成唯識論演祕 7

English (machine translation) 7

Language: English

7.2

Treatise: "What is falsely grasped by this... to intrinsic nature and differentiation."

7.3

Question: The intrinsic nature and differentiation among phenomena can be known; how are these two with respect to the self?

Answer: Taking it merely as a whole as the self is called 'intrinsic nature.' Distinctions such as omnipresent or permanent are called 'differentiation.' Grasping it as identical with or separate from the aggregates and so forth should all be understood accordingly. This is also the self as intrinsic nature, differentiation, and so forth in Buddhist logic (hetuvidyā).

7.5

Treatise: "Because all manifest resembling what is grasped and that which grasps."

7.6

Question: How is it known that resembling that which grasps and what is grasped are all called grasping?

7.7

Answer: Asabhāva's Commentary on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, fascicle four, states: 'The dependent nature arises based on karma, afflictions, what is grasped, that which grasps, and the memory conforming to pervasive conceptualization.' It also states: 'As previously stated, that which grasps and what is grasped by the consciousnesses such as the body have false discrimination established as their nature.' It also states: 'Just like the deer's craving [for a mirage], which by the power of its own mental continuum establishes a resemblance of water, one should know that the nature of erroneous pervasive conceptualization of what is grasped and that which grasps is called the dependent nature.' From this, it is known that possessing the two grasps is in all cases called grasping.

7.8

Question: Are the two grasped aspects concurrent or not concurrent?

7.9

Answer: There is an opinion: This text is a general statement. In actual principle, it follows the mind: when grasping that which grasps, there is the aspect of that which grasps; what is grasped is also like this; it is not that at all times one grasps both grasps.

7.10

Treatise: "Stating that the ālaya... serves as an objective support..."

7.11

Question: What does this intend to prove?

7.12

Answer: There is an opinion giving two explanations. First, it proves that the seven contaminated consciousnesses capable of perfuming all possess grasping; second, it universally proves [grasping in all] eight [consciousnesses], because it states that all causes capable of producing possess grasping.

7.13

Question: This master allows the sixth [consciousness] to have the two graspings; are the two graspings concurrent or not?

7.14

Answer: There is an opinion giving two explanations. One says it is the same as Dharmapāla; the second says they are not concurrent, just as the seventh [consciousness] grasps a self but has no grasping at phenomena.

7.15

Treatise: "Because estimating discrimination is capable of pervasive conceptualization."

7.16

This is identical to what is stated in Asaṅga's Mahāyānasaṃgraha. Asabhāva explains: "'One should know that the mental consciousness is capable of pervasive conceptualization because it has discrimination' means: because it is commingled with discrimination that manifests and discrimination of memory."

7.17

Exposition: 'Commingled' means the sense of associated and co-arising. Because the mental consciousness is concurrent with the two discriminations, it is capable of discrimination. 'Manifestation' is an alternative name for estimation; it is also called deliberative selection. The Treatise states: "'Using the perfuming of its own nominal designations as seeds' means: the seeds perfumed by the nominal designations of proliferation belonging to the mental consciousness throughout beginningless saṃsāra serve as the cause of this arising."

7.18

Exposition: This shows that the seeds perfumed by its own subjective seeing aspect are the actual directly producing causal substance of its own active manifestation. The Treatise states: "'And using the perfuming of nominal designations of all consciousnesses as seeds' means: taking as cause the seeds perfumed by the nominal designations of the reflected consciousnesses of boundless form and so forth, because it arises resembling them, therefore it operates discriminating boundless ākāras of all [things]."

7.19

Exposition: Taking the eighteen realms, other consciousnesses, and so forth as objects, what is perfumed into seeds within the objective aspect is collectively termed 'using others.' Because of this, the mental consciousness arises resembling all [things], and thus operates having boundless ākāras. The five or the eighth consciousnesses cannot have such an occurrence.

7.20

Treatise: "Those who grasp at self and phenomena must be wisdom (mati)."

7.21

Question: In Dharmapāla's [system], the five consciousnesses can be concurrent with wisdom (mati); now in refuting the other, does he not devour himself?

7.22

Answer: There is an opinion giving two explanations. One says: Because the five consciousnesses lack superior wisdom, being inferior they cannot grasp; the second says: this reason refutes only the eighth [consciousness].

7.23

Detailed analysis: Wherever there is grasping, it must be accompanied by wisdom; it is not said that wherever there is wisdom, it is entirely grasping. Because the other allows that all contaminated minds grasp, he refutes him by means of the absence of wisdom. Therefore, the two explanations are not yet fine expositions; however, they do not depart from the refutation, which can be understood if one reflects on it.

7.24

Commentary: "Following the explanation of the Viṃśikā... also has grasping at phenomena."

7.25

The Viṃśikā-vijñaptimātratā clarifies that knowledge of others' minds extends to both contaminated and uncontaminated. In explaining that uncontaminated knowledge of others' minds, there are three positions; one master explains that the entity of that bodhisattva's uncontaminated knowledge of others' minds also has grasping at phenomena. When the Treatise states 'it is not known like the Buddha's knowledge,' it clearly indicates that there is grasping. 'Not knowing' is precisely the meaning of ignorance. Because that ignorance has not yet been severed, it obscures the mind, and therefore it is not like the Buddha.

7.26

Commentary: "The doctrine of the Andhaka verse-master."

7.27

According to that sūtra: 'If ignorance and the various views had a single characteristic, there would be no purification or liberation, and ordinary beings and buddhas would not be two. Why is this? Because afflictions would have identical essential characteristics. For what reason? Because they would share a single mind, arise and cease at the same time, and be neither distinct nor different. Sons of the Buddha! If bondage and liberation had a single characteristic, the four great elements could be one, and the six tastes should not be different; but since the great elements are different, bondage and liberation are also like this. Sons of the Buddha! When all bodhisattvas are ordinary beings, they are endowed with all fetters; but when severing them, the coarse portions are removed first, and the subtle portions are eliminated later. If in a single mind the afflictions were one, there should not be two things, light and dark. Sons of the Buddha! Furthermore, to illustrate the distant by the near: in the wholesome mind of an ordinary being, there is not even unwholesomeness, how much less could there be ignorance in a signless mind? Sons of the Buddha! As for the statement that good and evil share a single mind, this is a verse of the non-Buddhist master Andha in the kingdom of King Bimbisāra: "Light and darkness have a single characteristic; good and evil share a single mind."'"

7.28

Treatise: "Although the categories of consciousness are only two... therefore it says 'various and sundry.'"

7.29

Such discriminations, as pointed out in the Commentary, are extensively explained in the Treatises and cannot be recorded in full. Now, according to what is essential, they are briefly listed.

7.30

Regarding the two kinds of pervasive conceptualization in [fascicle] seventy-three [of the Yogācārabhūmi], according to that treatise: The undifferentiated refers to pervasively conceptualizing the names possessed by all phenomena. The differentiated refers to pervasively conceptualizing these names as the individual distinct names possessed respectively by phenomena such as form. Exposition: Because one collectively conceptualizes all names as real existents, it is called undifferentiated.

7.31

Furthermore, regarding grasping through preparatory application and so forth: First, grasping through preparatory application has five kinds: attachment, anger, union, separation, and equanimity. Exposition: By means of these preparatory applications, one gives rise to grasping. Attachment and anger are respectively the two preparatory applications of union and separation.

7.32

Second, grasping through nominal designation has two kinds: namely, that made without words and that made with words. That made without words refers to grasping: 'What thing is this? How is this thing? This thing is what? How is this thing like?' That made with words refers to grasping: 'This is this thing; this thing is like this: namely, the five aggregates, the three natures, conditioned, unconditioned, and so forth.' The Prakaraṇāryavācā is also identical.

7.33

Furthermore, 'discriminating self-entity and so forth' shall be clarified in their mutual subsumption among the eight discriminations. Furthermore, regarding 'conforming awareness and so forth,' exposition: manifestation and seeds, in that order, are the objects conceptualized by the mind capable of pervasive conceptualization. Furthermore, according to [fascicle] seventy-three, regarding the four differentiations such as conceptualizing intrinsic characteristics: conceptualizing the intrinsic nature of phenomena of the three categories is called conceptualizing intrinsic nature. Conceptualizing all phenomena such as form as having diverse principles of all differentiations, such as visible, invisible, uncontaminated, and contaminated, is called conceptualizing differentiation. Conceptualizing all phenomena such as form as being what is grasped by the minds and mental factors belonging to their respective three realms, three natures, contaminated, uncontaminated, and so forth, is called conceptualizing what is grasped. Conceptualizing form and so forth as being capable of grasping form and so forth, and conceptualizing minds and mental factors as being capable of grasping phenomena, is called conceptualizing that which grasps.

7.34

Furthermore, regarding pervasively conceptualizing the referent based on the name, and so forth: According to the root text of Asabhāva's Commentary on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, fascicle five: 'First, pervasively conceptualizing the intrinsic nature of the referent based on the name, that is, such a name has such a referent; second, pervasively conceptualizing the intrinsic nature of the name based on the referent, that is, such a referent has such a name; third, pervasively conceptualizing the intrinsic nature of the name based on the name, that is, pervasively conceptualizing a name whose referent is not understood. Exposition: That is, understanding its name but not understanding that matter, one grasps the name as real. Thus the Yogācārabhūmi states: "Not understanding the matter of form, one discriminates the name of form." Fourth, pervasively conceptualizing the intrinsic nature of the referent based on the referent, that is, pervasively conceptualizing a referent whose name is not understood; fifth, pervasively conceptualizing the two intrinsic natures based on both, that is, pervasively conceptualizing this name and this referent as having such an essential nature.'"

7.35

Furthermore, according to fascicle seventy-three, regarding the five varieties of conceptualizing the intrinsic nature of the referent and so on: First, conceptualizing the intrinsic nature of the referent has four varieties, which are precisely the four kinds cited above—conceptualizing the grasper, the grasped, and so forth. Second, [conceptualizing] the intrinsic nature of the name is precisely the two names cited above, distinct and indistinct. Third, [conceptualizing] the defiled intrinsic nature refers to conceptualizing this form as possessing greed, anger, and ignorance, being unable to escape the bonds of greed, anger, and ignorance, and moreover not being associated with any wholesome [qualities]; conceptualizing the remaining aggregates and so forth is likewise. Fourth, [conceptualizing] the pure intrinsic nature should be understood as the reverse of the defiled. Fifth, [conceptualizing] neither the defiled nor the pure refers merely to conceptualizing phenomena as grasper and grasped.

7.36

Furthermore, in the sixteenth fascicle of the Xianshyang, the fifth preparatory practice is precisely the two preparatory practices mentioned earlier. The sixth, "non-scriptural" and so forth, is also the same as the previous two, and so it is not cited again.

7.37

Furthermore, according to fascicle thirty-six and others of the Yogācārabhūmi: Regarding the eight discriminations: discriminating the various intrinsic natures of form and so on is called discrimination of intrinsic nature; discriminating all the principles of form and so on, such as being visible or invisible, having the three moral natures, the three realms, the three times, and having an opposing counterpart, is called discrimination of distinction; totally grasping all sentient and non-sentient, conceptual and real phenomena, and giving rise to discrimination based on them, is called discrimination of total grasping; grasping [them] as self and what belongs to a self on the basis of the five aggregates and so forth is called the two discriminations of self and what belongs to a self; giving rise to discrimination conditioned by pure, marvelous, and agreeable objects is called agreeable discrimination; discrimination that arises conditioned by impure and disagreeable objects is called disagreeable discrimination; discrimination that arises conditioned by objects of affairs that are separated from both pure and impure, agreeable and disagreeable, is called contrary-to-both discrimination. As for producing three things: the first three discriminations produce the first thing, the middle two discriminations produce the second thing, and the last three discriminations produce the third thing.

7.38

Furthermore, regarding the ten discriminations in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and so on: The commentary says: The ten discriminations are that which discriminates. Among the ten in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, both that which discriminates and that which is discriminated are called discrimination, as harmonized in that commentary. According to Asabhāva: "The ālaya is the root of the other discriminations. Since its intrinsic nature is also discrimination, it is called the root. Discrimination of the perceived characteristic refers to discriminating form and so on as having such characteristics. Discrimination of the manifested characteristic refers to the eye consciousness and so forth together with their supporting consciousness, because they manifest images resembling those objective characteristics." The commentary says: "The eye consciousness and so forth" includes the mental consciousness. "The supporting consciousness" refers to manas. That is, the six functioning consciousnesses can manifest images resembling those objects, which is called "manifested characteristic." "Discrimination of transformation in the perceived characteristic" refers to discrimination arising from the transformation of the shadow-consciousness resembling form and so forth. The commentary says: When the objective characteristic undergoes transformation, the discriminating consciousness that conditions it receives its name therefrom. That is, aging, illness, the three feelings, greed, anger, ignorance, and so forth serve as conditions for transformation, causing the color of one's body to undergo transformation. The substance that transforms is the physical body and so forth, as when it is said that due to joy the face becomes dignified and so forth. "Discrimination of transformation in the manifested characteristic" refers to the images of form and so forth manifesting by virtue of the supporting sense-faculties such as the eye. The eye consciousness and other consciousnesses undergo various transformations, and one gives rise to discriminations right therein, just like the transformation through aging and so forth spoken of before. The commentary says: Through the transformation of the supporting faculty, body, and so on, the supported consciousness also undergoes transformation. Pointing to those manifested five-dust objective forms is intended to indicate the discriminating consciousness that conditions them. Saying "aging and so forth" reveals that the conditions of transformation are the same as before. The rest is cited in the Commentary, and the textual meaning can be known.

7.39

Furthermore, in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha there are ten kinds of distraction: first, without characteristic; second, with characteristic; third, superimposition; fourth, deprecation; fifth, identity; sixth, difference; seventh, intrinsic nature; eighth, distinction; ninth, grasping the referent according to the name; tenth, grasping the name according to the referent. To counteract these ten kinds of distraction, non-discriminative wisdom is spoken of in all Prajñāpāramitā scriptures. The commentary says: "Distraction" is just another name for discrimination.

7.40

Furthermore, the twelve views and non-views spoken of in the Abhidharmasamuccaya are subsumed under the twenty-eight views, and so they are not cited here.

7.41

Furthermore, in fascicle seventy-seven there are ten kinds of characteristics eliminated by the eighteen emptinesses. That treatise is very extensive, and I now briefly cite it: There are ten kinds of characteristics that emptiness can eliminate. First, discerning that phenomena and referents have the characteristic of letters is properly eliminated by the emptiness of all phenomena; second, discerning that, due to the referent of established Suchness, there is the characteristic of continuous occurrence through arising, cessation, and so forth is properly eliminated by the emptiness of characteristics and the emptiness of prior and posterior; third, discerning that the grasper has the characteristic of attachment to the body and the conceit of "I" is eliminated by internal emptiness and the emptiness of non-attainment; fourth, discerning that the grasped has the characteristic of attachment to wealth is eliminated by external emptiness; fifth, discerning the characteristic of enjoying the service of men and women and material requisites, having internal pleasure and external pure and marvelous characteristics, is eliminated by internal-and-external emptiness and the emptiness of original nature; sixth, discerning that the establishment [of the world] has immeasurable characteristics is eliminated by great emptiness; seventh, discerning that the formless has the characteristic of internal tranquility and liberation is eliminated by the emptiness of the conditioned; eighth, discerning that, due to the Suchness of characteristics, there are the characteristics of the two kinds of selflessness of persons and phenomena, the characteristic of consciousness, and the characteristic of ultimate truth, is properly eliminated by the emptiness of the ultimate, the emptiness of non-nature, the emptiness of the intrinsic nature of non-nature, and ultimate emptiness; ninth, discerning that purified Suchness has the characteristic of the unconditioned and the characteristic of non-transformation is eliminated by the two emptinesses of the unconditioned and non-transformation; tenth, directing one's mind and thinking upon that counteracting emptiness itself, so that there is the characteristic of emptiness, is properly eliminated by the emptiness of emptiness.

7.42

Furthermore, regarding the twelve, according to the fourth fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra: Taking pleasure in and adhering to various forms of speech and sweet sounds is called discrimination of speech; thinking that there should be real characteristics of prior phenomena, and that when noble ones practice they know speech arises based on those phenomena, is called discrimination of the knowable; grasping the various characteristics of heat, moisture, motion, and solidity within those knowable objects as real is called discrimination of characteristics; taking pleasure in various real objects such as gold and silver is called discrimination of referents; exclusively contemplating the individual forms of real phenomena as "this phenomenon is thus and thus, not different," which is discrimination seen through non-correct views, is called discrimination of intrinsic substance; conceiving ideas of discernment with regard to what causes and what conditions, whether there is or is not a causal characteristic of discernment, is called discrimination of cause; discriminations of attachment held by non-Buddhists of wrong views regarding existence and nonexistence, identity and difference, both and neither, are called discrimination of views; grasping the characteristics of self and what belongs to self and expounding fictitious phenomena is called discrimination of establishment; giving rise to an adhering mind toward existence and nonexistence based on multiple conditions is called discrimination of arising; [holding that] all phenomena originally do not arise because they are originally non-existent, and that they exist based on causes and conditions yet lack cause and effect, is called discrimination of non-arising; [holding that] such and such phenomena combine, like gold threads together, is called discrimination of combination; adhering to the cause of bondage as what is bound, like a person employing means to tie a knot in a rope and, having tied it, untying it again, is called discrimination of bondage and non-bondage. Mahāmati, these are called the distinctive characteristics of the nature of the phenomena of false discrimination.

7.43

Furthermore, regarding the sixteen: Those eliminated by the sixteen emptinesses—since emptiness can eliminate them, it is clear that the number of phenomena eliminated is also the same. That which is eliminated is precisely discriminative phenomena. What is spoken of below as "that which is eliminated" should all be understood in accordance with this.

7.44

Furthermore, regarding the twenty-eight views, they are fully clarified according to the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya. Now I state them briefly: 1. The view of characteristics: hearing the Mahāyāna teaching of emptiness with hidden intent, one clings to such characteristics as non-nature; this is called the view of characteristics. Due to this, one slanders the three natures taught by the Buddha, and thereupon gives rise to the second, the view of deprecating designation; third, the view of deprecating discrimination; and fourth, the view of deprecating reality. Again, wishing to establish this wrong view, one gathers a small amount of reasoning and, relying on provisional transformations of explicit sūtras, makes them conform to one's own view; therefore, one further gives rise to the fifth, the view of appropriation, and sixth, the view of transformation. Because of this, one further gives rise to the clingings: if one practices good and non-good relying on this view, there will be no fault at all, and one will be freed from all obstacles and defilements. From this, one further gives rise to the seventh, the view of faultlessness, and eighth, the view of liberation. Having clung to one's own view, one disdains, slanders, hates, and envies the Śrāvaka piṭaka and Śrāvakas, further giving rise to the ninth, the view of disdain, and tenth, the view of wrath. Furthermore, conforming to one's own evil view, one upside-downly establishes emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness; moreover, thinking that understanding this oneself and causing others to understand this established phenomenal nature will generate immeasurable merits, one further gives rise to the eleventh, the view of perversion, and twelfth, the view of generation. Because of this, when others reprove what one has established with correct reasoning, one fails to establish one's own thesis and instead reproves others with playful, fallacious reasoning, further giving rise to the thirteenth, the view of not establishing a thesis, and fourteenth, the view of arrogance and confusion. Furthermore, one gives rise to conceit, saying that practicing thus is true veneration and reverence for all Buddhas; this is the fifteenth, called the view of reverent service. Furthermore, when discerning people urge one to abandon this evil view and use genuine principles to expediently awaken one, one rigidly maintains a mind of non-abandonment, asserting that only this is true and all else is false; this is called the sixteenth, the view of obstinate foolishness. The heavy defilements of the karmic seeds of the views spoken of above are the seventeenth, the view of the root. 18. The view of non-view regarding views is the earlier view of characteristics; because one actually clings firmly to characteristics such as non-nature, yet gives rise to the notion of not clinging to any characteristics. 19. The view of abandoning expedients refers to the earlier three views of deprecating designation, discrimination, and reality; because one disdains the nature of all phenomena and gives rise to the notion that diligent exertion is useless. 20. The view of non-liberation refers to the earlier two views of appropriation and transformation; because practicing without proper expedients does not realize the fruit. 21. The view of increasing obstacles refers to the earlier two views of faultlessness and liberation; because what one practices is deviant and depraved, so that obstacles cannot possibly be exhausted. 22. The view of generating non-merit refers to the earlier two views of disdain and wrath; because giving rise to doors of wrong conduct toward the true Dharma and fellow practitioners of the pure life gives rise to great harm. 23. The view of having no fruit of merit refers to the earlier two views of perversion and generation; because what one establishes is improper, so that neither the teacher nor the recipient can realize the fruit of superior progress. 24. The view of suffering humiliation refers to the two views of not establishing a thesis and arrogance and confusion; because raising debate unreasoningly cannot possibly attain victory. 25. The view of slander refers to the earlier view of reverent service; because one forcefully superimposes what should not be spoken. 26. The view of not being fit to speak with refers to the earlier view of obstinate foolishness; because with one who wrongly clings to emptiness, one should not speak, as speaking with them is of no benefit. 27. The broad view refers to the earlier view of the root; because by this evil views will be broadened in the future. 28. The view of exaggerated conceit: the preceding twenty-seven views are all called predominant, and they are all able to give rise to fictitious, unreal exaggerated conceit.

7.45

The Treatise states: "The Mahāyānasaṃgraha says that this is the other-dependent," and so forth.

7.46

According to that treatise: "The imaginatively constructed nature, relying on the other-dependent, is truly non-existent, but manifests resembling a referent." It also says: "Moreover, the other-dependent nature is called that which is conceptualized."

7.47

The Commentary states: "If it were not relative to the mind, how could it be known?"

7.48

Question: Regarding the statement that it should be known, what scriptural teaching serves as evidence?

7.49

Answer: Yogācārabhūmi fascicle seventy-four says: "Question: Among the three intrinsic natures, how many should be thoroughly known? Answer: All." Therefore, we know that the imaginatively constructed is also a knowable phenomenon.

7.50

The Treatise states: "The various sacred teachings say [they are] ... the imaginatively constructed."

7.51

According to the verse of the new Madhyāntavibhāga: "Because of the nonexistence of duality and the existence of nonexistence, it is neither existent nor nonexistent, neither different nor identical: this is said to be the characteristic of emptiness." The prose commentary explains: "'Nonexistence of duality' means the nonexistence of the grasped and the grasper. 'Existence of nonexistence' means the existence of the nonexistence of the two graspings. This illustrates that having no nature is the nature of emptiness."

7.52

The explanation says: The emptiness of the two graspings is called "having no nature." This nature is not nonexistent; hence it is called "the existence of nonexistence." Regarding the Treatise stating: "Why is it not existent? Because there is no existence of duality," the explanation says: Falsely clinging to the two graspings of grasper and grasped as existent—the absence of that twofold existence is called "the nonexistence of the existence of duality." Regarding the Treatise stating: "Why is it not nonexistent? Because there is the nonexistence of duality," the explanation says: Because the principle of the two selflessnesses is not devoid of essence, it is called "the existence of the twofold nonexistence." Regarding the Treatise stating: "This emptiness is neither different from nor identical with that false conceptualization. If it were different, it would follow that the nature of phenomena (dharmatā) is different from phenomena (dharma), which would contradict right principle, as in the case of suchness and the like; if it were identical, it would not be an object of pure knowledge, nor would it be a common characteristic."

7.53

The explanation says: "[If it were] different," one should not say that the twofold emptiness-nature is the nature of all phenomena, because it would be different from phenomena. "If it were identical," one should not say that the principle of twofold emptiness is an object of non-conceptual pure knowledge, because it would be identical with concrete things (vastu).

7.54

Regarding the Commentary: "The darśana-bhāga and nimitta-bhāga each have various ākāras."

7.55

According to Asabhāva's commentary on the fourth fascicle of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha: "Within a single consciousness, one part transforms to resemble the appearance of the grasped, and one part transforms to resemble the vision of the grasper. These two parts each have various differentiated ākāras arising simultaneously. If one does not accept that a single consciousness possesses various characteristics at a single time, there would be no perceiving of various objects at a single time."

7.56

Regarding the Treatise: "Eleven consciousnesses," and so forth.

7.57

They are enumerated fully as in the Commentary. Now, addressing difficulties, it is explained: "Embodied consciousness" is the ālaya-vijñāna; because it is that upon which the body of the five consciousnesses relies, it is called "embodied." If so, the sixth [consciousness] also relies on the eighth; why mention only the five? Since there is this objection, it is further explained: The eighth grasps the five faculties, and only then do the five consciousnesses arise. The five faculties are called the "body"; the consciousness that grasps the body is called "embodied consciousness." The sixth is not analogous. According to Vasubandhu's commentary, afflicted manas is taken as the embodied consciousness. "Experiencing consciousness" refers to the afflicted manas, because it is the uncommon support of the sixth [consciousness]. The five consciousnesses are not analogous. The consciousness of the experiencer is called the experiencing consciousness.

7.58

Question: Why not take the immediately preceding and ceased manas of the sixth as the second or third?

7.59

Answer: Because it is not distinct from the six experiencing consciousnesses, it is not taken.

7.60

Regarding the Commentary: "Since it is said here that […] are also dependently arisen (paratantra)."

7.61

Among these eleven, five are the nimitta-bhāga. Since that text states that all eleven are dependently arisen, we know that the nimitta-bhāga is not the parikalpita.

7.62

Question: Why are time and number not included under the nimitta-bhāga? That treatise states that they are reflected images of the three times and calculation.

7.63

Answer: If one discusses reflected images, it is indeed as you object. However, the Commentary relies on the fundamental [aspect], which is solely the objective nimitta; thus it speaks only of five, just as the five faculties and so on are all the nimitta-bhāga of the eighth [consciousness]. The essence of the good and evil destinies is actually only the retributive consciousness; since it extends to discussions of graspable and grasper, requisites, and so forth, destinies are also nimitta-bhāga. Time and number are not analogous; consider this.

7.64

Regarding the Commentary: "Otherwise, this text follows the opponent's view and does not mean that it is mutually established (prasiddha)."

7.65

If one objects against the other that if the two parts lack real essence, they should not perfumed bījas, this objection does not hold, because for Sthiramati, perfuming bījas does not require having real essence. Dharmapāla is now pressing the opponent using his own doctrine; it is not a mutually established doctrine between the two masters.

7.66

Regarding the Commentary: "Yet it is not the nimitta-bhāga."

7.67

Although self-awareness takes the essence of the bīja as an object, it is nevertheless not included within the nimitta-bhāga; the reason is as stated in the Liaoyi deng. Where the Commentary mentions "nimitta-bhāga" above and below, it is following Dharmapāla's doctrine and conforming to him.

7.68

Regarding the Commentary: "How does it cognize self-awareness?" and so forth.

7.69

Cognizing oneself is direct perception (pratyakṣa); cognizing bījas is non-valid cognition (apramāṇa).

7.70

Regarding the Commentary: "Explaining the two lines as two."

7.71

The imagined (parikalpita) and the dependently arisen (paratantra) are called the "two lines"; alternatively, the verse on the dependently arisen has only two lines. The earlier initial outline text contains two senses: first, explaining the three natures separately as three; second, generally dividing the three natures into two, combining the parikalpita and the paratantra into one, because these two natures must be distinguished in relation to each other.

7.72

Regarding the Commentary: "If it is for the first nature […] conclusion of the first master."

7.73

According to the twofold outline, this is the conclusion of the very first master, Nanda.

7.74

Question: In explaining what is imagined (parikalpita), Dharmapāla's text contains four sections; the fourth, which establishes the correct view, is precisely this text. Why is it now said to be the conclusion of the first master?

7.75

Answer: Because Master Nanda's concluding text on the two parts of the dependently arisen accords with his view of not mentioning self-awareness and awareness of self-awareness, it slightly agrees with Dharmapāla; concealing his own view to follow the other, it says "conclusion of the first master." Earlier, when demonstrating his own doctrine, it said "the fourth establishes the correct view," so they do not contradict each other. Alternatively, the character "first" (初) is an error for "latter" (後), showing that this concluding text is not Sthiramati's. Since both interpretations are possible, one should follow the majority of editions.

7.76

Regarding the Treatise: "Excluding specific characteristics, common characteristics, empty space, the self," and so forth.

7.77

One interpretation says: The common characteristic explained in the Commentary is as stated in Hetuvidyā, having no distinct real essence and incapable of being called permanent; hence the word "permanent" excludes it. A current interpretation explains: This relies on the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra, speaking of suffering, impermanence, and so forth. Another interpretation says: Although common characteristics can be termed pervasive, because of arising and ceasing they are not called accomplished. Furthermore, the common characteristics stated in the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra are purely exclusionary (apoha) without positive affirmation (vidhi), whereas suffering, impermanence, and so forth possess both exclusion and positive affirmation. Because the former lack real nature and the latter undergo arising and ceasing, neither can be permanent, and both are excluded.

7.78

Detailed analysis says: The Commentary contains no text determining that it relies on Hetuvidyā and does not rely on the Buddhabhūmi. Yet it states that the common characteristic grasped by the mind lacks real essence; and moreover the commentary on the treatise speaks of the two of emptiness and selflessness, and the two of suffering and impermanence. The Treatise uses "and so forth" to include them; thus the Commentary does not explain them, following the treatise's abbreviation. It is not that it does not accept that they are also excluded; it universally excludes the common characteristics explained in both the sūtras and the treatises. If one says that it only excludes the common characteristics explained in the sūtras, why would it not exclude the common characteristics explained in the treatises? Could the common characteristics of the treatises not be among those excluded? If they were not excluded, "permanent" would have the fault of not completely excluding common characteristics. Therefore the Commentary is not contradictory, and the other interpretation is deficient.

7.79

Regarding the Commentary: "Because it does not exist in the manner it is imagined."

7.80

This citation is abbreviated; it should read: "Because it ultimately does not exist in the manner it is imagined."

7.81

The explanation says: What is falsely conceptualized as existent upon conventional existence is perpetually nonexistent; this is called the consummate nature (pariniṣpanna).

7.82

Regarding the Commentary: "This is different from the earlier Vasubandhu."

7.83

Earlier, that which can produce the mind that imagines is called the parikalpita; here, that which serves as the support for the parikalpita-svabhāva is called the parikalpita.

7.84

Regarding the Commentary: "Furthermore, the paratantra […] is called the parikalpita-svabhāva."

7.85

This is identical with Vasubandhu's latter explanation.

7.86

Regarding the Commentary: "He says […] as the parikalpita."

7.87

That is Asabhāva.

7.88

Question: According to the two Bodhisattvas [Vasubandhu and Asabhāva], they metaphorically designate the paratantra as parikalpita based on its being a support, and say "not different" to explain the root treatise. If one does not explain metaphorically, when viewing the two natures in relation to each other to interpret Asaṅga's treatise, is there non-separation or not?

7.89

Answer: In principle it can also be established. As for the root treatise stating, "Because it is the objective nimitta of that which is imagined," the explanation says: Due to the paratantra, the sixth mind capable of imagining is able to arise, and only then clings to a real self, real dharmas, and so forth separate from consciousness. If this paratantra object did not exist, that which imagines would not arise. If that which imagines does not arise, how could there be the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhāva) that is clung to? It is because of this that the two natures are not different. It is just like the cognition of a snake arising only on the basis of a rope. The rest can be understood by analogy.

7.90

Regarding the Treatise: "Like an illusion […] nonexistent yet appearing as existent," and so forth.

7.91

Asaṅga's root treatise elucidates these similes fully as listed in the Commentary; Asabhāva's commentary should now be cited here. The Treatise says regarding the "simile of the illusion": "Just as in reality there is no elephant, yet there is the objective sphere of an illusory elephant; the dependently arisen nature is also like this: although there are no six objective sensory realms of form and the like, when conceptualized, there is the appearance of resembling six objective sensory realms."

7.92

The explanation says: Externalists take the eight things such as sensory dust to be real existents; internally, the eight similes are used to refute them as false, which should form eight inferences (anumāna). The first inference states: The six dusts of form and so forth are not truly existent (thesis); because they appear distinctly as the objects of conceptualization (reason); like an illusory elephant (example). True Suchness is not an object that appears in that conceptualization, so it is the dissimilar instance (vipakṣa). Because it is neither that which imagines nor that which is imagined, there is no fallacy of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika). "Furthermore, like a mirage, when it wavers, in reality there is no water yet the cognition of water arises; the external vessel world is also like this." The inference states: The external vessel world is false and not truly existent; because it can produce the mind and mental factors that grasp at reality; like a mirage. True Suchness does not directly serve as the support for the arising of grasping, so there is no inconclusiveness. "Furthermore, like the aggregate of mind and mental factors arising from sleep in a dream, which is extremely confused and obscure, though lacking various objective referents such as shapes, there is the enjoyment of agreeable and disagreeable objects. The waking state is also like this." The inference states: Agreeable and disagreeable objects of the non-dream state are false and not truly existent; because they are objects liked or disliked by minds of love and hate; like what is dreamed. "Furthermore, like a reflected image, one sees the original form in a mirror or the like, yet thinks, 'I now see a distinct image,' whereas this image is completely nonexistent. The fruition of the image arising from good and evil volitional karma of non-equipoised stages taking the original form as a condition is also like this." The inference states: The fruits of good and evil karma are false and not truly existent; because they manifest dependent on conditions; like a reflected image. "Furthermore, like shadow puppetry, because the puppeteer obstructs the light, various shadows arise. The various consciousnesses in meditative equipoise and other stages operate with distinctions regarding nonexistent real referents."

7.93

The explanation says: Just as when dancing in the light, moving the body creates many shapes, and the shadows do likewise: the discrimination of meditative mind gives rise to various bodily karmas, obstructing non-discrimination. Just as the form obstructs light, the body arises relying on consciousness; therefore that body is designated as "various consciousnesses." Alternatively, the meditative minds of the upper two realms are not single, hence called "various consciousnesses." Since this consciousness operates dependent on unreal objects, it clearly shows that the mind is false. According to the former inference: The bodily karma arising from meditation is false and not truly existent; because it operates variously; like shadow puppetry. According to the latter inference: The consciousnesses of meditative stages are false and not truly existent; because they arise relying on various things; like shadow puppetry. "Furthermore, like an echo in a valley, in reality there is no sound, yet it causes the listener to seem to hear many kinds of verbal objects and various speech; verbal karma is also like this." The inference states: Verbal karma is not real; because it is heard by listening; like an echo in a valley. "Furthermore, like the moon in the water, because of the moisture and limpid nature of water, although there is no moon, a moon can be apprehended. Perfumed by taking real objective referents as objects, moisture and limpidity are its nature; the mind associated with various samādhis is also like this: although it lacks real objective referents, it operates appearing as existent. What is the difference between this and a reflected image? There is a difference between meditative and non-meditative stages."

7.94

The explanation says: The objective realm of meditative concentration can cause the continuity of wholesome dharmas, hence it is called 'real referent'. Alternatively, it is called 'real' to exclude the imagined realm. The formal proof is formulated: The realm manifested by meditative concentration is empty and not truly existent; because it manifests dependent on clear conditions; just like the moon in the water. [The sūtra says:] 'Furthermore, it is like an apparition: spoken of as an apparition dependent on this apparition. Although it is without reality, the magician is without distortion and diligently applies effort toward the conjured entity. Bodhisattvas are also like this: although there are no imagined sentient beings, out of compassion toward sentient beings that are dependently originated, they proceed to those various places of birth and take on a self-existence.'

7.95

The explanation says: This means that relying on this mind that is capable of transforming, transformation events are produced; or, relying on the transformed object, the mind capable of transforming is produced; because it lacks an objective realm produced by karma, it is said that 'although it is without reality.' The formal proof is formulated: The bodhisattva's taking birth is empty and not truly real; because it arises from an undistorted mind; just like an apparition.

7.96

Question: A verse in the Madhyāntavibhāga says: 'In unmovingness and non-distortion, / it is known that the referent is non-existent, / yet not non-existent like an illusion, etc., / because of unmovingness in existence and non-existence.' It takes the metaphor of an illusion and so forth to illustrate the imagined nature. Since the two treatises diverge, what are their respective intentions?

7.97

Answer: The Madhyāntavibhāga relies on the substance of those illusory events and so forth, as well as the mind capable of clinging and the clung-to water and so forth, to generally illustrate the two natures. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha relies on the phenomenal event and only analogizes it to the dependent nature. Therefore, they do not contradict each other.

7.98

Treatise: 'First, the suchness of transmigration,' and so forth.

7.99

The texts of the Yogācārabhūmi and this treatise differ, as reconciled in the Commentary. There is an opinion: Conditioned phenomena are of two kinds: first, that which is shifted by the four marks and produced by causes and conditions; second, that which is produced by afflictions. Here, speaking of 'conditioned' is based on the latter meaning; hence the term 'conditioned' only refers to conditioned arising. This explanation is superior, because in the subsumption below, it is subsumed under two natures. However, the Prakaraṇāryavācā says: with regard to defiled and pure dharmas, one contemplates the real nature of the transmigration of all formations. It is based on mundane purity, so they do not contradict each other.

7.100

Detailed analysis: It is not without this rationale. However, when the subsumption below states 'subsumed according to characteristics', transmigration, suffering, and origination are subsumed under the former two natures. Since it says 'according to characteristics', it is clear that it does not contradict the principle, being spoken from the perspective of predominance. The Prakaraṇāryavācā further says 'with regard to defiled and pure dharmas', and pure dharmas are not specified as based on mundane purity. Due to this teaching and reasoning, what the Commentary says does not conflict. Moreover, when the Commentary below says 'transmigration is only in terms of what is sāsrava', it is speaking of the Yogācārabhūmi's elucidation of transmigration.

7.101

Treatise: 'Fourth, the suchness of establishment.'

7.102

Question: All four are establishments; why discuss only suffering?

7.103

Answer: Although a general term is designated, it is by reason of a particular dharma, like the visible-matter āyatana and so forth. Furthermore, as the first of the four truths, it is designated from the general; because the remaining three follow after, they are named from the particular.

7.104

Treatise: 'That is to say, in some places ... up to ... does not subsume the five dharmas.'

7.105

According to the Yogācārabhūmi, fascicle seventy-four: Question: How many of the five dharmas subsume the first intrinsic nature?

7.106

Answer: None at all subsume it.

7.107

Question: How many subsume the second intrinsic nature?

7.108

Answer: Four subsume it.

7.109

Question: How many subsume the third intrinsic nature?

7.110

Answer: One subsumes it.

7.111

Treatise: 'Or again in some places ... up to ... the consummate nature.'

7.112

According to the verse of the Madhyāntavibhāga: 'Name is the imagined; / mark and discrimination are the dependent; / suchness and correct cognition / are subsumed under the consummate.'

7.113

Commentary: 'If they subsume each other according to their substances, it results in contradiction.'

7.114

If one takes the two substances of name and referent in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha to subsume these five dharmas, the substances of name and referent would then become contradictory. Why? Among the five dharmas, referent is mark and discrimination, and its substance is the dependent nature. That referent [in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha] is the first nature; if non-existence were to subsume existence, how would that not be contradictory?

7.115

Commentary: 'The Madhyāntavibhāga mutual subsumption between the three natures and the ten realities,' and so forth.

7.116

In the second chapter of that treatise, it explains the mutual subsumption extensively; here, it only mentions the names to briefly distinguish the meaning of the names: First, fundamental reality: because the other realities are established based on this, it is established based on the three natures; Second, mark reality: because this is undistorted regarding the marks of the fundamental reality; Third, non-distortion reality: because it can remedy the four kinds of distortion, such as impermanence, suffering, and non-self; Fourth, cause-and-effect reality: referring to the four noble truths, because defiled and pure causes and effects are differentiated; Fifth, coarse-and-subtle reality: referring to the distinction between saṃvṛti and paramārtha; Sixth, well-established reality: referring to being well-established conventionally and by reason; Seventh, reality as the domain of pure cognition: referring to the domain of pure cognition differing between the afflictive and cognitive obscurations; Eighth, subsumption reality: referring to the three natures and five dharmas mutually subsuming each other; Ninth, differentiation reality: referring to the seven suchnesses and three natures mutually subsuming each other; Tenth, skillfulness reality: remedying the ten views of self through cultivating the ten kinds of skillfulness such as the aggregates.

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成唯識論演祕 — Classical Chinese