肇論新疏 1

English (machine translation) 1

Language: English

1.1

Exposed by Śramaṇa Wencai, the Perpetual Lecturer, the Founding Abbot of the Great Wansheng Youguo Temple on Mount Wutai, Head of the Source of Śākya Great White Horse Temple, posthumously conferred the title Duke of Gui State, and Great Master of the Sāgaramudrā Dharmic Expansion.

1.2

From the beginning, I was fond of reciting this treatise and also casually savoured its phrases, but I was not yet able to absorb the flavour of its principle with my mind. When I was assigned to Xingjiao in Fanchuan, I obtained the commentary of Chan Master Yunan Da; some years later, responding to a summons to Ningxia, I further obtained the commentaries of Chan Master Guangyao of the Tang and Master Jingyuan of the Song. Examining them back and forth, their pure and flawed aspects were mingled and disordered, and there seemed to be many depths of the treatise's purport that were not fully brought to light. Moreover, the profundity, purity, terseness, and subtlety of this treatise have been praised since its inception; its phrasing is literary and its argumentation unfolds with eloquence—unless one has penetrated deeply into dharmatā and sits upon the peak of delightful eloquence and skillfulness, none could have composed it. I indeed consider it to be the great key that unlocks the vaipulya, the vast vessel that cruises the ocean of nature, the balanced chariot that conveys the provisional and the real, and the correct discourse that banishes deviant views: truly an elegant composition of the ekayāna siṃhanāda. I wish that those of us who study our nature would first apply the whip here; if one thoroughly penetrates this, then the principle of the Great Square will be wonderfully attained without anxious seeking. Alas! From the Yao Qin to the Tang, over more than two hundred years, successive sages and holy monks like Xianshou, Qingliang, and Guishan all cited it to resolve great doctrinal points; yet none elaborated its intricate essentials to summon those to come, causing diverse explanations to be as misfitted as a chisel in a mortise, leaving people not knowing how to judge correctly. Thus, on a day of leisure, I have carefully gathered the explanations of past enlightened ones and separately made an instructional commentary to impart to my assembly. I feel ashamed that, constrained by extraneous busyness, whenever I explain the doctrines and cite authorities I have not been able to exhaust the subtleties in my investigation. I hope that gentlemen of the same robe and the same virtue will forgive my rough, unpolished errors and correct them.

1.3

Zhaolun

1.4

"Zhao" is the name of the author, and "lun" is the method of what was composed; the person and the Dharma are combined to form the general title of the entire work. Because the four treatises were produced at different times and each takes one principle as its main doctrine, wishing to unite them as one, they could not all be titled under every heading; thus the single section "Zongben yi" was newly composed to crown the head of the treatises. Merely saying "Zhaolun", both the main doctrine and the expositions belong to it. As for speaking of "lun" (treatise), it means provisionally establishing host and guest to definitively resolve the extremely profound, examining and investigating back and forth to show beings practice and awakening; hence it is called a "treatise". However, there are two kinds: first, doctrinal treatises, which take a sūtra as the main doctrine to establish tenets, such as the Awakening of Faith, Vijñaptimātratā, and the like; second, expository commentaries, which merely follow a sūtra to explain it, such as the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa and the like. Now, these four treatises are of the first kind, not the second.

1.5

Composed by Śākya Sengzhao of Chang'an under the Later Qin

1.6

The Tongjian says: "Fu Jian occupied Guanzhong, naming the state Great Qin. Toward the end of Fu Jian's reign, Yao Chang usurped the throne and also called it Qin. Therefore, historians distinguished them by the words 'Former' and 'Later'." The treatise master lived under the Later Qin. Chang'an is the present-day Anxi. "Śākya" refers to Śākyamuni, which is the common surname of monastics, because the Tathāgata had the surname of the Śākya clan. Master Dao'an initiated this model, which from afar agreed with the āgamas; for a thousand ages it has been followed and relied upon, without change down to the present. Sengzhao is the name of the treatise master. His original biography states in brief: "A native of Jingzhao, he read widely through the classics and histories and thoroughly mastered ancient writings. His aspiration delighted in the subtle and profound, and he always took Zhuangzi and Laozi as his mental essentials. Hence he sighed: 'Beautiful indeed they are, yet their method of resting the spirit and merging with afflictions is still not completely consummate.' Later, when he saw the old Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, he rejoiced and received it on the crown of his head, saying that only then did he know where to take refuge. Thereupon he went forth from household life. He skillfully studied the vaipulya and simultaneously mastered the Tripiṭaka. Hearing that Kumārajīva was in Guzang, he went from afar to follow him; Kumārajīva praised and admired him without limit. When Kumārajīva came to Chang'an, Zhao also followed him into the city. Yao Xing decreed that he enter the Xiaoyao Garden to carefully settle the sūtras and treatises. The four treatises he authored, along with the Commentary on the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa and the prefaces he composed for various sūtras and treatises, are all transmitted in the world." "Composed" means formulated or created. The meaning is truly the Buddha's teaching, while the treatise was authored by himself—he composed its phrasing without concealing its meaning.

1.7

Zongben yi

1.8

What the four treatises venerate is called the "main doctrine" (zong). "Root" (ben) refers to the fundamental, which pervades both phenomena (fa) and principle (yi). As for phenomena, there are the general and the particular. The general is the ekacitta of dharmatā. Master Jingyuan of Zhongwu said: "Now these four treatises take this ekacitta as their main doctrine. Although the four treatises differ, they each also expound the meaning of this ekacitta." As for the particular, what the four treatises take as their main doctrines differs individually. Why is it so? Without the ekacitta, there would be no way to subsume the four dharmas; without the four dharmas, there would be no way to display the ekacitta. The one is the four, and the four are the one. "Principle" (yi) refers to doctrinal principle; it reveals the aspects of the principle based on the aforementioned substance of phenomena. If the phenomena are general, the principle is general; if the phenomena are particular, the principle is particular. The principles of the four passages herein, according to their scope, are what the four treatises below take as their main doctrines. Based on this, without the Zongben, there would be no way to unify the four treatises; without the four treatises, there would be no way to unfold the Zongben. If we take phenomena as the root, what is taken as the main doctrine is the root; if we take principle as the root, the root is also principle. If phenomena and principle are divided into two, when the root belongs to phenomena, it is the principle of the root.

1.9

Original non-being, dharmatā, dharmatā, prakṛti-śūnyatā, and concurrence of conditions

1.10

These five names are commonly found in the various sūtras; although their meanings differ, they do not exceed principle and phenomena. Now, tracing their succession from beginning to end, I explain them briefly. First, regarding the phenomena of the concurrence of conditions: prior to conditions, there was originally nothing, hence it is called "original non-being". The mark of animitta is again called "dharmatā (real mark)"; this very dharmatā is the nature of all dharmas, hence it is called "dharmatā (Dharma-nature)". This nature is true emptiness, hence it is again called "prakṛti-śūnyatā (nature-emptiness)". Furthermore, because the principle of prakṛti-śūnyatā is not separate from phenomena, following phenomena according to principle, it is again called the "concurrence of conditions". It means that through the coming together of causes and conditions, all dharmas exist; they are also called "conditioned aggregation", "conditioned arising", and the like, all intending phenomena. Upādhyāya Dushun said: "Apart from the ultimate principle, not a single phenomenon can be found."

1.11

are just a single meaning.

1.12

Meaning is revealed through dharmas. Since dharmas have principle and phenomena from a single source, how could their meanings admit of divergence? One must not seize upon the five names and posit that there are five dharmas, each being a separate meaning. Here, following the branches from the root, there are only branches and no root—this is also a single meaning. Subsuming the branches back to the root, there is only the root and no branches—this is also a single meaning. If root and branches are fused without distinction of boundary, it is all the more a single meaning. If explained in contrast with the "Immutability" below: the concurrence of conditions is things; original non-being and the others are principle. Due to their being a single meaning, they mutate yet are immutable; therefore this serves as the main doctrine for the Wubuqian lun below.

1.13

Why is this?

1.14

This is an inquiry.

1.15

All dharmas arise from the concurrence of conditions.

1.16

Whether form or mind, it is after causes and conditions aggregate that they arise.

1.17

Arising from the concurrence of conditions, then before arising they do not exist; when conditions separate, then they perish.

1.18

The first phrase follows from the preceding: causes and conditions are the cause, and all dharmas are the result. For the cause to be absent while the result is present is impossible; this is stated with respect to the prior limit. In the latter phrase, since dharmas arise from conditions of themselves and the conditioned undergoes transition and decay, when causes and conditions separate and disperse, all dharmas perish and decay; this is stated with respect to the posterior limit.

1.19

If they truly existed, existing, they would have no perishing.

1.20

"Truly" means real. If dharmas truly existed, their existing should have no perishing. Since dharmas perish accordingly, we know they do not truly exist. The treatise below states: "Now if existence were true existence, how could it wait for conditions and only then exist?" The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: "If a dharma truly existed, it should not be non-existent," and so on.

1.21

Inferring from this, we therefore know that although they are presently existing now, existing, their nature is ever of itself empty. Because their nature is ever of itself empty, they are called prakṛti-śūnyatā.

1.22

This reveals the root through the branches. Observing present dharmas with respect to the prior and posterior limits: since they merely arise from the aggregation of conditions, how could they wait for conditions to separate before they perish? Because causes and conditions are not a true harmony, they are ever separate even right now, and they are also perishing right now. Form is itself emptiness; its nature is inherently so. Hence conditioned arising is itself prakṛti-śūnyatā. The holy master Qingliang said: "Conditioned arising is asvabhāva; its very substance is true."

1.23

Because their nature is empty, it is called dharmatā.

1.24

True emptiness is the nature of all dharmas.

1.25

Dharmatā is like this, hence it is called dharmatā [as the real mark].

1.26

"Like this" means empty. Because emptiness is animitta, it is therefore called dharmatā [as the real mark].

1.27

The real mark is of itself non-existent, not made non-existent by inference; hence it is called original non-being.

1.28

Dharmas aggregated by conditions are fundamentally empty in their very substance, like reflections in a mirror or echoes in a valley; one does not wait to infer and refute them to make them non-existent. This very real mark is original non-being. The treatise below says: "How could one wait for dissection to seek penetration?" This excludes the Hīnayāna analysis of form into emptiness. Above, listing the names proceeded from root to branches; here, inferring the meaning proceeds from branches to root. Yet root and branches are fused: neither before nor after, neither one nor different.

1.29

Speaking of being neither existent nor non-existent:

1.30

Various sūtras and treatises often clarify the four tetralemmas, namely: existent, non-existent, both existent and non-existent, and neither existent nor non-existent. Expressing virtues based on dharmas does not go beyond these four. Furthermore, in terms of refuting attachments and eliminating slanders, there are also four propositions, namely: not existent, not non-existent, not neither-existent-nor-non-existent, and not both-existent-and-non-existent. What is cited now are the fourth of the former [tetralemma] and the first two propositions of the latter. The reason for specifically citing these to clarify them is to eliminate the two views, to block [extremes] and reveal the Middle Way, and to cause the mind to be without abiding; this serves as the main doctrine for the Buzhenkong lun below.

1.31

it is not like (meaning identical to) the existence of the view of existence and the view of permanence, or the non-existence of deviant views and the view of annihilation.

1.32

First, this is explained in terms of refuting attachments. The third fascicle of the Foxing lun says: "All views do not go beyond the two kinds, existence and non-existence. Due to the view of existence, one grasps permanence; within the view of non-existence there are again two kinds: first, deviant views, which claim that everything lacks cause and effect, denying all three times; second, the view of annihilation, which claims that there is only the present, disbelieving in the future." Following this, from existence arises permanence, and from non-existence arise the two of deviant view and annihilation; hence the treatise describes both. In the sūtras, to refute these views, it says "neither existent nor non-existent". The treatise states: "It is not like the view grasping existence which is the existence of the view of permanence, hence it is called 'not existent'; it is not like the view grasping non-existence which is the non-existence of deviant views and the view of annihilation, hence it is called 'not non-existent'." The two words "not like" govern both deviant view and annihilation below.

1.33

If one takes (meaning grasps) existence as existence (permanence), then one takes non-existence as non-existence (annihilation). Once existence is not existent, then there is no non-existence either.

1.34

This is explained in terms of arising and ceasing. The first two phrases clarify arising by mutual dependence: once a single view arises, the other view arises following it, just as seeing that a cow has horns makes one say a rabbit has no horns, and so forth. Hence the Ghanavyūhasūtra says: "It is only depending on existent dharmas that a view of non-existence arises." This is the disease to be cured. The latter two phrases clarify perishing by mutual dependence: if one cures one view, the other view perishes along with it. Since the sūtra already says "not existent", it is therefore also "not non-existent". Hence the Ghanavyūhasūtra says: "Existent dharmas are fundamentally non-existent of themselves; what could the view of non-existence depend on?" This is the medicine that can cure it. How grand! Skillfully exhausting the sūtra's purport in every detail.

1.35

Now, one who wishes to retain (meaning seize) non-existence in order to contemplate dharmas can be said to understand the real mark of dharmas; this means that although one contemplates existence, there are no marks seized upon.

1.36

This is explained in terms of contemplative practice. "Dharmas" are the various dharmas of conditioned arising. This means that although they are empty through conditions, one must not retain non-existence to contemplate them; if they were non-existent, then the three trainings, the six pāramitās, the five heinous sins, and the ten unwholesome deeds would be empty and without fruit. Because they are not non-existent, all dharmas are established. "Not seizing upon marks" means that although conditioned arising exists, one also must not seize upon marks to contemplate them; if one seizes upon them, how could conditioned practice of arising and ceasing accord with the true? Because they are not existent, the mind does not abide in marks; establishing a single merit and setting up a single virtue, there is none that does not accord with the Way. Seeing dharmas like this, one only then understands the real mark. The phrase "real mark" appears above, but its meaning belongs below; this is the contemplation of the Middle Way Buddha-nature. The purports herein are boundless and cannot be narrated in full, as explained in texts like the Nirvāṇasūtra and the Mohe zhiguan. The above three meanings explain the name: the first two depart from faults, and the last one accomplishes practice.

1.37

Thus the mark of dharmas is the mark of animitta, and the mind of the sage abides in that which has nowhere to abide.

1.38

"Dharma-marks" are the object of contemplation, belonging to the aforementioned dharmatā. Since it is neither being nor non-being, how could it have characteristic marks? It is merely spoken of as "marks" in sense when paired against the non-abiding mind; therefore it is called "the mark of the markless." "Sage mind" and so forth refers to the contemplating mind attaining non-conceptualization, both being termed "sage." However, for those practicing the tathatā-samādhi before the stages (bhūmi), they are also permitted to emulate this practice, illuminating both being and non-being simultaneously, which is called "abiding." Neither retaining non-being nor grasping at marks, they abide yet are without abiding. Although practitioners of the Nature school are ordinary persons fully bound by defilements, if they possess long-accumulated cultivation, they should indeed pay heed to this. Here, the sage mind is cited to cause people to admire and model themselves after it.

1.39

The three vehicles equally contemplate prakṛti-śūnyatā and attain the Way. Prakṛti-śūnyatā means the dharmatā of all phenomena.

1.40

"Equally" means with impartiality. "The Way" means the bodhi of one's own vehicle. The reason this is distinguished in terms of persons is out of fear that people might suspect that outside of dharmatā there are separate, distinct realizations for the three vehicles, unaware that the capacities and dispositions of the three vehicles differ according to their past perfumings, but the prakṛti-śūnyatā they contemplate is without difference. Thus Śāriputra said: "We all enter into the dharmatā together." The Buddha praised Kāśyapa for sharing the same liberation, just as when three beasts cross a river, the river has no different water.

1.41

Seeing the dharmatā of phenomena is therefore called correct contemplation; if it were different from this, it would be incorrect contemplation.

1.42

The two contemplations, correct and incorrect, are generally taught throughout the scriptures. Here, correct and incorrect are distinguished in terms of dharmatā. The Dazhidulun states: "Except for dharmatā, all else are works of Māra."

1.43

Suppose the two vehicles do not see this principle, then they are inverted.

1.44

There are two explanations of this: First, it simply refers to the two vehicles within the three vehicles. The meaning is: if the Hinayana does not see the principle of prakṛti-śūnyatā, then it is also inverted and will not achieve fruit and realization. This is because the two vehicles only see impermanence and do not see permanence, which is inversion. In this case, it can be spoken of in terms of contrasting the Great and Small [Vehicles]. If the Small is already like this, how much more so the Great Vehicle? Second, what was earlier called "the three vehicles" refers to those accommodated by the Shared Teaching who study the emptiness of dharmas, so their common contemplation of dharmatā is correct contemplation; whereas the "two vehicles" here refers to those dull regarding dharmas accommodated by the Pitaka Teaching. The meaning is: even the two vehicles dull regarding dharmas must also contemplate the principle of prakṛti-śūnyatā to obtain realization; if they do not see this principle, then they are inverted and therefore do not realize it. When the Great Commentary refutes the teaching of existence, it cites the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra: "I now correctly elucidate the real meaning within the Tripitaka, and the real meaning is emptiness." The Qingliang Commentary says: "One cannot attain the Way without seeing the real meaning." Because personal emptiness is also one part of twofold emptiness, how could it be so vastly different? Therefore it was earlier said that they "equally contemplate."

1.45

Therefore, the method of contemplation of the three vehicles does not differ; it is merely that their minds have the distinction of being broad or narrow.

1.46

The dharmatā that is the destination is one; the roots and aptitudes of those capable of proceeding to it are different. Receptacles have broad and narrow; wisdom has shallow and deep; transit has self and others; progression has circuitous and direct; realization has single and double. These differences lie in the person, not in the Dharma.

1.47

Upāya and prajñā are designations (names) for great wisdom.

1.48

Both names are cited together, and they pertain generally to its essence. Fascicle eighteen of the Dazhidulun says: "Mahāprajñā in the Qin language is called 'great wisdom.' Upāya here is called 'expedient means.'" When a single thought encompasses both, it is named great wisdom. The isolated wisdom of the two vehicles stands alone; it is wisdom, but not great. This is the theme of the treatise on prajñā below.

1.49

Seeing the dharmatā of phenomena is called prajñā; being able not to manifest (which means to display) realization is the efficacy of upāya.

1.50

The first two lines explain how the name is acquired: because it sees dharmatā, it is named prajñā. The latter two lines state that it sees yet does not realize; this is precisely because great compassion guides wisdom so that it does not realize emptiness, transcending the two vehicles. The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: "Wisdom without expedient means is bondage; wisdom with expedient means is liberation." This is because wisdom without compassion is intoxicated with the wine of quiescent extinction and falls into the pit of the unconditioned.

1.51

Going (meaning going forth) to transform sentient beings is called upāya; not being defiled by worldly encumbrances (pronounced in the falling tone) is the power of prajñā.

1.52

The first two lines also explain how the name is acquired: because it transforms sentient beings, it is named expedient means. The latter two lines state that it transforms yet is not defiled; this again is because great wisdom guides compassion so that it is not defiled by dust, distinguishing it from ordinary persons. The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: "Expedient means without wisdom is bondage; expedient means with wisdom is liberation." This is because expedient means without wisdom falls into the net of craving and views and is submerged in the forest of marks. "Dust" refers to the dusty objects of the five desires; "encumbrances" refers to the faults and afflictions of birth-and-death.

1.53

Thus, the gate of prajñā contemplates emptiness, and the gate of upāya enters into existence. Entering into existence, it is never for a moment (meaning temporarily) deluded regarding the void; therefore it constantly dwells (meaning abides) in existence yet is not defiled. Not rejecting (meaning abandoning) existence, it contemplates emptiness; therefore, contemplating emptiness, it does not realize it.

1.54

Continuing from before, this explains how identity avoids stagnation. The first two lines distinguish provisional and real in terms of contemplating emptiness and existence: nirvāṇa is emptiness, and birth-and-death is existence. The latter four lines directly reveal non-stagnation: with the single mind in which the two wisdoms are fused, it contemplates the true reality where emptiness and existence are non-dual. As when contemplating form as existence, form is itself emptiness; how could it ever momentarily be deluded about prakṛti-śūnyatā? Because it is not deluded about emptiness, it constantly dwells in the realm of existence without being defiled by dust. The next line should be understood conversely. This is called the mutual accord of the two truths and the mutual assistance of the two practices: like the two wheels of a cart, or like the two wings of a bird soaring into the sky and reaching afar; if either is lacking, nothing can be accomplished. Through the gate of emptiness one leaves birth-and-death and enters nirvāṇa; through the gate of existence one establishes the Buddha's teachings and transforms sentient beings. Since principle and cognitive measure are non-dual, and birth-and-death and nirvāṇa are identical, one does not stagnate in emptiness nor is one burdened by existence.

1.55

This is what is meant by the power of a single thought fully possessing both expedients and wisdom; the power of a single thought fully possessing both expedients and wisdom!

1.56

"Thought" refers to a thought of wisdom. "A single" means the shortest span of time. "Expedients" means upāya-jñāna, which is the aforementioned expedient means. "Wisdom" means tattva-jñāna, which is the aforementioned prajñā. It means that in a single brief thought, both wisdoms are fully present. Repeating it is an exclamation of praise for the marvel of this wisdom.

1.57

Reflect on this well, and it will be clearly understood.

1.58

"Clearly" means that the principle is extremely manifest, distinct, and clear, and can be grasped and understood.

1.59

"Nirvāṇa as the truth of exhaustion":

1.60

Both the Chinese and Sanskrit terms are cited. Ancient translations rendered the truth of cessation (nirodha-satya) as the truth of exhaustion; the meaning of exhaustion is explained below. This also cites a scripture to explain it, serving as the theme for the Treatise on the Namelessness of Nirvāṇa below.

1.61

It is simply the exhaustion of the fetters, nothing more.

1.62

"Fetters" means all bondages and afflictions, and also encompasses various karmas; that is the truth of origin (samudaya-satya). Explaining this by metaphor, it is like a knot tied in a rope in the world, which is the hardest to untie.

1.63

Then birth-and-death is forever eliminated; therefore it is called "exhaustion."

1.64

"Birth-and-death" is the truth of suffering (duḥkha-satya). Joined with the preceding, these are the three defilements, also called the three obstacles. These three obstacles mutually depend on one another and can obstruct nirvāṇa; here, in terms of the path of remedy, they are collectively spoken of as "exhausted." If spoken of separately, karma such as the ten evils can be eliminated at the stage of faith. Affliction has root and branch: the root is fundamental non-enlightenment, and the branch is branch non-enlightenment. Within the branches there are again seven categories, namely the three subtle and four coarse. Birth-and-death is also twofold: first, fragmentary; second, transformational. From the three stages of worthies before the grounds, one severs the coarsest of the coarse, and further contemplates and learns to sever fundamental ignorance. From the path of vision up to the seventh ground, one severs the subtle within the coarse; at that time fragmentary [birth-and-death] is exhausted. From the eighth ground up to the final ground, one severs the three subtle [aspects] of the ālaya and fundamental ignorance; at that time transformational [birth-and-death] is also eradicated. Since this treatise takes the One Vehicle as its doctrine, it is explained solely according to the Awakening of Faith; the detailed explanation is as found there.

1.65

There is no separate place of exhaustion apart from this.

1.66

The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, fascicle twenty-five, says: "The essence of nirvāṇa has no dwelling place; it is simply the place where all buddhas sever afflictions, hence it is called nirvāṇa, etc." It is not like the Hinayana, where birth-and-death is the mundane world and nirvāṇa is the supramundane world; the Great Vehicle merely transforms these three, and that is nirvāṇa—how could it indicate a separate realm? Therefore the root treatise says: "Refuting discourses about outside the realm, etc." Why is this? The secret treasury of the three virtues is great nirvāṇa, but it receives its name merely from overturning these three obstacles. That is, afflictions can obstruct prajñā: when afflictions are exhausted, prajñā is luminous; karma can obstruct liberation: when karma is eradicated, liberation is bright; suffering can obstruct the dharmakāya: when suffering ceases, the dharmakāya is revealed. Therefore these three virtues are spoken of merely in relation to the obstacles; how could there be a separate place of exhaustion apart from them? Furthermore, the three virtues are of one essence, neither parallel nor separate, like the Sanskrit letter [i]; although the four virtues are perfect and eternal and the qualities numerous as the sands of the Ganges are complete, the single mind harmonizes and sweeps away [distinctions], being neither mark nor name, so it can even more be said that there is no separate place of exhaustion apart from this. Taking this as its theme, "Namelessness" has already been clarified.

1.67

Part 1: Treatise on the Immutability of Things

1.68

"Things" refers to all phenomena arising from the concurrence of conditions, namely defiled and pure, environment and sentient being, ancient and modern, cold and heat, and so forth. "Immutability" is prakṛti-śūnyatā, dharmatā, and so on; because things born of conditions are by their original nature empty, and emptiness is itself dharmatā, every single thing is immutable. Now, according to the meanings of the Final and Sudden Teachings, its profound wonder is briefly shown. First, regarding the Final Teaching: the principle that accords with conditions arises to form all phenomena; since phenomena are identical to the true, mutation is itself immutability. Within this there are specifically three approaches: First, subsuming principle under phenomena, principle also changes along with them, so how much more so phenomenal dharmas? The Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra briefly states: "The tathāgatagarbha undergoes arising and ceasing together with causes." Again, the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa says: "The dharmakāya transmigrates through the five destinies, etc." All have this meaning. Second, subsuming phenomena under principle, phenomena do not even mutate, so how much more so ultimate principle? The Renwang jing says: "Because afflictions and bodhi are non-dual in the ultimate truth, all buddha-tathāgatas and all dharmas are completely suchness." The Laṅkāvatāra also says: "The five sense-consciousnesses are not transmigrating." Third, these two are unobstructed and simultaneously melted together, neither one nor different. Mutation and immutability are also not before and after; this is the "sārasa bird" of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra and the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa's "Dharmas have no coming or going, because they constantly do not abide." Qingliang said: "Because of contravening the permanent principle, the three realms consequently become impermanent. If one realizes the reality of impermanence, then impermanence is permanent." The main thrust of the treatise below is entirely this principle. Next, regarding the Sudden Teaching: each and every dharma is fundamentally true, yet delusion falsely perceives flux. If not a single thought arises and the past and future limits are severed, dharmas are neither arising nor ceasing, neither mutating nor immutable, yet they are still called immutable. The Avataṃsaka says: "All dharmas are unarisen, etc." According to Guifeng's Brief Commentary: "Dharmas born of conditions are identical in mark to the imaginary nature, seeming to arise and seeming to cease; in nature they are identical to the perfected nature, neither arising nor ceasing." This is also the import of the Final Teaching. Now, in this treatise both teachings are implicitly contained, as it says below: "Not casting aside motion to seek stillness, etc.," and also says: "Eyes facing the true without perceiving it."

1.69

Now, birth and death (meaning ceasing) alternating, cold and heat shifting (meaning taking turns), existing things in flux—this is the ordinary feeling of humans.

1.70

About to clarify the principle that mutation is itself immutability, he first sets forth the ordinary sentiments of those who are confused and invert immutability into mutation, so as to cause them to forget sentiments and awaken to reality. The first line presents the dharmas that undergo change, extending to all dharmas, where birth comes and death declines. Death arriving and birth perishing, arising and ceasing are mutually dependent; hence it is called "alternating." The next line presents the time that effects change, extending to all times, where alternating shifts are evident. "Existing" means conditioned existence; "in flux" means mutating. In the last line, the meaning encompasses ordinary people and non-Buddhists, and also directly addresses provisional and small vehicles, contrasting the three by means of the one. Those who only see impermanence and do not see identity with the permanent are all of ordinary sentiments and shallow views.

1.71

I (meaning myself), however, say that it is not so.

1.72

The author of the treatise took the One Vehicle as his fundamental awakening, skillfully entered dharmatā, and wished to guide ordinary sentiments; therefore he delivers this general refutation.

1.73

Why is this?

1.74

Not accepting the perception of change must be grounded in scriptural teaching and principle; therefore he presents this general inquiry.

1.75

The Fangguang [bore jing] says: "Dharmas have no going or coming, and nothing that moves or turns."

1.76

That is, in the seventh fascicle of that scripture it says: "Because all dharmas do not shake, all dharmas neither go nor come, etc." "Dharma" means things brought together by conditions, because they maintain their own essence and serve as a model generating understanding in people. Going, coming, moving, and turning mean mutation. Since it says they are all absent, this is immutability. Definitive teachings of the true teaching frequently have this statement; the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka says: "The marks of the world are eternally abiding."

1.77

If one examines the meaning of motionlessness, how could it be that it sets aside (abandons) motion to seek rest? It must seek rest in the very midst of motion. Because it must seek rest in the very midst of motion, though it is moving, it is always at rest; because it does not set aside motion to seek rest, though it is at rest, it is not separated from motion.

1.78

The first sentence cites the sūtra, but explains motion and rest to exemplify going and coming. Motion is flux, and rest is immutability. From 'how could it be that it sets aside' downward, it harmonizes and explains them. The next two sentences clarify not abandoning the motion of phenomena to seek the rest of principle. However, motion and rest have multiple aspects; for now they are briefly indicated in terms of mind and objective realm. As for the objective realm: the ultimate principle of the ultimate truth is restful, while the phenomenal dharmas of the conventional truth are active. The two truths are mutually identical, hence it says 'not abandoning'. The meaning is: if one wants to realize the rest of the ultimate truth, it is not separated from the conventional motion. As for the mind: tattva-jñāna faces the ultimate and is therefore restful, while upāya-jñāna responds to the conventional and is therefore active. Because the two kinds of wisdom are unimpeded, it also does not abandon conventional motion. The last four sentences pick up on what precedes them to clarify that motion is identical with rest. This also applies to both mind and objective realm: because one enters rest without abandoning phenomenal motion, the very moment of rest is precisely the moment of motion. In the treatise it is strictly just principle and phenomena, but since it says 'seeking rest without abandoning' and so forth, it concurrently encompasses the two kinds of wisdom.

1.79

Thus, motion and rest have never been different, yet the deluded take them to be distinct.

1.80

Motion and rest are originally one, yet confused persons see differences: mundane and supramundane are categorized as distinct, and the dependent and imagined are allocated to different locations from the fully perfected.

1.81

This causes (due to this) true words to be obstructed by contentious (disputatious) debate, and the doctrinal (principled) path to be bent by a fondness for peculiarities.

1.82

'True words' refers to the definitive verbal teachings of the real doctrine. 'Doctrinal path' refers to the principle of immutability of the ekayāna doctrinal path. The meaning is: motion and rest are non-dual as expounded in the definitive meaning, yet persons of the triyāna see two distinct things within the non-dual Dharma; clutching to the provisional and shallow, they do not believe in the non-dual path; their minds fond of peculiarities utter words in contentious debate, and thereby cause the definitive meaning to be obstructed and not practice, and the doctrinal path to be bent and not extended. This is precisely as Great Master Guifeng said: 'The definitive teachings were hidden in the dragon's treasury; this is stated as the reason for composing the treatise.' Now, the composition of all four treatises arose from refuting differences. Why? The *Buzhenkong lun* explicitly criticizes the three schools. The *Bore lun* says: 'Yet divergent treatises have been rampant for a long time.' The *Niepan lun* says: 'Now this act of expounding the treatise quiets them and opens broadly, refuting discussions that depart from the core.' Therefore we know they were all composed due to divergent views.

1.83

Therefore, the ultimate reaches of rest and agitation (motion) cannot be easily spoken of.

1.84

Those who dispute contentiously are numerous, and those fond of peculiarities are many, hence speaking of it is difficult.

1.85

Why (how so)? For to speak of the true goes against the conventional, while to follow the conventional contradicts the true. Because it contradicts the true, they are deluded about the nature and do not return (revert); because it goes against the conventional, the words are bland and tasteless.

1.86

The first two sentences clarify that going against and going along both result in contradiction. Embodying non-duality is called 'the true'; grasping at two differences is called 'the conventional'. If one follows the Dharma and speaks of unity, it goes against ordinary sentiments and those fond of peculiarities—this is Dharma failing to accord with faculties. If one follows the conventional and speaks of difference, it again contradicts the Dharma of true unity—this is faculties failing to reach the Dharma. The following four sentences show that both going against and going along fail: the non-dual true is precisely the nature. Now since one follows the conventional and speaks of difference to ordinary sentiments, they are deluded about this true nature and cannot return to the treasure trove. If one speaks of the true, conventional sentiments cannot enter, and instead deem the words bland and tasteless. Laozi says: 'When the Dao is spoken from the mouth, how bland and without taste it is.'

1.87

This causes middling persons to be undecided between its existence and nonexistence, and inferior persons to clap their hands (strike) and not look back (disregard).

1.88

This follows on from speaking of the true above. The meaning is: although going against the conventional invites the slander of being tasteless, one can only speak of the true to cause people to awaken and return, and must not follow the conventional and prevent them from entering. When superior persons hear the true, they practice it diligently; when middling persons hear the true, it is as if it exists and as if it does not, half doubting and half believing; when inferior persons hear the true, they clap their hands and laugh loudly, considering it plain and bland, and no longer look upon it with yearning. The text comes from the book of Laozi, hence it is explained in accordance with it.

1.89

That which is near yet unknowable—is it not only the nature of things?

1.90

The first phrase concerns phenomena and the conventional: flowing motion is called 'near', yet identical with the true and immutable it is difficult to know. The latter phrase pertains to essence.

1.91

Yet unable to stop myself (desist), I briefly lodge my true mind in the boundary between motion and rest; how could I say it is necessarily so? Let me attempt to discuss it, saying:

1.92

'Yet' is like saying: although middling and inferior persons doubt and laugh, in order to make the true words unobstructed, the doctrinal path brilliantly clear, and ordinary sentiments awaken and enter, I wish to stop but cannot; so I briefly rely on words to lodge the mind of true unity in the boundary of motion and rest. I dare not say it is definitely correct, but merely try to discuss it—this is modesty.

1.93

The *Daoxing* says: 'All dharmas originally have no place from which they come, and in going there is nowhere they reach.' The *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* says: 'Observing the direction, one knows that he goes; the goer does not reach the direction.'

1.94

This cites both sūtra and treatise to establish the thesis of immutability. The *Daoxing* quotes the primary text, in what corresponds to chapter ten. 'All dharmas' are things. 'Originally' means fundamental, and also origin. Arriving through the concurrence of conditions, from where does arrival come? Departing through the dispersal of conditions, to where does departing go? As when Sudhana asked Maitreya: 'Where did this tower go?' He replied: 'It went to the place from which it came.' The explanation says: to clarify its going, first know its coming. If coming has no seen source, where could going be? For example, like winter and summer succeeding each other: whence does winter come? Whither does summer go? This is called all dharmas being like an illusion and like a phantom, arising right where they are and perishing as they go. From 'the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*' downward, it merely draws the meaning from its chapter refuting going and coming, corresponding to chapter two. However, the treatise is extremely profound and subtle; now it is briefly shown. 'Direction' refers to the destination of going. 'He' refers to the goer. The prose commentary of the treatise says: 'The act of going, the goer, and the destination—these dharmas are all mutually dependent; one cannot say they definitely exist or definitely do not exist. Therefore one decisively knows that the three dharmas are false and completely empty of existence, having only provisional names, like an illusion and like a phantom.' The meaning of this treatise is: according with the conventional, one knows that he goes; conforming to the true, he does not reach the direction.

1.95

These all seek rest right within motion, by which knowing that things are immutable is clear.

1.96

Both sūtras and treatises are like this; what doubt can there be regarding the principle? Setting aside motion to seek rest is the view of the triyāna.

1.97

What people call motion is because things of the past do not reach the present; therefore they say it is motion and not rest. What I call rest is also because things of the past do not reach the present; therefore I say it is rest and not motion. Motion and not rest is because they do not come; rest and not motion is because they do not go.

1.98

The first three sentences are the inverted views of ordinary sentiments; the two sentences from 'Motion and...' downward reveal the meaning. The first sentence restates the clinging; from 'because things of the past' downward it provides the reason. Because they see things changing and departing into the past, only going and not coming, they call it flux. The next three sentences bring up awakening. The two sentences from 'rest and...' downward reveal the meaning. The first sentence brings up awakening, and from 'also because' downward it provides the reason. Things of the past do not reach the present, and things of the present do not go to the past—what motion is there? Present and past are mutually dependent and their marks are fundamentally empty; things exist within them without going and without coming.

1.99

Thus, what is reached (attained) has never differed, but what is seen has never (once) been the same. Going against it is what is called blockage; going along with it is what is called penetration.

1.100

Both see that things of the past do not reach the present, yet there is the difference between flux and immutability. Regarding the last two sentences, Master Jingyuan of Zhongwu says: 'The deluded follow their sentiments, opposing the nature, and are blocked; the awakened follow their wisdom, according with things, and penetrate.'

1.101

If one attains its path, what obstruction could there be?

1.102

Master Jingyuan says: 'If one awakens to the path of immutability, the blockage will naturally disappear.' The above has briefly explained it and the main import has already become manifest; below it is extensively analyzed again.

1.103

How lamentable that human sentiments have been deluded for so long!

1.104

Beginningless ignorance has continued from the past down to the present; the author of the treatise grieves that they are confused and do not awaken.

1.105

Facing the true right before their eyes, they do not realize it. Knowing already that past things do not come, they yet claim that present things can go. Since past things do not come, where could present things go?

1.106

The first sentence generally reproaches them; 'the true' refers to immutability. Great Master Xianshou says: 'The ultimate reality sits right before one's eyes, yet turns into an objective realm of names and marks.' The next two sentences directly reproach the manifestation of their lack of realization. Knowing that the past does not come, they nevertheless reckon that the present can go—this is delusion. The last two sentences point directly to immutability. Since one already knows that past things do not come, one can readily awaken to the fact that present things do not go.

1.107

Why is this?

1.108

This is a query.

1.109

If one seeks (searches for) a past (former) thing in the past, in the past it was never absent; if one demands (searches for) a past thing in the present, in the present it has never existed. In the present it has never existed, which shows that things do not come; in the past it was never absent, therefore we know that things do not go.

1.110

This is viewing the present from the past. The meaning of the first four sentences is: seeking a thing of the past in terms of the past, that thing was originally present in the past, just as in the past there were Yao and Shun, but in the present they do not exist. The last four sentences pick up on the preceding to establish immutability. Here, 'present and past' generally designate the times of the three periods that can cause flux. 'Things' are the things that undergo flux. Although it mentions that which causes flux, the intention lies in that which undergoes flux, hence it says 'things do not come' and so forth.

1.111

Conversely (turning around) seeking the present, the present also does not go.

1.112

Viewing the past from the present, immutability is also like this. One need only interchange the words 'past' and 'present' and 'come'. Therefore the treatise simply says: 'the present also does not go.'

1.113

This means that past things naturally abide in the past, and do not arrive at the past from the present; present things naturally abide in the present, and do not arrive at the present from the past.

1.114

This explains and establishes immutability. The treatise's import is that present and past are mutually dependent, and coming and going mutually define each other; since the essence of conditions is not real, how can any marks be established? Ordinary sentiments are turned about by marks, seeing flux and flowing; the awakened person comprehends their emptiness, and right in their marks they are quiescent and extinguished—how could there be the motion of present and past, or the flux of coming and going? Based on this, though there is cessation and perishing from thought-moment to thought-moment, there is also immutability from thought-moment to thought-moment. Therefore the *Dazhidulun*, fascicle five, says: 'Bodhisattvas know that all dharmas neither arise nor perish, and their nature is completely empty.' In the past, when I read this back and forth, I could not grasp it; but when I read Great Master Yongming's *Zongjing lu* where it explains this treatise, my doubts and blockages suddenly vanished. Thus we know the treatise's import is profound and hidden, and one cannot form an understanding simply following the literal text.

1.115

Therefore Zhongni said: 'Hui sees the new; crossing arms, it is no longer the old (former).'

1.116

This passage slightly alters the text of the *Nanhua jing*, which says: 'Zhongni said to Yan Hui: "All my life, as I cross an arm with you, I lose it; is this not lamentable?"' There are two explanations for 'crossing arms': one says it is a brief moment, like saying within the gesture of dropping an arm it is already lost; the other says it is clasping arms, Confucius and Yan Hui clasping arms with each other wishing it not to change, yet it has already passed away—how could one retain it? Therefore Guo Xiang's commentary says: 'Transformations cannot be held and retained.' The treatise's intention is that transformations secretly shift, and each new thing is not the old; since one only sees the new, and the new does not arrive at the old, how could there be flux?

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肇論新疏 — Classical Chinese