大乘百法明門論疏 2

English (machine translation) 2

Language: English

2.1

Composed by the Śramaṇa Dacheng Guang of Dacien Monastery

Now, the caitta-dharmas are briefly analyzed through five approaches. The five approaches are: first, differences among treatises; second, distinguishing nominal from real; third, distinguishing by the four realms; fourth, distinguishing by the three natures; and fifth, establishing and eliminating the six categories.

2.3

First, as for the differences among treatises: according to this treatise, there are fifty-one caitta-dharmas—namely, five sarvatragas, five viniyatas, eleven kuśalas, six kleśas, twenty upakleśas, and four aniyatas. According to the Yogācārabhūmi, there are fifty-three dharmas; fifty-one are identical to this treatise, but in the upakleśas it additionally teaches two: wrong chanda and wrong adhimokṣa. According to the Prakaraṇāryavācā and the Pañcaskandhaka, there are fifty-one caitta-dharmas, fully identical to this treatise without difference. According to the Abhidharmasamuccaya, there are fifty-five caitta-dharmas; all the other factors are identical to this treatise, except that within the six kleśas, asamyagdṛṣṭi is opened into five—namely, satkāya-dṛṣṭi, antagrāha-dṛṣṭi, dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa, śīlavrata-parāmarśa, and mithyā-dṛṣṭi. These are the differences in enumerated numbers among the treatises.

2.4

Question: "Why does the Yogācārabhūmi additionally add wrong chanda and wrong adhimokṣa among the upakleśas, whereas other treatises do not have them? What is the intention behind this?"

2.5

The explanation is: "The reason why the Yogācārabhūmi additionally adds wrong chanda and wrong adhimokṣa is that, among the five viniyatas, smṛti, samādhi, and prajñā enter into the upakleśas, so one should know that chanda and adhimokṣa also enter into the upakleśas. Furthermore, these two factors function gravely as hindrances, and thus are admitted into the upakleśas."

2.6

Question: "If that is so, why do the other treatises not mention them?"

2.7

Answer: "The reason the other treatises do not mention them is that smṛti, samādhi, and prajñā are subsumed under the five faculties, directly serving as proximate hindrances and having grave faults; therefore they enter into the upakleśas."

2.8

Question: "Chanda and adhimokṣa are not subsumed under the five faculties; why does the Yogācārabhūmi establish these two as entering into the upakleśas? If so, why do the five sarvatraga factors also not enter into the upakleśas?"

2.9

The explanation is: "Although these two factors are not subsumed under the five faculties when compared to smṛti, samādhi, and prajñā, their function as hindrances is somewhat lighter; yet when compared to the sarvatragas, they are still grave. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi, because these two factors function gravely as hindrances, admits them into the upakleśas."

2.10

Question: "Why does the Abhidharmasamuccaya, among the six kleśas, divide asamyagdṛṣṭi into five views, while the other treatises combine them into one? What is the intention behind this?"

2.11

The explanation is: "The reason the other treatises combine them into one is that these five views are identically of the nature of prajñā. The reason the Abhidharma treatise opens them into five is that it opens them into five according to differences in cognitive activity and understanding. This is merely a difference of opening or combining, and presents no contradiction."

2.12

Second, as for distinguishing nominal from real: regarding the caitta-dharmas, according to the Yogācārabhūmi, twenty-seven kinds are real existents (dravyasat), and the rest are nominally designated (prajñaptisat). The twenty-seven that are real are: the five sarvatragas, the five viniyatas, and eight among the kuśalas—excluding apramāda, upekṣā, and ahiṃsā. One should know that apramāda and upekṣā are nominally posited upon the four dharmas of alobha, adveṣa, amoha, and vīrya, while ahiṃsā is nominally posited upon adveṣa."

2.13

The treatise says: “Question: ‘Among these wholesome dharmas, how many are conventionally existent? How many are substantially existent?’ Answer: ‘Three are conventionally existent: apramāda, upekṣā, and ahiṃsā.’ Why is this? Apramāda and upekṣā are portions of alobha, adveṣa, amoha, and vīrya; for in the sense of these dharmas being detached from defilement, they are established as upekṣā; and in the sense of their remedying defilement, they are established as apramāda. Ahiṃsā is simply a portion of adveṣa, and therefore has no separate substantial entity. Among the six kleśas, five are substantially existent: rāga, pratigha, moha, māna, and vicikitsā. One is conventionally existent: improper view (dṛṣṭi).”

2.14

The treatise says: “The root kleśas are six: first, rāga; second, pratigha; third, avidyā; fourth, māna; fifth, dṛṣṭi; sixth, vicikitsā. Question: ‘Among these kleśas, how many are conventionally existent? How many are substantially existent?’ Answer: ‘Dṛṣṭi is conventionally existent, because it is a portion of prajñā. The rest are substantially existent, because they are distinct citta-dharmas.’” Regarding whether the upakleśas are nominal or substantial: if one relies on the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi, the four aniyata dharmas are also subsumed under the upakleśas, combining into twenty-four collectively named the upakleśa category; nor are there the two dharmas of wrong desire and wrong resolve, but there are twenty-six in the Maulībhūmi, because it adds wrong desire and wrong resolve. The Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī says: “Furthermore, what is the intrinsic nature of the upakleśas? It is krodha, upanāha, mrakṣa, pradāsa, īrṣyā, mātsarya, māyā, śāṭhya, mada, vihiṃsā, āhrīkya, anapatrāpya, styāna, auddhatya, āśraddhya, kausīdya, muṣitasmṛtitā, pramāda, vikṣepa, asamprajanya, kaukṛtya, middha, vitarka, and vicāra. As has already been broadly expounded in the Maulībhūmi, such classes are called the intrinsic nature of the upakleśas. Furthermore, among these upakleśas, how many are conventionally existent? How many are substantially existent? Āhrīkya, anapatrāpya, āśraddhya, and kausīdya—these four kinds are substantially existent; the rest are conventionally existent. Specifically, krodha, upanāha, pradāsa, īrṣyā, and vihiṃsā, being five portions of pratigha, are all conventionally existent; mātsarya, mada, and auddhatya, being three portions of rāga, are shown to be conventionally existent. Mrakṣa, māyā, śāṭhya, styāna, middha, kaukṛtya, muṣitasmṛtitā, vikṣepa, and bad prajñā—these nine dharmas, being portions of moha, are all conventionally existent. Pramāda is a portion of rāga, pratigha, and moha, and is also conventionally existent. Vitarka and vicāra, being both portions of the preparation of body, speech, and mind, as well as portions of prajñā, are both conventionally existent.” If one relies on the Yogācārabhūmi, twenty-seven are substantially existent and twenty-four are conventionally existent. If one relies on the text of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, twenty-two are substantially existent, and the rest are all conventionally existent. When it says twenty-two are substantially existent, it refers to the five sarvatragas, five viniyatas, and of the eleven kuśalas, seven are substantially existent and four are conventionally existent. Therefore the Abhidharmasamuccaya says: “Amoha is discernment, having for its nature the wisdom of retribution, teaching, and realization. ‘Wisdom of retribution, teaching, and realization’ refers respectively to the prajñā born of birth, listening, reflection, and cultivation, as should be understood in sequence. ‘Discernment’ means prajñā accompanied by courage and vigor. Therefore we know that amoha takes prajñā as its nature, having no separate substance.” As for apramāda and upekṣā, it says of both: “Relying on right effort, alobha, adveṣa, and amoha, they are therefore nominally established on the basis of these four dharmas.” As for ahiṃsā, it is a portion of the wholesome root of adveṣa, having the mind’s compassion as its substance. One should know that ahiṃsā is not separate from adveṣa, so it too is nominal. Among the ten root kleśas, five are substantially existent: rāga, pratigha, moha, māna, and vicikitsā. Five are conventionally existent: the five views, having no separate nature apart from prajñā. The upakleśas and aniyatas together make twenty-four, all of which are nominally established. Hence the treatise says: “One should know that krodha and so forth are nominally established, because they have no separate nature apart from pratigha and so forth.” That is, the five—krodha, upanāha, pradāsa, īrṣyā, and vihiṃsā—are a portion of pratigha, in agreement with the Yogācārabhūmi. Mātsarya and mada are a portion of rāga, and auddhatya is a portion of rāga; these three are portions of rāga, which also agrees with the Yogācārabhūmi. Pramāda is nominally established based on the four dharmas of kausīdya, rāga, pratigha, and moha, which also agrees with the Yogācārabhūmi. The two items of āhrīkya and anapatrāpya are nominally established as portions of rāga, pratigha, and moha, while the two items of āśraddhya and kausīdya are portions of moha, both being nominally established, which differs from the Yogācārabhūmi. That is, the Yogācārabhūmi says these four are substantially existent, but here the Abhidharmasamuccaya says the two items of āhrīkya and anapatrāpya are portions of rāga, pratigha, and moha, and the two items of āśraddhya and kausīdya are portions of moha, and hence it differs from the Yogācārabhūmi. The two items of śāṭhya and māyā are portions of rāga and moha. The one item of vikṣepa is a portion of rāga, pratigha, and moha. Muṣitasmṛtitā and asamprajanya have smṛti and prajñā within the defilements as their nature. Mrakṣa, middha, and kaukṛtya are portions of moha. The two items of vitarka and vicāra have either cetanā as their nature or prajñā as their nature, because there is a difference between investigation and non-investigation. In the Mahāyāna Yogācārabhūmi it says: “Nine items among the upakleśas—namely mrakṣa, māyā, śāṭhya, styāna, middha, kaukṛtya, muṣitasmṛtitā, vikṣepa, and bad prajñā—are all portions of moha.” Here in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, only the four of mrakṣa, styāna, middha, and kaukṛtya are portions of moha; the other five are different. Specifically, the one item of vikṣepa is a portion of rāga, pratigha, and moha; the two items of śāṭhya and māyā are a portion of rāga and moha; muṣitasmṛtitā and asamprajanya are portions of smṛti and prajñā within the defilements. One should know that these are simply differences of intent among the treatise-makers, each stating a single meaning. The various masters of the Western lands all say: “Seven among the upakleśas are substantially existent: āhrīkya, anapatrāpya, styāna, auddhatya, āśraddhya, kausīdya, and mental distraction; these seven items all have separate substances.”

2.15

Question: “That these four—āhrīkya, anapatrāpya, āśraddhya, and kausīdya—have separate substances is explicit in the treatises. By what is it known that the three items of styāna, auddhatya, and vikṣepa possess separate substances?”

2.16

The explanation says: “As for the item auddhatya, the treatise judges it to be a portion of rāga. If this item had no separate substance apart from rāga, rāga would not be associated with pratigha and moha. If so, there would be the fault that distinct auddhatya could not be associated with all kleśas. Since it is said that auddhatya is associated with all kleśas, we know that auddhatya has a separate substance. Since auddhatya is said to be a portion of rāga and yet has a separate substance, one should know that though styāna and vikṣepa are also said to be portions solely of moha, we know that they also have separate substances. And according to the text of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, whenever in the upakleśas pramāda is a portion of rāga, pratigha, and moha, it is substantially existent. Among these twenty upakleśas, only these seven items—āhrīkya, anapatrāpya, styāna, auddhatya, āśraddhya, kausīdya, and mental distraction—are called portions of rāga, pratigha, and moha; the remaining thirteen items are spoken of either as ‘a portion’ or as ‘relying upon,’ so we know they are all conventionally existent. Among the four aniyata items, middha and kaukṛtya are also called portions of moha, yet they have separate substances. That is, middha has saṃjñā and chanda as its nature, because apart from saṃjñā it has no separate substance. Hence the Prakaraṇāryavācā says: ‘Dreams are produced by desire and ideation; these too are largely unreal.’ Therefore we know that middha is of the nature of chanda and saṃjñā, called a portion of moha; although having a separate substance apart from moha, yet because it is of the nature of chanda and saṃjñā, one should know that it too is nominally established. Regarding kaukṛtya, there is no text. But the masters of the Western lands have traditionally said: ‘It is either prajñā, or though called a portion of moha, it has a separate substance apart from moha.’ Yet it is of the nature of cetanā or prajñā, and apart from cetanā and prajñā it has no separate substance, so we know it too is nominally established. The two items of vitarka and vicāra, having no separate nature apart from cetanā and prajñā, are likewise nominally established. The masters of the Western lands have traditionally said: ‘The wholesome root of amoha also has a separate substance.’ By what is this known? First, in the Yogācārabhūmi it only says: ‘Among the eleven wholesome ones, three are conventionally existent, namely upekṣā, apramāda, and ahiṃsā; the rest are substantially existent.’ Hence we know that amoha also has a separate substance. Furthermore, it says: ‘Great compassion takes the wholesome root of amoha as its nature, and is not said to be subsumed within the prajñendriya among the twenty-two faculties.’ Hence we know that amoha has a distinct substance and nature.”

2.17

Question: “If so, why does the Abhidharmasamuccaya say: ‘Amoha is discernment, having the wisdom of retribution, teaching, and realization as its substance’? And the commentary says: ‘“Wisdom of retribution, teaching, and realization” refers respectively to the prajñā born of birth, listening, reflection, and cultivation, as should be understood in sequence. “Discernment” means prajñā accompanied by courage and vigor.’ Why does this text say it is of the nature of prajñā?”

2.18

The explanation says: “The wholesome root of amoha merely remedies moha, just as alobha and adveṣa merely remedy rāga and pratigha, having no further distinct aspect (ākāra). In the Abhidharmasamuccaya, it explains amoha in terms of its aspect, not meaning that the wholesome root of amoha is identical in nature to prajñā. If one follows this meaning, among the fifty-one caitta-dharmas, thirty are substantially existent and the rest are all conventionally existent. When it says thirty are substantially existent, it refers to the five sarvatragas, five viniyatas, eight kuśalas plus amoha, five root kleśas excluding improper view, and seven upakleśas; combining these thirty, they are substantially existent, and the rest are conventionally existent.”

2.19

Third, the analysis by four realms: the four realms are the desire realm, form realm, formless realm, and undefiled realm. Among the fifty-one caitta-dharmas, twenty-one are common to the four realms: the five sarvatragas, five viniyatas, and eleven kuśalas. Fourteen are common to three realms, the three realms being the desire realm, form realm, and formless realm; the fourteen are rāga, māna, vicikitsā, avidyā, improper view, āśraddhya, kausīdya, pramāda, styāna, auddhatya, muṣitasmṛtitā, asamprajanya, vikṣepa, and mada. Four are common to two realms, the two realms being the desire realm and form realm; the four items are śāṭhya, māyā, vitarka, and vicāra. Ten items are exclusive to the desire realm; the ten items are pratigha, krodha, upanāha, pradāsa, mrakṣa, īrṣyā, mātsarya, vihiṃsā, āhrīkya, and anapatrāpya.

2.20

Fourth, the analysis by three natures: the three natures are wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate. Among the fifty-one caitta-dharmas, fourteen are common to the three natures; the fourteen are the five sarvatragas, five viniyatas, and four aniyatas. Sixteen are common to two natures, the two natures being the unwholesome nature and the indeterminate nature; the sixteen are rāga, māna, vicikitsā, avidyā, and improper view among the kleśas; and eleven among the upakleśas, namely śāṭhya, māyā, mada, styāna, auddhatya, āśraddhya, kausīdya, pramāda, muṣitasmṛtitā, vikṣepa, and asamprajanya. Twenty-one belong to only one nature: the eleven kuśalas are exclusively of the wholesome nature; pratigha, krodha, upanāha, mrakṣa, pradāsa, īrṣyā, mātsarya, vihiṃsā, āhrīkya, and anapatrāpya—these ten are exclusively unwholesome.

2.21

Fifth, the elimination and establishment of the six categories: relying on the Yogācārabhūmi, the caitta-dharmas are briefly eliminated and established through four criteria. The four criteria are: first, domain (pada); second, plane (bhūmi); third, time (kāla); fourth, all (sarva). ‘Domain’ refers to the three natures; ‘plane’ refers to the nine planes; ‘time’ refers to moment-to-moment continuity; ‘all’ refers to co-arising. Now, with reference to these four criteria, it will be clarified how many [each category] possesses. In this there are two parts: first, clarifying how many criteria the six categories possess; second, clarifying the reasons for the elimination and establishment of the six categories.

2.22

First, explaining the number of characteristics possessed by the six categories: The five sarvatraga dharmas possess all four: first, pervading the three natures; second, pervading the nine planes; third, being continuous; fourth, arising together. The five viniyata dharmas possess two and lack two: possessing two means, first, being common to the three natures, and second, pervading the nine planes; lacking two means, first, not being continuous, and second, not arising together. The eleven kuśala dharmas possess one and lack three: possessing one refers to pervading the nine planes; lacking three refers to, first, not being common to the three natures, second, not being continuous, and third, not arising together. The six kleśas possess one and lack four: possessing one refers to the nature of being root kleśas; lacking four refers to, first, not being common to the three natures, second, not pervading the nine planes, third, not being continuous, and fourth, not arising together. The first heading is also used to differentiate them from the upakleśas, which is why the other four headings are additionally added. These all rely on the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. The twenty upakleśas possess one and lack four: possessing one refers to the nature of being upakleśas; lacking four refers to, first, not being common to the three natures, second, not pervading the nine planes, third, not being continuous, and fourth, not arising together. The first heading is used to differentiate them from the nature of root kleśas, which is why the other four headings are additionally added. These all rely on the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. The four aniyata dharmas possess one and lack three: possessing one refers to being common to the three natures; lacking three refers to, first, not pervading the nine planes, second, not being continuous, and third, not arising together.

2.23

Regarding the rationale for establishing and excluding the six categories: First, contrasting the subsequent five categories with the sarvatraga to clarify establishment and exclusion: Because the five sarvatraga dharmas possess the four characteristics, they are named sarvatraga; the others do not possess them all, and thus are not subsumed under sarvatraga. The five viniyata dharmas both possess two characteristics, namely being common to the three natures and pervading the nine planes, yet they are neither continuous nor do they arise together; lacking these two characteristics, they are not named sarvatraga. The eleven kuśala dharmas both possess one characteristic, namely pervading the nine planes, yet they do not pervade the three natures, nor are they continuous, nor do they arise together; lacking these three characteristics, they are not named sarvatraga. The six kleśa dharmas lack all four: that is, they are not common to the three natures, they do not pervade the nine planes, nor are they continuous, nor do they arise together; lacking all four characteristics, they are not named sarvatraga. The upakleśa dharmas are as explained for the kleśas. The four aniyata dharmas both possess one characteristic, namely being common to the three natures, yet they do not pervade the nine planes, nor are they continuous, nor do they arise together; lacking these three characteristics, they are not named sarvatraga.

2.24

Second, contrasting the other five categories with the category of viniyata to clarify establishment and exclusion in terms of the presence or absence of characteristics: Those that possess two and lack two are included among the viniyata; the others are not so, and thus are not subsumed under viniyata. Although the five sarvatraga dharmas are common to the three natures and pervade the nine planes, merely because they are continuous and arise together—these two characteristics being different—they are not subsumed under viniyata. Although the eleven kuśala dharmas pervade the nine planes, and are neither continuous nor arise together, merely because they are not common to the three natures—one characteristic being different—they are not subsumed under viniyata. Although the six kleśa dharmas are neither continuous nor arise together, merely because they are not common to the three natures and do not pervade the nine planes—these two characteristics being different—they are not subsumed under viniyata. The establishment and exclusion of the upakleśa dharmas in contrast to the viniyata is as explained for the kleśas. Although the four aniyata dharmas are common to the three natures, and are neither continuous nor arise together, merely because they do not pervade the nine planes—one characteristic being different—they are not subsumed under viniyata.

2.25

Third, contrasting the other five categories with the eleven kuśala to clarify establishment and exclusion in terms of the presence or absence of characteristics: Those that possess one and lack three are included among the kuśala dharmas; the others are not so, and thus are not subsumed under kuśala dharmas. Although the five sarvatraga dharmas pervade the nine planes, merely because they are common to the three natures, are continuous, and also arise together—lacking these three characteristics—they are not included among the kuśala. Although the five viniyata dharmas pervade the nine planes, and are neither continuous nor arise together, merely because they are common to the three natures—one characteristic being different—they are not subsumed among the kuśala. Although the six kleśa dharmas are not common to the three natures, and are neither continuous nor arise together, merely because they do not pervade the nine planes—one characteristic being different—they are not included among the kuśala. The upakleśa dharmas are as explained for the kleśas. Although the four aniyata dharmas are neither continuous nor arise together, merely because they are common to the three natures and do not pervade the nine planes—these two characteristics being different—they are not included among the kuśala.

2.26

Fourth, contrasting the other five categories with the six kleśas to clarify establishment and exclusion in terms of the presence or absence of characteristics: Those that possess one and lack four are included among the kleśas; the other dharmas are not so, and thus are not subsumed under the kleśas. The five sarvatraga dharmas, merely because they are common to the three natures, pervade the nine planes, are continuous, arise together, and moreover are not root defilements—lacking all five characteristics—are not subsumed under the kleśas. Although the five viniyata dharmas are neither continuous nor arise together, merely because they are common to the three natures, pervade the nine planes, and moreover are not root defilements—these three characteristics being different—they are not subsumed under the kleśas. Although the eleven kuśala dharmas are not common to the three natures, and are neither continuous nor arise together, merely because they pervade the nine planes and are not root kleśas—these two characteristics being different—they are not subsumed under the kleśas. Although the twenty upakleśa dharmas are not common to the three natures, do not pervade the nine planes, and are neither continuous nor arise together, merely because they are not root kleśas—one characteristic being different—they are not subsumed under the kleśas. Although the four aniyata dharmas do not pervade the nine planes, and are neither continuous nor arise together, merely because they are common to the three natures and are not root kleśas—these two characteristics being different—they are not subsumed under the kleśas.

2.27

Fifth, contrasting the other five categories with the upakleśas to clarify establishment and exclusion in terms of the presence or absence of characteristics: Those that possess one and lack four are included among the upakleśas; the other dharmas are not so, and thus are not upakleśas. The five sarvatraga dharmas, merely because they are common to the three natures, pervade the nine planes, are continuous, arise together, and moreover are not upakleśa defilements—these five characteristics being different—are not subsumed under the upakleśas. Although the five viniyata dharmas are neither continuous nor arise together, merely because they are common to the three natures, pervade the nine planes, and are not upakleśas—these three characteristics being different—are not upakleśas. Although the eleven kuśala dharmas are not common to the three natures, and are neither continuous nor arise together, merely because they do not pervade the nine planes and are not upakleśas—these two characteristics being different—are not upakleśas. Although the six kleśa dharmas are not common to the three natures, do not pervade the nine planes, and are neither continuous nor arise together, merely because they are not upakleśas—one characteristic being different—are not upakleśas. Although the four aniyata dharmas do not pervade the nine planes, and are neither continuous nor arise together, merely because they are common to the three natures and are not upakleśas—these two characteristics being different—are not upakleśas.

2.28

Sixth, contrasting the other five categories with the four aniyata to clarify establishment and exclusion in terms of the presence or absence of characteristics: Those that possess one and lack three are named the four aniyata; the other dharmas are not so, and thus are not subsumed under the aniyata. Although the five sarvatraga dharmas are common to the three natures, merely because they pervade the nine planes, are continuous, and arise together—these three characteristics being different—they do not enter into the aniyata. Although the five viniyata dharmas are common to the three natures, and are neither continuous nor arise together, merely because they pervade the nine planes—one characteristic being different—they do not enter into the aniyata. Although the eleven kuśala dharmas are neither continuous nor arise together, merely because they are not common to the three natures and pervade the nine planes—these two characteristics being different—they are not subsumed under the aniyata. Although the six kleśa dharmas do not pervade the nine planes, and are neither continuous nor arise together, merely because they are not common to the three natures—one characteristic being different—they are not subsumed under the aniyata. Although the twenty upakleśa dharmas do not pervade the nine planes, and are neither continuous nor arise together, merely because they are not common to the three natures—one characteristic being different—they are not subsumed under the aniyata. The above concludes the brief analysis of the caitta-dharmas by means of the five headings.

2.29

The treatise says: "Third, rūpa-dharmas comprise briefly eleven kinds: 1. eye, 2. ear, 3. nose, 4. tongue, 5. body, 6. sight-object, 7. sound, 8. odour, 9. taste, 10. tactile-object, and 11. form subsumed under the sphere of dharmas."

2.30

This is the third [part], explaining rūpa-dharmas. Within this there are two: first, stating the heading; second, giving the number and enumerating the names. Regarding "Third, rūpa-dharmas": this is the first [part], stating the heading. Regarding "rūpa" (matter/form): dharmas of spatial resistance are named rūpa.

2.31

Question: "If they are named rūpa because of spatial resistance, the eyes and other forms can indeed be called spatially resistant; how can unmanifest form (avijñapti-rūpa) be spatially resistant?"

2.32

Explanation: "Although unmanifest form is not spatially resistant, yet because it is born from spatially resistant form, it is also named spatially resistant."

2.33

Regarding "comprise briefly eleven kinds" and so forth: this is the second [part], giving the number and enumerating the names. Discerning the dust of visible form is named the eye; hearing music and the like is named the ear; smelling aloeswood, musk, and the like is named the nose; distinguishing sweet, pungent, and the like is named the tongue; knowing rough, smooth, and the like is named the body. That which is the domain of the eye is named sight-object (rūpa); if based on the Samuccaya, there are twenty-five kinds, namely: blue, yellow, red, white, long, short, square, round, coarse, fine, high, low, regular, irregular, light, shadow, brightness, darkness, cloud, smoke, dust, mist, distant form, manifest form, and form revealing empty space. That which is heard by the ear is named sound (śabda); if based on the Samuccaya, there are eleven kinds, namely: agreeable, disagreeable, neither, originating from grasped great elements, originating from ungrasped great elements, originating from both great elements, worldly established, logically induced, conceptually constructed, subsumed under noble speech, and not subsumed under noble speech. That which is smelled by the nose is named odour (gandha); if based on the Samuccaya, there are six kinds, namely: good odour, bad odour, neutral odour, innate odour, composite odour, and transformed odour. That which is tasted by the tongue is named taste (rasa); if based on the Samuccaya, there are twelve kinds, namely: bitter, sour, sweet, pungent, salty, bland, agreeable, disagreeable, neither, innate, composite, and transformed. That which is apprehended by the body is named tactile-object (spraṣṭavya); if based on the Samuccaya, there are twenty-two kinds, namely: smooth, rough, light, heavy, soft, warm, urgent, cold, hunger, thirst, satiety, strength, weakness, faintness, itching, stickiness, sickness, old age, death, fatigue, rest, and vigor. Eleventh, 'form subsumed under the sphere of dharmas' (dharmāyatanaparyāpanna-rūpa) refers to that which is the domain of the mental consciousness, invisible and non-resistant, subsumed under the aggregate of form; there are briefly five kinds, namely: extremely reduced form, extremely distant form, form induced by acceptance, form arising from conceptual construction, and form produced by mastery. Extremely reduced form refers to infinitesimal form (paramāṇu). Extremely distant form refers to this very [form] separated from other obstructive touches. Form induced by acceptance refers to unmanifest form (avijñapti-rūpa). Form arising from conceptual construction refers to image form (pratibimba). Form produced by mastery refers to the objective form of the domain of liberation and meditative absorption. The above concludes the third major division, explaining rūpa-dharmas.

2.34

The treatise says: "Fourth, the citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra-dharmas are, in brief, of twenty-four kinds: 1. possession (prāpti), 2. life-faculty (jīvitendriya), 3. generic similarity (nikāya-sabhāgatā), 4. state of an ordinary person (pṛthagjanatva), 5. non-conceptual absorption (asaṃjñi-samāpatti), 6. absorption of cessation (nirodha-samāpatti), 7. state of non-conception (āsaṃjñika), 8. name-group (nāma-kāya), 9. phrase-group (pada-kāya), 10. phoneme-group (vyañjana-kāya), 11. origination (jāti), 12. aging (jarā), 13. subsistence (sthiti), 14. impermanence (anityatā), 15. continuity (pravṛtti), 16. specific differentiation (pratiniyama), 17. association (yoga), 18. speed (jāva), 19. sequence (anukrama), 20. spatial direction (diś), 21. time (kāla), 22. number (saṃkhyā), 23. harmony (sāmagrī), and 24. disharmony (asāmagrī)."

2.35

This is the fourth section, clarifying the citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra-dharmas. Within this there are two parts: first, stating the heading; second, giving the number and listing their names. As for stating "Fourth, the citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra-dharmas," this is the first part, stating the heading. The five sarvatraga [factors] and so forth are associated with the mind (citta), whereas these dharmas such as possession are not associated with the mind; hence they are named "citta-viprayukta" (unassociated with the mind). The term "saṃskāra" refers to the saṃskāra-skandha; this clarifies that these dharmas such as possession are subsumed under the saṃskāra-skandha, while the remaining citta, rūpa, and asaṃskṛta are not subsumed under the saṃskāra-skandha. Stating "viprayukta" excludes caitta-dharmas. Stating "saṃskāra" excludes citta, rūpa, and asaṃskṛta; therefore they are called "citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra."

2.36

As for "are, in brief, of twenty-four kinds" and so forth, this is the second part, giving the number and listing their names. 'First, possession' means that which is nominally designated over the acquisition of dharmas of the three natures; it is called 'possession'. That which is induced by prior karma, accords with the shortness or length of lifespan, and determines the duration of subsistence, is called 'life-faculty'. The distinctions among the six destinies are each different, yet beings abide with those of their own kind; this is called 'generic similarity'. Not yet having attained or realized the noble dharmas, being different from the noble ones, one is called an 'ordinary person'. Ceasing the six consciousnesses and their mental factors so that there is no cognitive object-directed reflection is called 'non-conceptual absorption'. Ceasing the six consciousnesses and their mental factors as well as a portion of the seventh is called 'absorption of cessation'. Being born in the Non-conceptual Heaven, having no cognitive object-directed reflection in the mind for five hundred kalpas, is called the 'state of non-conception'. That which expresses conditioned phenomena such as 'deva' or 'human' is called 'name-group'. Bringing dharmas together and designating names to make manifest the meaning of defilement or purity is called 'phrase-group'. That upon which both names and phrases depend is called 'phoneme-group'. Having originally been absent and now being present is called 'origination'. White hair and a wrinkled face are called 'aging'. Unbroken continuation is called 'subsistence'. Having existed and then becoming non-existent is called 'impermanence'. Moment-by-moment continuity is called 'continuity'. Causes and effects being distinct from each other is called 'specific differentiation'. The mutual correspondence of cause and effect is called 'association'. Swift succession is called 'speed'. Their not being simultaneous one by one is called 'sequence'. East, west, south, and north are called 'spatial direction'. Past, present, and future are called 'time'. One, ten, a hundred, and a thousand are called 'number'. The gathering together of multiple conditions is called 'harmony'. Conditions of conditioned phenomena falling apart is called 'disharmony'. Above, the fourth explanation of citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra is completed.

2.37

Now we briefly formulate three gates to analyze the twenty-four viprayukta-saṃskāra-dharmas: first, clarifying the differences among treatises; second, resolving objections; third, discerning their nominal characteristics.

2.38

First, clarifying the differences among treatises: the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the *Prakaraṇāryavācā*, and this treatise all have twenty-four viprayukta-saṃskāras; the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* has twenty-three, lacking disharmony; in the *Pañcaskandhaka* there are only fourteen, lacking the ten beginning with continuity. Thus the treatises differ in the numbers they present.

2.39

Second, resolving objections: Question: "Why do the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the *Prakaraṇāryavācā*, and this treatise agree, while the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* has twenty-three, lacking disharmony? What is the intention behind this?"

2.40

One explanation says: "When the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* says 'harmony and so forth', since the treatise states 'and so forth' after harmony, one should know that it includes disharmony as well." Another explanation says: "It is not mentioned because of brevity."

2.41

Question: "If it is an abbreviation, why not omit other numbers? Why omit only disharmony?"

2.42

The explanation says: "It is already expressed within what has been stated; therefore it specifically omits only disharmony. Saying 'it is expressed within what has been stated' means that the state of an ordinary person is nominally established based on the defilements abandoned upon the path of seeing, and in relation to the noble path it has the sense of non-attainment, which is precisely the meaning of disharmony. Within disharmony, it briefly raises one aspect; other disharmonies can be known by analogy, which is why it specifically omits disharmony. As for the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the *Prakaraṇāryavācā*, and this treatise having twenty-four, this is based on having a separate designation of disharmony apart from the state of an ordinary person; therefore other treatises speak of twenty-four."

2.43

Question: "That various treatises state either the number twenty-four or the number twenty-three has already been explained above. Why does the *Pañcaskandhaka* have only fourteen, lacking the ten beginning with continuity?"

2.44

The explanation says: "The reason the *Pañcaskandhaka* does not state the ten beginning with continuity is that that treatise explains: 'Categories such as these...' One should know that the words 'categories such as these' in that treatise also encompass the ten beginning with continuity. Here they are simply abbreviated, and their names are not separately listed."

2.45

Third, discerning their nominal characteristics: the twenty-four viprayukta-saṃskāra-dharmas are all nominally established upon the states (avasthā) of rūpa, citta, and caitta-dharmas.

2.46

Question: "Since the twenty-four viprayukta-saṃskāras are all nominally established upon the states of rūpa, citta, and caitta-dharmas, how many are nominally established upon rūpa? How many upon citta? How many upon caitta-dharmas? How many generally apply to rūpa, citta, and caitta-dharmas?"

2.47

The explanation says: "According to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, they are subsumed under eight states, established on the basis of eight kinds of states. Hence the treatise says: 'Such citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra-dharmas are established solely on the basis of distinctions among states; therefore one should know that they all exist nominally.'"

2.48

First: concerning 'establishing one kind upon the states of increase and decrease in wholesome, unwholesome, and other dharmas', the explanation says: "This is possession, which is nominally established generally upon rūpa, citta, and caitta-dharmas of the three natures."

2.49

Second: concerning 'establishing three kinds upon distinctions in the states of citta and caitta-dharmas', the explanation says: "One should know that these are the three: non-conceptual absorption, absorption of cessation, and non-conceptual maturation (āsaṃjñika-vipāka). With non-conceptual absorption and absorption of cessation, the entity of the two absorptions is nominally established on the basis of the gradual increase of capability upon the seeds of the mind of revulsion. As for non-conceptual maturation, one should know that it is nominally established upon the seeds of the non-conceptual retribution-mind from the perspective of the meaning of citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra; these three are nominally established generally upon citta and caitta-dharmas."

2.50

Third: concerning 'establishing one kind upon distinctions in the state of nature', the explanation says: "This is the life-faculty. On the basis of the ālaya-vijñāna being capable of sustaining the generic similarity so that the four great elements and the various sense-faculties do not deteriorate, the life-faculty is nominally established upon the citta and caitta-dharmas associated with the ālaya-vijñāna. This is nominally established generally upon citta and caitta-dharmas; in the desire and form realms, it is nominally established generally upon rūpa as well; in the formless realm, it is nominally established solely upon citta and caitta-dharmas."

2.51

Fourth: concerning 'establishing one kind upon distinctions in the state of similarity', the explanation says: "One should know that this is generic similarity, nominally established generally upon rūpa, citta, and caitta-dharmas."

2.52

Fifth: concerning 'establishing four kinds upon distinctions in the state of characteristics', the explanation says: "One should know that these are the four characteristics, nominally established generally upon rūpa, citta, and caitta-dharmas."

2.53

Sixth: concerning 'establishing three kinds upon distinctions in the state of verbal expression', the explanation says: "One should know that these are the three groups of name, phrase, and phoneme, nominally established generally upon rūpa, citta, and caitta-dharmas."

2.54

Question: "That name-, phrase-, and phoneme-groups are nominally established upon rūpa is without doubt. How are they nominally established upon citta and caitta-dharmas?"

2.55

The explanation says: "Because they are cognitive objects (ālambana-pratyaya) of the thought of the mind, giving rise to understanding, they are nominally established generally upon citta and caitta-dharmas."

2.56

Seventh: concerning 'establishing one kind upon distinctions in the state of non-attainment', the explanation says: "One should know that this is the state of an ordinary person. Based on the aspect of non-attainment of the aforementioned uncontaminated noble dharmas, the state of an ordinary person is nominally established; it is nominally established upon rūpa, citta, and caitta-dharmas prior to attaining the path of seeing."

2.57

Eighth: concerning 'establishing the remaining kinds upon distinctions in the states of cause and effect', the explanation says: "One should know that these are the remaining ten: continuity, specific differentiation, association, speed, sequence, spatial direction, time, number, harmony, and disharmony. One should know that all ten are nominally established generally upon rūpa, citta, and caittas."

2.58

In summary, one should know that three are nominally established generally upon citta and caitta-dharmas, and twenty-one are nominally established generally upon rūpa, citta, and caitta-dharmas. Stating that three kinds are nominally established generally upon citta and caitta-dharmas refers to non-conceptual absorption, absorption of cessation, and non-conceptual maturation. Stating that twenty-one kinds are nominally established generally upon rūpa, citta, and caitta-dharmas refers to possession, life-faculty, generic similarity, state of an ordinary person, name-group, phrase-group, phoneme-group, origination, aging, death, impermanence, continuity, specific differentiation, association, speed, sequence, spatial direction, time, number, harmony, and disharmony. Here the brief analysis of the citta-viprayukta-saṃskāras is completed.

2.59

The treatise says: "Fifth, asaṃskṛta-dharmas are, in brief, of six kinds: 1. space (ākāśa), 2. cessation through deliberation (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha), 3. cessation not through deliberation (apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha), 4. immobility (āneñjya), 5. cessation of conception and sensation (saṃjñā-vedayita-nirodha), and 6. suchness (tathatā)."

2.60

This is the fifth section, clarifying the asaṃskṛta-dharmas. Within this text there are two parts: first, stating the heading; second, giving the number and listing their names.

2.61

Stating "Fifth, asaṃskṛta-dharmas" is the first part, stating the heading. Stating "are, in brief, of six kinds" and so forth is the second part, giving the number and listing their names. 'Space' means having no material obstruction and accommodating all actions that are performed; hence it is named 'space'. Wisdom has the capacity of deliberation, and is therefore called 'deliberation'; because cessation is obtained through deliberation, it is named 'cessation through deliberation'. When causes and conditions do not assemble, dharmas do not arise; this is not cessation brought about by wisdom, hence it is named 'cessation not through deliberation'. Above the fourth dhyāna, only neutral feeling (upekṣā-vedanā) is manifest, unmoved by suffering and pleasure; hence it is named 'immobility'. In the absorption of cessation, citta and caitta-dharmas cease, and because conception and sensation have superior activity, it is named after the predominant [factors]; thus it is named 'cessation of conception and sensation'. The dharma-nature is originally and always quiescent in itself and has the meaning of not altering; this is called 'suchness'. This is the fifth section, clarifying asaṃskṛta-dharmas.

2.62

The above explanation from 'all dharmas' down to the fifth, the asaṃskṛtas, completes the reply to the first question. Below begins the second, answering the latter question.

2.63

The treatise says: "Concerning 'anātman', there are, in brief, two kinds: 1. pudgala-nairātmya, and 2. dharma-nairātmya."

2.64

This is the second [section], answering the latter question. Within this answer there are two [parts]: first, restating the section heading; second, presenting the number and listing the names. "Regarding anātman" is the first, restating the section heading. "Briefly, there are two kinds," and so forth, is presenting the number and listing the names. Regarding the term "pudgala": in this land it is correctly translated as "one who repeatedly takes rebirth in destinies." Going back and forth repeatedly among the six destinies is called "repeatedly taking rebirth in destinies." Although there is coming and going, there is absolutely no self or person; hence it is called "non-self" (anātman). Second, "dharma-nairātmya": the aggregates, realms, sense bases, and so forth are called "dharmas"; because these lack a person, it is called "non-self" (anātman). This concludes the second [section], answering the latter question.

2.65

Commentary on the Mahāyāna Treatise on the Gateway to Understanding the Hundred Dharmas, Fascicle Two.

Linked texts (1)

大乘百法明門論疏 — Classical Chinese