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The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c6: The First Part of the Vedânta System: Theology

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c6

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Contents

The First Part of the Vedânta System: Theology

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OR

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THE DOCTRINE OF BRAHMAN.

VII. Prefatory Remarks and Arrangement

1. On the names of God

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The doctrine, which we here undertake to set forth, is not seldom included under the general conception of Pantheism; this expression (like the corresponding: Theism, Atheism and the like) not only means very little, but also, seems actually inexact in its application to our system, as well in its exoteric and lower, as in its esoteric and higher form. For in the lower doctrine the Theology of the Vedânta should on the contrary be described as Theism, as is shown by the expressions for God, Îçvara, the Lord, Purusha, the Man, the Spirit, Prâjña, the wise, and the like; in the higher doctrine on the contrary, it is something that rises above all such catch words, and resists all attempts to include it in the accepted schemes, however, convenient such inclusion might be. In any case the name Bráhman, which, in the work which we are to analyse, is used only as a neuter,⁶⁶ indicates something impersonal, only in the sense, however, that its being is raised far above all personality. This word does not originally mean "the liberated," "the Absolute," from barh, separate, as the Vedântins derive it (p. 33, 2, and also perhaps already Kâṭh. 2, 13. 6, 17 pravṛihya, prahṛihet) but rather from barh, swelling, that is (above pp. 17, 49) "prayer," conceived not as a wishing (εὔχεσθαι) or wording (orare, precari) or demanding (bidjan) or softening (молиться) or offering incense (תְּפִלָּה), but as the will of man striving upwards towards the holy, the divine; in accordance with this, the designation of God as Brahman would arise from a concept which finds and grasps the Divine where it is preeminently to be sought and found. The other designation of God as Âtman, that is, “the Self,” or “the Soul” also points us to our inner life (cf. p. 100, 18: âtmâ hi nâma svarûpam); but when this is distinguished from “the living Self,” the individual soul (Jîvâtman, Jîva) as “the highest Self” (Paramâtman, Mukhyâtman, Aupanishadâtman), these expressions admonish us to distinguish two sides in our own selves, of which this whole empirical form of existence is only one, while the other, lying behind it, rests in the bosom of the deity, is even identical with it.

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⁶⁶ The Brahmán (m.) of Indian mythology appears quite exceptionally p. 913, 10 Vasiṣṭhaç ca Brahmaṇo mânasaḥ putraḥ and in the formula p. 61, 11 brahmâdi-sthâvarânta, p. 604, 2 brahmâdi-stambaparyanta; also in the quotations p. 209, 1. 301, 4. 338, 12. 339, 1. 998, 2, where he is usually explained as Hiraṇyagarbha (p. 301, 1. 339, 3). In the Vedânta it is frequently the custom, which we shall occasionally follow, to connect a pronun of masculine gender (he, his and the like) with Brahman in the neuter.

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This is not the place to follow up further the designations of God as Brahman, Âtman, Purusha, Îçvara and the profound views which they open up; to this end the first steps of our knowledge must first be exhibited from the Veda more clearly than has hitherto been done. Here we must restrict ourselves to developing the Theology of Bâdarâyaṇa and Çaṅkara, looking at the Upanishads only with their eyes; but even in this scholastic form, the ideas of the Godhead show a loftiness the like of which cannot easily be found elsewhere.

2. Arrangement of the Theology

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Apart from casual phrases scattered through the whole work, the doctrine of the Brahman is dealt with in two parts of the Brahmasûtras; that is, in the first Adhyâya, which lays down the Theology on the basis of a series of scripture texts, in a general way, and without developing the difference between Saguṇa and Nirguṇa Vidyâ,⁶⁷ and in an appendix to this, in 10) —, 13—17 . . . . . Chând. 4, 15, 1
11) —, 18—20 . . . . . Brịh. 3, 7, 3
12) —, 21—23 . . . . . Muṇḍ. 1, 1, 6
13) —, 24—32 . . . . . Chând. 5, 11—24
14) 1, 3, 1—7 . . . . . Muṇḍ. 2, 2, 5
15) —, 8—9 . . . . . Chând. 7, 23
16) —, 10—12 . . . . . Brịh. 3, 8, 8
17) —, 13 . . . . . Praçna 5, 5
18) —, 14—18 . . . . . Chând. 8, 1, 1
19) —, 19—21 . . . . . Chând. 8, 12, 3
20) —, 22—23 . . . . . Muṇḍ. 2, 2, 10
21) —, 24—25 . . . . Kâṭh. 4, 12
22) —, 39 . . . . . Kâṭh. 6, 1
23) —, 40 . . . . . Chând. 8, 12, 3
24) —, 41 . . . . . Chând. 8, 14
25) —, 42—43 . . . . . Brịh. 4, 3, 7
26) 1, 4, 14—15 Taitt. 2, 6
27) —, 16—18 Kaush. 4, 19
28) —, 19—22 . . . . . Brịh. 4, 5, 6

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⁶⁷ Such a difference seems to be kept in view, judging from the introductory discussions p. 111—114; but in the development of the question whether sagunam or nirgunam brahma is to be understood, another question is generally substituted, that is, whether the text cited refers to the highest self or to the individual self. The threefold antithesis of param brahma, 1) to the forms as which it is presented

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As this survey shews, the order of the passages, as they occur in the different Upanishads, is rigidly preserved. But apart from this, these passages are interwoven in a way for which we only here and there seem to recognise a reason. Possibly this enigmatic relation points to preparatory exegetical works within the different Çâkhâs, which were then gradually united in a single whole.

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However this may be, this much is clear, that this principle of arrangement is in fact an external one. Therefore, in our statement of the doctrine, we ignore it altogether, in order, after producing certain proofs of the existence of God (Chap. VIII), to treat of the Brahman on the basis of the material in question, first in itself (Chap. IX), then as a cosmic principle (Chap. X), again as a cosmic and at the same time psychic principle (Chap. XI), lastly as the soul (Chap. XII), and as the highest end (Chap. XIII). The investigation of the esoteric (nirguṇam) Brahman will form the conclusion of the Theology (Chap. XIV).

VIII. Proofs of the Existence of God

1. Prefatory Remark

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In the course of the work, with which we are concerned, we several times come across discussions, which have a certain likeness to the proofs of the existence of God that figure in the modern pre-Kantian philosophy. We give them here under the names in use among us, as a comparison of the arguments on both sides is not without historical interest. There can be no question of mutual dependence, since proofs like the cosmological and physico-theological lie in the nature of man's processes of thought; as it appears, the Indians were never ensnared into an ontological proof; on the other hand, we find a new proof, which we may call the psychological, and in which the concept of God blends with the concept of the soul. We begin with a short and provisional definition of the Brahman, and then introduce the passages which occur under the titles mentioned, without meaning to maintain that their entire contents are suited to these titles chosen for the sake of comparison.

2. Definition of the Brahman

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(p. 38, 2:) “The cause, from which [proceeds] the origin or subsistence, and dissolution of this world which is extended in names and forms, which includes many agents and enjoyers, which contains the fruit of works specially determined according to space, time and cause, a world which is formed after an arrangement inconceivable even for the spirit, this omniscient and omnipotent cause is the Brahman.”

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(p. 90, 3:) “Brahman is the omniscient and omnipotent cause of the origin, persistence and passing away of the world.”

3. Cosmological Proof

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Under this title we translate Sûtram 2, 3, 9 with Çankara's explanation (p. 627—628).

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Sûtram: "But [there is] no origin of 'the Existent,' on account of the impossibility." Explanation: "After anyone has been taught from the scripture, that also ether [or: space] and air have originated, although we cannot conceive their coming into being, he might come to think that the Brahman also originated from something, for when he perceives how from the ether and the like, which are still only modifications, yet other modifications arise, he might conclude that the ether also sprang into being from the Brahman, as if from a mere modification. The present Sûtram "But [there is] no-origin" etc., serves to remove this doubt; its meaning is: but one must not think that the Brahman, whose essence is Being (sad-ātmaka), could have originated from anything else; why? 'owing to impossibility.' For Brahman is pure Being. As such it can [firstly] not have sprung from pure Being, because [between the two] there is no superiority, so that they cannot be related [to each other] as original and modified;—but also [secondly] not from differentiated Being, because experience contradicts this; for we see that from homogeneity differences arise, for example, vessels from clay, but not that homogeneity arises from differences;—further [thirdly] also not from non-Being,⁶⁸ for this is essenceless (nirātmaka); and because the scripture overthrows it, when it says (Chând. 6, 2, 2): 'How should the Existent come from the non-Existent?' and because it does not admit a producer of the Brahman, when it is said (Çvet. 6, 9):

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⁶⁸ The similarity of this demonstration with that in the Parmenides v. 62 ff., is conspicuous; Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen I³, p. 471.

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"Cause is He, Master of the Sense's Lord,
"He has no Lord, and no Progenitor."

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"For ether and wind on the contrary an origin is shewn, but there is none such for the Brahman, that is the difference. And because it is seen how, from modifications, other modifications arise, there is no necessity for the Brahman also “to be a modification. For were this so, then we should come “to no primordial nature (*mûlaprakṛiti*) but should have a “*regressus in infinitum* (*anavasthâ*). What is assumed as the “primordial nature,—just that is our Brahman; there is thus “perfect agreement.” 69

4. Physico-theological Proof

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(p. 500, 3:) “When the matter is considered with the help “of examples only, it is seen that in the world no non-intelligent “object without being guided by an intelligence brings forth “from itself the products which serve to further given aims “of man. For, *e. g.*, houses, palaces, beds, seats, pleasure- “gardens and the like are [only] contrived in life by intelligent “artists in due time for the purpose of obtaining pleasure and “averting pain. Exactly the same it is with this whole world. “For when one sees, how, for example, the earth serves the end “of the enjoyment of the fruit of the manifold works, and how, “again, the body within and without by possessing a given “arrangement of parts suitable to the different species and “determined in detail that it may form the place of the en- “joyment of the fruit of the manifold works,—so that even “highly skilled artists full of insight are unable to comprehend “it through their understanding,—how should this arrangement “proceed from the non-intelligent original-matter [of the Sân- “khyas]? For lumps of earth, stones and the like are in “no wise capable of this? Clay also, for example, is formed, “as experience teaches, to different shapes [only] so long as “it is guided by the potter, and exactly in the same way must “matter be guided by another intelligent power. He, there- “fore, who relies on the material cause only as clay, etc., “cannot rightly maintain, that he possesses the primordial “cause; but no objection meets him who, besides it [the clay], “relies on the potter etc. as well. For when this is assumed “there is no contradiction, and at the same time the scripture, “which teaches an intelligent power as cause, is thereby re- “spected. So that, as the arrangement [of the Kosmos] would “become impossible, we may not have recourse to a non- “intelligent power as the cause of the world.”

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⁶⁹ In the last phrase, the relationship between the Indian and the western cosmological proof, as well as the inadequacy of both, comes out very clearly; since considered empirically nothing stands in the way of a *regressus* from the effect to the cause, from this again to its cause, *etc. in infinitum*.

5. Psychological Proof

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(p. 32, 4:) “Is the Brahman which is to be investigated “known or unknown? If it is known, we do not need to in- “vestigate it; if it is unknown, we cannot investigate it!— “Answer: That Being which is of its own nature is eternal, “pure, wise, free, all-knowing, almighty is Brahman. For from “the etymology of the word Brahman the meanings ‘eternal, “pure’ etc. are reached, according to the meaning of the root “barh [‘to separate;’ see above, p. 119]. But the existence of “the Brahman is demonstrated by the fact that it is the Self “(Soul, ātman) of all. For everyone assumes the existence of “himself, for he cannot say: ‘I am not.’ For if the existence “of Self were not demonstrated, then all the world could say “‘I am not.’ And the Self is the Brahman.—But if the “Brahman is universally demonstrated because it is the Self, “then it is known, and the objection that it need not be in- “vestigated, recurs?—Not so! For with reference to its “characteristics there is contradiction. For the common people “and the materialists [Lokāyatika: ‘those who follow the world’] “assert: ‘the Self is only the body invested with intelligence;’ “—others again: ‘the Self is only the [naturally] intellectual “organs of sense;’—others: ‘it is the understanding (manas);’ “—yet others: ‘it is only the perishable intellect;’—others: “‘the Void;’—others again: ‘it is the [individual soul] extend- “ing beyond the body, wandering, acting, and suffering;’—some: “‘it is only the sufferer, not the agent;’—some: ‘it is the “all-knowing, almighty Lord, who extends beyond this [world];’ “—still others: ‘it is the Self of him who suffers [or: enjoys] “there.’—Thus many oppose each other, and rely on arguments “and passages [of Scripture] or their appearance. He, there- “fore, who inconsiderately assumes the one or the other, may “compromise his salvation and come to destruction. Therefore, “because they set forth the investigation of the Brahman, the “consideration of the Vedânta [Upanishad] texts, supported “by non-contradictory reflexion, is recommended as a means “of salvation.”

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(p. 78, 6:) “For the eternal Spirit (*purusha*) different from “the agent [the individual soul], which is the object of the “presentation of I, dwelling as witness (*sâkshin*) in all being, “uniform, one, the highest, is not apprehended by anyone from “the Section of Works [of the Veda] or from any book based “on reflexion; he, who is the soul of all. And therefore none “can deny him, or make him an element of the Section of “Works; for he is even the Self (soul) of him who denies “him; and because he is the Self of all, it is therefore im- “possible either to flee from him or to seek him. For every- “thing that passes away, came into existence and passes away “through modification, because it finds its end in the spirit; “but the spirit is imperishable, because there is no cause of “perishableness in it, and because there is no cause of change “in it, therefore is it raised [above change], and eternal, and “for this very reason in its own nature eternal, pure and free “[or: freed].”

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Now in so far as God is the (metaphysical) I of man him- self, his existence cannot be proved at all, but also it does not need to be proved, because he is that which is alone known directly, and thereby the basis of all certainty, as is developed in the following most remarkable passage.

6. Cogito, ergo sum

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(p. 619, 8:) “For if the Self [that is, Brahman] also [like “ether, wind, fire, water, earth] were a modification, then, “since the Scripture teaches nothing higher above it, every “effect from ether downwards would be without Self (*nirât- “maka*, soulless, essenceless), since the Self [also] would be “[only] an effect; and thus we should arrive at Nihilism “(*çûnya-vâda*). Just because it is the Self, it is not possible “to doubt the Self. For one cannot establish the Self [by “proof] in the case of anyone, because in itself it is already “known. For the Self is not demonstrated by proof of itself.

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“For it is that which brings into use all means of proof, such as perception and the like, in order to prove a thing which is not known. For the objects of the expressions ether etc. require a proof, because they are not assumed as known of themselves. But the Self is the basis (âçraya) of the action of proving, and consequently it is evident before the action of proving. And since it is of this character, it is therefore impossible to deny it. For we can call in question something, which comes to us (âgantuka) [from outside], but not that which is our own being. For it is even the own being of him who calls it in question [cf. p. 79, l. 823, 2]; fire cannot call its own heat in question. And further, when it is said: ‘It is I, who now know what at present exists, it is I, who knew the past, and what was before the past, it is I, who shall know the future and what is after the future,’ it is implied in these words that even when the object of knowledge alters, the knower does not alter, because he is in the past, future, and present; for his essence is eternally present (sar-vadâ-vartamâna-svabhâvatvâd); therefore, even when the body turns to ashes, there is no passing away of the Self, for its essence is the present, yea, it is not even for a moment thinkable, that its essence should be anything else than this.”

IX. The Brahman in itself

1. Brahman as the non-Existent

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Sûtram 1, 4, 14—15.

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It is asserted, Çankara says (loc. cit.), that the Vedânta texts referring to the derivation of the world from Brahman, as well as those referring to the nature of Brahman itself, are frequently contradictory; in the former case, sometimes the ether, sometimes fire, sometimes breath is named as the first created, while in the latter, Brahman is in some passages described as the "non-Existent," in others as the "Existent." With regard to the first point, he says, it will be discussed further on (cf. Chap. XVII, 1); here we have only to do with the latter. It is true that it is said (Taitt. 2, 7):

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"Non-Existent was this in the beginning, thence the Existent arose"

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while on the other hand it is said (Chând. 6, 2, 1): "Existent "only, dear one, was this in the beginning, alone and without "a second. Some, verily, say: non-Existent was this in the "beginning, and without a second; from this non-Existent "arose the Existent. But how could this be, dear one? How "could the Existent arise from the non-Existent."

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Here, in the one passage, as in the other, the all-knowing, almighty, all-animating Being without a second is indicated as the cause of the world (p. 372, 7); and if the Taitt. Up. speaks of a non-Existent, it is not an essenceless non-Existent that is to be understood, as the preceding verse (Taitt. 2, 6) proves:

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"He is but non-Existent⁷⁰ who knows Brahman as non-Existent;
"He who knows Brahman as Existent becomes himself by this Existent."

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⁷⁰ Çankara always reads: asann eva sa bhavati, p. 375, 13. 124, 9. 128, 7. 823, 4.

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The word "Existent" is commonly used to indicate the world extended in names and forms; now in order to suggest, that this development did not exist before the creation, it is metaphorically said of Brahman which alone is: it was, as it were, a non-Existent (p. 376, 7).

2. Brahman as the primordial Light

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Sûtram 1, 3, 22—23.

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Muṇḍ. 2, 2, 10 (= Kâṭh. 5, 15 = Ҫvet. 6, 14) says:

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“There shines not sun nor moon nor stars, nor shine these lightnings, far less earthly fire: after Him the shining One, all shines, from His light is lighted this whole world.”

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In this passage, as Ҫaṅkara explains, it is not some kind of light-element that is to be understood, but the highest Âtman, of which Chând. 3, 14, 2 says: “Light is his form, truth his resolve” (p. 272, 9), and which is spoken of (p. 274, 2) in what goes before (Muṇḍ. 2, 2, 5. 9). A Light-element is not to be thought of, because from such an element the sun etc. [hence the moon also!] cannot borrow their light, since they are themselves just as much light-elements (p. 272, 11); but they can all very well borrow their light from the Brahman, for a borrowing can also take place in the case of things of different kinds, as a glowing ball of iron burns after the fire, and as the dust blows after the wind (p. 273, 2); moreover, besides the light-elements named, the sun etc., no other exists (p. 274, 8).—From the shining of the Âtman “all this” would borrow light, that is, either: the sun, etc., in the sense in which Bṛih. 4, 4, 16 says: “Him the Gods honour as immortal Life, as the light of lights,” or it means: this whole world-development, as it has arisen in names and forms as “the reward of works to the doer” (kriyâ-kâraka-phala, p. 273, 12; the same formula p. 291, 6. 447, 3. 987, 6), has as cause the light-nature of the Brahman, just as the revelation of all forms has as its cause the light-nature of the sun (p. 273, 13). All that is perceived, is perceived through the Brahman as light, but the Brahman is perceived through no other light, because its own being is to be Self-shining, so that the sun etc. shine in him (tasmin). For the Brahman reveals the other, but the Brahman is not revealed by the other (p. 275, 1).

3. Brahman as the last, unknowable origin of the Existent

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a) Sûtram 1, 2, 21-23.

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In the Introduction of the Muṇḍaka-Upanishad two doctrines are distinguished (in another sense than above, p. 98 ff.), a lower, which, as Śaṅkara remarks, has as its fruit ascent (abhyudaya, cf. p. 82), and a higher, which has as its fruit salvation (p. 203, 5). Under the lower the four Vedas besides the six Vedâṅgas (Phonetics, Grammar, Etymology, Metre, Ritual and Astronomy) are enumerated, and then it is said further, Muṇḍ. 1, 1, 5:

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"But the higher is that through which that Imperishable is known: the invisible, intangible, unoriginated, colourless, without eyes and ears, without hands and feet, the eternal, all-pervading, all-present, very subtle, this is the Unchanging which the wise know as the womb of beings. As the spider puts forth [the threads] and draws them back again, as herbs grow up upon the earth, as from a living man the hair on head and body, so from this Imperishable arises all the world."

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Here, as Śaṅkara develops it, the highest God is to be understood, not primordial matter or the individual soul. For though the examples brought forward, the spider's body and the man's body, are only directed by an intelligent power, but are themselves non-intelligent (p. 200, 12), yet these are only comparisons, which must not be pressed too far (p. 204, 14); that an intelligent original Being is to be understood, is proved by what immediately follows, and is therefore to be applied here, "he who understands all, who knows all" (Muṇḍ. 1, 1, 9), which cannot be applied to a non-intelligent primordial matter (p. 201, 3).—One might also think of the individual soul, because it certainly according to its moral nature (p. 201, 9) conditions what arises as being, but what follows further on, shews clearly that only the highest Brahman can be meant. For it is said further, Muṇḍ. 2, 1, 1:

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"This is the truth:—As, from a well lit fire, sparks, of like nature to it, arise thousandfold, so, dear one, from the

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“Imperishable go forth manifold beings, and return into it “again. For divine is the spirit (purusha), the formless, who “is within and without, unborn, breathless, wishless, pure, yet “higher than the highest Imperishable. From him arises “breath, the understanding with all the senses, from him arise “ether, wind, and fire, the water, and earth the support of “all. His head is fire, his eyes the moon and sun, the cardinal- “points are his ears, his voice is the revelation of the Veda. “Wind is his breath, his heart the world, from his feet the “earth;—he is the inner Self in all beings.”

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From this passage, says Çañkara, it is clear, that neither the individual soul, to which such majesty of body does not belong, nor primordial matter is to be thought of, because it is not the inner Self in all beings (sarva-bhûta-antarâtman), (p. 207, 12). If at the same time an individualised form is attributed to the invisible womb of beings, this is not in order to ascribe to it a real individuality, but only to make it clear that it is the Self of the universe (sarva-âtman) (p. 208, 1).— A difficulty is caused by the fact that the Âtman, which (above p. 131) is called “the Imperishable,” is here spoken of as “higher than the highest Imperishable.” The way in which Çañkara tries to solve this difficulty, by here understanding the “Imperishable as the undeveloped subtle body [Chap. XXXI, 3], “forming the seed-power for names and forms, which serves as “the ground-work for the Lord, and is only a limitation (upâdhi) “ascribed to himself” (p. 206, 1), as well as the opinion of some, considered by Çañkara (p. 208), that in the concluding words of the text Prajâpati (a cosmogonic personification of Brahman) is to be understood, we may very well pass by.

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b) Sûtram 1, 3, 10–12.

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In the Brihadâranyaka-Upanishad (3, 8) Gârgî, the daughter of Vacaknu (not the wife of Yâjñavalkya, as Colebrooke, M. E.¹ p. 343 erroneously supposes) asks Yâjñavalkya in what is woven and interwoven that which exists above heaven, beneath the earth, and between heaven and earth, in what the past, the present, and the future, and receives as answer: in the ether (space) all this is woven and interwoven.—“But in what,”

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¹ p. 343 erroneously supposes

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she asks further, “is ether (space) then woven and interwoven?”—To this Yâjñavalkya:

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“It is that, o Gârgî, which the Brahmans call the Imperishable (*aksharam*); it is neither gross nor fine, nor short nor long, nor red [like fire] nor adhering [like water], not shady nor dark, not wind nor ether, not sticky [like gum], without taste, without smell, without eye or ear, without voice, without understanding, without vital-force, and without breath, without mouth and without measure, without inner or outer; nothing whatsoever does it consume, nor is it consumed by any. At the bidding of this Imperishable, o Gârgî, sun and moon are kept asunder from each other; at the bidding of this Imperishable, o Gârgî, heaven and earth are kept asunder from each other; at the bidding of this Imperishable, o Gârgî, the minutes and the hours, the days and nights, the half-months, months, the seasons, and the years are kept asunder. At the bidding of this Imperishable, o Gârgî, the streams run downward from the snowy mountains some to the east, some to the west, and whithersoever each one goes; at the bidding of this Imperishable, o Gârgî, men praise the generous man, gods strive for the sacrificer, the fathers for the offerings for the dead. Verily, o Gârgî, he who knows not this Imperishable, though in this world he offers and has offerings made, though he suffers penance many a thousand years, gains an unenduring [reward]; but he who knows not that Imperishable, o Gârgî, and departs from this world, he, indeed, is miserable; but he who, o Gârgî, knowing this Imperishable, departs from this world, he, indeed, is a Brâhmaṇa. Verily, o Gârgî, this Imperishable is seeing, not seen, hearing, not heard, understanding, not understood, knowing, not known. For outside him there is no seer, outside him there is no hearer, outside him there is no none with understanding, outside him there is none with knowledge. In this Imperishable, verily, o Gârgî, is the ether woven and interwoven.”

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In this passage, as Çañkara explains, the Imperishable (*aksharam*) means not “the syllable,” as usually is the case, generally the sacred syllable “*om*,” of which it is said (Chând.

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2, 23, 4) “the sound *om* is all this,” but the highest divinity (p. 242, 10); for of it only is it true that in it the ether and thereby the universe is woven (p. 242, 14), as even in the passage mentioned (Chând. 2, 23, 4) the sound “*om*” signifies Brahman (p. 243, 3), whose properties of eternity and all-permeation are signified etymologically by *aksharam* (*na ksharati*, *aṇnute ca*, p. 243, 4). Primordial matter can also not be understood as the Imperishable, for it is said: “at the bidding of this Imperishable,” and “this is seeing not seen” etc., which must refer to an intelligent power (p. 243, 12. 244, 8); but it cannot refer to the individual soul, because in the words: “without eye and without ear” etc., all limitations (*upâdhi*) are excluded, and without these the individual soul cannot exist (p. 244, 13).

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All the properties of the Brahman, which we have dealt with hitherto, were (so far as they are not to be taken figuratively) purely negative; now we turn to the two positive determinations of the being of the Godhead, which show it as 1) pure intelligence, 2) pure bliss.

4. Brahman as pure Intelligence

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Sûtram 1, 1, 5--11.

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Prefatory Remark. When we consider the weakness and frailty of man's intellect, we can only wonder at the unanimity with which, in Indian, Greek and modern philosophy, Intelligence is ascribed as an essential attribute to “the Thing-in-itself.” It is well worth while to follow out the motives which have led the thinkers of ancient and modern times to declare so feeble a faculty, which works only intermittently, is bound up with organic life and perishes with it, to be the essence of the being of Beings. These motives are especially clearly seen in the deeply founded structure of the Vedânta philosophy. Metaphysics must above all seek a firm and immovable point of certainty, in order to attack the subject, and this can only be found in the consciousness of the philosophising subject; hence the Cartesian: *cogito, ergo sum*, and the corresponding statement of our work, which we have given above p. 127 ff. Here, within our own Self, we gain an infallible guide to the absolute Being which we are seeking: that which cannot be laid aside must also be the imperishable, the unchangeable must also be that which lies at the basis of every thing changeable, a conviction, which is most clearly expressed by calling the Principle of all Being the *Âtman*, that is, the Self. We reach it as, in the manner described above p. 58, and in note 29, we gradually separate from our "I" everything which is "not-I," hence not only the outer world, the body and its organs, but also the whole apparatus of *Buddhi* or intellect (the *indriyas* and the *manas*). What remains, should consequently be spoken of only as unconscious; but they could not go so far, without removing the whole phenomenon from the region of perceptibility. Consciousness, therefore, in which all this process of elimination proceeds, was left as the terminus, so that not only was the necessity avoided of abandoning, along with the organs of perception, their function also,—perception,—but also the very noteworthy objections of the adversary, which we shall presently detail, were set at defiance.

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Many times, as *Çaṅkara* says in the passage, with which we are concerned, intellect is ascribed to the Principle of world-creation in the Veda. So when it is said: "He designed (*aikshata*): I will become many, I will procreate" (Chând. 6, 2, 3);—"He designed: I will create worlds" (Ait. 1, 1, 1);—"He formed the design, then he created Breath" (Praçna 6, 3. 4);—"He who knows all, understands all" etc. (Muṇḍ. 1, 1, 9).—From this it follows that we must ascribe to the Brahman omniscience, absolute, unlimited knowledge, that, as a later passage (3, 2, 16) explains, Brahman is pure spirituality (*caitanyam*) and this alone.—Against these arguments the Sâṅkhyas raise the following objections:

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First Objection: An eternal cognition in Brahman would take away the freedom of Brahman with reference to the action of cognition (p. 93, 1).—To this *Çaṅkara* replies: to begin with, it is to be held that only an eternal actual, and not a potential, cognition (such as the Sâṅkhyas ascribe to the *sattva-guṇa* of their primordial matter) satisfies the demands of omniscience.⁷¹ A cognition of this kind does not take away the freedom of Brahman; for in the case of the sun also, although it continually gives forth heat and light, we say "it warms," "it shines" and thereby indicate that it does this of itself, of its own accord [p. 95, 16; that is to say: the following out of the law of its own nature does not take away the freedom of a being].

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⁷¹ p. 95, 10. The passage seems corrupt; it would be a help if we might read: katham nitya-jñāna-akriyatve asarvajñatva-hānir, by which what follows becomes consistent.

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Second Objection: a cognition is only possible, if there is also an object of perception (karman, literally "a product," in contrast to karaṇam, organ), which was not the case before the creation (p. 96, 1).—Answer: as the sun also shines, when there is nothing for it to shine on, so Brahman might know without having an object of cognition (cf. p. 649, 10). Yet one existed, even before the creation. What is this pre-cosmic object?—It is (p. 96, 6) "the Names and Forms which are neither "to be defined as beings nor as the opposite, which are not "evolved, but striving towards evolution (avyākrite, vyācikîrshite), "the Names and Forms" of the world [which as the words of the Veda, as we saw above p. 71, hovered before the spirit of the Creator before the creation].

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Third Objection: Cognition cannot proceed without organs of perception, body, senses, etc. (p. 93, 4. 96, 11).—Answer: because cognition inheres in Brahman, as shining in the sun, as an eternal law of its nature, it requires no organs to this end, like the individual soul (p. 97, 1), which, as is provisionally set forth on p. 98, is nothing but the Brahman itself, limited by the Upādhis like the body etc., and therefore only separate from the Brahman from the standpoint of Ignorance (cf. above p. 58 ff.). The individual soul (p. 100—101) is the Self of Brahman, and the Brahman is the Self of the individual soul; for of Brahman it is said: (Chând. 6, 3, 2) "this "divinity designed: good! I will enter into these three divinities "[Fire, Water, Earth] with this living self!" and again it is said (Chând. 6, 8, 7): "whose being is this universe, that is the “Real, that is the soul (the Self), that art thou, o Çveta-ketu!”—That Self means the own nature; a spiritual power, like the individual soul, cannot have an unspiritual as its own nature (p. 100, 18. 104, 9).—On this ground, which for our authors is unassailable, they take their stand further on, when, to prove the spirituality of the Existent or the Godhead, they refer to two phenomena, that of liberation, and that of dreamless sleep. Liberation is a return into Brahman (p. 102, 8); and from another point of view it is only a coming to consciousness of one’s own Self (p. 103, 7), it follows, therefore, that Brahman is simply this Self, and therefore spiritual. As Liberation is an eternal union with the Existent, that is, with Brahman, the cause of the world, so deep, dreamless sleep according to the scripture (Chând. 6, 8, 1) is a temporary union with the Existent (p. 109, 2); the word “he sleeps” (svapiti) means, however, “he has entered into himself” (svam apita); a spiritual power, like the individual soul, cannot enter into an unspiritual as into its own self (p. 108, 10).

5. Brahman as Bliss

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Sûtram 1, 1, 12–19; cf. 3, 3, 11–13.

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Brahman is the inmost essence of man.—This thought is exhibited in the second part of the Taittirîya Upanishad by the theory (which plays a large part in the later Vedântasâra, but not yet in Bâdarâyaṇa and Çaṅkara) of the different coverings (koça), by which our Self is surrounded, and through which we must break, in order to reach the inmost essence of our nature, and thereby the Brahman.

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After Taitt. 2, 1 has briefly explained, how from the Âtman the ether proceeded, from this the wind, from this the fire, from this the waters, from these the earth, from this plants, from these food, from this seed, from this man, and further it is said: this man consists of food (annarasamaya), in this self of food indwells, another, filling it, the Self of breath (prâṇamaya), in this again the self of understanding (manomaya), in this the self of intellect (vijñânamaya), in this lastly, as inmost, the self of bliss (ânandamaya). For each of these five sheath-like selves, indwelling one in the other, are distinguished and specified (perhaps while the form of a bird is present to the thought) the head, the right and left sides (wings), the body, and "the support (literally: the tail), the base." In the case of the self of food, these parts are formed by the parts of the body, in the case of the self of breath, by the vital spirits with the ether (in the heart) and the earth, for the self of understanding by the four Vedas and the Upanishads (âdeça), for the self of intellect by faith, truth, right, piety (yoga) and lordship; for the self of bliss it is said finally: "Love [literally: what is dear] is his head, joy "his right side, rejoicing his left side, bliss his body, Brahman "his support, his base" (Taitt. 2, 5).

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In this passage, according to Bâdarâyaṇa's Sûtras and the accompanying interpretation, by the "self of bliss" we are to understand Brahman; as is proved p. 116 from the connection of the passage, and from the frequent description of Brahman as bliss in the Taitt. Up. and elsewhere (Bṛih. 3, 9, 28), and finally, because it is spoken of as the innermost of all. The word "of bliss" do not here mean "made of bliss," but indicate only the fulness of the bliss of Brahman (1, 1, 13 p. 117), which is the source of all bliss (1, 1, 14 p. 118). Neither the individual soul (1, 1, 16—17 p. 119—120) nor the primordial matter of the Sâṅkhyas (1, 1, 18 p. 121) can be understood here, from the connection of the whole; moreover the union of the individual soul with the being "of bliss" is required (1, 1, 19, p. 121—122) in the words of Taitt. Up. 2, 7: "For "when one finds his resting-place and peace in this invisible, "bodiless, ineffable, unfathomable [literally: baseless], then he "has entered into peace; but if on the contrary, he assumes "a hollow in this [as in the four others]—[Commentary: if he "makes a difference between himself and this], then has he "unrest; it is the unrest of him, who thinks himself wise."

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But in direct contradiction to this interpretation, (which is to be applied when the subject is resumed 3, 3, 11—13) another explanation of the Upanishad passage is introduced at the end of our extract by the words: "Here, however, the following is to be noted," (p. 122, 9) explaining that the interpretation of -maya as "consisting of" and then as "having the fulness,” is as inconsequent as if one had only half-digested his food,⁷² and then, entering into the discussion, declares that it is not by the “self of bliss” that Brahman is to be understood, but only by that which is indicated as “its support, its basis;” the self of bliss is not yet the kernel, but only the inmost shell, of which, therefore, we should have counted not four but five (p. 123, 10: annamaya-âdaya’ ânandamaya-paryan-tâh pañca koçâh kalpyante). In conclusion, the representative of this opinion gives an explanation—extremely forced—of the sûtras in his sense.

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⁷² p. 122, 13: arddha-jaratîya-nyâyena; similarly p. 176, 11: na tatra arddha-jaratîyam (with this reading) labhyam. Differently and very naïvely Govinda explains the latter passage: arddham, mukhamâtram, jaratyâ vriddhâyâh kâmayate, na aṅgâni, iti, so ’yam arddhajaratîya-nyâyah.

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As both interpretations agree in recognising Bliss (ânanda) as the being of Brahman, this difference is of no particular consequence for our purpose. But it is interesting for the literary character of our work, as well as for the history of the Vedânta, that here in Çaṅkara’s commentary two opinions stand side by side, of which, as it seems to us, the former alone corresponds to the text of the Upanishads and Bâdarâyaṇa’s Sûtras, while on the side of the latter are ranged the Commentary to the Taittirîya-Upanishad, which goes under Çaṅkara’s name, as well as the Vedântasâra, which likewise interprets the self of bliss as only a shell (Vedântasâra, § 56, ed. Boehtl.) and thus counts five shells on which, in combination with the three Guṇas of the Sâṅkhya Philosophy, the whole of its psychology is built up.

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Either the latter interpretation is due to a later interpolator, not to Çaṅkara, in which case the Commentary to the Taittirîya-Upanishad also must not be attributed to him (cf. in it p. 25, 14 sushumnâ, and above note 8);—or it is Çaṅkara’s: in the latter case, we may suppose that he copied the first interpretation given to the separate Sûtras from an earlier commentator (a possibility, which would be of great importance for the character of his whole work, cf. notes 17. 45), or we can also suppose, that Çaṅkara disagrees with Bâdarâyaṇa here, that he therefore interprets the Sûtras first in Bâdarâyaṇa's sense, and then rejects this interpretation, in order to give another in its place in the sense of which he finally interprets the Sûtras as the standard authority of the school, consciously changing their original meaning.

6. Brahman as Free from all Evil

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Sûtram 1, 1, 20-21.

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As is well known, the hymns of the Sâmaveda, with but few exceptions (above p. 5) rest on those of the Rigveda. The composer of the Chândogya-Upanishad (which belongs to the Sâmaveda) takes advantage of this circumstance, to show how, in the provinces of cosmology and psychology, certain phenomena rest on others, while on the contrary Brahman, which is symbolically represented as the man in the sun and the man in the eye, is raised above everything else, and free from all evil.

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As the Sâman rests on the Ric (so is explained Chând. 1, 6), so fire rests on earth, wind on atmosphere, the moon on the stars, on the clear light of the sun rests the black, very dark in it (which, according to the scholiast, is seen by looking very intently at the sun; possibly: the sun-spots are to be understood?). "But the golden man (purusha) who is seen in the interior of the sun with golden beard and golden hair, to the tips of his nails all golden,—his eyes are like the flowers of the Kapyâsa-lotus, his name is "high" (ud), for high above all evil is he; he raises himself high above all evil, who thus knows;—his songs (? geshnau) are Ric and Sâman, therefore [it is said] the high-song (ud-gîtha), therefore also the high-singer (ud-gâtar), for he is his singer; the worlds, which lie upwards from the [sun],—over these he rules, and over the wishes of the gods."

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What is here set forth in the province of cosmology (adhidaivatam), is then developed in that of psychology (adhyât-mam). As the Sâman rests on the Ric, so rests breath on speech, the image (âtman) on the eye, understanding on the ear, the black, very dark on the bright appearance in the eye. "But the man who is seen in the interior of the eye, “he is this Ṛic, this Sâman, this praise, this sacrificial sentence, “this prayer (*brahman*). The form which the former has, this “also has the latter, the songs of the former are his songs, “the name of the former is his name; the worlds which lie “beneath him,—over these he rules, and over the wishes of “men. Therefore those who sing here to the lute, sing him, “therefore good is their lot.”

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Here, explains Çaṅkara, we must by no means understand by the man in the sun and in the eye, an individual soul raised through knowledge and works (p. 130, 3), but Brahman; for when form and position are attributed to him (p. 130, 6. 9), and the boundaries of his might are spoken of (p. 130, 13), all this happens only for the sake of worship (p. 133, 10. 13. 15), since we are dealing here with the attribute-possessing Brahman, not with the attribute-free (p. 133, 7). Of Brahman alone it can be said that he is “high above all evil” (p. 131, 10), and that he, the all-animating, is indicated as the subject of spiritual as well as of secular songs (p. 132, 1. 8). For of him it is said in the Bhagavadgîtâ (10, 41):

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“All that has might and beauty, vital force,
“Know thou that of my power ’tis a part.”

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We must distinguish between this sun-purusha and the individual soul embodied in the sun (p. 134, 2; cf. above p. 66); for thus says the scripture: (Bṛih. 3, 7, 9) “He who, dwelling “in the sun, is different from the sun, whom the sun knows “not, whose body is the sun, who rules the sun within,—he is “thy soul, thine inner ruler, the immortal.”

7. Brahman as Free from Causality and Affliction

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Sûtram 3, 3, 35—36.

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Just as Kant declares theoretical speculation insufficient, and turns the human soul with its demands away from speculation back to the practical way, so already did Yâjñavalkya, in a highly remarkable passage in the Bṛihadâranyaka Upanishad 3, 4—5, the consideration of which we shall transfer from 3, 3, 35—36 into the present connection.

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(Bṛih. 3, 4:) “Then asked him Ushasta, the descendant of “Cakra. ‘Yâjñavalkya,’ said he, ‘the immanent, non-transcen- “dent Brahman, which as soul is innermost of all, that shalt “thou declare to me.’—‘It is thy soul, which is innermost of “all.’—‘Which, o Yâjñavalkya, is innermost of all?’—‘That “which inbreathes by inbreath that is thy soul, the inner“most of all, that which outbreathes by outbreath that is “thy soul, the innermost of all, that which interbreathes by “interbreath that is thy soul, the innermost of all, that which “upbreathes by upbreath that is thy soul, the innermost of “all,—this is thy soul, which is innermost of all.’—Then said “Ushasta, the descendant of Cakra: ‘It is only indicated by “this, as when one says: that is a cow, that is a horse; but “the immanent, non-transcendent Brahman, the soul, which is “innermost of all, that shalt thou declare to me!’—‘It is thy “soul which is innermost of all.’—‘Which, o Yâjñavalkya, is “innermost of all?’—‘Thou canst not see the seer of seeing, “nor canst thou hear the hearer of hearing, nor canst thou “understand the understander of understanding, nor canst “thou know the knower of knowing. He is thy soul, which “is innermost of all.—What is different from him is afflicted.’ “—Then Ushasta, the descendant of Cakra, was silent.”

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(Brih. 3, 5:) “Then asked him Kahola, the descendant of “Kushîtaka. ‘Yâjñavalkya,’ said he, ‘even that immanent, “non-transcendent Brahman, which as soul is innermost of “all, that shalt thou declare to me.’—‘It is thy soul which “is innermost of all.’—‘Which, o Yâjñavalkya, is innermost “of all.’—‘That which overcomes hunger and thirst, affliction “and madness, age and death.—Truly, after they have found “[Caṅk.: recognised] this soul, the Brahmans cease from long“ing after children, and longing after possession, and longing “after the world, and wander about as beggars. For the “longing after children is a longing after possessions, and “the longing after possessions is a longing after the world; “for both are mere longings.—Therefore after the Brahman “has put off his erudition, let him abide in childlike sim“plicity; and after he has put off both his learned and his “childlike estate, then he becomes a silent one (Muni); after “he has put off keeping silence and not keeping silence, then “he becomes a Brâhmaṇa.—By what does this Brâhmaṇa

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“live?—By whatever it may be, by that he lives.—Whatever
“is different from him is afflicted.’—Then Kahola, the descen-
“dant of Kushitaka, was silent.”

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Çañkara’s remarks on this passage are limited to showing that both extracts belong to the unity of the same Vidyâ (cf. above p. 99), which appears from the beginnings and endings containing the same words (p. 923, 14), from the use of the particle *eva* “even” (p. 923, 16) as introductory conjunction of the second piece, as also from the fact that in both cases the inner soul is treated of (p. 922, 7), as there are not two inner souls, but one (p. 922, 9). The repetition is due to the difference of the instruction (p. 923, 7): the first time the Âtman is depicted as lying beyond cause and effect (*kârya-kâraṇa-vyatirikta*), the second time as overcoming hunger and the other qualities of Samsâra (*aṣanâyâ-âdi-saṃsâra-dharma-atīta*) (p. 924, 2. 3).

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That the two extracts make up a harmonious whole is evident from their parallel construction; moreover a comparison of them may teach us whether, with our recollections of Kant, we have rightly hit the central thought. The Brahman, so teaches the first extract, is theoretically unknowable: for because, in all knowing, it is the knowing subject, it can never be an object of knowledge for us. To the mind which, not resting content with this, puts forward the same question anew, it is, in the second extract, pointed out that Brahman is to be grasped practically. This happens as one raises oneself step by step from the estate of erudition (*pâṇḍityam*) to that of childlike simplicity (*bâlyam*, cf. Matth. 18, 3), from this to the state of the Muni, from this to that of the Brâhmaṇa [in its emphatic meaning, as Bṛih. 3, 8, 10. Chând. 4, 1, 7], who renounces family, possessions and worldly pleasure, because these are different from the Brahman, and therefore subject to affliction.

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Touching the nature of the steps mentioned, and especially the meaning of Bâlyam one may compare the investigations in 3, 4, 47—50 (p. 1034—1041), from which we take only the following beautiful passage of Smṛiti (p. 1041, 8):

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“Whom no one knows as high nor lowly born, “No one as erudite nor yet not erudite, “No one as of good deeds nor evil deeds, “He is a Brâhmana, in very truth! “Given up to hidden duties well fulfilled, “In secrecy let all his life be spent; “As he were blind and deaf, of sense bereft, “Thus let the truly wise pass through the world.”

X. The Brahman as Cosmic Principle

1. The Brahman as Creator of the World

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THE creative activity of the Brahman is one of the fundamental ideas concerning it, which recurs in most of the Vedic texts to be considered. We here discuss only a few passages, which cannot conveniently be introduced elsewhere and refer for further information to the texts as well as to our cosmological section (chaps. XVI, XVII). The passages in question teach us to know the Brahman from two sides: (a) as that which conditions the spatial extension of beings (Brahman as *Âkâça*, that is, "Ether" or "Space" of which later),—(b) as that which fills and animates the spatially extended (Brahman as *Prâna*, that is, "Breath" or "Life").

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(a) The Brahman as *Âkâça*. Sûtram 1, 1, 22 and 1, 3, 41.

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1. In the Chândogya-Up. 1, 8—9 there is a dialogue between three men, in which is investigated the point of departure (*gati*), of the Sâman (song). The Sâman, so it is said in the course of the dialogue, goes back to the Tone, the Tone to Breath, Breath to Food, Food to Water, Water to the celestial world, which has, however, as its basis the terrestrial world. But the terrestrial world also is finite, and goes back to the Ether (or space).

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