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Language: English
Extent: 159 passages, 12,944 words
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Source: pramana-mt · Machine translation by Gemini 3.8 Flash (2026-10-21) of in.bauddha.taisho.1837 · Machine output without human authorship: no copyright is claimed (CC0 1.0). The original text keeps its own…

1 — 94 parts
2 — 65 parts

Text

1.1

Composed by the Śramaṇa Dacheng Guang of Dacien Monastery.

Being about to compose this text, I will explain it briefly by way of three sections: first, clarifying the purpose of composing the treatise; second, explaining the title; third, commenting according to the text.

1.3

First, as for clarifying the purpose of composing the treatise: When one contemplates sentient beings of the three realms, drifting and drowning in the five destinies, revolving unceasingly, transmigrating without respite, there are none who are not tangled in mind by [the views of] annihilation and permanence, emptiness and existence. Therefore the Bodhisattvas descended into birth, setting an example to benefit beings. To eliminate both clingings to emptiness and existence, they opened the two gateways of emptiness and existence. By first clarifying that the hundred dharmas possess intrinsic substance, they dispel the clinging to emptiness; by subsequently clarifying the two types of emptiness—of person and of dharmas—they eradicate the view of existence. As for having intrinsic substance, on the level of conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya) it is not non-existent; as for being called empty, on the level of ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya) what exists? Medicine is prescribed according to the sickness; when the sickness ceases, the medicine is discarded. To cling to the medicine becomes a sickness; to awaken from the sickness becomes the medicine. Neither empty nor existent, simultaneously existent and empty, it completely terminates the hundred negations and dissolves the four extremes. Yet, because the ultimate purport is revealed through exposition, a treatise is provisionally used to elucidate it. Since it is preached without preaching and listened to with nothing to be heard, the arising of the treatise truly lies in this! This is the first [section], clarifying the purpose of composing the treatise.

1.4

Second, explaining the title: Regarding the phrase, "A brief record of nominal terms and categories from the Vastusaṃgrahaṇī of the Mahāyāna Treatise on the Gateway to Understanding the Hundred Dharmas": "Mahā" (great) gets its name by excluding the small; "yāna" (vehicle) takes conveying and carrying as its meaning. Calling it "Mahāyāna" here is establishing a title by negative exclusion, not by direct designation. As for "negative exclusion", because it excludes the Hīnayāna, it is called negative exclusion. Ten times ten is called a hundred, as extensively explained below. Because it maintains its own nature, it is called a "dharma". "Understanding" is prajñā; serving as a gateway to understanding, it is called the "gateway to understanding". The exchange of questions and answers is called a "treatise". Regarding "from the Vastusaṃgrahaṇī": that is to say, from the Vastusaṃgrahaṇī of the Mahāyāna Treatise on the Gateway to Understanding the Hundred Dharmas. The text in the Vastusaṃgrahaṇī is intricate, vast, and broad; because the text of this treatise is concise, it says "brief record", which does not mean the doctrine itself is abbreviated. What denotes various dharmas is called "nominal terms", and one, ten, a hundred, a thousand are called "categories". Therefore it says, "A brief record of nominal terms and categories from the Vastusaṃgrahaṇī of the Mahāyāna Treatise on the Gateway to Understanding the Hundred Dharmas". This is the second [section], explaining the title.

1.5

Third, regarding commenting according to the text: Within this text, distinguishing different meanings, it is divided into three parts: first, citing the sūtra to indicate the central thesis; second, raising questions based on the sūtra; third, resolving them according to the questions.

1.6

The treatise states: "As the World-Honoured One said: 'All dharmas are without self (anātman)'".

1.7

The commentary states: "This is the first: citing the sūtra to indicate the central thesis, clarifying the selflessness of dharmas (dharma-nairātmya). As the various sūtras of the Buddha, the World-Honoured One, all state that among all dharmas there is absolutely no self, he now cites the teaching to indicate it as the central thesis."

1.8

The treatise states: "What are 'all dharmas'? What is meant by 'without self'?"

1.9

The commentary states: "Below is the second: raising questions based on the sūtra. Having cited the sacred words, 'All dharmas are without self', it is not yet known what constitutes 'all dharmas', and what is meant by 'without self'?"

1.10

The treatise states: "'All dharmas' [briefly speaking, are of five kinds] etc."

1.11

The commentary states: "Below is the third: resolving according to the questions. Within the answering text there are two parts: first, answering the former question; second, from the words 'as for without self' onward, answering the latter question. Here, the phrase ''all dharmas' briefly speaking, are of five kinds, etc.' answers the first question. Within this first answer there are three parts: first, taking up the former question, presenting the number, and listing the names; second, determining the sequential order of the five dharmas; third, individually explaining the five dharmas. Within the first there are two: 1. presenting the number; 2. listing the names. This is the first: taking up the heading and presenting the number."

1.12

The treatise states: "First, citta-dharmas; second, caitta-dharmas; third, rūpa-dharmas; fourth, citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra-dharmas; fifth, asaṃskṛta-dharmas".

1.13

This is the second: listing the names of the five dharmas.

1.14

The treatise states: "Because they are the most supreme among all".

1.15

The commentary states: "Below is the second: determining the sequential order of the five dharmas.

1.16

"Question: 'Why are citta-dharmas explained first?'

1.17

"Among all dharmas, citta-dharmas are the most supreme. Therefore a sūtra states: 'Because the mind is pure, sentient beings are pure; because the mind is defiled, sentient beings are defiled.' Dependent on this mind, one either clings to saṃsāra or realizes nirvāṇa. Because their supreme function is powerful, citta-dharmas are explained first."

1.18

The treatise states: "Because they are associated (samprayukta) with these".

1.19

The commentary states: "Why are caitta-dharmas explained second? These mental factors always share the same basis, the same cognitive object, and the same time with the mind-king (citta-rāja). If according to the Hīnayāna, they furthermore have the same activity (ākāra); but now according to the Mahāyāna, caitta-dharmas and the king do not share the same activity. Why is this? Because the activity-aspects (ākāra) of caitta-dharmas and the king are each different. For instance, when taking blue as an object, the mind-king manifests on its own, and the mental factors manifest on their own; therefore they are not the same. These mental factors and their mind-king each take various objects, being associated simultaneously. When the mind arises, they arise; when the mind is absent, they are absent. Just as the attendants of a king do not depart from the king, the associated mental factors are also like this."

1.20

The treatise states: "Because they are the reflections manifested by the [previous] two".

1.21

The commentary states: "Why are rūpa-dharmas explained third? These rūpa-dharmas cannot arise separately; they are transformed and produced in dependence on the mind and mental factors, being reflections manifested by those two dharmas. Therefore rūpa-dharmas are explained third."

1.22

The treatise states: "Because they are differentiations among the states of the [previous] three".

1.23

The commentary states: "Why are citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra-dharmas explained fourth? The unassociated factors have no separate substantial entity; they are all provisionally posited, being nominally designated upon the distinctions of states among the preceding three dharmas of rūpa, citta, and caitta-dharmas. Therefore citta-viprayukta-saṃskāras are explained fourth."

1.24

The treatise states: "Because they are revealed by the [previous] four", etc.

1.25

The commentary states: "Why are asaṃskṛta-dharmas explained fifth? The characteristics of unconditioned dharmas are difficult to understand; if they are not clarified with reference to dharmas, how could they be revealed? Therefore, unconditioned dharmas are revealed in dependence upon the four dharmas: rūpa, citta, caitta-dharmas, and viprayukta-saṃskāras. For this reason, asaṃskṛta-dharmas are explained fifth."

1.26

The treatise states: "First, citta-dharmas".

1.27

The commentary states: "Below is the third: individually explaining the five dharmas. Within this there are five: first, explaining citta-dharmas; second, explaining caitta-dharmas; third, explaining rūpa-dharmas; fourth, explaining citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra-dharmas; fifth, explaining asaṃskṛta-dharmas. Within the first, explaining citta-dharmas, there are three parts: 1. taking up the heading; 2. presenting the number; 3. listing the names. This is the first: taking up the heading."

1.28

The treatise states: "Briefly speaking, there are eight kinds".

1.29

Presenting the number.

1.30

The treatise states: "First, cakṣur-vijñāna; second, śrotra-vijñāna; third, ghrāṇa-vijñāna; fourth, jihvā-vijñāna; fifth, kāya-vijñāna; sixth, mano-vijñāna; seventh, manovijñāna / manas; eighth, ālaya-vijñāna".

1.31

The commentary states: "Below is the third: listing the names. Eye-consciousness (cakṣur-vijñāna) and eye-faculty: consciousness is able to cognize; that is, this consciousness depends on the eye-faculty to cognize visual objects. The consciousness takes its name from what it relies upon, hence it is called eye-consciousness. As it is with eye-consciousness, so ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental consciousness should be understood accordingly. Seventh, manas: manas is Sanskrit, which is translated here as 'mind' (yi); 'mind' takes cogitation as its meaning. This is named according to its meaning. Eighth, ālaya-vijñāna: ālaya-vijñāna is Sanskrit from the Western lands, translated here as 'storehouse', and also called 'dwelling'. 'Dwelling' means containing and maintaining all dharmas; 'storehouse' means accumulating without remainder. The names 'storehouse' and 'dwelling' are both established according to their meaning. Above was the first: briefly explaining their names. Now, the eight consciousnesses are again briefly analyzed by way of five sections: first, differentiation of cognitive objects; second, differentiation of the four conditions; third, differentiation of the four realms; fourth, differentiation of layers; fifth, differentiation of the three natures."

1.32

As for the first, differentiation of cognitive objects: within cognitive objects there are two: first, discerning according to the causal stage; next, discerning according to the fruition stage. First, discerning according to the causal stage: regarding the cognitive objects of the five consciousnesses—eye and the rest—the masters of the Western lands have two explanations. The first explanation states: 'The five consciousnesses, eye and the rest, only cognize real objects, not nominal ones. Why is this? The five consciousnesses, eye and the rest, cognize objects by direct perception (pratyakṣa), without relying on nominal designations, and without relying on these other faculties and objects. Since the other nominal forms, such as long and short, must rely on nominal designations and on these other faculties and objects, they do not cognize nominal forms such as long and short.'

1.33

Question: "Among the five objects, which are real and which are nominal?"

1.34

The commentary states: "Among visual objects, four types—blue, yellow, red, and white—are real; the rest are all nominal. Among sound objects, sounds produced by grasped great elements, sounds produced by ungrasped great elements, and sounds produced by both grasped and ungrasped great elements: these three are real, and the rest are all nominal. Among scent objects, good scents, bad scents, and neutral scents: these three are real, and the rest are all nominal. Among taste objects, bitter, sour, sweet, pungent, salty, and bland: these six are real, and the rest are all nominal existents. Among tactile objects, earth, water, fire, and wind: four kinds are real, and the rest are all nominal existents."

1.35

Question: "Since the five consciousnesses, eye and the rest, do not cognize nominal [objects], why do various treatises say within visual objects that there are nominal forms such as long, and even within tactile objects that there are nominal touches such as smooth?"

1.36

The commentary states: "The reason why visual objects are said to have nominal forms, and tactile objects are said to have nominal touches, is that these texts merely speak in terms of subsuming the nominal under the real, and therefore discuss them together; strictly speaking, they are not cognized."

1.37

Question: "If they are not cognized, then like gazing at a forest from afar on a dark night, where one only sees long and short, but does not see blue or yellow, how could the eye-consciousness not cognize the nominal?"

1.38

The commentary states: "In this case as well, one is able to cognize the real forms of blue and yellow. Gazing from afar on a dark night, although blue, yellow, red, and white are not clearly and distinctly seen up close, yet one is still able to cognize them. Therefore, it only cognizes real forms such as blue, and does not cognize the nominal."

1.39

Question: "If nominal forms such as long and short are not cognized by eye-consciousness, under which form are these nominal forms subsumed?" Answer: "It should be known that these nominal forms are subsumed under forms arising from conceptual construction (parikalpa-samutthita-rūpa) within the base of mental objects (dharmāyatana)."

1.40

Question: "Defilements such as anger are nominal upon greed, and are entirely subsumed within the base of mental objects. Why are nominal forms such as long and short, being nominal upon blue and the like, not included within the base of visual form (rūpāyatana)?"

1.41

The commentary states: "Both anger and greed are cognized by the mind (manas), and are therefore subsumed under the base of mental objects; long and short are not seen by the eye, and are therefore not included in the base of visual form. As this distinction is made for visual objects, distinctions up through tactile objects should be understood accordingly."

1.42

"Another explanation states: 'The five consciousnesses, eye and the rest, cognize both the nominal and the real. When cognizing the nominal, they necessarily cognize the real; when cognizing the real, they do not cognize the nominal. Why is this? The nominal exists dependent upon the real; when cognizing the nominal, one must cognize the real. The real does not depend upon the nominal; when cognizing the real, one does not cognize the nominal.' The nominal dharmas spoken of by this school are not subsumed under the conceptually constructed nature within the base of mental objects. For instance, nominal forms such as long and short are included within the base of visual form, up to nominal touches such as smooth among tactile objects being subsumed within the base of tactile objects. The sixth, mano-vijñāna, cognizes all dharmas, which should be understood accordingly as appropriate."

1.43

"Regarding the cognitive object of the seventh, manas, the masters of the Western lands also have two explanations. One explanation states: 'Manas cognizes the seeing-portion (darśana-bhāga) of the ālaya-vijñāna as the self, and cognizes the image-portion (nimitta-bhāga) of the ālaya-vijñāna as its belongings (ātmiya).'"

1.44

Question: "How can a single mind grasp the darśana-bhāga of the ālaya-vijñāna as the self, and also grasp the nimitta-bhāga of the ālaya-vijñāna as what belongs to the self?"

1.45

Explanation: "Take, for example, the cakṣur-vijñāna: at a single moment it can still cognize diverse forms such as blue. What fault is there, then, in a single mind cognizing both the self and what belongs to the self?"

1.46

Question: "The treatises all say, 'The manas grasps the ālaya-vijñāna as the self and what belongs to the self'; they do not say that it grasps its nimitta-bhāga. Why, then, do you now say that it grasps its nimitta-bhāga as what belongs to the self?"

1.47

Explanation: "One should know that this nimitta[-bhāga] is not separate from the darśana[-bhāga]; therefore the treatises all say that it cognizes the ālaya-vijñāna as the self and what belongs to the self. This also entails no fault.

1.48

"Yet another explanation says: 'The manas grasps the ālaya-vijñāna as the self and what belongs to the self.'"

1.49

Question: "Having grasped the ālaya-vijñāna as the self, how does it again grasp it as what belongs to the self?"

1.50

Explanation: "This means that this manas first grasps the ālaya-vijñāna as the self, and then subsequently grasps this imagined self as belonging to 'my household'; therefore it is called 'what belongs to the self'."

1.51

Question: "If one grasps the nimitta-bhāga of the ālaya-vijñāna as what belongs to the self, what fault is there in this?"

1.52

Explanation: "In the treatises, it is only said that it grasps the ālaya-vijñāna as the self and what belongs to the self; it is not said that it grasps its nimitta-bhāga as what belongs to the self. The manas directly grasps the ālaya-vijñāna as the self and what belongs to the self; how could it further externally grasp the nimitta-bhāga as what belongs to the self? In terms of meaning, this is unacceptable. Therefore, it does not cognize the eighth ālaya-vijñāna, [which in turn] cognizes the seeds, the five sense faculties, and the five sense objects."

1.53

Question: "Why does it not cognize the sixth, seventh, and other consciousnesses?"

1.54

Explanation: "The ālaya-vijñāna cognizes spontaneous objects, whereas the sixth, seventh, and other consciousnesses are not spontaneous objects; therefore it does not cognize them."

1.55

Question: "Why is the sixth consciousness able to cognize the various consciousnesses?"

1.56

Explanation: "The conceptualizing function of the sixth consciousness is strong, and therefore it is able to cognize them; the eighth consciousness lacks this conceptualization, and therefore does not cognize them. This concludes the first [part], analyzing from the standpoint of the causal stage.

1.57

"Second, as for analyzing from the standpoint of the resultant stage: if one reaches the resultant stage, the cakṣur-vijñāna and other consciousnesses all cognize all dharmas.

1.58

"Second, regarding the distinction among the four conditions: when the ālaya-vijñāna is considered in its own nature, coarsely speaking there are only three conditions, but finely speaking it possesses all four conditions. Possessing three conditions coarsely speaking means: with respect to active manifestations, seeds can function as the causal condition; upon the cessation of the prior mind, the arising of the subsequent mind can function as the immediately antecedent condition; because they do not obstruct each other, there can be the sovereign condition; but because the prior and subsequent [moments of the] ālaya-vijñāna do not cognize each other, there is no objective support condition. If spoken of finely, there is also the objective support condition: when a single mind arises, it has four parts, namely, the nimitta-bhāga, darśana-bhāga, svasaṃvitti-bhāga, and svasaṃvittisaṃvitti-bhāga; within these four parts there is mutual cognition between earlier and later, and therefore there can be the objective support condition.

1.59

"The ālaya-vijñāna with respect to the manas can have two conditions: because the ālaya-vijñāna generates the actively manifest manas, there can be the causal condition; because they do not obstruct each other, there can be the sovereign condition; since the manas does not arise due to the cessation of the ālaya-vijñāna, there is no immediately antecedent condition; and because the ālaya-vijñāna cannot cognize the manas, there is no objective support condition.

1.60

"The ālaya-vijñāna with respect to the sixth consciousness can have two conditions: because the ālaya-vijñāna generates the actively manifest sixth consciousness, there can be the causal condition; because they do not obstruct each other, there can be the sovereign condition; since the sixth consciousness does not arise due to the cessation of the ālaya-vijñāna, there is no immediately antecedent condition; and because the ālaya-vijñāna cannot take the sixth consciousness as an object, there is no objective support condition.

1.61

"The ālaya-vijñāna with respect to the five consciousnesses has two conditions: because the ālaya-vijñāna generates the actively manifest five consciousnesses, there can be the causal condition; because they do not obstruct each other, there is the sovereign condition; since the five consciousnesses do not arise due to the cessation of the ālaya-vijñāna, there is no immediately antecedent condition; and because the ālaya-vijñāna cannot cognize the five consciousnesses, there is no objective support condition.

1.62

"When the seventh manas is considered in its own nature, coarsely speaking there are two conditions, but finely speaking there are three conditions. Possessing two conditions coarsely speaking means: the prior thought-moment serves as the sequential condition for the subsequent thought-moment, and because they do not obstruct each other, there is the sovereign condition. Possessing three conditions finely speaking means: the two conditions are as above, with the addition of the objective support condition; that is, within a single mind there are four parts, and because earlier and later cognize each other, there is the objective support condition. These four parts are as explained above and need not be listed again.

1.63

"The manas with respect to the ālaya-vijñāna can have three conditions: that is, because the manas perfurmes the ālaya-vijñāna, there can be the causal condition; because the manas cognizes the ālaya-vijñāna, there can be the objective support condition; because they do not obstruct each other, there can be the sovereign condition; but since the ālaya-vijñāna does not arise due to the cessation of the manas, there is no immediately antecedent condition.

1.64

"The manas with respect to the sixth consciousness can have one condition: namely, because they do not obstruct each other, there can be the sovereign condition; since the sixth consciousness does not arise due to the cessation of the manas, there is no immediately antecedent condition; because the manas does not perfume the sixth consciousness, there is no causal condition; and because the manas cannot take the sixth consciousness as an object, there is no objective support condition.

1.65

"The manas with respect to the five consciousnesses can have one condition: namely, because they do not obstruct each other, there is the sovereign condition; because the manas does not perfume the five consciousnesses, there is no causal condition; since the five consciousnesses do not arise due to the cessation of the manas, there is no immediately antecedent condition; and because the manas cannot take the five consciousnesses as objects, there is no objective support condition.

1.66

"When the sixth mano-vijñāna is considered in its own nature, it can have three conditions: because earlier and later cognize each other, there is the objective support condition; because the prior mind has the sense of clearing the way, there is the immediately antecedent condition; because they do not obstruct each other, there is the sovereign condition; but because it is born from the seeds in the ālaya-vijñāna, there is no causal condition.

1.67

"The sixth consciousness with respect to the ālaya-vijñāna can have three conditions: because it perfumes the ālaya-vijñāna, there is the causal condition; because it takes the ālaya-vijñāna as an object, there can be the objective support condition; because they do not obstruct each other, there can be the sovereign condition; but since the ālaya-vijñāna does not arise due to the cessation of the sixth consciousness, there is no immediately antecedent condition.

1.68

"The sixth consciousness with respect to the manas has two conditions: namely, because it takes the manas as an object, there can be the objective support condition; because they do not obstruct each other, there can be the sovereign condition; because it does not perfume the manas, there is no causal condition; and since the manas does not arise due to the cessation of the sixth consciousness, there is no immediately antecedent condition.

1.69

"The sixth consciousness with respect to the five consciousnesses can have three conditions: namely, because it takes the five consciousnesses as objects, there can be the objective support condition; because it has the sense of clearing the way, there is the immediately antecedent condition; because they do not obstruct each other, there can be the sovereign condition; but because it cannot perfume the five consciousnesses, there is no causal condition.

1.70

"When the five consciousnesses are considered in their own nature, coarsely speaking there is one condition, but finely speaking there are two conditions. Possessing one condition coarsely speaking means: the five consciousnesses do not obstruct each other earlier and later, hence there is the sovereign condition; because the five consciousnesses arise from the seeds in the ālaya-vijñāna, there is no causal condition; after the five consciousnesses the mano-vijñāna must arise, so because they are interrupted, when considered among their own kind, there is no immediately antecedent condition; and because the five consciousnesses do not cognize each other earlier and later, there is no objective support condition. Possessing two conditions finely speaking means: there can also be the objective support condition, for when the five consciousnesses arise they have four parts, and because earlier and later cognize each other, there can be the objective support condition. The five consciousnesses with respect to the ālaya-vijñāna can have two conditions: namely, because the five consciousnesses perfume the ālaya-vijñāna, there is the causal condition; because they do not obstruct each other, there is the sovereign condition; since the ālaya-vijñāna does not arise due to the cessation of the five consciousnesses, there is no immediately antecedent condition; and because the five consciousnesses cannot take the ālaya-vijñāna as an object, there is no objective support condition. The five consciousnesses with respect to the manas can have one condition: namely, because they do not obstruct each other, there is the sovereign condition; because the five consciousnesses do not perfume the manas, there is no causal condition; since the manas does not arise due to the cessation of the five consciousnesses, there is no immediately antecedent condition; and because the five consciousnesses cannot take the manas as an object, there is no objective support condition.

1.71

"The five consciousnesses with respect to the sixth consciousness have two conditions: namely, because the five consciousnesses with respect to the sixth consciousness have the sense of clearing the way, there is the immediately antecedent condition; because when arising they do not obstruct each other, there is the sovereign condition; because they do not perfume the sixth consciousness, there is no causal condition; and because they cannot take the sixth consciousness as an object, there is no objective support condition.

1.72

"Third, regarding the distinction among the four realms: the four realms are the desire realm, the form realm, the formless realm, and the untainted realm.

1.73

"Question: 'Among the eight consciousnesses, how many encompass the four realms? How many encompass three realms? How many encompass two realms? How many are in only one realm?'

1.74

"Answer: 'Three encompass the four realms: the three are the mano-vijñāna, the manas, and the ālaya-vijñāna. Three encompass three realms: the three are the cakṣur-vijñāna, the śrotra-vijñāna, and the kāya-vijñāna; the three realms are the desire realm, the form realm, and the untainted realm. Two consciousnesses encompass two realms: the two consciousnesses are the ghrāṇa-vijñāna and the jihvā-vijñāna; the two realms are the desire realm and the untainted realm. Among these eight consciousnesses, one should know that none belongs to only one realm.'"

1.75

"Fourth, regarding the distinction of the layers: the five consciousnesses such as the cakṣur-vijñāna and the manas have three layers: namely, seeds are the first layer, active manifestation is the second layer, and being cognized by the sixth mano-vijñāna is the third layer. The sixth mano-vijñāna has three layers: seeds are the first layer, active manifestation is the second layer, and earlier and later cognizing each other is the third layer. The ālaya-vijñāna has four layers: namely, seeds are the first layer, active manifestation is the second layer, being cognized by the sixth mano-vijñāna is the third layer, and being cognized by the manas is the fourth layer.

1.76

"Fifth, regarding the distinction among the three natures: the three natures are the wholesome, the unwholesome, and the indeterminate. The six consciousnesses such as the cakṣur-vijñāna encompass all three natures. The seventh, the manas, encompasses two natures, namely, the wholesome nature and the indeterminate nature: at the causal stage it is of the indeterminate nature; at the resultant stage and when entering meditative contemplation, one should know that it is of the wholesome nature. The eighth, the ālaya-vijñāna, also encompasses two natures, namely, the ripened indeterminate and the wholesome nature: at the causal stage it is the ripened indeterminate; at the resultant stage it is wholesome. This concludes the brief examination of the eight consciousnesses above."

1.77

The treatise says: "Second, caitta-dharmas, briefly [categorized] into six kinds."

1.78

Hereunder is the second part, explaining caitta-dharmas, which contains three [sections]: first, a general citing to open the topic; second, enumerating names and citing counts; third, separately citing and elaborating fully. This is the first, the general citing to open the topic. As for 'caitta-dharmas' (dharmas belonging to the mind), this means that that citta-rāja is what possesses them, and these various caittas belong to the mind; therefore they are named 'caitta-dharmas'. As for 'briefly [categorized] into six kinds', this cites the caitta-dharmas and sums up the counts and names of the six categories.

1.79

The treatise says: "Sarvatraga has five, viniyata has five, kuśala has eleven, kleśa has six, upakleśa has twenty, and aniyata has four."

1.80

This is the second, enumerating names and citing counts.

1.81

The treatise says: "The five sarvatragas are: 1. manaskāra, 2. sparśa, 3. vedanā, 4. saṃjñā, and 5. cetanā."

1.82

From here below is the third [part], separately quoting and fully setting forth [the caitta-dharmas]. Within this there are six [sections]: first, explaining the five sarvatragas; second, explaining the five viniyatas; third, explaining the eleven kuśalas; fourth, explaining the six kleśas; fifth, explaining the twenty upakleśas; and sixth, explaining the four aniyatas. This is the first, explaining the five sarvatragas. As for 'sarvatraga' (omnipresent), they arise continuously at all times and are universally present in all eight consciousnesses, hence they are called sarvatraga. As for 'first, manaskāra, and so on': stimulating the mind so that it repeatedly directs itself outwardly to various objects is called manaskāra. Once it has been stimulated, causing the citta-rāja to come into contact with the object before it is called sparśa. Experiencing the external sensory objects, feeling pain and knowing pleasure—apprehending objects in this way is called vedanā. Apprehending the image and appearance of an object, such as marks of squareness and roundness, is called saṃjñā. Causing the mind to perform karma such as wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate is called cetanā. This concludes the first [section], explaining the sarvatragas.

1.83

The treatise says: "The five viniyatas are: 1. chanda, 2. adhimokṣa, 3. smṛti, 4. samādhi, and 5. prajñā."

1.84

This is the second [section], explaining the five viniyatas. As for 'viniyata' (specific object), they take specific objects as conditions, hence they are called viniyata. What is meant by 'specific'? For instance, regarding chanda, desiring an object before oneself is called chanda; if one does not desire the object, then there is no chanda. The chanda that desires and [the state of] not desiring—these two kinds are distinct, hence it is called 'specific'. And so on up to the fifth mental factor, prajñā: discriminating dharmas is called prajñā; not discriminating dharmas is not called prajñā. The prajñā that discriminates and [the state of] not discriminating—these two kinds are distinct, hence it is called 'specific'.

1.85

As for 'first, chanda': desiring, wishing for, and seeking an object that one takes pleasure in, whether wholesome or unwholesome, is called chanda. In regard to an object of cognition, the mind generating certainty that 'this matter is definitely so' is called adhimokṣa. Clearly remembering and not forgetting objects previously experienced and familiarized with in the past is called smṛti. Causing the mind not to scatter regarding a single object, dwelling upon it exclusively and not departing from it, is called samādhi. The name samādhi is translated as dengchi ('equipoise-holding'); this is another name for concentration (dhyāna/samādhi). Holding the citta-rāja and the mental factors so that they abide equally upon the object is called dengchi. Discriminating right from wrong, distinguishing wholesome from unwholesome, and attaining definitive meaning is called prajñā. This concludes the second [section] above, explaining the viniyatas.

1.86

The treatise says: "There are eleven kuśalas: 1. śraddhā, 2. vīrya, 3. hrī, 4. apatrāpya, 5. alobha, 6. adveṣa, 7. amoha, 8. praśrabdhi, 9. apramāda, 10. upekṣā, and 11. ahiṃsā."

1.87

This is the third [section], explaining the eleven kuśalas. As for 'kuśala' (wholesome): not committing various evils is called wholesome. Having faith that the Three Jewels and the Four Truths exist, so that the mind does not give rise to denigration, is called śraddhā. The mind being courageous and non-retrogressing, diligently striving and encouraging itself to seek all wholesome dharmas, is called vīrya. Committing faults and evils and feeling inward shame is called hrī. Committing faults and evils and feeling shame before others is called apatrāpya. Another explanation says: 'Committing faults and evils and feeling shame before the devas is called hrī; committing faults and evils and feeling shame before humans is called apatrāpya.' In regard to worldly glory, profit, wealth, sensual forms, and such dharmas, the mind not being indulgently attached is called alobha. Toward all sentient beings, the mind having no intention to harm and harboring loving-kindness and compassion is called adveṣa. In regard to all wholesome dharmas, the mind being free of confusion and knowing them as they really are is called amoha. Body and mind being harmonious and compliant, free from coarse heaviness, and filled with ease and bliss is called praśrabdhi. Indulgently clinging to the five desires is called heedlessness (pramāda). Being free from those defilements is called apramāda. Being free from depression and free from agitation, dwelling in the middle way, and having an impartial mind is called upekṣā. Harming and afflicting sentient beings is called hiṃsā. Having pity and compassion for living beings is called ahiṃsā. This concludes the third [section] above, explaining the eleven kuśalas.

1.88

The treatise says: "The six kleśas are: 1. rāga, 2. pratigha, 3. māna, 4. avidyā, 5. vicikitsā, and 6. asamyagdṛṣṭi."

1.89

This is the fourth [section], explaining the six kleśas. As for 'kleśa' (affliction): tormenting and disturbing the body and mind is called kleśa. As for 'rāga' (greed): being attached to and craving sentient beings, material provisions, and the like is called rāga. Giving rise to harm toward sentient beings so that the mind is not at peace is called pratigha. Giving rise to haughtiness regarding manifold wealth, sensual forms, and the like, reckoning oneself superior to others, is called māna. Understanding reality is called vidyā (clarity); failing to understand reality is called avidyā (ignorance). Regarding the truths, having hesitation in mind like standing at a crossroads is called vicikitsā. Knowing in conformity with the object is called samyagdṛṣṭi; this view being deviant and perverse is called asamyagdṛṣṭi. This concludes the fourth [section] above, explaining the six kleśas.

1.90

The treatise says: "The twenty upakleśas are: 1. krodha, 2. upanāha, 3. pradāsa, 4. mrakṣa, 5. māyā, 6. śāṭhya, 7. mada, 8. vihiṃsā, 9. īrṣyā, 10. mātsarya, 11. āhrīkya, 12. anapatrāpya, 13. āśraddhya, 14. kausīdya, 15. pramāda, 16. styāna, 17. auddhatya, 18. muṣitasmṛtitā, 19. asaṃprajanya, and 20. vikṣepa."

1.91

This is the fifth [section], explaining the twenty upakleśas. As for 'upakleśa' (secondary affliction): tormenting and disturbing the body and mind and fatiguing practitioners is called kleśa. Defilements such as krodha arise following upon rāga and the like, hence they are called upakleśa. Another explanation says: 'These [defilements] such as krodha accord with the [deluded] mind and do not contemplate liberation, hence they are called upakleśa.' As for 'krodha and so on': bursting into rage at what opposes one is called krodha. Harboring enmity after rage is called upanāha. Harboring enmity in mind and raging violently is called pradāsa. Concealing actual faults and evils is termed mrakṣa. Slanderous deception and confusing others is termed māyā. Being arrogant while feigning compliance is called śāṭhya. Relying on worldly glory to elevate oneself with conceited delight is called mada. Lacking pity and compassion, harming and troubling others is termed vihiṃsā. Jealousy of others' excellence accompanied by sorrow is called īrṣyā. Hoarding wealth with greedy attachment is called mātsarya. Having faults and not feeling ashamed oneself is called āhrīkya. Doing evil and feeling no shame before others is called anapatrāpya. Opposing the right without desire [for it], the mind lacking purity, is called āśraddhya. Indulging in pleasures and falling away from the wholesome is called kausīdya. Failing to guard against evil is called pramāda. Stagnating on an object without capacity is called styāna. The mind lacking tranquility and conditioned by greed, desire, and the like is called auddhatya. Being incapable with respect to the teachings or meanings that have been spoken is called muṣitasmṛtitā. Correctly understanding dharmas is called saṃprajanya; deviant understanding without comprehension is called asaṃprajanya. Rushing outward to external objects so that the mind is scattered, revolving without rest, is called vikṣepa. This concludes the fifth [section] above, explaining the twenty upakleśas.

1.92

The treatise says: "The four aniyatas are: 1. middha, 2. kaukṛtya, 3. vitarka, and 4. vicāra."

1.93

This is the sixth [section], explaining the four aniyatas. As for 'aniyata' (indeterminate): these four dharmas are not determined to one single realm among the three realms—for example, the two factors vitarka and vicāra exist in the form realm, while the other two do not; nor do they determinately accompany [specific minds]—hence they are called indeterminate. As for 'middha and so on': briefly contracting the mind so that it operates without self-mastery, missing what was to be done, is called middha. Regarding wholesome and unwholesome deeds done or not yet done, harboring regret in mind is called kaukṛtya. Searching into dharmas without fine scrutiny, causing the mind to operate coarsely, is called vitarka. Repeatedly searching into the dharma that was sought, causing the mind to operate subtly, is called vicāra. This concludes the second [major section] above, clarifying the caitta-dharmas.

1.94

Commentary on the Mahāyāna Treatise on the Gateway to Understanding the Hundred Dharmas, Fascicle One

2.1

Composed by the Śramaṇa Dacheng Guang of Dacien Monastery

2.2

Now, the caitta-dharmas are briefly analyzed through five approaches. The five approaches are: first, differences among treatises; second, distinguishing nominal from real; third, distinguishing by the four realms; fourth, distinguishing by the three natures; and fifth, establishing and eliminating the six categories.

2.3

First, as for the differences among treatises: according to this treatise, there are fifty-one caitta-dharmas—namely, five sarvatragas, five viniyatas, eleven kuśalas, six kleśas, twenty upakleśas, and four aniyatas. According to the Yogācārabhūmi, there are fifty-three dharmas; fifty-one are identical to this treatise, but in the upakleśas it additionally teaches two: wrong chanda and wrong adhimokṣa. According to the Prakaraṇāryavācā and the Pañcaskandhaka, there are fifty-one caitta-dharmas, fully identical to this treatise without difference. According to the Abhidharmasamuccaya, there are fifty-five caitta-dharmas; all the other factors are identical to this treatise, except that within the six kleśas, asamyagdṛṣṭi is opened into five—namely, satkāya-dṛṣṭi, antagrāha-dṛṣṭi, dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa, śīlavrata-parāmarśa, and mithyā-dṛṣṭi. These are the differences in enumerated numbers among the treatises.

2.4

Question: "Why does the Yogācārabhūmi additionally add wrong chanda and wrong adhimokṣa among the upakleśas, whereas other treatises do not have them? What is the intention behind this?"

2.5

The explanation is: "The reason why the Yogācārabhūmi additionally adds wrong chanda and wrong adhimokṣa is that, among the five viniyatas, smṛti, samādhi, and prajñā enter into the upakleśas, so one should know that chanda and adhimokṣa also enter into the upakleśas. Furthermore, these two factors function gravely as hindrances, and thus are admitted into the upakleśas."

2.6

Question: "If that is so, why do the other treatises not mention them?"

2.7

Answer: "The reason the other treatises do not mention them is that smṛti, samādhi, and prajñā are subsumed under the five faculties, directly serving as proximate hindrances and having grave faults; therefore they enter into the upakleśas."

2.8

Question: "Chanda and adhimokṣa are not subsumed under the five faculties; why does the Yogācārabhūmi establish these two as entering into the upakleśas? If so, why do the five sarvatraga factors also not enter into the upakleśas?"

2.9

The explanation is: "Although these two factors are not subsumed under the five faculties when compared to smṛti, samādhi, and prajñā, their function as hindrances is somewhat lighter; yet when compared to the sarvatragas, they are still grave. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi, because these two factors function gravely as hindrances, admits them into the upakleśas."

2.10

Question: "Why does the Abhidharmasamuccaya, among the six kleśas, divide asamyagdṛṣṭi into five views, while the other treatises combine them into one? What is the intention behind this?"

2.11

The explanation is: "The reason the other treatises combine them into one is that these five views are identically of the nature of prajñā. The reason the Abhidharma treatise opens them into five is that it opens them into five according to differences in cognitive activity and understanding. This is merely a difference of opening or combining, and presents no contradiction."

2.12

Second, as for distinguishing nominal from real: regarding the caitta-dharmas, according to the Yogācārabhūmi, twenty-seven kinds are real existents (dravyasat), and the rest are nominally designated (prajñaptisat). The twenty-seven that are real are: the five sarvatragas, the five viniyatas, and eight among the kuśalas—excluding apramāda, upekṣā, and ahiṃsā. One should know that apramāda and upekṣā are nominally posited upon the four dharmas of alobha, adveṣa, amoha, and vīrya, while ahiṃsā is nominally posited upon adveṣa."

2.13

The treatise says: “Question: ‘Among these wholesome dharmas, how many are conventionally existent? How many are substantially existent?’ Answer: ‘Three are conventionally existent: apramāda, upekṣā, and ahiṃsā.’ Why is this? Apramāda and upekṣā are portions of alobha, adveṣa, amoha, and vīrya; for in the sense of these dharmas being detached from defilement, they are established as upekṣā; and in the sense of their remedying defilement, they are established as apramāda. Ahiṃsā is simply a portion of adveṣa, and therefore has no separate substantial entity. Among the six kleśas, five are substantially existent: rāga, pratigha, moha, māna, and vicikitsā. One is conventionally existent: improper view (dṛṣṭi).”

2.14

The treatise says: “The root kleśas are six: first, rāga; second, pratigha; third, avidyā; fourth, māna; fifth, dṛṣṭi; sixth, vicikitsā. Question: ‘Among these kleśas, how many are conventionally existent? How many are substantially existent?’ Answer: ‘Dṛṣṭi is conventionally existent, because it is a portion of prajñā. The rest are substantially existent, because they are distinct citta-dharmas.’” Regarding whether the upakleśas are nominal or substantial: if one relies on the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi, the four aniyata dharmas are also subsumed under the upakleśas, combining into twenty-four collectively named the upakleśa category; nor are there the two dharmas of wrong desire and wrong resolve, but there are twenty-six in the Maulībhūmi, because it adds wrong desire and wrong resolve. The Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī says: “Furthermore, what is the intrinsic nature of the upakleśas? It is krodha, upanāha, mrakṣa, pradāsa, īrṣyā, mātsarya, māyā, śāṭhya, mada, vihiṃsā, āhrīkya, anapatrāpya, styāna, auddhatya, āśraddhya, kausīdya, muṣitasmṛtitā, pramāda, vikṣepa, asamprajanya, kaukṛtya, middha, vitarka, and vicāra. As has already been broadly expounded in the Maulībhūmi, such classes are called the intrinsic nature of the upakleśas. Furthermore, among these upakleśas, how many are conventionally existent? How many are substantially existent? Āhrīkya, anapatrāpya, āśraddhya, and kausīdya—these four kinds are substantially existent; the rest are conventionally existent. Specifically, krodha, upanāha, pradāsa, īrṣyā, and vihiṃsā, being five portions of pratigha, are all conventionally existent; mātsarya, mada, and auddhatya, being three portions of rāga, are shown to be conventionally existent. Mrakṣa, māyā, śāṭhya, styāna, middha, kaukṛtya, muṣitasmṛtitā, vikṣepa, and bad prajñā—these nine dharmas, being portions of moha, are all conventionally existent. Pramāda is a portion of rāga, pratigha, and moha, and is also conventionally existent. Vitarka and vicāra, being both portions of the preparation of body, speech, and mind, as well as portions of prajñā, are both conventionally existent.” If one relies on the Yogācārabhūmi, twenty-seven are substantially existent and twenty-four are conventionally existent. If one relies on the text of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, twenty-two are substantially existent, and the rest are all conventionally existent. When it says twenty-two are substantially existent, it refers to the five sarvatragas, five viniyatas, and of the eleven kuśalas, seven are substantially existent and four are conventionally existent. Therefore the Abhidharmasamuccaya says: “Amoha is discernment, having for its nature the wisdom of retribution, teaching, and realization. ‘Wisdom of retribution, teaching, and realization’ refers respectively to the prajñā born of birth, listening, reflection, and cultivation, as should be understood in sequence. ‘Discernment’ means prajñā accompanied by courage and vigor. Therefore we know that amoha takes prajñā as its nature, having no separate substance.” As for apramāda and upekṣā, it says of both: “Relying on right effort, alobha, adveṣa, and amoha, they are therefore nominally established on the basis of these four dharmas.” As for ahiṃsā, it is a portion of the wholesome root of adveṣa, having the mind’s compassion as its substance. One should know that ahiṃsā is not separate from adveṣa, so it too is nominal. Among the ten root kleśas, five are substantially existent: rāga, pratigha, moha, māna, and vicikitsā. Five are conventionally existent: the five views, having no separate nature apart from prajñā. The upakleśas and aniyatas together make twenty-four, all of which are nominally established. Hence the treatise says: “One should know that krodha and so forth are nominally established, because they have no separate nature apart from pratigha and so forth.” That is, the five—krodha, upanāha, pradāsa, īrṣyā, and vihiṃsā—are a portion of pratigha, in agreement with the Yogācārabhūmi. Mātsarya and mada are a portion of rāga, and auddhatya is a portion of rāga; these three are portions of rāga, which also agrees with the Yogācārabhūmi. Pramāda is nominally established based on the four dharmas of kausīdya, rāga, pratigha, and moha, which also agrees with the Yogācārabhūmi. The two items of āhrīkya and anapatrāpya are nominally established as portions of rāga, pratigha, and moha, while the two items of āśraddhya and kausīdya are portions of moha, both being nominally established, which differs from the Yogācārabhūmi. That is, the Yogācārabhūmi says these four are substantially existent, but here the Abhidharmasamuccaya says the two items of āhrīkya and anapatrāpya are portions of rāga, pratigha, and moha, and the two items of āśraddhya and kausīdya are portions of moha, and hence it differs from the Yogācārabhūmi. The two items of śāṭhya and māyā are portions of rāga and moha. The one item of vikṣepa is a portion of rāga, pratigha, and moha. Muṣitasmṛtitā and asamprajanya have smṛti and prajñā within the defilements as their nature. Mrakṣa, middha, and kaukṛtya are portions of moha. The two items of vitarka and vicāra have either cetanā as their nature or prajñā as their nature, because there is a difference between investigation and non-investigation. In the Mahāyāna Yogācārabhūmi it says: “Nine items among the upakleśas—namely mrakṣa, māyā, śāṭhya, styāna, middha, kaukṛtya, muṣitasmṛtitā, vikṣepa, and bad prajñā—are all portions of moha.” Here in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, only the four of mrakṣa, styāna, middha, and kaukṛtya are portions of moha; the other five are different. Specifically, the one item of vikṣepa is a portion of rāga, pratigha, and moha; the two items of śāṭhya and māyā are a portion of rāga and moha; muṣitasmṛtitā and asamprajanya are portions of smṛti and prajñā within the defilements. One should know that these are simply differences of intent among the treatise-makers, each stating a single meaning. The various masters of the Western lands all say: “Seven among the upakleśas are substantially existent: āhrīkya, anapatrāpya, styāna, auddhatya, āśraddhya, kausīdya, and mental distraction; these seven items all have separate substances.”

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