: Because delusion and non-delusion, etc., are incompatible.

9.55

The Commentary states: Because contradictory phenomena cannot be associated, just as shamelessness (ahrīkatā) and shame (hrī) cannot arise together, the same should also apply by analogy to delusion and non-delusion, etc. If it is said that all defiled states are unwholesome, and it is not meant that non-delusion and delusion are associated, but that the mark of delusion is subtle and slight and hence called 'non-delusion'—

9.56

Treatise: Because no grasping is seen to guide the wisdom of emptiness.

9.57

The Commentary states: If it is an undefiled mind, it must be the manifestation of one of the two contemplations of emptiness; if a defiled mind necessarily has dharmagrāha, then since preparatory wisdom has dharmagrāha, how could it guide the wisdom of emptiness to manifest? For fire is not caused to arise from water, nor does darkness coming first guide light to arise.

9.58

Treatise: Because grasping existence and realizing non-existence do not arise together.

9.59

The Commentary states: Furthermore, the preparatory mind accords with the sacred teachings and performs the contemplation of the emptiness of self and phenomena, which is called 'realizing non-existence'. Since it possesses dharmagrāha, it is called 'grasping existence'; how could a mind that grasps existence and a wisdom that realizes non-existence arise together? Since they do not arise together, it is clear that the preparatory mind does not possess dharmagrāha.

9.60

Treatise: Because there has never been any grasping that was not capable of perfuming.

9.61

The Commentary states: Furthermore, if all defiled minds possessed dharmagrāha, a mind with dharmagrāha would necessarily have efficacy, and thus a mind born of maturation should also be capable of perfuming, because a defiled mind has efficacy and function, like wholesome, unwholesome, and so on. Yet you maintain that the eighth consciousness is also not capable of perfuming because as a mind of maturation it lacks efficacy and function. But no mind with grasping and efficacy is ever seen to lack the capacity to perfume. Thus the eighth consciousness should also be capable of perfuming; otherwise, it would contradict inference (anumāna). If so, why do the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, the upper fascicle of the Madhyāntavibhāga, and so forth state that the eight consciousnesses in the three realms are all false discrimination? Fascicle sixteen of the Prakaraṇāryavācā also states the same.

9.62

Treatise: Defiled minds and so forth [...] are [called] false discrimination.

9.63

The Commentary states: Below, in reconciling contradictions, there are three parts: this is the first reconciliation. It reconciles that [statement] by saying: Although the preceding stages and so forth cultivate the contemplation of the two emptinesses, they are provisionally posited marks and do not directly realize the true principle like the undefiled state; therefore, all eight consciousnesses are called false discrimination, but it is not that all false discriminations are grasping minds. If within defiled minds there are those that do not grasp, how can it be said that the marks of the two graspings manifest? Fascicle one of the Madhyāntavibhāga says: Because false minds and mental factors manifest resembling the two marks, all have grasping.

9.64

Treatise: Although they manifest resembling what is grasped [and that which grasps] [...] would also have grasping.

9.65

The Commentary states: This reconciles the second contradiction, in two parts: first, reconciliation; second, objection. This reconciles and initially objects that although all defiled minds manifest resembling the marks of what is grasped and that which grasps, they are not all minds capable of pervasive imagination. Because of the wholesome and indeterminate minds of dependent arising, although the two graspings manifest, they do not all give rise to grasping; one does not, merely because of resembling the two, judge that all are capable of pervasive imagination, for only minds possessing deliberative discrimination in which the marks of the two graspings manifest are capable of pervasive imagination. That Madhyāntavibhāga treatise speaks solely with reference to the sixth and seventh consciousnesses. If resembling the two graspings were in all cases grasping, so that the undefiled mind would not also have grasping, then the subsequent undefiled wisdom of all bodhisattvas and the two vehicles, which possesses the marks of the two graspings, should all have grasping. Fascicle seven of the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra-śāstra only says that the undefiled [wisdom] of the two vehicles has grasping; according to the commentary on the Viṃśikā, the subsequent [wisdom] of bodhisattvas also has dharmagrāha, which differs from the Buddhabhūmi. That text only says the two vehicles' undefiled state has grasping; here it merely says the Buddha lacks it, showing that the others also have it.

9.66

Treatise: Because the Tathāgata's subsequent [wisdom] would also have grasping.

9.67

The Commentary states: Objecting to the former master, it says: The Buddha should have grasping, because of possessing the marks of the two graspings, just as all bodhisattvas manifest the two marks. If he should rescue his position by saying that the Tathāgata's subsequent wisdom lacks the two marks, he commits the error of contradicting the sacred teachings, for lacking a nimittabhāga contradicts the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra.

9.68

Treatise: Because the sūtras say that the Buddha's wisdom [...] is like a mirror, etc.

9.69

The Commentary states: The conventional wisdom of the eighth consciousness is called the Great Mirror [Wisdom], which manifests the bliss of Dharma, the śrāvakas, the eight classes of beings, and the adorned bodhimaṇḍa, which are the manifested śrāvakas and so forth. The equality wisdom of the seventh consciousness, up to the all-accomplishing wisdom, all have the capacity to manifest; therefore, the four wisdoms of the Buddha all possess the two marks. Therefore the treatise says that it manifests bodies, lands, and so forth like a mirror, etc. Do not think that the remaining wisdoms all share this simile; it is only that in the sense of being able to manifest marks they can be identical. This proves that the undefiled state possesses a nimittabhāga.

9.70

Treatise: If it lacked cognitive functioning, it should not be wisdom, etc.

9.71

The Commentary states: If the Tathāgata's jñāna lacks a darśanabhāga, it would lack cognitive function and should not be a jñāna, etc.; this contradicts reason. 'Etc.' includes the other cittas and caitasikas. The objection states: The anāsrava four classes of jñāna of the Tathāgatas and bodhisattvas should not be classes of jñāna; because they lack a darśanabhāga, etc.; like empty space, etc. Once this has been established, overturning [the previous position] establishes [the corollary]: namely, that the sāsrava wholesome and indeterminate classes of jñāna of ordinary persons and the two vehicles, as well as their anāsrava classes of citta, should be free of dharmagrāha; because non-defiled cittas possess the two aspects; just like the Buddha's anāsrava class of jñāna, since the opponent maintains that the Tathāgata's anāsrava class of jñāna does not possess grasping. The lower fascicle of the Benye yingluo jing says: 'Light and darkness have one single mark; good and evil are one single mind,' etc., which is the doctrine of Master Andha of the kingdom of King Bimbisāra; therefore we know that what the previous master stated is incorrect. The previous master objected: 'If sāsrava cittas do not all have grasping, why is it said that the storehouse consciousness, which takes seeds as its object, is exclusively parikalpita?'

9.72

Treatise: Although it is said that the storehouse consciousness […] it therefore does not constitute proof.

9.73

The Commentary states: This reconciles the third contradiction. There is another explanation as well, as in the second fascicle. Here, it merely refers to the predominant [seeds] among the sāsrava as seeds of parikalpita; it does not say that all sāsrava seeds are parikalpita. Since that is so, it furthermore does not say that the eighth [consciousness] takes only seeds of parikalpita as its object. Since there is no word 'only', it is clear that the seeds which are the objects of the eighth [consciousness] are even more numerous.

9.74

Next, Master Dharmapāla concludes the above.

9.75

Treatise: By this line of reasoning […] are capable of parikalpita.

9.76

The Commentary states: By this line of reasoning as stated above, only in the two classes of sāsrava citta, the sixth and seventh, is there that which is capable of parikalpita. The fifth and eighth are named 'consciousnesses'; because no text has been seen stating that they are subsumed under the mental consciousness, the fifth and eighth are not capable of parikalpita. Such interrogations follow the seventh [fascicle] of the Buddhabhūmi[-śāstra], inquiring into the two hindrances; below, in [the section on] the two hindrances, they will be distinguished and debated in their own right. This then broadens [the explanation of] the two characters 'parikalpita' above. Below, it broadens the words 'this and that' above.

9.77

Treatise: Although the classes of consciousness are two […] therefore it says 'this and that'.

9.78

The Commentary states: 'Although the classes of consciousness are two' refers to the two consciousnesses, the sixth and the seventh. They are collectively named parikalpita because they are uniform in this, so there is no need to discuss it further; it merely says 'two', etc. Fascicle 4 of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says that parikalpita has two [kinds]: first, parikalpita of intrinsic nature; second, parikalpita of difference. Vasubandhu's commentary states: Just as one conceptualizes an intrinsic nature with respect to the eye, etc., one conceptualizes distinctions such as permanence, impermanence, etc., with respect to it. Fascicle 73 [of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra] says: first, without difference; second, with difference. Again, there are two: first, called preliminary application; second, called designation. Fascicle 16 of the Prakaraṇāryavācā says: first, with verbal expression; second, without verbal expression. Again, there are two: first, conceptualizing the entity itself; second, conceptualizing the objective affairs upon which it depends. That which subsumes the eight conceptualizations is stated in Fascicle 74: first, accompanied by awareness; second, latent (anuśaya). The threefold are: first, self; second, dharmas; third, function. Or, conceptualization of intrinsic nature, conceptualization of recollection, and conceptualization of calculation, as stated in Fascicle 2 of the Abhidharma[-samuccaya-vyākhyā]. The fourfold are stated in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha: first, parikalpita of intrinsic nature; second, parikalpita of difference; third, parikalpita accompanied by awareness, which refers to those skilled in verbal expression; fourth, parikalpita without awareness, which refers to those unskilled in verbal expression. Fascicle 73 says: first, conceptualizing the specific mark; second, conceptualizing difference; third, conceptualizing the grasped; fourth, conceptualizing the grasper. The fivefold are stated in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha: first, conceptualizing the referent based on the name; second, conceptualizing the name based on the referent; third, conceptualizing the name based on the name; fourth, conceptualizing the referent based on the referent; fifth, conceptualizing both based on both. Fascicle 16 of the Prakaraṇāryavācā and Fascicle 73 say one kind of fivefold, identical to this. Fascicle 73 also has five: first, conceptualizing the intrinsic nature of the referent—this has four, namely conceptualizing the specific mark, etc.; second, conceptualizing the intrinsic nature of the name—this has two, namely without difference, etc.; third, conceptualizing the intrinsic nature of defilement, which refers to having craving, etc.; fourth, conceptualizing the intrinsic nature of purity, which opposes defilement; fifth, conceptualizing the intrinsic nature of neither defilement nor purity, meaning that this form is that which is grasped, the grasper, etc. Again, there are five kinds: first, craving; second, anger; third, union; fourth, separation; fifth, equanimity and conforming to gifting, etc. Fascicle 16 of the Prakaraṇāryavācā has a text identical to this. Again, there are five: first, conceptualizing the impermanent as permanent; second, conceptualizing suffering as pleasure; third, conceptualizing the impure as pure; fourth, conceptualizing non-self as self; fifth, grasping at the parikalpita-svabhāva among all marks. The sixfold are stated in Fascicle 16 of the Prakaraṇāryavācā: first, parikalpita of intrinsic nature, meaning conceptualizing form, etc., as having real marks; second, parikalpita of difference, meaning conceptualizing form, etc., as really possessing form, being formless, etc.; third, parikalpita of awareness, meaning grasping by those skilled in words; fourth, parikalpita of latency, meaning grasping by those unskilled in words; fifth, parikalpita of preliminary application—this has five, namely craving, anger, etc.; sixth, called comprehensive parikalpita, meaning this has two, namely that which arises from verbal expression and that which does not. The sevenfold are the seven conceptualizations, namely: with marks, without marks, spontaneous, seeking, examining, defiled, and non-defiled, as stated in Fascicle 1 of the Yogācārabhūmi and Fascicle 2 of the Abhidharma[-samuccaya-vyākhyā]. The eightfold are the eight conceptualizations that generate the three affairs. Fascicle 16 of the Prakaraṇāryavācā, etc., speaks of eight conceptualizations: first, conceptualization of intrinsic nature, which means conceptualizing the affairs conceived as form, etc., and the intrinsic nature of form, etc.; second, conceptualization of difference; third, conceptualization of collective grasping; fourth, conceptualization of self; fifth, conceptualization of what belongs to self; sixth, conceptualization of the desirable; seventh, conceptualization of the undesirable; eighth, conceptualization of that which contradicts both the desirable and undesirable. The three affairs are: first, the affairs of conceived form that serve as the basis for proliferation; second, the affairs of views and self-pride; third, the affairs of craving, anger, and delusion. These broadly explain the eight conceptualizations generating the three affairs, as stated in Fascicle 36 of the Yogācārabhūmi and Fascicle 16 of the Prakaraṇāryavācā. The ninefold is constructed by reasoning: namely, conceptualizations taking the nine classes as objects, grasping at the nine stages is also like this, and grasping accompanying the nine fetters is also this. The tenfold is stated in Fascicle 4 of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha—though called 'conceptualizations' in Fascicle 14 of the Abhidharma[-samuccaya-vyākhyā], they are not those capable of parikalpita: first, fundamental conceptualization, the eighth consciousness; second, conceptualization of the objective mark, the consciousnesses of form, etc.; third, conceptualization of the manifest mark, the consciousness of the eye, etc., together with their bases; fourth, conceptualization of variation in the objective mark, variations such as old age; fifth, conceptualization of variation in the manifest mark, the variations of all variations; sixth, conceptualization induced by others, the category of hearing incorrect teachings; seventh, improper conceptualization, the category of non-Buddhists; eighth, proper conceptualization, the category of hearing correct teachings; ninth, conceptualization of grasping, the category of views of self; tenth, conceptualization of distraction, namely the ten distractions; the ten distractions are also ten, and these are the entities of conceptualization capable of parikalpita. Furthermore, Fascicle 12 of the Abhidharma[-samuccaya-vyākhyā] speaks of ten, such as seeing, non-seeing, seeing [views], etc. Furthermore, the ten marks eliminated by the eighteen emptinesses, as stated in Fascicle 77. The elevenfold refers to the eleven consciousnesses, namely the consciousness of body, of the possessor of body, etc.; conceptualizations arising from taking these eleven as objects are called the eleven conceptualizations, as stated in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. The twelvefold is stated in Fascicle 4 of the ten-fascicle Laṅkāvatāra: first, conceptualization of speech, because of delighting in speech; second, conceptualization of the knowable; third, conceptualization of marks; fourth, conceptualization of referents; fifth, conceptualization of real entities; sixth, conceptualization of causes; seventh, conceptualization of views; eighth, conceptualization of establishment; ninth, conceptualization of arising; tenth, conceptualization of non-arising; eleventh, conceptualization of conjunction; twelfth, conceptualization of bondage and non-bondage. Distinctly taking the twelve āyatanas as objects to generate conceptualization is also this. The thirteenfold does not exist. The fourteenfold refers to conceptualizations of the fourteen unanswerable questions. The fifteenfold also does not exist. The sixteenfold refers to that which is eliminated by the sixteen emptinesses, or eliminated by the three emptinesses; Fascicle 15 of the Prakaraṇāryavācā says: first, bondage of the faculties; second, bondage of sentient beings, etc. The seventeenfold is stated in Fascicle 12 of the Abhidharma[-samuccaya-vyākhyā], meaning marks, views, etc. The eighteenfold refers to that which is eliminated by the eighteen emptinesses, up to the twenty views of self and what belongs to self, that which is eliminated by the twenty emptinesses, the twenty-five views of self and what belongs to self, and the twenty-eight views and sixty-two views, etc., in Fascicle 12 of the Abhidharma[-samuccaya-vyākhyā]; therefore, this treatise says 'ten, etc.' Fascicle 74, etc., states that according to the measure of the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva), the parikalpita is likewise of such measure; therefore there are immeasurable kinds. This treatise says 'etc.' Each and every one of these is broadly differentiated in the various treatises cited, so they need not be quoted separately in burdensome detail.

9.79

The above has finished broadly explaining the first line of the first verse. Below, it broadly explains the second line.

9.80

Treatise: Next, what is the intrinsic nature of that which is conceptualized (parikalpita)?

9.81

The Commentary states: Having completed the questions and answers regarding that which is capable of parikalpita, it asks: what is the intrinsic nature of that which is parikalpita?

9.82

Treatise: The Mahāyānasaṃgraha says […] because it is the objective condition (ālambana-pratyaya).

9.83

The Commentary states: Among the three natures, it is the paratantra-svabhāva. In speaking of the objective condition (ālambana-pratyaya), it must be an existing dharma; parikalpita cittas, etc., take this as their condition, because the immediate nimittabhāga must be paratantra. They do not take the pariniṣpanna as their object, because it is not similar to it. Fascicle 4 of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states exclusively that the paratantra-svabhāva is that which is parikalpita.

9.84

Treatise: Why is the perfected nature (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva) not its object?

9.85

The Commentary states: This is an outsider's question. Fascicle 76 states that the ultimate lack of nature lacks the ultimate marks as conceptualized, as will be known below. It also takes that as a remote objective condition, but not as the nimittabhāga, because it is not similar to it and is extremely remote.

9.86

Treatise: The real is not false grasping […] is also that which is conceptualized.

9.87

The Commentary states: The paratantra is false, so a small portion of it can be conceptualized as its nimittabhāga; this true [nature] is not like that, because it is not proximate, though being remote is also not precluded.

9.88

Treatise: The imaginary nature (parikalpita-svabhāva) […] therefore it is not that which is conceptualized.

9.89

The Commentary states: Although what is grasped is the cognitive sphere of the parikalpita citta, it is not an objective condition (ālambana-pratyaya); therefore, it is not that which is conceptualized. That which is conceptualized is based on existing dharmas; the meaning of 'cognitive sphere' is broader and non-existent dharmas are also called cognitive spheres, while 'objective condition' is narrower and non-existent dharmas are not such. Therefore, only the paratantra is that which is conceptualized. Fascicle 74 says: 'Due to what is there conceptualization? Due to the paratantra-svabhāva.' This is precisely it. Why does Fascicle 74 also state: the parikalpita-svabhāva is not an object of ordinary or noble jñāna, because it lacks marks, saying 'it is the cognitive sphere of neither'? That which resembles a nimittabhāga is not a non-existent dharma. A non-existent dharma is not an objective condition; an objective condition must be an existing dharma. That nature may be called an 'object of cognition', which is why it is called a 'cognitive sphere' and 'not a condition'; because it lacks an entity, it is not that it is not spoken of as a non-object in contrast to the citta. Therefore this nature is said to be that which should be known. If it were not in contrast to the citta, how could one cause it to be known? Furthermore, it says: 'Because parikalpita is exclusively an object of the ordinary.' This concludes broadly explaining the second line of the verse above. Does a Buddha know non-existence or not? If He knows it, how does it constitute an object? If He does not know it, how can He be called all-knowing? This meaning should be contemplated, as explained in Fascicle 7 of the Vijñapti[-mātratā].

9.90

Below, it broadly explains the third and fourth lines above, and also explains the first line in the second verse.

9.91

Treatise: What are the characteristics of the imaginary nature (parikalpita-svabhāva)?

9.92

The Commentary states: It asks about the essential nature and marks.

9.93

Treatise: Furthermore, how does it differ from the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva)?

9.94

The Commentary states: It asks about the difference between the two, combining two questions.

9.95

Treatise: There is an opinion that the three realms […] are the imaginary nature (parikalpita-svabhāva).

9.96

The Commentary states: This master has two [parts]: first, setting up the thesis; second, citing proof, solely answering the first question. Although each mind and mental factor in substance is a single self-verifying part, they arise as if they were two other-dependent parts, namely the darśana- and nimitta-bhāgas. What various sūtras and treatises call the 'two graspers' are these two. Although such two parts seem to exist as substances, in reality and truth they do not exist. These two marks are spoken of in the Madhyāntavibhāga and other texts as the imagined [nature].

9.97

[Treatise:] The substantive entities upon which the two rely [...] because they are born from conditions.

9.98

The Commentary states: Answering the second question and revealing the distinction between the two [natures]. The substantive events of the consciousness and so forth upon which these two rely are truly born from conditions; this nature is not non-existent and is called other-dependent, because it is born from the condition of the seeds of false discrimination. This master means: only the self-verifying part has other-dependent existence; the grasped and the grasper, the nimitta- and darśana-bhāgas, are the imagined, because, like turtle hair and the like, they are non-existent dharmas.

9.99

[Treatise:] How is this known to be so?

9.100

The Commentary states: Below he cites proof. How is it known that those two parts are non-existent?

9.101

[Treatise:] Various sacred teachings state [...] the imagined nature.

9.102

The Commentary states: Distinguishing the difference between the two. False discrimination is the other-dependent. The older translation of the Madhyāntavibhāga says: 'The general category of the false is the mind and mental factors of the three realms.' The newly translated treatise says: 'The mind and mental factors of the three realms are false discrimination.' Prakaraṇāryavācā, fascicle sixteen, says: 'The substance and nature of discrimination are the mind and mental factors of the three realms.' The Yogācārabhūmi, Mahāyānasaṃgraha, and others all have these words, meaning: because they are the mind and mental factors of the three realms, they are other-dependent and born from causes and conditions; the two graspers are called the imagined nature. The older translation of the Madhyāntavibhāga verse says: 'Devoid of the two, there is this non-existence.' The prose commentary says: '"Devoid of the two" means devoid of the grasped and grasper; "there is this non-existence" means there is the non-existence of these two graspers.' The new translation says: 'Because there is the non-existence of the two.' In the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, Prakaraṇāryavācā, and others, such passages are not single; this first [view] here is the meaning maintained together by Sthiramati and many other masters.

9.103

Below, Bodhisattvas such as Dharmapāla only then make further distinctions.

9.104

[Treatise:] There is an opinion that all [...] the imagined nature.

9.105

The Commentary states: The explanation of the second master. Within the text there are four [parts]: first, declaring the thesis; second, citing proof; third, refutation; fourth, concluding with the correct [position]. That the darśana- and nimitta-bhāgas are born of causes and conditions is also the other-dependent; relying upon these two parts, one falsely grasps them as determinately real, as existent, as non-existent, as both existent and non-existent, as neither existent nor non-existent, as identical, as different, as both, as neither, etc. This takes existence and non-existence as one set of extreme propositions, identity and difference as a second set of extreme propositions at the head, with both and neither applying to both places. Only these two [erroneously grasped] darśana and nimitta are called the imagined nature; the two dharmas born from causes and conditions are not called the imagined nature. Therefore, harmonizing with the preceding master, he next cites textual proof.

9.106

[Treatise:] Various sacred teachings state [...] because they are other-dependent.

9.107

The Commentary states: Below he cites proof. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha, fascicle four, states: 'vijñapti-mātra, two, manifold.' What it calls 'vijñapti-mātra', here is called 'cognition-only' (mātra); what it calls 'two', here is called 'only two'. It explains itself: '"mātra" because there are no external objects; "only two" because there are darśana and nimitta; "manifold" because they arise in manifold aspects (ākāra).' Because there are nimitta and darśana, the two kinds can be established; thus the darśana- and nimitta-bhāgas are other-dependent. The Buddhabhūmi-sūtra states: 'manifesting bodies, lands, and so forth,' and the four authoritative teachings cited previously in the second fascicle all have two, three, and four divisions; therefore it says 'manifold', all being called other-dependent. Furthermore, 'manifold' means that the darśana-bhāga and nimitta-bhāga each have manifold aspects, as stated in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha.

9.108

[Treatise:] The four dharmas beginning with nimitta [...] because they are subsumed under the other-dependent.

9.109

The Commentary states: Furthermore, among the five dharmas, the first four beginning with nimitta [are other-dependent], tathatā alone being excluded. The eleven consciousnesses are: 1. body; 2. embodied one; 3. experiencer; 4. that which is experienced by it; 5. that which experiences it; 6. time; 7. number; 8. place; 9. conventional expression; 10. distinction between self and other; 11. consciousness of death and birth in good and bad destinies. The five sense faculties, eye and so forth, are called 'body'; the mental element upon which the five consciousnesses rely is called 'embodied one'; the mental element upon which the sixth mental consciousness relies is called 'experiencer consciousness'; these three consciousnesses have the six internal elements as their nature. The six sensory objects, matter and so forth, are called 'that which is experienced by it'; the six consciousness elements are called 'that which experiences'; what appears as a shadow resembling the three periods of time is called 'time'; what resembles calculations such as one is called 'number'; what appears resembling villages and so forth is called 'place'; what appears resembling the marks of speech such as seeing and hearing is called 'conventional expression'; that which gives rise to grasping at self and what belongs to self is called 'distinction between self and other'; what appears resembling the signs of the five destinies and so forth is called 'consciousness of death and birth in good and bad destinies'. The meanings of these categories are as stated in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. Here, since it states that the body-consciousness, the experienced-consciousness, the place-consciousness, the expression-consciousness, and the death-and-birth-in-good-and-bad-destinies-consciousness—a total of five consciousnesses—are called other-dependent, the nimitta-bhāga is also other-dependent. The Yogācārabhūmi, fascicles seventy-two and seventy-three, Prakaraṇāryavācā, fascicles twelve and sixteen, clarify the five dharmas; the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, fascicle four, clarifies the eleven consciousnesses as well as nimitta, nāma, and so forth; there they are all said to be subsumed under the other-dependent. Hence one knows that the two parts are not the imagined nature. When the treatise says 'and so forth', it refers to the consciousness of nimitta and so forth, the matter-places, and so on.

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成唯識論述記 — Classical Chinese