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Hindu Administrative Institutions c6: Chapter I. Sec. i. The Concept of Daṇḍa Nīti

Hindu Administrative Institutions c6

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Chapter I. Sec. i. The Concept of Daṇḍa Nīti

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AN endeavour is made here to trace the evolution and inter-relation of the state and society in ancient India as a preliminary to the study of administrative and political institutions which distinctly figure in ancient Indian literature. What is *daṇḍa nīti*? It is the science and machinery of government. Hindu texts dealing with the science and machinery of government are many and varied. They deal with recognized systems of constitutional practice in vogue then. In spite of nearly a century of research we are yet far from an authoritative text-book on the history of Hindu India. From the extant literature of the Hindus, *daṇḍa nīti* is understood as the science of Hindu administration dealing both with the function of government and the machinery of government. Ancient Indian writers on political science differ distinctly in one respect from modern ones. The political theorist and philosopher of to-day is concerned more with the machinery of government than with its function. The place assigned to the proper duties and functions of the state is rather meagre and inadequate; but this factor looms large in the political literature of the ancient Hindus. To them the machinery of government was not of much consequence. Still they did not neglect it, for the subject receives treatment, in the available literature on the *daṇḍa nīti*. Nevertheless the functions of government were considered a more important factor. Any slight deviation from the established duty which the state owes to the community at large was deemed an unrighteous act of government. Thus in a way the functions of administration might be said to have decided the machinery of government. From this it is not to be taken that both the function and the machinery were merged into one whole; on the other hand a sense of separateness was felt between the two concepts.

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*Daṇḍa nīti*, then, is the art and science of government. It came to be known later on by other terms such as the *Arthaśāstra*, *Rāja Dharma*, *Rāja Nīti* and *Nīti-śāstra*. In the शब्दादिवर्ग of *Amara Kośa* it is said that *ānvīkṣikī* and *daṇḍa nīti* are respectively *Tarkavidyā* and *Arthaśāstra*.

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This indicates that *daṇḍa nīti* was known as the *Arthaśāstra* in later literature.¹

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¹ आन्वीक्षिकी दण्डनीतिस्तर्कविद्यार्थशास्त्रयोः (i. 9. 9.)

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Goshal seems to read some distinction between *daṇḍa nīti* and *Arthaśāstra*. He accepts, as others do, that the former is concerned with the art of punishment as well as the art of Government, but ‘its scope in the

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This statement is further interesting as it helps to refute the remark of Dr. Jolly who says (Introduction, p. 4) that *Ānvīkṣikī* philosophy includes the materialistic system of *Lōkāyata* in the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭalya in which wealth (*artha*) and pleasure (*kāma*) are the only objects of human pursuit. According to *Amarakāra Ānvīkṣikī* is *Tarkavidyā* or the science of logic. This latter is also known as *Nyāya Śāstra* and *Hētu Vidyā*. Cf. Commentary on verse 47, ch. clxxx of *Mōkṣadharma Parvan* (Mbh., Śānti Parvan).

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Pandit Ganapati Śāstri explains the word ‘*Lōkāyata*’ as ‘न्यायास्त्रं ब्रह्मगार्ग्योक्तम्’ appropriately (Trivandrum edition, vol. i, p. 27). Again on p. 26, he explains how *ānvīkṣikī* is ‘त्रयो विशेषो’. This means that it not only closely follows the *Trayī* or the three Vedas—Rig, Yajus and Sāman, but also interprets the correct meaning contained therein. (Cf. Kāma, ii. 13; Śukra, ii. 155.) Thus the theory of the German scholar becomes untenable.

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latter sense falls short of the *Arthaśāstra*.¹ This cannot stand if what Kauṭalya himself has to say on this point be given due weight. He defines the *Arthaśāstra* thus: ² ‘Humanity depends on *artha* and *artha* is the territory where people live together. The means of acquiring and protecting this territory are laid down in the science known as the *Arthaśāstra*. Again *daṇḍa nīti* he explains as one of the four important sciences figuring in the Schools of Manu, Bṛhaspati, and Uśanas or Śukra. Kauṭalya quotes the authority of Śukra to the effect that it is the only important science (*vidyā*) inasmuch as all other sciences are dependent on it.³ Then he proceeds to define the term.⁴ This science of *daṇḍa* is the *sādhana* or means of realizing the *yogakshema* or progress of *ānvīkṣikī*, *trayī* and *vārtā*. In other words *daṇḍa nīti* is indispensable for the progressive realization of the objects dealt with in the science of logic, in the Vedas, and the science of economics. In short, *daṇḍa nīti* shows how best to promote the well-being of society.

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¹ *Hindu Political Theories*, p. 78.

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² मनुष्याणां वृत्तिः अर्थः, मनुष्यवतो भूमिरित्यर्थः, तस्याः पृथिव्यालाभपालनोपायः शास्त्रं अर्थशास्त्रमिति । (Bk. XV. 1.)

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³ Bk. I, sec. 2.

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⁴ ‘आन्वीक्षिकी त्रयोवार्तानां योगक्षेमसाधनो दण्डः, तस्य नीतिः दण्डनीतिः । (Bk. I, sec. 4).

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Kauṭalya does not stop with this but analyses the subject further by furnishing us with a categorical list of the benefits that would accrue from its adoption. These are: (1) अलब्धलाभार्था (attainment of desirable possessions not attainable by other means), (2) लब्धपरिरक्षणो (protection of what has been acquired), (3) रक्षितविवर्धनी (increasing what is then protected). (4) वृद्धस्य तीर्थेषु प्रतिपादनी (dispensing the wealth thus increased on meritorious purposes).¹

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¹ Bk. I, sec. 4.

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The object sought to be gained by this then is *lokayātra*² *Lokayātra* or the peace and progress of society is the be-all and end-all of *daṇḍa nīti*. This cannot be attained by itself, but requires active and efficient guidance. The *Arthaśāstra* calls such a guide the king, or leader of men. In this context may be quoted a verse of similar import from the *Mahābhārata*.³ That these were the main objects with which ancient governments were carried on in practice is evident from a parallel passage in the Junāgaḍh Rock Inscription of Skanda Gupta, dated the year 136 of the Gupta era (A.D 455-56).⁴

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² तस्यामायत्ता लोकयात्रा (*Ibid.*).

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³ > अलब्धलाभाय च लब्धवृद्धये ।

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⁴ > सर्वस्य लोकस्य हिते प्रवृत्तः ॥

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The passage is thus translated by Fleet—'Occupied with the welfare of all mankind : capable both in the lawful

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यथार्हतौर्थ प्रतिपादनायच ।
यशस्विनं वेदविदं विपश्चितं ।
बहुश्रुतं ब्राह्मणमेव वासयेत् ॥ (*Vana Parvan*, 26. 19.)

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न्यायार्जनेऽर्थस्य च कः समर्थः स्यात्
आर्जितस्याऽपि अथ रक्षणेच ।
गोपायितस्याऽपि (च) वृद्धिहेतो
वृद्धस्य पात्रप्रतिपादनाय ॥ (ll. 7 and 8, F.G.I., No. 14, p. viii.)

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acquisition of wealth and also in the preservation of it when acquired, and further in causing the increase of it when protected (and able), to dispense it on worthy objects, when it has been increased.'¹ It is then obvious that the science of daṇḍa nīti was also concerned with the art of government.

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¹ Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum, vol. iii, p. 62.

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Daṇḍa nīti is described by K. P. Jayaswal as the ‘ethics of the executive’² with which Goshal does not agree.³ We shall now proceed to examine the interpretation of Jayaswal in the light of other Arthaśāstra texts. Like his master Kauṭalya, Kāmandaka speaks of four sciences which tend towards the welfare of the world.⁴ Of these daṇḍa nīti treats of nayās or modes of policy which are known as नयानयौ both in the Kauṭalīya and the Śukranītisāra.⁵

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² Calcutta Weekly Notes, vol. xv, p. 275.

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³ Hindu Political Theories, p. 78.

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⁴ Chap. ii. 2.

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⁵ i. 153.

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Śaṅkarārya comments on this technical expression. Policy consists in

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ज्यायसा संधिः योगक्षेमनिष्पादकत्वात् नयः ।
विग्रहस्तु अनिष्पादकत्वादितरः अपनय इत्यर्थः ।

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(Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, Kāmandakinītisāra, p. 28.) establishing yogakshema by a treaty with the superior power. The reverse is impolicy. But it must be remembered that this is only one aspect of daṇḍa nīti. There is an excellent paraphrase of this term in the Rāmāyaṇa. Kumbhakarṇa speaks of it to his brother Rāvaṇa on the eve of the war.

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न्यायेन राजकार्याणि यःकरोति दशानन ।
न स संतप्यते पश्चान्निश्चितार्थमतिर्नृपः ॥
अनुपायेन कर्माणि विपरोतानि यानिच ।
क्रियमाणानि दुष्यन्ति हवींष्य प्रयतेष्विव ॥

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Kāmandaka proceeds to define the term.¹ ‘Repression of crime is known as daṇḍa. Owing to the possession of this virtue, the king himself is known as daṇḍa. The administration of the king is called daṇḍa nīti.’ It is called nīti because it leads, being derived from the root ‘nī’ to lead. This is leading the people into right conduct. Saṅkarārya in commenting on this verse quotes a popular verse from Manu. The whole world is under the influence of daṇḍa. Purity of conduct is hard to see anywhere. It is through fear of daṇḍa that the whole earth is made fit for enjoyment.² Kāmandaka then speaks of its great value. By means of daṇḍa nīti, therefore, the king must protect himself and afford protection to other sciences.³

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¹ दमो दण्ड इति प्रोक्तस्तात्स्थ्यात् दण्डो महीपतिः तस्य नीतिर्दण्डनीतिः नयनान्नीति रुच्यते ॥ (ii. 15; cf. Sukra, i. 157.)

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² सर्वोदण्डजितो लोको दुर्लभोहहि शुचिःकचित । दण्डभ्य हि भयात् कृत्स्नं जगत भोगाय कल्पते (7. 22.)

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³ तयाऽऽत्मानं च शेषाश्च विद्याः पायान्महीपतिः (i. 16.)

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More light is thrown by the works of Sukrācārya and Bṛhaspati.⁴

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⁴ Though we are not at present concerned with the date of the composition of their works on polity still one could not help assigning to these a remote antiquity. The reference to gun powder in the Sukranīti has made some scholars incline to the view that it is a work of the eleventh or the

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य पश्चात् पूर्वकार्याणि कर्माण्यभिचिकीर्षति ।
पूर्वं चापरकर्माणि न स वेद नयानयौ ॥
(Yuddha Kāṇḍa, xii. 31-33.)

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The substance of these lines is as follows: He who acts according to policy in administration will not regret afterwards. He who acts against policy, will regret for ever after. He who postpones deeds which ought not to be postponed and who does deeds which could be postponed is one ignorant of nayānayau.

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Presuming these works are comparatively old and not quite recent as some scholars take them to be, it is interesting to see what they have to say on the concept of *nīti* in general and *daṇḍa nīti* in particular. Śukrācārya says, ‘*Nītiśāstra* aims at social well-being and leads on to the welfare of mankind. It is admitted to be the very source of *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*, and hence a means to salvation. Therefore it is for the king to study always this *śāstra*, the knowledge of which helps him to overcome his enemies, and himself to become an object of delight to his people.’¹ Thus the *Nītiśāstra* is twelfth century. But a comparative study of the extant texts of Śukra with those of the *Mahābhārata* and even Kauṭalya where quotations are often given from Śukra demonstrates the fact that the present work is undoubtedly a fragment of the ancient treatise of Śukrācārya. The late lamented Pandit Gaṇapati Śāstri pointed out in the course of a personal discussion on the subject that the very fact that the extant treatise has no reference to Kauṭalya shows that it must be a work perhaps anterior to Kauṭalya himself. The *Bārhaspatya Sūtras* on the other hand remind one of the *Cāṇakya Sūtras* published by Dr. Shama Śāstri in his edition of the text of the *Arthaśāstra*. The present work which is in the form of *sūtras* in style bears the mark of an ancient work and leads to the supposition that there must have been an elaborate treatise, the *Bārhaspatya Arthaśāstra*, perhaps a *Bhāṣyam* (commentary) on the *Sūtras*, which has been lost. The archaic expressions, the style and even grammatical errors show that it is an early piece of composition with perhaps redactions of later centuries. That it mentions the town of Śrīrangam and the names of various religious sects cannot be taken to prove that the work is recent. The name Śrīrangam and the names of religious sects are found mentioned in the *Sangam Literature* of the ancient Tamil land. In works like *Śilappadikāram* and *Maṇimēkalai* there are distinct references to these and these works are claimed to be compositions of the earlier centuries of the Christian era. (*Vide* S. K. Aiyangar, *Ancient India*, pp. 255-382.) Such being the case it is hard to understand why the date of this work should not be fixed some time about or before that of these Tamil classics.

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¹ > सर्वोपजोवकं लोकस्थितिकृन्नोतिशास्त्रकं ।

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धर्मार्थकाममूलं हि स्मृतं मोक्षप्रदं यतः ॥ (i. 5.)
अतस्तदा नोतिशास्त्रमभ्यसेद्यततो नृपः ।
यद्विज्ञानात्पायाश्च शत्रुजिह्लोकरंजकाः ॥ (i. 6; also v. 12.)

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neither a treatise on ethics nor even on polity, but a synthetic science of society. Its end is social well-being, and this is realized by protection, justice and peace. As a matter of fact these were the functions of ancient Indian states, which were merely the channel of the communal will. To Sukra, *Nītiśāstra* is the very food of the social organism, its precepts supplying blood to, and helping to form the flesh of, human society. Like food supplying the primal wants of physical life, it ministers to the fundamental interest of social existence.¹ In verse 15 again Śukra compares a *nīti*-less state to a leaky vessel. It is dangerous in the sense that it increases the number of enemies and saps the quality of efficiency in the state. Hence the infinite importance of *nīti* to a state. It is said that a king who acts up to the precepts of the *nīti* literature is applauded, whilst a king who acts according to his own will is condemned.² Here, one can notice the subordination of the individual, though he be a king, to the teachings of *Nītiśāstra* or *Rāja Dharma*. It is for him to promote the good and happiness of the state as well as of himself by adhering closely to the precepts of the science of *nīti*.³ B. K. Sarkar remarks, ‘In Kāmandaka and specially in Śukra, we have accordingly not only the pedagogies of Plato, e.g. his “*Statesman*”, but also his ethics, the monograph on justice, viz., the *Republic*, as well as his treatise on political administration, the *Laws*, if, indeed, all the three are not to be regarded as equally pedagogical.’⁴

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¹ B. K. Sarkar's Translation, p. 3 ; Śukra, i. 11.

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² Chap. i. 17.

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³ Chap. i. 18.

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⁴ S.B.H., vol. xxv, p. 29.

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To Bṛhaspati again there is only one science⁵ and that is daṇḍa nīti. The concept of nīti is explained thus:

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⁵ Chap. i. 3.

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नदीतीरतरुवत् । (i. 102.) तन्नोहातव्यम् । (i. 103.)

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Here nīti is compared to a tree on the bank of a river. Just as a tree near the waters is unstable and may fall at any time, so also is nīti. It must not therefore be abandoned but kept well-cared for. Here Dr. F. W. Thomas who has edited and translated this work, keeps the original reading तन्नेहितव्यम् and translates it ‘it must not be desired’. A treatise on moral and political philosophy cannot speak of the non-desirability of nīti. Evidently the reading in the text is wrong. In the context the reading तन्नोहातव्यं suggested above seems better. For, it seems to be the idea of Bṛhaspati that that king who abandons the science of daṇḍa nīti is sure to land himself in misery as a moth burns itself in a flame through sheer ignorance.¹ The result of nīti is attainment of dharma, artha and kāma.² Bṛhaspati says that daṇḍa nīti is peculiar to the country of the Bharatas and must therefore be studied by every one of the four divisions of the Hindu community.³ It is owing to this science alone that the Sun-God is the king, and Vāyu and other gods, creatures (vs. 76-78). This daṇḍa nīti is said to be largely read by men of wisdom in the Kṛta Yuga, by the followers of karma in the Tretāyuga, by the followers of tantra in the Dvāpara, and by ordinary men in the first quarter of tishya or Kali Yuga. After this period people become victims to unrighteousness and no more follow the precepts of daṇḍa.⁴

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¹ Chap. i. 112.

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² Chap. ii. 43.

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³ Chap. iii. 74, 75.

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⁴ Chap. iii. 141-48.

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The same ideas more or less are found in the *Dharma Śāstra* literature. In the extant *Manusmṛti* it is stated

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दण्ड:शास्ति प्रजा: सर्वा दण्ड एवाऽभिरक्षति ।
दण्ड:सुतेषु जागर्ति दण्डं धर्मं विदुर्बुधा: ॥ (vii. 18.)

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‘It is *daṇḍa* that rules the subjects, it is *daṇḍa* that protects all. It is *daṇḍa* that keeps awake and guards people when they are asleep and hence the learned style *daṇḍa* itself as *dharma*.’ It will thus appear that the essential requisite for a state as a state is *daṇḍa*. It is the means to realize the end, namely, the propagation of *dharma*. The law-giver goes the length of deifying *daṇḍa* as a goddess with a dark complexion and with red eyes, carrying destruction to avowed sinners, but peace to the innocent. In a country where this goddess, *daṇḍa*, moves about, there the people never experience difficulties. And the king thoroughly enjoys his position.¹ Deification of *daṇḍa* is more elaborately made in the *Śānti Parvan* of the *Mahābhārata*.² The power of *daṇḍa*, and especially the dread of it, is such that even the Devas, Asuras, Gandharvas, Rākshasas, Pathagas, and Uragas, do their duty loyally. Kullūka Bhaṭṭa in his commentary on *verse* 23, chap. viii of Manu quotes the *śruti*³ ‘through fear of Him, Agni burns : through fear glows the sun : through fear Indra and Vayu : Mṛtyu runs the fifth.’ From these it is evident that the ancients realized the truth ‘No *daṇḍa*, no society; no *daṇḍa*, no state.’ State and society exist in and through *daṇḍa*. *Daṇḍa* is the guiding factor for everything.¹

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¹ Chap. vii. 25.

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² *Rāja Dharma*, chap. cxxi, *vs.* 14–22.

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³ भयादस्याग्निस्तपति, भयात्तपति सूर्य: । भयादिन्द्रश्च वायुश्च मृत्युर्धावति पञ्चमम् ॥

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¹ Kauṭalya qualifies the general term *daṇḍa*. According to him it is of three kinds: *tīkṣṇa daṇḍa* (cruel), *mṛdu daṇḍa* (mild), and *yathārtha daṇḍa* (just.) The first form of punishment alienates the people from the king, the second does not evoke respect for authority, and the third alone must be pursued.

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Kauṭalya says that *daṇḍa* which is applied after duly examining the precepts laid down in the *Śāstras* (सुविज्ञातप्रणीतः) alone ends in the realization of *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*,—the *trivarga* of Hindu literature. We shall examine later the nature of this *trivarga* and its relation to the *daṇḍa nīti*. An ill-application of the *daṇḍa* (दुष्प्रणीतः) i.e. not administering justice according to the rules and regulations ordained in the sacred books, cannot realize the end. It is said that *daṇḍa* which is the consequence of ambition, jealousy, and ignorance, enkindles the anger even of *vānaprasthas* and ascetics. And further the absence of application of *daṇḍa* gives the occasion for *mātsya nyāya* which we shall explain later on. Protected by *daṇḍa*, Kauṭalya concludes, the state prospers.² In recapitulating the substance of the original *daṇḍa nīti* of Brahma, the Creator, Bhīṣma remarks, that this treatise is directed by *daṇḍa*, or *daṇḍa* is the directing force of this work. This *daṇḍa nīti* was made for the well-being of the world and for the establishment of *trivarga*. *Daṇḍa* affords protection to the world by means of repression and favour.³

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² Bk. I, sec. 4.

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³ *Mahābhārata*, *Rāja Dharma*, chap. lviii. 79-82.

Sec. ii. Origin of State and Society

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So far the discussion has been about the nature and scope of *daṇḍa nīti*. As to its origin, our one source of information is tradition as embodied in ancient literary works. Here both the divine and human origins of the state and society find mention in a form apparently historical. More and fuller details as to the origin of the state are given in the *Mahābhārata*. Bhīṣma says to Yudhiṣṭhira: ‘Listen how the state came into being at first in the Kṛta Yuga. Then, there was no kingdom or king, *daṇḍa* or *dāṇḍika*. It was a state of nature when all people without exception pursued the path of *dharma* and conducted themselves towards one another in an absolutely righteous manner; but in course of time poverty and delusion possessed the minds of the people and this led to embarrassment and affliction of all kinds: Covetousness (*lopa*), lust (*kāma*) and desire (*rāga*) preponderated in the minds of the people. In such a state there was no distinction between right and wrong, between what is moral and the opposite. People yielded to all sorts of unhealthy feelings, spoke what should not be spoken, ate all kinds of food prescribed or prohibited. It appeared that King Dharma was completely dethroned. Devas became subjected to fear and appealed to Brahma for help and grace. The creator composed a science for the social advancement and well-being of the world in a hundred thousand chapters.¹ It included not only the science of *daṇḍa nīti* but also the *trayī*, *ānvīkṣikī* and *vārttā*. It further dealt with the *trivarga*, namely, *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*; and *ṣaḍvarga*, namely *ātma* (a clear and free mind), *deśa* (country capable of being turned into a good one), *kāla* (time well used), *upāyas* (means), *kṛtyam* (good deeds resulting in profit) and *sahāya* (allies).²

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¹ Cf. Manu, vii. 14 ; Samarāṅgaṇa Sūtradhāra, chap. vi.

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² Rāja Dharma, chap. lviii. 1-33.

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Bhīṣma continues: ‘Śankara, otherwise known as Śiva or Viśālākṣa, condensed this *Nītiśāstra* into ten thousand chapters. Indra who learnt this from Mahā-dēva further summarized it into five thousand chapters. This is well-known as *Bahudantaka*. Bṛhaspati made it into three thousand chapters, while Śukrāchārya further condensed it into a thousand.¹ From the extant *Vaiśampāyananīti* (apparently a later work) it is clear that the process of condensation went on for a long time. Bharadvāja summarized this science into seven hundred chapters and Gaurīśiras and Vyāsa into five hundred and three hundred chapters respectively. It would be legitimate to inquire why this process of condensation went on continuously. The answer is furnished by the authors of the *Śukranīti* and the *Vaiśampāyananīti*. They advance the argument that, as the tenure of life of the people was growing shorter as ages passed by, the political theorists of the various periods felt the need of a book which could be mastered in the short span of life available.²

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¹ *Rāja Dharma*, chap. lviii. 82-92.

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² *Śukra*, i, ii, iv; *Nīti Prakāśa*, i, vs. 21-25.

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Tradition as to the human origin of the science of *daṇḍa nīti* is not wanting. In the same book of the *Mahābhārata*³ the authorship of the science is attributed to eight sages. After composing the said science the sages placed it before God Nārāyaṇa for approval. The God was exceedingly pleased with that great and useful work, and remarked that this original work of the sages would last down to the period of King Uparichara and vanish at his death. It would further be a guide to Svāyambhuva Manu who will promulgate the principles of *dharma* to the world at large, and it would also prove a fruitful source of information for the treatises of Bṛhaspati and Sukra.

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³ Chap. cccxxxv; see *Carmichael Lectures*, 1918, p. 93.

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Whatever was the origin, human or divine, the fact was that there was a science extant in the world, *daṇḍa nīti*. The object of the science was to make the world happy and prosperous. This could not be effected by the science itself. It required an authority to enforce its practical application. Towards this end the institution of kingship came into being. Here again there are two traditional schools of thought, one describing the origin of kingship as divine and the other human. In the *Mahābhārata* Bhīṣma recounts how kingship was instituted. When the world was in a state of nature (in the sense in which Hobbes uses the term) and when people suffered untold misery arising from a state of anarchy, the Devas approached Viṣṇu and requested him to appoint the best leader of men. Then from His Mind sprang Virājasa. But he did not wish for the overlordship of the earth. His son Kīrtimān and his son Kardama were of the same temperament. But Anaṅga, son of Kardama, ruled the people according to *daṇḍa nīti*. So also his son Atibala. But his son Vena conducted himself badly by taking to unrighteous ways. The sages had him killed by the use of a charm (*mantra*). Out of his right thigh sprang Niṣādas (hill-tribes) and Mlechchas. Out of his right hand came Vainya, accoutred in military attire and versed in *daṇḍa nīti*. He satisfied the sages by promising to rule according to the laws of *dharma*, and to render even-handed justice by looking upon friend and foe alike. On this the sages vested him with the office of kingship and appointed Śukrāchārya his *Purohita* while the Vālakhilya sages and Sārasvata *Gaṇas* became his ministers. Gārga was appointed astrologer, Sūta and Māgadha entered into their respective duties, and Vainya's government was an ideal government. Wealth and treasure flowed from the mines of the land and the ocean as well as from mountains. Under his rule the whole earth was tilled and cultivated with seventeen kinds of grain. He first got the name *rāja* by giving his subjects the greatest amount of happiness. He got the name *Kṣatriya* for having freed the peoples from all their troubles. Under him again the earth became *pṛthivi* for the king's name was Pṛthu. Even Lord Viṣṇu was pleased with his great acts and deeds and entered his body. From that time forward Pṛthu became infused with divinity.¹

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¹ *Śānti Parva*, lviii. 95-153; *Nīti Prakāśa*, chap. i. 26 ff.

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In the *Samarāṅgaṇa Sūtradhāra* of Bhoja the account of the origin of kingship resembles that of other *nīti* texts in regarding Pṛthu as the first king. Here he is described as possessing prowess like Indra and the Lokapālas, and the strength and valour of the lion, the king of the beasts. While consecrating him, the Creator addressed the people: ‘ Pṛthu is the overlord of you all. He will afford protection to the good and punish the evil-minded. He will be a *nṛpa* by ridding you of all your fears. He will render even-handed justice and carry on an efficient administration so as to preserve the well-being of *varṇas* (castes) and *āśramas* (stages of life).’ On this the people addressed the king: ‘O lord of the earth, shelter us from the sea of troubles in which we are struggling hard.’ Pṛthu replied: ‘Do not entertain any apprehension. I shall free you from all your difficulties. I shall establish the *svadharma*, *varṇadharma* and *āśramadharma*, and enforce them with the rod of punishment. I shall establish hamlets, villages, townships and cities, and make the earth yield plenty. In this manner I shall endeavour to increase your happiness and prosperity to the utmost.'¹

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¹ Chap. vii.

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There is vast testimony to the fact of the human origin of the institution of kingship. The *Kauṭalīya* says:

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मात्स्यन्यायभिभूताः प्रजाः मनुं वैवस्वतं राजानं चक्रिरे ।

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Under the storm and stress of anarchy the people elected Manu as their king. In this passage Kauṭalya lends the weight of his authority to the human origin of the state. The word ‘प्रजाः’ distinctly emphasizes the human origin of kingship. The state of nature became so depressing that the people had Manu, son of Vivasvān, appointed as king. The terms on which the office was conferred on him are also given. The people agreed to pay one-sixth of the grains in kind, one-tenth of other articles of merchandise, besides a portion of the gold in their possession. Such wages to the king were in return for his guaranteeing to the people their *yogakshema* or social welfare. Towards this end the king enforced order and obedience by varied forms of punishment and by means of levy of several fees. In return for the king's protection even hermits in the forest had to give one-sixth of their forest-produce to him. The king was the visible awarder of punishment as well as favours, and hence he occupied a position only equal to that of Indra, the lord of heaven, and Yama, the lord of justice. To disregard him was to incur punishment. On this account it was ruled that kings ought not to be disrespected.²

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² Bk. I, chap. xiii.

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The *Śānti Parvan* of the *Mahābhārata* has also reference to the story how Manu became the first overlord of the earth. Here we meet with the peculiar doctrine of *samaya* or contract. When anarchy showed its abhorred head, people felt the need for peace. Hence they entered into a compact among themselves to the effect that the boaster (वाक्शूरः), the cruel man, the violator of women's chastity, and of agreements in general, should be banished from the land so as to create ease and confidence among all the communities. But still the arrangement was not fruitful. They appealed to Brahma who in his turn appointed Manu, the best among men, to rule as well as reign. Manu realized to the full the responsibilities of overlordship and expressed his unwillingness to rule over a people addicted to untruth and all other sins. On this the people agreed to give one cow for every fifty cows sold or bought, one-fiftieth of gold, and one-tenth of grains, besides an accomplished maiden in marriage and a number of armed men to follow him. In return they asked for peace and protection. Manu accepted the office and set out for conquest. People took to *svadharma* and the social welfare of the world was accomplished.¹

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¹ *Rāja Dharma*, chap. lxvi. 18-30. There are then two schools with different traditions, one describing Manu as the first king, and the other Pṛthu as the first king. At first sight it would appear that the two accounts are contradictory. Both of them agree in the theory of an original state of nature when the laws of nature were highly respected and adhered to. The original state of nature became in course of time transformed into the Hobbesian state when on appeal the Creator appointed Pṛthu to rule over the earth for the preservation of social *sthiti* (well being) according to *Samarāṅgaṇa Sūtradhāra* and other texts. After the lapse, perhaps, of several centuries commencing with Pṛthu, there again set in a state of anarchy, another form of the state of nature when the practice of *mātsyanyāya* held sway in the realm of mankind. It was so

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It is worthy of remark that these ideas of election and contract are quite in keeping with the Buddhistic theory of the origin of kingship. In the *Digha Nikāya* mention is made of the concept of the state of nature when kingship was instituted on the basis of contract.¹ The king is known as a Mahāsammata and a Khattiya. The state of nature represents here a stage of pre-political society in which the institutions of family and property are recognized though the enjoyments thereof are uncertain. It was a social state in which there was no fixed standard, nor a political authority which could prevent the violation of the rights pertaining to property and family. Towards this end a Mahāsammata was appointed whose duty it was to enforce the already existing rights and thus be a ‘protector of the fields’. ² It would then appear that both the Brahmanic and Buddhist texts agree as to the existence of the social state in the first instance, and the election of a king on the basis of contract in the second. To use modern political phraseology, the agreement with Pṛthu was a sort of political or social contract which is reckoned as the origin of civil society. That which Kauṭalya refers to is possibly a governmental contract as it deals with certain definite agreements between the ruler and the ruled. It may also be noted in passing that this contractual theory of a governmental compact was not a figment of Kauṭalya’s imagination, but a theory already existing. This is evident from the Kauṭalīya itself.³

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¹ Aggañña Suttanta, vol. iii. p. 93.

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² Rockhill, Life of Buddha, pp. 1-7.

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³ Bk. I, sec. xiii.

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distressing that people elected from among themselves the best, namely Vaivasvata Manu as their overlord by entering into a contract with him. In this way both the traditional accounts can be easily and satisfactorily reconciled. That Pṛthu was an earlier king than Vaivasvata Manu is evident from the fact that while there is reference to Pṛthu in the Vedic literature as the first of the consecrated monarches: (Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda Tait. Brāhmaṇa, i. 7. 7. 4.) there is no such reference to Vaivasvata Manu.

Sec. iii. The Concept of Matsya Nyāya

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Reference has already been made to the *mātsya nyāya* theory. The guiding principle of this theory is ‘might is right’. Literally rendered the term *mātsya nyāya* means the ‘logic of the fish’, in other words, the law of the greater fish devouring the smaller ones. This supplies the explanation of the Hindu concept of the state of nature. According to orthodox tradition as expounded in the *Arthaśāstra* and the *Itihāsas* the original state of nature was one of ideal bliss when people naturally led a moral life perhaps born of regard for humanity in general. They were not bound down by laws or conventions and systems. This state of innocence, however, in course of time gave place to a period of insecurity and even savagery when chaos and anarchy reigned supreme. Might was the order of the day. People had no regard for human and divine order. The very social existence (*sthiti*) was made impossible. It was felt that over the whole world were spread the wings of destruction, and the day seemed not far off when it would reach its end. On this the Lord, the Creator, out of his abundant love to mankind, set up spiritual and moral standards which were named *daṇḍa nīti*. Any violation of such standards was severely dealt with by the authority in power (*imperium*), and this authority was invariably the king. Out of fear of *daṇḍa* people began to lead a moral and even a spiritually good life. As Kauṭalya acutely remarks, protected by *daṇḍa* the state prospers.¹

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¹ Bk. I, sec. iv.

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This peculiar state of nature is also described as *arājaka* in the *Śānti Parvan* of the *Mahābhārata*. *Arājaka* simply means a state with no government. According to the then prevalent standards, government was indispensable for a state. ‘No government, no state,’ is the principle underlying the *Rāja Dharma* section of the *Mahābhārata*. *Arājaka* is a state of anarchy as is explained in chapters lxvi and lxvii of the *Śānti Parvan*. It will not be out of place to summarize these here.

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Unprotected by an authority the state becomes subject to plunder and devastation by marauders; people devour one another. Life becomes unsafe. A person cannot enjoy the possession of his person and property. The wicked rob the weak and the innocent of their wealth, and themselves also suffer in their turn. Women are forced to give up their chastity. The atmosphere is pervaded by an all-round darkness. Like fishes in a small pool of water, and like birds in the toils of hunters, people injure and kill one another. People in a state of anarchy are compared to a herd of cows without a cowherd, and hence confront insurmountable difficulties in the maintenance of their family and property. The spiritually-minded are often thrown into the jaws of death. No regard is shown to parents, the aged, the *ācārya*, or the guests. The rich every day are murdered or put in chains. Women themselves become loose in morals. Agriculture, trade or commerce, does not thrive. The Vedas begin to disappear and the performance of sacrifices (*yajñas*) ceases. There are no regular marriages, nor well-conducted assemblies. Unrighteousness and injustice prevail. There is an intermixture of castes, and religious authority is openly defied. No one sleeps without fear, and famine stalks naked.’

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As in the *Mahābhārata* so also in the *Manusmṛti* the word ‘*arājaka*’ equates with *mātsya nyāya*.¹ The conception of the law-giver is that in states where government ceases to be, all people live in perpetual dread. In the absence of *daṇḍa* or *daṇḍadhara* the strong would devour the weak as the spike, the fishes.²

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¹ Cf. Manu, chap. vii. 21.

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¹ अराजके हि लोकेऽस्मिन् सर्वतो विद्रुते भयात् । (vii. 3.)

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² शूले मत्स्यानिवाभक्ष्यन् दुर्बलान् बलवत्तराः । (vii. 20.)

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This text is as corrected by the celebrated commentators like Medhātithi and Gōvindarāja. But Kullūka Bhaṭṭa gives another reading in this context.

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जलेमत्स्यानिवाहिंस्युः दुर्बलान् बलवत्तराः ।

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This indicates the traditional feeling of *mātsya nyāya* and hence may be usefully adopted as the more correct view. It is interesting to recall here that the same line occurs in the *Yuktikalpa-taru*.³ There is also another reading of the line in the *Śānti Parvan* of the *Mahābhārata* with a slight difference.⁴ This idea again of smaller fish being devoured by the larger ones is also found mentioned in the legend of the fish narrated by Mārkaṇḍeya in the *Vana Parvan* of the *Mahābhārata*.⁵

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³ शूलेमत्स्यानिवाभक्ष्यन् दुर्बलान् बलवत्तराः । (105.)

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⁴ जलेमत्स्यानिवाभक्ष्यन् दुर्बलं बलवत्तराः । (66. 16.)

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⁵ Chap. cxc. 7-9.

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The state of *arājaka* is elaborately described in chapter lxvii of the *Ayodhya Kāṇḍa* of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. ‘It is the prime cause of all ruin to the state. There will be no seasonal rain, no fruitful crops, no obedient son or wife, no private property, no truth, no assembly, no beautiful parks or sacred places of pilgrimage, no performance of *yajñas*, no theatrical amusements, no festivals or festivities, no learned lawyers, no pleasure-drive with family in swift going vehicles, no peace, no sleep for the rich even with doors shut, no learning or practice of arms, no caravan traders, no self-controlled men enjoying solitude and bliss, no yogakshema (obtaining that which could not be got and protecting what has been acquired, according to Govindarāja), no army conquering hostile enemies, no temple-worship, and no enjoyments of any sort. The kingdom without a king resembles a river without water, a forest without pasture and cattle without a cow-herd. In such a territory nothing is one’s own. The people swallow one another like fishes.¹ Thus both the epics and the Dharmaśāstras like Manu, and the Purāṇas like the Mātsyapurāṇa are quite at one as regards the nature of an arājaka territory. That this notion continued to prevail even centuries after is demonstrated from the election to the throne of Gopāla of the Pāla dynasty of Bengal. It is said that the people elected Gopāla to free themselves from a state of anarchy, or mātsya nyāya. This Gopāla was the father of Dharmapāla who lived in the ninth century A.D.²

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¹ Chap. lxvii, śl. 8-31. Cf. Mātsyapurāṇa, chap. ccxxv, v. 9.

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² Khālīmpur Grant of Dharmapāla, Epigraphica Indica, vol. iv, p. 248. The name Dharmapāla instead of Gopāla is wrongly given in some recent publications.

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There is again reference to this concept, of mātsya nyāya in Raghunātha’s Laukika-Nyāya-Saṅgraha (a work attributed to the fifteenth century A.D.). Raghunātha explains this as occurring frequently in the Purāṇa and in the Itihāsa literature and quotes Vasiṣṭha in the course of Prahlādākhyāna.³

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³ एतावताऽथकालेन तद्रसातल मण्डलं । बभूऽऽराजकं तोक्ष्णं मात्स्यन्यायकदभितम् ॥ इति (The Pandit Series, 1901, p. 122.)

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This state of anarchy presupposes a state of nature where one finds perpetual conflict between strong and weak individuals in a group with the result that the weak are defeated and subjugated by the strong. This then indicates what we to-day understand by the terms, the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. This is surely the individualistic theory with a vengeance. People of sanity grew sick of this state of affairs and desired peace. Necessity for a powerful hand to dominate the people was badly felt, and the result was the code of laws which goes by the general term, *daṇḍa nīti*, the guiding feature of which is the institution of kingship.¹

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¹ Scholars are not quite agreed as to the interpretation of the term *arājaka*. Mr. Jayaswal thinks that the *arājaka* or non-ruled state was a living institution which had been tried as a constitutional experiment more than once in ancient times. The learned scholar places above others the Jaina *sūtras* as his authority in this particular. (*Āyāramgasuttam*, vol.ii, 3, 1-10, edited by Jacobi, Hindu Polity, pt. i. p. 99.) The Jaina *sūtra* cited gives six forms of state : ‘non-ruled’ (*arājaka*) states, *gaṇa-ruled*, *yuvarāja-ruled*, two-ruled, *vairājya*, and party-ruled state. Jayaswal goes the length of interpreting the term *arājaka* in the *Śānti Parvan*, chap. lviii, to which we have made pointed reference, as the state of law when people lived by mutual agreement or social contract. No doubt the *Śānti Parvan* speaks of a democratic form of Government in which law or *dharma* was the uncrowned ruler when people never dared to transgress its precepts; but whether this state is what the *Mahābhārata* calls as an *arājaka* state, one can hardly say with any confidence. There were in vogue in ancient india democratic and republican forms of constitution. They may have been of the nature of experiments, though not actually so intended. They failed apparently to meet the needs of the times. Hence the people obviously needed a powerful and a selfless authority to meet the situation with a firm hand. Consequently the people learned to prefer a monarch.

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Jayaswal’s interpretation of the term *arājaka* seems unacceptable and we are inclined to take it, on the explicit authority of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, that the ‘*arājaka*’ state meant a state in *mātsya nyāya* or anarchy. Rather the *mātsya nyāya* was one form of ‘*arājaka*’ which inspired people with fear of its consequences. Peculiar doctrines have been prevalent in every kind of constitution, and in the *arājaka* state the ‘doctrine of fish’ alone gained more currency than any other. Undoubtedly then both ‘*arājaka*’ and *mātsya nyāya* theories point to anarchical forms of the state. A close study of the various texts gives indication of the fact of the historical or evolutionary development of the state government. To use modern political terms, the original state was one of democracy of the ideal type. This led directly or indirectly to a stage of anarchy, confusion, and blood-shed. Consequently the purest democratic form was deemed ill-adapted as a working principle and gradually given up. Soon definite laws were established and kingship was made a living institution, and this king was not an absolute uncontrolled autocrat, but he was what we understand to-day by the term a constitutional monarch.

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This institution can be traced in Vedic literature wherein are found many references to monarchical forms of government, where the king could do wrong and where he was under the control of the people or law. Law was above the king and it was eternal (*sanātana*). But this characteristic of law must be understood in a qualified sense; for though law remains the same in principle, still a gradual evolution in practical application, according to the changing needs of the times, worked itself out. *Śiṣṭācāra* (the practice of the learned) warranted such an alteration, which the needs of the time actually brought about. The law was purely customary and hence the state had little to do with legislation. What the remarkable historian Grote said of Zeus would equally apply to our ancient Indian King, ‘He was not a lawmaker but a Judge.’ Thus was introduced a form of constitutional monarchy with healthy limitations which had a telling effect on the constitution, first, by upholding the rights of the people (which is democracy), and secondly, by enforcing duties on the authority, that is the monarch. Thus it was a mixed constitution in which both the democratic and monarchic principles found recognition, and in which both were interdependent.

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What were the ends that the ancients sought to attain by propounding a mixed constitution like this? It was already shown that general principles of law were formulated beforehand and were taken for granted as established; and hence the rule of the king was to be the rule of the law and the government of law. But this law was not of the universal and comprehensive type. It was law in the sense that it provided certain recognized regulations for the maintenance of order in society. Any law presupposes a community of people or society. In this context we must not confound state with society or society with state. Both society and state were separate entities, and independent organisms.¹ Each of these had its own sphere of functioning and activity, its own structure and growth. The state did not always interfere with the social activities and organizations. But this was not absolute non-interference. The state certainly interfered with society whenever and wherever it was necessary. The policy of the state was, in other words, individualistic in character. That means the sphere of governmental activity was limited to a considerable extent.

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¹ R. K. Mookerjee, *Local Government in Ancient India*, intro., p. xv.

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Professor Gilchrist summarizes the functions of government according to this individualistic theory.

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1. Protection of the state and individuals from foreign aggression.
2. Protection of individuals against each other, i.e. from physical injury, slander, personal restraint.
3. Protection of property from robbery and damage.
4. Protection against false contract or breach of contract.
5. Protection of the unfit.
6. Protection of individuals from preventible evils, such as plague or malaria.

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This was, in short, protection of life and property of the citizens by the state. In return for this function by the state people paid taxes and revenue. The state in ancient India according to the available sources of information, can be said to have rested on an individualistic basis, individualistic in the sense that the individual strove for the attainment of his ultimate aim, namely, the salvation of his soul. Society, as conceived by the ancient Hindus, existed for the promotion of this aim of the individual, and the individual did not exist for the society as was the case in the early History of Greece. Maine says, ‘ Society in primitive times was not what it is assumed to be at present, a collection of individuals. In fact and in the view of the men who composed it, it was an aggregation of families. The contrasts may be most forcibly expressed by saying that the unit of an ancient society was the family, of a modern society, the individual.’¹ Society thus realized pales into insignificance before the state. State-control of social organization is to-day rapidly dethroning society as a separate entity, the latter being slowly but surely merged in the more powerful organization of the state. This conception was foreign to the genius of the Hindus. The ancient Hindus evolved distinct organizations of their own, both political and social, each functioning in its limited sphere of action. In this structure of society the individual was a member of the group, and was in the group. As a member he was to partake of the nature and the character of the group whatever it be; and by virtue of his position in the group he was guided by the policy of common will and common interest. He was free to express his own ideas on the question or questions engaging the serious consideration of that group, but he must subordinate his opinion to the common opinion. It was what is called the ‘sacrifice’ of the individual to the state. This group-feeling is the chief support for the power of the state, says Bertrand Russel¹ and makes the further remark, ‘almost every man finds it essential to his happiness to feel himself a member of a group, animated by common friendship and enmities, and banded together for defensive attack.’

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¹ Ancient Law, p. 104.

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¹ Principles of Social Reconstruction, pp. 52, 53.

Sec. iv. The Relation of Trivarga to Daṇḍa Nīti

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There is one other aspect of the science of daṇḍa and that is its relation to trivarga. This important aspect has received but little attention. Daṇḍa nīti has been characterized rightly, as trivarga vidyā, the science of the three ends of life.² The trivarga, namely, dharma, artha, and kāma, leaving mokṣa, out of account, constitutes the puruṣārthas of Hindu sociology, and *Rājadharma* functions towards the attainment of these *puruṣārthas*.¹

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² नोते: फलं धर्मार्थकामावाप्तिः । (Br. Sūtra. ii. 43.)

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¹ धर्म:प्रधानं पुरुषार्थात् । (Ār. Śās., ii. 55.)

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Dharma is the most important of this *trivarga*, says the *Bārhaspatya Nītisāra*.² The realization of this *trivarga* is said to lead on to the fourth *puruṣārtha*, namely, *mokṣa*. ‘Dharma has been a word to conjure with. It has been taught in all possible and imaginable ways—by express teaching, by commands, by stories, by literature and art, in temples, on the stage, and by the living examples of saints and avatars. It implies structure and function; it has reference to a type, and it is based on discipline; it is the meeting-point of the individual and of society, of religion and philosophy, of here and hereafter, of man and God. It is the cement of society, the bond of love, the means of attainment of God.’³

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² धर्मप्रधानं पुरुषार्थानां । (Bṛ. Sūtra. ii. 55 ; cp. Kāmasūtra, Bk. I, ii. 14.)

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³ K. S. R. Sastri, *Hindu Culture*, p. 93.

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This plant of *dharma* should be carefully nurtured for all acts grow from it. That king who, though deprived of *artha* and *kāma*, clings to *dharma*, reigns long.⁴ *Daṇḍa nīti* is like the reins of a horse, or the goad of an elephant, to men of the four *varṇas*, to keep them in the ordained path of *dharma*.

c6.s3.8

⁴ सेवा धर्मस्य कर्तव्या सततं भूरिवत्सरै: । (Śānti, lxviii. 80.) पुरुषैर्नरशार्दूल तन्मूला: सर्वथाक्रिया: । अर्थकामविहीनोऽपि चिरंपालयतेमहीं । (Ibid., 87.)

c6.s3.9

The king is said to be the maker of *kāla* or time. He makes and unmakes the four *yugas* by his actions. He must ever endeavour to create the Kṛta Yuga as against the Kali Yuga.¹ In a later chapter (91) Bhīṣma speaks of the king himself as the Yuga (*v* 6). *Daṇḍa* or well-timed and impartial justice is *dharma*, and *artha* is the root of *dharma*. The whole chapter² is devoted to the discussion of this subject of *trivarga* and its place in Indian polity. The fruits of *dharma* are said to be the attainment of divinity and of heaven; of *artha* enjoyment (*bhoga*), of *kāma* (satisfaction of the senses) and of *mokṣa*, release from the bonds of these three. There must be healthy restraints in the realization of the three ends of life in order that this life may lead to *mokṣa*.³ There must be a harmonious co-ordination of these spiritual standards. In this context Bhīṣma narrates the discourse which took place between Kāmandaka Ṛiṣi and Angariṣṭa Rāja. The king enquires of the sage: ‘If a king under the influence of anger and jealousy commit deeds of sin and repent afterwards, will he be absolved of the sin? Can a king get salvation if in ignorance he practises *adharma* as *dharma*?’ The sage replied that the king who abandoned *dharma* and *artha*, and enjoyed *kāma* in excess would ruin his powers of knowledge, and in this state wicked people would increase in numbers. He would get himself involved in all kinds of troubles.

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